HUMANITARIAN ACCESS OVERVIEW

August 2018

GLOBAL ACCESS RANKING

- No access constraints
- Accessible with low access constraints
- Accessible with moderate access constraints
- Accessible with high access constraints
- Nearly inaccessible
- Inaccessible

ACAPS methodology uses 9 variables, grouped under 3 dimensions:

- Access of humanitarian actors to affected population
- Access of people in need of humanitarian aid
- Security and physical constraints

Each dimension is measured through proxy indicators, such as violence against personnel, denial of needs, or active hostilities. Data is collected at the country level and may therefore not show disparities between sub-regions.

This methodology relies mainly on available secondary data and carries the limitations associated with the information used.

See more about ACAPS methodology.

Date created: 09/08/2018
Source of data: 02/08/2018
### HUMANITARIAN ACCESS OVERVIEW

August 2018

#### Overall humanitarian access ranking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impediments to entry into country</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction of movement within the country</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference with humanitarian activities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against personnel, facilities and assets</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denial of humanitarian needs</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction of access to services and assistance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing insecurity / hostilities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of mines and UXO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical constraints</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The rounded score of the country’s overall humanitarian access does not correspond to the sum of the nine indicators. To see how this is calculated, read our methodology.
**METHODOLOGY**

Our methodology groups 9 variables under 3 dimensions:

1. Access of humanitarian actors to affected population comprised of 4 variables:
   - Impediments to entry
   - Restriction of movement
   - Interference with activities
   - Violence against personnel

2. Access of people in need to humanitarian aid comprised of 2 variables:
   - Denial of needs
   - Restriction of population’s access to aid

3. Security and physical constraints comprised of 3 variables:
   - Active hostilities
   - UXO and mines
   - Physical constraints

Each indicator is given a score from 0 to 3, and marked with an X when there is an information gap identified.

The overall access score by country is ranked according to the following scale:

0 - No constraints
1 - Accessible with low constraints
2 - Accessible with moderate constraints
3 - Accessible with high constraints
4 - Nearly inaccessible
5 - Inaccessible

We are providing analytical narratives for countries scored between level 3 to 5.

**INACCESSIBLE**

**ERITREA**

Few humanitarian actors are allowed to operate in Eritrea. Authorities frequently deny access to human rights observers and researchers, suggesting a context of denial of needs. Entry into the country is limited and permission is required to travel outside of the capital Asmara. Mine contamination remains a concern. Information on the situation in the country is sporadic due to high access constraints, and there are information gaps.

**SYRIA**

Humanitarian access remains severely constrained in Syria amid ongoing conflict. Current access restrictions caused by insecurity include a government campaign to retake the south, the gradual encircling of opposition held territory in Idlib, fighting between opposition groups in the north, and suicide attacks in government held areas. Health workers and other humanitarian actors continue to be targeted by shelling, airstrikes, and small arms fire. 120 health facilities have been attacked in the first half in 2018. The Jordanian, Israeli and Turkish border closures are hampering cross-border aid, while government offensives result in internal restrictions on movement, particularly in southern Syria. There is a high presence of UXOs and ERWs, even in areas of return. Access to Eastern Ghouta, Kefraya and Foua remains poor despite the end of sieges. 1.5 million people are living in hard to reach areas.

**VENEZUELA**

The government does not recognise the scale of humanitarian needs in Venezuela and does not allow most humanitarian agencies and aid into the country. While the government distributes some state benefits, new identity cards are increasingly required to receive the benefits. A general lack of information hampers the assessment of humanitarian access indicators.

**YEMEN**

Ongoing insecurity, administrative and physical movement restrictions, violence against humanitarian responders, and obstruction of civilian access to assistance continue to be the main factors hampering humanitarian access. Insecurity mostly affects western governorates, impacting on price and availability of fuel and there is increasing interference in humanitarian activities. Despite the blockade being lifted in 2018, allowing more humanitarian assistance to enter the country, impediments to entry enforced by the belligerent parties continue to severely hamper aid delivery, particularly at major ports such as Al Hudaydah.

**NEARLY INACCESSIBLE**

**AFGHANISTAN**

There are multiple constraints on humanitarian access, including a difficult registration process for NGOs and limitations on the type of activities and projects allowed. Approximately 40% of the country is either controlled or contested by armed groups, resulting in high constraints on movement. Aid workers and health infrastructure are frequently targeted. Civilian infrastructure - such as schools - is used for military operations, depriving people’s access to services. Afghanistan is still heavily contaminated by landmines. There has been no improvement in humanitarian access in 2018.

