

# GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS

March 2021

# INTRODUCTION

ACAPS *Global Risk Analysis* outlines a number of key contexts where a notable deterioration may occur within the next six months, leading to a spike in humanitarian needs

The crises identified in this report have been selected because there are certain events or factors (triggers) that may emerge over the coming six months, which point towards a hazard materialising and leading to a potential shift or change in the current situations of the monitored countries.

ACAPS analysts conduct daily monitoring and independent analysis of more than 150 countries, including risk analysis and risks analysis updates.

ACAPS continues to closely monitor the identified risks, to see how they evolve and whether or not they materialise. **You can find updates on the risks identified in the [October 2020 Global Risk Analysis](#) at the end of this report.**

For the next six months, ACAPS has identified the following eight risks:

High

Colombia  
Venezuela

Medium

Lebanon  
Myanmar  
Nicaragua  
Ukraine

Low

Libya  
Western Sahara

## WHAT IS A RISK?

Risk is a function of probability and impact. ACAPS defines a risk as the probability of a hazard or multiple hazards occurring, combined with the estimated impact of the hazard(s). The risk level (low, medium, or high) posed by a hazard rises as either the probability of it occurring or the severity of the expected impact increases, or both.

Overall, the occurrence of a risk prompts a change from the status quo, which leads to a notable deterioration in the humanitarian situation and a higher number of people in need, or a higher severity of need.

The [ACAPS risk methodology](#) combines probability with impact for each hazard or combination of hazards. This gives us the risk. Risks fall into one of three categories: low, medium, or high.

In this report, some risks are raised as 'new trends' and others as 'rapid and marked deterioration'. A deteriorating humanitarian situation that continues at the same rate is considered a trend rather than a risk; these are not included in the report.



# INTRODUCTION

## KEY PRINCIPLES OF RISK ANALYSIS

**Risk analysis requires a solid understanding of the context** and an investigation of how the variables that could cause or resist change interact.

**Risk analysis is not an exact science.** An event identified as a hazard might not evolve or materialise as expected, or not have the projected impact. Events or factors (triggers) that were expected to drive a shift or change in the current situation may not occur or new factors might arise, preventing the expected change or shift in the situation from happening.

**The probability of a risk does not need to be high for it to be a concern.** A hazardous event estimated to have a 50% probability of occurring should be a cause for concern for humanitarians. In some cases, a probability as low as 30% (a less than one-in-three chance of occurring) may be of concern.

## LIMITATIONS

- Considering the diversity and complexity of the crises in this report, it has not been possible to cover each one in detail. Instead, we have highlighted the broad evolution of each crisis to flag potential deteriorations and inform operational, strategic, and policy decision-makers.
- The focus on risk analysis means that we have not considered multiple possible factors that could lead to an improvement in a given context.
- We do not publish our full risk monitoring, but rather an edited version that we think is relevant for the humanitarian sector.
- In this report we have not given attention to unforeseen circumstances that may change the course of events, such as sudden onset disasters, including natural hazards like earthquakes or volcanic eruptions.
- Information gaps limit the analysis.
- While efforts were made to ensure that all information was current at the time of publication, the fluidity of situations in some countries means that significant changes can occur quickly.

## OTHER FORWARD-LOOKING ANALYSIS FROM ACAPS

ACAPS often produces country-specific risk reports, scenarios, and anticipatory notes as part of our forward-looking analytical work. Some recent publications that complement this global analysis are:

- [Post-COVID-19 scenarios](#)
- [Yemen risk overview](#)
- [Sahel scenarios](#)
- [Yemen risk alert](#)
- [South Sudan Scenarios](#)

[Read more about our risk methodology](#)




# GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS

MARCH 2021

## Risk level

- High
- Medium
- Low

*\*The risks identified on this map are expected to materialise within the next six months.*



*The border lines and names of the countries or territories indicated on this map comply with official international practices (UN) and do not in any way reflect an ACAPS political stance.*



# COLOMBIA



Risk level | High

Significant escalation of conflict leads to increased displacement, attacks in urban areas, and reduced humanitarian access, as well as a spike in the number of confinement events and attacks on social leaders


## RATIONALE

Following the demobilisation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP), many non-state armed groups in Colombia have fragmented and created new alliances. New armed groups have emerged along the border with Venezuela in areas such as Catatumbo, and along main narcotrafficking routes including northern Antioquia, Choco, and the wider Pacific Coast region. Fighting for territorial control and control over irregular economies such as drug production and trafficking has intensified. The presence and involvement of Mexican drug cartels in alliances and rivalries add further complexity to the conflict (Pares 06/2020; Indepaz 08/2020). Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, state presence in some areas has further weakened. Armed groups have begun to take advantage of national containment measures to impose their own measures and exercise social control over civilians, especially in conflict-affected regions (HRW 15/07/2020). Under the pretext of containing the spread of the virus, armed groups have imposed highly restrictive and illegal COVID-19 prevention measures such as business closures, roadblocks, checkpoints, curfews, and quarantines in at least 11 of Colombia's 32 departments. This is facilitated by the scarce institutional presence in some regions of the country (ACAPS 27/11/2020).


There is a risk of significant conflict escalation as state security forces lack capacity and presence, and armed groups are taking advantage of or are imposing containment measures to consolidate control over disputed areas, including areas previously controlled by the FARC-EP. The escalation is likely to manifest in conflict spreading to urban areas, where armed groups have formed alliances with urban criminal groups. Armed groups have started using social media more frequently for online recruitment, especially of young men and women who have lost their jobs because of the pandemic. The recruitment of new members would increase armed groups' capacity to carry out attacks in urban areas (El Tiempo 26/09/2020; El Espectador 24/09/2020). Escalation of conflict could also lead to a spillover into Venezuela, as various armed groups already have control over areas at the Colombia-Venezuela border (Semana 15/02/2021; Infobae 14/02/2021).

Significant conflict escalation would become more likely should financial constraints, aggravated by COVID-19, render Colombia unable to reduce violence and inequality as per the 2016 peace agreement, resulting in armed groups taking advantage of the situation to organise attacks and expand territorial control.

