YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT

KEY MESSAGES

- The Joint Monitoring Report (JMR) modeling, which uses data up to October 2024, raised 138 critical and 31 heightened risk alerts for exchange rate, displacement, and conflict. JMR modeling also indicates that 3.7 million people resided in areas at risk of deteriorating into Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse food insecurity conditions in October[1]

- In September 2024, according to the FAO High-Frequency Monitoring Snapshot and WFP Food Security Update, food insecurity in Yemen remained consistently high with over half of the population reporting inadequate food consumption. In September, 52% of Yemeni households were employing severe food-coping strategies (denoting a reduced Coping Strategies Index or rCSI of 19 or greater), with higher rates in AA-controlled areas (54%) than in GoY-controlled areas (49%). Common strategies included reducing meal portions, consuming cheaper foods, begging, and, in some cases, selling personal belongings. Overall, the use of coping strategies has remained more prevalent in AA-controlled areas.

- According to the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster population in need analysis, 17.1 million people in Yemen (49% of the population) will be in need of food assistance (severity levels three and above) during 2025, 12.4 million in AA-controlled governorates and 4.7 million in GoY-controlled areas. This marks a 2.8% decrease compared to the number of food insecure people according to the Humanitarian Response Plan 2024, when 17.6 million people were in need of food assistance.

- A correlation analysis between Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) platforms and Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) surveys highlighted Community Health and Nutrition Volunteers (CHNVs) data as a reliable alternative in AA regions due to house-to-house screenings. Proxy GAM trends in 2024 have been stable throughout the year and lower than the previous three years, except in Al Hodeidah governorate, where rates have been 4-5% above the national average.

- Yemen has been experiencing a severe outbreak of acute watery diarrhea and suspected cholera, with nearly 219,000 suspected cases reported between October 2023 and mid-October 2024 across all 22 governorates. Malnourished children are at heightened risk of contracting these diseases. A national cholera task force, co-chaired by Yemen's Ministry of Public Health and Population, has come together to coordinate the response.

- In October, the exchange rate indicator generated 136 critical risk alerts in GoY governorates. The monthly Yemeni rial average in GoY-controlled areas has continued to depreciate, falling to YER 1,927 to USD 1 this month, a 24% depreciation compared to the same period in 2023 and an all-time record-high monthly average. The depreciating exchange rate in GoY areas is primarily attributable to the dwindling availability of foreign currency reserves as a result of decreased crude oil exports and reduced remittance inflows, compounded by the AA authorities' decision to prohibit the sale of LPG produced in GoY-controlled Ma'rib governorate in their areas of control. In contrast, the exchange rate in AA-controlled governorates remained largely stable due to tight control by the authorities at YER 533 to USD 1.

- The IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) reported that 263 households experienced displacement in October based on data collected in GoY governorates only. The JMR model raised two critical and three heightened risk alerts for displacement in Al Mahwit, Lahj, Sana'a, and Ta'iz governorates. Overall, between 1 January and 31 October 2024, nearly 3,100 households were newly displaced in Yemen, mostly into or within Al Hodeidah, Ma'rib, and Ta'iz governorates.

- In October, the conflict indicator recorded 28 heightened risk alerts but no critical alerts. The combined forces of the GoY and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) clashed with AA forces across the governorates of Al Dali', Lahj, Shabwah, and Ta'iz. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) intensified its assaults on STC forces in Abyan governorate, causing multiple casualties. In Hays, Al Hodeidah governorate, and Arhab, Sana'a governorate, tribal conflicts and AA incursions led to further fatalities, underscoring escalating multifront tensions.

- JMR modeling raised no alerts related to fuel prices in October. Based on World Bank data, the average price of diesel, petrol, and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in GoY governorates increased by 2.4% this month compared

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1   Alerts and calculations regarding people living in areas at risk of deteriorating into IPC 4 or worse are based on statistically robust JMR quantitative indicators. Other factors relevant to food and nutrition insecurity are incorporated into other parts of this report but not included in JMR risk alert calculations because of technical considerations.

to August 2024 and by 8.9% compared to October 2023. In AA-controlled areas, the average price of diesel, petrol, and LPG only increased slightly by 0.7% between August–October and 0.6% year-on-year.

