The Social Impact Monitoring Project (SIMP) report is scheduled to be produced quarterly in 2022. With the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG) and the de-facto authority (DFA) in the north of Yemen (also known as the Houthis) agreeing on a truce starting 2 April, the first two editions of the 2022 SIMP reports covering the first six months of the year will mirror each other. They will focus on three themes that emerged from a review of available data across the first three months of 2022. This approach is intended to compare the impact of these themes on people before and during the truce.

The three highlighted themes are:

- conflict and its associated impacts (across the country)
- cultural and religious control (in DFA-controlled areas)
- decreasing purchasing power (across the country)

The analysis presented in this report is based on:

- the daily monitoring of relevant indicators logged in the ACAPS qualitative database
- the analysis of data from ACAPS’ core dataset
- the secondary data review of documents published in and on Yemen
- discussions with context experts
- key informant interviews and discussions with people in Yemen
- a collection of small case studies through interviews to capture the impressions and experiences of people living in Yemen.

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Yemen: Events with social implications between January-March

Source: (HNO 04/2022; YETI accessed 18/06/2022; ISW 18/06/2022)
Disclaimers: The boundaries, names, and designation provided on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by ACAPS.
Description of trends:

- **worse**
- **negative**
- **stable**
- **positive**
- **improving**

### Conflict and its associated impacts across the country

Between January–March, armed violence resulted in 1,095 civilian casualties (352 killed and 743 injured), with 42% resulting from increased air strikes. January saw the highest number of casualties, largely because of an air strike that hit a detention centre in Sadah governorate. The incident caused 327 civilian casualties, killing 91 people and injuring 236 others (Protection Cluster 04/2022). The facility was holding 2,000 detainees, including 700 migrants (UN 28/01/2022). In February–March, conflict and battles across front lines declined, while violence with small arms and light weapons increased (ACLED accessed 15/06/2022; Protection Cluster 04/2022).

#### The impact of conflict on people in detention and challenges for undocumented migrants

On 21 March, an air strike hit a detention centre on the outskirts of Sadah city. It demolished the facility, killed 91 people, and injured another 236 (CIMP 04/2022). The detention centre held at least 2,000 detainees, including 700 undocumented East African migrants (CIMP 04/2022; UN 28/01/2022).

The incident highlights safety concerns for people in detention. Migrants from Africa looking for work pass through Yemen on their way to Saudi Arabia, with some staying in Yemen if they find work. Challenges for them appear to be increasing, including human rights violations (such as detention in inhumane conditions), exploitation, and forced transfers across lines of control (IOM 31/05/2022). Labour migrants are also becoming increasingly unwelcome in Yemen; livelihood opportunities are declining, and they are seen to be competing for resources with community members and IDPs. Before the war, Yemenis did not want to do certain jobs, such as cleaning and rubbish collection. The combination of high prices, the devaluation of the Yemeni rial, delayed civil servant payments, and the general lack of livelihood options have made Yemenis more inclined to take these jobs and see migrants as competitors (ACAPS 08/02/2022).

#### Damage to critical infrastructure

Heightening air raids and shelling significantly increased the number of incidents affecting critical infrastructure, notably education, health, and fuel facilities, and telecommunication sites from the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2021.

There were:

- ten reports of the war affecting health facilities in the first quarter (Q1) of 2022, double the five in Q4 2021
- nine incidents affecting education facilities, a 50% increase from the previous quarter
- eight incidents affecting fuel facilities, a fourfold increase from two in Q4 2021
- 28 reports of the war affecting telecommunication sites in Q1 2022, up from eight during Q4 2021 and zero during the two quarters before that (CIMP 04/2022).

For this edition of the report, we will look closely at the disruption to telecommunications in Yemen and its impact on people.
Disruptions to telecommunications

Following an air strike on a telecommunications facility in Al Hodeidah city on 20 January 2022, almost all of Yemen lost internet connectivity for four days (CIMP 04/2022). Internet connectivity was only publicly accessible to a small number of residents of Aden via the Aden Net Company established in September 2018 (KII 09/06/2022; SMEX 05/09/2018). Phone calls through mobile phones and landlines were working, but the network was very weak and sometimes failed. Upon re-establishment of connectivity, it was very weak. Users reported that they had to avail of a service upgrade from the internet service provider to retrieve access, adding to their utility costs (KII 09/06/2022).

