This Regional Analysis of the Syria conflict (RAS) is produced quarterly and seeks to bring together information from all sources in the region to provide analysis of the overall Syria crisis. Part A covers the situation in Syria. Part A I highlights countrywide humanitarian concerns while Part A II provides detailed analysis per governorate. Part B covers the impact of the crisis on neighbouring countries. More information on how to use this document can be found on the last page of this report. The Strategic Needs Analysis Project welcomes all information that could complement this report. For more information, comments or questions please email SNAP@ACAPS.org.
INTRODUCTION

This document, which is one of the three Regional Analysis for Syria Q4 reports, details the situation in Syria on a governorate level. It outlines the main humanitarian needs identified within the respective governorates over the last three months and gives an overview of the main conflict and access developments. Almost all governorates report life-threatening needs in one or more sectors. Priority sectors per governorate are visualised as follows:

**Severity of needs per sector per governorate**

- Critical
- Normal to moderate

The information within the governorate profiles is based on a thorough review of a multitude of sources, including humanitarian assessments and situation reports, media sources and information from the Government of Syria (GoS), opposition groups, and media sources. For more information on the data sources and limitations, please see RAS Syria part A-I.

Although there is a considerable amount of information available on the current situation within Syria, large information gaps remain. This is because there is no information available or because the available information is unreliable. Within the specific governorate chapter, dedicated graphs indicate the extent and cause of the information gaps:

Information gaps are defined for each sector in each governorate according to whether available information is credible and recent enough to determine key priorities and scope of the needs.
1. ALEPPO

**People in Need (PiN)**
- 2 million (MSNA 10/2014, Data Review 11/2014) - out of 5 million estimated residing in 29/40 subdistricts*
- 2.8 million (Data Review 11/2014) - out of 6.7 million estimated residing in the governorate**

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)**
- 1.3 million (MSNA 10/2014, Data Review 11/2014) - compared to 5.3 million estimated pre-war population in 29/40 subdistricts
- 1.8 million (Data Review 11/2014) - compared to 4.9 million estimated, pre-conflict population

* MSNA estimate, roughly based on pre-crisis population + IDPs – people who have left the governorate.
** SNAP calculation: Pre-crisis population + IDPs. The Data Review did not estimate the number of people who had left the governorate.

**Sources:**
- Data Review 11/2014, SNAP Analysis on available data Q4

**Sectors where needs are considered critical:**
- Health
- NFI
- WASH

**Information availability and information gaps:**
- Health
- NFI

**Border crossings:**
- Open
- Restricted access
- Unofficial crossing

**Hum. access constraints (Data Review 11/2014):**
- High
- Low
- No data

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* MSNA estimate, roughly based on pre-crisis population + IDPs – people who have left the governorate.
** SNAP calculation: Pre-crisis population + IDPs. The Data Review did not estimate the number of people who had left the governorate.
1.1. Key issues and possible developments

- Conflict continued during Q4, particularly around Aleppo City, Ain-al-Arab/Kobani and As Safira in the south of the governorate. Communities in Aleppo face regular power cuts and water shortages, as well as serious protection violations caused by barrel bombing, air raids and strict practices imposed by hardliner Islamic organisations controlling parts of the governorate. Certain areas continue to be besieged, specifically the villages of Zahraa and Nubul and eastern Aleppo City.
- Between two to three million people in the governorate are in need while the changes in areas of control and the unpredictable shifting of frontlines in some areas have challenged the predictability of the humanitarian response. As a result, Aleppo Governorate was identified as one of four priority governorates where critical humanitarian needs were recorded across all sectors. For more information regarding this geographic prioritisation, please refer to Annex p. 53.
- During the last quarter, the Government of Syria (GoS) army clashed with different opposition forces, including Jabhat al Nusra (JAN), on the northern edge of Aleppo City, threatening to take the last main opposition supply route into the city. A GoS takeover of this road passing from Handarat and Mallah areas would significantly reduce the opposition’s ability to resupply and it would also allow the GoS army to besiege areas of the city that fell under opposition control two years ago.

1.2. Context

Aleppo Governorate, which hosted 20% of the total Syrian population and was the major commercial and industrial hub of the country before the conflict, has been embroiled in heavy conflict since mid-2012. Much of the infrastructure has been destroyed by ground fighting and aerial bombardment, and large population movements have occurred both within and outside the governorate. A large part of the governorate and parts of Aleppo City are currently under control of a multitude of anti-Government groups.

1.3. Armed Conflict

Aleppo continues to be one of the central sites of fighting between the different factions containing several shifting frontlines. The GoS continues its offensive in areas to the north of Aleppo city, with severe fighting around Mallah, Handarat Camp, Sifat and other areas north of the city, causing a high number of casualties. Battles between the two sides are expected to continue and it is unclear who will take control of this area. This heavy battle is accompanied by several attacks with aerial bombardment by GoS air force on opposition-held neighbourhoods in the city and in the villages surrounding it. (Reuters 04/11/2014, Al Jazeera 05/10/2014, As Safir 22/11/2014, AFP 24/10/2014, AFP 06/11/2014, AFP 09/11/2014, Al Jazeera 02/12/2014, Al Akhbar 09/12/2014, Al Hayat 10/12/2014, Reuters 15/12/2014, SOHR 17/12/2014)

Clashes were reported as well in the southern parts of Aleppo governorate, mainly in As Safira, where GoS has one of its main strongholds and defence material factories (producing weapons and ammunition). Another active front during the last quarter were Nubul and Zahraa fronts in the western part of the governorate, where JAN supported by several groups from the Islamic Front attempted to enter the two towns. Although this move was unsuccessful, the opposition is expected to keep the pressure on this front in order to divert GoS resources away from contested areas north of Aleppo City. (AFP 23/11/2014, UNOCHA 05/12/2014, Syrian Observer 13/10/2014)

1.4. Access

Intense fighting has curtailed access throughout the governorate. However, accessibility remains more or less stable, with conflict incidents sometimes causing delays.

However, the GoS-controlled villages of Nubul and Zahraa remain completely inaccessible. Likewise, access to eastern Aleppo City remains problematic, and access to IS and Kurdish-controlled areas in northeastern Aleppo remains problematic and unpredictable because of ongoing battles.

Roads in GoS areas remain accessible for the most part, although routes crossing into opposition-controlled areas are contested – compelling their accessibility. Castello road, a main delivery artery, is the only accessible route – but it is also a military target and is often only passable for a few hours every day. A secondary main route, Handarat road, has been blocked and inaccessible because of insecurity. (OCHA 19/12/2014, OCHA 24/10/2014, Aleppo Contingency Plan - Food Security & Livelihoods 12/2014, PI 12/2014)

1.5. Displacement

With Aleppo being increasingly encroached upon by the different fighting factions, the governorate has seen significant population movements – both within and outside the governorate. Most recent estimates put the number of IDPs in the governorate between 1.3 million (MSNA 10/2014, 29/40 subdistricts covered) and 1.8 million. (Data Review 11/2014)

Areas controlled by the Islamic State (IS) experienced several aerial attacks and barrel bombing by GoS forces, causing the death of a significant number of civilians during the last quarter, especially in the areas of Al Bab and Kabbasen. Significant battles between IS and GoS have not been reported, but at the end of December there were unconfirmed reports that IS was planning to take control of As Safira. (Reuters 22/10/2014, SOHR 25/12/2014)

Ain al Arab/Kobani has been continuously fought over by both the Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG) and IS forces. Since September, the subdistrict witnessed an all-out attack by IS fighters, in an attempt to defeat the local Kurdish forces. This battle took a regional dimension, drawing the involvement of various regional and international powers, mainly to prevent IS seizing control of the town. Though IS made significant progress initially, YPG, supported by other opposition groups, was able to maintain control of the city. By the end of December, the battle turned to stalemate.

‘Access to IS and Kurdish-controlled areas in northeastern Aleppo remains problematic and unpredictable because of ongoing battles’
Threatened by a possible besiegement by the Government of Syria (GoS), IDP movement increased as families left eastern Aleppo City. More recently, there are reports of people returning to the eastern side because of deteriorating humanitarian conditions in areas of displacement and a perceived decrease in aerial bombardments. There are currently an estimated 300,000-400,000 people in eastern Aleppo City; this could increase with any further returns. (Aleppo Contingency Plan - Food Security & Livelihoods 12/2014)

1.6. Humanitarian Needs

A recent data review estimated that there are over 2.8 million people in need (PiN) in the governorate, more than the 2.6 million indicated by OCHA in June. (Data Review 11/2014, OCHA 06/2014) The Syria Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) conducted in August-September estimated there were over 2 million PiN in the assessed subdistricts (29 subdistricts assessed out of 40 in total). (MSNA 10/2014) The data review also indicated that there are critical needs in all sectors. (Data Review 11/2014)

1.6.1. Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)

Food Security: Clashes between armed groups occasionally interrupt the supply of food to local markets in rural Aleppo. (WFP 31/12/2014) However, data collected indicates that in general across Aleppo, food is mostly available – albeit limited in diversity and/or quantity – but is not always accessible. This is due mainly to deteriorating livelihood opportunities and the subsequent lack of purchasing power and/or general price increases resulting from lack of production inputs. (MSNA 10/2014) The FSL Contingency Plan for Aleppo stipulates prices have sharply increased owing to a rise in USD vs. SYP, and the Assistance Coordination Unit’s (ACU) bakery assessment found that the average price of bread in Aleppo was SYP 57. (ACU-IMU 12/2014) The Contingency Plan further states that stocks of food baskets and flour are insufficient. (Aleppo Contingency Plan - Food Security & Livelihoods 12/2014)

In the larger markets, wheat flour prices are far below the national average, at SYP 72/kg – 81/kg compared to SYP 117/kg countrywide in December. This is could be attributed to the large scale flour distributions in the governorate. However, conflict related interruptions prevent flour from reaching markets in rural areas. (WFP 31/12/2014) As a result, flour shortages remain common. A lack of fuel and flour are additional obstacles to food production – either privately or in bakeries – and therefore further compromise food security in the governorate. An August REACH assessment in eastern Aleppo City found that provision of flour and fuel to bakeries was a key priority intervention. (REACH 10/2014) Lack of flour was the main cause for production decreases in bakeries assessed in Aleppo, and a gap analysis indicated that Aleppo’s bakeries were producing only ~60% of the quantity needed. (ACU-IMU 12/2014)

Agricultural output is also lower in Aleppo. The MSNA found that overall wheat and barley yields are worse than the previous year, and sources for production such as water, fuel and fodder are lacking. (MSNA 10/2014)

Aleppo’s compromised food security situation has been underscored in a few other assessments. The MSNA found that over 1.3 million people were in moderate need of food across the assessed subdistricts in Aleppo.

A recent Rapid Nutrition Assessment (conducted in March – July 2014 in collective shelters) found a serious nutrition situation in Aleppo (along with two other governorates). The assessment also found that nearly a third of surveyed families indicated they did not have enough food for all family members (leading to negative coping mechanisms such as reducing number of meals) and that nearly 80% of families rely on food aid in combination with purchased food. As the assessment was conducted in collective shelters and the host communities, where aid is distributed more widely, it is possible that the food security situation is worse in other areas that are less serviced by assistance. (UNICEF 22/12/2014)

Areas of conflict are understandably heavily affected and experience a greater deprivation of access to food. For example, humanitarian organisations suggest that food is one of the greatest needs of Ain al Arab/Kobani’s remaining population, given that IS has taken over food and water sources. (OCHA 03/10/2014)
Livelihoods: According to the MSNA, the main sources of income in the assessed subdistricts in Aleppo included food production and sale, as well as casual labour and humanitarian assistance. The increased reliance on food production and sale as a major source of income underscores the vulnerability of the population to fluctuations in agricultural yields, which are heavily susceptible to changes in climate, water availability and decreased availability of agricultural inputs. (MSNA 10/2014)

Livelihood opportunities have decreased also because of reduced mobility in and around Aleppo, especially Aleppo City. Other issues impacting livelihoods include reducing and/or delaying payment of salaries to employees. In November, there was an unconfirmed report of employees of Aleppo City’s Local Council staging a sit-in protesting the Interim Government’s obstruction of their payments. (SOHR 18/11/2014)

1.6.2. Health

The MSNA found that approximately 480,000 people were in need of health assistance in Aleppo.

Ongoing conflict situations prevented routine vaccination activities. In October’s vaccination round it was not possible to vaccinate children against polio in Ain al Arab/Kobani, because of active conflict in the area. (UNICEF 13/10/2014)

Conflict-related injuries have consistently been a major health concern in Aleppo. (MSNA 10/2014, REACH 10/2014) Chronic diseases, such as diabetes, cancer and asthma, are presenting a greater burden of disease as well, because access to chronic disease medicines in Aleppo has declined over time. (MSNA 10/2014, REACH 10/2014)

Various skin diseases have also been a concern, underscoring the more immediate impact of lack of water, sanitation services, hygiene products, and appropriate medicines. The MSNA found this to be a growing concern, and this concern was reinforced in early December with a lice and scabies outbreak recorded in parts of Aleppo City and eastern rural Aleppo. Other diseases driven by poor hygiene and sanitation conditions, namely Leishmaniasis and Acute Jaundice Syndrome (AJS), were on the rise in Aleppo throughout the last quarter. Of particular concern, Leishmaniasis, while endemic to the area, generally does not peak until later in the year when conditions become more favourable to the spread of the disease. (MSNA 10/2014, ACU-EWARN 13/12/2014, WHO-EWAR Weekly Bulletins 12/10/2014-22/11/2014, ACU-EWARN Weekly Bulletins 12/10/2014-20/12/2014)

In terms of the health system, lack of qualified medical staff is a consistent issue (one report stated there were only 13 surgeons left in all of Aleppo), as was lack of medicines and medical equipment. (MSNA 10/2014, REACH 10/2014, Syria Deeply 01/12/2014) As in other sectors, insufficient economic resources were yet another major obstacle to accessing medical care. (MSNA 10/2014) Apart from affecting the population’s access to care, the lack of financial resources has also affected the operations of hospitals themselves; one local source reports that the Al-Shifa hospital, the first field hospital established in Aleppo, is under threat of closure because it lacks funding and support, in addition to lacking stable supplies of medicine and medical staff. (Syrian Observer 30/10/2014)

1.6.3. WASH

Aleppo continues to be affected by eroding water infrastructure, irregular sanitation services and water shortages. According to a recent data review, the WASH situation in Aleppo is considered critical and the MSNA reported that around 1.7 million people were in need of water. Recent assessments found that the water network had been damaged in varying degrees throughout the conflict. Estimates of the extent of network damage hover around 30%, with most of the network suffering slight to no damage and approximately 12% catalogued as heavily damaged to completely destroyed. In early November, UNICEF reported a water crisis in Aleppo, arising from a reduction in the level of dams and armed opposition groups (AOG) controlling the water supplies. Pressures on the GoS economy has resulted in cuts to water subsidies – a factor which may further decrease access to water among the population, specifically in GoS-controlled areas of Aleppo. (MSNA 10/2014, REACH 10/2014, Washington Post 29/11/2014, UNICEF 12/11/2014, Data Review 11/2014)

There is a strong linkage between electricity and/or generator functionality, and the functionality of water. Therefore, with reduced electricity, fuel and generators, there is also noticeable decrease in the availability and access to water in different parts of Aleppo. (MSNA 10/2014, UNICEF 12/12/2014, REACH 10/2014) Another notable factor compromising access to safe water is the lack of chemicals needed to treat water. (MSNA 10/2014, Syria Deeply 01/12/2014)

Access to water is hindered on the household level as well – although it appears that water at the systemic level (i.e. water network) plays a larger role in Aleppo. As found in other sectors, lack of income to buy water was a major constraint to getting it. However, as noted in the NFI section, there was a great need for water containers – indicating an additional barrier to getting water on the household level. (MSNA 10/2014)

Sanitation and hygiene have also been a growing concern in Aleppo. Sanitation services, namely garbage collection, have not been operating at full capacity, resulting in garbage accumulation in public spaces. Similarly, there is a reported insufficiency of personal hygiene products available. This is corroborated by the fact that local production of such products – in industrial centres such as Aleppo – has decreased significantly as a result of the conflict. (MSNA 10/2014)

The lack of water, sanitation services and hygiene supplies manifested most recently in an outbreak of lice and scabies in parts of Aleppo City and eastern rural Aleppo. Reports from health facilities and schools indicated that thousands of children were infected, mostly of primary school age. Causes for the outbreak included prolonged water shortages in Aleppo; accumulation of garbage; inability to wash clothes due to lack of fuel and electricity and lack of medicines. (ACU-EWARN 13/12/2014)
1.6.4. Education
Data collected in September (MSNA) indicated that Aleppo had the highest proportion of non-functional education facilities compared to all other governorates assessed. An ACU assessment of public schools (in July) found that 61% of assessed schools were receiving no support from either the GoS or UN/NGOs, but somehow were still functioning. Nevertheless, the functionality status and number of temporary learning spaces that have been established in Aleppo require further assessments. Similarly, as other parties to the conflict assume control of parts of rural Aleppo and are reportedly implementing curriculum changes, further assessments will be required to ascertain the status of schooling and attendance. (ACU-JMU 11/2014, UNICEF 12/12/2014)

Regarding school resources, it appears that many of the schools in Aleppo continue to be staffed by official staff (as opposed to volunteer teachers and/or school officials), and many of them still get paid. However, it was reported that the GoS halted salaries for 6,000 teachers in the city of Afrin as another mechanism for putting pressure on the local population, indicating the possible fluctuation of support given to school staff. While an assessment in July found that textbooks and other materials were largely available in Aleppo schools, an assessment in September indicated that one of the biggest obstacles to getting schooling in the area was the lack of materials and textbooks. As such, it is possible to assume that while there are materials available, they are insufficient to meet the needs of all students. Many schools have also been rendered non-functional because of damage or occupation. (Syrian Observer 05/11/2014, MSNA 10/2014, ACU-JMU 11/2014)

Enrolment figures for the academic year 2014-2015 are yet to be available, though some estimates exist for the previous academic year. Consistent with trends across other governorates, primary schools (grades 1-6) and lower secondary schools had a higher proportion of enrolment and attendance in Aleppo compared with enrolment and attendance in upper secondary school (ages 15-18 years). Unsurprisingly, attendance rates at all levels of schooling were lower in areas of Aleppo that constitute frontlines (Al Bab, Eastern Kwaires, Rasm Haram El-Imam, Banan, Hajeib, Khanasar, A’zaz, Aghtrin, Hadher, Haritan, parts of Menbij) and eastern Aleppo City sectors.

Despite these enrolment rates, dropouts and irregular to no attendance is common as well. Different assessments found that the main reason for this is the need to work and support the family, which reflects inherent child protection concerns as well. Additional reasons for not attending school include repeated displacement, insecurity, and an inability to pay for schooling. In areas particularly affected by violence, such as certain sectors of Aleppo City, the education status was categorised as critical, reflecting little functionality and/or attendance. (MSNA 10/2014, ACU-JMU 11/2014)

1.6.5. Shelter/NFI
Shelter: The shelter situation in Aleppo is deemed to be fairly critical. A recent data review indicated a critical shelter situation (score 0.58 on scale of 0-1) in Aleppo Governorate, the most severe situation of all 14 governorates. (Data Review 11/2014)

Continued ground fighting and aerial bombardment have resulted in damage to structures throughout the Governorate of Aleppo, and Aleppo City in particular. The MSNA found that Aleppo had the highest number of people in need of shelter when compared with the other governorates; in fact, 40% of those identified in need of shelter were located in Aleppo. Apart from intense fighting and continuous aerial bombardment taking place in the governorate and damaging buildings, Aleppo is also hosting a large number of IDPs – posing an additional reason for the recorded high needs for shelter. Shelter needs in Aleppo are exacerbated mostly by insufficient rental spaces available, lack of materials to repair homes and the lack of income to afford repair materials and/or rent shelter spaces. (MSNA 10/2014, Data Review 11/2014)

Preliminary analysis using satellite imagery from three different timeframes showed that in Aleppo City approximately 8,500 structures were affected, with over 1,500 structures completely destroyed and close to 4,900 structures were severely damaged. The report also highlighted that while much of the city structures were damaged by September 2013, the greatest proportion of damage still occurred between September 2013 and May 2014 - in correlation with an uptick in the level of fighting and aerial bombardments. (UNITAR/UNOSAT 06/11/2014)

Non-Food Items (NFI): Availability of fuel and electricity remain a continued concern. Already in August there were reports of recurring electricity shortages (REACH 10/2014), reinforced by the subsequent MSNA findings that electricity/lighting was a preferred intervention. With the winter months already underway, the need for fuel and electricity for heating purposes is only expected to increase – leading to an increasingly dire situation for those remaining in the city, specifically eastern Aleppo City. While there was some improvement in the supply of electricity and water following successful negotiations between community leaders and AOG, resulting in the reactivation of the thermal station in eastern Aleppo (main source of electricity in the city), the struggle for areas of control in and around Aleppo City has led parties to the conflict to inflict power and water cuts and block various access and supply routes to the city and eastern Aleppo, exacerbating an already fragile situation. (Assafir 28/11/2014, UNICEF 12/12/2014, PI 12/2014)

Another NFI issue highlighted in Aleppo was the need for water containers. This is indicative of the shortcomings of the water network in the governorate, and the needs of the population to acquire water storage equipment in order to better cope with the unpredictable functionality of the water system. (MSNA 10/2014)

1.6.6. Protection
Coupled with the intense fighting across Aleppo, and with hardliner organisations taking control of several areas, the population in Aleppo continues to experience protection infringements.