## PROBABILITY



## IMPACT



## IMPACT

Multiple humanitarian consequences are likely in the event of conflict escalation, especially if coupled with the extension of COVID-19 containment measures, such as mobility restrictions and prolonged states of emergency in some areas of the country. Limited freedom of movement and the state of emergency are already translating into reduced service provision and reduced humanitarian presence. Fighting is likely to negatively impact humanitarian access in the affected areas.

If armed group activity against civilians increases both in rural and urban areas, this will result in targeted attacks on social leaders, human rights activists, and teachers; massacres; and



# COLOMBIA



● Risk level | High

increased confrontations between rival armed groups for territorial control or confrontations between armed groups and state forces (Indepaz 13/02/2021; Universidad de los Andes 15/10/2020). Clashes between armed groups over territorial disputes will generate displacement. While this mostly affects Colombian communities, Venezuelan refugees and migrants have also been victims of threats and displacement, and will be increasingly exposed to both (W Radio 25/11/2020).

Significant conflict escalation would likely lead to further confinement of civilian populations, increased presence of antipersonnel mines, and threats or attacks against members of communities living in conflict-affected areas, such as farmers, indigenous people, and Afro-Colombian communities. Demobilised members of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and/or the FARC-EP are at high risk of targeted attacks (ACLEDD 03/02/2021; InSight Crime 10/12/2020; UN Colombia 07/01/2021; Universidad Nacional de Colombia 06/09/2020).

Number of massacres<sup>1</sup> over 2020 and the beginning of 2021



Source: INDEPAZ (23/03/2021)

1. In this report ACAPS uses the term 'massacres' in the context of Colombia with the meaning of "intentional murder of four or more people in a defenceless state" as defined by the Historical Memory Group. In Colombia, there is no agreed upon legal definition of the term 'massacres' and the use of the term varies according to the sources (DW 24/08/2020; Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica last view 26/03/2021; Historical Memory Group 06/2016).



# VENEZUELA



**Risk level** | High

Worsening living conditions and reduced access to humanitarian assistance and basic services lead to a spike in displacement to Colombia

## RATIONALE


In December 2020, after winning 91% of seats in the National Assembly with a low voter turnout, President Nicolás Maduro's government gained formal control of all major political institutions in Venezuela. The post-electoral period has left the opposition weakened and holding very limited political power (AP 10/12/2020). It has also been accompanied by an increase in harassment and intimidation of civil society organisations (CSOs) and groups, NGOs, and media outlets by security forces, including office raids, detention of members/staff, arrest warrants, and the freezing of bank accounts (HRW 21/12/2020). Such activities are expected to continue over the next six months.

National NGOs will continue to face increased difficulties in registering or updating their registration, resulting in months of delays in the implementation of activities or the suspension of operations. The situation risks being further aggravated by the November 2020 announcement by the new National Assembly of a new law meant to significantly restrict the access of NGOs to foreign funding (Food Security Cluster Venezuela 15/09/2020; Caracas Chronicles 06/01/2021; BBC 08/12/2020; DW 03/12/2020; UN News 18/12/2020).


Humanitarian constraints and harassment against humanitarian organisations will likely force many national CSOs, NGOs, and INGOs to suspend or close their operations, decreasing their ability to implement programmes to respond to people's needs. This could likely increase the number of people in need in Venezuela.

Nationwide fuel shortages are hampering the movement of people and goods, including humanitarian aid, and limiting people's access to food and essential services such as healthcare. The economic crisis is also a driver of humanitarian needs in the country. Hyperinflation is causing price increases and household purchasing power is low, as illustrated by the monthly minimum wage - which could buy less than 2% of the monthly basic food basket in November 2020 (CENDA 28/12/2020). The price of food and services is likely to increase or remain the same, while the minimum wage will likely decrease and hyperinflation will continue. As a result, access to basic services and goods, including food, will be very limited.

## PROBABILITY



## IMPACT



## IMPACT

Significantly reduced access to basic services, goods, and humanitarian assistance, coupled with the effects of COVID-19, is expected to lead to worse living conditions and a severe rise in humanitarian needs (ICG 30/12/2020; Council of Foreign Relations 22/01/2021). A survey conducted by FAO in nine states of Venezuela in September 2020 showed that over 70% of those surveyed did not have enough food or limited the diversity of their diet, and more than 50% reported consuming less healthy and nutritious food (FAO 01/2021). Food security and nutrition are expected to deteriorate because of decreased purchasing power, as well as local food production challenges (OCHA 2021). Continuation of or increases in fuel shortages will affect overall movement and humanitarian access to people in need of assistance, as well as the entire food production chain - especially food distribution in indigenous communities and hard-to-reach areas (Food Security Cluster Venezuela 15/09/2020). Fuel shortages will also affect Venezuelans who travel across the country to cross the border into Colombia. The lack of public transport will force people to journey on foot, putting them at risk of extortion, physical and/or sexual violence, and exploitation.




# VENEZUELA




● Risk level | High

Worsening living conditions and a significant increase in humanitarian needs are likely to lead to increased migration and displacement flows. Over 330,000 Venezuelans are projected to leave the country and be in transit throughout the region in 2021. According to some sources, this number could be higher - if not double - if the border between Colombia and Venezuela reopens (key informant interview 15/03/2021). Of the 330,000, an estimated 160,000 migrants and refugees will pass through Colombia, over 90,000 through Ecuador, around 76,000 through Peru, and around 3,000 through Central America and Mexico (R4V 10/12/2020). These are estimates based on the continuation of a deteriorating trend; the number could also be higher if NGOs are significantly hampered in their operations. Insecurity, violence, and persecution are other reasons for leaving Venezuela and are expected to drive migration and refugee movements, as the excessive use of force by government forces increases (Mixed Migration Centre 01/2020).

Estimated migration flows and protection concerns at the Venezuela-Colombia border



# LEBANON



**Risk level** | Medium

Subsidies for basic goods are removed, leading to a marked deterioration of economic conditions and food insecurity, and an increase in political violence

## RATIONALE

People in Lebanon have suffered from mounting public debt and currency devaluation since October 2019. The compounded effects of economic deterioration and a negative perception of the response to the Beirut blast in August 2020 led to the government's resignation on 10 August. The government of Hassan Diab remains in a caretaker capacity until a new cabinet is formed. The formation of a new government has been stalled however, hampering any political or economic reforms (Al Jazeera 07/03/2021; Alarabiya News 18/02/2021; Al-Monitor 29/11/2020).

