

**Active conflict** continued destroying civilian infrastructure, disrupting services, and causing civilian casualties and displacement in the May – July period. The conflict has intensified in Donetsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts, after shifting away from Luhansk oblast, which came under the full control of Russian and non-government-controlled-area (NGCA) forces in early July. By the end of July, the frontlines had stabilised, with fighting in Kherson intensifying as Ukrainian forces looked to prepare for a counteroffensive.

Despite an overall decrease in the number of IDPs, **displacement from southern and eastern oblasts has increased**, especially starting mid-June. Further displacement is likely because of the continuation of conflict, the call for evacuations by Ukrainian officials from Kherson and Zaporizhzhia NGCAs, and the mandatory evacuation of the Donetsk government-controlled area (GCA). In mid-June, Melitopol's Ukrainian mayor announced the 'second wave' of displacement from the city (Zaporizhzhia NGCA) resembling the initial displacement at the start of the invasion (Ukrinform 19/07/2022).

**Humanitarian access constraints remain high in all frontline oblasts** (Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhia). The main drivers are active conflict, fuel scarcity, the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), disruptions to basic services, and movement restrictions for humanitarians and civilians.

**Insufficient assistance is a concern** among the most conflict-affected oblasts, including territories previously held by Russian forces (such as Sumy and Chernihiv). The international response is particularly lacking in Zaporizhzhia oblast (KII 05/08/2022 a; CF SSS 24/06/2022). Lack of sufficient assistance is particularly concerning in rural areas that are often overlooked or difficult to reach.

**Unmet water and hygiene needs** risk causing the spread of diseases. During the reporting period, several locations (Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts) experienced these issues as a result of damaged infrastructure and insufficient water assistance. In Mykolaiv city, people far from the centre or with mobility problems had difficulty accessing water distributions. In Mariupol, a complete lack of water and hygiene services was reported.

**Shelter needs are increasing** before winter. The affected population requires assistance to insulate and repair their homes and purchase heating appliances and fuel. Disruptions to heating infrastructure risk leaving some civilians without adequate heating during the cold winter months.

### About this report

This report is the first in a series of periodic ACAPS reports capturing key recent developments and analysing humanitarian trends in the most crisis-affected oblasts of Ukraine. This report in particular discusses the May–July analysis period.

**Limitations:** the situation remains dynamic, posing significant challenges in acquiring accurate data on displacement, locations, and needs. Key informant interviews (KIIs) may also present a subjective perspective. The updates presented and oblasts selected were based on the availability of key informants during the analysis period.

**Methodology:** the report relies on primary data collected by Charity Foundation Stabilization Support Services from 64 responses between 3 June and 25 July, the secondary data review of public and non-public sources, five KIIs, and references to previous KIIs to highlight trends.

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## KEY DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN MAY–JULY

### Conflict developments

Continued combat operations and shelling caused a deterioration of humanitarian conditions in several oblasts between May–July, particularly Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia (CF SSS 24/06/2022; CF SSS 25/07/2022). Missile strikes, air strikes, and shelling have continued to hit civilian centres, causing fatalities and severe damage to housing and infrastructure (ICG 06/2022; OCHA 29/07/2022; ACLED accessed 20/07/2022).

**In the eastern frontline**, the most intense fighting shifted towards Donetsk oblast after Russian and NGCA forces took control of Luhansk oblast (BBC 30/08/2022; OCHA 29/07/2022). Intensive fighting prevented the setting up of evacuation and humanitarian corridors from Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (CF SSS 24/06/2022; CF SSS 25/07/2022).

**Fighting along the southern frontline** intensified as Ukrainian forces looked to make territorial gains in Kherson. On 20 July, Ukrainian forces targeted the Antonivskiyi bridge, a key route for supplying the Russian military in Kherson with weapons and ammunition (Kyiv Post 20/07/2022; The Guardian 22/07/2022; BBC 28/07/2022). The Russian military has moved some of its forces from the Donetsk front to strengthen its position in Kherson oblast (ISW 01/08/2022).

On 30 June, Ukrainian forces regained their position on the strategic southern Zmiinyi Island in the Black Sea (ICG 06/2022; BBC 30/06/2022).