Early in the quarter, with the battle for Ain al Arab/Kobani unfolding, there were deep concerns for the population of the city, fearing a massacre at the hands of IS. (Reuters 10/10/2014, UN News 07/10/2014) The battle, in a stalemate over the last few months, has resulted in high numbers of casualties – including civilians. (Guardian 07/10/2014)

Attacks on the population come from both GoS forces and from opposition groups. Opposition forces were reportedly using improvised and inaccurate mortal bombs, which
killed hundreds of civilians in the last six months. The SOHR has found that two thirds of the recorded
deaths occurred in Aleppo City, where these weapons were used on government-held districts.
(Reuters 12/12/2014) Meanwhile, GoS forces have bombarded areas held by opposition groups via
aerial strikes and dropping barrel bombs; for a time, during the Coalition airstrikes, there was also a
notable increase in the targeting of civilian areas by the GoS, including the targeting of schools and
medical facilities, which is a blatant violation of international humanitarian law. (NPA 03/11/2014)

An estimated 25,000 Palestinian refugees are in need of support across the governorate. Armed
clashes continue in the surroundings of the official Palestinian refugee camp Neirab, which hosted over
20,000 Palestinian refugees before the start of the crisis. Although services remain largely available in
the camp, the clashes lead to road blockades and expose residents to protection concerns such as
armed violence and kidnapping. (Jafra 12/2014, UNRWA 09/12/2014)

Migrants are an additional vulnerable group in the governorate. IOM estimates that over 300 migrants
are stranded in hard to reach areas in Aleppo governorate. (Data Review 11/2014)

Child protection is a major concern in Aleppo. The MSNA found that children in almost all areas
assessed exhibit fear and anxiety as a result of exposure to bombings. Other child protection concerns
documented were the lack of documentation preventing registration of newborns and child labour.
(MSNA 10/2014)
2.1. Key issues and possible developments

- Compared to neighbouring governorates, the conflict situation in Al-Hasakeh has remained relatively stable, with the exception of several contested pockets. However, severe humanitarian needs remain, primarily due to the isolation of the governorate and the widespread lack of income-generating opportunities. A multi-sector needs assessment indicated in September that Health and WASH were the priority concerns within the governorate, and a recent data review cited critical needs notably in food security and protection. The main areas affected are the contested areas of Quamishli and Al-Hasakeh city. Limited economic resources are the main cause of existing needs, hampering access to health care, water trucking, and NFIs. (MSNA 10/2014, Data Review 11/2014)

- Cross-border shipments to Al-Hasakeh are highly dependent on the security situation on the Turkish side of the border. At the end of October, Nusaybin City was put under high alert after clashes between Kurdish youth and the Turkish police. (WFP 30/10/2014) Although this did not impact the delivery of assistance across the Nusaybin–Quamishli, any deterioration of the situation on the Turkish side will have an immediate impact on aid delivery.

- The current operation by Kurdish forces in Iraq in areas bordering Syria could lead to further displacement into Al-Hasakeh, as occurred in August, when an estimated 150,000 people fled through the governorate to escape a siege by the Islamic State (IS) on Mount Sinjar, in Iraq’s Ninewa governorate. It is not expected that many Iraqis would remain as refugees in Syria—only around 4,000 have remained in Al-Hasakeh from the August displacement, and if Kurdish forces are successful in establishing a relative sense of stability in Ninewa, a portion of those are expected to return. (Reuters 17/12/2014)

2.2. Context

Al-Hasakeh is a large, predominantly rural governorate. The northern part is held by Kurdish forces, while the remainder of the governorate is primarily controlled by IS, with small pockets controlled by the Government of Syria (GoS) and armed opposition groups (AOG). Its main economic activities pre-conflict were oil production and agriculture and both are heavily affected by the conflict and resulting destruction and negligence. The governorate is most susceptible to water scarcity owing to the low coverage of public water supply, exacerbated by conflict-related damage, and a drought that has persisted since 2006. (UNDP 2010, WFP 2012)

2.3. Armed Conflict

Low levels of conflict continue to be reported around contested areas in the governorate:

- Jaza’a – There are unconfirmed reports of continued low-level fighting between the Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG) and IS in Jaza’a, a small town near the Al Ya’Roubiyah-Rabia border crossing. IS has contested this area in what is likely to be an attempt to cut off Kurdish forces at the border from the rest of the governorate, and also as a base to advance on the border crossing itself. Simultaneously, heavy fighting continues on the Iraqi side of the crossing. (ISW 18/11/2014, Rudaw 04/08/2014, ARA 24/07/2014, ISW 22/08/2014, Guardian 17/12/2014)

- Ras al Aïn – Conflict incidents continue to occur in and around Ras al Aïn, Hasakeh’s northwestern border crossing with Turkey, currently held by the YPG. At the end of November for instance, IS detonated several vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), targeting YPG and Kurdish security forces. IS control of the town would divide the Kurdish region of Syria, and could allow IS access to a flow of goods and fighters from Turkey. (ISW 25/11/2014, ISW 10/10/2014)
• Al-Hasakeh City – The governorate capital has seen ongoing conflicts, with the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) and YPG separatedly fighting against IS, particularly in the eastern, predominantly Arab neighbourhood of Ghuweiran, which leaned towards IS control but was reportedly brought under control of combined YPG and GoS forces in September. Low-level clashes were reported in the west of the city throughout Q4, including SAF bombardments. (ARA 30/12/2014, ISW 02/12/2014, ISW 22/09/2014, Syria Direct 03/09/2014, ISW 08/07/2014, ARA 26/07/2014, Kurwatch 07/08/2014, SOHR 29/08/2014)

• Quamishli – A major city in the Kurdish area of the governorate, Quamishli is divided between the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the GoS, and access is limited because the Turkish border is closed, and IS control many roads. Occasional SAF aerial and artillery bombardments are reported around Quamishli. (ARA 30/12/2014, ISW 08/07/2014, ISW 26/07/2014, ISW 03/07/2014)

• Regiment 121 – There are no updates on the situation around Regiment 121, a contested Syrian military base that was used to target militants in the surrounding countryside.

• Coalition airstrikes have targeted IS infrastructure and material on multiple occasions in the south of the governorate. (ISW 23/11/2014, ISW 10/10/2014) Around 20 of the 500 airstrikes launched by the US-led coalition in Syria since 8 August hit areas of Al-Hasakeh. (BBC 03/12/2014)

2.4. Access

According to the Syria Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA), movement and travel restrictions for relief agencies, personnel or goods is the main operational constraint in the 12 subdistricts assessed (out of 16 subdistricts in total). Fighting among multiple groups in the governorates bordering Al-Hasakeh, and IS take-over of roads from Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor, has closed access routes for Damascus-based actors for most of the year.

The governorate is therefore highly dependent on cross-border aid and trade from Turkey and Iraq. There are two border crossings into Al-Hasakeh through which the humanitarian community is allowed to provide cross-border relief under UN Security Council Resolution 2165: Nusaybin/Quamishli (with Turkey) and Al Ya’roubiyah/Rabia (with Iraq). Al Ya’roubiyah crossing has not been used for cross-border provision of aid, as the crossing has been the site of fierce fighting on both sides. According to a recent data review, the opening of Nusaybin border crossing contributed to the expansion of the humanitarian reach in the governorate, and access has reportedly improved in five hard-to-reach areas including Al-Malika, Jawadiyah, Amuda, Quamishli, and Darbasiyah. Al-Hasakeh City also reportedly became largely accessible with the exception of the Gweirin neighbourhood, where active conflict is reported. (Col 21/11/2014, WFP 20/11/2014, OCHA 21/11/2014, WFP 30/10/2014, UNSC 21/11/2014, Col 23/10/2014, Field Exchange 11/2014, ISW 18/11/2014, Data Review 11/2014)

Within the governorate, security constraints hamper aid provision. In September alone, almost 70 security incidents that had the potential to endanger humanitarian staff or operations, including improvised explosive devices (IEDs), airstrikes and armed conflict were recorded. (Trusted source 12/2014)

Interference in the implementation of humanitarian activities by powerful groups or persons is an additional, significant constraint. An example of interference is the strict conditions IS poses on relief provision, dictating the staff involved, the exact modalities and beneficiaries. GoS often prevents additional, significant constraint. An example of interference is the strict conditions IS poses on relief

2.5. Displacement

Estimates on the number of IDPs in the governorate vary greatly, and it is unclear whether discrepancies can be attributed to differences in methodology or reliability and comprehensiveness of sources used. IDP caseloads range from 250,000 (Data Review 11/2014) to 510,000. (MSNA 10/2014, 12/16 subdistricts covered) The MSNA figure (amounting to 30% of the total population assessed) is double the June OCHA estimate of almost 200,000. (OCHA 26/08/2014, MSNA 10/2014)

According to the MSNA, the IDP population is primarily concentrated in Quamishli (360,000 IDPs, or 70% of IDPs identified in the governorate), followed by Al-Hasakeh City hosting over 100,000 IDPs. The OCHA June IDP estimates also indicated that the largest proportion of IDPs is residing in Al-Hasakeh City and Quamishli. (MSNA 10/2014)

Additional displacement has been reported after the MSNA data was collected in August and September:

• At least 2,600 people fleeing from Ain al Arab/Kobani have settled in Darbasiyah and Ras Al-Ein. (WFP 11/10/2014)

• Around 40,000 civilians fled intensifying clashes in the Tal Hmis, Gweirin and Ya’roubiyah areas of Hasakeh Governorate, with most families displaced to Quamishli city and surrounding areas. (Col 23/10/2014)

Iraqi refugees: In August, over 150,000 Iraqis fled to Al-Hasakeh, following the advance of IS in Sinjar, an area in Iraq bordering Syria. While most crossed back into Iraq via the Simalka-Peshkabour crossing, WFP reports that almost 3,800 Iraqi refugees still remain in Nowruz camp in Al-Malika district. (UNHCR 31/08/2014, WFP 15/10/2014)

Returnees from Iraq and Turkey: During Q4, UNHCR recorded 5,500 Syrians in Iraq returning to Syria, primarily to Al-Hasakeh. In total, at least 33,000 Syrians have returned from Iraq in 2014. (UNHCR 16/08/2014, UNHCR 31/07/2014)

‘In September alone, almost 70 security incidents that had the potential to endanger humanitarian staff or operations’
2.6. Humanitarian needs

The MSNA found just over 600,000 people in need (PiN) in the assessed subdistricts (12 out of 16 subdistricts covered), and a recent data review indicated over 630,000. (MSNA 30/10/2014, Data Review 11/2014) This represents a slight increase compared with OCHA’s estimation in June, which indicated there were 580,000 PiN in the whole governorate of Al-Hasakeh. (OCHA 06/2014) The Data Review also evinced critical needs in the following sectors: protection, FSL, NFIs, and education. (Data Review 11/2014)

Al-Hasakeh MSNA findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12 out of 16 subdistricts assessed</th>
<th>1.8 million People in need out of 15.6 million</th>
<th>600,000 People in need out of 6.6 million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33% of total population in assessed areas of Al-Hasakeh</td>
<td>510,000 IDPs out of 4.8 million</td>
<td>28% of total population in assessed areas of Al-Hasakeh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only a portion of this governorate was assessed by the MSNA. These figures cannot be generalized to the whole governorate, and should be used with caution.

The situation in the four subdistricts not assessed during the MSNA in August-September because of access constraints is likely to be worse than the general situation in the governorate. (Be’er Al-Hulo Al-Wardeyyeh, Qahtaniyyeh, Al-Malika, Ras Al Ain). The situation in Ras Al Ain is particularly of concern. The area is one of the conflict hotspots and in June, 30% of the population was in need of assistance according to OCHA, while humanitarian access was limited. However, no updated information on the humanitarian situation is available.

Trend: According to data collected in September, access to water and economic resources are the main humanitarian needs in the governorate. In November 2013, a comparable assessment highlighted health and food security as the priority concerns. This trajectory of needs is in line with seasonal trends. The governorate is normally self-sufficient in terms of food and the yields of the May-July wheat harvest are likely to have significantly improved the food security situation between November and September.

However, six months after the harvest, it can be assumed that food security has deteriorated. The health situation appears to have improved as a result of increased health support, with 85% of subdistricts having received some type of health assistance in September compared to 45% in November 2013. Although the accompanying rain is likely to have eased pressure on the water infrastructure since the assessment, water trucking, a main source of water, will remain expensive. In addition, it can be assumed that continued conflict bombardments have damaged critical infrastructure.

2.6.1. Protection

Arrest/detention, restriction of movement, armed violence/clashes, and kidnapping/disappearances were the main protection concerns reported during the MSNA. Other data sources confirm these human rights violations:

The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) stated that three civilians were killed in coalition air strikes in the governorate on the night of 9 October. However, this remains unconfirmed. In response to the attacks, IS placed more fighters in populated areas, raising additional concerns for the protection of civilians. (Col 21/11/2014, Guardian 15/10/2014)

GoS continues to use barrel bombs in Al-Hasakeh. In mid-November, for instance, seven children were killed after barrel bombs were dropped on a primary school in Ras Al Ain, and Al-Shadadi witnessed a major barrel bomb attack on 2 December, resulting in an unknown number of casualties. (ISW 02/12/2014, UNSC 21/11/2014)

Public executions continue to be recorded from IS controlled areas in Al-Hasakeh. All four subdistricts reporting instances of killings and executions were under IS control at the time of the MSNA. The UN Commission of Inquiry documented the use of torture and murder as part of attacks on civilians in Al-Hasakeh and other governorates, amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The dominant tribal communities in Al-Hasakeh pose particular challenges to IS rule, and harsh oppression of perceived opposition is common. In areas under its control, the group has imposed a ban on smoking, compulsory participation in prayers at mosques, and specific dress-codes for women. (Col 14/11/2014, ARA 30/12/2014, ARA 29/12/2014)

Restricted population movement is of concern in almost all areas assessed, due to restrictions imposed by AOG and security incidents. One of the main obstacles is the border restrictions imposed on the crossings from Al-Hasakeh into neighbouring countries. The two crossings from Al-Hasakah into Iraq (Simalka/Pesh Khabur and Al Ya’roubiya/Rabia) are in practice closed to new arrivals, except for ad-hoc admittances at Pesh Khabur in case of medical
emergencies. In October, a small number of individuals from Ain al Arab/Kobani were admitted to Iraq through the Pesh Khabur border. Movement through the official crossings leading into Turkey is influenced by the security situation, the possession of documentation and capacity within the camps. (Amnesty 05/12/2014, UNHCR 07/12/2014)

Children have witnessed killings and shootings, and exhibit fear, anxiety and sleep disturbances. Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) have on multiple occasions been accused of forcing children in active combat roles. This was reported as a priority concern in ten subdistricts assessed under the MSNA, a violation occurring regardless of whether the area is under control of GoS, Kurdish forces, AOG or IS-affiliated groups. (Col 12/08/2014, MSNA 30/10/2014)

2.6.2. WASH

In September, the highest severity ranking in the governorate was recorded for water and NFIIs, and around 100,000 people were found in acute need of water related assistance. Key informants in six subdistricts indicated that the community is facing a life-threatening situation because of water-related problems: in parts of Al-Hasakeh City, Areeshes, Hole, Markada, Shadadah, Tal Hmis. In all these severely affected subdistricts, the public-water network no longer functions as the main source of water; and people are forced to rely on wells and trucking water. Across the board, areas under IS control reported a life-threatening situation, which could indicate that the group has been unable to establish and maintain public services. (MSNA 10/2014)

In the nine subdistricts where the public water system functions as a main source of water, its capacity is insufficient to cover all the needs, and the population still has to resort to alternative sources, such as wells and water trucking. The functioning of the public water system, which was already underserved pre-crisis, is further degraded by a lack of electricity and lack of chemicals for treatment. (MSNA 10/2014)

The degradation of the public water system forces people to buy water. All subdistricts assessed noted a lack of money, income or resources to buy water. NFI priority concerns are highly related to the severe water situation, with key informants indicating there is a need for cash and water containers. (MSNA 10/2014)

During the MSNA, there was no regular rubbish collection in at least 11 subdistricts and garbage was accumulating in public locations, resulting in an increased risk of contamination of water sources. (MSNA 10/2014)

These findings are corroborated by a REACH assessment undertaken in August 2014, which indicated that communities in Quamishli and Al-Hasakeh City had severe, life-threatening drinking water issues because of a lack of power and fuel, damage to infrastructure, lack of water treatment chemicals, and in some places, physical constraints caused by conflict. (REACH 26/08/2014, REACH 26/08/2014)

According to the MSNA, Ghuweiran area in Al-Hasakeh City which is controlled by AOG and faces heavy fighting, is the most severely in need. The public network is no longer functional and water shortages are a main concern. Amadu, a subdistrict controlled by Kurdish groups, seems to be least affected, with key informants indicating a low severity level and no problems in sanitation. This exceptional situation could be explained by the fact that the public system for water and sewage disposal remains functional. The subdistrict also received hygiene and waste collection support in the month before the assessment. (MSNA 10/2014)

Even if the winter months lessen water shortages, it can be assumed that access to water remains a significant concern because people lack the economic resources to purchase water.

‘Armed Opposition Groups have on multiple occasions been accused of forcing children in active combat roles’

2.6.3. Health

According to the latest Health Resources Availability Mapping System (HeRAMS) data (September 2014), four of the five public hospitals in the governorate are fully functional and accessible. The fifth hospital, in Ras Al Ain, has been destroyed and is inaccessible. Of Al-Hasakeh’s 91 public health centres, 35 are non-functioning, and 17 only partially functioning. (WHO 30/09/2014) There have been no reports of attacks on health infrastructure since then, so it is assumed that the number of operational hospitals and health facilities remains similar.

The MSNA confirms that the health infrastructure remains largely intact. However, the health situation remains severe as people lack the economic resources to access appropriate health care. There is a widespread shortage of medicine and medical equipment, and electricity cuts hamper functionality. (IFRC 16/04/2014, MSNA 10/2014)

In areas under IS control, the restrictions imposed by AOG on the shipment of medicines have led to shortages, while some doctors and nurses have fled because of IS-imposed restrictions on their professional activities. All IS controlled areas reported a shortage of medical staff during the MSNA. (Col 14/11/2014, MSNA 30/10/2014)

A Syria-wide rapid nutrition assessment of some 4,500 IDP children under the age of five residing in collective shelters identified Al-Hasakeh as one of seven governorates where the situation is of particular concern. (Data Review 11/2014) Suspected cases of malnutrition were reported in three subdistricts in September. (WFP 30/10/2014, MSNA 30/10/2014)

2.6.4. Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)

The severity of the food security situation in the governorate in September was relatively low, with only 2% of the assessed population in need of life-saving food security assistance. However, this assessment was conducted at the time of harvest and the situation is likely to have worsened. In October, WFP reported a deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Al-Hasakeh, with widespread population displacement within and to the governorate. Consequently, the number of PIIN of food assistance in urban centres increased. (WFP 15/10/2014, MSNA 30/10/2014)

Purchase of food on the market is the main source of food for communities in the governorate. However, access is hampered by the widespread lack of economic resources, and average bread prices are far above the subsidised rate of SYP 25. Available data on the actual price of bread varies. WFP market monitoring indicates that unsubsidised bread was SYP 60 in September, while data from the MSNA for the same time period on the same markets found a
price ranging between SYP 100-150. The discrepancy can be explained by a difference in methodology: the MSNA interviewed a wide variety of key-informants, while WFP price monitoring focussed on traders and wholesalers. (MSNA 30/10/2014, WFP 01/10/2014) The lowest prices were recorded in areas held by IS or affiliated groups, indicating that the group succeeded in setting lower prices. (MSNA 10/2014)

2.6.5. Shelter
During the MSNA, only a low severity level for shelter was recorded in Al-Hasakeh. With the onset of winter, however, it can be assumed that the situation has deteriorated. Bad protection from weather conditions was already reported at the time of the assessment and there were insufficient tools and material on the market to repair shelter. Most IDPs are residing in rented apartments, and any decrease in income will put them at risk of evictions. (MSNA 10/2014)

Electricity supply is low in the governorate and is impacting access to water, health and irrigation activities. (UNHCR 07/09/2014, MSNA 10/2014)

2.6.6. Education
According to the MSNA, the number of functional schools has decreased by 25%, from around 2,000 pre-crisis to 1,500 in September. Access to education is further disrupted by a lack of school supplies (textbooks, pens, boards), and a lack of money, income or resources to send children to school. (MSNA 10/2014) In areas under IS control, local sources report that the group imposes a strict religious curriculum and classes not in line with this curriculum are cancelled. (WT 16/09/2014, Al Monitor 10/2014)

Given all these constraints, attendance rates have decreased. In more than half of the subdistricts assessed, fewer than 50% of primary school-aged children regularly go to a learning space. (MSNA 30/10/2014)
3. AR-RAQQA

3.1. Key Issues and Possible Developments

- Ar-Raqqa Governorate was identified as one of four priority governorates where critical humanitarian needs were recorded across all sectors. For more information regarding this geographic prioritisation, please refer to Annex page 53.

