

YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT

BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS

APRIL 2025 - REPORT #8

KEY MESSAGES

- The Joint Monitoring Report (JMR) modeling raised 119 critical and 78 heightened risk alerts for conflict, displacement, drought, exchange rate, and fuel prices in February 2025. JMR modeling also indicates that up to 3.8 million people (11% of the population) resided in areas at risk of deteriorating into Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse food insecurity levels in the same month.¹
- In January, according to both the [FAO High-Frequency Monitoring Snapshot](#) and [WFP Food Security Update](#), food insecurity – as measured by inadequate food consumption – remained consistently high across the country. The primary drivers of continuing high levels of food insecurity include economic instability, high food prices in GoY areas, impacts of the lean season, limited livelihood opportunities, funding shortages causing humanitarian assistance gaps (particularly impacting AA areas), and limited conflict across frontlines. During this month, more Yemeni households relied on Crisis or Emergency livelihood coping strategies compared to December, including selling productive assets, withdrawing children from school, begging, etc. Food-based coping strategies declined slightly, suggesting some relief in food stress, but nearly half of households still used severe coping measures (denoting a reduced Coping Strategies Index or rCSI >=19).
- Yemen is expected to face [worsening drought conditions](#) in mid-March 2025, with minimal rainfall and rising temperatures aggravating water scarcity. While isolated showers may occur in the highlands, most regions will receive than 5 mm of rain, and desert areas will see virtually none. These dry conditions will reduce crop yields, accelerate soil degradation, and limit pasture regeneration, threatening both farming and livestock livelihoods.
- In January 2025, the JMR model raised 117 critical and two heightened risk alerts resulting from [exchange rate depreciation in areas under Government of Yemen \(GoY\) control](#). The monthly average exchange rate hit a new record high of YER 2,300 to USD 1 in February, marking a 28% depreciation compared to February 2024. The depreciating exchange rate in GoY areas is primarily attributable to the [dwindling availability of foreign currency reserves](#) resulting from halted crude oil exports and reduced remittance inflows, compounded by the Ansar Allah (AA) decision to [prohibit the sale of liquefied petroleum gas produced in GoY-controlled Ma'rib governorate](#) in AA areas. In contrast, [the exchange rate in AA-controlled governorates](#) remained largely stable at YER 536 to USD 1 as a result of tight control by the authorities. Despite the nearly fixed exchange rate by AA authorities, there remain concerns about liquidity, the status of foreign currency reserves in AA areas, and disruptions in the international banking operation.
- In February 2025, 47 heightened fuel risk alerts were recorded in the GoY-controlled governorates of Al Dali', Al Hodeidah, Al Maharah, Lahj, and Ta'iz related to rising gas prices. Al Dali' saw the highest increase (65% year-on-year), followed by Al Hodeidah and Ta'iz (31% each), Lahj (24%), and Al Maharah (19%). The average fuel price declined in AA-controlled areas during the same period, with price caps minimizing variations despite higher US dollar costs.
- In February 2025, Yemen recorded 25 heightened [conflict risk alerts](#), primarily in Abyan, Aden, Al Bayda, Dhamar, Hadramawt, Ibb, Lahj, Shabwah, and Ta'iz governorates. These alerts were related to violence and other incidents in neighboring districts, such as tribal conflicts, targeted killings, and clashes between armed groups. In Al Quraishyah (Al Bayda), Al Masud tribesmen launched an attack on AA forces, resulting in an imprecise number of AA fatalities (coded as three) and the death of one tribesman. In Rada' (Al Bayda), violence and tribal disputes involved the shooting of a civilian, and tribal clashes resulted in one fatality. Additional violence in Rada' included the assassination of an AA commander. In Al Had (Lahj), unidentified gunmen killed two civilians on February 6. Five fatalities were reported from armed clashes over a land dispute in Ba'dan district (Ibb) on February 11, while in Al Makhadir (Ibb), on February 2, AA forces killed two Salafists, accusing them of terrorism, and tortured a qat vendor to death after they abducted him from a qat market in January, although the motive remains unclear.
- The [IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix](#) reports a total of 365 households newly displaced from January–February. The JMR model raised one critical and four heightened risk alerts for displacement in Al Bayda, Amran, and Sana'a governorates. Of the total number of households displaced from January–February, 55% reported conflict as the main driver, while the remaining 45% cited economic reasons.

¹ Alerts and calculations regarding people living in areas at risk of deteriorating into IPC 4 or worse are based on statistically robust JMR quantitative indicators. Other factors relevant to food and nutrition insecurity are incorporated into other parts of this report but not included in JMR risk alert calculations because of technical considerations.

