ACAPS’ *Global Risk Analysis* outlines a number of key contexts where a particular situation may notably deteriorate within the next six months, causing (a spike in) humanitarian needs.

The risks included in this report were based on certain events or factors (triggers) that may emerge over the coming six months. Such triggers would point towards a hazard materialising, which would deteriorate the humanitarian situation in the context of the monitored crises.

ACAPS analysts conduct daily monitoring and independent analysis of more than 150 countries, including risk analysis and risk analysis updates. ACAPS closely monitors previously identified risks to see if they materialise.

You can find updates on the risks identified in the October 2021 Global Risk Analysis at the end of this report.

For the complete list of risks ACAPS’ analysts identified during their daily monitoring and analysis, you can consult the ACAPS Risk List.

### WHAT IS A RISK?

The ACAPS *risk methodology* defines risk as the probability of a hazard or multiple hazards materialising, combined with the estimated impact of such hazards. The associated risk level (low, medium, or high) rises with the hazard’s probability of occurring and the severity of its expected impact.

**Impact** is the predicted overall humanitarian consequence of a hazard materialising. It can be an increase in the number of people needing assistance, in the severity of their needs, or both. The impact is based on exposure to the hazard, the intensity of the hazard, and the population’s vulnerability and coping capacity. ACAPS classifies impact on a five-point scale: very low, low, moderate, significant, or major.

**Probability** is the chance of a hazard materialising. ACAPS assesses probability on a five-point scale: very low, low, medium, high, or very high.

In this report, some of the risks represent ‘newly emerging crises’, and others indicate a potential ‘rapid and marked deterioration’ in an existing crisis. A steadily deteriorating humanitarian situation that continues at the same rate is considered a trend instead of a risk. This report does not include trends.
KEY PRINCIPLES OF RISK ANALYSIS

Risk analysis requires a solid understanding of the context and an investigation of the interaction of variables that could cause or resist change.

Risk analysis is not an exact science. An event identified as a hazard might not evolve or materialise as anticipated, or it might not have the projected impact. Events or factors (triggers) that were expected to drive a shift or change in the situation may not occur, or new factors may arise that prevent the projected change or shift from happening.

The probability of a risk does not need to be high to warrant concern. A hazardous event with a low or medium probability of occurring should be a cause of concern for humanitarians if the expected impact is medium, high, or very high.

LIMITATIONS

• Considering the diversity and complexity of the crises in this report, we cannot cover each in detail. Instead, we highlight the broad evolution of each crisis to flag potential deteriorations and inform the framing of operations, strategies, and policies.

• The focus on risk analysis means we have not considered multiple possible factors that could lead to a given context improving.

• We do not publish our full risk-monitoring process; we publish an edited version that we deem relevant for the humanitarian sector.

• In this report, we have not considered unforeseen circumstances that may change the course of events (e.g. sudden-onset disasters including natural hazards, such as earthquakes or volcanic eruptions).

• Information gaps limit the analysis.

• While we seek to ensure that all information is current at the time of publication, the fluidity of the situation in some countries means significant changes can occur quickly.

OTHER FORWARD-LOOKING ANALYSIS FROM ACAPS

ACAPS often produces country-specific risk reports, scenarios, and anticipatory notes in our forward-looking analytical work. Some recent publications that complement this global analysis are:

• Sudan: Scenarios
• Displacement and Access in Afghanistan: Scenarios
• Colombia: Risk Update
• Eastern Ukraine: Current Humanitarian Situation and Outlook

Read more about our risk methodology
MALI: The withdrawal of Barkhane forces and consequent increase in clashes and territorial expansion between armed groups result in displacement, protection concerns, and the deterioration of humanitarian access.

YEMEN: The militarisation of Al Hodeidah and Saleef ports leads to targeted attacks on the ports, forcing their closure and causing food and fuel import disruptions.

ETHIOPIA: Resource-based clashes because of continuing drought increase insecurity and conflict displacement in Oromia and Somali regions.

COLOMBIA/VENEZUELA: The intensification of armed conflict on both sides of the Colombian-Venezuelan border and in Venezuela increases the number of internally displaced Colombians and Venezuelans in Colombia needing assistance.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC): The resurgence of the 23 March Movement (M23) and intensification of conflict lead to displacement and further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Nord Kivu.

PAKISTAN: The strengthened presence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the newly merged tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) increases humanitarian needs, protection concerns, and access constraints in the area.

MALI: Prolonged economic sanctions lead to loss of livelihoods and increased food insecurity.

YEMEN: The militarisation of Al Hodeidah and Saleef ports leads to targeted attacks on the ports, forcing their closure and causing food and fuel import disruptions.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK): The detection of COVID-19 cases causes the Government to (re)enact strict border control measures that worsen food insecurity, lowering food consumption and nutritional diversity levels among the most vulnerable.

SUDAN: A reduction in subsidies causing severe electricity and fuel shortages leads to crop failures, livelihood loss, and worsening food insecurity.

THE PHILIPPINES: Political violence and attacks by armed groups in Mindanao around the May 2022 presidential elections result in displacement and protection issues.

KENYA: Electoral violence and increased intercommunal conflict throughout Kenya result in displacement, livelihood disruptions, and protection concerns.

TONGA: Continued COVID-19-related movement restrictions and extreme weather conditions during the cyclone season delay the recovery process from the tsunami and result in increased humanitarian needs.

The border lines and names of the countries or territories indicated on this map comply with official international practices (UN) and do not in any way reflect an ACAPS political stance.

*The risks identified on this map are expected to materialise within the next six months.
Prolonged economic sanctions lead to loss of livelihoods and increased food insecurity

RATIONALE

On 9 January 2022, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) applied additional economic sanctions against Mali, including the closure of land and air borders with member countries, the suspension of all commercial and financial transactions between ECOWAS countries and Mali, and a freeze on Malian assets in the Central Banks of ECOWAS (ECOWAS 09/01/2022). The sanctions came after Mali’s National Transitional Council presented a transition plan to civilian governance that pushed presidential and parliamentary elections, previously agreed for February 2022, to the end of 2025 (Al Jazeera 21/02/2022; TV5Monde 30/12/2021).

ECOWAS applied similar sanctions following the August 2020 coup. It lifted these sanctions two months later after the military junta agreed to appoint an interim civilian president and prime minister (ECOWAS 20/08/2020 and 05/10/2020).

On the other hand, the recent sanctions could last longer as the transition authorities (who have made two coups in nine months) do not seem to accept ECOWAS’ demands of a civilian transition and elections before the five-year period (RFI 24/01/2022). They have described demonstrations against the sanctions in several Malian cities as manifested popular support for their presence at the head of the country (RFI 14/01/2022).