**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC**

Widespread insecurity because of protracted conflict and frequent attacks against humanitarians and UN peacekeepers continues to hamper humanitarian operations. Kidnapping of humanitarian workers is at one of the highest rates in the world and deaths of aid workers and UN peacekeepers are often reported. UN and NGO vehicles and premises are regularly robbed and looted. Organisations working in the health sector have been particularly targeted in 2018. Growing insecurity has reduced access in Bangui in 2018. Road infrastructure is poor, and armed groups impose roadblocks and illegal taxation. There has also been an increase in levels of interethnic tensions in prefectures such as Mbomou, Basse-Kotto and...
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS OVERVIEW
August 2018

Haut-Mbomo. Armed groups around IDP sites, such as the PK3 Bria site restrict IDP movement, preventing IDPs from reaching water and food, accessing basic services, and receiving humanitarian assistance.

DPRK
Overall humanitarian access remains poor, although some agencies note an improvement. While the government of DPRK tightly regulates the access and activities of humanitarian organisations, access is possible for national and international staff in ten out of 11 provinces (Jagang is inaccessible to international staff), and authorisations are seldom refused. Travel within DPRK remains regulated by national authorities. International humanitarian agencies need to obtain advance clearance for field visits outside of Pyongyang, as do DPRK nationals. Itineraries must be planned, generally a week in advance, and international staff accompanied by DPRK nationals. Road networks outside Pyongyang are of varying quality and in some areas become impassable during winter. The DMZ border area between DPRK and South Korea is heavily mined.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Violence, widespread insecurity, and clashes between armed groups present a serious threat to humanitarians operating in DRC, especially in Nord and Sud Kivu, Ituri, Maniema, Tanganyika, and Greater Kasai provinces. Looting and attacks on humanitarian staff are regularly reported, and humanitarian organisations often suspend activities because of insecurity. Lack of infrastructure and poor road conditions make some areas hard to reach. Congolese authorities heavily interfere with humanitarian activities. The government has accused the international community of exaggerating the scale of the crisis. Humanitarian access varies according to regional conflict dynamics. Access has generally improved in Maniema and Ituri but is extremely challenging in other conflict-affected areas.

LIBYA
Lack of a unified government perpetuates a complex administrative environment regarding visas and other requirements to implement activities in the country. Most humanitarian agencies have been operating from Tunisia since 2014 but relative stabilisation of the conflict has resulted in some offices re-opening in Tripoli in mid-2018. Access to Derna has improved since June when the LNA took control of the city after years of siege. However, sporadic fighting and the presence of ERW and IEDs restrict the return of IDPs and limit humanitarian access, especially in formerly besieged areas such as Derna, Sirte, and Misrata. Aid workers and health facilities are frequently targeted by armed groups. Access to detention centres remains very limited.

SOMALIA
Access is severely hampered by conflict and insecurity and restrictions imposed by armed groups. Some areas controlled by Al Shabaab, particularly in southern Somalia, are inaccessible for humanitarian actors. Al Shabaab is preventing people in areas under their control from accessing food, healthcare, and other forms of humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian operations are further disrupted by seizure of goods and attacks against aid workers. Since April, flooding has further constrained access, with some locations accessible only by plane.

SOUTH SUDAN
Access is severely disrupted by ongoing conflict and insecurity. Attacks against humanitarian staff, assets, and facilities are frequent. Lootings, staff relocations, and bureaucratic constraints, imposed by government and opposition groups, commonly occur. Fighting and insecurity regularly result in the suspension of activity and relocation of staff. Many locations become inaccessible during the rainy season. Although the overall number of access-related incidents per month has decreased in comparison to 2017, the impact on humanitarian aid remains significant.

BURUNDI
Criminality and insecurity resulting from the socioeconomic situation has generally worsened humanitarian access. Humanitarian activities and movements are heavily regulated by the Burundian government: local and international organisations face administrative restrictions, bans, suspensions, and even staff arrests, which limit the humanitarian response. Heavy rains and floods routinely cause damage to infrastructure, particularly roads and bridges, decreasing access to affected populations. The political context makes it difficult for agencies to share information about the crisis.