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- In February, the JMR recorded one critical drought risk alert in Sharas district in Hajjah governorate, signaling lower precipitation compared to the same month in previous years. The [Agricultural Stress Index \(ASI\)](#) for January–February showed no impact on cropped land, as many areas were off-season during this period.
- The average [minimum food basket \(MFB\) price in GoY-controlled areas](#) has continued to increase steadily, reaching the highest value ever recorded in Yemeni rial – YER 144,000 (USD 64) – in February, a 27% increase year-on-year. This increase, largely owing to currency depreciation in GoY areas, did not surpass the heightened or critical risk alert threshold. In [AA-controlled areas](#), the MFB cost in February decreased by 11% compared to February 2024 at YER 46,000 (USD 85).
- In January–February 2025, Yemen's total [food imports](#) reached 1,268,000MT, a 9% increase from the previous two months. Imports through Red Sea ports remained stable at 825,000MT, while imports via southern ports rose by 32%. A ban on wheat flour imports through Red Sea ports, announced in November, has halted flour imports since December, while wheat grain imports remained steady – and grew slightly higher in February – compared to December and January. [Fuel imports](#) through Red Sea ports dropped by 27% but stayed within the average, while imports via southern ports increased by 32%, still below the 12-month average.
- Yemen has been experiencing a [severe outbreak](#) of acute watery diarrhea and suspected cholera since mid-March 2024. In January 2025, Yemen recorded [6,110 new cholera cases and four related deaths](#), with a case fatality rate of 0.1%. This marks a 42% decrease in cases and a 75% drop in deaths compared to December 2024. Despite the overall decline, the country continues to report over 1,000 cases weekly and it bears the highest cholera burden globally. Malnourished children are at heightened risk of contracting these diseases. Nearly half of Yemen's children under 5 suffer from [chronic malnutrition](#), with stagnant stunting rates and 17% facing severe wasting.

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AGGREGATED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ALERTS AND RISK SEVERITY

This section summarizes the heightened and critical alerts recorded based on JMR key indicators of deteriorating food and nutrition security.² For a more detailed breakdown of indicator alerts by governorate and district, please refer to Annexes I and II.

In February 2025, the exchange rate indicator recorded 119 risk alerts, all from GoY-controlled districts. Fuel prices triggered 47 heightened risk alerts in five GoY governorates. Conflict raised 25 alerts, 22 in AA-controlled areas and three in GoY-controlled Lahj governorate. Displacement recorded one critical and four heightened risk alerts in three governorates, all under AA control. Finally, one critical risk alert was raised for drought in a district in Hajjah governorate. Please refer to Table 1 below for an overview of heightened and critical food and nutrition security risk alerts countrywide by indicator.

Table 1. Heightened and critical food security risk alerts countrywide by indicator in February 2025

INDICATOR	CRITICAL RISK ALERTS	HEIGHTENED RISK ALERTS	GOVERNORATE
Exchange rate 	117	2	<u>All GoY governorates</u>
Fuel prices 	0	47	Al Dali' Al Hodeidah Al Maharah Lahj Ta'iz
Conflict 	0	25	<u>Al Bayda</u> Al Mahwit Amran Dhamar Hajjah Ibb Lahj Sana'a
Displacement 	1	4	Al Bayda Amran Sana'a
Drought 	1	0	Hajjah
Food prices 	0	0	
Total	119	78	

Note: underlined governorates recorded critical alerts.

JMR modeling shows that, in February 2025, there were 3.8 million people (11% of the population) residing in areas at risk of deteriorating into IPC 4 or worse food insecurity levels. For a comprehensive historical overview of the population at risk of a decline in food and nutrition security (such as transitioning to IPC 4 or worse) from October 2014 to February 2025, please refer to Annex IV.³

2 Critical alerts identify areas where a deterioration in food security is almost certain based on historical trends. Decision makers should consider these areas high-priority. Heightened alerts identify areas where there is a high chance of deterioration in food and nutrition security and provide decision makers a good overview of current food and nutrition security trends countrywide.

3 The JMR calculates the probability of food and nutrition insecurity across different districts using a statistical model known as a generalized linear model. This involves the analysis of various risk alerts and their predictive significance in estimating a potential decline in food and nutrition security. A confidence score determines the likelihood of such deterioration, multiplied by the population of the district, to project the anticipated number of people residing in areas vulnerable to a deterioration in food and nutrition security (e.g. transitioning to IPC 4 or worse). It is essential to understand that this process involves prediction (forecasting) and clarify that the JMR does not formally classify IPC phases for districts.