- The average price of the minimum food basket (MFB) in Yemen has continued to rise since January 2024, reaching its all-time highest value in October, though still below JMR alert thresholds. In GoY-controlled areas, the MFB reached YER 130,364 (USD 68) in October, 25% higher than the same month in 2023. In AA-controlled areas, the cost was YER 46,247 (USD 87), a 2% increase compared to the previous year.

- In October 2024, Yemen's food imports totaled 472,690MT, a 30% decrease compared to September 2024, but a 12% increase compared to August. September food imports via Red Sea ports were the highest ever recorded. On the other hand, food imports via GoY-controlled southern ports in October 2024 were 20% higher than in September but 32% lower than in August. Fuel imports decreased by 7% compared to September and by 31% compared to August. Fuel imports via southern ports reached their lowest level since May 2024, while imports through Red Sea ports increased by 50% compared to September and were at similar levels compared to August.

AGGREGATED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ALERTS AND RISK SEVERITY

This section summarizes the heightened and critical alerts recorded based on JMR key indicators of deteriorating food and nutrition security.[2] For a more detailed breakdown of indicator alerts by governorate and district, please refer to Annexes I and II.

In October 2024, the exchange rate indicator recorded 136 critical risk alerts for all GoY-controlled districts. Displacement also triggered two critical and three heightened risk alerts in four governorates – two each in GoY- and AA-controlled areas. Conflict raised 28 heightened risk alerts in ten governorates; 7 were in four governorates under AA control, while the remaining 21 occurred in six different governorates under GoY control. Please refer to Table 1 below for an overview of heightened and critical food and nutrition security risk alerts countrywide by indicator.

Table 1. Heightened and critical food security risk alerts countrywide by indicator in October 2024

INDICATOR	CRITICAL RISK ALERTS	HEIGHTENED RISK ALERTS	GOVERNORATE
Exchange rate	136	0	All GoY governorates
Displacement	2	3	Al Mahwit Lahj Sana'a Ta'iz
Conflict	0	28	Abyan Aden Al Dali' Al Mahwit Amran Ibb Lahj Sana'a Shabwah Ta'iz
Fuel prices	0	0	
Drought	0	0	

2   Critical alerts identify areas where a deterioration in food security is almost certain based on historical trends. Decision makers should consider these areas high priority. Heightened alerts identify areas where there is a high chance of deterioration in food and nutrition security and provide decision makers a good overview of current food and nutrition security trends countrywide.

INDICATOR	CRITICAL RISK ALERTS	HEIGHTENED RISK ALERTS	GOVERNORATE
Food prices	0	0	
Total	**138**	**31**	

JMR modelling shows that, in October 2024, there were 3.37 million people (nearly 10% of the population) residing in areas at risk of deteriorating into IPC 4 or worse food insecurity conditions. For a comprehensive historical overview of the population at risk of a decline in food and nutrition security (such as transitioning to IPC 4 or worse) from October 2014 to October 2024, please refer to Annex IV. [3]

SELECTED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ANALYSIS

This section offers context-specific details related to each crisis risk indicator, providing a more detailed analysis of the factors triggering risk alerts.

Exchange rate

In GoY-controlled areas, the monthly average exchange rate reached a new all-time record high at YER 1,927 to USD 1 in October 2024, peaking at YER 2,043 to USD 1 by the end of the month. This represents a 24% depreciation compared to October 2023 and a nearly 2% depreciation compared to August 2024 (Figure 1). The exchange rate depreciation led to the JMR raising 136 critical risk alerts for all GoY districts in October. In this month, the average exchange rate in AA-controlled areas stayed at YER 533 to USD 1 as in previous months.

