OVERVIEW

On 2 October 2022, the truce ended between the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG) and the de-facto authority (DFA) in the north of Yemen (also known as the Houthis) (OSESGY 02/10/2022).

Two key observations can be made about the truce period, which started in April. Firstly, the absence of active fighting increased the enforcement of rules and behaviours restricting women and enhancing gender segregation. Examples include the Mahram requirement, increased gender segregation in public spaces, and changes in school curricula. Secondly, reduced fighting and decreased displacement improved humanitarian access to IDPs, especially in Ma'rib governorate. As a side note, while conflict-related displacement remained the main driver of people's movement, followed by displacement resulting from natural hazards, displacement for economic reasons increased compared to 2021 (IOM 30/10/2022).

A review of the data reveals that the truce, regional economic conditions, deteriorating healthcare, flash floods, and reduced purchasing power were key drivers of humanitarian needs in July–September 2022. These factors affected everyone to a degree, but specific categories of people felt them more acutely. Such categories include women, children, IDPs, and (Yemeni and non-Yemeni) migrants.

This edition of the Social Impact Monitoring Report (July–September) highlights three themes:

- The truce gave the DFA considerable leeway to impose more social restrictions on Yemeni women.
- The DFA had increased control over the education system in areas under their control.
- The truce improved humanitarian access for IDPs in Ma'rib governorate.

About the report

The SIMP report identifies events and themes emerging from information on Yemen between July–September 2022 that have had or are likely to have a social impact. It uses a broad definition of social impact, which is the effect on people and communities of a specific action or event or the lack of action to intervene in a situation. Themes were chosen based on the considered significance of their impact (or potential impact) on people as already observed and through time. The report aims to support the understanding of the groups and categories of people in Yemen facing the greatest challenges in meeting needs and those most vulnerable to protection concerns.

Limitations

There is limited information available, specifically related to the impact of the conflict on specific groups and categories of people more exposed to certain risks and with specific needs. The nature of available information, which is mainly qualitative, also makes it difficult to compare and aggregate data on a continuous and country-wide basis. ACAPS accounts for this constraint by structuring available information and following up with interviews, consultations with experts, and through joint analysis.

Methodology

The analysis presented in this report is based on the following:

- the daily monitoring of relevant indicators logged in the ACAPS qualitative database
- the analysis of data from ACAPS' core dataset
- the secondary data review of documents published in and on Yemen
- key informant interviews and discussions with context experts
- a collection of small case studies through interviews with Yemeni people to capture the impressions and experiences of people living in Yemen. People who spoke to ACAPS did so voluntarily. Their names have been changed to protect their identities (marked with * throughout the report). Interviews were carried out by phone in Arabic and translated into English.
There was increased control over the education system in DFA areas.

There was increased social restrictions on Yemeni women in DFA areas.

There was increased displacement resulting from economic reasons.

There was improved humanitarian access and response to IDPs in Ma'rib.

Disclaimer: The boundaries, names, and designation provided on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by ACAPS.

Source: ACAPS using data from OCHA(19/04/2022); ISW (accessed 10/11/2022)
### Focus Areas/The Themes Emerging July-September 2022

**The reduction of open conflict during the truce enabled:**

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| **Improved information environment**       |
| Only in Marib                             |
| GBV concerns                             |
| Women travelling alone are at risk        |

**Reduced number of IDPs**

**Drivers of displacement**

1. Conflict
2. Natural hazards
3. Economic reasons (increased numbers) mainly towards Marib

Source: ACAPS
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THEME 1: THE TRUCE HAS GIVEN THE DFA CONSIDERABLE LEEWAY TO IMPOSE MORE SOCIAL RESTRICTIONS ON YEMENI WOMEN.

Since 2015, the DFA has been gradually increasing the enforcement of policies and restrictions imposing social and religious control across their governing areas. Targets include women, children, university students, religious groups, occupation-based groups (such as musicians), and aid workers (ACAPS 05/11/2021).

The trend has been worsening since the beginning of the truce in April 2022. The absence of widespread open conflict seems to have provided considerable leeway for the DFA to impose more social restrictions on these communities and increase efforts to influence their behaviour.