SELECTED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ANALYSIS


This section offers context-specific details related to each crisis risk indicator, providing a more detailed analysis of the factors triggering risk alerts.

Exchange rate

The monthly average exchange rate in GoY areas has continued to depreciate, reaching a new all-time record high of nearly YER 2,300 to USD 1 in February 2025, marking a 28% depreciation compared to February 2024 (Figure 1). Because of the exchange rate depreciation, the JMR raised 117 critical risk alerts for all GoY governorates in February, except Socotra, which recorded two heightened risk alerts. During the same month, the average exchange rate in AA-controlled areas decreased by 5% compared to February 2024, at around YER 536 to USD 1. Despite AA authorities creating a nearly fixed exchange rate, there remain concerns about liquidity and the status of foreign currency reserves in AA areas.

A combination of factors drives continuing exchange rate depreciation in GoY-controlled areas, severely constraining foreign currency reserves and weakening the broader economy. A major driver is the decline in crude oil exports, historically a primary source of GoY foreign currency earnings. This decline has significantly worsened since November 2022 following a series of AA drone attacks on oil terminals at GoY-controlled ports. These attacks disrupted oil shipments, forced tankers to leave without loading exports, cut off vital revenue streams and led to the YER in GoY area losing half of its value against the US dollar. It is estimated that the GoY lost around USD 6 billion in revenue.

Figure 1. YER-USD exchange rate in Aden (GoY) and Sana'a (AA) from February 2024 to February 2025



Sources: ACAPS using data from FAO (03/10/2025) and WB (accessed 03/08/2025)


At the same time, the May 2023 AA decision to prohibit the sale within AA-controlled areas of liquefied petroleum gas produced in GoY-controlled Ma'rib governorate has further limited the GoY's ability to generate revenue from local resources, aggravating its economic situation. The reduction in revenue has had severe implications for the delivery of essential services in GoY-controlled areas. One of the most significant impacts is the GoY's inability to consistently pay public sector salaries, undermining livelihoods and diminishing public institutions' capacity to support the population. Compounded by higher food prices, the resulting low purchasing power of people living in GoY areas makes it difficult to access basic needs, including food, with over half of the households in GoY areas consistently reporting inadequate food consumption in the last 12 months.

Fuel prices

In February 2025, the fuel prices indicator recorded 47 heightened risk alerts in the GoY-controlled governorates of Al Dali', Al Hodeidah, Al Maharah, Lahj, and Ta'iz, all related to a significant increase in the price of gas. Based on data from the [World Bank](#), the highest increase in gas prices was recorded in Al Dali', with a 65% increase year-on-year, followed by Al Hodeidah and Ta'iz with an increase of 31% in both governorate, then Lahj and Al Maharah, where the gas price increased by 24% and 19%, respectively. The gas price also increased in other GoY governorates but without reaching an alert threshold. On average in all GoY-controlled governorates, the prices of diesel, gas, and petrol increased by an average of 12%, 18%, and 6%, respectively, between February 2024 and February 2025. By comparison, during the same period in AA governorates, prices decreased by 11%, 9%, and 7%, respectively.

In January 2025, the fuel price indicator recorded only six heightened risk alerts, in Al Dali' governorate, also because of a year-on-year increase in prices, including a 53% increase for gas and 18% for diesel.

Figure 2. Diesel, gas, and petrol prices in GoY- and AA-controlled areas between February 2024 and February 2025



Sources: ACAPS using data from FAO (03/10/2025) and WB (accessed 03/08/2025)

Conflict

In February 2025, the conflict indicator recorded 25 heightened risk alerts but no critical alerts. Alerts recorded in districts in Abyan, Aden, Al Bayda, Dhamar, Hadramawt, Ibb, Lahj, Shabwah, and Ta'iz governorates were all related to events that occurred in neighboring districts, per the [Armed Conflict Location and Event Data](#) from February.