The continued depreciation of the exchange rate in GoY-controlled areas is driven by a combination of factors that have severely constrained foreign currency reserves and weakened the broader economy. A major driver is the decline in crude oil exports, historically a primary source of foreign currency earnings for the GoY. This decline has been significantly worsened since November 2022, following a series of AA drone attacks on oil terminals in GoY-controlled ports. These attacks disrupted oil shipments, forced tankers to leave without loading exports, and cut off vital revenue streams, further exacerbating the government's inability to stabilize the economy. Compounding this is a decrease in remittance inflows, another vital source of foreign exchange, likely due to tighter regulations in remittance-sending countries.

At the same time, the May 2023 AA decision to prohibit within areas under their control the sale of LPG produced in Ma'rib governorate (which is under GoY control) has further limited the GoY's ability to generate revenue from local resources, aggravating its economic situation. The reduction in revenues has had severe implications for the delivery of essential services in GoY-controlled areas. One of the most significant impacts is the Government's inability to consistently pay public sector salaries, undermining livelihoods and diminishing the capacity of public institutions to support the population.

These economic challenges are reflected in the broader macroeconomic outlook. According to the World Bank, Yemen's gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to contract by 1% in 2024, following a 2% contraction in 2023 and a modest 1.5% growth in 2022. Between 2015 and 2023, Yemen experienced a 54% decline in real GDP per capita, leaving most Yemenis in poverty. This prolonged economic contraction compounds the depreciation's effects, as it limits the government's fiscal space to implement stabilizing measures or invest in economic recovery.

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3   The JMR calculates the probability of food and nutrition insecurity across different districts using a statistical model known as the generalized linear model. This involves analysis of various risk alerts and their predictive significance in estimating a potential decline in food and nutrition security. A confidence score determines the likelihood of such deterioration, multiplied by the population of the district, to project the anticipated number of people residing in areas vulnerable to a deterioration in food and nutrition security (e.g. transitioning to IPC 4 or worse). It is essential to understand that this process involves prediction (forecasting) and to clarify that the JMR does not formally classify IPC phases for districts.

Figure 1. YER-USD exchange rate in Aden (GoY) and Sana'a (AA) from October 2023 to October 2024

Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 10/11/2024)

Displacement

In October 2024, the JMR raised two critical risk alerts for displacement, one in Al Rujum district (Al Mahwit governorate) and one in Al Musaymir district (Lahj governorate), plus three heightened risk alerts: one in At Tahrir district (Sana'a governorate) and two in Ta'iz governorate, in Al Misrakh and As Silw districts, based on IOM DTM data. The critical alert in Al Mahwit governorate resulted from the displacement of six households from Ar Rajum district to Raghwan district in Ma'rib governorate. The other critical alert in Lahj governorate occurred in Al Musaymir district after the displacement of 265 households in September, all because of conflict. Of these, 227 households were displaced within the same district of Al Musaymir, while 28 households came from Mawiyah district in Ta'iz governorate. The heightened risk alert in Al Tahrir district in Sana'a governorate in October was a result of the displacement of six households in August that also raised a critical alert that month. In Ta'iz governorate, the heightened risk alerts raised in Al Misrakh resulted from the economy-driven displacement of six households to Ma'rib governorate in October. In the same month, three households were also displaced to Al Misrakh from Ta'iz and Al Hodeidah governorates because of conflict. Finally, the displacement of nine households from Al Silw district in Ta'iz governorate raised the heightened risk alert recorded in the district in October. Of these nine households, eight were displaced within the same district for economic reasons, while one household was displaced to Al Misrakh (also in Ta'iz governorate), citing conflict.

Over the entire month, 263 households faced displacement, including 137 in Ma'rib, 77 in Al Hodeidah, 46 in Ta'iz, and 3 in Al Dali'. Between 1 January and 31 October, nearly 3,100 households experienced displacement at least once. Out of the total number of households displaced, 52% reported conflict as the main driver of displacement, while the rest (48%) cited economic reasons. Out of all the households that experienced displacement in October, 46% reported needing food assistance, 26% needing financial support, and 24% needing shelter. Although the IOM DTM collects data exclusively in GoY-controlled governorates, alerts were also raised in AA areas. This is because the JMR model accounts for displacement from a district, which is information IOM gathers upon arrival at the destination.