- The humanitarian situation in Ar-Raqqa is expected to have deteriorated during Q4 as a result of ongoing airstrikes and continued human rights violations committed by the Islamic State (IS) or affiliated groups. Humanitarian access in Ar-Raqqa remains highly restricted. September, Ar-Raqqa had the highest number of people in need (PiN) of health assistance across all governorates assessed by the Syrian Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA). Four out of ten subdistricts reporting life-threatening conditions for the population. Availability of health services is mostly impacted by the lack of medicine, which is one of the supplies difficult to deliver as assistance to the governorate.

- Fuel is reported to be missing in the markets across all subdistricts in the governorate. With continued coalition airstrikes targeting the IS-controlled oil refineries in Tel Abyad in Ar-Raqqa, there is a significant scarcity of fuel reported, which has led to sharp increase in prices of both food and fuel - the top two expenditures of the population in the governorate. The lack of fuel will further significantly reduce availability of food as well as water in the governorate, given the higher demand of fuel in the winter months and increase the number of people in moderate and acute need of food and water.

3.2. Context

Since March 2013, Ar-Raqqa city has been under control of IS and affiliated armed opposition groups (AOG). On 29 June, the IS claimed the city as the capital of its self-declared caliphate. Of all areas under its control, IS governance is strongest in Ar-Raqqa Governorate and the population is subject to stringent regulations, affecting freedom of movement, trade and access to law and order. IS tightly controls media and humanitarian access. As a result, information available on the humanitarian situation is often unreliable and incomplete.

3.3. Armed Conflict

According to the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), which relies on activist and medical sources on the ground, Government aircrafts have carried out almost 1,600 raids since October 20 killing 396 civilians, including 109 children.

3.4 Access

United Nations aid convoys cannot reach vast areas of Syrian territory under IS control. To get food and medicine to areas controlled by IS, the UN relies on partner humanitarian organisations such as the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) and on tribal contacts. An international newspaper reports that this has led to "huge gaps" in delivering aid and assessing needs. (Reuters 13/10/2014)
One of the main constraints for humanitarian actors to deliver assistance into Ar-Raqqa is interference with their activities and the diversion of humanitarian aid. IS reportedly confiscates assistance and distributes it to IS fighters. Furthermore, humanitarian actors report being informed by IS members that between 30 to 50% of assistance targeting beneficiaries in Ar-Raqqa will be apprehended by IS. (MSNA 10/2014, Data Review 11/2014)

### 3.5. Displacement

Most recent estimates put the number of IDPs in the governorate over 170,000 (MSNA 10/2014, all subdistricts covered, Data Review 11/2014). Ar-Raqqa City hosts almost half of the displaced population, with 85,000 people. During the Syria Integrated Needs Assessment (SINA) around 17% of the population in Ar-Raqqa was displaced, at the time of the Syria Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) this decreased to 9%. Displacement patterns in Ar-Raqqa differ from neighbouring governorates, as the governorate primarily sees an outflow instead of an influx of people. OCHA in August found some 180,000 IDPs in the governorate with 94,000 in Ar-Raqqa city. The population in the governorate has remained stable and eight out of ten subdistricts reported that the displaced population was registered by the local authorities. The majority of the IDPs in six out of ten subdistricts are reported to have come from other governorates, primarily from Aleppo, Homs and Deir-ez-Zor. (MSNA 30/10/2014)

### 3.6. Humanitarian Needs

The MSNA found just over 830,000 PnN in the assessed subdistricts (all subdistricts covered), and a recent data review indicated over 740,000. (MSNA 10/2014, Data Review 11/2014) This represents a significant increase compared with OCHA’s estimation in June of 490,000 PnN in the whole governorate. (OCHA 06/2014) The Data Review also indicated critical needs in the following sectors: protection, health, WASH, FSL, early recovery, and education. (Data Review 11/2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ar-Raqqa</th>
<th>MSNA Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 out of 10 subdistricts assessed</td>
<td>1.6 million Population Assessed 15.6 million in all areas assessed by the MSNA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52% People in need</td>
<td>830,000 out of 6.6 million in all areas assessed by the MSNA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11% IDPs</td>
<td>170,000 out of 4.8 million in all areas assessed by the MSNA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.6.1. Protection

The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry noted in its report from November that IS has perpetrated murder and other inhumane acts, enslavement, rape, sexual slavery and violence, forcible displacement, enforced disappearance and torture. These acts have been committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population in Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, Al-Hasakeh and Deir-ez-Zor governorates. (OHCHR 14/11/2014, Data Review 11/2014) It is the first time an international human rights body has gathered this amount of evidence on IS conduct and judged it as being contrary to international law.

Protection violations continue in the governorate with the main safety and dignity concerns expressed by Key Informants in the MSNA being the impact of aerial shelling/bombing, followed by arrest/detention, forced disappearances and armed violence. The main safety and dignity issues affecting individuals in the governorate were the lack of or loss of personal identity documentation (e.g. birth certificate, passport, family booklet), followed by family separation and harassment and discrimination. (MSNA 10/2014) The lack of official documentation is particularly highlighted, as people are unable to defend their property rights on assets or houses. This is of specific concern as IS fighters are reported to systematically loot, destroy and confiscate the property of ethnic Kurds, and in some cases, resettle displaced Arab Sunni families from the Qalamoun area (Rural Damascus), Deir-ez-Zor, and Ar-Raqqa itself, in abandoned Kurdish homes. A similar pattern was documented in Tel Arab and Tal Hassel in July 2013 as well as in over 400 villages subject to the September offensive of IS towards Ain-al Arab/Kobani (Aleppo). (OHCHR 14/11/2014) The lack of documentation could pose significant constraints in the future if a transitional justice process is established and victims of misappropriation are to be resituated. (MSNA 10/2014)

With a high number of arbitrary detentions, a number of men have fled IS-controlled areas; they are considered ‘wanted’ because of their affiliation with political and military groups, or are government employees, medical staff, ethnic minorities or flee for other reasons, all of which contribute to family separation. (MSNA 10/2014)

**‘Boys, are at particular risk of being recruited into armed forces, arrested, exposed to violence and engaged in child labour’**

3.6.1. Protection

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**‘Boys, are at particular risk of being recruited into armed forces, arrested, exposed to violence and engaged in child labour’**
Children in the ages between 12 and 18, especially boys, are at particular risk of being recruited into armed forces, arrested, exposed to violence and engaged in child labour. Some subdistricts in Ar-Raqqa reported that children are seen to wear weapons and perform hazardous work. It is further reported that boys recruited by IS for child labour receive salaries and are the main bread winners in some households. Girls are exposed to early forced marriages, harassment and sexual and gender based violence. There are cases of divorce from the girls married to foreign fighters, and in several cases domestic violence and SGBV are recounted. (MSNA 10/2014)

3.6.2. Health

In Ar-Raqqa as well as across all assessed governorates, infants and older persons were identified as the age-groups most at risk of health concerns in the MSNA. These groups are further identified at risk of food shortages. Reported vulnerable groups at risk of health concerns are people with disabilities and chronically ill. People with disabilities also experience restrictions in access to food. (MSNA 10/2014)

In the governorate, four out of ten subdistricts (Sabka, Mansura, Karama and Ar-Raqqa City), including Ar-Raqqa City, reported life-threatening problems in terms of health. There were 37,000 people in acute and immediate need for health assistance and a further 590,000 PiN of assistance, making it the governorate with the highest number of PiN of health assistance. All subdistricts with life-threatening problems except the city are rural, have no access to health facilities and are experiencing sporadic fighting. In Sabka subdistrict the nearest medical point is 40 km away and ambulances are lacking. (MSNA 10/2014)

The main health concerns reported in Ar-Raqqa in the MSNA include skin diseases, kidney diseases and war-related injuries. Availability of health services is mostly impacted by lack of medicine, medical equipment, assistive devices for persons with restricted mobility and lack of female staff. Lack of medical staff in Ar-Raqqa is of less concern, with the main hospital in Ar-Raqqa City still functioning and being the main referral facility. The Ar-Raqqa City hospital is one of the hospitals with the highest number of medical staff in the northern governorates, albeit with a low proportion of female medical staff. This is a significant concern, as female patients are only allowed to be examined and treated by female medical staff in IS-controlled areas. (MSNA 10/2014)

As with all other governorates and sectors, the lack of economic resources is the key constraint in accessing health care in Ar-Raqqa, followed by lack of adapted services for people with restricted mobility, and security constraints hampering access, including transportation to health facilities. Half of all assessed subdistricts in Ar-Raqqa report that health services are generally too expensive for the population. This is mostly true for areas that are remote and are only served by private clinics and other medical points. (MSNA 10/2014)

‘Four out of ten subdistricts reported life-threatening problems in terms of health’

3.6.3 Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)

According to the MSNA, some 370,000 people were identified in need of food assistance in the governorate, accounting for 23% of the current total population assessed in Ar-Raqqa. IDPs residing in collective shelters (some 32,000 people), damaged or unfinished buildings (41,000) and open spaces were ranked as most at risk of food shortages as they have limited to no access to income generating activities, resources to buy food. With decreased humanitarian access they also have diminished access to aid. (MSNA 10/2014)

In Ar-Raqqa, the main coping mechanisms during food shortages include relying on less preferred and less expensive food, purchasing food on credit, and reducing the number of meals eaten a day. (MSNA 10/2014)

As of October 2014, the main problems relating to food availability in Ar-Raqqa are related to lack of infant formula and generally food to feed children between six to 24 months. In general, markets in Ar-Raqqa report that food is available in moderate quantities and with intermittent variety. The second most reported issue reducing availability of food is the lack of fuel/gas for cooking. Lack of money is the main impediment to accessing food for the population in Ar-Raqqa, followed by the lack of adapted services for persons with restricted mobility. Given the already greatly expressed need for fuel for cooking and heating, decreasing winter temperatures and increasing prices, the recent imposed electricity cuts and increased price of fuel by the IS will have a significant impact on food security in Ar-Raqqa in the upcoming months, thereby increasing the number of people in acute need of food assistance. As assessed in the MSNA, food and fuel are the top two main expenditure items for the population in Ar-Raqqa. Fuel was also reported to be missing in the markets across all subdistricts in the governorate. (MSNA 10/2014)

One local source reports that after the US-led coalition forces targeted the IS-controlled oil refineries in Tel Abyad in the Raqqa governorate and Deir-ez-Zor, Ar-Raqqa suffered from a significant scarcity of fuel. To compensate, IS imposed electricity cuts of up to 20 hours per day in parts of Raqqa. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the move has caused a spike in prices of food, transportation and groceries. The price of diesel has doubled, to more than SYP 150 (USD 0.93) per litre. Many bakeries have had to stop producing bread for lack of power, driving the price of bread to SYP 200 (USD1.25). Angry at the surge in energy prices, the shopkeepers of Ar-Raqqa went on mass strike in protest. (Syria Deeply 16/10/2014) Government officials in Iraq further announced that IS has smuggled over one million metric tons of wheat and barley, approximately a quarter of overall national output, from Ninewa in Iraq to the Syrian cities of Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor. This is likely to have a negative impact on the food security situation in Iraq but compensate for the sharp food price increases in Ar-Raqqa. (WFP 04/12/2014, IRIN 27/11/2014)
The main source of food according to the MSNA (August-September 2014) had not significantly changed in Ar-Raqqa compared with the previous year (when compared to results of the November 2013 SINA). The top three sources of food for the population in Ar-Raqqa were purchasing food in the market, own production, and food aid. Borrowing food as a source of food has slightly increased. Fourteen out of 16 subdistricts in Ar-Raqqa reported that the areas planted with wheat decreased in 2014 compared to the previous agricultural season, while it has remained about the same for barley. Ar-Raqqa is one of the main wheat-producing areas in Syria. The main constraints to local food production are the lack of inputs, with fertilizer, seeds and fodder mainly missing, as well as the lack of access to land, mostly because of conflict and insecurity. Agricultural support was identified as the third priority for humanitarian intervention, after provision of food baskets and cash assistance in Ar-Raqqa. For the autumn/winter planting season, which began in October, small-scale farmers in seven locations in Ar-Raqqa received over 1,100 tonnes of wheat and barley seeds. The assistance will enable farmers to cultivate a total of nearly 4,500 hectares and harvest more than 9,800 tonnes of cereals in seven locations in Ar-Raqqa Governorate: Raqqa centre, Beer Al Hashm, Karama, Khass Ejeil, Maadan, Al Sabkha and Al Mansoura. Agriculture-based livelihoods in Ar-Raqqa and other parts of Syria face severe constraints across the value chain, affecting farmers’ food security and coping strategies. This year, cereal crop production in the governorate was particularly affected by the conflict, drought conditions and limited access to land and essential production inputs. According to FAO estimates, Syria’s overall cereal production in 2014 amounted to around 2.4 million tonnes, which is approximately 18% below total production in 2013 and 38% below the five-year average (2009-13). (FAO 14/10/2014, MSNA 10/2014, SINA 31/12/2013)

**Livelihoods:** The main sources of income in Ar-Raqqa in 2013 were reported to be Food Crops Sales and Production, followed by skilled employment/salaries and livestock production. This has significantly changed in 2014 given the reduction of agricultural yields caused by drought conditions, lack of agricultural inputs, and insecurity. While food crops sales and production remain the main source of income, petty trade and casual labour have replaced salaries and livestock production in the top three sources of livelihoods.

### 3.6.4 WASH

Some 230,000 people were reported to be in need of safe drinking water in Ar-Raqqa Governorate during the MSNA, with IDPs residing in collective shelters, damaged or unfinished buildings, and in open spaces being most at risk regarding the lack of safe water. Three rural subdistricts (Maadan, Suluk and Ein Issa) reported life-threatening problems with regards to lack of safe water, with 63,000 people in acute and immediate need of water assistance. In Maadan, which hosts 60,000 people in acute need of safe water, the population is relying on untreated, unsafe water from the Euphrates river, which is contaminated with sewage water. The population in Maadan and Suluk have reduced their water consumption to cope with the shortages but not received any assistance. In Suluk water tanks were purchased to ensure supply with drinking water. (MSNA 10/2014)

### ‘Three rural subdistricts reported life-threatening problems with regards to lack of safe water’

The main issue with regards to water in Ar-Raqqa is quality over quantity, with lack of treatment and decreased water quality reported in the MSNA, the most common problem being water that did not taste or look good. Five out of ten subdistricts reported that sewage water is disposed into streams, rivers, branches or tributaries or in the open. This is further reflected in the most reported problems with regards to sanitation: sewage causing water pollution, in addition to garbage accumulation. (MSNA 10/2014)

The main problems regarding water availability in Ar-Raqqa are linked to the lack of fuel to operate generators and systems, with the water infrastructure being deficient and overburdened. Current shortages of fuel because of coalition air strikes and the increase in demand for fuel during winter will likely to lead to further deterioration of the humanitarian situation related to water supply. (MSNA 10/2014)

The main obstacle to accessing safe water as well as hygiene products is lack of economic means, followed by logistical constraints and lack of adapted services.

#### 3.6.5. Shelter and NFI

Some 59,000 people were assessed to be in need of shelter in the MSNA. IDPs in collective shelters, damaged or unfinished buildings, in the open space, and IDPs residing with host families were found most vulnerable. (MSNA 10/2014)

The main problems with regards to shelter in Ar-Raqqa include lack of protection against weather conditions, lack of electricity/lighting, and lack of private spaces for women. These vulnerabilities were high in summer during the data collection for the MSNA and have potentially significantly increased with low temperatures and precipitation. Regarding shelter availability, the lack of space to rent and lack of collective shelters and materials to repair shelters are the biggest constraints. Lack of financial means remains the main accessibility issue, which includes lack of financial means owing to sharp rent increases for limited available rentable space. Lack of privacy was reported a serious concern for women, as most of the IDPs living in collective shelters, share a room with several families. (MSNA 10/2014)

One source reported in November that shopkeepers who do not have saleswomen are not allowed to sell any women’s products, and women’s clothing is banned from being displayed in shop windows. (Syria Deeply 12/11/2014) This would significantly decrease the accessibility of women to both NFI’s and female hygiene items.
3.6.6. Education

IS has occupied schools and used them as military bases in several subdistricts in Ar-Raqqa. 11% of the schools recorded as functioning are identified to be occupied and used for non-educational purposes in the MSNA. In addition, nine out of ten assessed subdistricts reported that schools have been subject to aerial shelling. Overall, the number of functional learning facilities in Ar-Raqqa was reported to have decreased by 30% compared to 2011. Children still attending functional schools are experiencing gun shooting and witnessing killings and violence as well as bullying and harassment. Children are exhibiting anxiety, fear, aggression and reduced self-care in response to the experiencing of these traumatic events. (MSNA 10/2014)

Law, physics, chemistry and sociology have been removed from the academic curricula. Books are rare in schools, in the same class there are about ten books and students are sharing. The lack of learning materials, including books, is the main reason reported to be preventing children from attending school, in addition to lack of salaries for teachers and lack of resources of the households to send children to school. (MSNA 10/2014)

Recruitment of children into AOG is third highest in Ar-Raqqa, after Al-Hasakeh and Deir-ez-Zor, further reducing children’s attendance rates in schools. (MSNA 10/2014)
4. AS-SWEIDA

4.1. Key issues and possible developments

- While relatively calm, ongoing fighting as well as the reported presence of Islamic State (IS) in rural northeastern areas such as al-Qasr village, and that of Jabhat al Nusra (JAN) in neighboring Dar’a, pose a threat to stability in As-Sweida Governorate. (LBC 03/12/2014)

- The governorate has attracted over 70,000 IDPs (around 20% of its pre-crisis population).

- Persisting conscription by the Government of Syria (GoS) in As-Sweida (among other major locations in Syria), may risk turning straightforward social tensions in the governorate into a subconflict along sectarian lines.

4.2. Context

As-Sweida Governorate remains one of the areas least directly affected by the conflict, and the situation has remained stable since the previous reporting period. Because of its relative stability however, the governorate has become host to a growing number of IDPs originating from neighbouring Dar’a and Rural Damascus governorates, which has increasingly strained the local economy as well as intercommunal relations. The area is inhabited by Druze, many of whom have found themselves aligned mainly with GoS as a result of being targeted by armed opposition groups (AOG). (CarnegieEndowment 16/04/2014) That said, anti-government protests have also sporadically occurred since 2011. (OCHA 06/2014, FriedrichEbertStiftung via AlJumhuriya 10/11/2014)

4.3. Armed Conflict

No instances of armed conflict were reported in As-Sweida during Q4.

4.4. Access

Access throughout the governorate and from Jordan has improved further since UNHCR opened a field office and warehouse in Sweida City (UN 19/06/2014).