The number of heightened risk alerts in Al Bayda was driven by incidents in Al Quraishyah and Rada' districts (Al Bayda), Al Had district (Lahj), and Qa'tabah (Al Dali'). On February 8, 2025, AA forces converted the Technical Industrial Institute in Khubzah into a military base, prompting a tribal attack on February 9, which resulted in four fatalities. Rada' district saw a mix of AA-led violence, tribal disputes, and targeted killings. On February 8, AA fighters shot a civilian on a motorcycle who did not stop when AA members tried to pull him over. The AA members were searching for suspects in an incident of a person shooting in the air during a wedding. The civilian later died from his injuries. On February 10, clashes between Al Shahari and Al Haydi tribes resulted in one fatality. Other violent events include the targeted killing, for an unknown reason, by Bani Sabr tribesmen of a man in front of his shop on February 16 and the assassination of an AA commander on February 17, possibly related to internal power struggles. In Al Had, on February 6, unidentified gunmen killed two civilians in Bani Bakr by ramming their motorcycle with a car, although the motive remains unknown. Qa'tabah witnessed intense frontline clashes when AA forces attacked Southern

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Transitional Council positions, causing multiple casualties. On February 5, AA fighters clashed with GoY forces in Bab Ghaliq and Murays, with 11 fatalities reported. The incidents in Al Quraishyah and Rada' also raised alerts for districts in Sana'a and Dhamar.

The conflict alerts in Amran governorate were driven by incidents in Huth (Amran) and Mabyan (Hajjah), primarily involving tribal disputes and targeted killings by AA forces. In Huth, on February 2, 2025, Thu Muti tribesmen ambushed and killed two Dhu Fari tribesmen in an incident linked to a territorial dispute. In Mabyan, on February 19, AA forces ambushed and killed a tribal sheikh from Al Hamari tribe and his driver, but the motive was not reported.

Lahj governorate recorded heightened risk alerts in three districts in relation to incidents that occurred in Al Dali'. On February 19, Southern Transitional Council forces clashed with AA fighters in the Al Dali' area using medium and heavy weapons, resulting in at least ten AA fatalities.

Ibb governorate recorded heightened risk alerts because of violent incidents, including targeted killings and tribal conflict. In Al Makhadir, unidentified gunmen attacked a house, killing one person and injuring another in an act of tribal revenge. In the same district, AA forces killed two Salafists after accusing them of terrorism and tortured a qat vendor to death. In Ba'dan district, on February 11, armed clashes erupted between Bayt al Amari tribesmen over a land dispute, resulting in five casualties.

Displacement


A total of 183 and 182 households were newly displaced in January and February 2024, respectively. The majority were displaced to Al Hodeidah, Ma'rib, and Ta'iz governorates. Of those, 31% reported needing financial support, 31% were in need of shelter, and 30% were in need of food assistance. Of the total number of households displaced in January–February, 55% reported conflict as the main driver, while the remaining 45% cited economic reasons.

In February, the JMR recorded one critical and one heightened risk alert for displacement in Al Quraishyah and Rada' districts in Al Bayda governorate, driven by the conflict-related displacement of six and nine households, respectively, towards Ma'rib city. The two heightened risk alerts in Amran governorate were recorded in Al Ashah and Shaharah districts, driven by the displacement of nine and eight households, respectively, in November 2024. All 17 households were displaced to Ma'rib city; of these, 15 cited economic reasons and two cited conflict as the main reasons for displacement. The final heightened risk alert was recorded in Bani Hushaysh district in Sana'a governorate, from where five households were displaced to Ma'rib city in January, also because of conflict. Alerts were also raised in AA-controlled areas; even though the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix collects data exclusively in GoY-controlled governorates, the JMR model accounts for displacement from a given district, which is information IOM gathers upon arrival at the destination. Displacement within AA districts is not recorded by the IOM dataset.

Drought

In February 2025, the Standardized Precipitation Index-based drought indicator flagged one critical risk alert in Sharas district in Hajjah governorate, signaling lower precipitation compared to the average of the same month in previous years. The ASI, a remote sensing-based tool designed to rapidly detect water stress, such as drought, in agricultural areas, did not indicate any significant impact on cropped land for the January–February monitoring period. This is largely attributed to the seasonal cropping calendar, as many agricultural areas in the region were off-season during the monitoring time. As a result, the ASI did not register the typical indicators of agricultural water stress, such as vegetative decline or abnormal temperature-related stress, as fewer crops were actively growing, making them less susceptible to precipitation deficits. Consequently, while meteorological data indicated below-average rainfall, the limited presence of actively cultivated crops during the monitored period reduced the likelihood of detectable water stress on agricultural land.