Mali is landlocked and dependent on neighbouring countries, such as Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, for most of its trade. Border closures will primarily affect the cotton sector, one of Mali’s main export products (The Guardian 28/01/2022; African Business 14/01/2022; Jeune Afrique 31/01/2022). ECOWAS uses the risk of a lack of cash linked to decreased customs revenue because of the sanctions, coupled with the inability to borrow money from regional financial institutions, as one of the main means to compel Mali’s National Transitional Council to shorten its timeline towards democratic elections.
IMPACT

Prior to the sanctions, the number of people in acute food insecurity to increase from 1.1 million in October–December 2021 to 1.8 million in June–August 2022, mainly because of insecurity and climatic shocks (FONGIM and Food Security Cluster 09/01/2022; CILSS 08/12/2021). Sanctions will decrease food access for IDPs, host communities, people living in areas with armed group activity, and those affected by climate shocks and likely add around 300,000 people in need of emergency food assistance. Supply chain disruptions in the coming months will also likely worsen the price increase of essential food items (such as oil, rice, sugar, and milk) already reported in June 2021 (WFP 09/2021). There are also speculations about increased sugar prices despite the state capping prices (DW 27/01/2022). The shortage of manufactured goods will likely put people working in the informal economy with unstable incomes (small traders, street vendors, and temporary workers) out of work (Le Monde 25/09/2020). Livelihood loss is also expected in the livestock sector, as most products are sold in the neighbouring countries that have closed their borders. The livestock sector supports around 30% of the population (RFI 01/09/2020).

1. This estimate considered how the number of people in need of emergency food assistance almost tripled between 2020–2021. Since insecurity and climatic hazards are the main drivers of the food security crisis, we did not consider the impact of the sanctions on food insecurity to be as high as that of other drivers.
A reduction in subsidies causing severe electricity and fuel shortages leads to crop failures, livelihood loss, and worsening food insecurity

RATIONALE

Sudan’s economic crisis has worsened following the October 2021 military coup, foreign assistance cuts, and rising prices and taxes (Reuters 02/03/2022). Since mid-2021, the country has been following a three-year economic reform programme with the International Monetary Fund, which requires the Government to reduce subsidies on retail electricity and fuel prices (IMF accessed 15/02/2022). In January 2022, the Government reduced subsidies on electricity, resulting in a 460% increase in electricity costs for the agriculture sector (Reuters 24/01/2022). In February, fuel prices increased by nearly 13%, aside from a 400% spike in October 2020 (Reuters 05/02/2022; Dabanga 28/10/2020). Further increases in the retail costs of electricity and fuel are likely throughout 2022, especially as global fuel prices rise as a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine (Al Jazeera 05/01/2021).

Higher electricity prices have already affected farmers in northern Sudan, who depend on electricity to irrigate crops. Farmers protested and blocked the Shiryan El-Shamal highway (linking Egypt to Sudan) between 9 January and 16 February and demanded a freeze on electricity prices. The blockade ended when they reached an agreement with the Government (Dabanga 10/01/2022, 11/01/2022, and 17/02/2022; Reuters 11/02/2022). The Government has exempted the agriculture sector from the increase until 30 April. If the Government cancels or does not renew the exemption, similar blockade events will likely resume in May (Dabanga 17/02/2022). As announced in past protests, farmers could likely pressure the Government to reach a new agreement by disrupting the electrical supply line from Merowe dam to northern Sudan (Dabanga 14/01/2022). The dam contributes to Sudan’s electricity production (Al Jazeera 05/01/2021). Any disruption will likely result in shortages in electricity across Sudan, where power cuts already occur every three to four days.

IMPACT

A possible spike in electricity prices in May will likely affect agricultural activities in northern Sudan that depend on irrigation by electricity-run machines (Dabanga 11/01/2022). On the other hand, fuel shortages will likely affect and reduce agricultural output in states highly dependent on fuel for agriculture, land preparation, and planting, such as Al Gezira (Ayin Network 05/02/2022; Dabanga 15/03/2020). Below-average harvest, combined with high inflation, could lead to a spike in food prices. More frequent power cuts and increased electricity and fuel prices would affect small businesses like plumbing and carpentry, which do not usually own generators, possibly resulting in closure. There have already been reports from small-business owners of income losses of up to 50% as a result of power cuts (Al Jazeera 29/08/2021). The impact on livelihoods will likely push people to adopt negative coping strategies, such as reducing meals (OCHA 12/03/2020). Economic decline and inflation are among the key drivers of acute food insecurity for an estimated six million people between October 2021 and February 2022. An electricity and fuel crisis would possibly result in 3.5 million 2 people facing severe food insecurity. Especially during the 2022 lean season (May–October), the number of people facing severe acute food insecurity could go back to June–September 2021 levels (IPC 24/05/2021).

2. Estimates are based on an IPC analysis, which expects improvement in the second projection period (October 2021 to February 2022), where only 13% will experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity levels or worse. In contrast, this report suggests that the situation will likely stay the same as in the first projection (June–September 2021), where 21% (8% more than IPC’s second projection) were food insecure and needed food assistance.
Timeline of key economic and political events

**JANUARY 2018**
Wheat subsidies cuts
(Reuters 05/01/2018)

**APRIL 2019**
Removal of President El-Bashir
(World Bank 29/09/2021)

**SEPTEMBER 2019**
The formation of a Transitional Government
(World Bank 29/09/2021)

**JULY 2020**
Sudan was reclassified to low-income country status
(World Bank 29/03/2021)
The government announces it will devalue the currency
(AI Jazeera 25/10/2021)

**JULY 2021**
Inflation rate rises to 422%
(Dabanga 17/08/2021)

**JANUARY 2022**
Electricity prices reaching 460% increase
(Reuters 24/01/2022)

**JULY 2021**
Inflation rate rises to 422%
(Dabanga 17/08/2021)

**OCTOBER 2021**
Military coup
(AI Jazeera 25/10/2021)

**FEBRUARY 2022**
Prices of petrol and diesel rise by 13%
(Reuters 05/02/2022)

**OCTOBER 2020**
400% fuel price hike
(Dabanga 28/10/2020)

**MARCH 2020**
Start of COVID-19 pandemic resulted in increased prices of basic foods, rising unemployment, and falling exports
(World Bank 29/09/2021)

**SEPTEMBER 2019**
The formation of a Transitional Government
(World Bank 29/09/2021)

**JULY 2021**
Inflation rate rises to 422%
(Dabanga 17/08/2021)

**JANUARY 2022**
Electricity prices reaching 460% increase
(Reuters 24/01/2022)

**JULY 2021**
Inflation rate rises to 422%
(Dabanga 17/08/2021)

**OCTOBER 2021**
Military coup
(AI Jazeera 25/10/2021)

**FEBRUARY 2022**
Prices of petrol and diesel rise by 13%
(Reuters 05/02/2022)
The intensification of armed conflict on both sides of the Colombian-Venezuelan border and in Venezuela increases the number of internally displaced Colombians and Venezuelans in Colombia needing assistance.

**RATIONALE**

The demobilisation and subsequent withdrawal from the Colombian-Venezuelan border of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) following the 2016 peace agreement strengthened other armed groups, mainly the National Liberation Army (ELN) and FARC-EP dissidents, in Colombia and Venezuela border departments (InSight Crime 19/10/2021 and 11/01/2022; Centro de Pensamiento UNCaribe 11/2020; FIP 07/07/2021; Fundación CORE 26/07/2021).