Restrictions on women

Enforcing the Mahram requirement

Between April–September 2022, the DFA increased the enforcement of the Islamic male guardian (Mahram) requirement (OCHA 01/08/2022; Amnesty 01/09/2022). The requirement for women to be accompanied by a Mahram is not a part of Yemeni law, and authorities have not made any formal changes to legislation or related policies, but the DFA is increasingly enforcing it through verbal directives (Amnesty 01/09/2022). The requirement bans women from travelling without a male guardian or without evidence of their written approval across governorates under DFA control or to other areas of Yemen. The written form women workers must complete contains contact information, identification card details, and the signature or fingerprint of the guardian stating his approval of the travel and responsibility for any consequences (KII 03/10/2022). The Mahram requirement has been observed mainly in DFA areas, but influential tribal leaders in IRG areas have been reciprocating it mainly in Abyan, Lahj, and Ma’rib governorates (OCHA 01/08/2022).

Traditionally, Yemen is considered a religious and patriarchal society, where male guardians play a primary role in women’s life. In many parts of Yemen, families automatically insist that a Mahram accompany women while shopping, visiting friends, or travelling as a form of protection. The practice started to diminish before the war mainly in urban areas (SCSS 10/03/2021). The movement from rural village life to urban life in larger centres changed how people behaved. Daily life started involving a different set of activities, and behaviours evolved naturally to accommodate these changes. People, including women, began working outside their homes and with colleagues they were not related to. The nature of men’s work also changed, obtaining fixed hours and less flexibility than in rural areas, where they mostly worked in agriculture.

As a result, female family members were forced to pick up roles they would not have usually carried out, such as going to the market or paying bills. This change led them to move about their neighbourhoods without a Mahram and interact with people who were not their family members. Behaviours evolved organically, and the change was not linked to immorality within their social circles. On the other hand, the resulting differences between the way urban dwellers and their rural counterparts lived led the latter, including influential leaders in their area, to find the behaviours of the former unacceptable (SCSS 10/03/2021; KII 09/10/2022; KII 22/09/2022).

National and international humanitarian and development organisations, including UN agencies, in DFA areas are the ones more acutely feeling the impact of these restrictions on women. Despite no written or official documents supporting the Mahram requirement, it is implemented across DFA areas in checkpoints, ministries, and travel agencies. There have been multiple reports of travel agencies and humanitarian organisations assisting women travellers in completing their paperwork in line with the requirement so they can travel to DFA areas (SCSS 18/10/2022; Al-Mushahid 23/05/2022).

Some civil society organisations have made different approaches, strategies, and other forms of mitigation to address the situation, including negotiating with authorities to allow women to travel as a group, allowing women to travel without a Mahram, and stopping sending women to work in other governorates. Overall, efforts have been fragmented, varying based on the organisation, location, and relationships with people in authority. Organisations have worked either bilaterally with authorities or independently to find ways to work under the restrictive conditions. No solution has been found, and the constraints have only increased (KII 03/10/2022; KII 09/10/2022).
EVOLUTION OF THE MAHRAM REQUIREMENT AND IMPACT ON ACCESS TO AID FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS

Sources: ACAPS using data from Mwatana (08/03/2022); OCHA (01/08/2022); Amnesty (01/09/2022); KII (04/10/2022); Al-Mushahid (23/05/2022)
“Before travelling, I have to submit different documents of my medical condition and then seek approval from the foreign ministry in Sana’a to travel without a Mahram. It is a long and unnecessary process. When I finally get the approval, it doesn’t get easier. On the day of the travel, I have to go through different checks and uncomfortable harassment and judgement of why I was allowed to travel without a Mahram. I am in my 40s, I have been working for almost 15 years, and I have never faced such treatment. I feel so disappointed and sad.”
— Rasha*, 45 years old

“Travelling outside the country was a sort of coping strategy for me. It was like filling the energy tank in my body, and when I returned home, I would feel recharged and ready to take on whatever came my way, but with all these constraints, the travel process has become so exhausting that I have to think twice. Sometimes I feel like I am suffocating.”
— Suzan*, 35 years old

