KEY MESSAGES

- The Joint Monitoring Report (JMR) modeling, which uses data up to December 2024, raised 137 critical and 46 heightened risk alerts for exchange rate, drought, conflict, and displacement. JMR modeling also indicates that 3.3 million people resided in areas at risk of deteriorating into Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse levels of food insecurity in December 2024.¹
- In November–December 2024, according to both the FAO High-Frequency Monitoring Snapshot and WFP Food Security Update, food insecurity – as measured by inadequate food consumption – remained consistently high across the country. The decline in purchasing power, driven by the higher cost of the minimum food basket (MFB), is the main driver of continuing high levels of food insecurity. This is especially evident in Government of Yemen (GoY)-controlled areas, where MFB prices in December were 33% higher than the three-year average.
- In December 2024, the use of Crisis and Emergency livelihood coping strategies decreased slightly in both GoY and Ansar Allah (AA) areas compared to November, although such strategies were used by over half the population in both areas of control. Severe food-based coping increased in GoY areas, from 24.6 to 26.6% compared to November, and decreased in AA governorates from 33.4 to 31.7% in the same period. Households in AA-controlled areas relied on Crisis livelihood and severe food-based coping strategies more extensively than those in GoY areas: 60.7% compared to 56.1%, respectively, for Crisis livelihood coping strategies, and 31.7% in AA areas and 26.6% in GoY areas according to the Reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI ≥19).
- Food insecurity is expected to worsen between January–February 2025 as the lean season intensifies and food prices are expected to increase. A high risk of frost is forecast for Yemen's highlands, particularly in Sana'a and Dhamar, threatening agricultural livelihoods. Dry conditions will persist, aggravating water shortages and hampering crop growth while the likelihood of locust infestations remains minimal.

- According to the Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, 17.1 million people (49% of Yemen's population) will be in need of food and agriculture assistance (severity levels three and above²) during 2025, including 5.1 million people projected to face severity level four. Out of the total, 12.4 million people (73%) are in AA-controlled governorates and 4.7 million (27%) in GoYcontrolled areas.
- Proxy GAM trends in 2024, based on data from the Community Health and Nutrition Volunteers (CHNVs)³, were stable throughout the year and lower than the previous three years, except in Al Hodeidah governorate, where rates were 4–5% above the national average.
- Yemen has been experiencing a severe outbreak of acute watery diarrhea and suspected cholera, with nearly 256,000 suspected cases reported between mid-March-December 2024 across all 22 governorates. The country continues to bear the highest cholera burden globally. Malnourished children are at heightened risk of contracting these diseases. In December 2024, 33 districts reported a 100% response gap (no organization presence), 30 districts reported a 75% gap (one organization responding), and 20 districts reported a 50% gap (two organizations responding). The cholera response faces a USD 20 million funding gap.
- In December 2024, the JMR model raised 119 critical risk alerts resulting from the exchange rate depreciation in GoY areas. The monthly average exchange rate hit a record YER 2,047/USD 1 in November before further depreciating to YER 2,053/USD 1 in December, marking a 26% depreciation compared to December 2023 and over 50% depreciation since the truce was signed in April 2022. The depreciating exchange rate in GoY areas is primarily attributable to the dwindling availability of foreign currency reserves resulting from decreased crude oil exports and reduced remittance inflows, compounded by the AA decision to prohibit the sale of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) produced in GoYcontrolled Ma'rib governorate in AA areas. In contrast, the exchange rate in AA-controlled governorates remained largely stable at YER 531/USD 1 as a result of tight control by the authorities.





Alerts and calculations regarding people living in areas at risk of deteriorating into IPC 4 or worse are based on statistically robust JMR quantitative indicators. Other factors relevant to food and nutrition insecurity are incorporated into other parts of this report but not included in JMR risk alert calculations because of technical considerations.
While the severity levels for people in peed of food and arriculture assistance are comparable to IPC Phases, due to data collection processes limitations they have been

² While the severity levels for people in need of food and agriculture assistance are comparable to IPC Phases, due to data collection processes limitations they have been labelled as Population in Need Analysis using severity levels aligned with the terminology from the Global Food Security Cluster.

³ The Yemen nutrition information technical team conducted a correlation analysis between Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) platforms and Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) surveys and highlighted Community Health and Nutrition Volunteers (CHNVs) data as a reliable alternative for assessing Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) in AA-controlled regions as a result of house-to-house screenings.