Strict COVID-19 prevention measures imposed in 2020, including mobility restrictions, reduced drug-trafficking income for armed groups in Colombia (UN 07/05/2020; UNODC 26/06/2020). The reduction pushed the groups to revert to other illegal markets, including human smuggling and trafficking, increasing their armed activity along the border (UNODC 2021). The armed conflict, previously essentially limited to Colombia, started acquiring a cross-border characteristic in 2020, with increasingly regular clashes on both Colombia and Venezuela sides. Disputes between armed groups on the Venezuelan side of the border also began in January 2022. The ELN and FARC-EP dissidents had a non-aggression and territorial division agreement. The alleged assassination of some leaders of the FARC-EP dissidents by ELN forces in December 2021 broke this agreement and marked the beginning of the fight for territorial control and expansion (InSight Crime 18/01/2022; FIP 24/01/2022).

Since the beginning of 2022, the Venezuelan army has also been responding to attempts by FARC-EP dissidents to expand their territory along the border (HRW 26/04/2021). In the past, the ELN and the FARC-EP dissident group known as La Segunda Marquetalia could continue their activity without the intervention of the Venezuelan army (InSight Crime 01/03/2019; Centro de Pensamiento UNCaribe 11/2020; InSight Crime 27/01/2022). The emergence of new dissident groups, such as the 10th Front, has prompted the Venezuelan army to respond militarily (France 24/04/2021).

The new conflict dynamics show a marked deterioration of the conflict situation at the Colombia-Venezuela border and a risk of further conflict expansion and intensification in some areas in Venezuela. The lack of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela, which got severed in 2019, aggravates this situation (BBC 23/02/2019; ICG 28/04/2021; Infobae 03/01/2022).

**IMPACT**

These conflict dynamics are expected to result in insecurity and violence against civilians on both sides of the border. In January, clashes in the area between Apure (Venezuela) and Arauca (Colombia) killed at least 61 people and displaced over 1,800 Colombians and 370 Venezuelans (OCHA 31/01/2022).

In other border departments, such as Vichada, conflict displaced more than 1,200 Venezuelan citizens to the other side of the border between 10 January and 10 March (OCHA 10/03/2022). Landmine accidents have killed at least eight people in Venezuela in 2022 (El País 12/02/2022).
The intensification of violence in Venezuela will likely increase cross-border displacement, as the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela makes it difficult for IDPs to get assistance. The planting of landmines on Venezuelan territory will likely increase civilian casualties. Increased armed group presence may also lead to the confinement of communities. The targeted assassination of civilians can be expected to increase, as armed groups assume that those who do not support them are allied with their enemies (El País 21/01/2022; ACAPS 31/01/2022).

Previous cross-border displacements saw a lack of food, shelter, and sanitation facilities, and education and health services were nearly impossible to obtain (OCHA 31/01/2022 and 10/03/2022). The cross-border nature of the conflict means there is little clarity regarding who should respond to these displacements, and there are serious limitations to humanitarian response in Venezuela (ACH 12/01/2022; OCHA 28/01/2022).

Colombia: Municipalities (COL) and provinces (VEN) with armed groups’ presence between 2020 and 2022

Sources: Centro de Pensamiento UNCaribe, Universidad del Norte (2020a, 2020b); Early Warning System of the Ombudsman’s Office in Colombia (accessed 28/02/2022); FIP (2018); Insight Crime (2018); Fundaredes (2021); Fundaredes (2022).
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO - DRC (1/2)

The resurgence of the 23 March Movement (M23) and intensification of conflict lead to displacement and further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Nord Kivu

RATIONALE

Since November 2021, more than a dozen attacks targeting the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) in Nord Kivu province have been attributed to the military arm of M23 (RFI 27/01/2022; Protection Cluster 11/01/2022; France 24 09/11/2021). The presence of M23 mainly in the territory of Rutshuru is a source of concern. Between 2012–2013, the group’s armed activity and clashes with the FARDC displaced around 800,000 people (IDMC 14/11/2013; BBC 12/12/2013; TV5 Monde 15/02/2022).

The M23 was founded in 2012 around the defence of Tutsi communities in DRC and was defeated in 2013. The sudden resumption of its attacks seems inseparable from its insistence to enforce the terms of the Nairobi agreement set in May 2013, wherein in exchange for the M23 disengaging from fighting, the Congolese Government committed to disarming, demobilising, and socially reintegrating ex-combatants (RFI 12/12/2013; DW 12/12/2013; Reuters 12/12/2013). The M23 is still calling for the implementation of these commitments, particularly the repatriation of ex-combatants in Rwanda and Uganda.

The M23’s attacks on the FARDC will likely continue over the coming months as they seek to pressure the Government before the 2023 presidential elections. Despite its nine years of inactivity, except for a few incidents in 2017 and 2020, the M23 seems sufficiently armed to pose a threat to the FARDC, as indicated by its latest attacks in Rutshuru territory (AA 24/12/2021 and AA 27/01/2022; Actualite.cd 08/11/2021). The ‘state of siege’ decided by the Government in May 2021 and the Government’s refusal to integrate ex-combatants into the army could intensify clashes. The resumption of M23 activities in an area where the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Rwanda’s Hutu armed group in North Kivu) is already active also raises fears of clashes between the two armed groups, potentially leading to intercommunal violence (Protection Cluster 11/01/2022).

IMPACT

In Nord Kivu province, where dozens of armed groups are active, the increase of M23 attacks and FARDC operations would considerably worsen the humanitarian situation, especially in Rutshuru territory, where thousands of IDPs and returnees live (OCHA 03/11/2021; KST 23/02/2021). Around 1.9 million IDPs are already reported in North Kivu (UNHCR 28/02/2022). The resumption of the M23’s attacks has already displaced an average of 5,000 people. The continuation of attacks could newly displace around 50,000 people over the next six months. If attacks escalate, this figure could double to around 100,000 additional IDPs. Most of the newly displaced people would find refuge in more secure localities in Rutshuru, adding pressure to the limited resources of host communities.

Others will likely cross the Ugandan border (7SUR7.cd 08/11/2021; Actualite.cd 08/11/2021; Reuters 08/11/2021). Although displacement can be temporary, its intermittency and the deterioration of the security context would increase shelter, water, sanitation, and
healthcare needs (AP 29/01/2022). If the M23 starts fighting with other armed groups along ethnic lines, conflict would trigger more violence and displacement. If the M23 reprised their practices as documented in 2012–2013, which included targeted killings, sexual violence, and the recruitment of child soldiers, an increase in protection incidents could be expected (Protection Cluster 11/01/2022; Stabilisation Unit 02/2018; HRW 11/09/2012). During the harvest period in Nord Kivu, intermittent attacks would probably drive many people away from their fields. Such a situation would affect livelihoods and food security in the province, where people already experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity (FEWS NET 31/01/2022).

