Crisis Severity The severity score from 1 to 5 is based on 31 indicators aggregated into 3 pillars (impact, conditions, and complexity)4.60 Very lowVery high 5
Impact This measures the impact of the crisis itself, in terms of the scope of its geographical, and human effects.4.10 Very lowVery high 5
Humanitarian Conditions This measures the conditions and status of the people affected, including info about the distribution of severity.5.00 Very lowVery high 5
Complexity This measures the complexity of the crisis, in terms of factors that affect its mitigation or resolution.4.20 Very lowVery high 5
Access Constraints This measures the level of humanitarian access constraints.5.0No constraintsExtreme constraints
Yemen: Bimonthly economic update
Ripple effects of the conflict in Ukraine: truths and myths
Humanitarian Access Overview 2022
Yemen: social impact monitoring July - September 2022
CrisisInSIght: Global Risk Analysis
Yemen: Fuel supply dynamics
Yemen: Global wheat supply dynamics and their impact
Conflict between the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG), with support from the Saudi-led coalition, and the de-facto authority (DFA) in the north of Yemen (also known as the Houthis) has been active since 2015. The conflict has resulted in a severe economic and humanitarian crisis that has displaced up to 4.3 million people and led more than 23.4 million (over 76% of the total population) needing humanitarian assistance. Active conflict and economic hardship have also severely limited people’s access to services and aid. (Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022)
Yemen has historically been divided based on different political, tribal, ethnic, and religious identities, but the current conflict has furthered this fragmentation into three main areas of control. As at September 2022, the Houthis controlled the majority of northern and central governorates, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council controlled part of southern Yemen (mainly Aden, Lahj, and Socotra), and the IRG controlled the remainder of southern and eastern governorates.
Active conflict between the Houthis and the IRG in late 2020 and early 2022 intensified in some areas, opening new frontlines along the borders of Al Jawf, Ma’rib, and Sana’a governorates. In Ad Dali', Al Bayda, Al Hodeidah, Sa'dah, and Ta'iz governorates, conflict has remained intermittent with no major changes since the signing of the Stockholm agreement in December 2018. The conflicting parties agreed to an UN-mediated truce on 2 April 2022, which expired on 2 October. The truce called for an end to all hostilities, the entry of fuel ships into the Al Hodeidah ports, the resumption of commercial flights from and to Sana'a airport, and the reopening of closed roads, including to Ta’iz. The truce was not extended because the parties to the conflict could not agree on some points. Civilian casualties have significantly decreased since the start of the ceasefire. (Global Centre for Responsibility accessed19.9.2022). (ACLED13.10.2022)
No significant recent humanitarian developments. This crisis is being monitored by our analysis team.
Despite a six-month truce from 2 April to 2 October 2022, armed conflict continued to obstruct humanitarian access in Yemen. Until early October, there was a moderate decrease in access events affecting aid workers’ safety and security. Regardless, violence against humanitarian personnel and assets remained a major concern. The abduction, detention, and carjacking of aid workers, often linked to the spread of anti-humanitarian social media campaigns and misinformation, continued to significantly affect humanitarian operations, including by temporarily suspending activities. Access constraints continue to impede the ability of humanitarians to reach people in need in a timely and principled manner. Bureaucratic constraints by the different authorities in Yemen, such as travel permit denials or delays and the cancellation of field missions, restrict the movement of humanitarian staff and supplies. The requirement for a Mahram (close male relative) to accompany female Yemeni aid workers on humanitarian programme visits and missions in areas under the control of the de-facto authority in the north of Yemen (also known as the Houthis), and recently in a few tribal-influenced governorates under the control of the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen, have resulted in the cancellation of programme visits and aid delivery. In the past six months, the different authorities have suspended and disrupted humanitarian activities, interfered in project design, and made requests for information and documentation from humanitarian staff and aid recipients. Interference with activities continues to be one of the most significant humanitarian access barriers for both humanitarians and people in need. Incidents related to mines or UXO also pose significant challenges, especially during the rainy seasons (normally in April–May and July–September). Past rains have moved mines, contaminating areas and roads used for transportation and humanitarian movements. Heavy rains and flooding in June–August that caused damage to infrastructure, such as roads, also limited access to affected areas.
For more information, you can consult our latest ACAPS Humanitarian Access Overview - December 2022
YEMEN ECONOMY TRACKING INITIATIVE
The Yemen Economic Tracking Initiative (YETI) dashboard and dataset track key economic trends, developments, and risks to support economic policymaking for Yemen.
YETI provides a greater overall and comparative understanding of the current political-economic situation in the country.