4.5. Displacement

Latest estimates indicate the governorate currently hosts 73,000 IDPs, a slight increase compared to the 69,000 reported in the second quarter of 2014. (Data Review 11/2014)
4.6. Humanitarian needs

A recent data review showed there are over 120,000 people in need (PiN) in the governorate. (Data Review 11/2014) This represents a slight decrease compared to OCHA’s estimation in June, which indicated there were over 130,000 PiN in the whole governorate. (OCHA 06/2014) This can be explained by the governorate’s relative calm and stability. However, IDPs are likely to continue seeking refuge here from more conflict-prone governorates, which risks adding to the strain on local social support structures and intercommunity relations. The data review also showed there are critical needs within the sectors of protection and shelter. (Data Review 11/2014)

4.6.1. Health

The health system in the governorate as a whole remains one of the country’s most functional. Three public hospitals are still working (one only partially) and fully accessible. (WHO-HeRAMS 09/2014)

4.6.2. Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)

As-Sweida’s food supply has registered improvements compared with previous months. The price of public bread is the lowest in the country at the subsidized rate of SYP 25/kg. (WFP 31/12/2014) On the other hand, a local source indicates that the price of olive oil has reportedly risen to SYP 12,000 per tank as a consequence of lower harvests this year. (Swaidanews 19/10/2014)

4.6.3 Protection

As-Sweida’s Druze population continues to protest against GoS attempts at conscripting local youth for the war effort, instead of allowing them to serve in local defence forces as agreed previously. (NYTimes 27/12/2014) While this is hardly an anti-GoS uprising, tensions have occasionally flared into violence. Local sources report for instance that citizens from Jneineh town attacked security forces, holding a security official hostage in return for an 18-year old member of the local community who had been held and forced to serve in the military. (Zaman al-Wasl 12/12/2014, All4Syria 15/09/2014)
5. DAMASCUS/RURAL DAMASCUS

People in Need (PIN)

- Not covered by MSNA
- 750,000 People in Need (PIN)
- Data Review 11/2014
- Out of 2.2 million estimated residing in the governorate*

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

- Not covered by MSNA
- 440,000 IDPs
- Data Review 11/2014
- Compared to 1.8 million estimated pre-conflict population

* SNAP calculation: Pre-crisis population + IDPs.

Sectors where needs are considered critical:

- NFI
- Information availability and information gaps

Source: Data Review 11/2014, SNAP Analysis on available data Q4
A REGIONAL ANALYSIS

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OVERVIEW AND SECTOR CHAPTERS

HOST COUNTRIES

RURAL DAMASCUS

People in Need (PiN)

- MSNA data too limited for comparison
  - 2.1 million
    - Data Review 11/2014
    - out of 3.2 million estimated residing in the governorate*

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

- MSNA data too limited for comparison
  - 1.4 million
    - Data Review 11/2014
    - compared to 1.8 million estimated pre-conflict population

* SNAP calculation: Pre-crisis population + IDPs.

Information availability and information gaps

Sectors where needs are considered critical

Source: Data Review 11/2014, SNAP Analysis on available data Q4
5.1 Key issues and possible developments

- In mid-December, the Government of Syria (GoS) reportedly approved the delivery of medical and surgical supplies to three hardtoreach or besieged areas. However, there is no indication this has resulted in an improvement of the health or overall situation in hardtoreach areas.

- Information on the needs and priorities in Rural Damascus is extremely limited. However, the available information continues to highlight a life-threatening humanitarian situation in the besieged areas Yarmouk and in Eastern and Western Ghouta, where an estimated 185,000 civilians face shortages of water, electricity, food and health care. Overall, Rural Damascus was identified as one of four priority governorates where critical humanitarian needs were recorded across all sectors. For more information regarding this geographic prioritisation, please refer to Annex page 53.

- Continued deterioration of the situation in besieged areas could possibly pressure actors to agree on localised truces in the upcoming quarter.

- There are signs of increased presence of the Islamist State (IS) in the governorate, with at least three armed opposition groups (AOG) in the area having pledged allegiances to the Islamic State (IS) in Q4. This could lead to increased fighting among AOG and the opening of new front lines around Eastern Ghouta or towards Dar’a in attempts by IS to gain military ground in central and southern Syria.

5.2 Context

The Syrian capital and surrounding areas remain a key strategic area of control. The GoS continues to focus its military operations to secure an area of control in a radius of about 8 km around the city to protect against opposition incursions from strongholds in the Damascus suburbs and Rural Damascus. Damascus City has drawn a large number of IDPs because of its relative safety and availability of goods and services. The humanitarian situation in the area is characterised by the long-lasting sieges imposed on areas around the capital, such as Yarmouk, and Eastern and Western Ghouta, which lack access to goods and freedom of movement, and are frequently subjected to heavy attacks.

5.3 Armed Conflict

The situation in Damascus has not significantly changed, with clashes frequently breaking out in its southern and eastern areas. Clashes continue in the Jobar neighbourhood, in northeastern Damascus, between the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF), supported by Hezbollah, National Defence Forces (NDF) and other GoS-affiliated armed groups, and AOG. Jobar has been of significant importance to the GoS in getting closer to Duma, the opposition’s main stronghold in Rural Damascus. The neighbourhood has been almost entirely destroyed by continuous SAF shelling and airstrike campaigns. Sporadic clashes still frequently break out in the outskirts of the besieged Yarmouk camp and the southern outskirts that connect to Western Ghouta. On 6 October, SAF took hold of the Dakhaniye neighbourhood in southeast Damascus. The neighbourhood, according to state media, was used by opposition groups to launch mortar shells on central Damascus. (AFP 06/10/2014)

AOG in parts of Western Ghouta in southern Rural Damascus have attempted to push towards Damascus; however, failure to do so has put the area in a stalemate amid increasing local support for negotiations. Local sources report that several protests have erupted in opposition-held areas of Western Ghouta such as Yelda, Bábila and Beit Sahem against opposition attempts at obstructing negotiations. (Al Akhbar 18/11/2014, AFP 07/11/2014, Al Akhbar 04/12/2014)

5.4 Access

Humanitarian access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas in both Damascus and Rural Damascus continues to be negatively impacted by hostilities, conflict incidents, and government restrictions, particularly medical and surgical supplies because they are viewed as potentially benefitting AOG. According to a recent data review, an estimated 190,000 people reside in nine fully besieged areas, including Yarmouk (Damascus) and eight locations in Rural Damascus. (Data Review 11/2014)

Access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas could potentially improve in the next quarter, if attempts for a truce in Rural Damascus and Aleppo succeed. In this context, WHO’s representative in Syria stated that the GoS approved the delivery of medical and surgical supplies to three areas that were previously viewed as hard or impossible to reach. The areas include Moadamiya and Eastern Ghouta. (Reuters 22/12/2014)

Damascus: Some 18,000 people remain under siege in the Yarmouk camp in southern Damascus. UNRWA expressed grave concerns over the degrading humanitarian access to the camp since July, owing to restrictions and insecurity. This had significantly decreased the amount of food and other vital forms of assistance provided to the camp. UNRWA was able to surgical supplies to three areas that were previously viewed as hard or impossible to reach. The areas include Moadamiya and Eastern Ghouta. (Al Jazeera 27/11/2014, Assafir 28/11/2014)

In November, an estimated 50 opposition fighters were killed in an SAF ambush while attempting to flee the Meed’a village in Eastern Ghouta. The crossing from Meed’a is one of the only remaining passages in and out of Eastern Ghouta, but SAF checkpoints and ambushes hamper movement. (Al Jazeera 27/11/2014, Assafir 13/12/2014, Assafir 14/12/2014)

There are indiscriminate attacks, including the use of barrel bombs, on opposition-held areas in and around Damascus, especially on the besieged towns and cities of Eastern Ghouta. Clashes continue in the outskirts of Duma. Dozens of civilians, as well as opposition militants, are regularly killed by the airstrikes. (Assafir 08/12/2014, Syrian Observer 08/12/2014, Syrian Observer 24/10/2014)

In a separate development on 7 December, Israeli warplanes bombed two locations in the Dimas area and near the Damascus international airport. Western and Israeli officials claimed the strikes targeted Iranian missiles being sent to Hezbollah, while Syrian officials claim it targeted an arms depot of the SAF. However, the nature of the attacked sites has not yet been confirmed. (Guardian 07/12/2014, Reuters 07/12/2014)

In the Qalamoun region, the Al Qaeda-affiliated group JAN, supported by AOG, has advanced and attempted to regain areas in western Qalamoun that were taken over by IS in early 2014. Activists report that the opposition took hold of parts of the Assal Al-Ward area, an important GoS stronghold near the Lebanese border. However, some reports indicated that AOG and JAN are shifting their focus to eastern Qalamoun in order to gain ground, with reports also claiming that the leader of the Islamic Army, Zhurhan Alloush, is currently in Al-Petra in eastern Qalamoun. AOG and JAN in Qalamoun are increasingly concerned after three opposition groups in the area pledged allegiance to IS. IS has since sent reinforcements to the factions in Beer Al-Qasab. While it is not yet clear whether IS and its affiliates will open a front towards Dar’a or Eastern Ghouta, IS fighters in Beer Al-Qasab are frequently clashing with the Islamic Army and JAN. (Syrian Observer 10/10/2014, Assafir 12/12/2014, Assafir 13/11/2014, Assafir 12/12/2014, Assafir 14/11/2014, Assafir 15/12/2014)
to deliver food parcels for only 430 families and hygiene kits and health services to others in October. The agency was not cleared to access the camp in November or December. (UNRWA 02/11/2014, UNRWA 04/11/2014, UNRWA 16/10/2014, AFP 29/10/2014, UNRWA 03/11/2014)

**Rural Damascus:** Local sources reported to Assafir that living circumstances significantly improved in parts of Western Ghouta after opening the Babila crossing, which connects GoS-held areas to other areas that have undergone localised truces. The Khan Esthieh Palestinian camp in Western Ghouta, while relatively calm, is inaccessible because of hostilities in its perimeter. Civilians are allowed to leave the camp to receive food assistance but are not allowed to bring anything back to the camp. The Sbeineh camp is also inaccessible; however the majority of the Palestinian residents reportedly left the camp without being permitted return. (Assafir 22/11/2014, UNRWA 16/11/2014)

In mid-October, MSF stated that 50,000 people remained in Erbin town, Eastern Ghouta. The town has been besieged for more than two years along with other areas in Eastern Ghouta. In November, Syrian authorities closed Wafidein, the only remaining crossing to Eastern Ghouta, with access possible only for merchants during the preceding six months, to sell food rations and vegetables in opposition-held areas. The Wafidein crossing was used in November by the GoS to allow approximately 250 people to leave Eastern Ghouta. Another passage that leads to Eastern Ghouta is from Meed’a town, but SaF in the town restrict any entry or exit of civilians and assistance. (MSF 16/10/2014, Syrian Observer 10/11/2014, Al Akhbar 17/11/2014, Syrian Observer 26/11/2014, Al Akhbar 29/11/2014)

### 5.5 Displacement

Most recent estimates put the number of IDPs at 440,000 in Damascus and almost 1.4 million in Rural Damascus. (Data Review 11/2014)

Very few displacement movements have been reported since October. Besides the lack of reliable coherent information, this can be attributed to the fact that civilians are unable to move because of active battlefronts and besiegement by government troops in areas of Damascus and Rural Damascus. (Syrian Observer 26/11/2014, Al Akhbar 29/11/2014)

During Q4, thousands of people fled from increased fighting in the Dukhania area in Damascus to neighbouring areas such as Jaramana and Doyla’a. Tens of thousands of others displaced within areas in Eastern Ghouta, they fled escalating violence in Marj El-Sultan to other areas in Eastern Ghouta. (UNSC 23/10/2014, WFP 11/11/2014)

### 5.6 Humanitarian Needs

A recent data review indicated there are 750,000 people in need (PiN) in Damascus, and over 2.1 million in need in Rural Damascus. (Data Review 11/2014) This caseload is significantly higher than the PiN of 110,000 found by the Syria Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) conducted in August-September for Rural Damascus. The discrepancy is largely attributed to the fact the MSNA covered only four of 36 subdistricts. (MSNA 10/2014) For Rural Damascus, a data review indicated a PiN number much higher than OCHA’s estimation in June, which indicated 1.7 million PiN in the governorate’s countryside. (OCHA 06/2014) This increase in the PiN number may be attributed to the increase in the number of IDPs from 770,000 in May to 1.4 million in November. (Data Review 11/2014)

‘**Availability of health facilities and access to health care, is significantly worse in Rural Damascus than Damascus**’

The Data Review also indicated that there are critical needs in the following sectors (Data Review 11/2014):
- Damascus: Protection, and NFIs
- Rural Damascus: Protection, FSL, NFIs, Shelter, Education, and early recovery.

#### 5.6.1. Health

**Damascus:** WHO reported the outbreak of a tropical disease spread by flies that is unprecedented in Syria. Three people have been infected by the disease near Damascus. Miyasis, though not life-threatening, illustrates the severity of health and sanitation conditions. (Reuters 27/11/2014, AFP 28/11/2014)

**Rural Damascus:** The health situation, including availability of health facilities and access to health care, is significantly worse in Rural Damascus than Damascus. This is the result of severe damage and destruction to health facilities and besiegement of many locations, and to the pre-crisis marginalisation of Rural Damascus where fewer health facilities were built in the countryside’s towns and cities than in the capital. (Syrian Observer 07/10/2014, WHO 08/12/2014)

More than two years of siege has caused an alarming shortage of medical supplies and staff in the besieged town of Erbin. Illustratively, MSF reported that the local hospital was unable to provide services to the hundreds of civilians wounded in an explosion on 9 October in a crowded market in Erbin. (MSF 16/10/2014)

#### 5.6.2. Protection

Anecdotal information highlights continuing, life-threatening protection concerns:
- Siraj Press published a report on the situation in the Al-Mezze military prison, Damascus. The report details the methods of torture used inside the detention centre. (Syrian Observer 14/10/2014)
- On 5 November, 13 children were killed and dozens injured by an SAF strike on a primary school in the opposition-held neighbourhood of Qaboun. (AFP 05/11/2014, Syrian Observer 06/10/2014, UNSC 21/11/2014)
- A local source reports that two Palestinian civilians were publicly beheaded in the Yarmouk camp by JAN. The Al Qaeda affiliate accused the Palestinians of blasphemy. (Syrian Observer 19/11/2014)
5.6.3. Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)

According to a recent data review, Rural Damascus ranked among the most in need for food security, with the highest number of people in acute food needs in Az Zabdani and Duma. Market price monitoring indicates that supplies of essential food commodities in some markets of Rural Damascus have been disrupted, mainly because of conflict and instability. (WFP 31/12/2014, Data Review 11/2014)

In mid-November, thousands of Duma’s residents engaged in protests against the Islamic Army, following a dramatic price inflation in food products. They accused the group of covering up for merchants who reportedly withheld food products in view of selling them later at a higher price. On 11 November, civilians attacked the A’dala association’s warehouse, where food products were stored. The warehouse’s guards opened gunfire, triggering a response by some protesters who used individual weapons to fire back. Following the clashes, the Islamic Army took coercive measures, including a series of detainments against AOG leaders who supported protesters, as well as civilians accused of instigating and organising the protests. (Assafir 17/11/2014, Al Monitor 24/11/2014, ibtimes 25/11/2014)

Local news sources report that the Judicial Council in Eastern Ghouta responded by demanding merchants put the food products in the market at a reasonable price. However, no binding or coercive measures were undertaken to put an end to the merchants’ monopolisation and withholding of food products. (Assafir 16/11/2014, Assafir 19/11/2014, SOHR 16/11/2014)

The ongoing siege on Eastern Ghouta has increased concerns over the food security situation for an estimated 600,000 civilians still living in the area. Local markets have reported acute food shortages of the most vital food commodities. Also, price inflation and a lack of income make it increasingly difficult for civilians to secure food necessities. (WFP 11/11/2014)

5.6.4. WASH

Local news sources report that opposition factions in the Barada valley, which holds Damascus’ main water supply, completely cut off water from Damascus for several days in November, reportedly as a means to pressure the Government of Syria (GoS) into halting military airstrikes on Barada. (Syrian Observer 28/11/2014, Syrian Observer 02/12/2014)

Access to water in the Yarmouk refugee camp is deteriorating. While no information was available on the severity of the situation and on the civilians’ alternatives to a functioning water network, a UN official stated at the end of October that Palestinians in the camp had been deprived of water for some 40 days. (AFP 29/10/2014)

5.6.5. Shelter and NFIs

Rural Damascus hosts one of the largest IDP caseloads in the country and has seen large scale displacement during Q3 and Q4. Although there is limited information available on the shelter and NFI situation, it can be assumed that the large number of IDPs have overwhelmed the available shelter options, particularly in areas where collective shelters are unavailable or up to capacity. However, although some IDPs have resorted to residing in tents, large informal tented settlements have not been identified. This could either mean that IDPs have been able to find shelter with host families and in rented apartments or is a reflection of the large information gaps within the governorate. (REACH 13/01/2015)
6. DAR‘A

6.1. Key Issues and possible developments

Dar‘a has remained a significant front in the Syrian conflict. Although delivery of cross-border aid to opposition-controlled areas improved humanitarian access in 2014, continued conflict and displacement, a lack of regular assessments, and the difficulties of post-distribution monitoring make it impossible to create a clear picture of the needs, or the impact of increased access. As new armed opposition groups (AOG) offensives in Q4 have led to an intensification of fighting in the governorate, it is presumed this has exacerbated problems, and that this trend will continue, either because AOG continue to push northward toward Damascus, or because the Government of Syria (GoS) makes a concerted effort to roll back opposition gains.

6.2. Context

Dar‘a was the location of the first reform protests in Syria, in 2011, and is considered the birthplace of the revolution. Additionally, one of Syria’s major shipping and transit arteries, the M5 highway, which connects Damascus to Jordan (and to Aleppo in the north), runs through the centre of the governorate. These factors have made it a site of ongoing conflict. The governorate remains divided between AOG, who control most of the southwest, and GoS, based in the northern garrison towns of Izra‘ and As-Sanamayn. A large number of Dar‘a’s estimated one million pre-conflict inhabitants have been displaced internally, or have fled to Jordan: as of August 2014, UNHCR Jordan had more than 280,000 active registrations of refugees from Dar‘a.

6.3. Armed Conflict

Dar‘a has seen a number of military offensives by AOG during the reporting period, though gains have been minor. In October, AOG captured checkpoints along the M5 in an unsuccessful attempt to take over the Nassib crossing into Jordan. (Al Jazeera 23/10/2014, Now Media 31/10/2014, Daily Star 23/10/2014) In November, an alliance of AOG, which included both Jabhat al Nusra (JAN) and groups backed by foreign powers, including the US, made gains in Dar‘a, taking over the city of Nawa and the western part of Sheikh Miskin. (Associated Press 29/11/2014, Institute for the Study of War 12/11/2014, Al-Monitor 17/11/2014, Syria Deeply 17/11/2014, McClatchey 17/11/2014, Syrian Observer 13/11/2014) The GoS responded with a counter-offensive, including heavy aerial bombardment. (Institute for the Study of War 02/12/2014) The stated goal of the AOG offensive was to link up territory they control in Dar‘a with the AOG-held areas on the outskirts of Damascus. This goal appears distant, if not outright unachievable, but it is expected that AOG will continue to push slowly north, and possibly make another attempt on the Nassib crossing.

There has been some public discussion about whether the Islamic State (IS) is attempting to build up a presence in Dar‘a during Q4. In October, an unconfirmed media report had JAN leaders assassinating two of their own commanders, who were presumed to be IS-linked, in order to keep the hardliner group out of the governorate. (Assafir 10/12/2014) A JAN leader in Dar‘a has also reportedly ordered precautions to be taken against IS attempts to infiltrate the governorate. IS is known for swift advances that take advantage of sleeper cells and the cooperation of local AOG, but it is not clear whether the warning from JAN was a genuine concern or a political move. (Al-Monitor 03/12/2014, Institute for the Study of War 02/12/2014)
6.4. Access
Since June, WFP has been delivering assistance to opposition-controlled areas of Dar’a from Jordan, under UN Resolution 2165. The agency reports that security incidents continue to prevent deliveries in conflict-affected rural areas, and the situation appears to have worsened in the reporting period. (WFP 11/11/2014, WFP 25/11/2014, Data Review 11/2014) However, it is also reported that 69 of 70 areas classified as hard-to-reach have been accessed recently. (UNSC 21/11/2014) In December, the UN renewed Resolution 2165’s mandate for another 12 months. (UNSC 21/11 17/12/2014)

In Nawa and Sheikh Miskin, where control appears to have shifted from GoS to AOG, during the reporting period, the nature of access constraints has likely changed.

According to the MSNA, the major access constraint in Dar’a was the active conflict, which prevents the population from getting access to relief. Movement restrictions on humanitarian organisations, and the interference of powerful actors (presumably AOG) also limited humanitarian access to beneficiaries. A lack of personal identity documentation was also cited as an issue affecting the safety of some residents.