Figure 3. ASI estimates for January–February 2025




Source: FAO (accessed 03/13/2025)

Food prices

The average MFB⁴ price in GoY-controlled areas has continued to increase steadily and in February reached the highest value ever recorded in Yemeni rial – YER 144,000 (USD 64) – marking a 27% increase year-on-year. This increase, largely owing to currency depreciation in GoY areas, did not surpass the heightened or critical risk alert threshold. In AA-controlled areas, the MFB cost in December decreased by 11% compared to December 2023 at YER 46,000 (USD 85). Price caps regulate food prices in AA areas, resulting in only minor price variations, but the MFB cost in US dollars remains higher in AA areas than in GoY areas. The diverging exchange rate for the currency used in each area of control is the main reason for the MFB price difference between GoY and AA-controlled areas and the main driver of higher MFB prices in GoY areas because of currency depreciation.

Figure 4. MFB price in GoY- and AA-controlled areas in YER and USD between February 2024 and February 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from FAO (03/10/2025) and WB (accessed 03/08/2025)

In February 2025, the FAO Global Food Price Index rose by 1.6% from January, reaching 127.1 points, driven by increases in sugar, dairy, and vegetable oil prices, while meat prices remained stable. The index was 8.2% higher than it was in the previous

⁴ The MFB composition calculated in the JMR model comprises 10kg beans, 8L vegetable oil, 1kg salt, 2.5kg sugar, and 75kg wheat flour for an estimated household size of seven people.

year but 20.7% below its March 2022 peak. The FAO Cereal Price Index saw a 0.7% rise, with wheat and maize prices increasing because of tight supplies in Argentina, Brazil, and Russia, while rice prices fell by 6.8% amid ample exportable supplies and weak demand. The FAO Vegetable Oil Index climbed by 2%, marking a 29.1% increase year-on-year, fueled by seasonal palm oil shortages in Southeast Asia and strong global demand for soy oil. The FAO Sugar Price Index jumped by 6.6%, reversing a three-month decline, as production concerns in India and Brazil tightened supply expectations.

OTHER INDICATORS

This section covers additional contextual information on pertinent food and nutrition security indicators in Yemen.

Cholera outbreak

The total number of suspected cases of acute watery diarrhea and cholera has been decreasing since early November 2024 following the beginning of the outbreak in mid-March 2024. In January 2025, Yemen recorded 6,110 new cholera cases and four related deaths, with a case fatality rate of 0.1%. This marks a 42% decrease in cases and a 75% drop in deaths compared to December 2024. Despite the overall decline, the country continues to report over 1,000 cases weekly. The highest numbers of cases overall have been reported in Al Hodeidah, Amran, Hajjah, and Ta'iz governorates.


At the Riyadh International Humanitarian Forum held on February 24–25, 2025, WHO and King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre finalized two agreements to support health interventions in Yemen, including USD 2.1 million to expand cholera response and control measures and improve access to treatment in high-risk areas.

At the end of December 2024, cholera interventions by the WASH Cluster were present in only 22 districts out of 333 in 8 governorates out of 22, delivered by five responders.

Food imports

In January and February 2025, cumulative food imports to Yemen amounted to 1,268,000MT, 9% higher compared to November and December 2024.⁵ Food imports through Red Sea ports (under AA control) in January and February were the same as the preceding two months at around 825,000MT. The southern ports (under GoY control) saw higher food import volumes in the first two months of 2025 compared to the previous two months by 32%. Food imports through southern ports in January were 145% above the 12-month moving average. The increase is likely related to the beginning of the month of Ramadan on March 1, 2025.

Figure 5. Monthly food imports by port between February 2024 and February 2025




Source: ACAPS (accessed 03/10/2025)

5 For the January–February period, food imports included wheat (63%), rice (13%), corn (12%), soya (5%), sugar (5%), and wheat flour (1%).

On November 24, 2024, AA authorities announced a [ban on wheat flour imports](#) through Red Sea ports, aiming to boost the domestic milling industry. This decision was implemented on January 8, 2025. No flour has been imported through Red Sea ports since December 2024. Wheat grain imports through Red Sea ports in February were largely in line with the monthly average. Wheat flour can still be imported through southern GoY-controlled ports.

Figure 6. Monthly wheat flour and wheat grain imports by port between February 2024 and February 2025



Source: ACAPS (accessed 03/10/2025)

A [milling assessment](#) by the Logistics Cluster for Yemen shows that Red Sea ports have a milling capacity of 12,250MT per day that can cover all imported wheat grains. The recent policy change is not expected to pose an immediate risk to food security, provided grain and fuel imports remain stable. Potential fuel shortages in AA areas, however, could disrupt milling operations and drive up flour costs. Continuous monitoring of global wheat prices and wheat grain imports to Yemen, as well as milling efficiency, will be essential in the coming months. The price of 1KG of [imported wheat grains](#) in AA areas decreased from YER 292 (USD 0.55) in November and December 2024 to YER 279 (USD 0.52) and YER 284 (USD 0.53) in January and February respectively. The grinding cost for 50KG of wheat grain also decreased from YER 1,623 (USD 3) in December 2024 to YER 1,484 (USD 2.77) in January and YER 1,394 (USD 2.6) in February 2025.

