Crisis Severity The severity score from 1 to 5 is based on 31 indicators aggregated into 3 pillars (impact, conditions, and complexity)4.70 Very lowVery high 5
Impact This measures the impact of the crisis itself, in terms of the scope of its geographical, and human effects.4.70 Very lowVery high 5
Humanitarian Conditions This measures the conditions and status of the people affected, including info about the distribution of severity.5.00 Very lowVery high 5
Complexity This measures the complexity of the crisis, in terms of factors that affect its mitigation or resolution.4.30 Very lowVery high 5
Access Constraints This measures the level of humanitarian access constraints.5.0No constraintsExtreme constraints
Conflict between the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG), with support from the Saudi-led coalition, and the de-facto authority (DFA) in the north of Yemen (also known as the Houthis) has been active since 2015. The conflict has resulted in a severe economic and humanitarian crisis that has displaced up to 4.5 million people and led to more than 21.6 million (over 80% of the total population) needing humanitarian assistance. Active conflict and economic hardship have also severely limited people’s access to services and aid. (Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023)
)Yemen has historically been divided based on different political, tribal, ethnic, and religious identities, but the current conflict has furthered this fragmentation into three main areas of control. As at September 2022, the Houthis controlled the majority of northern and central governorates, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council controlled part of southern Yemen (mainly Aden, Lahj, and Socotra), and the IRG controlled the remainder of southern and eastern governorates.
Active conflict between the Houthis and the IRG in late 2020 and early 2022 intensified in some areas, opening new frontlines along the borders of Al Jawf, Ma’rib, and Sana’a governorates. In Ad Dali', Al Bayda, Al Hodeidah, Sa'dah, and Ta'iz governorates, conflict has remained intermittent with no major changes since the signing of the Stockholm agreement in December 2018. The conflicting parties agreed to an UN-mediated truce on 2 April 2022, which expired on 2 October. The truce called for an end to all hostilities, the entry of fuel ships into the Al Hodeidah ports, the resumption of commercial flights from and to Sana'a airport, and the reopening of closed roads, including to Ta’iz. The truce was not extended because the parties to the conflict could not agree on some points. Civilian casualties have significantly decreased since the start of the ceasefire. (Global Centre for Responsibility accessed19.9.2022). (ACLED13.10.2022)
No significant recent humanitarian developments. This crisis is being monitored by our analysis team.
Despite a six-month truce from 2 April to 2 October 2022, armed conflict continued to obstruct humanitarian access in Yemen. Until early October, there was a moderate decrease in access events affecting aid workers’ safety and security. Regardless, violence against humanitarian personnel and assets remained a major concern. The abduction, detention, and carjacking of aid workers, often linked to the spread of anti-humanitarian social media campaigns and misinformation, continued to significantly affect humanitarian operations, including by temporarily suspending activities. Access constraints continue to impede the ability of humanitarians to reach people in need in a timely and principled manner. Bureaucratic constraints by the different authorities in Yemen, such as travel permit denials or delays and the cancellation of field missions, restrict the movement of humanitarian staff and supplies. The requirement for a Mahram (close male relative) to accompany female Yemeni aid workers on humanitarian programme visits and missions in areas under the control of the de-facto authority in the north of Yemen (also known as the Houthis), and recently in a few tribal-influenced governorates under the control of the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen, have resulted in the cancellation of programme visits and aid delivery. In the past six months, the different authorities have suspended and disrupted humanitarian activities, interfered in project design, and made requests for information and documentation from humanitarian staff and aid recipients. Interference with activities continues to be one of the most significant humanitarian access barriers for both humanitarians and people in need. Incidents related to mines or UXO also pose significant challenges, especially during the rainy seasons (normally in April–May and July–September). Past rains have moved mines, contaminating areas and roads used for transportation and humanitarian movements. Heavy rains and flooding in June–August that caused damage to infrastructure, such as roads, also limited access to affected areas.
For more information, you can consult our latest ACAPS Humanitarian Access Overview - December 2022
YEMEN ECONOMY TRACKING INITIATIVE
The Yemen Economic Tracking Initiative (YETI) dashboard and dataset track key economic trends, developments, and risks to support economic policymaking for Yemen.
YETI provides a greater overall and comparative understanding of the current political-economic situation in the country.