Reasons behind the restrictions

Protection and safety used as a justification and the Houthi practice of piloting restrictions in sympathetic locations

The enforcement of the Mahram requirement started in Al Hodeidah, Hajjah, and Sa’dah. The justification was that it was not safe for a woman to be alone in areas considered frontlines of the conflict. A closer observation reveals a pattern in the enforcement of these restrictions not necessarily linked to the frontlines. Sa’dah and Hajjah governorates are strongholds of the Houthis. Authorities in these areas often practise a fundamental and even radical version of Islam, and communities are among the more conservative in the country (KII 03/10/2022). The timeline shows that DFA authorities often begin implementing these initiatives in these governorates before rolling them out across their areas of control. They use the governorates where they are most likely to succeed as pilot cases to understand the level of community pushback or acceptance. This pattern has not been the case for the Mahram requirement only. The trend of imposing pilot restrictions at a smaller scale (e.g. in villages, only one university, or even a single department) to test the response and resistance level has been observed with gender-segregation restrictions and dress codes in universities and with other areas of life (SCSS 15/03/2022; ACAPS 29/06/2022; ACLED 24/03/2022).

The Houthi ideology

From the start of the war, the Houthis has claimed and implemented their ideology through different means and methods on people living under their areas of control. One way they have done so is through training programmes called cultural courses (KII 22/09/2022; KII 02/10/2022). These courses include information on the emergence of the Houthis as a religious group with a divine message, explanations of the group’s objections to democratic rule, and the role of women as caregivers within the household without social, political, and economic rights (YPP 09/02/2018; Fikra Forum 06/11/2020; KII 22/09/2022). Anecdotal observations suggest that the Houthis are trying to formalise and make the observance of the core aspects of their religious ideology and compliance with messages from Houthi leaders as the new norm for people to follow. They also aim to create the Zaidi Shia theocratic order, with a return to premodern values in the name of Islamic authenticity (SCSS 18/10/2022). This order can be used to help them control the population and stay in power.

Other reported restrictions include:

• Some reproductive health activities, particularly those focused on family planning and contraception, have been prohibited in Amran, Hajjah, and Sa’dah governorates since 2017 (Mwatana 08/03/2022). The restrictions started in Sa’dah before being enforced in Amran and Hajjah.

• There are reports of increased segregation between men and women in universities and cafés (Mwatana 08/03/2022). Anecdotal observations indicate that Al Zainbyat (the women’s wing of the DFA military) exerts control over women by monitoring and forcing a conservative dress code in women-only gyms and cafés. Requests by Al Zainbyat to install surveillance cameras to ensure that women abided with these regulations have resulted in the closure of many of these businesses, reducing the public spaces where women could gather (KII 22/09/2022; KII 03/10/2022; KII 02/10/2022).
Social impact on women

These restrictions have affected the population, especially regarding women’s participation in different aspects of life, such as politics, the social sphere, and career opportunities and progression (ACAPS 05/11/2021). They have also affected the work of humanitarian, development, and civil society organisations.

Decrease in women’s participation in the political sphere

The war has led to major setbacks in women’s participation in the political sphere and the country’s gender equality agenda. The decrease in the presence of women is evident in peace negotiations, where there is either no or very few women participants. Before the conflict, women were increasingly becoming involved and influential in the country’s political processes. Examples include the influence women had on the drafting of the new constitution in 2014 and securing the recognition of women as equal citizens and independent individuals, as well as the 30% quota for the presence of women in elected bodies and government institutions (IRC 25/02/2019; CIVICUS 09/03/2022; KII 04/10/2022).

Decrease of women’s participation in the humanitarian sphere

The Mahram requirement limiting the movement of female humanitarians has a knock-on effect of inhibiting the gathering of information on women’s needs. This constraint creates an information gap that limits the degree humanitarian response can target and meet the needs of women. Making it more difficult for women to travel out of Yemen, including to conferences, meetings, and training sessions, means female Yemeni voices are less likely to be heard at these events. It also disregards the important roles women played before and during the war in peace-building, humanitarian assistance, capacity-building, and advocating women’s rights (KII 04/10/2022).