### Raions most affected by ground conflict between May–July 2022

OBLAST	RAION	NUMBER OF ARMED CLASHES
Donetsk	Bakhmutskiyi	271
Luhansk	Sievierodonetskiy	245
Donetsk	Kramatorskiy	135
Donetsk	Pokrovskiy	121
Kharkiv	Iziumskiy	80
Kharkiv	Kharkivskiy	70
Donetsk	Volnovaskiy	43
Kherson	Beryslavskiy	33
Donetsk	Donetskiy	23


Source: ACLED (accessed 17/08/2022)

### Attacks on civilians

Between 1 May and 31 July, there were 726 reports of air strikes, missile strikes, shelling, and mine and UXO incidents directly affecting civilians, leading to 1,078 deaths in 21 oblasts. There were also 25 attacks (including torture, physical violence, and shootings), 52 abductions, and five incidents of sexual violence against civilians. Nationally, the vast majority (77%) of incidents affecting civilians were air strikes, missile strikes, and shelling. The only exceptions to this trend were in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, where abductions and attacks accounted for 43% of incidents directly affecting civilians, and Kyiv oblast, where mines and UXO were the main drivers of incidents involving civilians (ACLED accessed 17/08/2022).

There was a decreasing trend in the overall number of reported incidents affecting civilians between late May and early July, followed by an increase until the end of the analysis period (31 July). This trend is represented most strongly in Donetsk oblast, with the increase in early July coinciding with the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Luhansk oblast and intensification of conflict in Donetsk (ACLED accessed 17/08/2022).

### Violent incidents impacting civilians per week in most affected oblasts



Source: ACLED (accessed 17/08/2022)

Violent incidents affected civilians in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts the most. The most affected cities include Avdiivka, Bakhmut, Lyman, Sloviansk, Soledar, Toretsk (Donetsk oblast), Balakliia, Chuhuiv, Derhachi, Kharkiv, Zolochiv (Kharkiv oblast), Melitopol (Zaporizhzhia oblast), Kherson (Kherson oblast), Mykolaiv (Mykolaiv oblast), Lysychansk, Sievierodonetsk (Luhansk oblast), and Odesa (Odesa oblast) (ACLED accessed 17/08/2022).

As at 31 July, according to the UN, conflict had killed 5,327 civilians since the onset of the Russian invasion in February. The actual figure is likely much higher, as figures from some areas are yet to be added, including from Izium, Lysychansk, Mariupol, Popasna, and Sievierodonetsk, where there are reports of numerous civilian casualties (OHCHR 02/08/2022). The number of confirmed civilian deaths has increased by 83% since the end of April 2022 (OHCHR 29/04/2022).

## Political developments

**New laws in Kherson NGCA:** on 15 June, the de facto authorities in Kherson oblast issued a decree that made it illegal to interfere with the activities of de facto governing bodies or discredit the activities of the Russian Federation. The decree states that violators will be “forcibly expelled” from the oblast (Kherson VGA Telegram 15/07/2022). Efforts to integrate Kherson into the Russian Federation have continued. Ukrainian security services have published information about intercepting plans for a referendum on the adhesion of Kherson into Russia (Kyiv Post 01/08/2022; Euromaidan Press 01/08/2022).

**Food exports** resumed from three Odesa ports after a five-month blockade that resulted in global supply chain disruptions and price hikes (CSIS 15/04/2022; Brookings 14/06/2022; WSJ 31/07/2022). On 22 July, Russia and Ukraine each signed a deal with the UN and Türkiye allowing for the resumption of Ukrainian food exports, including grain, via the Black Sea. The fact that both Ukraine and Russia have extensively mined the waters complicates maritime circulation in the Black Sea. On 27 July, a Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul was established. Personnel from Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine, and the UN will oversee the departure of ships from Ukrainian Black Sea ports (The Kyiv Independent 22/07/2022; Reuters 27/07/2022). Ukrainian officials have stated that operations in Chornomorsk, Odesa, and Pivdennyi ports have resumed (DW 27/07/2022).

## OVERVIEW OF CHANGES TO HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS

### Humanitarian needs

**Water and hygiene:** the cities of Pryvillia (Luhansk), Blahodatne, Sloviansk, Svitlodarsk (Donetsk), Stepnohirsk, and Novoandriivka (Zaporizhzhia) and cities in Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts saw a deterioration in humanitarian conditions because of a lack of drinking water and subsequent concerns over the spread of diseases (REACH 08/07/2022).

**In Mariupol (Donetsk),** the lack of hygiene and clean water in the city, combined with inadequate medical care, is increasing the risk of the spread of infectious diseases (Mariupol City Council Telegram 22/07/2022). There has been speculation about the presence of cholera in the city, but there have been no tests to identify cases, and cholera symptoms may resemble the symptoms of other illnesses resulting from poor WASH infrastructure (Libération 10/06/2022).