6.5. Displacement
Displacement has been ongoing in the reporting period, presumably in response to military operations. (WFP 15/10/2014) In late October, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent reportedly registered 50,000 new IDPs in As-Sanamayn and vicinity, who had fled violence in Inkhil and other rural areas of the governorate. (WFP 30/10/2014) In November, there were reports of 18,000 people displaced to Izra, Dar’a city, Ash-Shajara and Tal Shihab in less than 48 hours, and forced to find temporary shelter, often in unsuitable conditions. (WFP 11/11/2014) At the end of November, another 40,000 reportedly fled Sheikh Miskin, which was heavily contested and under frequent air and shelling attacks by GoS. (WFP 25/11/2014)

Most recent estimates put the number of IDPs in the governorate between 170,000 (MSNA 10/2014, 7/17 subdistricts covered) and 390,000. (Data Review 11/2014) In June, OCHA estimated there were some 160,000 IDPs in those seven subdistricts, and around 270,000 in the governorate as a whole. (OCHA 26/08/2014) The vast majority was reported to be living with host families or renting, but more than 7,000 lived in unfinished buildings, 7,000 in Informal Tented Settlements (ITS), and 8,500 in collective shelters. Most displacement had occurred within the governorate. In particular, there was net migration out of Dar’a and Nawa subdistricts, which contained the largest population centres assessed, as well as from Tassil subdistrict. The largest IDP populations were in Mzeirib, Ash-Shajara and Dar’a subdistricts. In late September, ICRC said fighting had displaced more than 100,000 in Dar’a and Quneitra during the month (ICRC 17/10/2014).

6.6. Humanitarian Needs
A recent data review estimated that there are just over 600,000 PiN in the governorate, which is an increase compared with the 520,000 indicated by OCHA in June. (Data Review 11/2014, OCHA 06/2014) The MSNA estimated there were more than 380,000 PiN in the assessed subdistricts of Dar’a. (7 out of 17 assessed subdistricts). (MSNA 10/2014) The Data Review also indicated critical needs in all sectors. (Data Review 11/2014)

6.6.1. Protection
In the MSNA, respondents rated protection as their second priority need, after health. Although the assessment did not include protection-related questions, issues highlighted by key informants included (MSNA 10/2014):
• Barrel bombings and airstrikes, including strikes on schools and medical facilities, particularly in Ash-Shajara and Dar’a city, and even areas that reported no fighting, such as Jasim and Jizeh, reported aerial attacks;
• Harassment, detention and torture during detention in some areas, particularly Mzeirib;
• Students in some areas being prevented from going to school by shelling or fear of shelling, as schools are perceived as unsafe;
• University students may have to travel to GoS-controlled areas to study, are significantly afraid of harassment, detention or assault by GoS or affiliated parties;
• Nawa and Inkhil were described as ‘the most dangerous areas in the governorate,’ although no details were provided.

Given that these issues are directly or indirectly related to armed conflict, the new AOG offensive in October means protection issues in Dar’a have almost certainly grown more severe since the MSNA, particularly in areas like Sheikh Miskin and Nawa. As portions of both those areas have changed hands from the GoS to AOG, the nature of protection concerns has likely also changed. In particular, civilians in areas falling under AOG control are immediately at serious risk from airstrikes.

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<tr>
<th>Dar’a</th>
<th>MSNA Subdistricts</th>
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<tr>
<td>7 out of 17 subdistricts assessed</td>
<td>480,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>People in need</td>
<td>15.6 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>of total population in assessed areas of Dar’a</td>
<td>79%</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>4.8 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>of total population in assessed areas of Dar’a</td>
<td>35%</td>
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Despite this, lack of functioning medical facilities, particularly female staff, lack of medical equipment, lack of ambulances, and lack of assistive devices such as wheelchairs and crutches. Logistical constraints and lack of money were the major impediments to health care access. In some areas (Ash Shajarah, Jasm, Mzeireb, Nawa) respondents reported having to travel long distances to reach health facilities, often across checkpoints or areas where transportation was not available. Some reported the presence of diseases new to the area arising from poor hygiene and water contamination (scabies, bloody diarrhoea), and the spread of disease among IDPs because of overcrowding. (MSNA 10/2014)

At the beginning of Q4, out of nine public hospitals in the governorate, four were non-functional or inaccessible (one had been destroyed), and four were partially functioning: only one hospital was rated intact, fully functioning and accessible. (HeRAMS 30/09/2014) Despite this, lack of functioning medical centres was not described as a major problem in the MSNA.

6.6.3. Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)
In the MSNA, key informants rated food security as the fourth priority sector. Again, the most severe area assessed was Nawa. Though Dar’a has a strong agricultural base, agricultural production was not described as a significant source of food in the year prior to assessment. Residents described producing food as a source of income, while relying primarily on markets and charitable assistance for consumption. Lack of money to buy food was the most reported food security issue, related to low incomes and rising prices, though physical and security constraints in reaching markets were also noted in some areas. Food was listed as the primary household expenditure in all areas, followed by fuel. Some problems of food availability were reported, including lack of diversity in markets and lack of locally produced food in rural areas, and lack of baby/infant food in all areas. (MSNA 10/2014)

Respondents on the MSNA reported food or livestock production had been the primary source of income a year ago in many areas (the exceptions being the urban areas of Jizeh and Dar’a city) and low crop yields, lack of agricultural inputs, and lack of access to land for agriculture were also reported as significant barriers to both food production and income generation. In several areas, casual labour and humanitarian assistance has replaced food production as the major income source. (MSNA 10/2014)

Coping mechanisms included relying on less expensive food, buying food on credit, or borrowing food. Overall, humanitarian assistance was described by key informants as a major coping strategy, including borrowing from charities, relatives, or people who were still better off. IDPs staying with host families, and those in open spaces were considered most at risk of food insecurity. The primary intervention asked for was fuel for bakeries. (MSNA 10/2014)

Notably, in October, WFP price monitoring in Dar’a and Mzeireb subdistricts captured few major price increases in the governorate. However, bread prices were already close to double the national average, and Dar’a did see a further (67%) rise over a six-month period. (MSNA key informants reported higher bread prices than were found in WFP monitoring) There were also significant rises in the price of some fuel products. In Mzeireb, diesel and butane prices roughly doubled over six months, and in October stood at more than twice the national average. Wheat and rice prices were near the national average, which has risen considerably over the course of the conflict. (WFP 10/2014) in September, the agency reported ‘unrestrained rises’ of up to 75% in Dar’a. (WFP 30/09/2014)

As conflict has intensified, it is likely food security in the governorate has worsened since the MSNA, and will continue to deteriorate at an accelerated pace.

6.6.4. WASH
In the MSNA, male respondents only rated access to water as their third priority need. The primary source of water was trucking. A majority of assessed subdistricts still reported having access to the public network, but there were also reports of significant conflict damage to water infrastructure. The primary availability issue was a lack of electricity or fuel for generators, followed by damage to the water system, a lack of storage containers, and a lack of treatment chemicals at the municipal level. Access problems included a lack of money, and logistical and physical constraints. (MSNA 10/2014)

The major hygiene problem reported was insufficient money to buy hygiene products. (MSNA 10/2014)

The major sanitation problems were lack of garbage removal and an increase in flies and mosquitoes. Interventions requested were: fuel for generators (water), garbage removal, and family hygiene kits, especially for women and infants. (MSNA 10/2014)

The coming of winter rains may have improved water access since the MSNA was conducted; however, in areas where the water system is damaged, they may increase the risk of cross-contamination and spread of water-borne illnesses. Again, with increasing conflict and no opportunities to repair public infrastructure, the WASH situation is likely to further deteriorate.

6.6.5. Shelter/NFI
In the MSNA, women only rated shelter as their third priority need. The assessment suggested that in most subdistricts, 10-20% of houses had been destroyed, 20-30% of houses had taken heavy damage, and 30-50% moderate damage, though confidence in these figures was not overwhelming. Major shelter issues reported were lack of protection from the weather and lack of electricity. Other issues included lack of money and tools for making repairs, lack of money for rent, and rent inflation. Requested interventions included the provision of heating fuel, solar lanterns and cash. (MSNA 10/2014)

UNOSAT images show limited damage to housing stock in Dar’a city, particularly when compared to other major cities in Syria. (UNOSAT 18/11/2014) The coming of winter will have made the consequences of living with inadequate protection from the elements much more severe.

Access to fuel is a main concern in the governorate, impacting access to electricity, water supply and market prices. By December, the price of diesel in the black market reached SYP 367 per liter; which is 360% more than the official price (SYP 80 per liter). (WFP 31/11/2014)

‘Respondents reported having to travel long distances to reach health facilities’
6.6.6. Education

The MSNA reported that secondary enrolment was very low in some subdistricts: in Mzeireb and Dar'a it was 0-25% for boys. Enrolment numbers were high in other areas. Some subdistricts also appeared to have specific problems with enrolment of girls: in Jasim and Mzeireb, girls’ secondary enrolment was 0-25%. Bombings and gunfire were reported as major risks, and schools or getting to school were seen as unsafe. Children were reported suffering fear, anxiety and panic attacks. In some areas, there were reports of serious damage to education facilities (Dar’a, Mzeireb and, to a lesser degree, Tassil). School facilities were in poor condition, and teachers were unpaid. The primary intervention requested was provision of school materials. (MSNA 10/2014)
7. DEIR-EZ-ZOR

7.1. Key issues and possible developments

- Deir-ez-Zor Governorate was identified as one of four priority governorates where critical humanitarian needs were recorded across all sectors. For more information regarding this geographic prioritisation, please refer to Annex page 53.

- Impeded access to Deir-ez-Zor makes it difficult to assist the population, further degrading their resilience levels particularly for the population living in the city. Moreover, the governorate has also experienced substantial population displacement as indicated in the Syria Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) conducted in August-September. Due to access constraints and fuel shortages, prices for basic commodities are among the highest in the country. (WFP 31/12/2014, MSNA 10/2014)

- Child protection is one of the major concerns in Q4. Reports indicate that schools are being used to influence and recruit children by imposing a new curriculum perceived as religiously extreme. (Alshorato 10/11/2014)

- In addition, indication of use of chlorine type bombs by the Government of Syria (GoS) to repel Islamic State (IS) attacks, in violation of international law and several elements of UNSC 2118, has been reported. (AlArabya 07/12/2014)

7.2. Context

Oil-rich Deir-ez-Zor Governorate in eastern Syria is an important supply route and transit zone, which connects IS strongholds in Iraq to the one in Ar-Raqqa. Its population was around 1.2 million by 2011 estimates, with populated areas mainly along the Euphrates. It has witnessed major battles between the Government, IS and opposition forces during the whole of 2014, with IS seizing large parts of the governorate.

7.3. Armed Conflict

After continuous territorial gain, the IS offensive on Deir-ez-Zor is reportedly being stalled. December 2014 was characterised by numerous unsuccessful IS attempts to take over the GoS military airport of Deir-ez-Zor City with a high number of casualties among IS fighters. The battle for control of the military airport is probably one of the key to establish IS's next staging area. The party that controls this airport controls the city and the access to western Syria. For IS, it holds the key to fully controlling a second governorate and opening military capability toward the west part of the country, reinforcing its geographical hegemony. For GoS, the capacity to demonstrate that it can still maintain control over some major oil fields is at stake, as well as containing IS advance. Keeping control of Deir-ez-Zor City is of strategic importance for the morale of GoS troops and supporters. This is even more important since the fall of Ar-Raqqa and the beheading of over 100 GoS soldiers. However, the current standoff is likely to continue over the next few months. Civilian casualties caused by GoS shelling, or allegedly by coalition airstrikes, have been reported in IS controlled areas. (Theleuthiujournal 31/12/2014, UNSC Report 23/10/2014, SOHR 05/12/2014, OCHA 22/12/2014, Al Jazeera 07/12/2014, Reuters 04/12/2014, OCHA 05/12/2014, Al Masdar News 12/12/2014, SOHR 04/12/2014, SOHR 30/11/2014)
7.4. Access

Access to Deir-ez-Zor is still a major challenge for aid providers in all sectors, as a result of insecurity caused by the conflict and delays in GoS approval. As an example, WFP reported disruption of the planned food assistance in the governorate because of fighting along supply routes. GoS has either rejected or not responded to WHO requests to provide support to hard-to-reach areas.

Concerns over access to the remaining 150,000 civilians (half of the pre-crisis population) living in Deir-ez-Zor city have emerged with IS maintaining a series of outposts around the city, thereby restricting access to commercial and humanitarian trucks aiming to reach western parts of Deir-ez-Zor still under GoS control. (MSNA 30/10/2014, OCHA 07/11/2014, UNSC 21/11/2014, WFP 20/11/2014, Data Review 11/2014)

7.5. Displacement

Deir-ez-Zor witnessed largescale displacement during 2014, peaking in the 3rd quarter with an estimated 230,000 newly displaced in the governorate. The MSNA identified the number of IDPs at around 390,000 or 28 % of the overall remaining population in the governorate; a recent data review indicated some 460,000. (Data Review 11/2014) However, credible reports estimated that thousands of people were displaced to mainly rural areas of Deir-ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa because of coalition airstrikes. As the majority of Deir-ez-Zor is still under IS control, more coalition and GoS airstrikes were expected, leading to further population displacements. (UNSC 23/11/2014) Therefore, the number of IDPs number is likely to have increased. Overall, the MSNA identified the IDPs as one of the most vulnerable population groups, particularly those living in collective shelters or damaged/unfinished buildings during the winter months. (OCHA 26/08/2014, MSNA 10/2014)

7.6. Humanitarian Needs

A recent data review estimated there are over 790,000 people in need (PiN) in the governorate, which represents an increase compared with the 710,000 indicated by OCHA in June. (Data Review 11/2014, OCHA 06/2014) The MSNA estimated there were more than 520,000 PiN in the assessed subdistricts (all subdistricts covered). (MSNA 30/10/2014) Differences in PiN numbers between MSNA and the November data review may be attributed to methodological differences. The data review also indicated critical needs in the following sectors: protection, WASH, education, and early recovery. (Data Review 11/2014)

7.6.1. Protection

More mass graves were found in areas controlled, or previously controlled, by IS. A new grave was found in Deir-ez-Zor containing 230 bodies, the vast majority being civilians belonging to the Sh’aitat tribe that had risen up against IS in July 2014. This brings the number of Sh’aitat tribal members killed by IS since summer 2014 to more than 900. (Al jazeera 17/12/2014, Reuters 14/12/2014) Local sources report that thousands of members of this tribe were allowed to return to their villages. (SOHR 6/11/2014, Syria Direct 03/11/2014, SOHR 26/11/2014)

Civilian casualties is still a major protection concern in Deir-ez-Zor, with most parties using means of indiscriminate warfare such as barrel bombs, Suicide Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIED), shelling, etc. (The Guardian 15/10/2014, UNSC 23/11/2014, Reuters 18/10/2014, SOHR 18/10/2014, SOHR 24/11/2014)

7.6.2. WASH

The MSNA estimated that 370,000 people were in need of a WASH intervention, roughly 30 % of the remaining population in the governorate. More than 25 % of the remaining living population in Deir-ez-Zor needs WASH assistance. This is a decrease of 22 % from the 480,000 reported in July 2014. However the number of people in moderate or acute need has increased from 200,000 to over 260,000. The rise in number is inversely proportional to the continued degradation of the water infrastructure. In areas remaining with water coverage, leaks also pose a major problem and contribute to contamination created by infiltrations of stagnant water and raw sewage in the network. The lack of water treatment chemicals, dosing pumps, and accessories at central treatment level and aqua tabs and similar chemicals at household level, were identified as the principle cause of problems with water quality. For example, water trucking is reported as the third most commonly used water source (26%). This is a significant increase as prior to the crisis, when only 12% of the population used trucked water. (Dynamo 31/07/2014, MSNA 10/2014, SINA 16/01/2014)
7.6.3. Health
The health system of Deir-ez-Zor has been significantly impacted by the conflict. Deir-ez-Zor has the highest number of damaged health centres compared with the rest of the governorates and the highest number of health centres that are only partly functional (70 out of 101). Furthermore, 21 health centres are non-functional and only 10 are fully functional. (WHO 11/2014)

The MSNA reported that health is the highest priority needs compared with other sectors in the governorate. Over 260,000 people are in need of health assistance. Not knowing how to access health services was the most common reported issue and several assessed subdistricts reported life-threatening problems. (MSNA 10/2014)

A rapid nutrition assessment showed that overall, Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates were above 10% in Deir-ez-Zor, which is considered ‘serious’ as per WHO standards. (UNICEF 21/12/2014)

7.6.4. Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)

The population in opposition-controlled areas reported they do not benefit from subsidies and fuel shortages are leading to a surge in bread prices due to increased transportation and production costs. In December, the governorate recorded the highest price for wheat flour and rice nationwide, at SYP 183 and 275 per kilo respectively. (WFP 31/12/2014) This, combined with an estimated 80% of people in Deir-ez-Zor living below the poverty line, makes food availability and the ability to purchase it a large problem for most of the governorate’s population. (UNSC 23/11/2014, MSNA 30/10/2014) A recent UNICEF study showed that almost 80% of IDPs living in Deir-ez-Zor were relying on food assistance and purchased food. Nearly a third (29%) of them reported having difficulties accessing food, out of which 70% were reducing their food intake as a coping mechanism. (UNICEF 21/12/2014)

The MSNA covered all of Deir-ez-Zor’s subdistricts and ranked it as the governorate with the lowest variety of food in its markets. This was explained by severe access constraints as well as high intensity conflict and insecurity on supply routes. It was reported that over 370,000 people needed food assistance.

7.6.5. Shelter & NFI

The MSNA (conducted in August-September 2014) reported that over 110,000 people need shelter assistance in Deir-ez-Zor, with 6,300 in acute need. It also reported some 220,000 PiN of NFI assistance, with 5,000 in acute need. According to the Dynamo report in July, over 54,000 people were in need of shelter and NFI support, including 13,000 people in acute need. This increase in reported numbers could be explained by the wave of displacement in between assessments. A further compounding factor is the lack of rental houses or other places to stay. Most people are forced to stay with relatives or other people, resulting in privacy concerns and overcrowding of spaces. (MSNA 30/10/2014, Dynamo 31/07/2014) The lack of housing space is mostly because of the conflict, as demonstrated by a recent UNITAR / UNOSAT report. It identified a total of 3,004 affected structures within a portion of the city of Deir-ez-Zor, out of which 417 were completely destroyed, 1,564 severely damaged and 1,613 moderately damaged. Much of the city had been damaged by October 24, 2013, but 1,149 structures were newly damaged and 106 structures sustained further damage since 13 May 2014. (UNOSAT 06/11/2014)

7.6.6. Education

A significant number of Deir-ez-Zor subdistricts report a maximum 25% attendance rate across all age and gender groups. Further to that, with 25% moderately or heavily damaged schools, and 27% either destroyed or occupied, Deir-ez-Zor came second to Aleppo in the number of non-functional schools. Dropout causes include child recruitment (Deir-ez-Zor has been ranked among the top three governorates with the highest frequency of reports identifying child recruitment as the reason for not attending school) or the need to generate income. (MSNA 10/2014)

In IS-controlled areas, school curricula were revised to reflect ideological priorities and weapons training. Education is being used as a tool of indoctrination in IS-controlled areas, in order to raise a new generation of supporters. In some cases, schools have been used to recruit children for active combat. The impact on children’s welfare and the aftermath of the inclusion of hardliner ideologies within the school system will be long lasting, even if IS retires from those areas. (UN 14/11/2014, Reuters 07/11/2014)
8. HAMA

**People in Need (PIN)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High freq. conflict locations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military airport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power plant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in Need</td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>MSNA 10/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Data Review 11/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>MSNA 10/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Data Review 11/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>Data Review 11/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* MSNA estimate, roughly based on pre-crisis population + IDPs – people who have left the governorate. This total has been recalculated by SNAP due to a minor error in the MSNA data, and may differ from other published versions.

**Information availability and information gaps**

- **Sectors where needs are considered critical**
  - NFI
  - Food
  - Health
  - Shelter

**Source:** Data Review 11/2014, SNAP Analysis on available data Q4

**Governorate Profiles**

- As-Suqaylabiyah
- Tell Salhib
- Jeb Ramleh
- Shinas
- Ziyara
- Madiq Castle
- Shat-ha
- Hamra
- Hama
- As-Saan
- As Salamiyeh
- Eastern Bari
- Hamra
- Oqerbat
- Hamra
- Masyaf
- Hama
- Ein Halaqim
- Shin Oj

**Host Countries**

- Hama
- NFI
- Information availability and information gaps
8.1. Key issues and possible developments

Violent attacks and fighting in the north, northwest, and east of the governorate are affecting civilians both in areas controlled by the opposition and Government of Syria (GoS). Critical needs in protection and shelter are reported, while significant population movements because of violence were recorded in rural areas in northern Hama at the beginning of the reporting period.