M23 attacks in Rutshuru territory since November 2021

Source: ACLED accessed 04/03/2022
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)

The detection of COVID-19 cases causes the Government to (re)enact strict border control measures that worsen food insecurity, lowering food consumption and nutritional diversity levels among the most vulnerable.

RATIONALE

Low agricultural productivity, natural disasters and weather shocks, unsustainable economic and agricultural practices, and international sanctions against the DPRK's nuclear programme drive a complex crisis in the country, in which chronic food insecurity is a prominent component (Lee et al. 01/03/2019; UNICEF 21/11/2019; FAO and WFP 03/05/2019; Centre for Humanitarian Leadership 03/04/2020; ORF 02/07/2021; 38 North 22/08/2019). In 2019, an estimated 40% of the total population was food insecure, with people largely depending on food distributions managed entirely by the Government to obtain food (FAO and WFP 03/05/2019; VOA 20/10/2021; OCHA 24/04/2020). In January 2020, the Government introduced strict containment measures against COVID-19, including closing the land border with China (OCHA 24/04/2020; VOA 22/10/2021). Related restrictions between 2019–2021 have caused China's trade with the DPRK to drop by 90% and constrained the import of aid, both of which the DPRK relies on to cover chronic food shortages (Nikkei Asia 18/01/2022; Al Jazeera 01/07/2021; VOA 22/10/2021). In 2021, the 2021–2031 International Food Security Assessment model by the US Department of Agriculture estimated 63% of the population to be food insecure (USDA 28/07/2021). In January 2022, the DPRK resumed limited trade and aid imports following delays related to prolonged quarantine measures, but some urgently needed aid supplies, including food, remained blocked (Reuters 16/01/2022; The Korea Herald 11/02/2022). There are significant information gaps around the severity of needs in the DPRK, but increased food insecurity and malnutrition caseloads and mortality rates are likely in 2022 (UNICEF 19/02/2021; UN 08/10/2021). The DPRK has not accepted any COVID-19 vaccinations, relying instead on severe preventative measures to contain the disease (WHO accessed 18/03/2022; France 24 23/02/2022). Although the DPRK reports no COVID-19 cases to date, an outbreak remains a possibility, especially with the necessary slow reopening of borders for imports. In the event of a COVID-19 outbreak, the DPRK will likely reimpose strict border closures, internal movement restrictions, and quarantine measures (Brookings 22/11/2021; WHO accessed 18/03/2022).

IMPACT

Tightened border controls would reduce overall imports, including food and aid, and increase the prices of basic goods, compound-
ETHIOPIA [1/2]

Resource-based clashes because of continuing drought increase insecurity and conflict displacement in Oromia and Somali regions

RATIONALE

Drought is affecting at least 2.8 million people in Oromia and 2.3 million people in Somali (UNICEF 01/02/2022; OCHA 07/03/2022). More than 1.5 million livestock died between November 2021 and March 2022 in both regions (OCHA 07/03/2022; Addis Standard 04/03/2022). Families continue to migrate with their livestock in search of water, food, and pasture (OCHA 08/03/2022). Food insecurity will likely increase during the current lean season between February–April. If the March–May rainy season is below average as forecasted (making it the fourth below-average rainy season in a row), the situation would further deteriorate (WFP 20/01/2022; FEWS NET 02/11/2021; OCHA 07/02/2022). Crop failures, harvest loss, and massive livestock deaths are likely, leading to a depletion of food and livelihood sources.

Food and water shortages and the exhaustion of coping strategies, such as using savings, selling livestock, and livestock migration for grazing, will likely result in increased competition over limited land and water resources and sporadic clashes. Within neighbouring Somalia and Kenya, which are also affected by the same drought, conflict over resources has recently increased between pastoralists and resulted in fatalities and displacement (OCHA 09/02/2022; FSWNG 10/02/2022). The scarcity of grazing, food, and water resources has also been intensifying clashes between pastoralist communities in southern Ethiopia since the 1990s (Beyene 04/2017; LSE 03/2020). While grazing areas are usually shared with neighbours from other kebeles (the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia) and sometimes neighbouring countries without conflict, there have been conflicts among Oromia and Somali pastoralists (ILIRI 12/2017). A prolonged drought between 2016–2017 aggravated pre-existing border disputes, put pressure on pasture and resources, and contributed to conflict and displacement (TNH 08/11/2017; OCHA 20/06/2018). In Oromia and Somali, continued periods of drought leading to the depletion of resources, combined with pre-existing intercommunal tensions, will likely aggravate insecurity.

IMPACT

A lack of water and pasture will drive people to cross the regional border in search of land and water, increasing the risk of cattle-looting and clashes because of pre-existing ethnic tensions. There will also be increased competition over resources. In 2016–2018, conflict between Oromo and Somali displaced around one million people (OCHA 20/06/2018). Although drought did not trigger the conflict, new resource-based clashes between the two groups are at risk of reaching similar levels of conflict. Such an escalation could result in a similar level of displacement. If fighting erupts over the next six months, there would possibly be 500,000–600,000 additional IDPs within the two regions. Clashes may remain localised or possibly spread to neighbouring woredas (the third-level administrative division in Ethiopia) because of ethnic ties (BBC 18/09/2017; LSE 03/2020).
Women caught in clashes may be exposed to sexual assaults and require protection services (OCHA 17/02/2022; The World 15/12/2017). Emergency shelter needs, already increased because of drought-driven displacement, would further increase if resource-related clashes newly displace people. Insecurity and displacement, combined with the deterioration caused by drought, will likely result in the disruption of the livelihood activities of pastoralists and farmers, followed by crop failures and livestock deaths, all of which would reduce households’ purchasing power.

**Number of conflict events and fatalities in the 2000s (drought periods highlighted)**

Source: ERCS 11/2003; Gro Intelligence 27/11/2015; Reliefweb 2021; ACLED data accessed 10/03/2022

**Disclaimer:** This visual overlays available country-level data on conflict events (and related fatalities) and drought periods in Ethiopia since 2000. The increase in fatalities is related not only to the number of conflict events but also to the ‘type’ of conflict event, some leading to more fatalities than others. The graph shows that the peak in fatalities and increase in conflict events and drought only overlap at some points. Peaks or decrease in conflict events may of course be explained by a number of cumulative factors, not drought only. Resources-based clashes may also happen as a consequence after a drought period, not exactly during it. A deeper analysis of the data may be needed to show whether the recorded conflict events were directly related to drought. Data sources on drought periods are the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS), Reliefweb, and the Gro Intelligence platform. Conflict events and fatalities were taken from the ACLED dataset.
The withdrawal of Barkhane forces and consequent increase in clashes and territorial expansion between armed groups result in displacement, protection concerns, and the deterioration of humanitarian access.