Conflict

In October 2024, the conflict indicator recorded 28 heightened risk alerts but no critical alerts. Alerts recorded in Abyan, Aden, Al Dali', Lahj, Shabwah, and Ta'iz governorates were all related to the following events that took place within the same or neighboring districts as per Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) from September–October.

Throughout September 2024, conflict intensified across multiple fronts in Yemen, with sustained clashes between AA fighters and joint GoY-STC units. In Al Dali' and Lahj governorates, GoY and STC forces repelled multiple AA offensives, inflicting significant AA-related casualties, especially on the Al Qurayn and Battar fronts. In Shabwah governorate, there was intense conflict in the Ghabar and Lajiya Mountains, with both sides sustaining considerable losses. Tribal tensions also erupted in Markhah Al Olya district, Shabwah governorate, over land disputes, resulting in fatalities. Abyan governorate faced heightened

AQAP attacks against STC positions, alongside road blockades resulting from significant protests from members of a tribe over the abduction of one of their colonels. GoY forces continued their counterattacks on AA positions in Ta'iz governorate. Overall, September saw persistent intensified territorial control efforts by GoY and southern forces.

In October 2024, violent clashes and attacks also occurred across multiple fronts. In Lahj governorate's Al Qurayn area, STC forces countered multiple AA offensives, inflicting significant AA casualties. In Shabwah governorate's Bayhan and Ta'iz's Maqbanah areas, southern forces thwarted AA infiltration attempts. AQAP intensified its assaults on STC forces in Abyan governorate's Mudiyah district through ambushes, sniper fire, and the improvised explosive devices, resulting in multiple STC casualties. In Ma'rib governorate's Harib district, AA fighters suppressed an attempted defection of fighters to the Giants Brigades – a militia comprised of Salafist and tribal fighters from southern Yemeni governorates, established in 2018 with the support of the United Arab Emirates, that joined the GoY in their military efforts against AA – leading to intense clashes and an unspecified number of fatalities.

The conflict alerts that the JMR raised in the AA-controlled governorates of Al Mahwit, Amran, Ibb, and Sana'a in October resulted from the violent incidents that occurred across the districts of Hays (Al Hodeidah governorate) and Arhab (Sana'a governorate). On 19 October, the West Coast Joint Forces repelled an AA infiltration attempt east of Hays in Al Hodeidah, resulting in two fatalities among the West Coast Joint Forces and significant losses on the AA side. In Arhab district, tribal conflict between Bani Habar and Bani Buays militias intensified following the assassination of a Bani Habar tribesman with suspected ties to AA. The clash killed at least seven people, including an AA leader and multiple militants from both tribes, reflecting continued conflict and regional tensions.

Drought

There were no drought-related alerts in October, although the JMR model raised one critical and eight heightened risk alerts in September. Al Bayda governorate recorded five heightened alerts and one critical alert, and the remaining heightened alerts occurred in Ibb governorate (two alerts) and Hadramawt governorate (one). The alerts are mostly driven by a significant change in the amount of rainfall between August, when many areas in the country experienced high levels of rainfall, and September, when total rainfall amounts were lower.

Despite the alerts, the Agricultural Stress Index (ASI), a tool used to quickly identify agricultural areas likely experiencing water stress, such as drought, for September and October does not show any impact on cropped land.

Map 1. Agricultural Stress Index estimates for September–October 2024


Source: FAO (accessed 12/11/2024)

Food prices

The average MFB[4] price in GoY areas increased in October, reaching the highest value ever recorded in Yemeni rial at YER 130,364 (USD 68), 1.5% higher than in August and 25% higher compared to October 2023. This increase, largely owing to currency depreciation in GoY areas as well as global price increases for wheat, sugar, and vegetable oil, did not surpass the heightened or critical risk alert threshold. In AA-controlled areas, the MFB cost increased slightly by 0.8% in October 2024 compared to August and was 2% higher than in October 2023 at YER 46,247 (USD 86). Price caps regulate food prices in AA areas, where they make only minor increases despite higher global prices. The main difference in the MFB price in the two areas of control is the diverging exchange rate for the currency used in each area.