8.2. Context

Known for its historical opposition to the ruling Ba’ath Party and subsequent government crackdown in 1982, Hama remains severely affected by more than three years of conflict owing its proximity to contested areas in the north and central regions, and its central position as a link between the country’s north and southern regions. The governorate is largely controlled by GoS, with pockets in the north under control of armed opposition groups (AOG).

8.3. Armed Conflict

In late November, the Al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al Nusra (JAN) continued its offensive against Free Syrian Army (FSA) affiliates in the northwest of the country, including in southern Idleb and northern Hama, causing two major FSA factions to disband and hand their weapons over to the local IS factions. One FSA faction expelled JAN from the towns of Ma’arrat AnNu’man and Khan Sheikhoun. Overall, a range of factions continue to operate in the area but JAN is clearly succeeding in expanding its influence. (OCHA 05/12/2014) FSA factions in the area, already militarily weakened, are either surrounded by JAN or have their supply routes blocked by JAN. This dynamic is likely to spark JAN-FSA clashes, which could cause insecurity in areas where a wide variety of humanitarian actors operate. (OCHA 21/11/2014)

By the end of October, the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) had made significant gains in the northern and western countryside of Hama, recapturing most of the towns in the region. (Al Akhbar 30/10/2014, OCHA 03/11/2014) The SAF notably retook control of the strategic town of Marez in Hama’s northern countryside after battling with AOG (Hazem Movement and JAN), AOG had been in control of the town since June. The town’s importance derives from its strategic location as a node connecting the opposition’s supply lines, starting from Hama’s countryside and to the areas it controls in Idleb. (Al Monitor 30/10/2014, Reuters 24/10/2014) In the east, reports indicated that SAF conducted airstrikes and clashes with AOG on the ground, in Bregeth, Damina, near Quba Al-Kurdi, and Al-Rahjan. (SOHR 01/12/2014)

8.4. Access

Information remains limited regarding operational constraints and security affecting access across the governorate. Conflict intensity was reportedly higher in northern and eastern rural Hama, where violent events and insecurity may have disrupted relief activities. During the reporting period, shipments with humanitarian supplies crossed the Bab Al-Hawa and Bab Al-Salam borders and assisted over 75,000 people, mainly in the districts of Muhradah and Hama. (OCHA 05/12/2014, OCHA 21/11/2014)

8.5. Displacement

Most recent estimates put the number of IDPs in the governorate between 350,000 (MSNA 10/2014) and 450,000 (Data Review 11/2014), the vast majority of them in the subdistricts of Hama. (MSNA 10/2014) These figures represent an increase compared with the 240,000 IDPs reported by OCHA in June.

Additionally, in early September, WFP reported that some 100,000 people displaced to the cities of Hama and As-Salamiyeh were fleeing their homes in northeast of the governorate because of ongoing violence. (WFP 02/09/2014)

In late September and early October, SAF continued their counteroffensive to retake parts of northern Hama, resulting in at least 75,000 people being displaced to rural areas of northern Hama and southern Idleb. Of these, at least 25,000 are staying in open-air informal settlements outside of villages. (OCHA 03/10/2014)

8.6. Humanitarian Needs

A recent data review estimated there are just over 630,000 PiN in the governorate, representing an increase compared with the 530,000 indicated by OCHA in June. (Data Review 11/2014, OCHA 06/2014) The Syria Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) conducted in August-September estimated there were more than 480,000 PiN in the assessed subdistricts (nine out of 22 assessed subdistricts). (MSNA 10/2014) The Data Review also indicated that there are critical needs in the protection and shelter sectors. (Data Review 11/2014)
**Trend:** In November 2013, an assessment indicated that food and health were the priority concerns in Hama. According to both the MSNA data collected in Q3 (August-September) of 2014 and the Data Review, there are critical needs in protection and shelter, which is consistent with deteriorating security and seasonal trends. (MSNA 10/2014, Data Review 11/2014)

### 8.6.1. WASH

In four out of nine subdistricts where the public water system functions as a main source of water, capacity is insufficient to cover all the needs and the population has to resort to alternative sources, such as water trucking and wells. In six out of nine subdistricts, key informants reported heavy damage to physical water infrastructure due to conflict. (MSNA 10/2014)

The deterioration of the public water system forces people to buy water at increasing prices. In Hama, eight out of nine assessed subdistricts assessed report a lack of income to buy water. Security constraints are also one of the main issues regarding access to water. (MSNA 10/2014)

During the MSNA, there was no regular rubbish collection in eight out of nine subdistricts and garbage was left to accumulate in public locations, resulting in an increased risk of contamination of water sources. Additionally, almost half of the assessed subdistricts indicated that the sewage system was damaged. (MSNA 10/2014)

### 8.6.2. Health

According to the latest Health Resources Availability Mapping System (HeRAMS) data (September 2014), three of the six public hospitals are fully functional. Two are functioning partially, and one is not functioning at all. Of Hama’s 161 public health centres, 15 are non-functional and 23 only partially functioning. (WHO 30/09/2014) The MSNA confirmed that the lack of functioning health facilities is an issue reported in a third of assessed subdistricts.

Overall, the health status of the population is adversely impacted by the lack of medicine, the lack of economic resources, and security constraints hampering access to appropriate health care. (MSNA 10/2014)

An assessment of the nutritional status of displaced children under five years of age living in collective shelters and the host community in Syria reported Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates above 10%, and Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) rates above 3% among children sampled in three governorates including Hama. This is a ‘serious’ nutrition situation according to WHO standards. (UNICEF 22/12/2014, Data Review 11/2014)

### 8.6.3. Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)

The severity of the food security situation in the governorate in September was relatively low, with less than 1% of the assessed population in need of life-saving food security assistance. However, this assessment was conducted at the time of harvest and the food security situation is likely to have significantly worsened since, along with the nutritional situation, as indicated in the health section.

In Hama, eight out of nine assessed subdistricts indicated that the barley and wheat harvests have deteriorated compared with 2013 yields. Most governorates indicate food production was hampered by the lack of available inputs, but MSNA data showed that food production in Hama is mostly constrained by the lack of access to land.

‘The deterioration of the public water system forces people to buy water at increasing prices’

Food crop production and sales were the main source of income last year; however, the MSNA showed people are now mainly relying on humanitarian assistance. Market purchases and aid are the two main sources of food for communities in the governorate but access is hampered by the widespread insecurity and lack of economic resources. (MSNA 10/2014)

### 8.6.4. Protection

Critical information gaps prevent a better understanding of protection issues in the governorate. Concerns focus on areas affected by high levels of violence, mostly in the north, east, and west of Hama, where GoS air raids, clashes between government forces and AOG, and infighting between AOG continue to be documented. (SOHR 01/11/2014, Reuters 13/10/2014)

Anecdotal information suggests that human rights violations including executions are being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict. Reports also speak of torture by GoS (SOHR 01/11/2014), and the stoning of a woman by IS in the eastern countryside. (Syrian Observer 21/10/2014)

Additionally, the MSNA data indicated that across the governorate, as a result of having been heavily exposed to bombings and shootings, children exhibit trauma symptoms such as fear, aggressiveness and anger. The data also showed that children are being kept out of school because they are needed to help the family (including child labour), and/or because schools are perceived as unsafe in seven out of nine assessed subdistricts. (MSNA 10/2014)

### 8.6.5. Shelter/NFI

According to the MSNA, two-thirds of the assessed subdistricts reported that people’s living conditions had worsened in the three months prior to assessment, which took place in August-September. The main issue reported was bad protection against the weather, a situation which has likely deteriorated with the onset of winter, especially considering that the vast majority of assessed subdistricts reported insufficient tools and materials on the market to repair shelters, as well as limited economic resources.

Dwindling income is a concern, as a high proportion of IDPs reside in rented accommodation, placing them at risk of eviction. The lack of available collective shelters was mentioned in seven out of nine assessed subdistricts, suggesting limited alternatives for IDPs who cannot afford rent. (MSNA 10/2014)

Additionally, insecurity was mentioned as a key issue limiting access to shelter or markets for NFI provision in seven out of nine assessed subdistricts. (MSNA 10/2014)
8.6.6. Education
According to the MSNA, the number of functional schools has decreased by 38% (from around 560 pre-crisis to 340 in September). Access to education is further disrupted by a lack of school materials, the fact that children are increasingly needed to help out at home, and the perception of schools as unsafe places. (MSNA 10/2014)

These constraints have caused a decrease in attendance rates. In over half of the subdistricts assessed, less than 50% of primary school-aged children regularly go to a learning space. (MSNA 10/2014)

‘In over half of the subdistricts assessed, less than 50% of primary school-aged children regularly go to a learning space’
9. Homs

- High freq. conflict locations (Oct-Dec)
- Military airport
- Power plant
- Civil airport

Border crossings
× Restricted access

Hum. access constraints
(Data Review 11/2014)

High

Low

Not covered by MSNA

People in Need
(PiN)

670,000
Data Review 11/2014
out of 2.3 million estimated residing in the governorate*

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

490,000
Data Review 11/2014
compared to 1.8 million estimated pre-conflict population

* SNAP calculation: Pre-crisis population + IDPs.

Host Countries

Governorate Profiles

Governorates where needs are considered critical

Information availability and information gaps

Source: Data Review 11/2014, SNAP Analysis on available data Q4
9.1. Key issues and possible developments

- Al-Wa’er suburb remains one of the most affected areas of the governorate. Despite a recent truce in this last major AOG stronghold, access remains a critical issue due to insecurity and a continued siege-like situation imposed by the Government of Syria (GoS).

- Information on the humanitarian situation in the governorate is extremely limited. Available information indicates that accessibility and availability of food in Homs is continually deteriorating and protection concerns, including human rights violations by Islamic State (IS) are widespread.

9.2. Context

Homs is the largest governorate in Syria with populated areas mainly concentrated in the west. (OCHA 06/2014) Since the start of the civil war, Homs has witnessed major violence between armed opposition groups (AOG) and GoS forces. In March 2014, GoS gradually took back areas previously held by opposition forces, cutting off opposition supply routes from Lebanon. (OCHA 06/2014, AFP 02/05/2014, Amnesty International 10/06/2014, DW 02/05/2014)

9.3. Armed Conflict

The governorate is in stalemate, with clashes frequently breaking out on frontlines. Shortly after negotiations between government officials and opposition and local representatives in Al-Wa’er came to a standstill, GoS forces resumed extensive airstrikes and shelling, likely as a means to strengthen their bargaining power and shape the conditions for the AOG’ submission as was done previously in the Old Homs agreements. Strikes on Al-Wa’er lead to daily civilian casualties and injuries. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), 35 civilians, including women and children, were killed and dozens others injured by a series of airstrikes on Al-Wa’er on 17 December. (SOHR 18/12/2014, UNSC 23/11/2014)

The only remaining direct clashes in the governorate currently take place between IS and the Syrian armed forces (SAF) over the Al-Sha’ar gas field, east of Homs City. The gas field has changed hands four times since July, when IS fighters seized it and killed 350 soldiers from the Syrian armed forces (SAF), allied militants, and gas field employees. IS continues to attack SAF and allied militant groups in and around the gas field in order to control it after government troops and affiliates regained control over the field in early November. Clashes in and around the Sha’ar gas field will likely continue until one of the conflicting parties wrests control over the area. (Reuters 06/11/2014, The Guardian 03/11/2014)

9.4. Access

Security forces continue to hamper humanitarian access, particularly the delivery of medical assistance, to Al-Wa’er neighbourhood and other areas perceived as sympathetic to the opposition, such as Rastan, Talbiseh, Al Qamho and Terr Mallah. (Data Review 11/2014) Three inter-agency convoys were dispatched, for the first time in six months, to Al-Wa’er and northern rural areas of Homs in October and November.

An estimated 130,000 people, most of them civilians, remain hard to reach in Al-Wa’er neighbourhood, with only limited and irregular access to humanitarian assistance. According to a Security Council report, security forces prevented an inter-agency convoy of 23 trucks from bringing in medical and surgical supplies earlier in the month, despite having received previous approval by the Government. However, a convoy reached the neighbourhood for the first time in six months and distributed food and NFI assistance, including hygiene supplies and winter clothing, to some 60,000 people on 15 November. (UNSC 21/11/2014, Assafir 14/11/2014, WFP 2011/11/2014)

9.5. Displacement

Most recent estimates put the number of IDPs in the governorate 490,000 (Data Review 11/2014), which represents a slight decrease compared with the almost 750,000 indicated by OCHA in June. (OCHA 06/2014) At the time, OCHA indicated that half of the displaced in the governorate were concentrated in Homs City.

Updated information on displacement in the governorate is scarce and difficult to verify, but it can be assumed that sporadic clashes and deteriorating living conditions caused additional small-scale displacement in the populated western areas of the governorate.

9.6. Humanitarian needs

A recent data review estimated there are just under 700,000 PdN in the governorate, which shows a decrease compared with almost 750,000 indicated by OCHA in June. (Data Review 11/2014, OCHA 06/2014) The Data Review also evidenced critical needs in the protection, FSL, NFI, shelter, and education sectors. (Data Review 11/2014) GoS restrictions on midwifery kits were also applied to a second inter-agency convoy on 21 October; after the first was dispatched on 14 October, despite WHO having received official approval by the Governor of Homs. The Governor afterwards asked the UN hub to submit a new request for midwifery kits to be delivered to the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC). The two convoys eventually delivered food, NFI and WASH assistance to approximately 35,000 people in Krad Dasnieh, Ghanto, Jabbourin and Tir Maallah neighbourhoods in northern rural Homs. (UNSC 21/11/2014, UNSC 23/11/2014, WFP 30/10/2014, WFP 15/10/2014)

Humanitarian workers in the field are still at risk of being targeted of becoming casualties from the use of indiscriminate weapons. On 7 November, two SARC volunteers were killed by a mortar shell while transporting supplies for an inter-agency centre. A truck driver was injured while delivering humanitarian assistance as part of a joint UN-SARC mission to Al-Wa’er. The truck was fired upon by unidentified gunmen. (UNSC 21/11/2014)

‘An estimated 130,000 people, most of them civilians, remain hard to reach in Al-Wa’er neighbourhood’
9.6.1. Protection
Indiscriminate air strikes continue to cause civilian casualties and injuries in opposition-held areas. One day of GoS airstrikes on the town of Talbisseh in October killed 22 people; another 35 were killed by a series of airstrikes on the besieged Al-Wa’er neighbourhood in mid-December. (SOHR 18/12/2014, AFP 26/10/2014, Syrian Observer 27/10/2014) According to unconfirmed media reports, civilians trapped in the neighbourhood of Al-Wa’er said government snipers on top of the National Hospital consider every moving body as a target, and have reportedly killed several civilians across different age groups. (Syrian Observer 08/12/2014)

On 1 October, two car explosions targeted an elementary school in the government-held A’krama neighbourhood. According to SOHR, 52 civilians, 48 of them children, were killed by the explosions and more than a hundred others were reportedly injured. The casualties and damages caused by the explosions led to a large wave of anger and discontent within the neighbourhood, triggering protests against the Governor of Homs. Protesters called for his removal because of his inability, despite security forces in the area, to impose the necessary security measures to prevent the explosion. The local authorities responded by firing two local security officials, but no punitive measures were taken by the central Government against the Homs Governor. (AP 01/10/2014, Syrian Observer 30/10/2014, UNSC 23/11/2014, Al Jazeera 02/10/2014, New York Times 02/10/2014, SOHR 14/10/2014)

IS executions have also been reported in the governorate. In December, IS militants beheaded four men accused of blasphemy in the countryside east of Homs City. (Reuters 13/12/2014)

Local sources report that hundreds of prisoners, a significant part being prisoners of conscience and people detained for protesting in early 2011, went on a hunger strike in the Homs prison by the end of December. The prisoners, reportedly exceeding 1,000, called against the prison guards’ ill-treatment of prisoners, lack of food and medicine, and demanded for their release, particularly those whom have been arbitrarily detained and/or have finished their sentence. (Daily Star 30/12/2014, Al Arabiya 30/12/2014)

9.6.2. Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)
Accessibility and availability of food in Homs is continually deteriorating. The government’s troops and allied militants restrict and obstruct access to opposition-held areas, primarily the Al-Wa’er neighbourhood, but also rural areas such as Ar-Rastan and Tadmor, thus limiting the entry of food products to the area. Access constraints and the destruction of farming and agricultural productive capacities have both contributed to a significant price increase, estimated in Al-Wa’er at 30-35% above average prices, at a time when civilians have no sufficient income to cover basic requirements. (WFP 30/10/2014, Data Review 11/2014)

Following a six-month cut-off from all humanitarian assistance, three inter-agency convoys were dispatched in October and November to assist some 95,000 PiN in Al-Wa’er and areas in northern rural Homs. OCHA’s Governorate Profiles indicate that beneficiaries in the reporting period only comprise about 13% of the governorate’s 750,000 people in need. Although the reports’ estimates are more than five months old and may not be entirely accurate, they provide an indication of the gap between PiN and those being assisted. The inter-agency convoy to Al-Wa’er reported acute shortages of all basic food commodities in the neighbourhood. (WFP 11/11/2014, OCHA 06/2014)

9.6.3. Shelter
Half of Al-Wa’er’s current population of 130,000 are IDPs, who reportedly live in unstable conditions in makeshift accommodations, schools and unfinished buildings. According to UNOSAT, more than three years of conflict has damaged, either partially or completely, 13,778 structures in the city of Homs. Of those, 22% are destroyed, 42% severely damaged and 36% are moderately damaged. (WFP 15/10/2014, UNOSAT 06/11/2014)
10. IDLEB

10.1. Key issues and possible developments

- The situation in the governorate is characterised by intensified military operations by Jabhat al Nusra (JAN) and resulting protection concerns. Jihadist laws imposed by JAN in places such as Darkosh and Salqin risk heightening protection and human rights concerns in these areas of relative stability. Given JAN’s consolidation in the governorate, it is reasonable to assume that over time, draconian laws will be promulgated in other areas under its control, beginning with Jebel al-Zawiya region. (Al-Akhbar 06/12/2014)

- Water accessibility is still a major issue in the governorate, and part of the reason has to do with the lack of adequate fuel and electricity to operate pumps, or financial means to purchase water in the absence of functional public utilities. In IDP settlements, the situation is even worse. IDP settlement clusters have been mentioned several times as receiving comparably scarce assistance coverage. Sarmada cluster, for instance, reported the lowest coverage in terms of water, shelter and NFI assistance, whereas Karama cluster reported serious scarcities in food and shelter. (MSNA 10/2014)

10.2. Context

The governorate has witnessed heavy battles between armed opposition groups (AOG) and the government forces that control most of the major cities including Idleb city and strategic access routes. Before the start of the conflict, the governorate ranked among the poorest parts of Syria for income, health and education. Bordering Turkey, the governorate hosts a high number of IDP camps.

10.3. Armed Conflict

Jabhat al Nusra-led activity: Over the last quarter, JAN intensified its military operations and secured significant territorial gains against both Western-backed opposition factions and government forces. In seizing two of the key military bases of the Government of Syria (GoS), Wadi Deif and Hamidiyye, it now maintains paramount control of Idleb Governorate, along with the areas bordering Turkey, as well as the major trunkroad (and supply line for both GoS and opposition) linking Aleppo to Damascus. (The Guardian 15/12/2014)

This consolidation helps JAN further compensate for its withdrawal from key oil-rich areas in Deir-ez-Zor, taken over by the Islamic State (IS) when it announced the creation of the caliphate in mid-2014. JAN’s military strength has been enhanced by operational alliances with a number of Islamist groups including, prominently, Ahharr al-Sham, the loss of whose leading figures in September may have forced it to tighten this alliance or suffer more losses. These alliances also possibly attest to the success of JAN’s incrementalist strategy of winning over the ‘Jihadist street’, as opposed to the IS blitzkrieg approach to territorial conquest and social control. Still, what its Idleb consolidation suggests is the strengthening of JAN in parallel (if not in cooperation, as has been rumoured) with IS, setting the stage for either an eventual clash, or reconciliation among both leading Jihadist groups, at the expense of a weakened non-Jihadist opposition.