This new platform is divided in four modules:
- Imports and exports
- FX rate and commodity price
- Interactive monitoring timeline
- IPC food emergency analysis
WASH: Yemen is one of the world’s most water-stressed countries. Around 18 million people need safe drinking water and sanitation assistance, with 11.2 million being in acute need. WASH services continue to be severely lacking in the country. The nationwide Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment found that 19.5 million people (61% of the population) lack access to safe water and 11.4 million (36%) live with ?inadequate sanitation facilities. Reliefweb.int/HNO-2022 The lack of water contributes to a high prevalence of preventable waterborne diseases, such as cholera. IDPs, especially those living in informal settlements, have limited access to clean water and sanitation.
Food security: conflict and economic decline primarily cause food insecurity in Yemen. Livelihoods have been disrupted since the conflict began in 2015, reducing income opportunities and people’s ability to purchase food. Food insecurity is most severe in areas with active fighting, particularly affecting IDPs, socially and economically marginalised groups, fishing communities, and landless wage labourers. As at March 2022, 17.4 million people (54% of the population) were estimated to experience high acute food insecurity levels (IPC phase 3 or worse) in 2022, with the figure expected to rise to 19 million by the end of the year. Of this number, 31,000 people in three districts faced Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) food insecurity in January 2022, with the number expected to increase to 161,000 by June. (reliefweb. HNO-2022, IPC accessed 10/26/2022)
Health: access to healthcare is severely limited, with only 50% of health facilities fully functional throughout the country. A lack of salaries for heath personnel, damage to health facilities, difficulties importing medicine and medical supplies, and a lack of fuel to run facilities are some of the factors accelerating the decline of the already deteriorated healthcare system in Yemen. Private health facilities exist but remain out of reach for millions of vulnerable people who cannot afford the high costs.
Yemen has been identified as having a ‘very high risk' of infectious diseases affecting humanitarian needs, including COVID-19, cholera, and vector-borne diseases like malaria and dengue. 21.9 million people are expected to require assistance in accessing health services in 2022, a 9% increase from 2021. reliefweb HNO-2022
YEMEN ANALYSIS HUB
The ACAPS Yemen Analysis Hub provides inter-sectoral, forward-looking analysis to support a stronger evidence base for humanitarian decision making in Yemen.
Learn more about the Yemen Analysis Hub.
If you are interested in the reports produced by the hub, please subscribe to the ACAPS Yemen mailing list.
Information Gaps and Needs
More granular information is required to better understand the causes and level of needs.
More research on specific needs of vulnerable and marginalised groups is needed to understand the severity of needs and coping mechanisms between different communities.
Yemen is prone to natural disasters. Yemen has two rainy seasons: one from March–May and a second from July–August. The country is also vulnerable to tropical cyclones that last from March–October and come with a high threat of flooding in western and coastal areas. Flash floods resulting from heavy rains and cyclones cause displacement, severe damage to critical infrastructure, and casualties. Floodwaters and disruptions also contribute to the spread of communicable diseases.
By the end of August 2022, heavy rains in approximately 18 out of 22 governorates leading to flooding had affected more than 300,000 people. The most affected have been people living in IDP sites and settlements. Flooding has destroyed and damaged houses, farms, shops, and other means of livelihood, damaged critical infrastructure, and killed several people. According to reports, flooding has also moved unexploded ordnance towards residential and open areas, posing a serious threat to the safety of civilians. Yemen | Situation Reports (unocha.org); Updates (reliefweb.int) . (OCHA,5/9/2022)?
Yemen: Areas of control map and dataset
The ACAPS Yemen Analysis Hub produces a bi-weekly dataset providing an overview of the latest areas of control in Yemen, including a map, excel spreadsheet and GIS layer. All datasets are fully PCODED to Admin 2 district level, enabling interoperability with other datasets.
The datasets are published on HDX and can be found here.
Update from the February 2022 Risk Analysis
MEDIUM RISK LEVEL
The militarisation of Al Hodeidah and Saleef ports leads to targeted attacks on the ports, forcing their closure and causing food and fuel import disruptions
This risk remains active. Since the publication of this risk in March, accusations about the militarisation of Al Hodeidah and Saleef ports have subsided as the parties to the conflict agreed on a truce on 2 April 2022. This, however, expired without renewal on 2 October. On 1 September the Houthis organised a military parade in Al Hodeidah, which local and international stakehold - ers condemned as a breach of the 2018 Stockholm Agreement to demilitarise the port city?. A continued display of military force is likely to trigger further tensions that could lead to the materi - alisation of the newly identified risk about the collapse of the truce. Similarly, if the truce collapses or is not extended, further military presence could build up in Al Hodeidah, likely triggering a resumption of air strikes by the Saudi-led coalition and other military confrontations in the area. Fuel imports through Al Hodeidah are also likely to be disrupted again if the IRG imposes new restrictions in response to the militarisation of ports. Over - all, while the probability of a targeted attack on DFA-controlled Red Sea ports remains low, the risk remains relevant as its impact would have significant consequences on food and fuel supply flows, including for humanitarian purposes, resulting in increased acute humanitarian needs.
Read the February 2022 Risk Analysis here.