- In December, the JMR recorded 20 critical drought risk alerts in 11 governorates, concentrated in Ad Dali', lbb, Lahj, Ma'rib, and Ta'iz. Despite this, the Agricultural Stress Index (ASI) for November–December 2024 showed no impact on cropped land, as many areas were off-season in this period.
- The IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) reported that, in November and December, 352 and 256 households faced displacement, respectively. The JMR model raised one critical and seven heightened risk alerts for displacement in Al Hodeidah, Al Mahwit, Amran, lbb, Lahj, and Raymah governorates. Overall, between January 1 and December 31, 2024, 3,668 households were newly displaced in Yemen, mostly into or within Al Hodeidah, Ma'rib, and Ta'iz governorates.
- In December 2024, the conflict indicator recorded 19 heightened risk alerts across several governorates. In Abyan's Mudiyah district, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) launched multiple offensives against Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. In Ta'iz, an AA drone strike killed eight civilians in Maqbanah district, followed by intense clashes. In Lahj's Al Musaymir district, STC forces repelled AA attacks, causing six fatalities among AA fighters. GoY-STC forces in Ad Dali' targeted advancing AA fighters with artillery strikes, resulting in three additional fatalities. In Sana'a City's As Safiyah district, AA security forces opened fire on migrants, killing three. Landmine explosions in Al Hodeidah's Al Khawkhah district also caused two civilian fatalities.
- The average price of the Minimum Food Basket (MFB) in Yemen has continued to rise since January 2024, reaching a new all-time highest value in November in GoY areas, peaking at YER 143,000 (USD 70) before falling 1.3% in December, but remained 25% higher year-on-year compared to December 2023 as a result of currency depreciation. In AA areas, prices remained stable at YER 45,118 (USD 84),⁴ 12% lower year-on-year, with price caps minimizing variations despite higher USD costs. The JMR model did not raise any alerts for food prices in December.

- JMR modeling raised no alerts related to fuel prices in December 2024 but recorded 17 heightened risk alerts in November. In November, fuel prices rose by 3–4% in GoY areas, driven by a 4.6% Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) price increase in Ta'iz and Al Hodeidah, but fell 2% in December. In AA-controlled areas, prices dropped 1.2% from October to December and declined 6% year-on-year, while GoY-controlled areas saw a 6% annual increase.
- In November and December 2024, total food imports to Yemen amounted to 1,161,000MT similar to total food imports in September–October.⁵ Food imports through Red Sea ports (under AA control) in November and December were 15% lower compared to September– October. The southern ports (under GoY control) saw the highest food import volumes in November since June 2020, at 243,540MT, 123% above the 12-month moving average, following two months of below-average food imports in September–October. The increase is likely driven by higher available storage capacity that usually affects import trends and dynamics. Moreover, the lower price of wheat grains in July and August may have encouraged traders to purchase larger volumes that were then delivered in November.
- On November 24, 2024, AA authorities banned wheat flour imports to support local milling industries. The policy, effective January 8, 2025, may lead to higher wheat grain imports for domestic processing. In 2024, flour imports totalled 181,000MT, compared to nearly 3 million MT of wheat grains. Major importers have milling capacity, and Red Sea ports can process 12,250 tons daily. While no immediate food security risks are expected, potential fuel shortages in AA areas could disrupt milling and raise flour costs. Monitoring global wheat prices, grain imports, and milling efficiency will be crucial.
- In November–December 2024, fuel imports through Red Sea ports were 59% and 13% above the 12-month moving average, respectively, and 71% higher compared to September–October, indicating alternative storage capacity despite reduced AI Hodeidah capacity. Conversely, southern ports saw a declining trend, with imports 70% and 42% below the 12-month average in November and December, despite a slight month-onmonth rise in December.

⁴ Both food and fuel prices for AA areas in November and December 2024 were taken from FAO Market Information System data, as there has been a lack of collected price information by the WFP in AA-controlled areas since May.

⁵ For the November–December period, food imports included wheat (63%), sugar (12%), rice (10%), corn (4%), wheat flour (4%), soy (3%), vegetable oil (2%), and beans (1%) (ACAPS YETI accessed 12/01/2025).

AGGREGATED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ALERTS AND RISK SEVERITY

This section summarizes the heightened and critical alerts recorded based on JMR key indicators of deteriorating food and nutrition security.⁶ For a more detailed breakdown of indicator alerts by governorate and district, please refer to Annex I and II.

In December 2024, the exchange rate indicator recorded 119 risk alerts, all for GoY-controlled districts.⁷ Drought also triggered a significant amount of risk alerts in 12 governorates across AA and GoY-controlled governorates. Displacement recorded one critical alert and seven heightened risk alerts in six governorates, all under AA control except one. Conflict raised 19 alerts in nine governorates, of which six are under GoY control and three under AA control. Please refer to Table 1 below for an overview of heightened and critical food and nutrition security risk alerts countrywide by indicator.