Shelling has destroyed desalination and purification plants in **Mykolaiv city (Mykolaiv oblast)**. As a result, water is brought into the city at two distribution points and to the courtyards of apartment complexes that residents must access with their own means of transport. This system is a challenge particularly for people unable to carry large amounts of water, such as people with disabilities and elderly people (NV Peaceforce 11/07/2022; Left Bank Analytics Mykolaiv Location Profile 14/07/2022; KII 05/08/2022 b).

**Housing:** as at mid-June, the houses of about one million households (around 2.5 million people) were damaged or destroyed (National Council of Recovery of Ukraine 07/2022). The pace of the reconstruction of private houses in the most affected areas (Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts) has been slow given a lack of construction materials, transport, and construction workers (CF SSS 25/07/2022; KII 07/08/2022 a). As a result, many people risk entering the winter season without adequate shelter (KII 05/08/2022 a; CF SSS 05/08/2022). The repair of damaged houses was also cited as one of the main needs in Kharkiv oblast (KII 09/08/2022). ACAPS recently published a short note on the key issues around the upcoming winter season: *Overview of Winterisation Needs and Response*.

**Gas and electricity service provision:** as at 10 August, 635,200 people were without electricity in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. Authorities are working on restoring electricity to the affected communities. For example, on 10 August alone, electricity was restored for 7,500 people. As at 10 August, most of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts remained without gas because of damages to the main supply line. Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts also faced similar challenges with gas supply. A total of 236,400 people were without gas across the country (Dixigroup 11/08/2022).

## Insufficient assistance

While humanitarians deliver aid to all areas, access to the most affected and frontline oblasts is limited. **The areas that need the most attention from humanitarian responders are Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.**

**Territories previously occupied by Russian forces** are considered underserved by the Government and humanitarian responders. They do not get enough attention and aid or enough information on how to receive assistance (CF SSS 25/07/2022).

In some areas, aid packages for IDPs and affected people are becoming smaller and contain less variety of items (both from local and international responders). Insufficient assistance was reported in **Ivano-Frankivsk, Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, although similar situations likely occur in other oblasts** (KII 05/08/2022 b; KII 07/08/2022 a; CF SSS 24/06/2022).

While the amount of aid has substantially increased in some areas, such as Kharkiv, the growing reliance of the population on humanitarian assistance, also because of increasing return movements, has meant that there is still not enough to cover needs (CFF SSS 24/06/2022; KII 09/08/2022). Lack of sufficient assistance is particularly concerning in rural areas that are often overlooked or difficult to reach (CF SSS 05/08/2022).

## Displacement trends

**While the estimated number of IDPs decreased between May–July, the number of IDPs from southern and eastern oblasts increased.** Between 3 May and 23 July, the estimated number of IDPs in Ukraine dropped from eight million to 6.65 million, mostly driven by a drop in the number of IDPs staying in western oblasts (from 2.9 to 1.3 million).

**When looking at the place of origin of IDPs, the trends highlight an increase in IDPs from the eastern (3.9 million to 4.45 million) and southern oblasts (871,000 to 1.14 million).** On the other hand, new displacements from central, northern, and western oblasts substantially decreased (IOM accessed 31/08/2022). Displacements from eastern and southern oblasts are likely to increase as a result of intensifying conflict in the south generating renewed displacement in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, mandatory evacuation from Donetsk, and the search for adequate shelter before winter.

**Displaced populations are increasingly losing the ability to afford living in their places of displacement.** As their tolerance to risk increases over time, reports of returns to frontline

and occupied areas, including Donetsk GCA (before the call for evacuation on 30 July), also increase (CF SSS 24/06/2022; Left Bank Analytics Critical Areas Situation Report 22/07/2022).

**People returning to their habitual place of residence are likely to face increased safety and security risks and be beyond the reach of humanitarians.** Between May–July, the estimated number of people returning to their homes increased from 2,715,000 to 5,545,000 (IOM 09/05/2022 and 29/07/2022). On 7 July, ACAPS published a report about the dynamics of return movements in Ukraine.

**Calls for evacuation:** on 8 July, Ukrainian officials called on the populations of the Russian-controlled areas of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts to evacuate by any means necessary in anticipation of increased hostilities (Ukrainska Pravda 08/07/2022). On 24 July, thousands of private vehicles were reported to be waiting for more than a week at a Russian-controlled checkpoint in Vasylivka, where they were being prevented from continuing north to Zaporizhzhia city (GCA). Six people died while waiting (OCHA 29/07/2022).

