Yemen

WASH: Yemen is one of the world’s most water-stressed countries, estimated 15.4 million people will need humanitarian WASH assistance and services in 2023. It is estimated that about 6.9 million women, girls, boys and 1.4 million people with disabilities are in acute need of life-saving WASH support. The deteriorating socio-economic situation is making meeting basic WASH needs, increasingly challenging for vulnerable communities and households, while new displacements to urban areas have overstretched existing WASH service capacity. Districts around active frontlines have been facing acute WASH needs for years, where 5.1 million people (including 1.4 million displaced people are identified with WASH needs) currently have WASH needs. The current humanitarian WASH needs cannot be solely addressed by humanitarian stakeholders due to the limited water resource availability and the impact of climate change. Even though durable WASH support has reached 3 million people as of September 2022. (Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023)

Food security: Since the beginning of the conflict, the number of people in IPC Phase 3 and IPC Phase 4 has dramatically increased, with 17 million between October and December 2022, meanwhile in 2023 the number of people in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed) has dropped by 36 per cent, stood at 9 million. As the majority of Yemenis slip into IPC Phase 3 and above, their livelihoods have deteriorated and reliance on food assistance has increased. Any minor shock having direct impact on food consumption, such as reduced food assistance, import shocks or sharp rise in food price, is detrimental to most of the population. Of the Yemen’s 333 districts, 184 districts (55 per cent) are classified in IPC Phase 4 ( Emergency) and 140 districts (42 per cent) in IPC 3 (Crisis). Based on the 2023 UN validated population dataset, about 17.3 million people are estimated to suffer from high levels of AFI (IPC Phase 3 or above) in 2023 (Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023) .

Health: In 2023, the number of people requiring health assistance has decrease by 1.6 million compared to 2022. While the target for health assistance will be increase by 0.3 million as collapse of the health system, environmental degradation leading to food insecurity and weakened essential services have profoundly affected the health of host communities and nearly of 4.5 million displaced persons. In 2023, the number of people in need of health services remain nearly the same as 2022—20.3 million, including 12.9 million with acute need. Of the 333 districts, 226 (68 per cent) are with severe and extreme health needs  (Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023).

Yemen is prone to natural disasters. Yemen has two rainy seasons: one from March–May and a second from July–August. The country is also vulnerable to tropical cyclones that last from March–October and come with a high threat of flooding in western and coastal areas. Flash floods resulting from heavy rains and cyclones cause displacement, severe damage to critical infrastructure, and casualties. Floodwaters and disruptions also contribute to the spread of communicable diseases.

By the end of August 2022, heavy rains in approximately 18 out of 22 governorates leading to flooding had affected more than 300,000 people. The most affected have been people living in IDP sites and settlements. Flooding has destroyed and damaged houses, farms, shops, and other means of livelihood, damaged critical infrastructure, and killed several people. According to reports, flooding has also moved unexploded ordnance towards residential and open areas, posing a serious threat to the safety of civilians. Yemen | Situation Reports (unocha.org); Updates (reliefweb.int) . (OCHA,5/9/2022)?

MEDIUM RISK LEVEL

The militarisation of Al Hodeidah and Saleef ports leads to targeted attacks on the ports, forcing their closure and causing food and fuel import disruptions

This risk remains active. Since the publication of this risk in March, accusations about the militarisation of Al Hodeidah and Saleef ports have subsided as the parties to the conflict agreed on a truce on 2 April 2022. This, however, expired without renewal on 2 October. On 1 September the Houthis organised a military parade in Al Hodeidah, which local and international stakehold - ers condemned as a breach of the 2018 Stockholm Agreement to demilitarise the port city?. A continued display of military force is likely to trigger further tensions that could lead to the materi - alisation of the newly identified risk about the collapse of the truce. Similarly, if the truce collapses or is not extended, further military presence could build up in Al Hodeidah, likely triggering a resumption of air strikes by the Saudi-led coalition and other military confrontations in the area. Fuel imports through Al Hodeidah are also likely to be disrupted again if the IRG imposes new restrictions in response to the militarisation of ports. Over - all, while the probability of a targeted attack on DFA-controlled Red Sea ports remains low, the risk remains relevant as its impact would have significant consequences on food and fuel supply flows, including for humanitarian purposes, resulting in increased acute humanitarian needs.

Read the February 2022 Risk Analysis here.