CAMEROON
Ongoing conflict and an increased military presence in the English-speaking Northwest and Southwest regions have restricted humanitarian access: very few aid agencies have been granted access and newly established checkpoints are constraining access in the area. In the Far North region, insecurity fuelled by frequent Boko Haram attacks and the presence of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) impedes humanitarian access.
**ETHIOPIA**
Strict procedures to enter the country and operational restrictions constrain humanitarian access. Movement and some supply routes are constrained by growing insecurity in areas affected by intercommunal violence, and seasonally by floods. Violence is sporadically affecting humanitarian workers. Ethiopia is still heavily contaminated by the presence of landmines. Since the beginning of 2018, the security situation has worsened along with increased physical access constraints, such as flooding.

**MALI**
Increasing insecurity due to the presence of Islamist armed groups and increased intercommunal conflict continue to be the main factors disrupting humanitarian access, especially in the northern and central regions. The presence of mines and explosives, especially in Mopti region, pose a danger to humanitarian convoys, security forces and civilians: at least 93 IED incidents were recorded during the first five months of 2018. Attacks on aid workers and security forces have also increased since the beginning of 2018. In June, six NGOs temporarily suspended activities in Menaka region following repeated break-ins and attacks against their staff. Similar events are recurrent in Timbuktu and Kidal regions.

**MYANMAR**
Humanitarian access remains poor overall, especially in Rakhine state, where the government has placed severe restrictions on the activities of humanitarian organisations. There were reports of humanitarian staff being targeted in 2017 in Rakhine, but no reports in 2018. Areas controlled by armed groups in Kachin and Shan states are largely restricted for humanitarian actors, but not completely blocked. The Myanmar military has been accused of blocking relief supplies to people displaced by the fighting in territories controlled by non-government controlled armed groups.

**NIGERIA**
Access to northeast Nigeria remains highly constrained, largely because of ongoing insecurity, and access has no changed significantly in the past six months. Abadam and Mart local government areas (LGAs) are entirely inaccessible. Access in most other affected LGAs in Borno state is limited, while the rest of the LGA is partially accessible. Military escorts usually accompany humanitarian road cargo in the northeast. In the Middle Belt region, violence between farmers and herders has grown since January 2018 and causes access constraints. Flooding during the ongoing rainy season could further limit access.

**SUDAN**
Humanitarian access overall remains poor, particularly in the Jebel Marra of Darfur, and other states where armed groups are active, such as Blue Nile and South Kordofan. Travel procedures for humanitarian organisations have been eased, but heavy administrative procedures and interference present significant obstacles to the timely provision of assistance. UNAMID personnel are denied access to conflict areas by government forces. The government generally denies access to aid organisations in Blue Nile areas administered by SPLM-N (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North).

**TURKEY**
The main factors limiting humanitarian access involve administrative movement restrictions, particularly in Kurdish areas, and a volatile environment for NGOs and humanitarian workers, including detentions and revoking of licenses. A new ‘anti-terrorism’ law is likely to create administrative access impediments. Access to areas of southeastern Turkey, where the government and PKK continue to wage conflict, remains extremely limited. The needs of displaced Kurdish populations are often denied or ignored, as there is very limited information available on the humanitarian needs in these areas.

**UKRAINE**
Ongoing conflict continues to leave humanitarian access highly constrained. In order to reach the non-government-controlled area (NGCA), humanitarian personnel are required to cross the contact line through one of the five entry-exit checkpoints, creating a critical access constraint. There are limitations on humanitarian cargo and controls on movements across the contact line. Shelling along the contact line is frequent. Long lines at the entry-exit checkpoints restrict access to social services. Overall there has been no change in humanitarian access over the past six months.
METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

This methodology, developed by ACAPS, aims to compare current humanitarian crises based on their level of humanitarian access. This method relies mainly on available secondary data and carries the limitations associated with the information used.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND RANKING

Humanitarian access is divided into three core dimensions, based on indicators developed by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and widely used among humanitarian organizations. The three dimensions are: access of people in need to aid, access of humanitarian actors to the affected populations, and physical and security constraints. Each dimension is made up of different variables, for a total of nine variables across all three dimensions. The dimensions and their variables are as follows:

1. Access of humanitarian actors to affected populations
   - Impediments to entry into country (bureaucratic and administrative)
   - Restriction of movement (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions)
   - Interference into implementation of humanitarian activities
   - Violence against personnel, facilities, and assets

2. Access of People in Need to aid
   - Denial of existence of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance
   - Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance

3. Physical and security constraints
   - Ongoing insecurity/hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance
   - Presence of mines and improvised explosive devices
   - Physical constraints in the environment (obstacles related to terrain, climate, lack of infrastructure, etc.)