**RATIONALE**

On 17 February, the French president announced the withdrawal from Mali of the Barkhane forces and the European Takuba Task Force. Their full withdrawal is set to happen over the next four to six months (DW 17/02/2022; France 24 17/02/2022). Following a previous announcement of Barkhane’s downsizing in Mali in June 2021, hostile reactions from the population and transition authorities contributed to questioning the French presence. The five-year transition period proposed by the transition authorities in February and the involvement of the Russian private paramilitary Wagner Group have aggravated tensions between France and Mali. France has gone from a reorganisation of its troops to a total withdrawal from Mali (France 24 10/06/2021; Al Jazeera 17/02/2022; VOA 18/02/2022). The vacuum created by this withdrawal after nine years of presence will likely cause renewed violence and expansion by different armed groups, particularly in the centre of the country. The Malian army, which is undertrained and underequipped, often relied on Barkhane forces to fight armed groups, particularly during airstrikes (RFI 15/06/2021; Le Soleil 16/02/2022). With their withdrawal, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), the dominant rival armed groups in the centre of the country, would possibly be tempted to expand their areas of control.

The Malian authorities have opted to reach out to the Wagner Group, which many perceive as the only one able to defeat the armed groups. The change of military partners while the country is under ECOWAS economic sanctions still presages a reduced capacity of the transition authorities to limit the advance of armed groups (France Info 18/02/2022). The authorities could favour negotiation with the GSIM, long refused by France, in the coming months, but recent experiences have shown that ceasefire agreements are often broken after a few months (RFI 14/07/2021).

**IMPACT**

The attempts of armed groups to expand their areas of control will likely intensify clashes not only between the GSIM and ISGS but also between the two and the Malian Armed Forces supported by the Wagner Group. The strong presence of armed groups and self-defence militias would increase clashes and affect central regions of the country. The number of displaced people, which is on the rise particularly in Mopti and Ségou regions, could increase (UNHCR accessed 19/03/2022).

Alliances between the Wagner Group and pro-government militias could escalate intercommunal violence if certain communities are targeted for their alleged support of armed groups. The adoption by the Wagner Group of practices similar to those in other African countries will likely increase incidents of looting, extrajudicial executions, and sexual violence. Abuses against civilians by the Wagner Group could deepen resentment on the part of some communities, from which armed groups recruit the most, and increase the popularity of non-state armed groups (R1 09/2021; The Sentry 06/14/2021). Humanitarian access, which is already limited, could deteriorate further in this context, particularly with greater recourse by armed groups to explosive devices. The use of improvised explosive devices, which has intensified in recent months as part of the strategy of armed groups to reduce the movement of security forces, could increase further if the Malian Armed Forces and Wagner Group were to be more offensive (TV5 Monde 14/01/2021).
Political violence and attacks by armed groups in Mindanao around the May 2022 presidential elections result in displacement and protection issues

**RATIONALE**

Electoral violence across the Philippines is a threat during the three-month-long election season that started on 8 February 2022. Filipino voters will choose their next president, vice president, and 18,000 other political positions on 9 May (The Diplomat 07/02/2022). Electoral violence by privately hired armed groups includes voter intimidation, attacks on polls, and the assassination of political rivals (Benar News 02/02/2022; New Mandala 08/07/2021; PNA 09/02/2022; Newswise 30/09/2021; University of Portsmouth 08/10/2021; Rappler 14/02/2022; Inquirer 01/12/2021).

The leading candidate for the presidential elections is Ferdinand Marcos Jr., son of Ferdinand Marcos Sr., who held the presidency from 1965 until a people’s revolution ousted him in 1986 (Al Jazeera 14/12/2021; VOA 06/01/2022). In southern Mindanao, Marcos Sr.’s policies contributed to land grabs, human rights abuses, and conflict (Inquirer 28/12/2016; Asia Society accessed 08/03/2022). Marcos Jr.’s controversial candidacy will likely contribute to increased political tensions and violence in Mindanao.

Armed group attacks and clashes with the military still affect Mindanao. Armed groups include the New People’s Army, Maute, Abu Sayyaf, and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (The Diplomat 02/03/2022; Inquirer 12/03/2022; Global Initiative 10/02/2020). These groups may take advantage of political tensions and authorities’ focus on the elections and conduct more attacks. Security forces are being deployed to areas of security concern across the country, mostly in Mindanao (Inquirer 12/03/2022; Business Mirror 14/02/2022).

Rivaling political clans that control the local economy by force and a shadow economy that provides the means for armed groups aggravate political violence and conflict in Mindanao (ICG 18/02/2022; Global Initiative 10/02/2020; International Alert 04/2014). The situation puts Mindanao at high risk of increased violence and attacks by armed groups, including electoral violence by ‘private’ armed groups hired to attack polls and political candidates by rivalling politicians (Benar News 30/06/2021; PhilStar 15/02/2022; Philippine Army 13/01/2022).

Polls in areas with the presence of armed groups, particularly the New People’s Army, are most at risk (New Mandala 08/07/2021; Manila Bulletin 13/02/2022).

**IMPACT**

The risk of electoral violence and increased conflict during and after the three-month-long election season (February–May 2022) will likely result in higher-than-average displacement (including protracted displacement) and raise protection concerns. There are two reasons the number of IDPs will most likely increase or spike when voters head to the polls on 9 May. The polls could be targeted with violence, or armed groups may take advantage of the security focus on polls to conduct attacks elsewhere.
THE PHILIPPINES [2/2]

The Government has sufficient resources to respond to IDP needs, but IDPs in Mindanao tend to become displaced for protracted periods. Protracted displacement reduces access to basic services, livelihoods, food, WASH, and protection. Evacuation centres and IDP sites in Mindanao also tend to be in remote areas difficult to access or far from services. IDPs may face protection issues because of a lack of security and the presence of criminality (such as drug-selling). Displaced people in Mindanao often resort or choose to stay with relatives, but sharing homes reduces privacy and space. The loss of livelihoods that accompanies displacement can also increase family tensions and gender-based violence (UNHCR 31/12/2021; WB 08/03/2021). Host families in Mindanao will likely come under additional economic strain for supporting displaced relatives, particularly when displacement becomes protracted. Mindanao regions have the highest poverty rates in the country, and the negative economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the impacts of Typhoon Rai have worsened the situation (WB 07/06/2021 and 10/11/2021; OCHA 11/02/2022).

IDPs in Mindanao in 2021

- **Displaced for more than 6 months**
- **Displaced for 1-3 months**
- **Displaced in the current month**

Source: Philippines Protection Cluster 31/12/2021
The militarisation of Al Hodeidah and Saleef ports leads to targeted attacks on the ports, forcing their closure and causing food and fuel import disruptions.

Rationale

Since January 2022, the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen has made more accusations regarding the Houthi militarisation of Al Hodeidah and Saleef ports. On 3 January 2022, the de-facto authority (DFA) in the north of Yemen (also known as the Houthis) seized an Emirati-flagged vessel in the Red Sea. They have since kept it in Saleef port just north of Al Hodeidah (France 24 03/01/2022; The Guardian 03/01/2022). The incident led the Saudi-led coalition to declare that the militarisation of the Red Sea ports could lead to counter-measures, including a military operation, despite international law protecting ports as civilian facilities (and not military objects) (Reuters 08/01/2022; RFI 08/01/2022). A series of drone and ballistic missile attacks by the DFA towards the United Arab Emirates (UAE) followed the seizing of the vessel. These attacks resulted in increased airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition in DFA areas. On 21 January, the Saudi-led coalition launched an airstrike against Al Hodeidah, hitting the telecommunications hub and causing widespread telecommunications outage for three days (ETC 31/01/2022).