The Lebanese government subsidises fuel, flour, medications, and other essential commodities to maintain affordable prices of basic products (Arabian Business 05/01/2021). In late 2020, the governor of Lebanon's Central Bank publicly stated that depleting foreign currency reserves were likely to push the state to remove subsidies (Qantara 04/01/2021). Recent public statements suggested that resources for subsidies are likely to last up to approximately June 2021, depending on how much money remains in the foreign reserve (Bloomberg 16/03/2021).

The expected deterioration in living conditions, driven by the currency depreciation and subsidy removal, is likely to drive further protests across Lebanon. The rapid and unprecedented currency depreciation, which has reached 15,000 Lebanese pounds to 1 USD, has already led to the re-ignition of protests in March 2021 (Middle East Eye 16/03/2021). Poverty levels increased from 30% of the Lebanese population in 2018 to 45% in 2019. Salaries have not increased in line with inflation, decreasing purchasing power and pushing more people into poverty (WFP 12/12/2020; World Bank 01/12/2020). Depreciating currency, the risk of subsidies being removed, and soaring prices triggered further demonstrations in Beirut in June and December 2020 (AP 30/06/2020; BBC 08/12/2020).

The protests are likely to turn into violent demonstrations and trigger a violent police response. This has already happened in Tripoli: following the announcement of a COVID-19 curfew amid already deteriorating economic conditions, protests sparked between 14 January - 8 February 2021 and spread to other cities including Beirut (BBC 28/01/2020; Al Jazeera 08/03/2021). Since 2019, security forces have exercised increasing violence against and repression of protesters, through arrests and detentions (LCPS 31/10/2020; Amnesty International 22/09/2020; HRW 02/09/2020; HRW 17/01/2020).

## PROBABILITY



## IMPACT



## IMPACT

The removal of subsidies will result in immediate price increases for basic commodities such as wheat, fuel, and medicine. This will reduce households' purchasing power, pushing more people under the poverty line and severely restricting access to basic goods, particularly for refugee populations and poor Lebanese households. Almost half of the Lebanese population and all Syrian refugees already live with dire levels of food insecurity (WFP 24/02/2021; Inter-Agency Coordination 18/12/2020). The impact of the subsidy removal, compounded by governmental control over foreign capital, will likely be felt by up to 90% of Lebanese residents and all Syrian refugees across all of the country's cities within the next six months (Arabian Business 27/08/2020; Financial Times 16/06/2020).



# LEBANON




● Risk level | Medium

The removal of subsidies is likely to drive an increase both in the number of people suffering from food insecurity and malnutrition and the severity of their needs. It is likely to increase the adoption of negative coping mechanisms by the country's poorest, ranging from eating less food or choosing a less diverse diet to child labour, crime, and migration.


There is a high probability that subsidy removal would provide a foundation for mass political mobilisation, social tensions, and rivalry over resources (LBC Group 04/03/2021). The increase in protests and violence is likely to result in the antagonisation of social and sectarian identities and deeper fragmentation. High protection concerns are also expected as a result, including physical violence, sexual harassment, evictions, tensions between Lebanese people and refugees, and significant migration. Increases in crime, substance abuse, suicide, and domestic violence would also be likely.

Civil unrest, road blockages, and riots will lead to service gaps and deterioration, particularly in urban centres. In the absence of government support, humanitarian and development organisations and civil society will likely try to fill the gaps. Many challenges will be difficult for humanitarians to overcome, including currency exchange, procurement, market availability, access, and coverage.

Official and black market exchange rate LBP to USD between February 2020-February 2021



Number of protests and riots in Lebanon between February 2020-February 2021



Source: Banque du Liban - Lira rate - Lebanese Lira

Source: ACLED (access 04/03/2021)



# MYANMAR



**Risk level** | Medium

Militarisation of political space and the public sphere, and the escalation of violence by the military junta, result in greater access constraints, worsening of needs, and heightened protection concerns, particularly for ethnic minority groups

## RATIONALE

On 1 February, the Myanmar military staged a coup for the third time in 35 years and ordered a year-long state of emergency under Sections 417 and 418(a) of the 2008 Constitution, alleging mass fraud in the November 2020 elections (Reuters 31/01/2021; Nikkei 13/11/2020). The military junta established the State Administrative Council as a means to legitimise the coup (Myanmar Times 02/02/2021). Chief ministers and party members of the National League for Democracy were arrested and detained, and a series of legislative and judicial laws were passed, including a cybersecurity law and an amendment of the Ward or Village Tract Administration Law, previously abolished in 2016. This has serious repercussions for freedom of speech and assembly (Eleven Media Group 17/02/2021; The Irrawaddy 16/02/2021; Frontier Myanmar 20/02/2021; Fortify Rights 03/2015).

As the military junta continues to consolidate its grip on power, anti-coup protests - which began in cities including Mandalay, Yangon, and the capital Nay Pi Taw - have gained considerable momentum countrywide. Bankers, municipal councils, teachers, health workers, transport workers, and religious groups are all joining the movement. Continued pressure by these sectors and groups is highly likely to continue (Reuters 16/02/2021). Cash flows

and transport have been affected and the price of essential commodities such as rice, oil, and gas has increased (UNOPS 10/03/2021). There is a high risk that the coup by the military junta, coupled with prolonged COVID-19 containment measures, will affect and worsen access, provision, and supply of goods, including for humanitarian assistance (Myanmar Now 23/02/2021; Reuters 25/02/2021; GardaWorld 17/02/2021).

Conflict in Shan, Kachin, and Kayin states and in Bago region is still active, and resulted in displacement throughout December 2020 and January and February 2021 - with no signs that this will subside in the next six months (IDMC 09/03/2021; OCHA 23/12/2020). In Rakhine state, the security situation remains precarious, and the lull in fighting since the general elections is particularly fragile (Radio Free Asia 29/12/2020). The impact of the military junta's takeover on armed conflict is unclear but is likely to affect access to humanitarian assistance and livelihood activities, and may leave certain humanitarian needs unmet.