The following matrix shows the dimensions and their variables, with examples of indicators that are used for analysis.

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DIMENSION 1: Access of Humanitarian Actors to Affected Populations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Impediments to entry into country (bureaucratic and administrative) | • Taxes, fees and other costs incurred for personnel
• Reduction in number of allowed operating NGOs in country
• Delays/denial of visas
• Delays/denial in official registration
• Constraints on import of equipment and relief items into the country
• Formal and/or informal policies regarding movements
• Cluster system is activated or not |
| Restriction of movement (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions) | • Taxes and fines on the passage of goods and people
• Quotas on items allowed in specific geographical areas
• Assistance seized (due to restriction of movement)
• Agencies waiting/on hold to intervene - inaction despite readiness
• Closure of crossings to affected area
• Checkpoints frequently preventing movements of humanitarian personnel and supplies |
| Interference into implementation of humanitarian activities [interference with activities when actors already in country] | • Type of assistance interfered with and frequency
• Humanitarians restricted to operate through government structures or in certain areas only
• Restriction of aid to certain population/group
• Diversion or confiscation of aid |
| Violence or threats against personnel, facilities and assets [government conditions] | • Staff withdrawal
• Looting of humanitarian warehouses, cars, and other assets
• Attacks against humanitarian workers, execution, kidnapping, etc.
• Security incidents involving humanitarian personnel and/or assets |

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### HUMANITARIAN ACCESS OVERVIEW

**August 2018**

#### DIMENSION 2: Access of People in need to Aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Denial of existence of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance | • Type and frequency of the interference to the civilian population to access care and service.  
• Discrepancy between humanitarian reported needs and official statements  
• Denial of needs in area, social discrimination on minorities, etc.  
• Travel restrictions on civilians and duration of the restriction  
• Public or private statements (and designation of issuing entity/person, if relevant) recognising needs of target population.  
• Public or private statements of legal obligations to assist (and designation of entity/person, if relevant) |
| Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance | • Forced movement of IDPs away from services  
• Denial of access of affected population to safe places and services  
• Bureaucratic and administrative requirements to access assistance (e.g., personal identification documents required to access health services)  
• Prevention of crossing an international border to seek refuge/assistance  
• Travel restrictions on civilians and duration of the restriction  
• Roadblocks, curfews, harassments  
• Population groups/affected population is “stranded”/cut off  
• Sieges |

#### DIMENSION 3: Physical and Security Constraints

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Ongoing insecurity/hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance          | • Armed confrontations frequency / security operations, bombing, etc.  
• Hostilities impeding population movement to aid  
• Untargeted destruction of humanitarian facilities/operations  
• Withdrawal of personnel  
• Suspension of humanitarian activities  
• Staff evacuated/relocated |
| Presence of mines/unexploded ordnance (UXO) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) | • Demarcation of mined area / de-mined  
• Demarcation of an area with cluster munitions and other UXO  
• Incidents / civilian casualties because of mines or UXO  
• Population inaccessible due to elimination of risk from mines, cluster munitions, and other UXO |
| Physical environment (obstacles related to terrain, climate, lack of infrastructure) | • Status of roads, bridges, airfields  
• Additional time required to travel  
• Areas made inaccessible and duration (months or weeks / year)  
• Reduced/insufficient access of affected pop. owing to remoteness, physical constraints (aid requires difficult travel/risks)  
• Logistical and communications (e.g., no fuel)  
• Seasonal event (rainy season)  
• Weather conditions |
RANKING

1. Analysts collected all the relevant secondary data and sources for the countries monitored by the ACAPS analysis team. Each of the variables was assigned a score from 0 to 3 according to the following table:
   - This variable does not apply in the context. No impact on access
   - The impact of this variable is creating constraints in humanitarian access
   - The impact of this variable is creating high constraints
   - The impact of this variable is blocking access

2. The scores for all variables pertaining to a given dimension were added to reach a total for each dimension.

3. Based on pre-set thresholds the scores of the dimensions are transposed to a scale from 0 to 5.

4. The rounded average score of the three dimensions was calculated to provide the country's overall humanitarian access score.

Exception: When the variable ‘Impediments to entry into country’ is assigned a score of 3, the crisis is automatically categorised as Level 5: Inaccessible.