The further escalation of DFA cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with other military activities in the Red Sea threatening their vessels and international shipping lines in general, increases the risk of DFA forces stationed in Al Hodeidah city close to the ports being targeted. The partial or total destruction of the Red Sea ports would very likely disrupt commercial and humanitarian food and fuel imports to the majority of the Yemeni population in DFA areas. International concern over the humanitarian consequences and the UAE being conscious of any reputational damage currently deter any targeted attacks, keeping their probability low. Regardless, such an incident would have extreme humanitarian consequences, making it a medium risk overall.

Impact

Al Hodeidah and Saleef ports are a lifeline for the majority of the population in DFA areas. Approximately 70% of bulk food and 80% of humanitarian aid food come through Al Hodeidah port (UN-Habitat 2020). A military attack destroying Al Hodeidah port or other critical supply chain infrastructure nearby would hamper the delivery of basic food commodities and humanitarian aid and sharply increase food prices. Humanitarian needs would significantly increase, and food insecurity levels would rise. The disruption of port operations would further reduce the already limited fuel supply through Al Hodeidah, likely affecting electricity production, health and WASH services, and transportation. Humanitarian organisations would have to import food and fuel from southern ports controlled by the DFA then transport them overland to DFA areas. The longer routes would significantly increase costs. The rerouting will also very likely result in a bottleneck, causing massive delays. Although both Aden and Mukalla ports have demonstrated the ability to absorb increased volumes of commercial fuel, questions remain regarding how bulk food imports could be scaled up. Finally, the halting of fuel and food imports would put thousands of people’s jobs at serious risk, affecting livelihoods (ACAPS 04/07/2021).

3. The import of commercial fuel through Al Hodeidah is already disrupted.
KENYA (1/2)

Electoral violence and increased intercommunal conflict throughout Kenya result in displacement, livelihood disruptions, and protection concerns

RATIONALE

Violence has marred previous election periods in Kenya, where there has been an established pattern of disputed presidential election outcomes since 2007. In the run-up to the August 2022 general elections, politicians are mobilising support based on ethnic affiliation and socioeconomic difference (Horn Institute 25/10/2021; Saferworld accessed 14/02/2022; The Africa Report 25/10/2021). Shifting political alliances have contributed to rising political tensions. In 2021, there were attempts to make constitutional amendments through the Building Bridges Initiative spearheaded by President Uhuru Kenyatta, as well as a recent amendment to the political parties’ bill perceived to increase the political influence of one presidential candidate. These incidents further aggravated tensions and resulted in violent disruptions to political rallies in Githurai township (Kiambu county), Kisii town (Kisii county), and Murang’a town (Murang’a county). Violence and electoral malpractices characterised parliamentary by-elections that year, indicating that Kenya may not be on track for peaceful elections in August 2022 (The East African 28/01/2022; The Star 29/12/2021 and 28/01/2021; Nation 15/02/2022; The Sentinel Project 29/03/2021; Saferworld accessed 14/02/2022). During the current campaign, some politicians have made divisive public remarks, legally considered hate speech and incitement to violence. Hate speech and disinformation displayed on social media and digital platforms have the potential to degenerate into physical violence (ISD 18/11/2021; The Standard 17/01/2022; The Star 21/01/2022; The Africa Report 24/01/2022). There is also distrust among the population towards key institutions that manage the electoral process. There was a highlight on the need for structural reforms in the Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission after the 2017 elections, but there have been no significant changes since. Some politicians also believe that the judiciary is biased against them. There is a risk of violence and protests being seen as the only way to address electoral grievances (KHRC 27/01/2022 and 08/06/2021; Al Jazeera 30/12/2021; IA 09/2021). Similar to the 2013 general elections, intercommunal conflicts could also increase in some drought-affected regions if political figures exploit and weaponise resource-based conflicts for political gain (IA 09/2021).

IMPACT

As seen in past electoral periods, localised violence and increased intercommunal conflicts after elections could result in displacement. Past election-related violent events displaced up to 150,000 people. Arid and semi-arid counties like Elgeyo Marakwet, Isiolo, Laikipia, Marsabit, Migori, Samburu, Turkana, and West Pokot are particularly at risk of increased intercommunal conflict (IA 09/2021; KRCS 17/09/2012; National Academy of Engineering 2013).
Potential violence around the 2022 elections would possibly repeat various forms of violence that took place following elections in the past, including physical violence resulting in deaths and injuries, the destruction of property, intimidation, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Those affected by SGBV will need sexual and reproductive healthcare, psychological care, medical forensic services, and legal services, yet gaps exist in the provision of these services (FIDH 17/01/2022; The Carter Center 2018). The COVID-19 pandemic has had a negative economic impact on a significant proportion of the population, with female informal workers being the most affected. As a result, many Kenyans have become particularly vulnerable to any additional economic shocks resulting from the elections. Electoral violence could further disrupt livelihoods, particularly for people working in the informal sector. Similar to the 2017 post-election period, violence will likely make small-scale traders unable to access local markets. To avoid looting and property destruction, businesses may also temporarily remain closed after the elections (KRCS 01/09/2017; FIDH 17/01/2022; Business Daily 29/09/2021; ICRW 2021; ILO 20/09/2021).

Number of violent incidents and fatalities from 1997-2021 (General election periods highlighted)

Source: ACLED data last accessed 10/03/2022; ACE Project; NDI accessed 22/03/2022
The strengthened presence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the newly merged tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) increases humanitarian needs, protection concerns, and access constraints in the area.

**RATIONALE**

The US-Taliban peace deal in early 2020 precipitated a resurgence of TTP activity in Pakistan, further boosted by the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, with whom the TTP has a long-standing relationship (USIP 19/01/2022; The Diplomat 06/01/2022; Gandhara 13/01/2022). TTP attacks increased by 122% in 2020–2021, reversing the decreasing trend since 2015 (ACLED accessed 14/02/2022). Most attacks were on Pakistani military personnel in the newly merged tribal districts of KP (as well as in Balochistan province) (PICSS 01/01/2022). Their capacity has increased with the Taliban releasing imprisoned senior TTP commanders and several fighters (ANI 31/01/2022; USIP 19/01/2022). The TTP has acquired modern weapons and expanded its recruitment and presence in Pakistan inside and beyond the tribal districts of KP (Gandhara 13/01/2022). Their financial resources, gained from kidnapping, extortion, smuggling, donations, and taxes, have significantly grown (CISAC 01/2022; Gandhara 18/05/2021; Reuters 16/07/2021).