Furthermore, the ‘Khorasan Group’ and Jund al-Aqsa, two other factions thought to be affiliated to Al-Qaeda and therefore to JAN, were also active in recent weeks. The ascendance of the Jabhat al Nusra-led alliance coincided with the expansion of US-led coalition strikes beyond the Islamic State to include the Khorasan Group (embedded within Jabhat al Nusra).
and Ahrar al-Sham. (ISW 02/10/2014, US DoD 06/11/2014) Other Idleb-based groups sympathetic to JAN include Liwa al-Haqq, the Omar Brigade and Liwa al-Umma. Together with Jund al-Aqsa, these have reportedly called themselves the Alliance of Muhajirin wa al-Ansar. (ISW 12/2014)

JAN’s recent advances in Idlib, and the expulsion of Jamal Marouf’s Syrian Revolutionary Front (SRF) has also brought a little known group into prominence. Jund al-Aqsa (Soldiers of the Al-Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem]), also affiliated with Al-Qaeda, split off from JAN and has both maintained neutrality in the conflict between the latter and IS and refrained from opposition infighting, focusing instead on GoS forces. (HuffingtonPost 06/11/2014)

JAN (with Ahrar al-Sham) and IS detained alleged sleeper cells or fighters associated with the other, in villages east of Saraqab. (ISW 18/11/2014)

Opposition activity: Local sources report that opposition infighting continued as armed clashes took place near Bab al-Hawa between Islamic Front allies Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam, prompting the Turkish Government to temporarily close the crossing point on 16 November. (Assafir 17/11/2014)

In Talmanes town, east of Ma’arar al-Nu’man in rural southern Idlib, a quarrel over operational planning details deteriorated into limited clashes between JAN and Ahrar al-Sham. (Al-Akhbar 09/12/2014)

Some 17 FSA-affiliated AOG announced the ‘Union of Southern Idlib Revolutionaries’ in an effort to defend Khan Shaykhoun. In Ma’arar al-Nu’man, Ahrar al-Sham and a number of other AOG, including the FSA’s 13th Division, have formed a coalition known as the Mujahedin of Ma’arar An Nu’man. (ISW 25/11/2014)

US-led coalition: Coalition airstrikes expanded the target beyond IS, to include positions in northern Idlib belonging to Ahrar al-Sham, a key member of the Islamic Front. (Aljazeera 06/11/2014, Reuters 06/11/2014). Strikes have also targeted a group known as ‘Khorasan’ – another affiliate of Al-Qaeda thought to be embedded within JAN (SyriaDirect 19/11/2014, ISW 12/2014) – near Sarmada, not far from the Turkish border city of Reyhanli, wounding a French national suspected to be a bombmaker. (The Guardian 06/11/2014, CNN 11/12/2014)

10.4. Access

Following UNSC resolutions 2165 and 2139, humanitarian access to hard-to-reach areas has improved from along the Turkish border and cross-lines. Access through the Bab al-Hawa/Cilvegozu official crossing point is regular with few exceptions (such as when clashes between Ahrar al Sham and Jaysh al Islam prompted a temporary Turkish Government closure in mid-November), whereas access through other crossing points – with the exception of the Friendship Bridge (Dostluk Koprusu) – remain sporadic. (OCHA 02/01/2015, Data Review 11/2014) According to one source, the Turkish Government has opened a new border crossing, Khirbet Jouz, in the governorate. (ISW 02/12/2014)

In the governorate, all 15 hard-to-reach areas could be accessed by humanitarian agencies at least once over the reporting period. (UNSG 21/11/2014) However, cross-line movement from GoS-controlled territory to those held by the opposition remains hampered by insecurity and GoS bureaucracy. (MSNA 10/2014, UNSG 21/11/2014) Access along parts of the road leading from opposition-controlled rural southern Idlib into northern Hama Governorate is restricted, as is ingress into GoS-held Idlib City, and into Aleppo City to the east. (OCHA 03/11/2014)

Despite cross-border relief activities, the inhabitants of the mountainous areas of opposition-controlled eastern Idlib have reported being marginalised in terms of humanitarian assistance. (MSNA 10/2014)

‘Cross-line movement from GoS-controlled territory to those held by the opposition remains hampered by insecurity and GoS bureaucracy’

10.5. Displacement

Most recent estimates put the number of IDPs in the governorate between 920,000 (Data Review 11/2014) and 990,000. (MSNA 10/2014, 22/26 subdistricts covered) This is one of the country’s highest in absolute terms and as a proportion of the governorate’s population. (MSNA 10/2014) Most IDPs reside in settlements, making Idlib the site of majority of these settlements as well.

According to the Syria Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) conducted in August-September, Idlib may be the governorate with the relatively highest levels of population stability, especially in the northern fringes near the Turkish border. (MSNA 10/2014)

An estimated 1,700 individuals recently fled rural Idlib towards other parts of the governorate including Salqin, Ariha and Abul Thohur. (OCHA 05/12/2014) GoS counteroffensives in northern Hama have resulted in minimum 75,000 individuals being displaced to rural areas of northern Hama and southern Idlib. At least 25,000 are staying in open-air informal settlements outside of villages. (OCHA 03/10/2014)

JAN’s commandeering of Wadi Deif and Hamidiyye camps, given they were a source of GoS shelling on residents in the surrounding area (notably Ma’arar An Nu’man and Jebel al-Zawiya), has apparently encouraged the return of some IDPs. (OCHA 19/12/2014)

10.6. Humanitarian Needs

A recent data review estimated over 1.4 million PiN in the governorate, a significant increase compared with the 1.1 million indicated by OCHA in June. (Data Review 11/2014, OCHA 06/2014) The MSNA estimated there were more than 1.2 million PiN in the assessed subdistricts. (MSNA 10/2014, 22 out of 26 assessed subdistricts) The Data Review also indicated critical needs in the protection, LFS, NFI, shelter, WASH, and early recovery sectors. (Data Review 11/2014)
10.6.1. Protection

The bulk of traumatic events children are exposed to include bombardments and small arms violence. Of the more widespread trauma symptoms, 95% of assessed children reported suffering from fear, 86% from anxiety, and 62% each for disturbed sleep and aggressive behavior. (MSNA 10/2014) Minors have also been observed manning checkpoints in the governorate, and this may be an indication of more widespread child recruitment by armed groups. (MSNA 10/2014)

In the governorate, GoS airstrikes have allegedly targeted:

- the Orient Hospital in Kafr Nobol (which served 30,000 people in rural Idleb), killing 13 civilians and putting the hospital out of commission; (OCHA 19/12/2014)
- areas of Ma’arrat An Nu’man; (SOHR 20/12/2014)
- a school bus near Jabass village, killing at least 4 children and wounding another 10; (AFP 22/12/2014, AlArabiya 22/12/2014)
- through barrel bombs, al-Nazihin camp west of Khan Sheikhoun (southern Idleb), reportedly killing 60 Syrians (ISW 04/11/2014), as well as the town of Sfuhun in Jebel al-Zawiya region, killing 5-7 children. (Aljazeera 23/12/2014, SOHR 23/12/2014)
- Furthermore, a GoS rotary-wing craft allegedly dropped two barrel bombs on an IDP camp near Habeet, killing at least 10 people and wounding dozens of others. (AFP 29/10/2014, Aljazeera 30/10/2014)

10.6.2. WASH

Some 860,000 individuals are in need of WASH interventions, of whom about 90,000 are acute cases. (MSNA 10/2014)

Among others, the main causes linked to water unavailability in the governorate have been identified as the lack of electricity to operate public pump systems, and the lack of fuel (required for backup generators). (MSNA 10/2014) The lack of financial means to purchase water supplies – and corresponding increases in price – was also cited as the leading problem in Idleb Governorate. (MSNA 10/2014)

Among IDP settlements, water coverage is reported to be at its lowest in the Sarmada cluster. (MSNA 10/2014)

On 27 October, Idleb City’s water supply was disrupted for six days after fighting damaged an electricity cable (electricity was also disrupted for three days). (UNSG 21/11/2014) From 22-30 December, JAN reportedly cut the supply of water and electricity, as well as road access, going into Idleb City. An estimated 600,000 residents were temporarily affected by the resulting price increases. (OCHA 02/01/2015)
10.6.3. Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)

In the governorate, some 700,000 individuals have been assessed to be food insecure, i.e., approximately 58% of all PIN. (MSNA 10/2014)

Food supplies to local markets have been disrupted because of insecurity or hostilities. The price of commodities sold in Idleb’s major market, however, have remained relatively low, with one of the lowest prices recorded for rice countrywide in December, at 107 SYP/kg. (WFP 31/12/2014, WFP 10/2014)

Both wheat and barley yields in 2014 were ‘worse’ than 2013, according to local perceptions, thus further decreasing the relative proportion of local produce as a main food source. Humanitarian distributions have increased (not quantified) as a source of income and livelihood in 2014 compared with 2013. Recourse to negative coping mechanisms, including some ordinarily deemed illegal, is also on the rise. (MSNA 10/2014)

Of 32 bakeries assessed by the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) in late 2014, four were non-functional, a low figure compared to other governorates directly affected by conflict and/or ruled by IS. Reasons include the lack of flour, yeast or fuel. One private bakery, assisted with flour distributions from NGOs, was distributing bread for free at the time of the assessment (bread prices currently hover at about SYP 40 per standard pack of eight pieces). The 28 functional bakeries assessed are estimated to serve 960,000 beneficiaries in Idleb Governorate. (ACU 12/2014)

IDP settlements in the Karama cluster reported the scarcest food coverage within the governorate. (MSNA 10/2014)

Food baskets continued to be distributed to some 800,000 beneficiaries located, among others, in Idleb City, Al Ma’tra, Arila, Harim, and Jisr-Ash-Shugur. (NRRG 10/2014)

10.6.4. Health

Over 310,000 individuals in the governorate were reported to be in need of health assistance, or just above a quarter of all of the governorate’s PIN. (MSNA 10/2014) Of Idleb Governorate’s three hospitals, only two are fully functional. (WHO-HeRAMS 09/2014)

Syrian official media reported an increasing incidence in respiratory and skin diseases in Idleb City related to the use of stolen diesel, refined via primitive and health-damaging methods. (Tishreen 15/12/2014)

10.6.5. Shelter & NFI

The available data indicates that Idleb hosts the largest number of IDPs residing in settlements. (MSNA 10/2014, Data Review 11/2014) Within IDP settlements, shelter was reported the least covered sector (notably in Bab al-Hawa, Karama and Sarmada clusters). Many IDPs receive tents, but these rarely last longer than a year. The poor coverage was attributed to the high price of tents and the lack of contingency warehousing capacity of humanitarian actors, and is expected to grow more urgent as temperatures drop. (MSNA 10/2014) Heating fuel, blankets, bedding and clothes are even more crucial in the absence of adequate tентage. (MSNA 10/2014)

Sarmada IDP settlement cluster reported the poorest coverage in terms of NFI. (MSNA 10/2014)

Diesel prices in Idleb Governorate remain one of the highest in the country. As of October, 1 liter cost 188 SYP. (WFP 10/2014)

‘Both wheat and barley yields in 2014 were ‘worse’ than 2013’

10.6.6. Education

Of 729 educational facilities in the governorate assessed by the MSNA, 21% were occupied by fighting forces, while 59% had suffered no damage. (MSNA 10/2014)

ACU reports that in Darkoush subdistrict, school textbooks are completely absent, possibly because of Jabhat al Nusra’s presence. Only slightly better is Dana (24%), Kafr Nobol (28%) and Bennish (35%). The other areas assessed vary but fare comparatively better. In terms of equipment, the largest reported needs were standard classroom furniture. Lamps, glass panels and doors, heater units and water taps have also been indicated as a pressing need. (ACU 11/2014)

The Data Review indicates that 80% of schools were still functioning in Idleb in August. However, an ACU assessment in 10 subdistricts (out of 22 in total) in July provides a much lower figure, with only 60% of schools still functioning. This discrepancy can be explained by the differing geographic coverage, with the Data Review covering all subdistricts (GoS and AOG controlled), while the ACU assessment can be expected to have focussed on areas outside of GoS control. Across the country, a larger proportion of schools in areas outside of GoS control are non-functional. (Data Review 11/2014, ACU 11/2014, MSNA 10/2014)

Among the reasons for non-attendance in classes, child labour (soldiering excepted) as a pull factor was reported by 61% of assessed areas in Idleb. Another reason is displacement as a consequence of escalation in fighting. (MSNA 10/2014, ACU 11/2014)
11. LATTAKIA

11.1. Key Issues and Possible Developments

- The majority of the governorate continued to be highly stable in terms of security. However, hosting a large number of IDPs has resulted in high competition over services, assistance and livelihood opportunities and social tensions in Lattakia are rising. An increase of tensions in the first quarter of 2015 is possible.

- Although the governorate continues to record some of the lowest food prices in the country, some 330,000 people were identified to be in need of food assistance in the areas covered by the MSNA in Lattakia. Lack of income and income-generating activities was the most significant constraint identified for the population to access food in the assessed areas, in addition to security constraints. The importance of lack of income as an impediment to access food has increased since the 2013 Syria Integrated Needs Assessment (SINA).

- It can be assumed that the conflict situation will remain stable, therefore humanitarian access conditions are not expected to change significantly unless critical changes in the conflict dynamics and areas of control occur.

11.2. Context

The coastal governorate of Lattakia is a government stronghold and apart from areas in the north/northeast has remained under steady Government of Syria (GoS) control. Owing to its relative stability and availability of services, the stable areas in the centre and south of the governorate have seen a large influx of IDPs. However, clashes have been recorded since July in the northern and northeastern parts of Lattakia, especially in what is known as Kurds and Turkmen mountains in the sub-districts of Qastal Maaf, Salma, Kansaba, and Kiseb. Opposition fighters launched an offensive on 21 March and seized control of Kiseb border crossing with Turkey and the nearby areas, but they lost control of it within three months and were only able to maintain control of a small area in Kurds and Turkmen mountains.

11.3. Armed Conflict

In the last quarter of 2014, Kansaba was the subdistrict experiencing the most intense conflict in Lattakia with government forces targeting opposition forces such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) with aerial shelling, including barrel bombing. The subdistrict continues to be contested. Rabee’a, also a contested subdistrict, was experiencing the second-highest number of conflict incidents in Q4. The main conflict-related incidents recorded continued to be shelling and barrel bombing of opposition-held villages. Skirmishes between government forces and opposition forces are further reported sporadically in the subdistrict of Lattakia, including Lattakia City. (PI 11/2014) This signifies no change in the established conflict dynamics. The rest of the governorate continued to be stable in terms of security, and is not expected to be subject to significant conflict in the first quarter of 2015.
11.4. Access

Frequent shelling and bombing in Kansaba and Rabee’a subdistricts have resulted in constraints to humanitarian access. GoS-held areas in the governorate continue to be highly accessible for humanitarian assistance, which is mainly delivered by operational actors from Damascus. Constraints to access in the governorate are mostly related to interference into humanitarian delivery of assistance by armed forces as well as denial of aid to people suspected to support opposition forces. (MSNA 30/10/2014)

11.5. Displacement

Most recent estimates put the number of IDPs in the governorate between 580,000 (Data Review 11/2014) and 760,000. (MSNA 10/2014, 5/22 subdistricts covered) Large discrepancies between the different IDP estimates in Lattakia were already noted in mid-2013 and remain unresolved. (SINA 13/12/2014)

Updated information on displacement in the governorate is scarce and difficult to verify. Lattakia continues to be one of the main governorates receiving IDPs in the country. According to the MSNA, Lattakia City was reported as hosting the highest number of IDPs among the assessed areas with 700,000 internally displaced people: 450,000 in rented accommodation, 220,000 living with host families and 23,000 in structured settlements (camps), bringing the total population of the city to more than 1.2 million. The vast majority of the IDPs are originally from Aleppo, having faced multiple displacements prior to their arrival to Lattakia. Hosting a large number of IDPs, social tensions in Lattakia are on the rise. (MSNA 30/10/2014)

11.6. Humanitarian Needs

A recent data review estimated just over 460,000 people in need (PiN) in the governorate, an increase compared with the 360,000 indicated by OCHA in June. (Data Review 11/2014, OCHA 06/2014) The MSNA estimated there were around 350,000 PiN in the assessed subdistricts. (MSNA 10/2014, 5 out of 22 assessed subdistricts) The Data Review also indicated critical needs in the protection, NFI and shelter sectors. (Data Review 11/2014)

11.6.1. Protection

Protection concerns highlighted in the subdistricts assessed by the MSNA were shelling, air raids and the targeting and use of schools as military bases and shelters. Potentially linked to the number of kidnappings and abductions or forced disappearances recounted in the MSNA, the lack of information on missing persons was expressed to be a great need. (MSNA 10/2014, Syrian Observer 18/11/2014) It is also reported that Government forces in Lattakia are continuously carrying out search and arrest operations to capture individuals hiding from military service. (PI 11/2014)

The main protection concerns for children in the assessed subdistricts in Lattakia include the recruitment of children into armed groups and child labour: It was reported in the MSNA that children as young as nine years have been subject to recruitment into armed groups. (MSNA 10/2014)

11.6.2. Health

The severity of health needs in Lattakia was reported to be non-life threatening in the MSNA. Generally, health facilities are still functioning and available and coverage is relatively good in Lattakia compared with the significantly compromised health infrastructure in other governorates. Only around 10,000 people were reported in need of health assistance in the assessed subdistricts in the governorate and the health status of the population was reported as stable in the three months prior to the MSNA assessment. Lattakia is furthermore the only governorate where the assessed areas did not report health services to be too expensive; in fact, three out of five subdistricts reported that health services are free.

The top four reported health concerns for the governorate were war related injuries, psychological trauma, chronic diseases (diabetes and hypertension), and skin diseases. The most reported problem reducing availability of health services is the lack of medicines, followed by lack of medical staff and lack of assistive devices in the health centres. (MSNA 10/2014)
11.6.3 Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)

Lattakia continues to be one of the entry and distribution points for national and international humanitarian assistance, in addition to still functioning markets and supply routes. Therefore the reported severity of needs during the MSNA was non-life threatening, with the population generally facing moderate problems in accessing food – defined as 70% of the population of the subdistrict being able to meet their basic food needs. In the MSNA, Lattakia was identified as one of the governorates facing the least problems regarding food availability in the markets: 80% of assessed subdistricts reported moderate to high quantity and variety of food available in local markets. Nevertheless, with a large number of IDPs and competition over scarce livelihood opportunities, some 330,000 people were identified to be in need of food assistance in the areas covered by the MSNA. IDPs residing with host families and in unfinished or damaged buildings were facing the largest risk of experiencing food shortages.

The top four coping mechanisms for food shortages in Lattakia were: relying on less preferred and less expensive types of food; reducing the number of meals eaten per day; buying food on credit; and borrowing food or relying on assistance from the community. Generally the amount of food consumed in the 30 days prior to the MSNA assessment, carried out in August and September, had remained stable. (MSNA 10/2014)

Livelihoods: Lack of income and income-generating activities was the most significant constraint identified in the MSNA for the assessed population to access food in the assessed areas in Lattakia, in addition to security constraints. The importance of lack of income as an impediment to accessing food has increased compared with the SINA assessment conducted in 2013. The main expenditure for households in Lattakia is food, a consistent finding across all assessed governorates in the MSNA.

11.6.4 WASH

The MSNA found 50,000 people in need (PiN) of safe water in the assessed areas in Lattakia, with IDPs residing in collective shelter and damaged/unfinished buildings being most at risk of not having access to safe water. Three out of five subdistricts reported no physical damage to water infrastructure. However, the main sources for drinking water are wells, trucked (purchased) water, bottled water, and piped network because of the high pressure on the available water resources. The subdistricts clearly reported a reduction of water consumption per person per day as the biggest issue with regards to water. There was insufficient water quantity and deterioration in the water conditions in the three months prior to the MSNA assessment, largely accounted for by summer conditions and timing of the assessment.

Generally, no significant issues were reported regarding hygiene and sanitation. Sewage is still mostly disposed in the fully or partially functional public network. The most reported concerns include irregular collection of garbage as well as irregular provision of desludging services. (MSNA 10/2014)

11.6.5 Shelter

According to the MSNA, some 55,000 people were found to be in need of shelter in five assessed areas in Lattakia Governorate. Displaced persons residing in collective shelter and damaged/unfinished buildings, followed by displaced in rented accommodation were most at risk because of lack of adequate shelter in areas assessed by MSNA in Lattakia. Most of the reported problems in the MSNA reflect the fact that the majority of IDPs in Lattakia live in rented accommodation and with host families, but the displaced people living in damaged/unfinished buildings or collective shelter are among the most vulnerable: the most reported shelter problem was the bad protection from weather conditions, followed by personal safety and security and insecurity of belongings, particularly a problem in crowded shelters.

The main obstacle to accessing shelter as well as non-food items (NFI) in Lattakia is the lack of financial means; specific to shelter, a lack of money to pay rent or repair available shelter. It should be noted the MSNA was conducted in August and September, when shelter needs are typically lower than in the winter months. (MSNA 10/2014)

11.6.6. Education

Lattakia is one of the governorates with the highest reported school attendance rates in the MSNA with 75-100% of primary school-aged children (6-14 years old) and 50-75% of secondary school-aged children (15-18) attending school at least four days per week. The number of children not attending school is reported to be higher among IDPs than among the host community.

