ACAPS Quarterly risk analysis outlines a number of key contexts where a notable deterioration may occur within the next six months, leading to a spike in humanitarian needs.

ACAPS analysts conduct daily monitoring and independent analysis of more than 150 countries to support evidence-based decision-making in the humanitarian sector.

The knowledge acquired in this process enables analysts to develop a solid understanding of crisis dynamics and identify trends and risks. Risk analysis takes in to consideration current and potential future variables that could cause situations to develop in ways that pose humanitarian threats. It also considers the capacities and vulnerabilities of potentially affected communities.

For the next six months, ACAPS has identified the following ten risks:

**HIGH RISK LEVEL**
- Libya
- Sudan
- Venezuela

**MODERATE RISK LEVEL**
- Afghanistan
- Burkina Faso
- Ethiopia
- Mozambique
- Myanmar
- Somalia

**LOW RISK LEVEL**
- Bosnia and Herzegovina

**What is a risk?**

The probability of a hazard (or multiple hazards) occurring combined with the estimated impact (exposure and intensity) of the hazards. In other words: Risk = probability x impact

Impact and probability are measured on an ordinal scale from 1-5 with 5 representing the highest.

The occurrence of a risk prompts a change from the status quo that leads to a notable deterioration in the humanitarian situation and a higher number of people in need (exposure), or a higher severity of need (intensity). The crises identified in this report have been selected because there are certain triggers that may emerge over the coming six months that point towards this potential shift.

A deteriorating humanitarian situation that continues at the same rate is considered a trend rather than a risk. Such crises have not been included in this report, as while the humanitarian situation is deteriorating, the rate of deterioration is not expected to exceed the current trend.

**Objective of risk analysis**

The objective of ACAPS risk analysis is to enable humanitarian decision makers to understand potential future changes that would likely have humanitarian consequences. By exposing the more probable developments and understanding their impact, they can be included in planning and preparedness which should improve response.

At ACAPS, risk analysis enables us to ensure our monitoring of countries and crises is forward-looking and our consequent analysis more informed; gain advance warning about countries and crises on which we ought to report in more depth; and respond to specific requests for risk reports.

All of which aim to inform the ACAPS audience, and thus the humanitarian community, of likely future events.
Key principles of risk analysis

Risk analysis depends on a solid understanding of the context and on investigating the interaction of the variables that cause or resist change.

Risk analysis is a process that should be repeated at regular intervals and the change in risk recorded over time.

Risk analysis improves with time: regular reviews of risks that analyse why previously identified risks did or did not materialise will help strengthen the analyst’s ability to create chains of events and assess probabilities. Documenting this builds the evidence base for ACAPS as a whole.

Risk analysis is not an exact science: an event identified by one analyst as a hazard, might be identified by another as a trigger for different event which the second analyst considers the hazard. This is of little consequence; the important issue is that the sequence of events and a hazard are identified.

Risk is a function of Severity and Probability: i.e. the risk posed by a potential event increases as either the expected severity of the event increases or the probability that it will occur increases.

Limitations

Considering the diversity and complexity of the crises, it has not been possible to cover each crisis in detail. Instead, we have highlighted the broad evolution of the crises to flag potential deteriorations and inform operational, strategic, and policy decision-makers.

The focus on risk analysis means that we have not considered multiple possible factors that could lead to an improvement in a given context. Unforeseen circumstances that may change the course of events have not received attention in this report, such as natural hazards and sudden onset events.