The reduced presence of female aid workers results in less access to women and girls and less understanding of their situation, capacities, and humanitarian needs. Necessitating a male guardian to accompany women aid workers, together with the way humanitarian organisations have been discredited as safe and respectful places for women to work (see boxed text below), can affect humanitarian response, particularly regarding humanitarian aid and services to women and girls. A reduced number of women aid workers means less access and response to women and girls in need. Overall, the imposition of the Mahram requirement overturns the increase of female presence in the Yemeni labour force since the war started. It narrows women’s freedom and right to be independent and heavily affects access and the delivery of aid and services (KII 03/10/2022).

Limited career progression

Prohibiting women from travelling within or outside the country means that they have less access to training, conferences, and other social interactions. This constraint limits their learning and career progression and leaves them to take on more administrative jobs (KII 04/10/2022; KII 10/11/2022).

“The Mahram requirement has affected my work in a humanitarian organisation. When I went to the villages, I could speak to women and ask them the personal questions my male colleagues could not discuss comfortably and easily. My male colleagues still went to the field, and they would share their observations, but it was not the same as direct conversations. When I went, women would speak to me about their situations. For example, they shared if women were exposed to some sort of gender-based violence (GBV) incident. Yemen is a conservative country where men cannot interact freely with women, especially in rural areas. It is hard for us as humanitarians because by preventing the movement of female workers, humanitarian organisations do not get the full picture and cannot properly address all needs.”

—Rosa*, 27 years old
While the Mahram requirement is mostly a feature of life in DFA areas, a social media campaign targeting aid organisations in IRG areas in April 2022 left huge implications on the humanitarian community and response (CARE Yemen Twitter 18/04/2022). The campaign spread propaganda that humanitarian organisations encouraged immoral behaviour and did not respect Yemeni culture. It called on families to not allow their female members to work for humanitarian organisations or participate in their programmes. As a result, women stopped participating in activities in Aden, Lahj, and Ta’iz. Humanitarian organisations have since reported the cautiousness of the communities they engaged with and difficulties in renting offices (KII 03/10/2022; KII 02/10/2022).

“Sometimes, educated people would come to me and say they heard that when women went inside organisations, they were made to take off their hijab and do immoral behaviours. I told them that no, this is not happening. Another example is when an organisation covered all their windows for security reasons, and rumours started spreading that the reason for covering the windows was that they were engaging in immoral behaviours inside.”

—Sameer*, 33 years old

Although the campaign targeted IRG areas, its impact reached the whole country. People circulated the rumours through social media platforms, and the campaign asked authorities in IRG areas to also implement the Mahram requirement.

“There was a programme that required women to participate in a training session in Ta’iz. They were granted the approval to travel but refused to join the session, fearing any potential risk. What I have observed is that hearing about women being stopped at checkpoints for several hours or returned to their families has created fear in many people. Today, anyone travelling within the governorate or outside the country needs to think a thousand times about their decision.”

—Sara*, 40 years old

The campaign, rumours, and the requirement for a signed approval document by the Mahram have sown fear and anxiety in the population in terms of engaging in the activities or programmes of humanitarian organisations. The threat of social stigma, reputation damage, and harassment in the community has made them hesitant to enrol their daughters and wives in training courses or allow them to travel. Many civil society organisations in Abyan, Aden, Shabwah, and Ta’iz reported a noticeable withdrawal of women and girl participants from capacity-building training programmes (KII 04/10/2022).

In the past, I was proud to say I worked in a humanitarian organisation. Today, I am scared to tell anyone about my work in the aid sector because of the risk.”