INDICATOR	CRITICAL RISK ALERTS	HEIGHTENED RISK ALERTS	GOVERNORATE
Exchange rate	119	0	All GoY governorates
Drought	17	20	<u>Abyan</u> , Ad Dali', Al Hodeidah, Al Maharah, <u>Hadramawt, Hajjah</u> , Ibb, Lahj, Ma'rib, Sana'a, <u>Shabwah</u> , Ta'iz
Displacement	1	7	Al Hodeidah, Al Mahwit, <u>Amran,</u> Ibb, Lahj, Raymah
Conflict	0	19	Abyan, Aden, Al Bayda, Dhamar, Hadramawt, Ibb, Lahj, Shabwah, Ta'iz
Fuel prices	0	0	
Food prices	0	0	
Total	137	46	

Table 1. Heightened and critical food security risk alerts countrywide by indicator in December 2024

Note: critical alerts recorded in underlined governorates.

JMR modeling shows that, in December 2024, there were 3.3 million people (nearly 10% of the population) residing in areas at risk of deteriorating into IPC 4 or above levels of food insecurity. For a comprehensive historical overview of the population at risk of a decline in food and nutrition security (such as transitioning to IPC 4 or above) from October 2014 to December 2024, please refer to Annex IV.⁸

⁶ Critical alerts identify areas where a deterioration in food security is almost certain based on historical trends. Decision makers should consider these areas high priority. Heightened alerts identify areas where there is a high chance of deterioration in food and nutrition security and provide decision makers a good overview of current food and nutrition security trends countrywide.

⁷ The total number of districts under GoY control has changed from 136–119 based on an updated areas of control map that operational partners shared with ACAPS.

⁸ The JMR calculates the probability of food and nutrition insecurity across different districts using a statistical model known as the generalized linear model. This involves analysis of various risk alerts and their predictive significance in estimating a potential decline in food and nutrition security. A confidence score determines the likelihood of such deterioration, multiplied by the population of the district, to project the anticipated number of people residing in areas vulnerable to a deterioration in food and nutrition security (e.g. transitioning to IPC 4 or worse). It is essential to understand that this process involves prediction (forecasting) and clarify that the JMR does not formally classify IPC phases for districts.

SELECTED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ANALYSIS

This section offers context-specific details related to each crisis risk indicator, providing a more detailed analysis of the factors triggering risk alerts.

Exchange rate

The monthly average exchange rate in GoY areas reached a new all-time record high of YER 2,053/USD 1 in December 2024, marking a 26% depreciation compared to December 2023 (Figure 1). The exchange rate depreciation led to the JMR raising 119 critical risk alerts for all GoY districts in December. During the same month, the average exchange rate in AA-controlled areas remained at similar levels, YER 531/USD 1, compared to the previous months. Despite the nearly fixed exchange rate by AA authorities, there remain concerns about liquidity and the status of foreign currency reserves in AA areas.

Continuing exchange rate depreciation in GoY-controlled areas is driven by a combination of factors that have severely constrained foreign currency reserves and weakened the broader economy. A major driver is the decline in crude oil exports, historically a primary source of GoY foreign currency earnings. This decline has significantly worsened since November 2022, following a series of AA drone attacks on oil terminals at GoY-controlled ports. These attacks disrupted oil shipments, forced tankers to leave without loading exports, and cut off vital revenue streams. Compounding this is a decrease in remittance inflows, another vital source of foreign exchange, likely as a result of tighter regulations in remittance-sending countries.

At the same time, the May 2023 AA decision to prohibit the sale of LPG produced in GoY-controlled Ma'rib governorate within AA-controlled areas has further limited the GoY's ability to generate revenue from local resources, aggravating its economic situation. The reduction in revenue has had severe implications for the delivery of essential services in GoY-controlled areas. One of the most significant impacts is the GoY's inability to consistently pay public sector salaries, undermining livelihoods and diminishing public institutions' capacity to support the population.



Figure 1. YER-USD exchange rate in Aden (GoY) and Sana'a (AA) from December 2023 to December 2024

Source: ACAPS using data from FAO (01/06/2025) and WB (accessed 01/12/2025)

Drought

In December 2024, the Standard Precipitation Index-based drought indicator flagged 20 critical risk alerts across 11 governorates in Yemen, signaling a deficit in expected precipitation. These alerts were predominantly concentrated in Ad Dali', Ibb, Lahj, Ma'rib, and Ta'iz, governorates already grappling with a limited availability of water resources and high agricultural dependency. This will intensify challenges for farming communities reliant on rain-fed agriculture.

Map 1. Monthly cumulative rainfall volumes (Top) and estimated precipitation anomaly (bottom) in December 2024⁹



Source: FAO (accessed 01/15/2025).

9 The estimated precipitation anomaly map illustrates the difference between the current rainfall volume and the long-term average levels. Warmer colors indicate regions with below-average rainfall, while cooler colors represent areas with above-average precipitation.