Information gaps also limit the analysis. Additionally, while efforts were made to ensure that all information was up to date at the time of publishing, the fluidity of situations in some countries means that significant changes are often observed from one week to another.
CrisisInsight
QUARTERLY RISK ANALYSIS
March 2019*

MOZAMBIQUE
Violence increases in Cabo Delgado resulting in displacement, protection needs, and deteriorated access to food and livelihoods

SUDAN
Economic crisis leads to increased food insecurity, socio-political instability, and protection concerns amidst protests

LIBYA
Escalation of violence in northwest Libya leads to large-scale displacement and shelter, protection, and health needs

BURKINA FASO
Increasing violence and displacement in the north result in a deterioration of food security

AFGHANISTAN
Escalation of conflict amid fragile peace process leads to displacement and civilian casualties

BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA
Up to 50,000 migrants, refugees and asylum seekers arrive in Bosnia and Herzegovina with humanitarian needs that push current response capacity to its limits

ETHIOPIA
Escalation and spread of intercommunal violence leads to increased displacement and humanitarian needs

SOMALIA
Drought as a result of the poor rains followed by a harsh dry season leads to increased levels of food insecurity

VENEZUELA
Hyperinflation, drought, and a deteriorating political situation generates increased needs and further displacement

MYANMAR
Spike in violence between Myanmar Army and Arakan Army in Rakhine state causes further internal displacement and multiple needs amid deteriorating access

AFGHANISTAN
Escalation of conflict amid fragile peace process leads to displacement and civilian casualties

BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA
Up to 50,000 migrants, refugees and asylum seekers arrive in Bosnia and Herzegovina with humanitarian needs that push current response capacity to its limits

AFGHANISTAN
Escalation of conflict amid fragile peace process leads to displacement and civilian casualties

SUDAN
Economic crisis leads to increased food insecurity, socio-political instability, and protection concerns amidst protests

LIBYA
Escalation of violence in northwest Libya leads to large-scale displacement and shelter, protection, and health needs

BURKINA FASO
Increasing violence and displacement in the north result in a deterioration of food security

AFGHANISTAN
Escalation of conflict amid fragile peace process leads to displacement and civilian casualties

MYANMAR
Spike in violence between Myanmar Army and Arakan Army in Rakhine state causes further internal displacement and multiple needs amid deteriorating access

ETHIOPIA
Escalation and spread of intercommunal violence leads to increased displacement and humanitarian needs

SOMALIA
Drought as a result of the poor rains followed by a harsh dry season leads to increased levels of food insecurity

VENEZUELA
Hyperinflation, drought, and a deteriorating political situation generates increased needs and further displacement

MYANMAR
Spike in violence between Myanmar Army and Arakan Army in Rakhine state causes further internal displacement and multiple needs amid deteriorating access

*The risks identified on this map are expected to materialise within the next six months.
Escalation of conflict amid fragile peace process leads to displacement and civilian casualties

RATIONALE

Peace talks between the US and the Taliban have seen some progress in 2019, most notably a draft agreement on the timeline for US troop withdrawal and the Taliban’s commitment to prevent militants from attacking US targets from Afghanistan (Reuters 26/02/2019; DW 13/03/2019). Conceding to a potential ceasefire agreement would likely undermine the Taliban’s favourable negotiating position, for which military gains have seemingly been crucial in the past (Reuters 19/08/2018; ICG 19/06/2018; Al Jazeera 25/04/2018; NYT 18/07/2018; AAN 25/06/2018). Targeted attacks to exert pressure on negotiations have occurred from both sides and are likely to continue (NYT 01/03/2019). Furthermore, the premature withdrawal of foreign forces risks leading to (non-state) armed groups expanding their offensives (Guardian 21/12/2018).

There is a general perception that the current talks are focused on lowering US financial and military involvement rather than on finding sustainable peace. This perception is reinforced by the absence of the Afghan government from talks and a lack of clarity over the content, as well as unclear discussion on the possibility of an interim government in the run up to the elections which have been postponed from July to September. If elections proceed without including the Taliban, the group is likely to violently disrupt the process.

IMPACT

A new escalation of hostilities will likely spark temporary and prolonged displacement and maintain the record-high levels of civilian casualties as seen in 2018. Major Taliban assaults on the strategic cities Farah, Ghazni and Kunduz in 2016 and 2018 led to the displacement of tens of thousands of people and several hundred civilian casualties, and these are in particular remain at risk of future assaults (DI 11/10/2016; AAN 16/12/2018).