Across the country, only 27% of Yemenis have internet access, and it is among the most expensive and least reliable in the world, with an average download speed of 0.53MBps (ABT 03/2022; TRF 21/03/2022). The situation has had the most impact in cities where people rely on the internet (particularly social media) as an important source of information and connectivity. There has been less impact in rural areas because of the limited access to and reliance on the internet. Satellite internet exists in Yemen but only for large companies. Access is limited because of:

- expensive costs that make it unaffordable for medium and small businesses
- restrictions by authorities that prevent smaller businesses from accessing information.

Although the internet disruption lasted only four days, it affected people in many ways. It had effects on livelihoods, education, safety, and psychosocial wellbeing, particularly for online business owners, students, and workers with time-bound deadlines and obligations.

Across the country, people with online (home-based) businesses, such as catering, on selling imported products, and selling handmade items, reported being unable to do their usual work. There were varied impacts, with food-related enterprises suffering the most; some reported a significant loss in income when order deliveries failed and remained unpaid (KII 09/06/2022). Based on other research, it is often women who start and manage these small businesses to support the growing gap in their household’s capacity to meet basic needs (SCSS 10/03/2021).

Sarah* is a 45-year-old mother of five children living in Al Hodeidah city. She has a Facebook page where people contact her to cater for weddings, birthday parties, and other events.

“I was supposed to provide a wedding event with 500 pieces of pizza, 500 croissants, and a wedding cake. They confirmed the order, but because of the internet blackout, they didn’t get to give me their contact information. I didn’t know what to do, so I decided to go ahead and make the order thinking that the internet would come back at any time and that they would be very disappointed if they didn’t have the food for their wedding, but it didn’t, and I ended up losing a big amount of money.”

People reliant on the internet for communication in their work also felt the impact of the blackout (KII 09/06/2022). These are often people hired as consultants who have limited job security.

Salma* is 28 years old and lives in Hadramawt. A private company hired her to give online training on network marketing. The internet blackout prevented her from informing them that she would not be able to run the training, and they couldn’t reach her. They did not pay her for the training even though she had done the preparations. The situation also affected perceptions of her reliability.

“Although I explained what happened, I am not even sure if they are going to hire me again fearing the risk that this blackout could happen again.”

The internet disruption also affected receiving money from outside or within Yemen, causing challenges for people who relied on income they received from small exchange agents. Bigger currency exchange companies continued to operate because they had access to satellite internet, but the blackout affected smaller ones that could not afford or did not have the approval of authorities to access satellite connection (KII 09/06/2022). During this time, there was a fuel crisis that made it easier for people to access the closest exchange shops rather than going to the bigger shops that were unavailable in their neighbourhoods.
Perceptions and social impact

Communicating using mobile phones and the internet has become a critical way for people to cope with the conflict. It has become a way for them to access information on the location of air strikes and increased violence, keeping them updated on which locations to avoid. Connectivity also provides vital information on the safety and whereabouts of their family and friends in Yemen, and it has become a way to stay in contact with those living abroad for mental support (SCSS 15/03/2022).

Specifically, most people access important and reliable information, such as locations of explosions, through social media, which became impossible during the blackout. Without accurate information, they could not determine which locations to avoid, making decisions on their movements very difficult. The information vacuum, combined with the fear and uncertainty that is a part of living with active conflict, led rumours to circulate among people living in Sana’a city (SCSS 15/03/2022), increasing overall anxiety levels and further affecting people’s movements. These effects had associated impacts on livelihoods and access to food items and NFI’s. One of the rumours was that warring parties were preparing to attack busy places and highly populated areas and the internet cut-off was a way to prevent the media from alerting people. As a result, some people, mainly women and children, left their homes for fear of attacks, especially in areas close to political leaders, military camps, or public institutions. Many shops closed, and people living beside Al Tashrifat military camp in Sana’a city spent several nights outside their homes because of fear (KII 16/09/2022; SCSS 15/03/2022). Another rumour was that schools close to Houthi leaders’ houses in Aser street in Sana’a city were possible targets, leading to the closure of some schools. Families also became afraid to send their children to school. Some children did not attend school for two to three weeks (KII 16/06/2022).

The internet shutdown fed into perceptions in the DFA-controlled areas that the authorities cut the internet so that they could control its use (KII 09/06/2022).

Staying connected to family and friends inside and outside Yemen has been an important strategy for people to cope with the distress and fear resulting from living in war. Reports indicate that IDPs in Marib became unable to reach family members in other governorates, causing concern over their safety. Yemenis living abroad also experienced the anxiety of not knowing the situation of their family members (KII 09/06/2022).