—Sumaya*, 31 years old
**THEME 2: THE DFA HAD INCREASED CONTROL OVER THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN DFA AREAS.**

The content of the educational curriculum in schools in DFA areas has changed multiple times over the past four years, and these changes have been broader than even under the truce (IASC 14/07/2022). The curriculum has increasingly adopted a narrative of Islamic history focused on teaching Shia ideas and beliefs, such as the universal validity of the Imamate and the supremacy of the Hashemite bloodline, without references to the views of other branches of Islam (ACLED 23/09/2021; IMPACT-se 05/03/2021; SCSS 05/11/2021). The official religion in Yemen is Islam, with around 55% belonging to the Sunni Shafai school and 45% to the Zaydi Shia school of thought. Non-Muslim minority groups (Bahai, Christian, and Jewish) make up less than 1% of the population (ACLED accessed 13/11/2022).

Changes to the curriculum appear to have accelerated under the truce. By the start of the new school year in July 2022, multiple developments had taken place and materialised in schools in the following ways:

- Changes to the educational curriculum occurred particularly in history, geography, and Arabic and Islamic studies. Examples are promoting Jihad and joining the frontlines, consequences and punishment for betraying the country, the introduction of Houthi leaders and supporters as iconic figures, lessons about Imam Ali and the Al Hadi from Zaydi school of thought, how blood wins, and emphasising and praising verses in Quran about Jihad (South24 05/11/2022; SCSS 03/05/2022). In 2022, students in grades six, seven, and eight must pass an exam set by the Ministry of Education to ensure that these lessons are well learnt (KII 11/10/2022).

- A list of scheduled activities, assembly topics, and celebrations based on Shia Islam has been applied in all schools across DFA areas, taking away any freedom the schools had to determine what was appropriate for the communities in their region (KII 22/09/2022; KII 11/10/2022; OpenDemocracy 01/02/2022).

- A dress code has been applied requiring girls to wear the hijab from grade four (age nine) in all private and public schools. Wearing the face veil (niqab) has also been required for some public schools from grade eight (age 13) (KII 22/09/2022; KII 11/10/2022).

- A team from the Ministry of Education makes regular visits to ensure that schools are complying with these regulations. Schools found to be uncompliant are fined with non-payment, resulting in the threat of closure (KII 22/09/2022; KII 11/10/2022).

"As a parent, I struggle to make my son understand that he only has to learn to pass the exam and not believe in the information written in the new curriculum. I make sure to teach him the correct history myself at home."  
—Ahmed*, 56 years old

**Changes in education can have an impact across society**

The changes to the curriculum mean that learners are exposed to only one ideological view at school, which is taught as the singular truth. This system may inhibit them from learning skills needed for research, problem-solving, and creativity. The rewriting of history has the impact of entrenching ideas central to the legitimacy of the Houthi leadership in the minds of young Yemenis (Carnegie MEC 15/11/2021; Al-Mashareq 10/11/2022). These changes can also contribute to a long-term gap between the education system in DFA and IRG areas (IASC 14/07/2022).

These changes come together with the effort to promote ‘summer camps’ in 2022, where children learnt about Houthi ideology and beliefs and the value of enrolling in the war effort. According to UNICEF figures, more than 3,600 children in Yemen were recruited into fighting in the conflict in the past six years. This number is likely much higher in reality given the difficulty in reporting this information. (UNICEF 05/07/2021). Read more in the SIMP report April–June 2022.

**THEME 3: THE TRUCE IMPROVED HUMANITARIAN ACCESS FOR IDPS IN MA’RIB GOVERNORATE.**

Before the truce, aid organisations had to respond to IDP movement across the country, of which movement within and towards Ma’rib was a large part (IOM accessed 06/11/2022). When the truce commenced in April, IDP movement decreased, giving organisations time to conduct assessments to better understand needs and improve IDP settlements in Ma’rib governorate. Doing so allowed them to highlight protection concerns for women and girls, particularly issues around GBV:

- The ability to do assessments revealed that GBV was more concerning than anticipated, mainly resulting from the tension around the lack of livelihood opportunities (KII 09/10/2022).

- The more conducive information environment also revealed an increase of women travelling without Mahram to flee GBV in DFA areas towards Ma’rib city. Those caught by the authorities were imprisoned either because of the absence of a male guardian in DFA areas or under suspicion that they were affiliated with the DFA in IRG areas (KII 09/10/2022; KII 10/10/2022).