## IMPACT

As protests continue, protestors will very likely be met with increasing levels of violence, including the use of lethal weapons, indiscriminate targeting, raids, arrests, and detention (Frontier

## PROBABILITY



## IMPACT



Myanmar 08/03/2021; GardaWorld 08/03/2021; HRW 12/02/2021). Activists and CSOs will face increased scrutiny and targeted intimidation, impacting their ability to operate. Ethnic minority groups are particularly at risk because of high levels of pre-existing discrimination and historical and ongoing clashes between the military and ethnic armed groups. Frequent nationwide internet blackouts will increase difficulties in accessing and sharing information, directly affecting freedom of assembly and expression. This tactic is likely to be implemented in the long term, with dire consequences for those in need as well as for CSOs.


The needs of people requiring humanitarian assistance because of armed conflict will likely increase as humanitarian operations face greater access constraints. CSOs providing assistance in hard to-reach areas, such as Rakhine, northern Shan, or Kayin states, will face heightened scrutiny - impacting the quality and quantity of service provision. As the banking system comes to a standstill, cash and voucher assistance will be severely affected, with a medium risk of higher levels of debt. Protection concerns will rise as population groups requiring humanitarian assistance seek livelihood opportunities in areas of armed conflict and political instability. Populations in areas not controlled by the military junta are likely to experience higher rates of food insecurity and increased health needs because of limited service provision.



# MYANMAR




Chain of plausability:



# MYANMAR



## Timeline of events in 2021



# NICARAGUA



Risk level | Medium

## New legislation that highly limits humanitarian operations adds to unmet needs and worsens humanitarian conditions

### RATIONALE

In September 2018, as a result of ongoing demonstrations against the Nicaraguan government, a statement issued by the national police prohibited anti-government protests (El País 28/09/2018). This prohibition remains in place as at 25 March. Since September 2018, the government has issued more laws that considerably restrict the exercise of human rights and forms of opposition and dissent, resulting in the government gaining more political control (Amnesty International 15/02/2021; OAS 06/01/2021; Diálogo 05/03/2021).

In October 2020, the Nicaraguan parliament passed the Foreign Agents Act. This legislation requires all people and entities (including humanitarian organisations and agencies) who receive funds or goods from foreign governments or entities to register with the government and report on activities on a monthly basis in order to operate in the country. If they do not register as foreign agents and comply with the requisites and procedures of the act, they could be forced to shut down (Government of Nicaragua 19/10/2020).

As a result of this law, as at 5 February 2021 two prominent organisations that promote human rights and freedom of speech and press had announced the closure of their operations in rejection of the legislation (El País 05/02/2021). As at 9 March 2021,


two humanitarian organisations - which had provided material aid following hurricanes Eta and Iota - were facing possible closure because of difficulties in registering as foreign agents (La Prensa 09/03/2021). This law poses a significant access constraint for national and international organisations and agencies that receive foreign funding or which have links to foreign countries.

Human rights organisations were already facing restrictions and persecution from the government. There is a moderate risk that humanitarian organisations that provide material aid will also see their operations being hampered as a result of the bureaucratic difficulties imposed by the Foreign Agents Act. This will likely lead to worsening humanitarian conditions and limited or no response capacity for existing and new needs.

### IMPACT

In the event that the operations of humanitarian organisations are hampered, the following humanitarian needs linked to the socio-political and economic crisis, as well as to natural disasters, are expected to go unmet. Nicaragua is in fact facing a socio-political and economic crisis that has been worsening since the 2018 political events. It is also one of the least developed countries in Latin America in terms of basic services, and is vulnerable to recurrent natural disasters (World Bank 09/10/2020). Food insecurity and malnutrition remain a key concern as the

### PROBABILITY



### IMPACT



prevalence of chronic undernutrition is 17%; rates are as high as 30% in some regions. Food insecurity is closely related to poverty and to frequent natural disasters (WFP 12/2020).

In November 2020, hurricanes Eta and Iota hit Nicaragua. These hurricanes affected 60% of the national territory, triggering intense flooding and landslides which resulted in the destruction of homes, agriculture, and fishery-based livelihoods. More than three million people were exposed, with an estimated 1.8 million people affected. There are still 730,600 people in need and new weather events could increase this number (UN 22/02/2021). People affected by the economic crisis and the hurricanes, or who face food insecurity, often rely on aid provided by humanitarian organisations to meet their needs. These include WASH, health, food, education, and the recovery of livelihoods and agricultural production. If humanitarian organisations temporarily or permanently close their operations, existing and new needs will be unmet - increasing the number of people in need.

Migration flows are also likely to increase, as people leave Nicaragua because of worsening socio-economic conditions and a lack of access to services and aid. The lack of human rights organisations could also lead to more violent repression and human rights violations from state actors, as well as increased protection concerns.




# NICARAGUA



Risk level | Medium

Timeline: Current consequences and expected impact of approved Laws in Nicaragua



**PRIMARY IMPACTS:**



**SECONDARY IMPACTS:**



# UKRAINE



● Risk level | Medium

## Moderate conflict escalation in Donbas leads to casualties and an increase in humanitarian needs

### RATIONALE

The ceasefire agreement reached in July 2020 between Ukrainian and pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine led to a significant decrease in the level of conflict (ACLEd 24/11/2020). Low-level conflict continues however, and the number of ceasefire violations has been increasing since December 2020 - with a 22% increase in violations reported in January 2021 compared to December 2020. More than 80% of the ceasefire violations in January and February 2021 were reported in Donetsk region, where a rising number of military casualties has been reported since December 2020 (OSCE accessed 02/03/2021). These developments increase the probability of the latest ceasefire collapsing, leading to renewed conflict escalation in Donbas.

Since December 2020, active preparatory military activities have been reported in both government-controlled areas (GCA) and non-government-controlled areas (NGCA), including repair works, digging of trenches, and new arms being bought such as drones or missiles (The Defense Post 28/01/2021). Increased military preparedness on both sides, an unstable political situation, growing anti-Russia sentiment, and a pervasive lack

of agreement around the holding of local elections in Donbas contribute to the risk of renewed fighting (Liveuamap 16/03/2021; ACLEd 19/02/2021; Kyiv Post 15/03/2021; Donbass Insider 09/03/2021).