In October 2024, the FAO Cereal Price Index increased to its highest level since April 2023 – owing to weather-related hikes in wheat prices, Russia's unofficial price floor, and Black Sea tensions – while rice prices declined as India lifted export restrictions. The Vegetable Oil Price Index rose to a two-year high, with supply concerns and strong demand leading to price increases in palm, soy, sunflower, and rapeseed oils. Despite improved weather and harvests in some regions, the Sugar Price Index increased for the second month, influenced by concerns over Brazil's production and higher crude oil prices.

Figure 2. MFB price in GoY and AA areas in YER and USD between October 2023 and October 2024

Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 10/11/2024)

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4   The MFB composition calculated in the JMR model comprises: 10KG beans, 8L vegetable oil, 1KG salt, 2.5KG sugar, and 75KG wheat flour for an estimated household size of seven people.

Fuel prices

In October, there were no alerts for fuel prices. Based on data from the World Bank, the average price of diesel, petrol, and LPG in GoY governorates only increased by 2.35% compared to August 2024 and by 8.85% compared to October 2023. In AA-controlled areas, the average price of diesel, petrol, and LPG slightly increased by 0.7% between August–October and 0.6% year-on-year.

Figure 3. Diesel, gas, and petrol prices in GoY and AA areas between October 2023 and October 2024

Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 10/11/2024)

OTHER INDICATORS

This section covers additional contextual information on pertinent food and nutrition security indicators in Yemen.

Cholera outbreak

Yemen has been grappling with a cholera outbreak since October 2023, with the Ministry of Public Health and Population reporting around 219,000 suspected cases by mid-October 2024 across all 22 governorates. The outbreak has most severely affected young children, older people, malnourished individuals, and those with chronic health issues. Children under five make up 16% of cases and 18% of fatalities, while those over 60 account for 36% of cholera-related deaths. Water and food contamination drive the outbreak, with especially high caseloads in Al Baydah, Al Dali', Al Hodeidah, and Hajjah governorates.

UN agencies and affiliated organizations, in coordination with regional authorities, launched the multisectoral cholera response plan in April 2024. This plan requires USD 28 million in funding and emphasizes WASH interventions along with risk communication and community engagement. By mid-September, the response had mobilized 78% of the necessary funding, enabling health and hygiene support for over two million people. Key response actions included the establishment of 68 diarrhea treatment centers (DTCs) and 365 oral rehydration corners (ORCs) to effectively treat and manage cases; scaling up WASH efforts in 135 districts and 118 IDP sites through 31 WASH responders; providing water supply, hygiene support, and emergency sanitation; and an oral cholera vaccine campaign targeting 3.8 million doses in the southern governorates' highest-risk areas.

Despite progress, a funding shortfall has constrained the response capacity. By August, reduced funding had forced the closure of six DTCs and 62 ORCs, with a projected 80% of DTCs expected to close by December if funding does not increase.

Food imports

In October, total food imports to Yemen amounted to 472,690MT, marking a 30% decrease compared to September but a 12% increase compared to August and being nearly 29% lower than in October 2023.[5] Based on available import data, September saw the highest levels of food imports through Red Sea ports (under AA control) since 2017 with 590,880MT of food imported, 42% above the 12-month moving average. The high levels of food imports through Red Sea ports from September–October came after three consecutive months (June–August) of decreasing food import volumes, which had raised concerns during the previous reporting period for the JMR of possible food shortages in AA-controlled areas if the amounts continued to decrease. On the other hand, food imports via southern ports (under GoY control) in October were 20% higher than in September but 32% lower than in August and 11% below the 12-month moving average.

Figure 4. Monthly food imports (by port) between October 2023 and October 2024

Source: ACAPS YETI (accessed 10/11/2024)

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5   For the September–October period, food imports included wheat (52%), sugar (17%), corn (11%), rice (9%), wheat flour (5%), soy (3%), and vegetable oil (3%) (ACAPS YETI accessed 10/11/2024).