This new platform is divided in four modules:
- Imports and exports
- FX rate and commodity price
- Interactive monitoring timeline
- IPC food emergency analysis
WASH: Yemen is one of the world’s most water-stressed countries, estimated 15.4 million people will need humanitarian WASH assistance and services in 2023. It is estimated that about 6.9 million women, girls, boys and 1.4 million people with disabilities are in acute need of life-saving WASH support. The deteriorating socio-economic situation is making meeting basic WASH needs, increasingly challenging for vulnerable communities and households, while new displacements to urban areas have overstretched existing WASH service capacity. Districts around active frontlines have been facing acute WASH needs for years, where 5.1 million people (including 1.4 million displaced people are identified with WASH needs) currently have WASH needs. The current humanitarian WASH needs cannot be solely addressed by humanitarian stakeholders due to the limited water resource availability and the impact of climate change. Even though durable WASH support has reached 3 million people as of September 2022. (Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023)
Food security: Since the beginning of the conflict, the number of people in IPC Phase 3 and IPC Phase 4 has dramatically increased, with 17 million between October and December 2022, meanwhile in 2023 the number of people in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed) has dropped by 36 per cent, stood at 9 million. As the majority of Yemenis slip into IPC Phase 3 and above, their livelihoods have deteriorated and reliance on food assistance has increased. Any minor shock having direct impact on food consumption, such as reduced food assistance, import shocks or sharp rise in food price, is detrimental to most of the population. Of the Yemen’s 333 districts, 184 districts (55 per cent) are classified in IPC Phase 4 ( Emergency) and 140 districts (42 per cent) in IPC 3 (Crisis). Based on the 2023 UN validated population dataset, about 17.3 million people are estimated to suffer from high levels of AFI (IPC Phase 3 or above) in 2023 (Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023) .
Health: In 2023, the number of people requiring health assistance has decrease by 1.6 million compared to 2022. While the target for health assistance will be increase by 0.3 million as collapse of the health system, environmental degradation leading to food insecurity and weakened essential services have profoundly affected the health of host communities and nearly of 4.5 million displaced persons. In 2023, the number of people in need of health services remain nearly the same as 2022—20.3 million, including 12.9 million with acute need. Of the 333 districts, 226 (68 per cent) are with severe and extreme health needs (Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023).
YEMEN ANALYSIS HUB
The ACAPS Yemen Analysis Hub provides inter-sectoral, forward-looking analysis to support a stronger evidence base for humanitarian decision making in Yemen.
Learn more about the Yemen Analysis Hub.
If you are interested in the reports produced by the hub, please subscribe to the ACAPS Yemen mailing list.
Information Gaps and Needs
More granular information is required to better understand the causes and level of needs.
More research on specific needs of vulnerable and marginalised groups is needed to understand the severity of needs and coping mechanisms between different communities.
For more information read ACAPS Yemen Analysis Ecosystem report
Yemen is prone to natural disasters. Yemen has two rainy seasons: one from March–May and a second from July–August. The country is also vulnerable to tropical cyclones that last from March–October and come with a high threat of flooding in western and coastal areas. Flash floods resulting from heavy rains and cyclones cause displacement, severe damage to critical infrastructure, and casualties. Floodwaters and disruptions also contribute to the spread of communicable diseases.
By the end of August 2022, heavy rains in approximately 18 out of 22 governorates leading to flooding had affected more than 300,000 people. The most affected have been people living in IDP sites and settlements. Flooding has destroyed and damaged houses, farms, shops, and other means of livelihood, damaged critical infrastructure, and killed several people. According to reports, flooding has also moved unexploded ordnance towards residential and open areas, posing a serious threat to the safety of civilians. Yemen | Situation Reports (unocha.org); Updates (reliefweb.int) . (OCHA,5/9/2022)?
Yemen: Areas of control map and dataset
The ACAPS Yemen Analysis Hub produces a bi-weekly dataset providing an overview of the latest areas of control in Yemen, including a map, excel spreadsheet and GIS layer. All datasets are fully PCODED to Admin 2 district level, enabling interoperability with other datasets.
The datasets are published on HDX and can be found here.
Update from the February 2022 Risk Analysis
MEDIUM RISK LEVEL
The militarisation of Al Hodeidah and Saleef ports leads to targeted attacks on the ports, forcing their closure and causing food and fuel import disruptions
This risk remains active. Since the publication of this risk in March, accusations about the militarisation of Al Hodeidah and Saleef ports have subsided as the parties to the conflict agreed on a truce on 2 April 2022. This, however, expired without renewal on 2 October. On 1 September the Houthis organised a military parade in Al Hodeidah, which local and international stakehold - ers condemned as a breach of the 2018 Stockholm Agreement to demilitarise the port city?. A continued display of military force is likely to trigger further tensions that could lead to the materi - alisation of the newly identified risk about the collapse of the truce. Similarly, if the truce collapses or is not extended, further military presence could build up in Al Hodeidah, likely triggering a resumption of air strikes by the Saudi-led coalition and other military confrontations in the area. Fuel imports through Al Hodeidah are also likely to be disrupted again if the IRG imposes new restrictions in response to the militarisation of ports. Over - all, while the probability of a targeted attack on DFA-controlled Red Sea ports remains low, the risk remains relevant as its impact would have significant consequences on food and fuel supply flows, including for humanitarian purposes, resulting in increased acute humanitarian needs.
Read the February 2022 Risk Analysis here.