Fuel imports


In January and February 2025, [fuel imports](#) through Red Sea ports were 27% lower compared to November and December and 10% lower than the 12-month moving average, although it should be noted that fuel imports through Red Sea ports were above the monthly average from November–January, likely signaling higher stocks. Since the attack on Al Hodeidah port in July 2024, fuel imports to AA-controlled areas have only been conducted through Ras Issa port. On the other hand, fuel imports via southern ports in January and February were 32% higher compared to the previous two months while remaining below the 12-month moving average.

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Figure 6. Monthly fuel imports by port between February 2024 and February 2025



Source: ACAPS (accessed 03/10/2025)

FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY OUTCOMES

In Yemen, food consumption patterns vary between areas under AA or GoY control, reflecting differences in food prices and coping strategies. In AA-controlled governorates, greater regulation means food prices are more stable and generally lower in Yemeni rial values compared to GoY governorates, and households are more likely to adopt coping mechanisms that enable better food consumption. For instance, borrowing food is a more common strategy in these areas as indicated by data from the rCSI. Conversely, in GoY-controlled areas, households face higher essential food prices and demonstrate relatively lower availability or implementation of coping strategies, which may contribute to more pronounced levels of inadequate food consumption.

Food Consumption Score

Food insecurity in Yemen remained alarmingly high in both GoY and AA areas, with the [FAO](#) and [WFP](#) both reporting that a significant proportion of households struggled to meet their minimum food needs. All governorates in Yemen remained well above the crisis level threshold of 40% for inadequate food consumption and above the very high threshold of 20% for poor food consumption. The governorates most affected by food insecurity, based on at least three of five FAO indicators, include Al Hodeidah, Al Jawf, Amran, Hajjah, Lahj, Ma'rib, and Sana'a. The primary drivers of continuing high levels of food insecurity include economic instability, high food prices, loss of income, and humanitarian assistance gaps (particularly impacting AA areas). The FAO highlighted that loss of income and sickness were key shocks in AA areas, while in GoY areas, high food prices, sickness, and job losses were the main contributors. The WFP noted that limited income-generating activities, as well as localized conflict in Al Bayda and Al Jawf, further worsened food insecurity.⁶

Reduced Coping Strategies Index

The FAO reported that the share of households resorting to Crisis or Emergency livelihood coping strategies increased in January compared to the previous month. The emergency level indicates the use of strategies that cause irreversible or more dramatic impacts on future productivity. Households in Yemen increasingly relied on livelihood-based coping strategies, such as borrowing money and purchasing food on credit. Food-based coping strategies (rCSI) – such as reducing the number and portions of meals per day, relying on help from others to access food, or relying on less preferred and less expensive foods – saw a decline, indicating slight relief in food consumption stress. WFP data shows that nearly half of all households nationwide used severe food-based coping strategies, though this figure had declined over the past year.

Harvests in late 2024, peak fishing seasons for coastal communities, and stable food prices in AA areas helped mitigate worsening conditions, while the resumption of food assistance in targeted districts in AA governorates played a role in improving food consumption.

⁶ The difference between the FAO and WFP in the Food Consumption Score can sometimes be attributed to the sampling methodology and timing of data collection. FAO data is representative at the governorate level, while WFP data is collected at the district level. FAO high-frequency monitoring data collection is based on computer-assisted telephone interviews using random digit dialing (RDD). This method tends to find more respondents in populated areas, introducing urban and wealth biases. To address this, adjustments for rural-urban biases are made, and weights are applied during data analysis to correct regional stratification. The sample size, based on the population across 22 governorates, is designed for 10% precision, 50% food insecurity prevalence, and a 95% confidence interval. Adjusting for urban biases, the total sample size is 2,500 households, averaging 112–113 per governorate. WFP remote monitoring combines RDD and a panel of 1.2 million phone numbers, collecting data from around 9,000 calls monthly. The sample is 30–50% RDD, with the rest from the panel, proportionate to those supported by the WFP and district populations. Monthly samples are representative at the governorate level and quarterly at the district or cluster level, with 32 surveys per district monthly and 95 quarterly. Overall, 241 districts and 36 clusters are monitored monthly.