A spike in conflict will likely hamper access in a country where the humanitarian space is already limited. Uncertainty about the outcomes of peace negotiations and the upcoming Presidential elections – likely to be heavily contested – add to the extremely uncertain operating environment.

Protection is a major concern for the civilian population. IDPs will also likely have urgent shelter, food, NFI and health needs. New displacement will add a strain to limited host community capacities. Resources will be further stretched due to high numbers of undocumented returnees that continue to return from Iran. Humanitarian needs will be exacerbated by decades of conflict, protracted poverty, and a severe drought in 2018 that left 13.5 million people severely food insecure (FAO March 2019).
BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA

Up to 50,000 migrants, refugees and asylum seekers arrive in the country with humanitarian needs that push current response capacity to its limits

RATIONALE

Some 24,000 migrants and refugees registered entry into Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 2018, compared to 755 in 2017. An estimated 5,500 of these people remain in the country, many in accommodation centres in Una-Sana Canton in the northwest, where they attempt to cross the Croatian border into the EU (ECHO 13/02/2019). Tightened Croatian border controls since May 2018 have reduced the number of successful crossings, prolonging the stay of irregular migrants and refugees in BiH (IFRC 27/09/2018).

Although the number of monthly arrivals to BiH decreased during the winter months, a spike in arrivals is expected in the spring as weather and travel conditions improve, with overall arrival numbers projected to double in 2019 (IFRC 11/12/2019). In January 2019, 732 arrivals were recorded, a rise compared to January 2018 (237 arrivals) and January 2017 (77 arrivals), indicating a significant chance of increased arrivals in the first half of 2019. These numbers likely underestimate the real situation, as people are smuggled in and uncounted (UNHCR 02/2019).

IMPACT

Shelter will be a critical need as existing accommodation facilities, mainly ad-hoc migrant centres, are already at or beyond full capacity and living and sanitary conditions are poor (UNHCR 02/2019). Protection is a concern as inadequate shelter conditions and overcrowding are likely to aggravate existing tensions among migrant and refugee groups of different nationalities and ethnicities, leading to conflicts and protection risks (UNHCR 02/2019).

Fair and efficient access to asylum in BiH will likely be a challenge given the limited capacity of BiH authorities (UNHCR 02/2019). A rise in violent push-backs from the Croatian border is likely and will result in further protection and health concerns, such as denial of access to asylum, as well as injuries (Human Rights Watch 11/12/2018). An estimated 50-100 people were pushed back weekly in the second half of 2018, 70% of them claiming they were beaten by Croatian authorities (The Guardian 14/11/2018). An increase in violent push-backs will worsen tensions between migrants, refugees and authorities (IRIN 31/10/2018).
Burkina Faso

Increasing violence and displacement in the north result in a deterioration of food security

Rationale

Around 80% of Burkina Faso’s population relies on agricultural livelihoods (Cadre Harmonisé 22/03/2019). Agriculture is mainly rainfed, making it highly dependent upon the amount of rainfall. The combination of a longer than usual dry season in 2017 and below-average rainfall in 2018 negatively impacted both food availability and agriculture incomes (FEWS NET 19/12/2018) and found some 307,000 people in Crisis (IPC-3) food security outcomes over September-December 2018 (Cadre Harmonisé 22/03/2019).

Food security has been further impacted by violence between armed groups and both civilian and security forces, that has increased exponentially, especially in the north. As a result, more than 115,000 people have been internally displaced, including 70,000 since January 2019, and access to fields is constrained (OCHA 14/03/2019). The situation is not showing sign of a normalisation and violence is likely to endure due to lack of local governance and strong presence of armed groups in the northern regions, and the instability in neighbouring countries.

Impact

 Violence is likely to impact the next planting season (normally March to mid-May), with lasting consequences on the food security of local populations. The conflict is also likely to disrupt livestock migration (usually January-June). Market activity is likely to drop, especially in areas closer to the border with Mali and Niger where violence is particularly bad, impacting both farmer and herder livelihoods (FEWS NET 02/2019).