The information environment about the situation of IDPs has not improved, except in Ma’rib, as assessments, especially surrounding certain themes such as GBV, continue to be denied in many parts of Yemen (KII 23/10/2022).
REASONS FOR DISPLACEMENT

• Between July–September 2022, over 12,000 people were displaced as a result of conflict, natural hazards, and economic reasons compared to 30,000 in the same period in 2021.

• Conflict remains the main driver of displacement in Yemen since the war started in 2015, including during the truce, which commenced in April 2022.

• Displacement because of natural hazards, such as flooding, is an annual occurrence heavily affecting IDPs in displacement sites. Between July–September 2022, over 1,600 individuals were displaced for this reason.

• Displacement because of economic reasons affected over 1,500 people. Movement for economic reasons has increased in 2022 compared to 2021. Between January–September 2022, around 6,000 individuals (11% of the 53,800 total displaced people) were displaced as a result of economic reasons compared to 3,000 individuals (4% of the 66,000 total) in the same period in 2021. Over 70% of those displaced for economic reasons moved towards Ma’rib governorate. Governorates witnessing high movements are Al Hodeidah, Ibb, and Ta’iz governorates (IOM accessed 06/11/2022).

RATIONALE AND IMPACT OF MOVEMENT FOR ECONOMIC REASONS TOWARDS MA’RIB:

• Ma’rib has been a popular displacement destination throughout the conflict. According to IOM data, the main reasons for displacement are unemployment, a lack of salaries, and price increases, and people believe that Ma’rib offers better opportunities (IOM accessed 06/11/2022). Other resources reported the following:

  • Ma’rib is considered a neutral governorate, where people feel safer than in other areas

  • People are heading to Ma’rib for the availability of services, such as electricity, cooking gas, and petrol (KII 09/10/2022; IOM 13/11/2022).

  • They are also aiming for the availability of humanitarian assistance (KII 09/10/2022; IOM 13/11/2022).

  • Ma’rib also offers easier investment opportunities and requirements to open businesses (KII 22/09/2022; KII 09/10/2022; KII 10/10/2022).

A positive impact of the growth of Ma’rib as a centre for displacement and economic opportunities given the population influx is that it provides services to the host community and increases opportunities for community members to sell their lands, which were less valuable before the conflict. That said, the community has also observed some negative and unforeseen impacts:

• **Local conflict about property and old grievances**: as buyers emerge to purchase land in Ma’rib, regional conflict and unsolved grievances between land owners resurface. Sometimes, people sell land without adequate consultation with different property owners, causing conflict (KII 10/10/2022).

• **Supply and demand**: the estimated population of Ma’rib city is 630,000 (UN 16/04/2021). Although the city has grown compared to before the war, employment supply has decreased compared to the demand, lowering salaries. The situation has created competition between people over job opportunities and tensions over limited resources (KII 10/10/2022).

• **New economic classes emerging**: before the war, when there was a smaller population in Ma’rib, people living there were all in relatively the same economic situation, and living conditions were fairly homogeneous. Changes since the war, including migration to Ma’rib and the new businesses that have emerged as a result of the influx, have seen the creation of different economic classes within the host community and the new arrivals, fostering economic tensions between groups.
ON THE WATCH LIST

The watch list comprises themes that are part of our overall monitoring and that emerged from the SIMP review process but that we have not focused on deeply in this product because they were less prominent than those we have delved into. We list these to alert the reader and as a list of issues that may become a focus of future reports.