**On 30 July, President Volodymyr Zelensky called for the mandatory evacuation of the remaining population of Donetsk GCA, an estimated 200,000 people, including 52,000 children.** This evacuation was decided considering the safety and security risks of the conflict. Another factor was the inability to guarantee adequate heating in the upcoming winter season because of damaged infrastructure (NYT 31/07/2022; CNN 30/07/2022).

## Priority needs among IDPs

**Lacking employment prospects for IDPs:** 47% of IDPs surveyed by IOM reported being unemployed, and 29% earned less than before the invasion (IOM 23/07/2022).

**Housing solutions for IDPs:** the start of the school year is expected to increase the demand for housing for IDPs, as they will need to vacate educational facilities to make way for students (CF SSS 24/06/2022). **Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Rivne, and Ternopil oblasts** have the highest number of educational institutions housing IDPs (MESU et al. 04/07/2022). ACAPS recently published a report on the impact of conflict on education in Ukraine. In Zaporizhzhia oblast, housing solutions are needed for the growing number of IDPs (KII 05/08/2022 a).

**Financial aid:** many IDPs have not obtained or have only received part of financial aid (CF SSS 24/06/2022). New state regulations adopted starting early May led to the new wave of IDPs receiving less or no financial aid from the Government and international organisations, unlike those that arrived in the first months of the war (CF SSS 27/07/2022). Cash assistance is a key need, especially for older people and poorer people with no access to employment, for example, in Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Sumy oblasts (KII 05/08/2022 b; KII 07/08/2022 a; KII 09/08/2022).

**Basic supplies:** there is a growing number of requests among IDPs for clothing and footwear (IOM 29/07/2022). Areas nearest to active ground conflict in **Mykolaiv oblast** need all types of basic supplies, including food, medicine, and hygienic products (KII 05/08/2022 b). **In Odesa oblast**, IDPs from Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts require assistance to cover all their basic needs (KII 07/08/2022 b). Aside from winter-specific clothing, IDP-specific winterisation assistance includes insulating current IDP shelters or, where upgrades cannot be performed, opening new winterised shelters (KII 07/08/2022 a; KII 05/08/2022 a).

**Health treatment for chronic illnesses and disabilities:** permanent solutions for long-term needs among IDPs are still lacking. These needs include regular treatment for people with disabilities or chronic illnesses (CF SSS 24/06/2022). A lack of medicine and access to health services is disproportionately affecting the elderly (OCHA 05/08/2022).

## LOCAL RESPONSE TRENDS

This section provides updates on the local response between May–July 2022 based on the initial analysis done in ACAPS' Bridging Humanitarian Response report from 25 May 2022. It does not contain a complete analysis but instead provides a quick overview of the major trends affecting the local response in Ukraine, complemented by examples from a limited number of KIIs.

### Coordination trends

**Coordination between local responders** generally works well at the oblast level. Local organisations share surplus items, communicate needs, and provide logistical assistance, such as by sharing cars and acquiring fuel. Examples of this sort of collaboration can be found in Kharkiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts, among others (KII 07/08/2022 a, KII 07/08/2022 b; KII 09/08/2022). In Mykolaiv oblast, however, coordination concerns already present in April have remained, with little horizontal cooperation between organisations that mostly work on their own (KII 05/08/2022 b; KII 10/04/2022 a). In Mykolaiv city, reports indicate that community members were left without assistance to transport water from distribution points to their homes, with neighbours assisting them instead (NV Peaceforce 11/07/2022; Left Bank Analytics Mykolaiv Location Profile 14/07/2022).

**Coordination between local responders and Ukrainian authorities** has improved since April. Humanitarian hubs have allowed for communication between local authorities, local

NGOs, and volunteers as they exchange requests for support and offers of assistance. Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv are two oblasts where humanitarian hubs have facilitated increased coordination. In some cases, however, the strong centralisation of the response by local authorities has had the opposite effect of decreasing collaboration between local authorities, local NGOs, and volunteers (KII 05/08/2022 a, KII 04/04/2022 c; KII 07/04/2022 d; KII 19/04/2022 b; KII 05/08/2022 b). In Sumy oblast, local authorities took the lead in reconstruction and social work response, decreasing collaboration with local counterparts (KII 07/08/2022 a).

**Coordination between local responders and the international humanitarian community** continues to be inadequate. Much of the collaboration between INGOs and local responders is via oblast-level authorities or national NGOs. Several local NGOs and volunteers reported that assistance from international organisations only accounted for a small part of the aid they received. **In fact, most of the international aid that local NGOs and volunteer groups receive continues to be through their own networks outside the international humanitarian system** (KII 05/08/2022 b; KII 07/08/2022 a; KII 07/08/2022 b; KII 09/08/2022). One local NGO reported that whenever they tried contacting international responders, they were usually told to get in touch with national NGOs and local authorities (KII 07/08/2022 a). Aid from international responders is sometimes brought in without consulting local authorities, leading to some gaps and duplications in responses (KII 05/08/2022 a).