Some 4.7 million people living in conflict-affected areas in northern Burkina Faso rely on livestock and cereals as their main sources of livelihood (FEWS NET 2014). Consequently the number of people in IPC phase 4 (Emergency) is likely to increase during the first half of 2019 and exceed the 24,000 people expected to face IPC Phase 4 from June-August in the regions affected by conflict. Should the conflict spread to the rest of the country, the overall number of food-insecure people will increase. At least some of the 38,000 people projected to face Crisis in the Est and Centre-Est region are likely fall into Emergency (Cadre Harmonisé 22/03/2019).
Escalation and spread of intercommunal violence leads to increased displacement and humanitarian needs

RATIONALE
Conflict-driven displacement increased throughout 2018, bringing the total of IDPs to nearly 3 million, up from 1.1 million at end of 2017 (ECHO 02/10/2018; IDMC 05/2018). Conflict has continued and there is a significant risk it will increase as a result of at least three factors.

First, local elections scheduled for mid-2019 risk inflaming already high intercommunal tensions by spurring competition between different groups for power and resources. Originally scheduled for April 2018, these elections were already postponed due to fears of violence and unrest (ICG 21/02/2019). Additionally, growing demands for autonomy among ethnic minority groups, such as the Sidama and Qemant, pose the risk of localised protests leading to violence (Ethiopia Insight 16/12/2018). In Sidama zone a proposed referendum to establish Sidama as an independent state sparked large-scale protests in February 2019, and continued clashes between pro-independence and anti-independence factions are likely (Borkena 21/02/2019).

Finally, a breakdown in relations between the government and political opposition groups would likely trigger further violence – particularly in western Ethiopia, where the Oromo Liberation Front clashed with government forces in recent months and was accused of carrying out ethnically motivated attacks, despite formally agreeing in August 2018 to disarm (Africa News 02/10/2019; Xinhua 16/01/2019).

IMPACT
A further spike in intercommunal violence in Ethiopia is likely to lead to large-scale displacement in areas where IDPs are already present, such as Gedeo (SNNPR), west Guji (Oromia region), and Kamashi (Benishangul-Gumuz region) zones, and potentially new areas.

Given that local and international response capacities are already stretched to their limit, it will likely be even more challenging to address the food, shelter, protection, and health needs of newly displaced people (IDMC 12/09/2019).

Access issues will likely be a concern as certain areas become unsafe due to conflict, and due to government limitations concerning the areas where humanitarians are allowed to operate. At present, humanitarian access is almost completely restricted in many of the areas that have experienced the most intense intercommunal conflict, such as Dawa zone (Somali region), Gedeo zone, and Guji zone (OCHA 07/03/2019).
Escalation of violence in the northwest leads to large-scale displacement and shelter, protection, and health needs

RATIONALE

Recent developments in Libya have raised the risk of conflict escalation in the northwest. Following the very recent offensive into the oil-rich southern region, the Libyan National Army (LNA) now controls the majority of Libyan territory, strengthening the political and economic position of its commander, Khalifa Haftar (The Guardian 11/03/2019). Some LNA units have moved into central Libya and towards Sirte province in the north, possibly indicating an advance to the northwest, and Tripoli in particular (The Libya Observer 11/03/2019).

Tripoli, currently under control of the opposing UN-backed government, is strongly divided and home to different armed groups with fluid alliances. Although Haftar has not announced a move towards the capital, his LNA has repeatedly threatened to march on Tripoli (REUTERS 09/03/2019). Tensions have increased and local forces opposing the LNA are mobilizing (Libya Herald 21/03/2019).

Despite the show of force, the LNA struggles with internal divide and stretched resources and does not seem ready to invade Tripoli – Haftar is likely using his soft power to leverage his role in a new Libyan government ahead of elections (The Guardian 11/03/2019). However, the situation in Libya is extremely volatile and strategies change quickly. Any attempt to seize the capital would be met with violent resistance from LNA-opposing groups.