Global and regional economic conditions affecting Yemeni and non-Yemeni labour migrants

Although remittances from Saudi Arabia have remained stable, since June 2021, the number of Yemeni migrants returning from Saudi Arabia has increased and continues to rise in 2022 (IOM 23/10/2022). The increase is mainly because of the tightening of employment opportunities for labour migrants and increasing the employment of Saudi labourers. The situation has resulted in a rigorous classification process for migrants and visa restrictions for lower categories of work. Many companies can no longer hire new migrant workers or renew work permits for their employees. The increased cost of living and decreased salaries make it difficult for many migrants to afford residency permits, health insurance, rent, and other necessities (ACAPS 15/10/2021). As at September 2022, over 50,000 Yemeni migrants had returned since January 2022 (IOM 04/10/2022). Yemeni migrants are not the only people affected; anecdotal information indicates that non-Yemeni migrants are also taking the route back to Yemen. Given the access constraints and small number of people entering, the route from Saudi Arabia to Yemen is not clear. These migrants are subjected to harassment, trafficking, and imprisonment (KII 09/10/2022).

The recurrence of flash floods

Between June–August, Yemen witnessed heavy rains and widespread flooding, destroying property and livelihoods, including critical infrastructure such as roads and bridges. The rains and flooding affected around 440,000 individuals across the country, including 72 who died. Al Hodeidah, Al Jawf, Amran, Hajjah, Ma’rib, Sana’a city, and Sana’a governorate were the hardest hit by the calamity (OCHA 10/10/2022). Read more in the social impact report covering July–September 2021.

Weak purchasing power across the country

The truce helped prevent prices from increasing and the Yemeni rial from depreciating further. Despite these developments, the root causes of people’s low purchasing power, such as high and unaffordable prices, the weak Yemeni rial, continuous inflation, a lack of adjustment in public institution salary payments, and inconsistent salaries, persist. The trend continues to decline, and, with continuously occurring shocks, is exhausting people’s coping strategies further. There is a noticeable drop in children attending school because of parents’ inability to afford educational fees, especially for families with more than three children. According to unpublished statistics, Al Hodeidah, Ibb, and Sana’a city have the highest drop in children attending school (KII 11/10/2022).

Deteriorating healthcare

On 14 October, ten children patients in DFA areas died after being administered smuggled expired doses of cancer treatment. The children were between three and 15 years old (ABC News 14/10/2022). Only 51% of health facilities are considered fully functional in Yemen. Many health facilities lack operational specialised cadres, equipment, and basic medicine, especially in remote rural areas. The armed conflict, economic decline, and natural disasters such as floods pose further stress on the health system by aggravating existing vulnerabilities and impeding access to health services (OCHA 14/08/2022).