Although the internet blackout only happened for four days and the impact was short-term, these stories highlight how internet access has become a crucial and important tool for many households across Yemen. The internet has become important for livelihoods, education, money transfers, and other similar transactions. It has become a reliable and trusted way for people to receive information, supporting their daily activities and informing them about safety and security. Connectivity also enables relationships to continue in the war, supporting mental health and wellbeing by connecting people with family in Yemen and in the diaspora (ACAPS 22/05/2022). The reoccurrence of such an incident, with the risk of a complete blackout for a longer period, will result in longer impacts and increase people’s vulnerability in relation to income loss and connection between people in times of distress and fear. The rumours that spread in DFA-controlled areas about the assumed deliberate nature of the blackout also highlight the general fear of the population and their lack of trust in authorities.

“It was only four days, but lots of events and thoughts came to my mind of what could have happened. It was very stressful. At least when you are away, you can call your family, comfort them, and make sure they are fine, but when you can’t do so, it becomes stressful. It is even better to physically be with them during that situation rather than being away and worrying.” –Saad* from Saudi Arabia

“One of my friends living in Egypt heard that all her family in Sana’a passed away when an air strike hit their home after two days. She was in shock and couldn’t confirm the information.” –Yasmeen*
Cultural and religious control in DFA-controlled areas

The continuous occurrence of policies, restrictions, and control in DFA controlled areas regarding gender segregation in schools and universities, control of university research, and imposition of dress code are raising concerns that this type of official declaration will become increasingly widespread. In effect, it will hamper women’s mobility and participation in the workplace and academia and narrow intellectual thinking, ultimately leading to a more conservative society with less civic liberties and rights and changing the social fabric. In this quarter, there were reports of intellectual control targeting bookstores and universities.

Forced bookstore closure: on 6 February, a DFA-run court in Sana’a ordered the closure of Abu Dharr al-Ghifari bookstore, which had operated in the capital for nearly 40 years. The bookstore was well known for its selection of philosophical, intellectual, and political titles. Its closure appears to be part of a broader campaign to restrict viewpoints that challenge DFA ideas and authority (SCSS 15/03/2022).

Gender segregation in universities: the closure of the bookstore is in line with efforts to exert control over what universities across DFA-controlled areas teach and how they manage students. Some departments, such as the literature department at Sana’a University, have made classes separate for female and male students. In the first semester of the 2021–2022 academic year (from November 2021 to February 2022), graduation ceremonies were separated by gender for the first time since the university’s establishment in 1970. Some departments prohibit students from working in mixed-gender groups and research studies. Observers reported that this segregation is only taking place in departments where either the department head has affiliations with the Houthis or there has been no resistance from the students, academic staff, or department head. For example, when these policies were introduced in the political science department of Sana’a University, the authorities were faced with resistance from teaching faculty and students and decided to not implement them (KII 09/06/2022). There’s a growing risk of the forced implementation of these policies and restrictions in the future.

Control of university subjects and research: since mid-2021, master’s degree students, particularly those in the Islamic studies, political science, and history departments in Sana’a University and other private universities in DFA-controlled areas, have no longer been allowed to select their own topic, receive wider perspectives and knowledge about a certain topic, or consult with academics outside their discipline. The DFA has also established a council in charge of approving research topics. Topics concerning women’s rights, political issues perceived as against Houthi ideology, or Islamic sects other than Zaydis are generally not accepted. There have been exceptions in the political science department because the department head is against sending the topics of the students to the council (KII 09/06/2022). There is a risk of some people being replaced, losing their income, or facing detention if they continue to push against related DFA policies.

Some departments, such as philosophy and history, in Sana’a University were at risk of closure at the beginning of 2022 under the pretext that they were receiving lower attendance or enrolment than other departments. There was a temporary closure, but students and academics protested, highlighting that there was no lack of demand for those fields of study, leading to the departments reopening (KII 09/06/2022).

Imposition of a dress code: aside from the aforementioned efforts at intellectual repression, there have also been reports of the exertion of other kinds of control over students. DFA
authorities issued a circular in March providing guidelines for an approved dress code for male and female students in multiple private and public universities in Sana’a city and Al Hodeidah, Dhamar, and Hajjah governorates. The circular prohibits various things, including specific haircuts, tattoos, accessories, tight clothes, open-toe sandals, nail polish, nose piercings, and make-up (ACLED 24/03/2022; KII 09/06/2022).

Observations indicate that Houthi authorities often initially pilot restrictions at a smaller scale (e.g. in villages, only one university, or even a single department) to test the response and level of resistance. One case last year was in Bani Hushaysh district in Sana’a governorate when they circulated a document banning women from using smartphones, wearing make-up, and working in humanitarian organisations, calling these activities an ‘ideological invasion’ (ACAPS 09/11/2021). Many of the restrictions are linked to violating freedom of expression and more often imposed on women than men.