Fuel imports

In October 2024, total fuel imports were 7% lower than September 2024, 31% lower than August, and 11% below the 12-month moving average. Notably, fuel imports via southern ports decreased following two months of above-average fuel imports, reaching the lowest level since May 2024 and 25% below the 12-month moving average. Fuel imports via Red Sea ports increased by 50% compared to September but were slightly lower compared to August and were 6% below the 12-month moving average for imports from Red Sea ports. After the attack on Al Hodeidah port in July, fuel imports were only conducted between August—October through Ras Issa port. After the Israeli attacks in July and September in retaliation to the drone attacks against Tel Aviv, concerns remain about fuel stock levels in AA areas because of damage to fuel storage infrastructure at both Al Hodeidah and Ras Issa ports. It is reported that Al Hodeidah port's fuel storage capacity might have dropped from 150,000 to 50,000MT.

Figure 5. Monthly fuel imports by port from October 2023 to October 2024

Source: ACAPS YETI (accessed 10/11/2024)

YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT
BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS   NOVEMBER 2024 - REPORT #6

FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY OUTCOMES

In Yemen, food consumption patterns vary between areas under AA control and those under GoY reflecting differences in food prices and coping strategies. In AA-controlled governorates, where food prices are more stable and generally lower due to greater regulation, households are more likely to adopt coping mechanisms that enable better food consumption. For instance, borrowing food is a more common strategy in these areas, as indicated by recent data from the reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI). Conversely, in GoY-controlled areas, households face higher essential food prices and demonstrate a relatively lower reliance on coping strategies, which may contribute to more pronounced levels of inadequate food consumption.

Food Consumption Score

In September 2024, according to the FAO High-Frequency Monitoring Snapshot and WFP Food Security Update over half of the population in Yemen continued to report high levels of inadequate food consumption, with some improvement comparing to the previous three months thanks to seasonal cereal harvests, reduced flooding, and food assistance efforts. When comparing year-on-year, however, the prevalence of inadequate food consumption increased nationwide by 20%. In GoY-controlled areas, poor food consumption peaked in Abyan, Al Dali', Lahj, and Shabwah and it nearly doubled in Abyan and Hadramawt governorates. In AA-controlled areas, all governorates except Sana'a City exceeded the 'very high' level for poor food consumption. Peaks occurred in Al Bayda, Al Hodeidah, and Al Jawf governorates, where poor food consumption nearly doubled year-on-year.

Reduced Coping Strategies Index

In September 2024, over half of the households surveyed by the WFP (52%) employed food-coping strategies with severely negative outcomes consistent with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse (rCSI ≥ 19). This was more common in AA areas (54%) than in GoY areas (49%), with the highest rates reported in Al Jawf, Hajjah, and Sa'dah governorates. Nationally, the most frequently used coping mechanisms were reducing meal portion sizes and consuming cheaper or less preferred foods, reported by 77% and 71% of households, respectively.

Harsh living conditions and a lack of income-generating opportunities have driven many households to adopt crisis or emergency livelihood coping strategies to meet basic needs. These strategies were more prevalent in the north, affecting 79% of households compared to 75% in the south, according to the WFP. In AA areas, 6% of surveyed households resorted to begging, while 9% reported selling their homes to secure food. In GoY governorates, these figures stood at 4% and 7%, respectively.

Malnutrition

A correlation analysis was conducted between various Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) platforms and Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) surveys to identify alternative data sources, particularly in AA regions where SMART surveys are less frequent. The Community Health and Nutrition Volunteers (CHNVs) data showed a strong correlation with the SMART surveys conducted in the same locations and at similar times. This strong correlation is likely because CHNVs conduct house-to-house visits, screening all children aged 6-59 months regardless of their nutritional status, and refer malnourished children to health facilities. MUAC data collected by CHNVs proved valuable for trend analysis in the absence of SMART surveys. The trend analysis indicated that the proxy Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate has remained relatively stable throughout 2024 and lower compared to the previous three years.