OUTLOOK

Agrometeorological forecast and food security

According to the [FAO agrometeorological bulletin](#), Yemen is set to experience minimal rainfall, rising temperatures, and worsening water stress conditions in mid-March 2025, heightening the risk of dry spells and reduced soil moisture levels. While isolated showers may occur in the highlands, most regions, including the Central Highlands, Southern Uplands, and coastal areas, are expected to receive less than 5mm of rain, with desert areas seeing virtually none. Daytime temperatures will rise, reaching 30–38° C in coastal and desert areas, while moderate winds and dust storms in northern Hadramawt could further affect air quality and visibility, though they are not expected to pose severe risks to agriculture.

These dry conditions will significantly affect agricultural livelihoods. In the upcoming cultivation season, increased water stress will most likely affect rain-fed crops such as sorghum and barley, potentially leading to lower yields and reduced income for farming households. A lack of moisture is anticipated to cause soil degradation, leading to erosion and nutrient depletion, further diminishing land productivity. Limited pasture regeneration will leave livestock herders struggling to feed their animals, increasing reliance on supplemental feed and alternative water sources.

The broader implications for food security include lower agricultural production, increased food prices, and a greater dependence on imports, disproportionately affecting households reliant on farming and herding. Dust storms may worsen respiratory illnesses and disrupt market access for agricultural goods in coastal and desert areas specifically. Humanitarian organizations should focus on repairing water infrastructure, promoting water conservation, and strengthening early warning systems to prepare communities for extreme weather events.

Conflict escalation

Between March 15–16, 2025, the [US launched a wave of air strikes](#) on AA-controlled governorates, with 31 reported fatalities and over 100 injuries. The strikes campaign came after AA vowed to resume attacks against Israeli and US ships in the Red Sea if the aid blockade on Gaza was not lifted. The situation is likely to escalate, with [AA declaring itself ready to respond](#) to the US attacks on Yemen. The US also called for Iran to halt support to AA in Yemen, although the commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps [Hossein Salami has stated that AA forces operate independently from Iran](#) and make their own strategic decisions.

Further air strikes and an overall deterioration of the security situation risk causing mass displacement in Yemen, as well as possible damage to civilian infrastructure including ports and storage facilities, can increase food prices, reduce food access, and increase food insecurity.

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ANNEXES

Annex I. Number of JMR alerts by governorate in February 2025

Table 2 shows the number of JMR district alerts for each indicator by governorate.

Table 2. Number of JMR district alerts by governorate in February 2025

GOVERNORATE	EXCHANGE RATE		FUEL PRICES		CONFLICT		DISPLACEMENT		DROUGHT	FOOD PRICES
	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	
Hadramawt	28									
Shabwah	17									
Lahj	15			15		3				
Ta'iz	15			15						
Abyan	11									
Al Maharah	9			9						
Aden	8									
Al Dali'	6			6						
Ma'rib	6									
Al Hodeidah	2			2						
Al Bayda						3	1	1		
Hajjah						1			1	
Ibb						5				
Dhamar						5				
Al Mahwit						4				
Amran						2		2		
Sana'a						2		1		
Socotra		2								
Sana'a City										
Al Jawf										
Raymah										
Sa'dah										
Total	117	2		47		25	1	4	1	

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Annex II. JMR alerts by district in February 2024, districts at higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration

Table 3 shows JMR alerts by district. The districts with the highest alert level – three and four in this case – are included. The table highlights critical alerts (red), heightened alerts (yellow), and typical status (white) per food security risk indicator by district.

Table 3. JMR alerts by district with higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration in February 2025

GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT	CONFLICT	DISPLACEMENT	DROUGHT	EXCHANGE RATE	FOOD PRICE	FUEL PRICE
Lahj	Al Maflahi						
Lahj	Habil Jabr						
Lahj	Yahr						
Al Dali'	Al Dali'						
Al Dali'	Al Azariq						
Al Dali'	Al Hasayn						
Al Dali'	Al Shu'ayb						
Al Dali'	Jahaf						
Al Dali'	Qa'tabah						
Al Hodeidah	Al Khukhah						
Al Hodeidah	Hays						
Al Maharah	Al Ghaydhah						
Al Maharah	Al Masilah						
Al Maharah	Haswin						
Al Maharah	Hat						
Al Maharah	Hawf						
Al Maharah	Man'ar						
Al Maharah	Qishn						
Al Maharah	Sayhut						
Al Maharah	Shahin						
Lahj	Al Had						
Lahj	Al Hawtah						
Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah						
Lahj	Al Malah						