Decreasing purchasing power and commodity shortages

Several factors continue to erode purchasing power in Yemen, including:

- the continuous depreciation of the Yemeni rial in IRG-controlled areas
- a lack of adjustments in public institution salary payments since October 2018, together with regularly delayed or missed payments, preventing Yemenis from keeping up with inflation (Al Mahrah Post 04/10/2018; FEWS NET 03/2022)
- increased taxes, global price increases, and shortages of commodities (such as fuel and cooking gas) resulting in local price increases in official and unofficial markets.

Increased tensions between IRG and DFA have led to severe fuel shortages in the DFA-controlled areas. Between January–March, fuel was only sporadically available at official stations for around YER 9,900 equivalent to 16.5 USD per 20L (72% higher than in 2021). In parallel markets, people paid four times higher than the official price (at YER 40,000 or USD 67 per 20L).

In the IRG-controlled areas, fuel was generally available at official stations, but because of rising global price increases, the Yemen Petroleum Company in Aden raised prices by 7.6%, reaching YER 20,400 per 20L equivalent to 17 USD (FEWS NET 09/04/2022).

The impact of commodity shortages, price increases, and reduced purchasing power extends across most, if not all, of society. It leads to changes in daily activities and less frequent social events, such as the celebration of religious or cultural events, and forces people to find ways to cope (see ACAPS’ coping strategies paper here).

Conversations with people in Yemen revealed some of the impacts on specific groups:

**Impacts of increased transportation costs on students:** between January–March, public transportation costs doubled, making it difficult for people to afford transportation (KII 09/06/2022). When there are fuel shortages, students are unable to go to universities or schools because of unaffordable transportation costs or the unavailability of transportation modes. The issue has also led households to become less likely to send their children to universities or schools. As a result, there has been an increase in the number of university dropouts, and the situation is likely to lead to lower enrolment numbers. Some students also limit their attendance from five to only one or two days a week, and others prioritise paying for transportation over breakfast. There have been many cases of students fainting or lacking concentration, decreasing their overall performance (KII 09/06/2022).
“Many of my friends dropped out in their second or third year of university as they couldn’t afford the expenses. They decided to work, save money, and then hopefully return to study when the situation is better.” —Suha* from Aden

“Many students skip breakfast because they want to save money for transportation. There have been many cases of students fainting during exams or in class because of a lack of nutrition.” —Ayesha* (teaching assistant in a university in Sana’a city)

Impacts of increased transportation costs on employees, including teachers and university academics: reports indicate that people face difficulties getting to work because of unavailable or expensive transportation. These difficulties cause stress and exhaust people, and the situation sometimes leads to wage deductions when an employee arrives late or is forced to skip work (KII 17/06/2022; KII 09/06/2022).

“One of the professors in the university started taking public transportation to work as he couldn’t afford fuel from the black market for his car. He would arrive very exhausted because of the long commute, and he said he couldn’t concentrate as he was concerned about his family situation.” —Ayesha* (teaching assistant in a university in Sana’a city)

“There have been times that I did not go to work because I did not have fuel in my car, and I got salary deductions as a result. I would decide to skip work because the salary deduction was less than the cost of the fuel.” —Hana, a 40-year-old from Sana’a working in the public sector, with a monthly salary of YER 60,000 (or USD 100 according to the exchange rate in DFA-controlled areas)

People who owned vehicles used to be able to work as part-time taxi drivers to supplement their income, but this setup has become less viable with increased fuel prices. People who had been sharing the cost of a water tanker or gas cylinder with neighbours are finding the situation even more challenging (KII 09/06/2022).

Impacts of the increased cost of cooking gas

• Bakery shop prices have increased, and the quality of their products has decreased.
• Bakery shops used to give leftover bread to the poor, but price increases and gas shortages have led them to mix unsold bread with fresh ones and sell them to people. As a result, people who used to depend on receiving free bread have lost that option.
• In rural areas, a bundle of wood consisting of four small pieces costs around YER 500 equivalent to 0.83 USD. One bundle is enough for a household to make bread and two or three meals. Given the situation, households have started sharing wood and cooking their meals in one oven to make the most of the fire and save on the cost of wood (KII 09/06/2022).

Impacts on social structures

Anecdotal observations suggest that the war has led to changes in the social structure. Some previously lower-income people with limited influence have emerged as better off given their involvement with parties to the conflict. On the other hand, others previously considered middle class have ended up struggling because of limited income, continuous shocks, and a lack of contact with influential groups or personalities (KII 16/06/2022).