Despite the alerts, the ASI – a tool used to quickly identify agricultural areas likely experiencing water stress, such as drought – for November–December does not show any impact on cropped land, especially as many areas were off season during the monitored period. Consequently, the ASI's assessment did not capture the usual indicators of agricultural water stress, as fewer crops were exposed to potential water scarcity during this time, resulting in a lower likelihood of perceptible water stress on the land.





Source: FAO (accessed 01/15/2025)

Displacement

A total of 352 and 256 households faced displacement in November and December 2024, respectively. Of those, 37% reported being in need of food assistance, 30% in need of shelter, and 26% in need of financial support. Between January 1 and December 31, 2024, 3,668 households experienced displacement at least once, with the majority displaced within or to Ma'rib (45%), Al Hodeidah (24%), Ta'iz (21%), and Lahj (7%). Of the total number of households displaced, 61% reported conflict as the main driver, while 36% cited economic reasons.

The JMR recorded one critical risk alert for displacement in Al Ashah district in Amran in December, driven by the displacement of nine households in November, bringing the indicator above the critical threshold level. The nine households were all displaced to Ma'rib City and cited economic reasons for the move, according to IOM DTM data. The heightened risk alert in Al Jarrahi district in Al Hodeidah was driven by the displacement of 52 households in November and 29 households in December, nearly all as a result of conflict. In Ar Rujum district in Al Mahwit, the heightened risk alert was driven by the displacement of six households in October as a result of conflict (four) and economic reasons (two), bringing the indicator above the heightened risk threshold, which persisted in November and December. In November, five households were also displaced from Qaflat Odhar in Amran to Ma'rib City as a result of both conflict and economic reasons, raising one heightened alert in each month. The heightened alert in Al Musaymir district in Lahj was driven by the displacement of 231 households in September as a result of conflict, bringing the alert threshold above the critical level but then decreasing to remain above the heightened threshold level. Similarly, the last heightened alert was recorded in As Salafiyyah district in Raymah governorate because of the displacement of six households in November as a result of conflict (three) and economic reasons (three).

Although the IOM DTM collects data exclusively in GoY-controlled governorates, alerts were also raised in AA-controlled areas. This is because the JMR model accounts for displacement from a given district, which is information IOM gathers upon arrival at the destination.

Conflict

In December 2024, the conflict indicator recorded 19 heightened risk alerts but no critical alerts. Alerts recorded in Abyan, Aden, Al Bayda, Dhamar, Hadramawt, Ibb, Lahj, Shabwah, and Ta'iz governorates were all related to events that occurred within the same or neighboring districts, as per the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data from December.

In Abyan's Mudiyah district, AQAP militants intensified attacks against STC forces, launching offensives in areas such as Wadi Awmran and Imbaqirah. These clashes, marked by repeated assaults and counterattacks, resulted in losses on both sides, with AQAP suffering 11 fatalities and STC forces losing one soldier. The persistent violence underscored the continuing threat posed by AQAP in this region.

In Ta'iz governorate, AA forces carried out a deadly drone strike on Al Boumiya village in Maqbanah district, targeting a school and market area and killing eight civilians. This was followed by fierce clashes with Giants Brigades forces – a militia comprised of Salafist and tribal fighters from southern Yemeni governorates, established in 2018 with support from the United Arab Emirates, which joined the GoY in its military efforts against AA – in which AA fighters suffered heavy losses while attempting to push forward. The armed conflict in Ta'iz highlighted the continued volatility of this contested region, where both sides vie for control.

Further south in Lahj's Al Musaymir district, STC forces repelled multiple AA offensives on the Al Qurayn front. These engagements, which involved mortar exchange and ground assaults, inflicted three fatalities among AA forces. At the same time, in Ad Dali', GoY-STC joint forces launched artillery strikes against AA fighters preparing to advance on the Murays front, causing additional fatalities.

In Sana'a City's As Safiyah district, AA security forces opened fire on African migrants protesting their exploitation, killing three and injuring others. This incident highlighted the broader humanitarian toll of the conflict, extending beyond Yemeni combatants and civilians to migrant populations.

In Al Hodeidah, AA-planted landmines in Al Khawkhah continued to exact a heavy toll, with explosions killing two and injuring multiple civilians. These incidents emphasized the persistent danger posed by landmines, even in non-combat zones.

Food prices

The average MFB¹⁰ price in GoY-controlled areas in November 2024 reached its highest value ever recorded in Yemeni rial, YER 143,000 (USD 70), before decreasing 1.3% in December. On average, the MFB price in December 2024 was nearly 25% higher compared to December 2023. This increase, largely owing to currency depreciation in GoY areas, did not surpass the heightened or critical risk alert threshold. In AA-controlled areas, the MFB cost in December remained largely stable at YER 45,118 (USD 84), marking a 12% decrease compared to December 2023. Price caps regulate food prices in AA areas, resulting in only minor price variations, but the MFB cost in USD remains higher in AA areas than in GoY areas. The diverging exchange rate for the currency used in each area of control is the main reason for the MFB price difference between GoY and AA-controlled areas. This is especially evident in GoY-controlled areas, where MFB prices in December were 33% higher than the three-year average.