IMPACT

An escalation of conflict between the LNA and LNA-allied forces, and the opposing Tripoli-based forces would have a severe humanitarian impact. The northwestern region is densely populated compared to the rest of the country and the security situation across Libya has severely hampered humanitarian access.

Tripoli alone has 940,653 inhabitants (Bureau of Statistics and Census Libya 2012). A direct conflict would lead to massive displacement and large-scale humanitarian needs, including shelter needs in particular and protection against torture and extrajudicial killings, which commonly occur in conflict-affected areas. Some health infrastructure has been damaged by the conflict and at least a partial suspension of health services is expected if there is further violence (HRP November 2018).
MOZAMBIQUE

Violence increases in Cabo Delgado resulting in displacement, protection needs, and deteriorated access to food and livelihoods

RATIONALE

Islamic extremists have been launching violent attacks on civilians in the northern province of Cabo Delgado since October 2017, resulting in at least 2,000 people displaced, nearly 300 people killed, and more than 1,000 properties destroyed (NewsDay 21/02/2019; RFI 25/11/2018; Africans Rising 10/01/2019; Club of Mozambique 08/02/2019). Events involving the group, known as Ahlu Sunna Wa-Jama, have been increasing, with 20 attacks in the first two months of 2019 compared with 50 in all of 2018 (ACLED). The group’s activities have been concentrated on the coast of Cabo Delgado from Pemba to the Tanzanian border, and recent events showed a possible shift in tactics from night-time attacks on isolated homes, to coordinated daytime attacks against employees of the foreign oil company Anadarko, currently leading the biggest liquefied natural gas project in the country worth 20 billion dollars (Southern Times Africa 11/03/2019; Bloomberg 22/02/2019).

Government response, however, is leading to human rights abuses. Government forces have detained journalists for covering events in Cabo Delgado and subjected civilians suspected of supporting the group to perquisitions, looting, and arbitrary detention (Carta de Mocambique 06/03/2019). If the government fails to address the social, religious, and political dynamics behind the insurgency, the attacks are very likely to continue.

IMPACT

The attacks have already affected the food security situation in Cabo Delgado, where Stressed levels (IPC-2) are reported along the coast compared to Minimal (IPC-1) food insecurity in the rest of the province (FewsNet 21/12/2018).

The insurgents’ strategy has been focused on destruction of property, burning houses and stalls, leading to displacement and shelter needs (Club of Mozambique 14/01/2019; HRW 01/2019). Should this type of attack continue, food insecurity is likely to increase as more households are displaced and unable to access food or engage in agricultural activities (Club of Mozambique 01/10/2018).

Livelihoods will be impacted due to insecurity and destruction. Education will likely be affected due to fear of attacks on public schools by the armed group in a show of dissent towards the State. Protection issues are likely to increase, arising from both the insurgent activity and the response of government forces. Currently there are no reported constraints on humanitarian access.
**Spike in violence between Myanmar Army and Arakan Army in Rakhine state causes further internal displacement and multiple needs amid deteriorating access**

**RATIONALE**

Sporadic fighting between the Myanmar Army and Arakan Army (AA), a Rakhine insurgent group, has intensified in northern Rakhine state and southern Chin state since December 2018. Clashes in several townships over the last months resulted in an unknown number of casualties on both sides, as well as multiple civilian fatalities (The Irrawaddy 21/03/2019) and thousands of people displaced (ECHO 28/02/2019; The Irrawaddy 19/03/2019).

Following an AA attack on police posts in January that killed 13 police officers (REUTERS 18/01/2019), Myanmar’s President ordered a military crackdown on the AA (REUTERS 07/01/2019). This generated increased support of the AA by ethnic Rakhine and other armed ethnic groups such as the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), who threatened to join the conflict (The Irrawaddy 19/03/2019). A buildup of 8,000 troops (RFA 06/03/2019), airstrikes, and heavy artillery use by the Myanmar Army (RFA 14/03/2019) over the last two months, along with the spreading of conflict southward (The Irrawaddy 07/02/2019) indicates risk of further escalation of violence in the region. However, with the monsoon approaching and the AA running low on supplies, the likelihood of a larger scale offensive is reduced.