These changes and the suspicion around why some people are managing more successfully than others have led to a lack of trust, disconnection, and a lack of social cohesion. The situation has resulted in less social capital, which is one of the main coping strategies for survival in Yemeni communities (ACAPS 22/05/2022).
ON THE WATCH LIST

Yemeni migrants returning from Saudi Arabia: the number of returnees continues to rise, putting pressure on households depending on remittances (FEWS NET 03/2022; IOM accessed 19/06/2022).

Tensions between landlords and tenants or IDPs leading to evictions: reports of tensions leading to evictions continued in January–March (UNHCR 10/02/2022). Prolonged conflict and economic decline increase the cost of rent and decrease people’s ability to meet essential needs. IDPs live in rented houses, with family, or in IDP settlement camps, some of which are privately owned. Years of conflict are contributing to continuous tensions between IDPs, who increasingly lack the means to pay rent, and the landlords who own the private IDP settlements or rented houses they are staying at. Read more on the highlight on tensions in the last quarterly report.

A lack of concern about COVID-19 and the vaccine hesitancy of people despite a fourth wave of cases: a fourth wave of COVID-19 cases began in January and ended in February. As at the end of June, only 859,241 vaccine doses had been administered to a population of over 30 million (WHO accessed 19/06/2022). As at June 2022, no COVID-19 safety restrictions were being implemented inside the country. Anecdotal observations indicate that people and the health community are less wary of catching the virus. Vaccines are available and accessible in IRG-controlled areas, but there are rumours among the community that the vaccines have expired and are substandard. Usually, people travelling outside the country are the ones being inoculated. In DFA-controlled areas, vaccines are not available. Anecdotal observations indicate that DFA authorities are also prohibiting the use of other vaccines, such as the polio vaccine (KII 19/06/2022; The National 08/11/2020).

Women’s civic space continues to shrink in DFA-controlled areas: female Yemeni aid workers continue to be required to travel with a Mahram (male guardian) in Al Hodeidah, Hajjah, and Sadah. In recent years, this requirement has been framed as part of religious law and has been increasingly emphasized. Humanitarian organisations have been confronted with the issue since 2017 by being stopped at checkpoints or denied permission to travel within governorates, but events of recent months show that it is being enforced much more frequently in IRG-controlled areas (ACAPS 09/11/2021).

Civil unrest decreased, but possibly only temporarily as most reasons remain unresolved. Key factors behind the unrest, including the lack of public services such as water and electricity, increased prices, and the depreciation of the rial, remain unresolved (ACLED accessed 15/06/2022).

Social capital

The project benefited from support by the IMEDA programme, which is supported by UK aid from the UK government.
### ISSUES AND THEMES EMERGING FROM QUALITATIVE DATA MONITORING

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### Vulnerable Groups or Categories Particularly Affected, January–March 2022

- IDPs
- 也门南部和其家属
- 农民生产者（农业和渔业）
- 诺尔人生活在南方
- 移民居住在也门
- 监狱和被羁押的人民
- 儿童（女孩和男孩）
- 孕妇和哺乳期妇女
- 女性户主家庭
- 有限的经济活动
- 非经济活动
- 信息差距
- 不适用或无具体影响

这张表格基于定性监测。关键信息：

- 非常负面
- 负面
- 有点负面
- 无影响
- 有点正面
- 正面
- 非常正面
- 信息差距
- 不适用或无具体影响
Increased conflict
- The internet cut-off affected Yemeni migrants and their families by preventing them from sending or receiving remittances. They were also unable to connect with their families. Despite the shutdown only lasting four days, the impact was still somewhat negative.
- The four days disruption in telecommunication prevented northerners living in the south from sending or receiving internal remittances.
- The air strike that hit the detention centre in Sadah governorate in January affected detainees.

Reduced purchasing power
- Yemeni migrants and their families have to deal with the reduced purchasing power of remittances that might no longer be enough given the increased prices of transportation, electricity, water, and cooking gas.
- Fuel shortages affect primary producers.

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- Fuel shortages affect primary producers.

COVID-19 and vaccination
- The COVID-19 situation remains unclear in DFA-controlled areas, keeping the impact of the pandemic somewhat negative.
- Similarly, the situation concerning the COVID-19 vaccine rollout in DFA-controlled areas remains unclear.

Fuel
The impact on northerners living in the south has changed to negative, as increased fuel prices and shortages will restrict them from moving back to their governorates of origin. The issue will affect all people across Yemen, but northerners living in the south are more vulnerable to social stigmas.

Religious control
There is no specific information regarding the impact of religious control, and the only available information is on the repression of university students and the closure of bookstores.

Seasonal rain
No impacts are expected as the seasonal rain begins in April and ends in October.