Figure 2. MFB price in GoY and AA-controlled areas in YER and USD between December 2023 and December

Source: ACAPS using data from FAO (01/06/2025) and WB (accessed 01/12/2025)

10 The MFB composition calculated in the JMR model comprises: 10kg beans, 8L vegetable oil, 1kg salt, 2.5kg sugar, and 75kg wheat flour for an estimated household size of seven people.

In December 2024, the FAO Food Price Index decreased by 0.5% from November, but was 6.7% higher than a year earlier and 20.7% below its March 2022 peak. Cereal and sugar prices declined, with sugar dropping for the second month as a result of increased production in Brazil and positive global supply prospects. The FAO Vegetable Oil Index saw a marginal decrease of 0.5% between November–December, but remained 33.5% higher than in 2023, driven by tight palm oil supplies in Southeast Asia and overall tightening global availability. Rice prices also reached a 16-year high, reflecting strong demand in Asia. Overall, the 2024 annual index recorded a 2.1% decline compared to 2023.

Fuel prices

In November 2024, the fuel prices indicator recorded 17 heightened risk alerts in Ta'iz and Al Hodeidah, but no alert was raised in December. Based on data from the World Bank, the average price of diesel, petrol, and LPG in GoY governorates increased by 3% between October–November. In Ta'iz and Al Hodeidah, the average price increased by 4% in the same period, primarily driven by a 4.6% increase in LPG prices in these two governorates. The average fuel price in GoY-controlled areas decreased in December by 2%, as compared to November, as a result of reduced LPG prices. In AA-controlled areas, the average price of diesel, petrol, and LPG – based on FAO data – decreased by 1.2% between October–December as a result of reduced gas prices. Year-on-year, average fuel prices in AA-controlled areas decreased by 6% in December and increased by 6% in GoY areas.





Source: ACAPS using data from FAO (01/06/2025) and WB (accessed 01/12/2025).

OTHER INDICATORS

This section covers additional contextual information on pertinent food and nutrition security indicators in Yemen.

Cholera outbreak

The Ministry of Public Health and Population reported that, from mid-March 2024 until the end of December, there were 256,000 suspected cases of acute watery diarrhea and cholera reported across Yemen's 22 governorates. The number of total cases per week started to decrease since the beginning of November, with the second week of December recording the lowest number of cases per week since the beginning of the outbreak in mid-March. The highest number of cases were reported in Al Hodeidah, Amran, Hajjah, and Ta'iz governorates. In December, 33 districts reported a 100% response gap (no organizational presence), 30 districts reported a 75% gap (one organization responding), and 20 districts reported a 50% gap (two organizations responding).

Yemen's cholera response faces a USD 20 million funding gap for the October 2024 to March 2025 period. Between March and November 2024, insufficient funds had already forced 47 diarrhea treatment centers and 234 oral rehydration centers to close; more closures are expected if funding gaps persist. There is a need for urgent, comprehensive interventions to address cholera, including coordination, surveillance, laboratory capacity, case management, WASH, community engagement, and oral cholera vaccinations, supported by timely and sufficient funding. Damaged water and sanitation infrastructure also requires rehabilitation in order to prevent the expansion of outbreaks.

Food imports

In November and December 2024, total food imports to Yemen amounted to 1,161,000MT similar to total food imports in September–October.¹¹ Food imports through Red Sea ports (under AA control) in November and December were 15% lower compared to September–October. The southern ports (under GoY control) saw the highest food import volumes in November since June 2020, at 243,540MT, 123% above the 12-month moving average, following two months of below-average food imports in September–October. The increase is likely driven by higher available storage capacity that usually affects imports trends and dynamics. Moreover, the lower price of wheat grains in July and August may have encouraged traders to purchase larger volumes that were then delivered in November. In December, food imports through southern ports were 28% below the 12-month moving average.



Figure 4. Monthly food imports by port between December 2023 and December 2024

Source: ACAPS YETI (accessed 12/01/2025).

¹¹ For the November–December period, food imports included wheat (63%), sugar (12%), rice (10%), corn (4%), wheat flour (4%), soy (3%), vegetable oil (2%), and beans (1%) (ACAPS YETI accessed 12/01/2025).