Conflict escalations in Ukraine are often politically motivated and increase around significant political dates or events (ACLEd 19/02/2021). The Ukrainian president is preparing to host a diplomatic summit in August 2021 aiming to refocus international attention on the conflict in Crimea (President of Ukraine 18/01/2021). Similarly, the 30th anniversary of Ukrainian independence will take place on 24 August (112.International 25/12/2020). It is likely that conflict incidents will increase because of attempts by political stakeholders to reassert their positions in preparation for these events. If political negotiations fail, military preparedness between GCA and NGCA intensifies, and ceasefire violations increase, there is a risk that the ceasefire could fail and moderate, localised conflict escalations could be seen.

### PROBABILITY



### IMPACT



# UKRAINE



Risk level | Medium


## IMPACT

Localised fighting is likely to be centred between 0-30km along the 427km-long contact line dividing east Ukraine into GCA and NGCA. Critical infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, and WASH facilities are likely to be affected by localised fighting, resulting in increased needs for WASH, health, and education. Water infrastructure in south Donbas is likely to be affected. 68% of the 3.4 million people considered in need of humanitarian assistance in Ukraine live within 20km of the contact line. Renewed conflict will increase the severity of their needs and their reliance on increasingly negative coping mechanisms (OCHA 15/02/2021).

Two out of five entry-exit crossing points between GCA and NGCA that are currently open will likely close in the event of conflict escalation, further limiting mobility that is already constrained by COVID-19 movement restrictions. Around 50% of people in need living in the affected areas are elderly or have a disability, and are therefore expected to face difficulties in moving to safe areas because of movement limitations (OCHA 15/02/2021). The conflict is expected to result in extreme humanitarian access constraints, worsened by insecurity and movement restrictions in both GCA and NGCA, aggravating the already difficult access situation and capacity of NGOs.

Industrial facilities in Mariupol, Donetsk, and Horlivka store chemical and explosive materials. Conflict around these areas will increase the risk of pollution, leading to illnesses and agricultural damage in already hard-to-reach areas.

Number of ceasefire violations in east Ukraine before and after the ceasefire agreement



Source: OSCE (4/03/2021)



# LIBYA



Risk level | Low

Disruption of the political process leads to conflict escalation and an increase in humanitarian needs

## RATIONALE


A ceasefire agreement between the Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Government of National Accord (GNA) was reached in October 2020, following conflict escalation around Tripoli between April 2019-June 2020. Conflict levels have decreased, but the agreement is very general and open to competing interpretations, misunderstandings, or intentional ambiguity - which are likely to undermine the peace process (UN 19/01/2021).

A new interim executive authority was elected by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in February 2021 with a mandate to formulate a new government, establish a safe security situation, and organise elections in December 2021 (EC 07/02/2021). The task of creating a cabinet that satisfies all factions has been challenging for the Prime Minister designate Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, and disputes about new appointments were still ongoing as at mid-March. The new government is likely to face serious challenges in unifying divided institutions and the military, and in reaching an agreement on oil revenues. Gaining legitimacy

among local armed groups also remains a challenge, impeding the creation of a unified state security apparatus. Failure to appoint a defense minister or unite military and political institutions could undermine the peace process, potentially delaying the election and aggravating political disputes (Financial Times 15/03/2021; ICG 15/02/2021).

Although troop withdrawals and foreign fighter repatriation were at the centre of the ceasefire agreement, foreign armed groups and mercenaries remain in Libya, sustaining rivalries between military factions (Reuters 21/02/2021). The failure of the new authority to achieve political progress and get sustained support from foreign countries such as Turkey, Russia, United Arab Emirates, and Egypt could lead to local and foreign armed groups rejecting the new authority and returning to violence, disrupting the fragile ceasefire. Growing fragmentation within the parliament and tensions between local actors attempting to exert control over territories and national resources would likely lead to renewed conflict, aggravated by mercenaries and continued foreign weapon inflows.

## PROBABILITY



## IMPACT



## IMPACT

If the peace process and ceasefire fail, conflict is likely to escalate between the GNA, the LNA, and local and foreign armed groups. Tripoli, Sirte, and Aljufra governorates would be most affected by fighting because of their political importance and oil reserves. If fighting erupts, up to 150,000 people are expected to be displaced within three months from and within Tripoli, Sirte, and Benghazi governorates to safer areas. Up to 250,000 people would need additional assistance in conflict areas (IOM 31/07/2019). Some IDPs, particularly those from Tripoli, would experience displacement again, after having returned to their areas of origin during the ceasefire.



# LIBYA




Risk level | Low

Fighting is expected to affect critical facilities such as airports, oil facilities, hospitals, schools, and water and sanitation infrastructure, leading to decreases in service provision and increased levels of needs. Migrants will be particularly vulnerable to conflict-driven protection concerns, as they are expected to experience increased incidents of killings, torture, arbitrary detention, sexual abuse, forced labour, extortion, and exploitation as a result of the escalation. 53% of migrants in Libya live in the west region (IOM 02/03/2021; OCHA 31/12/2020).

Disputes over control of the Libya Central Bank and oil revenues, compounded by fragmentation and a lack of political stability, will likely have severe economic consequences (Financial Times 15/03/2021). Lack of resources and disrupted access will likely increase shortages of medical supplies and delays in salaries for medical staff, leading to additional pressures on and interruption of services in healthcare facilities, which are already overwhelmed by COVID-19. Humanitarian access will be hampered by heavy fighting, mine contamination, and movement restrictions. A significant increase in the number of humanitarian access constraints can be expected (OCHA 15/02/2021).

Expected displacement in the event of the conflict escalation in Libya



# WESTERN SAHARA



Risk level | Low

Localised fighting aggravates existing protection concerns and results in increased protection needs and limited access to services

## RATIONALE


Clashes erupted between Morocco and the independence-seeking Sahrawi movement, the Polisario Front, over the contested territory of Western Sahara in late 2020 for the first time in 29 years. On 13 November 2020, Moroccan soldiers entered the UN-monitored buffer zone between Morocco and Polisario-controlled areas, violating the 1991 ceasefire agreement. They aimed to re-open the Guerguerat border crossing - the main route connecting Morocco with Mauritania - which had been blocked by supporters of the Polisario Front for three weeks. The Polisario Front accused the Moroccan security forces of shooting civilians, and targeted Moroccan military posts in response. Although the violence had died down by early December, the US subsequently recognised Moroccan sovereignty over the contested territory. Several African and Middle Eastern countries then opened consulates in Laayoune - Western Sahara's capital, which is controlled by Morocco - increasing the international recognition of Morocco's control (Pressenza 17/02/2021; IAI 16/01/2021).