**IMPACT**

An estimated 7,800 people have been internally displaced by the recent violence (RFA 18/03/2019). With Bangladesh threatening to close its borders to people displacing from Myanmar, an escalation of conflict would likely result in large-scale internal displacement within the country.

Humanitarian access remains severely restricted since January, when the government banned most aid groups from working in northern Rakhine (REUTERS 14/01/2019). Priority needs would likely be shelter, food and health assistance. Further attempts by the Myanmar Army to undermine support for the AA, such as large-scale arrests of civilians perceived to be supporting the AA already undertaken, raises protection concerns (The Irrawaddy 04/02/2019; RFA 25/02/2019; RFA 20/03/2019).
SOMALIA

Drought as a result of the poor rains followed by a harsh dry season leads to increased levels of food insecurity

RATIONALE

Recurrent droughts have left people with unmet humanitarian needs, compounded by the armed conflict. Across much of Somalia, the 2018 Deyr rainy season (October-December) was below average, and the Jilaal dry season (January-March) has been harsher than average. Dry weather conditions and relatively high temperatures prevail and little rainfall is forecast in the coming weeks (FEWS NET; FSNAU 09/03/2019). Pasture and water availability are already deteriorating, particularly in the northern and central regions (OCHA 23/01/2019). 139,000 people countrywide are currently facing Emergency (IPC-4) levels of food insecurity (FAO, FSNAU 03/02/2019).

The situation is expected to deteriorate until June, especially in northern and central pastoral livelihood zones. Should the Gu rainy season (April-June) perform poorly it will be more difficult for the food security situation to recover and further deterioration will be likely through late 2019 (OCHA 05/03/2019; IPC 01/01/2019; FEWS NET FSNAU 09/03/2019). In terms of nutrition, 903,100 children under five are likely to be acutely malnourished (GAM) including 138,200 severely (SAM) in 2019 (Jan-Dec) (FAO, FSNAU 03/02/2019).

IMPACT

An estimated 1.5 million people are currently facing Crisis (IPC 3) or Emergency (IPC 4) through to June 2019, this includes around 139,000 people who are facing Emergency (IPC 4). Poor Gu season rainfall could result in crop failure and livestock deaths, thereby reducing food availability and access among pastoral and agropastoral livelihoods.

Should food insecurity worsen, rates of malnutrition rates may rise further, especially for groups with particular vulnerabilities such as children under 5, pregnant and lactating mothers, elderly people, and people living with disability (IFRC 05/03/2019).

Further displacement is likely among pastoralist communities in search of water and pasture, as well as rural to urban migration. In January, around 17,000 people were newly displaced, 53% due to drought-related causes (FAO FSNAU SWALIM 25/02/2019). Reduced water availability for humans and animals in northern and central pastoral livelihood zones is a major concern and has triggered earlier-than-normal water trucking at high prices (FEWS NET 01/2019). Outbreaks of communicable diseases such as acute watery diarrhoea will likely increase as a result of a potential drop in water availability (IFRC 21/02/2019).
SUDAN

Economic crisis leads to increased food insecurity, socio-political instability, and protection concerns amidst protests

RATIONALE

Sudan’s economy is facing continuous shortages of hard currency and decreasing availability of basic commodities such as fuel, flour and medicines leading to rising prices (FEWS NET 02/2019; ACAPS 13/2/2019). The economic crisis is likely to worsen due to the government’s continued inability to address the challenges holistically, including enhancing free trade, fighting corruption, and reducing military spending. It is likely that Sudan will not receive needed foreign investment as the country is expected to remain classified as a ‘state sponsor of terror’ (Financial Times 08/11/2018; Middle East Eye 14/9/2018 Human Rights Watch 7/11/2018).