On November 24, 2024, AA authorities announced a ban on wheat flour imports through Red Sea ports, aiming to boost the domestic milling industry. This decision was implemented on January 8, 2025. It is likely that there will be increased wheat grains imports in the coming months from Russia and Australia, which will be processed in the country.¹² In 2024, wheat flour imports through Red Sea ports amounted to 181,000MT compared to nearly 3 million MT of wheat grains. According to ACAPS analysis, the biggest grain importers in Yemen have their own milling capacity. A milling assessment by the Logistics Cluster for Yemen shows that Red Sea ports have a milling capacity of 12,250 tons per day that can cover all imported wheat grains. According to WFP, recent policy change is not expected to pose an immediate risk to food security, provided grain imports remain stable. However, potential fuel shortages in AA areas, could disrupt milling operations and drive-up flour costs. Continuous monitoring of global wheat prices and wheat grains import to Yemen, as well as and milling efficiency will be essential in the coming months.

Fuel imports

In November–December 2024, fuel imports through Red Sea ports were 59% and 13% above the 12-month moving average, respectively, and 71% higher compared to September–October. This follows several months (from May to October) of slightly below average fuel imports through Red Sea ports. Since the attack on AI Hodeidah port in July 2024, fuel imports to AA-controlled areas have only been conducted through Ras Issa port. Despite reports that AI Hodeidah port's fuel storage capacity might have dropped from 150,000 to 50,000MT, increased fuel imports in November–December indicate that some alternative storage capacity is likely available.

On the other hand, fuel imports via southern ports in November–December decreased by 67% compared September–October, being 70% and 42% below the 12-month moving average in November and December respectively. The decrease comes after significantly higher fuel imports in August–September. This dynamic is also likely to be influenced by storage capacity and demand.



Figure 5. Monthly fuel imports by port from December 2023 to December 2024

Source: ACAPS YETI (accessed 12/01/2025)

¹² Based on ACAPS analysis of import data, wheat grains imported through Red Sea ports in 2024 came mostly from Russia, the US, and Australia. The US administration decision to re-start the process of designating AA as a 'Foreign Terrorist Organisation' (see section below) could negatively impact imports from the US.

FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY OUTCOMES

In Yemen, food consumption patterns vary between areas under AA and GoY control, reflecting differences in food prices and coping strategies. In AA-controlled governorates, greater regulation means food prices are more stable and generally lower, and households are more likely to adopt coping mechanisms that enable better food consumption. For instance, borrowing food is a more common strategy in these areas, as indicated by recent data from the rCSI. Conversely, in GoY-controlled areas, households face higher essential food prices and demonstrate relatively lower access to coping strategies, which may contribute to more pronounced levels of inadequate food consumption.

Food Consumption Score

In December 2024, according to the FAO High-Frequency Monitoring Snapshot, overall food insecurity remained high across the country as a result of persistently high food prices and declining household incomes. Rising MFB costs outpaced incomes, eroding purchasing power. Nearly 25% of households in GoY-controlled areas cited high food prices as a major shock, while reduced agricultural activities post-harvest and limited off-farm labor opportunities as a result of cold weather further decreased incomes. Overall, most households reported a decline in income as compared to both the previous month and the previous year, with AA-controlled areas experiencing disproportionately severe impacts compared to GoY areas. Still, inadequate food consumption was reported by 43% of the population in AA-controlled areas in December, a slight improvement compared to November, although higher than in September–October. In GoY-controlled areas, inadequate food consumption was reported by 52% of the population, similar to November but marginally higher compared to September–October. According to the WFP Food Security Update, which is based on data collected in December 2024, the prevalence of inadequate food consumption was reported at 63% in AA areas and 67% in GoY areas.¹³

Reduced Coping Strategies Index

In December 2024, the use of Crisis and Emergency livelihood coping strategies decreased in both GoY and AA-controlled areas compared to November, although such strategies were used by over half the population in both areas of control. Severe food-based coping strategies increased in GoY areas, from 24.6–26.6%, compared to November and decreased in AA-controlled governorates, from 33.4–31.7%, during the same period. Households in AA-controlled areas relied on livelihood and food-based coping strategies more extensively than those in GoY areas.

¹³ The difference between the FAO and WFP in the Food Consumption Score can sometimes be attributed to the sampling methodology and timing of data collection. FAO data is representative at the governorate level while WFP data is collected at the district level. FAO high-frequency monitoring data collection is based on computer-assisted telephone interviews using Random Digit Dialing (RDD). This method tends to find more respondents in populated areas, introducing urban and wealth biases. To address this, adjustments for rural-urban biases are made, and weights are applied during data analysis to correct regional stratification. The sample size, based on population across 22 governorates, is designed for 10% precision, 50% food insecurity prevalence, and a 95% confidence interval. Adjusting for urban biases, the total sample size is 2,500 households, averaging 112–113 per governorate. WFP remote monitoring combines RDD and a panel of 1.2 million phone numbers, collecting data from around 9,000 calls monthly. The sample is 30–50% RDD, with the rest from the panel, proportionate to those supported by the WFP and district populations. Monthly samples are representative at the governorate level and quarterly at the district/cluster level, with 32 surveys per district monthly and 95 quarterly. Overall, 241 districts and 36 clusters are monitored monthly.