The TTP leadership has a natural affinity towards the Taliban, even claiming to be a branch of the Taliban in Pakistan, yet they retain good relations with the Islamic State Khorasan Province. The Taliban have shown no indication that they will prevent the TTP from operating from Afghanistan. Although the TTP initially rejected offers of dialogue from the Pakistan Government, ceasefire negotiations started in November 2021. The ceasefire failed, but negotiations continued (Carnegie 21/12/2022; Gandhara 24/01/2022; ACLED 03/03/2022). Stalled Taliban-mediated peace talks and the failed ceasefire will likely increase attacks against state forces, amplifying TTP leverage and pressure on the Government to accept their provisions. Greater concessions to the TTP will reaffirm their legitimacy, which will highly likely increase protection concerns and human rights violations in the region and worsen existing humanitarian needs.
**IMPACT**

KP is home to many of the most food-insecure Pakistanis. They live in geographically remote locations with poor infrastructure, limited logistics, and significant insecurity. Military operations against the TTP in 2007 destroyed much of the infrastructure, which has yet to be repaired or compensated (Dawn 28/06/2021; IPC 08/12/2021; Al Jazeera 22/08/2019). The TTP have consolidated their control over certain areas of the newly merged tribal districts of KP. They are currently trying to further extend their influence towards the entire region (Al Jazeera 08/12/2021; BBC 13/10/2021). About 1.5 million people were projected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity levels between October 2021 and April 2022. Low rainfall levels, compounded by violence, displacement, and poor infrastructure, mainly drive these food insecurity levels (IPC 08/12/2021). There are about 3.8 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in KP, which is home to about 55% of the Afghani refugees in Pakistan (OCHA 12/2021; OCHA 11/05/2021). A continued increase in conflict and expansion of TTP control would add to existing needs and further restrict the provision of government services and humanitarian assistance.

Movement restrictions in and out of the districts and increased checkpoints would likely increase access constraints by isolating people from services and assistance. Despite the TTP focusing on military personnel, attacks against humanitarians, such as the TTP-claimed attack on a polio vaccination team in December 2021, may occur (Dawn 11/12/2021; CISAC 01/2022). Given TTP’s aim to implement a particularly strict interpretation of Sharia law over the region, protection needs for women, girls, and the youth will likely increase should the TTP expand or strengthen its influence. Women and girls will highly likely be subjected to discrimination and repression and denied social, economic, and political rights (ICG 14/02/2022; DNI accessed 16/02/2022).

**Number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3+) in the newly merged tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa October 2021 - June 2022**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Oct 21 - Apr 22</th>
<th>May 22 - Jun 22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bajaur</td>
<td>50k</td>
<td>350k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khyber</td>
<td>150k</td>
<td>300k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurram</td>
<td>250k</td>
<td>350k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohmand</td>
<td>100k</td>
<td>250k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Waziristan</td>
<td>50k</td>
<td>100k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orakzai</td>
<td>10k</td>
<td>20k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Waziristan</td>
<td>200k</td>
<td>450k</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IPC 08/12/2021
TONGA  [1/2]

Continued COVID-19-related movement restrictions and extreme weather conditions during the cyclone season delay the recovery process from the tsunami and result in increased humanitarian needs.

RATIONALE

A volcanic eruption and a tsunami hit Tonga on 15 January 2022, affecting 80% of the population (84,000 people) (OCHA 19/01/2022). With relief aid coming from foreign countries into the island, there has been an increase in COVID-19 cases starting 1 February. Previously, Tonga had recorded only one COVID-19 case since the start of the pandemic, with the Government applying strict measures on international travel to avoid an outbreak (BBC 30/10/2021; Al Jazeera 02/02/2022).

There were 2,765 cases confirmed between 1 February and 18 March, including two related deaths (WHO accessed 20/03/2022). Despite a relatively high vaccination rate (around 70% of the population), officials fear that a COVID-19 outbreak could be a bigger threat than the volcanic eruption (The Guardian 02/02/2022; Reuters accessed 15/03/2022). The rapid increase in cases led the Government to impose a nationwide lockdown on 2 February that will likely create delays in recovery from the disaster. Lockdown measures in Tonga include keeping people indoors, suspending internal travels between Tonga's islands, closing schools and non-essential businesses, and prohibiting foreign nationals from entering the country (Crisis24 01/02/2022; Al Jazeera 02/02/2022). Despite an easing of restrictions on 28 February, primary and high school students have continued being homeschooled, and the nighttime curfew is still active between 20:00–05:00 (Matangi 26/02/2022).

IMPACT

The volcanic eruption and tsunami have already affected about 80% of the population in Tonga. A delayed recovery process resulting from COVID-19 movement restrictions will likely worsen the situation for these people. The restrictions can also have a socioeconomic impact on the rest of the population. As at 28 February, there are 2,400 IDPs across Tonga because of damages to their homes. Reconstruction work is essential to assist displaced people, but COVID-19 movement restrictions will likely make the process challenging (OCHA 10/02/2022; CARE 28/02/2022). The impact of volcanic ash on crops, livestock, and fisheries, considered the main sources of income for Tonga's population, has affected about 60,000 people (OCHA 20/01/2022). Movement restrictions and the closure of non-essential businesses, such as bars, gyms, and restaurants, would also increase livelihood needs and likely delay people's recovery. Schools reopened on 31 January but closed again on 2 February as part of the COVID-19 lockdown (OCHA 10/02/2022). Remote education is challenging because some communication services still need repairs (Global News 22/02/2022). The tsunami damaged some classrooms, and COVID-19 movement restrictions and possible extreme weather conditions will likely delay reconstruction (Save the Children 25/01/2022). The health system in Tonga is already stretched; the volcanic eruption and tsunami damaged some healthcare centres, and others serve as evacuation centres (Govt. Tonga 25/01/2022). A COVID-19 outbreak resulting in increased hospital admissions will likely overburden healthcare facilities.
TONGA

Trend of COVID-19 weekly cases in 2022

- 105,000 Total population (The World Bank last accessed on 20/03/2022)
- 84,000 People affected by volcanic eruption (OCHA 19/01/2022)
- 60,000 Livelihoods affected people (OCHA 20/01/2022)
- 2,765 Cumulative Covid-19 cases as of 18 March (WHO accessed 20/03/2022)

Source: WHO accessed 20/03/2022

The World Bank last accessed 20/03/2022

OCHA 19/01/2022

OCHA 20/01/2022

WHO accessed 20/03/2022

Risk level: Low
UPDATE FROM THE OCTOBER 2021 RISK ANALYSIS

These risks were identified in the October 2021 report; below each risk, we have provided an update on the situation.