Although the rate of damage to schools is relatively low in Lattakia (75% of schools in MSNA-assessed areas reported no damage), 9% (21 out of 219) of functional schools are reported to be occupied: used as collective shelters or for military purposes. Most of the schools do not have proper WASH facilities. (MSNA 10/2014)
12. QUNEITRA

12.1. Key issues and possible developments

Critical humanitarian needs continue to be recorded in Quneitra governorate. Aerial bombardments by the Government of Syria (GoS) targeting armed opposition groups (AOG) positions continue apace, including on densely populated areas. During Q4, indiscriminate attacks have further degraded critical infrastructure, damaging schools and hospitals. Assessment findings from the Syria Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) conducted in August-September indicate consistently high severity levels across multiple humanitarian sectors, with nearly three quarters of the assessed population in need. However, the situation in the four sub-districts not covered by the MSNA is unclear, as limited information is available.

There are indications of a renewed offensive by AOG on Ba’ath city, which, if succesful, will result in large scale displacement and lead to a further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the governorate’s most populous city.

12.2. Context

This rural and sparsely populated governorate is particularly sensitive given its proximity to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The 1974 armistice prohibits GoS from engaging in military activity within the buffer region known as the ‘Disengagement Zone’ straddling the border between Quneitra and the occupied Golan Heights. Although the terms of the agreement have not been followed to the letter, GoS has, with some exceptions, largely refrained from significant airstrikes close by the border, allowing opposition forces more operational space there. The governorate remains divided between AOG controlling the east and southern part while GoS holds areas in the north.

12.3. Armed Conflict

For their part, AOG continue to hold their ground in the governorate and have sought battle with GoS forces in recent weeks, maintaining pressure on the capital’s southwestern flank. Jabhat al Nusra (JAN) in particular is consolidating its military presence in Quneitra (and neighboring Dar’a) Governorate as part of its southern military command. (ISW 12/2014) Additional territorial gains in rural Quneitra may preface yet another attempt to seize Ba’ath City and Khan Arnabe from GoS control and again force the displacement of thousands of residents. As of June 2014, the majority of the governorate’s IDPs were reported to be concentrated in and around Khan Arnaba. (OCHA 06/2014)

As part of Operation ‘Nasr min Allah wa Fath Qarib’ (Assafir 19/11/2014) some 2,000 insurgents from JNA and its allies unsuccessfully attacked Ba’ath City, taking advantage of simultaneous GoS troop redeployments to Aleppo. Ba’ath City is the only major GoS stronghold within the vicinity of the Disengagement Zone. Eventual AOG control would facilitate the opening of an additional front, through western Rural Damascus, towards the capital only 65km away. In the governorate, only Ba’ath City and Khan Arnaba remain in GoS control, the defence of which it has depended largely on aerial bombardments. (Reuters 20/11/2014)
Armed opposition groups (including Ahrar al-Sham, the Furqan Brigades, and the SRF) clashed with GoS forces in Tel Kroum and Jaba, which as of this report still remains in the latter’s control. This was part of an operation known as ‘Wa’ad al-Fitnah’. (Various, ‘FreeSyria’ via Twitter 25/12/2014, GoS via Twitter 26/12/2014, ISW 30/12/2014, SOHR 27/12/2014)

GoS forces allegedly barrel-bombed a number of towns in rural Quneitra including, but not limited to:
- Rasm al-Khawaled (FreeSyria via YouTube 16/12/2014, SANA 26/12/2014)
- Om Batenah and Mashara (SOHR 27/12/2014)
- Briqa (SOHR 19/11/2014)

Compared to elsewhere in the country, operational cooperation in the governorate between JAN, Islamist factions and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) has so far been less fraught. (Reuters 20/11/2014)

12.4. Access
Humanitarian access remains possible but challenging in parts owing to checkpoints and insecurity, especially between GoS- and opposition-held areas. (OCHA 05/12/2014) Crossborder access since the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2165 in July 2014 has improved and allowed humanitarian agencies to access all 13 communities and locations within Quneitra Governorate defined as hard-to-reach. (MSNA 10/2014, UNSG 21/11/2014) However, Quneitra, Western Samadaniyeh, Hadar, Jaba, Jbata Elkhashab, Khan Arnaba, and Um Batna continue to be considered as hard-to-reach. (Data Review 11/2014)

12.5. Displacement
Displacement figures for Quneitra Governorate vary considerably. A recent data review estimated 57,000 IDPs in the governorate. (Data Review 11/2014) According to the MSNA, the figure stands at 39,000 individuals, but this is only for areas assessed in August-September 2014. (MSNA 10/2014, 2/6 subdistricts covered) OCHA’s mid-2014 estimate placed the figures at 72,000 IDPs. (OCHA 06/2014) A third assessment dated March 2014 and focusing on Quneitra put the figure at just under 150,000, which it attributes, at least in part, to a series of military operations in the area preceding the adoption of the assessment. (AWG-SS 20/03/2014) Whatever the actual figures, Quneitra appears to host one of the highest numbers of IDPs as a proportion of its original, pre-conflict population, and all within a relatively small area. Furthermore, 100% of IDPs assessed by the MSNA in the governorate reported having been displaced multiple times. (MSNA 10/2014)

Considerable displacement flows were reported after these different estimations were compiled:
- An attempt by AOG to oust GoS forces from their last stronghold in the governorate, Ba’ath city, reportedly led thousands to flee. (Reuters 20/11/2014)
- WFP reported at least 7,500 had fled to other areas of the governorate, as well as rural Damascus, in response to a military advance, and further displacements were expected. (WFP 25/11/2014)
- A likely destination in Rural Damascus is Qatana, where ICRC reported receiving 20,000 refugees from Quneitra in September. (ICRC 15/09/2014) In late September, ICRC said fighting had displaced more than 100,000 in Dar’a and Quneitra during the month (ICRC 17/10/2014)

12.6. Humanitarian Needs
A recent data review estimated there are 80,000 PiN in the governorate, which represents a slight decrease compared with the 87,000 indicated by OCHA in June. (Data Review 11/2014, OCHA 06/2014) The MSNA estimated there were 56,000 PiN in the assessed subdistricts (two subdistricts out of six covered). (MSNA 30/10/2014) The Data Review also indicated critical needs in the protection, FSL, health, NFIs, and shelter sectors. (Data Review 11/2014)

Quneitra

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Assessed</th>
<th>80,000</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>out of</td>
<td>15.6 million</td>
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<td>all areas assessed by the MSNA</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People in need</th>
<th>56,000</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>out of</td>
<td>6.6 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>all areas assessed by the MSNA</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDPs</th>
<th>39,000</th>
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<tr>
<td>out of</td>
<td>4.8 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>all areas assessed by the MSNA</td>
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Only a portion of this governorate was assessed by the MSNA. These figures cannot be generalized to the whole governorate, and should be used with caution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdistricts assessed</th>
<th>2 out of 6</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People in need</td>
<td>70% of total population in assessed areas of Quneitra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>49% of total population in assessed areas of Quneitra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12.6.1. Protection
Bombardments and aerial attacks have been identified as the main protection concern in the governorate. All children assessed during the MSNA reported suffering from fear, disturbed sleep and mood swings as a result of these bombardments and small arms violence. [MSNA 10/2014]

On 20 October, mortar shelling targeted Quneitra University in GoS-held Ba’ath City during class hours. 17 people were reported injured, one critically. [UNSG 21/11/2014] The targeting of learning spaces more generally has been noted as an issue in the governorate, with important consequences for the immediate safety of civilians, especially children, and disruptions to their longer term development. [MSNA 10/2014]

Missing or incomplete personal identification documents owing to displacement are a major problem impacting individual safety and dignity. [MSNA 10/2014]

12.6.2. WASH
Much of the population depends on water trucking and wells. Water trucking has been closely associated with quality issues arising from unsafe sources or the lack of purification material. Some residents also reportedly rely on springs and rivers for their water supply. [MSNA 10/2014]

The majority of Quneita’s residents appear to lack accessibility to water sources as a result of inadequate financial means or logistical constraints. One way of coping with this has been to decrease water intake. [MSNA 10/2014]

Disposal of waste in soak pits and open areas is rife in the governorate, and the latter to a large degree correlates with IDPs living in unfinished structures and open spaces. Likewise rubbish continues to accumulate in public places owing to reduced municipal manpower capacities, a problem also in evidence in other areas affected by fighting. [MSNA 10/2014] Inadequate sanitation, particularly over extended periods of time, increases morbidity risks, which in turn drives up mortality rates in overpopulated areas.

12.6.3. Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)
Some 56,000 individuals have been assessed to be food insecure, and given decreasing food crop production (see further), reliance on other income avenues such as humanitarian assistance has increased in 2014. [MSNA 10/2014] Food supply has also faced disruptions as a result of fighting in the governorate. [WFP 31/12/2014, WFP 10/2014] This has impacted food variety, as well as the quantity of food/nutrients of daily meals consumed, a coping mechanism noted in subdistricts in the MSNA.

Where children, especially those under 5 are concerned, such coping mechanisms have long-term consequences for nutrition and health. [MSNA 10/2014]

Both wheat and barley yields in 2014 were ‘worse’ than in 2013 according to local feedback, which also implies a decrease in the relative proportion of local produce as a main source of food or income. A FAO estimate cited in the MSNA found wheat production to have decreased by 50% relative to the 10-year average throughout Syria. The lack or exorbitant cost of agricultural inputs (seeds, tools and especially fertiliser) may be one cause, alongside non- or partially functional irrigation systems (where rain is scarce), including in the absence of fuel. Ongoing fighting and resulting insecurity also hampers access to land in some parts. This impacts both livelihoods/incomes and food security. If the trend persists, farmers who can still access their land may cope by shifting increasingly towards rain-fed crops, which will render them susceptible to fluctuating precipitation rates (although Quneita is also located in the part of the country that enjoys the highest relative rainfall). [MSNA 10/2014, FAO 22/12/2014]

The targeting of learning spaces more generally has been noted as an issue in the governorate, with important consequences for the immediate safety of civilians, especially children, and disruptions to their longer term development. [MSNA 10/2014]

12.6.4. Health
16,000 individuals, or roughly 20% of the population assessed, are in need of health assistance. The most common health problems in the governorate are conflict-related injuries. Treatment for a small number of cases has been provided in Israel, although both countries have remained in an official state of war since 1973. [MSNA 10/2014]

The sole hospital is functioning and accessible (WHO-HeRAMS 09/2014); however, physical access to treatment remains difficult for many residents, as are prohibitive treatment costs for 100% of those assessed by the MSNA. [MSNA 10/2014]

12.6.5. NFI & Shelter
The high concentration of IDPs has forced those displaced to seek shelter in substandard conditions. At least five informal tented settlements have been identified in the governorate, with over 4,000 IDPs residing in makeshift shelters. It can be assumed that the actual number of people in shelters offering little protection against the elements is significantly higher. Due to the lack of accommodation, IDPs often share shelters with non-household members. [Data Review 11/1/2014, REACH 12/01/2014]

Water storage containers are scarce and in great need owing to increased recourse to water trucking and wells in the absence of functional public supply systems. [MSNA 10/2014]

At the time of the MSNA (August-September), there was reported to be a lack of heating fuel in the governorate. By the current reporting period, winter conditions would have exacerbated the situation. Coping mechanisms may include burning firewood, scrap parts, and even nylon bags. [MSNA 10/2014]

Among the ten of 14 governorates covered by the MSNA, Quneitra Governorate, along with Dar’a and Lattakia, reported the most acute needs for shelter. IDPs living in damaged or unfinished buildings are particularly vulnerable. [MSNA 10/2014]
12.6.6. Education

Of the three educational facilities in the governorate accessed and assessed by the MSNA, two are heavily damaged, and the third has been destroyed. (MSNA 10/2014) Ongoing fighting risks further reducing available learning spaces, especially now that the school term is supposed to have restarted, and memories of previous bombardments continue to traumatising children. An assessment conducted in March 2014 indicated that all 48 schools in the part of the governorate encompassing Bir Ajam southwards to Qarqas and Sayda (mainly Al-Khashniyye and a small part of Fiq) had become collective shelters, and schooling services had ceased. Attempts to reinstate learning spaces run up against problems such as insecurity, lack of means, prohibitive travel distances, or a change in domestic priorities (child labour). According to the same report, one school remained open in the central area that includes Khan Arnabe, Ba’ath City, Jaba, Nabe al Sakher and Mashara, but risks of shelling have impacted attendance. (AWG-SS 20/03/2014)

In August, at least 50% of schools were not functional in the governorate (153 out of 420), compared to around 20% across the country. (Data Review 11/2014) Where schools are still functional, cash assistance for school-aged children (for transportation, school fees etc) is more urgently needed in Quneitra than any other governorate. Support for teachers’ salaries ranked next. (MSNA 10/2014)
13. TARTOUS

13.1. Key issues

Tartous Governorate is still relatively isolated from the widespread violence and is home to some 200,000 IDPs, who reside in rented apartments, government facilities and outdoor spaces. The limited information available indicates a relatively stable humanitarian situation. The main development in Q4 is the more apparent discontent of the population with policies by the Government of Syria (GoS), which manifested itself in several protests. (Data Review 11/2014)

13.2. Context

Tartous has been the most stable governorate since the start of the Syrian civil war and is thus a natural refuge for IDPs escaping nearby conflict areas in Idleb, Hama and Homs. The area is under control of GoS and communities continue to enjoy a relatively high level of access to public services. The governorate’s port remains functional and trade has continued on high levels. (Jadaliyya 13/04/2014, OCHA 06/2014)

13.3. Tensions

Local sources report that civilians in Tartous, a significant proportion of whom are families of soldiers from the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF), are increasingly discontent with GoS policies perceived to have neglected and marginalized SAF soldiers. This was evident in the protests which erupted in September 2014 after 250 SAF soldiers were killed by IS either during clashes or in subsequent executions following the takeover ofAl-Tabaqqa airport in Ar-Raqqaa. (Syrian Observer 16/10/2014) Protests reportedly broke out again in mid-October, calling for the removal of several GoS officials. Protests are expected to recur in the governorate following the takeover by Jabhat Al Nusra (JAN) and other armed opposition groups (AOG), of Wadi Deif and Hamidiyye military camps in Idleb, during which dozens of SAF soldiers were killed and executed. (Annahar 02/09/2014)
13.4. Access
The governorate’s stability and ease of access has made it an obvious base for humanitarian missions delivering assistance to surrounding governorates. However, conflict in surrounding governorates frequently disrupts the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In October, UNICEF reported that conflict in Idlib hampered humanitarian assistance from being dispatched from Tartous to people in need (PiN) in Idlib. (UNICEF 10/2014)

13.5. Displacement
A recent data review indicated that there are 200,000 IDPs in Tartous. This represents a significant decrease compared with OCHA’s estimation in June, which indicated that some 450,000 IDPs currently reside in the governorate, mainly in Tartous City, Mashta Elhiu, Safita and Banyas. (Data Review 11/2014, OCHA 06/2014) This sharp drop in IDP numbers might be attributed to a verification exercise, although there is no available information to confirm this assumption.

13.6. Humanitarian Needs
A recent data review estimated that there are almost 280,000 PiN in the governorate, a significant decrease from the roughly 470,000 indicated by OCHA in June. (Data Review 11/2014, OCHA 06/2014) This difference in PiN caseload may be attributed to the fact that the number of IDPs in the governorate was revised from over 450,000 in June to just over 200,000 in October. The Data Review also indicated critical needs in the protection and FSL sectors. (Data Review 11/2014)

Updated information on the humanitarian and living conditions in the governorate remains extremely limited. Because some sectoral information from before the current reporting period is unlikely to have changed drastically, it has been included here to provide a general indication.

13.6.1 Health
Owing to the relative absence of hostilities, hospitals and medical centres are still functioning, but lack the capacity to absorb the increasing number of IDPs. WHO reported only three partially functioning health centres out of an identified 164 health centres while the rest are fully functioning. (WHO 06/2014, UNFPA 31/03/2014, UN Children’s Fund 11/04/2014, OCHA 06/2014)

UNICEF reported that Tartous was among three governorates with the highest rate of severe acute malnutrition (3%) in formal and informal IDP settlements and concentration areas, as compared to other governorates such as Damascus, Aleppo and Quneitra (2.5%). This demonstrates that although the overall situation in the governorate can be considered a low priority for humanitarian needs, critical needs are present among IDPs in collective centres and other settlements. (UNICEF 10/2014)

13.6.2 Shelter
In a June report, OCHA identified 21 collective shelters in the governorate with 1,600 families residing in them. Fourteen of the shelters are located in Tartous City and seven in the other districts in the governorate. While middle class people who fled to Tartous have sought accommodation mainly in rented apartments and chalets, many less well-off IDPs have found shelter in government facilities and buildings, especially schools. (Jadaliyya 13/04/2014, OCHA 06/2014)

13.6.3 Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)
In December, Tartous experienced better food supply to markets compared to previous months. Illustratively, one of the lowest retail prices of bread in Syria was recorded in Tartous at SYP 30/kg, as compared to SYP 200/kg in Dar’a. (WFP 31/12/2014, WFP 10/2014)
BACKGROUND TO THE RAS

Definitions humanitarian profile

Affected

The number of affected refers to people affected by the violence in Syria. The number of affected can be divided in two groups: those non-displaced and those displaced.

Non-Displaced

The non-displaced include all those within Syria that have been, directly or indirectly, affected by the conflict, including those who have been injured, have lost access to essential services, and those whose vulnerability has increased due to the impact of the unrest on livelihoods and access to essential services. (OCHA 05/06/2012)

In addition, this group includes the host community, the people who are part of a community or family receiving displaced people. Host families and communities are considered part of the humanitarian caseload because of the extra stress placed on their resources. As there is currently no information available on the needs of the host communities, these groups are currently excluded from this humanitarian profile.

Displaced

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are those persons or groups of persons who are residing in Syria but who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict. (OCHA 2004)

Refugees and Asylum Seekers are those who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, are outside Syria, and are unable to, or owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country. (UN 1951)

For the purpose of this document, the category ‘refugees’ includes those registered, awaiting registration as well as those unregistered – despite the fact that unregistered Syrians are technically not refugees, as their refugee status has not been established. Within this group, the Iraqi and Palestinian refugees are in a particularly vulnerable position, both within Syria as well.

Others of Concern - Persons who have been displaced by the emergency and form part of the humanitarian caseload, but do not fall into either of the above categories (e.g. migrants, returnees).

Other definitions

In this report the term ‘armed opposition groups’ is used to refer to all armed groups and individuals engaged in armed conflict against the Government of Syria.

Previous SNAP reports

Regional Analysis for Syria

Thematic reports

- Aleppo Governorate Profile
- Legal Status of Individuals Fleeing Syria
- Impact of the Conflict on Syrian Economy and Livelihoods
- Syrian Border Crossings
- Assessment Lessons Learned
- Lebanon Baseline Data
- Cross-Border Movements of Goods
- Relief Actors in Syria
- Jordan Baseline Data
- Palestinians from Syria
- Idlib Governorate Profile
- Explosive Remnants of War
- The Onset of Winter
- Latest Scenarios

All reports can be found on: http://www.acaps.org/en/pages/syria-snap-project

Map data sources

How to use the RAS

This report is divided into three sections:
• Part A-I focuses on the situation in Syria, first by outlining the issues on a country level and afterwards, in more depth, on a sectoral level.
• Part A-II outlines the humanitarian situation per governorate
• Part II covers the host countries Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq, and discusses the main humanitarian issues related to the crisis.

The RAS is intended as a reference document and the different parts and components can be read separately, according to information needs. While those working in a host country or a specific governorate might only be interested in small parts of the report, individuals working on a regional level can benefit from reading all sections.

Disclaimer: Information provided is provisional as it has not been possible to independently verify field reports. As this report covers highly dynamic subject, utility of the information may decrease with time.

How to quote this document

The Strategic Needs Analysis Project (SNAP) is established to support the humanitarian response by providing an independent analysis of the humanitarian situation of those affected by the Syrian crisis. We support the communication of humanitarian needs and agree to them being used by other organisations to this end. Please note that most information is derived from secondary data and the original source should be quoted when this information is used. The original source can be found at the end of a paragraph and whenever possible, the hyperlink to this source has been made available. Information sourced as ‘PI’ refers to personal interviews with persons unknown to the SNAP project. Information sourced as a ‘Trusted Source’ refers to information received from an actor known and trusted by the project. All information which is not sourced is based on SNAP’s own analysis and should be quoted as such. Should you wish to reproduce the maps or other information within this document, kindly use this link, to agree to the copyright terms and conditions.