Malnutrition

Nutrition partners conducted a correlation analysis of various MUAC platforms and SMART surveys to identify alternative data sources, particularly in AA-controlled regions where SMART surveys are less frequent. CHNVs data showed a strong correlation with the SMART surveys conducted in the same locations at similar times. This strong correlation is likely because CHNVs conduct house-to-house visits, screening all children aged 6–59 months regardless of nutritional status and referring malnourished children to health facilities. MUAC data collected by CHNVs proved valuable for trend analysis in the absence of SMART surveys. Trend analysis indicated that the proxy GAM rate remained relatively stable throughout 2024 and lower than in the previous three years.

Figure 6. Proxy GAM trends using CHNVs screening



Source: UNICEF (accessed 01/15/2025)

OUTLOOK

Agrometeorological forecast and food security

Food insecurity is expected to deteriorate further between January–March 2025 as the lean season intensifies. Without scaledup, targeted humanitarian assistance in the most at-risk areas, significant improvement remains unlikely.

According to the FAO agrometeorological bulletin, a high risk of frost is forecasted to significantly affect agricultural livelihoods across Yemen, particularly in the highlands, as nighttime temperatures are expected to drop below 0° C in mid-January. Dry conditions will persist, with minimal rainfall limited to coastal areas near the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea, aggravating water shortages and hampering vegetation growth in key agricultural regions. These conditions highlight the need for irrigation and water conservation to mitigate the impact on agropastoral communities.

The highlands, including Sana'a and Dhamar, face the greatest frost risk, with moderate threats in surrounding regions. Desert frost may occur in Hadramawt. Cold night temperatures threaten winter cereals, vegetables, and livestock, with cold stress reducing crop germination and forage availability.

Unfavorable weather conditions mean that desert locust activity remains minimal, although small-scale breeding could occur if conditions change. The FAO and partners recommend targeted interventions, such as improved early warning systems, frost protection techniques (such as cultivation of cold-resistant crops), soil conservation, and livestock support measures to safeguard agricultural productivity and enhance resilience.

According to the Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, 17.1 million people (49% of the population) in Yemen are expected to be in need of food and agriculture humanitarian assistance (severity levels three and above) during 2025, of whom 22% are women, 55% are children, and 15% are people with disabilities. Among these individuals, 5.1 million are projected to experience critical levels of acute food insecurity (severity level four) in 2025.

US executive order to re-designate AA as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)

On January 22, 2025, the US issued an executive order to begin the process of designating AA as a 'Foreign Terrorist Organization' (FTO). Citing AA's ties to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force and AA's history of attacks on US personnel and regional allies, civilian infrastructure, and global maritime trade, the order outlines a policy of eliminating AA's capabilities, depriving it of resources, and countering its threats to US interests and international stability. The order directs the Secretary of State, in consultation with other key institutions, to assess the designation and take necessary actions while also reviewing US aid-related operations in Yemen to ensure compliance.

While the intent is to address security threats and counter AA actions, designating the group as an FTO poses significant risks, particularly in Yemen, where AA controls the majority of the population and critical infrastructure. Such a designation would likely criminalize most interactions with AA, even routine transactions such as purchasing food, fuel, or paying salaries, could be interpreted as material support. Subsequent disruptions to supply chains and aid delivery is highly likely to result in inflated food prices and increased humanitarian needs in a country where 17.1 million people already face acute food insecurity.

The economic impact of an FTO designation could be severe, as financial institutions and businesses may withdraw from Yemen to avoid penalties, narrowing the flow of hard currency critical to importing essential goods such as food, fuel, and medicine. The complexities of waivers and exemptions, which often take time to implement and may not be broad enough to address Yemen's operating environment, mean that humanitarian aid would likely face delays and legal challenges.

The designation also risks undermining peace efforts, both formal and informal, by complicating negotiation channels, potentially resulting in the resumption of large-scale conflict. Unlike previous FTO designations, which targeted groups with smaller territorial control, this move would affect an area encompassing most of Yemen's population, largest seaport, and banking system. This unique context makes it nearly impossible to avoid humanitarian and economic harm, amplifying the potential risks of negative impacts on the population despite the designation's aim of countering AA threats.