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
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GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT	CONFLICT	DISPLACEMENT	DROUGHT	EXCHANGE RATE	FOOD PRICE	FUEL PRICE
Lahj	Al Maqatirah						
Lahj	Al Musaymir						
Lahj	Al Qubaytah						
Lahj	Halmin						
Lahj	Radfan						
Lahj	Tuban						
Lahj	Tur Al Bahah						
Lahj	Yafi'						
Ta'iz	Al Ma'afer						
Ta'iz	Al Makha						
Ta'iz	Al Mawasit						
Ta'iz	Al Misrakh						
Ta'iz	Al Mudhaffar						
Ta'iz	Al Qahirah						
Ta'iz	Al Wazi'yah						
Ta'iz	As Silw						
Ta'iz	Ash Shamayatayn						
Ta'iz	Dhubab						
Ta'iz	Jabal Habashi						
Ta'iz	Mashr'ah Wa Had-nan						
Ta'iz	Mawza'						
Ta'iz	Sabir Al Mawadim						
Ta'iz	Salah						

Annex III. JMR historical heightened and critical risk alerts (January 2014 to February 2025)

Figure 7 shows the historical breakdown of JMR food and nutrition security risk alerts by indicator for all districts. The graphs show the percentage of total possible heightened and critical risk alerts for all six food and nutrition security crisis risk indicators. The higher the score, the worse the deterioration in food and nutrition security.


Figure 7. Historical percentage of total JMR heightened and critical risk alerts (January 2014 to February 2025)



Annex IV. Historical overview of the population at risk of experiencing a deterioration in food and nutrition security into IPC 4 or worse (January 2014 to February 2025)

Figure 8 shows the population living in areas at risk of experiencing a deterioration in food security into IPC 4 or worse between January 2014 and February 2025.

Figure 8. Percentage of population living in areas at risk of experiencing a deterioration in food and nutrition security into IPC 4 or worse (January 2014 to February 2025)



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Annex V. Sources and time frames of JMR risk indicators and target variables

Table 4. Indicators' sources and time frames

	SOURCE	LINK	DATA FROM	DATA TO
Risk indicator				
Conflict	ACLED	https://acleddata.com/data/	01/01/2015	02/28/2025
Displacement	IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix	https://dtm.iom.int/yemen	01/01/2014	02/28/2025
Drought	WFP	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/yem-rainfall-subnational	01/01/1981	12/31/2024
Exchange rate	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6159	01/01/2009	02/28/2025
Exchange rate	FAO	https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrjoiZTg1NzJhMjktMWI5MS00ZjM1LTlmYjQtNWJlMGU4MGZyWQZliwidCI6IjE2M2FjN-DY4LWFYjgtNDRkMjM0MjZkLWQ5ZGIxNWUzYWY5NiIsImMiOiJh9	07/31/2018	02/28/2025
Food prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4508	01/01/2009	02/28/2025
Food prices	FAO	https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrjoiZTg1NzJhMjktMWI5MS00ZjM1LTlmYjQtNWJlMGU4MGZyWQZliwidCI6IjE2M2FjN-DY4LWFYjgtNDRkMjM0MjZkLWQ5ZGIxNWUzYWY5NiIsImMiOiJh9	01/01/2016	02/28/2025
Fuel prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6133	01/01/2009	02/28/2025
Fuel prices	FAO	https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrjoiZTg1NzJhMjktMWI5MS00ZjM1LTlmYjQtNWJlMGU4MGZyWQZliwidCI6IjE2M2FjN-DY4LWFYjgtNDRkMjM0MjZkLWQ5ZGIxNWUzYWY5NiIsImMiOiJh9	01/01/2016	02/28/2025
Target variable				
FEWS NET	World Bank	https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0064614	07/01/2009	10/01/2024

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ABOUT THIS REPORT

The JMR combines quantitative modeling and qualitative analysis to provide robust bimonthly food and nutrition security monitoring that identifies emerging food and nutrition security crisis risks. The report aims to complement IPC analyses and facilitate early recognition and coordinated responses to emerging major food and nutrition security crises among humanitarian and development stakeholders. The JMR is the product of a core development team comprising members from ACAPS, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and the World Bank.

A detailed explanation of the empirical foundation the Yemen JMR uses is available in this World Bank [Policy Research Working Paper](#). Further nutrition analysis is planned for future iterations of the JMR.

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