Further disaggregation of the data reveals an increasing trend in the proxy GAM rate in Al Hodeidah governorate. This trend is supported by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) findings from June 2024. The proxy GAM rates for September and October 2024 stands at 14.7% and 13.4%, respectively which is 4-5% above the national average prevalence in 2024.

Figure 6. Proxy GAM trends using CHNVs screening

Source: UNICEF (accessed 26/11/2024)

OUTLOOK

Food security

According to the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster population in need analysis, 17.1 million people (representing 49% of the population) in Yemen are expected to be in need of humanitarian assistance (severity levels three and above) during 2025, of whom 22% are women, 55% are children, and 15% are people with disabilities. Among these individuals, 5.1 million are projected to experience critical levels of acute food insecurity (Severity level 4) in 2025. Out of the total, 12.4 million people are in AA-controlled governorates and 4.7 million people in GoY-controlled areas. This marks a 2.8% decrease compared to 2024, when the number of people in need of food assistance as reported in the Humanitarian Response Plan, was 17.6 million, of whom 17% were women, 37% million were children, and 15% were people with disabilities.[6]

FEWS NET reported that the beginning of the main cereal harvest in October offered a seasonal increase in food availability and income. Severe flooding in Al Hodeidah and Hajjah governorates during Yemen's July–September rainy season, however, has affected crop yields and limited labor opportunities in the hardest-hit areas, with overall cereal production in 2024 estimated to be slightly below average. Following the unusually high rainfall in October 2024, a second generation of desert locust breeding is anticipated between October 2024 through March 2025.

Cholera outbreak

Humanitarian responders estimate that without intensified intervention, the current cholera outbreak could generate as many as 244,000 additional cases between October 2024 and March 2025. To manage this expected surge, an additional USD 20 million is urgently required. Continued spread is likely unless funding is secured to enhance DTC and ORC operations, strengthen WASH activities, and support sustained risk communication and community engagement efforts to improve public knowledge on prevention measures. Immediate, flexible funding is necessary to sustain health, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure and allow responders to address the cholera outbreak effectively.

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6   The figure of 17.6 million people was used as a placeholder for the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster Population in Need (PIN) in the 2024 HRP due to the lack of an updated IPC analysis in AA areas in 2023.

ANNEXES

Annex I. Number of JMR alerts by governorate in October 2024

Table 2 shows the number of JMR district alerts for each indicator by governorate.

Table 2. Number of JMR district alerts by governorate in October 2024

GOVERNORATE	EXCHANGE RATE		CONFLICT		FUEL PRICES		DISPLACEMENT		DROUGHT	FOOD PRICES
	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED		
Hadramawt	28									
Ta'iz	23			4				2		
Shabwah	17			2						
Lahj	15			7			1			
Ma'rib	14									
Abyan	11			2						
Al Dali'	9			3						
Al Maharah	9									
Aden	8			3						
Socotra	2									
Al Mahwit				1			1			
Amran				4						
Ibb				1						
Sana'a				1						
Sana'a City								1		
Al Bayda										
Al Hodeidah										
Al Jawf										
Dhamar										
Hajjah										
Raymah										
Sa'dah										
Total	**136**			**28**			**2**	**3**		

Annex II. JMR alerts by district in October 2024, districts at most risk of food and nutrition security deterioration

Table 3 shows JMR alerts by district. The districts with the highest alert level – three in this case – are included. The table highlights critical alerts (red), heightened alerts (yellow), and typical status (white) per food security risk indicator by district.