### Local response challenges

**Response at a local level struggled to access people in remote rural areas in all affected oblasts.** Major constraints include a lack of transportation, fuel shortages, and high fuel prices (KII 07/08/2022 a). These constraints have led to irregular and delayed aid deliveries to small towns and villages outside the cities served by humanitarian hubs (KII 05/08/2022 b). **In Mykolaiv oblast**, fighting has destroyed depots with relief supplies and roads close to the frontlines, resulting in the loss of critical supplies. Medicines are mostly delivered directly to hospitals or the reserves of the regional administration, which can make it hard for people located further away to reach them. People either face a lack of medicine in pharmacies or prices that have increased two or threefold (KII 05/08/2022 b).


**Information on local needs does not always reach international responders, leading to challenges in coordination.** A key challenge to an effective logistic response is a lack of understanding of local market capacity, as the presence or absence of given products in local markets needed for the response determines the configuration of humanitarian supply chains (Logistics Cluster 11/07/2022). **In Odesa oblast**, the international humanitarian coordination structure mostly overlooks local responders and focuses on the relationship between big organisations and political structures (KII 07/08/2022 b). **In Zaporizhzhia**, international responders bring in some aid, but they still need to have a more permanent

presence in the oblast (KII 05/08/2022 a). In **Kharkiv** oblast, the regional online information system informs the humanitarian network, including local oblast authorities and other humanitarian organisations, on humanitarian needs, possibly providing a model for improved information-sharing at the oblast level (KII 09/08/2022).

**The sustainability of the local response continues to be a challenge for local NGOs and volunteers.** Local responders continue to be the primary providers of material aid and services, especially in remote areas. The deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine has affected the capacity of local responders, as volunteers are turning towards other opportunities that can provide stable employment. A lack of financial resources and fuel shortages also add to the challenge (NV Peaceforce 11/07/2022).

Several local NGOs (in Kharkiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts) report difficulties in raising funds (KII 07/08/2022 a; KII 09/08/2022; KII 07/08/2022 b). The provision of assistance to both civilians and the Ukrainian armed forces by volunteer groups continues to create a challenge for international responders wishing to establish partnerships while maintaining the civilian nature of humanitarian aid (NV Peaceforce 11/07/2022).

## HUMANITARIAN ACCESS BETWEEN MAY–JULY 2022



Sources: ACAPS (25/07/2022); Stepanenko et al. (14/07/2022); ACLED (accessed 23/08/2022)

The updates in the following section are based on ACAPS' current data collection for the Humanitarian Access Events dataset that feeds into our oblast-level access severity index. For more information on the methodology and an analysis of humanitarian access in Ukraine up to 20 June, please read our first report on oblast-level humanitarian access constraints in Ukraine. Access severity in some areas may be underscored because of a lack of reporting of access events.



## Oblasts with the most severe access constraints as at 25 July 2022

	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIANS	SECURITY AND PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS	SEVERITY SCORE
Donetsk	4.5	5	4.02	4.5
Luhansk	4	5	4.37	4.5
Kharkiv	4	5	4.22	4.4
Kherson	4	5	3.47	4.2
Mykolaiv	4	4.46	3.83	4.1
Zaporizhzhia	4	4.13	3.52	3.9


Note: all scores are out of 5.

**Access constraints remain the highest in all oblasts where there is active ground conflict and where Russian and NGCA forces are controlling territories.** The main development affecting access in these oblasts during the analysis period was the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from their remaining positions in Luhansk oblast in early July. The intensification of fighting in Donetsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts is likely to add constraints for civilians and humanitarians in areas heavily targeted by shelling and air strikes and along the frontlines.

**Nationwide, the main access constraints between May–July involved fuel scarcity affecting humanitarian operations** (15% of reported access constraints), landmine explosions causing deaths and injuries (13%), the disrupted access of civilians to basic services (10%), movement restrictions affecting humanitarians (9%), and violence affecting the movement of civilians (6%).

## Oblasts with the highest number of access events between 1 May and 31 July 2022

Recorded humanitarian access events in most impacted oblasts between May and July 2022



Source: ACAPS humanitarian access events dataset

Note: the number of humanitarian access events in an oblast does not directly correlate to its access severity score.