The project benefited from support by the IMEDA programme, which is supported by UK aid from the UK government.
### VULNERABLE GROUPS OR CATEGORIES PARTICULARLY AFFECTED, JULY-SEPTEMBER 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES AND THEMES EMERGING FROM QUALITATIVE DATA MONITORING</th>
<th>GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION</th>
<th>VULNERABLE GROUPS OR CATEGORIES PARTICULARLY AFFECTED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict and associated impact</td>
<td>Nationwide or across frontlines</td>
<td>IDPs, Yemeni migrants and their families (supported by remittances), Prime producers (agriculture and fisheries), Nonmigrants living in Yemen, Prisoners and detained people, Women (employed, unemployed, and female-headed households), Persons with disabilities, the elderly, and the young, Women (unemployed, without access to livelihood), Widows and female-headed households, Pregnant and lactating women and girls, Children (girls and boys)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced purchasing power</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>IDPs, Yemeni migrants and their families (supported by remittances), Prime producers (agriculture and fisheries), Nonmigrants living in Yemen, Prisoners and detained people, Women (employed, unemployed, and female-headed households), Persons with disabilities, the elderly, and the young, Women (unemployed, without access to livelihood), Widows and female-headed households, Pregnant and lactating women and girls, Children (girls and boys)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COVID-19 situation</td>
<td>DFA-controlled areas are potentially the most affected and where information is the most limited</td>
<td>IDPs, Yemeni migrants and their families (supported by remittances), Prime producers (agriculture and fisheries), Nonmigrants living in Yemen, Prisoners and detained people, Women (employed, unemployed, and female-headed households), Persons with disabilities, the elderly, and the young, Women (unemployed, without access to livelihood), Widows and female-headed households, Pregnant and lactating women and girls, Children (girls and boys)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaccine rollout</td>
<td>Nationwide, but the DFA-controlled areas are potentially the most affected and where vaccine rollout is limited to health and aid workers</td>
<td>IDPs, Yemeni migrants and their families (supported by remittances), Prime producers (agriculture and fisheries), Nonmigrants living in Yemen, Prisoners and detained people, Women (employed, unemployed, and female-headed households), Persons with disabilities, the elderly, and the young, Women (unemployed, without access to livelihood), Widows and female-headed households, Pregnant and lactating women and girls, Children (girls and boys)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious control (cultural control)</td>
<td>DFA-controlled areas</td>
<td>IDPs, Yemeni migrants and their families (supported by remittances), Prime producers (agriculture and fisheries), Nonmigrants living in Yemen, Prisoners and detained people, Women (employed, unemployed, and female-headed households), Persons with disabilities, the elderly, and the young, Women (unemployed, without access to livelihood), Widows and female-headed households, Pregnant and lactating women and girls, Children (girls and boys)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel crisis (current)</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>IDPs, Yemeni migrants and their families (supported by remittances), Prime producers (agriculture and fisheries), Nonmigrants living in Yemen, Prisoners and detained people, Women (employed, unemployed, and female-headed households), Persons with disabilities, the elderly, and the young, Women (unemployed, without access to livelihood), Widows and female-headed households, Pregnant and lactating women and girls, Children (girls and boys)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seasonal rain (between April-October)</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>IDPs, Yemeni migrants and their families (supported by remittances), Prime producers (agriculture and fisheries), Nonmigrants living in Yemen, Prisoners and detained people, Women (employed, unemployed, and female-headed households), Persons with disabilities, the elderly, and the young, Women (unemployed, without access to livelihood), Widows and female-headed households, Pregnant and lactating women and girls, Children (girls and boys)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrinking civic space (cultural and religious control)</td>
<td>DFA-controlled areas are potentially impacted the most</td>
<td>IDPs, Yemeni migrants and their families (supported by remittances), Prime producers (agriculture and fisheries), Nonmigrants living in Yemen, Prisoners and detained people, Women (employed, unemployed, and female-headed households), Persons with disabilities, the elderly, and the young, Women (unemployed, without access to livelihood), Widows and female-headed households, Pregnant and lactating women and girls, Children (girls and boys)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil unrest</td>
<td>IRG-controlled areas</td>
<td>IDPs, Yemeni migrants and their families (supported by remittances), Prime producers (agriculture and fisheries), Nonmigrants living in Yemen, Prisoners and detained people, Women (employed, unemployed, and female-headed households), Persons with disabilities, the elderly, and the young, Women (unemployed, without access to livelihood), Widows and female-headed households, Pregnant and lactating women and girls, Children (girls and boys)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table is based on qualitative monitoring. Key information:
- **Very negative**
- **Negative**
- **Somewhat negative**
- **No impact**
- **Somewhat positive**
- **Positive**
- **Very positive**
- **Information gap**
- **Not applicable or no specific impact**
### VULNERABLE GROUPS OR CATEGORIES PARTICULARLY AFFECTED, COMPARISON BETWEEN QUARTER 1 (JANUARY TO MARCH) 2022 AND QUARTER 2 (APRIL TO JUNE) 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerable Groups or Categories Particularly Affected</th>
<th>Geographical Location</th>
<th>Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased conflict</td>
<td>Nationwide or across frontlines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced purchasing power</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID-19 situation</td>
<td>Nationwide, but the DPA-controlled areas are potentially the most affected and more information is the most limited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitamin pollutant</td>
<td>Nationwide, but the DPA-controlled areas are potentially the most affected and more information is the most limited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious control (excluding control)</td>
<td>DPA-controlled areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food staple (current)</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative role between fund distribution</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilling and job space (political and religious control)</td>
<td>Nationwide, but the DPA-controlled areas are potentially impacted the most</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil control</td>
<td>DPA-controlled areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See full table on ACAPS Social impact monitoring report: January - March 2022

See full table on ACAPS Social impact monitoring report: April - June 2022