Table 3. JMR alerts by district with higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration

GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT	EXCHANGE RATE	CONFLICT	DISPLACEMENT	DROUGHT	FOOD PRICE	FUEL PRICE
Lahj	Al Musaymir	▓	▒	▓			
Abyan	Jayshan	▓	▒				
Abyan	Khanfar	▓	▒				
Aden	Al Burayqah	▓	▒				
Aden	Dar Sa'd	▓	▒				
Aden	Khur Maksar	▓	▒				
Al Dali'	Al Dali'	▓	▒				
Al Dali'	Al Husha	▓	▒				
Al Dali'	Jahaf	▓	▒				
Lahj	Al Hawtah	▓	▒				
Lahj	Al Malah	▓	▒				
Lahj	Al Qubaytah	▓	▒				
Lahj	Radfan	▓	▒				
Lahj	Tuban	▓	▒				
Lahj	Tur Al Bahah	▓	▒				
Shabwah	Al Sa'id	▓	▒				
Shabwah	Habban	▓	▒				
Ta'iz	Al Misrakh	▓	▒				
Ta'iz	Al Silw	▓	▒				
Ta'iz	Al Ta'iziyah	▓	▒				
Ta'iz	Dimnat Khadir	▓	▒				
Ta'iz	Hayfan	▓	▒				
Ta'iz	Sabir Al Mawadim	▓	▒				
Al Mahwit	Al Rujum			▓			

Annex III. JMR historical heightened and critical risk alerts (January 2014 to October 2024)

Figure 6 shows the historical breakdown of JMR food and nutrition security risk alerts by indicator for all districts. The graphs show the percentage of total possible heightened and critical risk alerts for all six food and nutrition security crisis risk indicators. The higher the score, the worse the deterioration in food and nutrition security.

Figure 6. Historical percentage of total JMR heightened and critical risk alerts (January 2014 to October 2024)

Annex IV. Historical overview of the population at risk of experiencing a deterioration in food and nutrition security into IPC 4 or worse (January 2014 to October 2024)

Figure 7 shows the population living in areas at risk of experiencing a deterioration in food security into IPC 4 or worse between January 2014 and October 2024.

Figure 7. Percentage of population living in areas at risk of experiencing a deterioration in food and nutrition security into IPC 4 or worse (January 2014 to October 2024)

Annex V. Sources and time frames of risk indicators, target variables, and food and nutrition outcome indicators

Table 4. Indicators' sources and time frames

	SOURCE	LINK	DATA FROM	DATA TO
Risk indicator				
Conflict	ACLED	https://acleddata.com/data/	01/01/2015	10/31/2024
Displacement	IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix	https://dtm.iom.int/yemen	01/01/2014	10/31/2024
Drought	FAO	Shared by FAO	01/01/1981	10/31/2024
Exchange rate	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6159	01/01/2009	10/31/2024
Food prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4508	01/01/2009	10/31/2024
Fuel prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6133	01/01/2009	10/31/2024
Target variable				
FEWS NET	World Bank	https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0064614	07/01/2009	02/01/2024
Food and nutrition outcome indicators				
FCS	FAO	Shared by FAO	01/01/2018	10/31/2024
rCSI	FAO	Shared by FAO	01/01/2018	10/31/2024
IPC	IPC	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/b70c2734-2339-4a4d-a69d-fa2bd3225156/resource/5e7ac2dd-84c1-4177-b009-0c47b1f20a9a/download/ipc_yem_area_wide.csv	12/01/2018	03/15/2023
GAM	UNICEF	Shared	01/01/2019	02/01/2024
MAM	UNICEF	Shared	01/01/2019	02/01/2024
SAM	UNICEF	Shared	01/01/2019	02/01/2024

ABOUT THIS REPORT

The JMR combines quantitative modeling and qualitative analysis to provide robust bimonthly food and nutrition security monitoring that identifies emerging food and nutrition security crisis risks. The report aims to complement IPC analyses and facilitate early recognition and coordinated responses to emerging major food and nutrition security crises among humanitarian and development stakeholders. The JMR is the product of a core development team comprising members from ACAPS, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and the World Bank.

A detailed explanation of the empirical foundation that the Yemen JMR uses is available in the World Bank's Policy Research Working Paper. Further nutrition analysis is planned for future iterations of the JMR.

DISCLAIMER

For questions or comments, please contact yahinfo@acaps.org.