These developments are likely to drive increasing frustration among the Polisario movement, which has been waiting for a resolution of the conflict since 1975, and among Sahrawi refu-

gees in camps near Tindouf, Algeria, who have been waiting to return to Western Sahara. Western Sahara's self-determination referendum is increasingly unlikely to happen, the international political peace process has stagnated, and there has been no Special Representative of the Secretary General for Western Sahara appointed since May 2019 (El Confidencial 14/11/2020; Arab News 17/11/2020). The latest escalation in conflict resulted in a decision by the Polisario movement to resume its policy of armed resistance (Morocco World News 18/11/2020; Middle East Eye 24/01/2021). The lack of progress towards a political resolution, coupled with the Moroccan government's steadily increasing control, is likely to cause the Polisario movement to undertake localised attacks along the Berm - a 2,700km sand wall that divides areas controlled by Morocco and the Polisario - in an attempt to bring international attention to its cause.

Even small-scale, localised attacks are likely to trigger a heavy-handed response by Moroccan forces seeking to crack down on the Polisario movement in their controlled areas. In the longer term, this could become a driver for regional tensions between Morocco and Algeria - the main supporter of the Polisario.

## PROBABILITY



## IMPACT



## IMPACT

The increase in conflict between the Polisario Front and Morocco will expose Sahrawi people to more violence and protection concerns, worsen humanitarian needs such as food, water, and shelter, disrupt humanitarian access, and cause displacement. While the 30,000 people living in Polisario-controlled areas are likely to be affected the most, there is a moderate risk that the humanitarian impact will extend to the 500,000-600,000 people living in Morocco-controlled areas of Western Sahara and the 170,000 Sahrawi refugees living in camps in Algeria (AI Jazeera 11/12/2020; Geographical 17/06/2020; The New Humanitarian 02/04/2019).

Insecurity is highly likely to increase protection incidents against Sahrawi activists and people associated with them in Morocco-controlled areas (Jacobin 30/01/2021; HRW 18/12/2020; Pressenza 17/02/2021; The New Yorker 10/02/2021; Inventa 13/10/2020). Suspected Sahrawi activists and supporters are likely to experience close surveillance and harassment, and be subjected to interrogation, arrest, and imprisonment. Sahrawi people are likely to be separated from family members who are living in areas administered by competing parties.



# WESTERN SAHARA




Risk level | Low

Civilians in Polisario-controlled areas will be caught in the crossfire and exposed to violence, which may force them to flee into Algeria. The remaining population is likely to lack access to assistance because of restricted humanitarian access. The Berm is significantly contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war, limiting mobility between areas controlled by the Polisario and Morocco (MINURSO 01/02/2021). Increased levels of insecurity could further hamper both people's movement and humanitarian interventions, isolating the Sahrawi people from services and assistance.

New arrivals would put additional pressure on already overstretched camps on the border with Algeria, which are highly dependent on aid to survive because of a lack of access to sustainable livelihoods (Oxfam 23/11/2020). The insecurity implications could hamper humanitarian movements in the camps, with serious consequences for refugees, particularly regarding their access to essential goods and services including food and hygiene items.

Western Sahara - territories controlled by Morocco and the Polisario Front and refugee camps in Algeria



Source: BBC (10/12/2020) modified by ACAPS to display refugee camps and Guerguerat crossing



# UPDATE FROM THE OCTOBER 2020 RISK ANALYSIS

These risks were identified in the October 2020 report; below each risk, we have provided an update on the situation.

## HAITI —● High risk level

**An unusually active hurricane season leads to higher levels of food insecurity and humanitarian needs in a country with already limited national response capacity**

Even though the latest Atlantic hurricane season did not affect Haiti as expected, social and economic factors have continued to impact people's food security and overall living conditions, as highlighted by ACAPS in the October 2020 Global Risk Analysis. The high prices of goods, the weakened value of the Haitian gourde, the economic effects of COVID-19, and below-average autumn harvests continue to affect livelihoods and drive acute food insecurity countrywide (FEWS NET 28/01/2021). 4.4 million people are expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or higher levels of food insecurity in the months of March-June 2021. 4 million people were projected to face IPC Phase 3 levels and above in the August 2020-February 2021 period (IPC 09/2020; IPC 04/09/2020; FEWS NET 16/09/2020).

Security conditions have also deteriorated in Haiti as a result of an increase in kidnappings for ransom, assassinations, and social and political protests. These factors were not taken into consideration in the risk analysis published in October, and are having a significant impact on food security and other sectors such as education. New protests broke out in the capital Port-au-Prince in mid-February 2021 in an effort to drive out President Jovenel Moïse, whose term was expected to end on 7 February. Continued violence, civil unrest, and kidnappings could constrain access to markets or close down market areas, disrupting market supply and further deteriorating food availability and access (FEWS NET 31/01/2021).

## LEBANON/SYRIA —● High risk level

**The deepening socio-economic crisis in Lebanon leads Syrian refugees to opt for unsafe return to Syria, increasing humanitarian needs**

Lebanon continues to experience a deepening socio-economic crisis with a deteriorating political and healthcare situation. Poverty among Syrian refugees in Lebanon dramatically increased in 2020. Around 90% of the 1.5 million Syrian refugees in the country live in extreme poverty, up from 55% in 2019 (WFP 18/12/2020). The number of Syrian refugees who are food insecure also increased, from 29% in 2019 to 49% in 2020 (UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP 31/12/2020). COVID-19 contingency measures resulted in increased humanitarian needs and aggravated difficulties in sustaining livelihoods and income. This increased people's reliance on negative coping mechanisms, particularly among the poorest and most vulnerable in the country (3RP 31/12/2020; 3RP 31/11/2020). Overall poverty and access to basic services in Lebanon is likely to continue to worsen in 2021, affecting all population groups (World Bank 01/12/2020).