Countrywide anti-government demonstrations that began in mid-December 2018 are expected to continue despite a national ban. The government’s violent and repressive response is very likely to trigger further mobilisation of protestors. A regime change is unlikely, however a more authoritarian rule is expected as President Al-Bashir tries to hold onto power (International Crisis Group 26/2/2019; International Crisis Group 14/1/2019; ACAPS 13/2/2019).

IMPACT

The deteriorating economy is expected to further reduce access to food and public services (FEWS NET 02/2019; International Crisis Group 14/1/2019; International Crisis Group 26/2/2019; ACAPS 13/2/2019; Amnesty International 18/1/2019). 5.67 million Sudanese are already severely food insecure and have increasingly limited capacity to cope with a potentially reduced harvest, as well as rising living costs.

IDPs in areas controlled by armed groups are particularly vulnerable: some 124,000 IDPs in conflict-affected South Kordofan and Jebel Marra face high restrictions to access humanitarian assistance, and are at high risk of Emergency (IPC-4) levels of food insecurity during the peak lean season (August/September) (FEWS NET 02/2019; IPC 15/1/2019; ACAPS 13/2/2019; OCHA 31/1/2019).

Growing shortages of medical supplies as well as doctors participating in anti-government strikes reduces access to public health service, particularly in rural areas (Radio Dabanga 15/2/2019; Radio Dabanga 13/1/2019; Radio Dabanga 13/2/2019; ACAPS 13/2/2019; BBC 18/1/2019; WHO 11/3/2019).

Government forces are likely to continue to violently suppress protests, which will likely result in an increase in human rights violations including arbitrary arrests, detention and physical violence (Human Rights Watch 18/1/2019). Rising political instability and the potential for armed groups to become more active, will exacerbate security concerns and further restrict humanitarian access (ACAPS 13/2/2019; International Crisis Group 14/1/2019).
**VENEZUELA**

Hyperinflation, drought, and a deteriorating political situation generates increased needs and further displacement

**RATIONALE**

Venezuela’s economy is expected to continue spiralling, with inflation predicted to reach 10,000,000% by the end of 2019. The deepening political and socio-economic crisis within the country has led to the collapse of services, deterioration of health, food security, and nutrition among the population, and one of the biggest mass displacements in South America’s history. 2.7 million people have fled the country since 2014 and the number is expected to reach 5.3 million by the end of 2019.

Tensions between Maduro’s government and the opposition escalated in the beginning of 2019. There is a risk that pressure from international stakeholders calling for change in Venezuela’s leadership and threatening armed intervention could lead to a potential armed confrontation between the government and the US-backed opposition. In addition, growing discontent is likely to lead to large-scale civil unrest, and there is a risk that mass protests could be violently repressed by Venezuelan authorities. The current drought in combination with an El Niño episode confirmed in the beginning of 2019 is also causing concern (UNHCR 03/2019; Le Monde Diplomatique 03/2019; El Universal 28/01/2019, Caracas Chronicles 24/02/2019; The Guardian 11/03/2019: 13/03/2019).

**IMPACT**

With inflation spiralling, the living situation for Venezuelans inside the country is likely to deteriorate significantly, with increased food and medicine shortages, increasing deaths caused by the failure of the health system, as well as paralysis of commerce, education, and increased poverty. Livelihoods and food security are also at risk of being disproportionately impacted by the current drought and El Niño episode.

Armed confrontation and large scale civil unrest is likely to significantly worsen the humanitarian situation, create serious protection concerns for civilians, and trigger further displacement. Migration from Venezuela shows no signs of slowing down, and the continuing influx is likely to keep impacting neighbouring countries, straining capacities and leading to the deterioration of basic services. Potential pushback or change in migration policies from host countries would likely lead to increasing difficulties for Venezuelan refugees to access legal status or gain right to employment (R2P 15/03/2019; El Stimulo 12/03/2019; IFRC 01/02/2019; Reuters 09/10/2018).