ANNEXES

Annex I. Number of JMR alerts by governorate in December 2024

Table 2 shows the number of JMR district alerts for each indicator by governorate.Table 2. Number of JMR district alerts by governorate in December 2024

	EXCHANGE RATE		DROUGHT		CONFLICT		DISPLACEMENT		FOOD PRICES	FUEL PRICES
GOVERNORATE	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED		
Hadramawt	28		1			1				
Shabwah	17		9	1		4				
Lahj	15			4		2		1		
Ta'iz	15			2		1				
Abyan	11		2	1		6				
Aden	8					1				
Al Maharah	9			1						
Ad Dali'	6			2						
Ma'rib	6		2	2						
Hajjah			3	3						
Al Hodeidah	2			1				1		
Socotra	2									
Amran							1	2		
Al Mahwit								1		
lbb				1		1		1		
Sana'a				2						
Sana'a City										
Al Bayda						1				
Al Jawf										
Dhamar						2				
Raymah								1		
Sa'dah										
Total	119	0	17	20		19	1	7		

Annex II. JMR alerts by district in December 2024, districts at higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration

Table 3 shows JMR alerts by district. The districts with the highest alert level – four and five in this case – are included. The table highlights critical alerts (red), heightened alerts (yellow), and typical status (white) per food security risk indicator by district.

Table 3. JMR alerts by district with higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration

GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT	CONFLICT	DISPLACEMENT	DROUGHT	EXCHANGE RATE	FOOD PRICE	FUEL PRICE
Abyan	Al Mahfad						
Shabwah	As Sa'id						
Shabwah	Hatib						
Abyan	Jayshan						
Hadramawt	Al Abr						
Ma'rib	Ma'rib						
Ma'rib	Ma'rib City						
Shabwah	Ayn						
Shabwah	Bayhan						
Shabwah	Jardan						
Shabwah	Markhah Al Olya						
Shabwah	Markhah As Sufla						
Shabwah	Nisab						
Shabwah	Osaylan						
Lahj	Al Malah						
Shabwah	Habban						
Ta'iz	Dhubab						

Annex III. JMR historical heightened and critical risk alerts (December 2014 to December 2024)

Figure 6 shows the historical breakdown of JMR food and nutrition security risk alerts by indicator for all districts. The graphs show the percentage of total possible heightened and critical risk alerts for all six food and nutrition security crisis risk indicators. The higher the score, the worse the deterioration in food and nutrition security.





Annex IV. Historical overview of the population at risk of experiencing a deterioration in food and nutrition security into IPC 4 or above (December 2014 to December 2024)

Figure 7 shows the population living in areas at risk of experiencing a deterioration in food security into IPC 4 or above between December 2014 and December 2024.

Figure 7. Percentage of population living in areas at risk of experiencing a deterioration in food and nutrition security into IPC 4 or above (December 2014 to December 2024)



% of Population living in areas at risk of experiencing a deterioration into IPC Phase 4+

Annex V. Sources and timeframes of risk indicators, target variables, and food and nutrition outcome indicators

Table 4. Indicators' sources and time frames

	SOURCE	LINK	DATA FROM	DATA TO
Risk indicator				
Conflict	ACLED	https://acleddata.com/data/	01/01/2015	12/31/2024
Displacement	IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix	https://dtm.iom.int/yemen	01/01/2014	12/31/2024
Drought	FAO	Shared by FAO	01/01/1981	12/31/2024
Exchange rate	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6159	01/01/2009	12/31/2024
Exchange rate	FAO	Shared by FAO	07/31/2018	12/31/2024
Food prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4508	01/01/2009	12/31/2024
Food prices	FAO	Shared by FAO	01/01/2016	12/31/2024
Fuel prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6133	01/01/2009	12/31/2024
Fuel prices	FAO	Shared by FAO	01/01/2016	12/31/2024
Target variable				
FEWS NET	World Bank	https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0064614	07/01/2009	10/01/2024
Food and nutrition outcome indicators				
FCS	FAO	Shared by FAO	01/01/2018	10/31/2024
rCSI	FAO	Shared by FAO	01/01/2018	10/31/2024
IPC	IPC	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/b70c2734-2339-4a4d- a69d-fa2bd3225156/resource/5e7ac2dd-84c1-4177-b009- 0c47b1f20a9a/download/ipc_yem_area_wide.csv	12/01/2018	12/31/2024
GAM	UNICEF	Shared	01/01/2019	02/01/2024
MAM	UNICEF	Shared	01/01/2019	02/01/2024
SAM	UNICEF	Shared	01/01/2019	02/01/2024

ABOUT THIS REPORT

The JMR combines quantitative modeling and qualitative analysis to provide robust bimonthly food and nutrition security monitoring that identifies emerging food and nutrition security crisis risks. The report aims to complement IPC analyses and facilitate early recognition and coordinated responses to emerging major food and nutrition security crises among humanitarian and development stakeholders. The JMR is the product of a core development team comprising members from ACAPS, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and the World Bank.

A detailed explanation of the empirical foundation the Yemen JMR uses is available in the World Bank's Policy Research Working Paper. Further nutrition analysis is planned for future iterations of the JMR.

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