Despite these circumstances and the severity of needs, the total number of Syrian refugee returnees in 2020 was 9,351 - less than half of the 22,728 returns registered in 2019 (UNHCR accessed 31/12/2020). This can be attributed to the fact that the decision of refugees to go back to Syria is influenced mainly by the security and safety situation, economic growth and possibilities, public service availability, and personal ties to their places of origin in



Syria - and less so by the poor living conditions in Lebanon (IPL 09/11/2020). In a needs assessment conducted in 2020, 81% of key informants among the Syrian returnees from all countries of displacement - including Lebanon - said that the worsening economic situation in their place of displacement was the most important factor for returning, followed by a need to protect properties, cultural ties, and the improvement of the security situation in their location of origin (HNAP 01/01/2021). Unless the situation significantly improves in Syria, refugees are unlikely to return; this differs from the risk highlighted in the October 2020 Global Risk Analysis.

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## SUDAN — ● High risk level

### **Severe economic deterioration leads to an inability of the state to cope with immense economic and food insecurity**

Severe economic deterioration and a significant increase in food insecurity, as identified in the October 2020 Global Risk Analysis, has gradually been materialising. Despite it being the harvest period, staple food prices continued increasing atypically between December 2020-January 2021. The prices of non-cereal food items increased by 20-40% between January-February 2021 and were 250-450% higher than in February 2020 (FEWS NET 02/2021; FAO 10/02/2021). The rapid depreciation of the Sudanese pound has also resulted in a 60-85% drop in household purchasing power. The situation led to protests in January and February across Sudan and the declaration of a state of emergency in seven regions of the country (Dabanga Radio 09/02/2021; AfricaNews 09/02/2020; The Guardian 16/02/2021).

8.2 million people are projected to need food security and livelihoods assistance in 2021, compared to 6.2 million in 2020 (OCHA 12/2020; OCHA 01/2020). The most recent IPC analysis (covering October-December 2020) projected 7.1 million people (16% of the analysed population) to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and higher levels of food insecurity (IPC 12/2020). Conflict-affected areas continue to be particularly impacted by food insecurity. Although the economy has continued to deteriorate as projected, in February the government implemented some measures meant to improve the situation; these included the decision to devalue the Sudanese pound in an attempt to merge the gap between the managed and parallel markets (FEWS NET 02/2021). In December 2020, the US removed Sudan from the state sponsors of terrorism list, which may make it easier for Sudan to access debt relief packages and other multilateral loans and financing (USIP 06/02/2020).



# UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

## YEMEN ● High risk level

### **Continued depreciation of the Yemeni riyal drives up inflation, reducing households' purchasing power and their ability to meet basic needs**

The risk of inflation being driven up by the continued depreciation of the Yemeni riyal, as identified in October's Global Risk Analysis, remains high. This is mostly a result of the depletion of foreign currency reserves and the likely continuation of competing economic regulations between the Government of Yemen (GoY) and Ansar Allah-controlled areas.

Since January 2021, the riyal in GoY-controlled areas has resumed a steady depreciation, following a temporary appreciation in December 2020 related to the announcement of a new cabinet and the release of funds from the Saudi deposit to cover letters of credit for the import of basic commodities. The value of the riyal in December 2020 increased to YER 640 per 1 USD; it then started to depreciate again up to YER 860 per 1 USD in January 2021, from an average of YER 778 per 1 USD throughout 2020. The value of the riyal in Ansar Allah-controlled areas remained stable at around YER 595 per 1 USD in January 2021, in line with the average in 2020.

The bilateral support by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the GoY - which contributes to the stability of the riyal in Yemen - is likely to be affected by a UN Panel of Experts' report highlighting a lack of transparency, allegations of corruption, and misuse of the Saudi

deposit by the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) in Aden (UNSC 25/01/2021). This could also push the GoY towards significant reforms within CBY Aden, aimed at improving transparency and possibly encouraging foreign financial support, which could potentially contribute to currency stability. If the current situation continues however, dwindling foreign currency reserves will continue to drive inflation up, affecting people's ability to afford food and other basic commodities. The escalation of conflict since the beginning of February in Marib - the main source of oil and liquefied gas in Yemen - could significantly disrupt oil and gas facilities and extraction operations, affecting GoY revenues and currency stability.

affected Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, and Logone-et-Chari divisions (GCR2P 18/01/2021; HRW 2021; OCHA 05/02/2021). In December 2020, 460 protection incidents were reported, including cases of looting, extortion of properties, and injuries. The same month, two suicide attacks were carried out in Mayo-Sava division, and there was also a violent attack on four islands of Lake Chad in Lagone-et-Chari division, with casualties and abductions reported. In 2020, violence triggered the internal displacement of 322,000 people. Over 115,000 refugees and 123,000 returnees live in the Far North. Humanitarian access continues to be highly constrained. In December 2020, some areas of the region were reported to be inaccessible without armed escorts (OCHA 01/02/2021).

## CAMEROON ● High risk level

### **Rise in violent events targeting civilians, IDPs, and refugees in the Far North region results in increased displacement and protection needs**

Boko Haram's violence against civilians in the Far North region, as well as related fatalities, increased slightly during most of 2020 - but have so far decreased in 2021 (ACLED accessed 08/03/2021). Although the risk identified by ACAPS in October 2020 has not materialised, violence and humanitarian needs in the region continue to be high.

Targeted attacks and events of generalised violence became more frequent in 2020 than in the previous years, and particularly



# UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR) — ● Medium risk level

### Loss of state authority following contested elections leads to an increase in armed group activity and in the severity of humanitarian needs

On 15 December 2020, six armed groups formed the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) and launched an offensive to try to derail the electoral process in the lead-up to the 27 December elections (RFI 20/12/2020). The formation and activity of this coalition generated increased displacement and humanitarian needs and affected the delivery of goods. The election was held as scheduled; however, voting did not occur in 29 of CAR's 71 sub-prefectures and access to voting sites in six other sub-prefectures was limited. The results were confirmed on 18 January by the constitutional court and Faustin-Archange Touadéra was reelected as president (Le Monde 19/01/2021; France 24 30/12/2020).

A surge in violence continued after the election and led to 276,000 new IDPs, of whom 129,000 are still displaced as armed group activity prevents them from returning. 112,000 refugees have also fled to DRC, Chad, Cameroon, and Republic of Congo. Newly displaced people are in need of protection (sexual and gender-based violence protection, child protection, and official documentation), as well as shelter, WASH, food, non-food items, and healthcare, depending on the resources available at host locations (DW 13/01/2021; OCHA 02/03/2021; UNHCR 01/03/2021).

The CPC also imposed a blockade on CAR's main supply route between Garoua-Boulai (Cameroon) and Bangui, which 80%

of the country's imports transit through. At one point, up to 1,600 trucks - including 500 with humanitarian supplies - were blocked at the border (OCHA 03/02/2021; Le Monde 13/01/2021). The first escorted convoys reached Bangui on 8 and 16 February, signaling the reopening of the route (Al Jazeera 08/02/2021; RFI 17/02/2021). The blockade led to an increase in food prices and food shortages (WFP 02/02/2021). The risk outlined in October 2020 materialised, but with slightly different developments and triggers than those that ACAPS had initially identified.

## LESOTHO — ● Medium risk level

### Reintroduction of COVID-19 mitigation measures results in decreased access to livelihoods and a deterioration in food security

The risk identified by ACAPS in October 2020 has materialised; however, its consequences are only likely to be seen and assessed in the coming months.

Lesotho and South Africa have faced a surge of COVID-19 cases since December 2020, leading to the reintroduction of mitigation measures including lockdowns, border closures, and movement restrictions (WHO accessed 10/02/2021; WHO accessed 10/02/2021; GardaWorld 28/01/2021; GardaWorld 12/01/2021; The Guardian 08/01/2021; SADC RVAAP 03/02/2021). COVID-19 containment measures implemented since March 2020 had significant negative effects on Lesotho's economy, impacting livelihoods and food security. The relaxation of restrictions in October 2020 led to the return of near-normal levels of economic activity. The reintroduction

of COVID-19 measures in January 2021, including a 21-day lockdown, has slowed down the economy again and has impacted livelihood opportunities, especially for urban poor households that depend on daily and weekly wages (FEWS NET 01/2021; FEWS NET 11/2020; SADC RVAAP 03/02/2021; IPC 08/2020). In February, following a drop in the number of cases, some economic and social activities were newly allowed and some border points with South Africa reopened. A negative COVID-19 test result is required to cross the border (WFP 02/2021). According to the latest IPC analysis, over 582,000 people (40% of the assessed population) in Lesotho are expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or higher levels of food insecurity between October 2020-March 2021. This is a 35% increase compared to the October 2019-March 2020 period. While the analysis takes into account losses of remittances and employment opportunities driven by COVID-19, it is not clear if figures will further increase following the easing of the measures. Businesses are still not operating at normal levels (IPC 08/2020; The Guardian 19/01/2021; FEWS NET 02/2021). The evolution of the pandemic and the spread of new strains (including the South African variant) are unpredictable. Plans for vaccine campaigns are still unclear. These factors could potentially further impact livelihoods and food security in Lesotho.



# UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

## COLOMBIA/VENEZUELA — ● Medium risk level

### Severe economic deterioration leads to an inability of the state to cope with immense economic and food insecurity

The risk for Colombia/Venezuela identified in the previous ACAPS Global Risk Analysis has materialised, with a moderate impact. On 1 September 2020, Colombia lifted most COVID-19-related restrictions that were having an impact on the economy. As a result, many Venezuelan refugees and migrants decided to return to Colombia or migrate for the first time, despite the border remaining closed until at least 1 June 2021 (Infobae 01/03/2021). As at 31 December 2020, there were 1.7 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants in Colombia; of these, an estimated 967,000 were without regular status (Migración Colombia accessed 12/02/2021).

As a result of the pandemic, the economic resources of Colombian households have decreased, which has led to increased competition over resources between members of host communities and Venezuelans, contributing to a rise in xenophobia (Infobae 07/01/2021). Host community members have shown their discontent at the increased presence of Venezuelan refugees and migrants through protests, physical and psychological violence, hate speech, and discrimination (Clamor, UNHCR 11/2020). Comments on social media reflect polarisation and worsening perceptions of Venezuelans in Colombia (El Derecho a No Obedecer 09/2020).

The closed border and lack of documentation have led to an increase in Venezuelans in Colombia with irregular status and no access to basic services, which also leads to protection concerns. On 8 February however, Colombian President Iván Duque presented the Temporary Protection Statute for Venezuelan Migrants for the regularisation of around 1 million Venezuelans who can prove they were in Colombia before 31 January 2021. This will facilitate their access to healthcare and legal employment opportunities (El Tiempo 08/02/2021; El Espectador 08/02/2021).

## MYANMAR — ● Low risk level

### Fighting between government forces and non-state armed groups continues amid scheduled elections and COVID-19, worsening the level of humanitarian needs and disenfranchising parts of the population

The risk for Myanmar identified in the previous ACAPS Global Risk Analysis did not materialise in Rakhine state, as there has been a lull in fighting across the state since the elections. Despite this, insecurity in Rakhine and Chin states remains a reality as landmines and unexploded ordnance continue to limit the free movement of people and cause death and injuries (Radio Free Asia 29/12/2020). The movement of troops and fighting in northern Shan and Chin states were observed throughout December and January and, as predicted, resulted in displacement (IDMC 09/03/2021; OCHA 23/12/2020). Food insecurity and shelter shortages for IDPs remain widespread across Rakhine, Chin, and Shan states (OCHA 01/2021).

The general elections on 8 November 2020 took place largely uninterrupted, despite over 1.5 million people being unable to vote because of active conflict - of whom 1.2 million are Myanmar citizens in Rakhine (Radio Free Asia 28/10/2020; The Carter Center 10/11/2020). On 9 December, for the first time in two years, in-person talks were held between the Arakan Army and Tatmadaw government forces (Yohei Sasakawa Blog 18/01/2021). This led to the release of three National League for Democracy candidates on 1 January 2021, who had been kidnapped in the lead-up to the elections, and acted as a precursor to a ceasefire agreement in the region (The Irrawaddy 01/01/2021). These developments should be assessed critically in the light of the military coup on 1 February 2021 and the disbanding of the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC). This raises questions around how peace talks with armed groups will be re-negotiated and whether the disbanding of the NRPC will have an impact on the security situation and humanitarian needs in Myanmar (Myanmar Times 08/02/2021).



# SEE THE CRISIS CHANGE THE OUTCOME

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