AFGHANISTAN — ● High risk level

Financial crisis leads to reduced income and purchasing power, resulting in increased humanitarian needs in Afghanistan

The Taliban’s takeover, the freezing of assets by the US and EU, and reduced international financial assistance have been driving the possible deterioration of conditions in Afghanistan over the past six months. Drought, displacement and urbanisation, and market and financial system disruptions, which all contribute to increased competition over limited essential public services, worsen the situation (UNDP 01/12/2021; OCHA 07/01/2022; Gandhara 18/12/2021). Following the August 2021 change in administration, more than 500,000 people have lost their jobs, with the number expected to reach 900,000 by mid-2022 (ILO 19/01/2022). The Afghani currency lost over 31% of its value against the USD in 2021, contributing to price increases on basic goods and causing instability in humanitarian assistance and the value of salaries and cash (OCHA 07/01/2022; FAO 23/12/2021; WFP 12/01/2022; Business Insider accessed 17/01/2022). The food security of Afghans is expected to deteriorate between November 2021 and March 2022, with 22.8 million people projected to experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity or higher, up from 19 million between September–October 2021 (IPC 25/10/2021). A harsh winter season, which has disrupted humanitarian access and depleted food stocks, has also compounded the situation (UNHCR 25/01/2022; Shelter Sector and UNHCR 23/01/2022). No country has yet recognised the Taliban interim administration, who is struggling to maintain functional public services and facing liquidity challenges (World Bank 14/01/2022; IRC 09/02/2022). Current strict regulations over banking systems and money transfers highly affect the ability to import goods. The economic situation will likely continue to worsen.

AFGHANISTAN (regional) — ● High risk level

Increased displacement into surrounding countries, particularly Pakistan and Iran, results in increased needs and heightened protection concerns

Afghanistan continues to experience a deepening economic crisis, compounded by sporadic violent attacks by the Islamic State Khorasan Province, fighting with the National Resistance Front, and the Taliban lacking recognition as the legitimate government from the international community. There have been no significant improvements since the Taliban’s takeover in August.
Overall access to basic services, such as education, healthcare, and financial and social services, will likely continue to worsen in 2022, affecting all population groups (OCHA 08/01/2022; ACLED 03/03/2022). Given these circumstances and the severity of needs, the total number of new Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran reached about 122,480 in 2021 (UNHCR accessed 17/01/2022; UNHCR 22/12/2021). The actual number of Afghans displacing into neighbouring countries might be greater (NYT 02/02/2022). Numbers remain difficult to verify as the borders remain tightly controlled, and people resort to using irregular border-crossing locations and smugglers (UNHCR 05/02/2022 and 25/01/2022). As the movements take place irregularly, Afghans are exposed to increased protection concerns, exploitation, and abuse. Major concerns that surfaced in a needs assessment conducted with undocumented Afghans who recently left the country include detention fears and forced returns. Those interviewed cited shelter, livelihood, food, and documentation needs (UNHCR 25/01/2022, 14/01/2022, 04/12/2021, and 13/12/2021). Despite the majority of Afghans leaving the country for security-related reasons, deportations continue from host countries (UNHCR 25/01/2022). Unless the situation significantly improves in Afghanistan, refugee arrivals in neighbouring countries will unlikely stop, and the risks highlighted in the October 2021 Global Risk Analysis will continue.

COSTA RICA/NICARAGUA — Medium risk level

Government crackdown on the opposition and economic uncertainty surrounding the upcoming elections result in a spike in the number of Nicaraguan migrants and asylum seekers with food, health, and protection needs

A deterioration in the humanitarian situation followed election results and the new presidential mandate in Nicaragua. Prior to the elections, the Nicaraguan Government imprisoned more than 36 opposition leaders, seven of whom were presidential candidates, and several other human rights defenders (France 24 09/01/2022; OEA 20/10/2021). By 2022, at least 25 NGOs have ceased to operate, constraining humanitarian access (ICN 16/02/2022; La Gaceta 16/02/2022). In 2021, between 144,000–170,000 Nicaraguans migrated, the highest number since the sociopolitical crisis started in 2018 (CNN 01/01/2022; Confidencial 01/01/2022). By early 2022, 350,000 refugees and asylum seekers (or 85% of the migrant population) were living in Costa Rica (UNHCR 23/12/2021; Confidencial 03/02/2022). As anticipated, 2021 had the highest number (approximately 53,000) of asylum requests from Nicaraguans in Costa Rica (Confidencial 01/01/2022). Nicaraguan migration to Costa Rica started increasing in the months
before the elections, driven by fear and threats from the Ortega regime (La Nación 28/11/2021; VOA 18/12/2021; Confidencial 01/01/2022). Only about 11% of asylum seekers aimed to avoid reprisals from the Nicaraguan Government (EFE 18/12/2021). Nicaraguans in Costa Rica continue to face xenophobia and violence (VOA 18/12/2021).

**ETHIOPIA (AFAR AND AMHARA) — Medium risk level**

Increasingly intense and widespread conflict in Afar and Amhara causes mass displacement, access constraints, food insecurity, and protection concerns

This risk has largely materialised as Tigrayan forces advanced south, but through Amhara and not Afar as suggested. On 31 October 2021, Tigrayan forces were able to control two strategic Amharan towns (Dessie and Kombolcha). These towns are located on a highway linking Addis Ababa to the port of Djibouti, increasing fears of the Tigrayan forces controlling the supply route (Al Jazeera 31/10/2021; Reuters 01/11/2021). They also formed an alliance with eight armed groups, including the Oromia Liberation Army, against Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's Government, which greatly increased tensions across the country (Al Jazeera 05/11/2021). A few reports from Tigrayan refugees in Sudan indicated that the Eritrean Defense Forces were still involved in the conflict and supported the Ethiopian regional government forces (AP 08/11/2021). The Ethiopian Government declared a six-month state of emergency on 3 November in response to the increased threat of Tigrayan forces advancing (Al Jazeera 02/11/2021). Many clashes erupted in Amhara and Afar over the control of towns, resulting in large-scale displacement and an increase in humanitarian needs (OCHA 27/10/2021 and 30/12/2021). The mass looting of humanitarian supplies happened over days at the beginning of December in Kombolcha and Dessie towns, resulting in the suspension of operations (OCHA 08/12/2021). Since mid-December, fighting has shifted mostly to Afar, and there have been reports of large-scale displacement and access constraints. On 3 February 2022, unidentified armed men targeted Berahle camp in Afar region, displacing more than 14,000 Eritrean refugees. The attack killed at least five refugees, and the armed men kidnapped several women. The camp remains inaccessible, and the status of the remaining refugees is unknown (UNHCR 18/02/2022; News24 18/02/2022).

**ETHIOPIA (TIGRAY) — High risk level**

Intensified conflict in the Tigray region, a sustained humanitarian blockade, and the main harvest being missed for the second time result in mass starvation and deaths

This risk has partially materialised. The blockade has prevented access to Tigray, resulting in cash and fuel depletion. The 2021 Meher harvest has also been below average (WFP 28/01/2022). As at February 2022, large-scale fighting had not shifted back to Tigray but continued to affect border areas in Afar and Amhara, and airstrikes remained a security risk in Tigray. Data on starvation in the region remains unavailable, except for unverified information collected by local doctors and researchers. This information indicates that between late June and October, almost 200 children under the age of five died of starvation in 14 hospitals across Tigray (The Guardian 16/11/2021). On 26 November 2021, the Ethiopian regional government started to regain control of towns in Afar and Amhara regions, while the Tigrayan forces started to retreat (Reuters 29/11/2021). Airstrikes over Tigray intensified between mid-October and the start of January 2022, increasing insecurity and affecting the Meher harvest season (October–January) (Reuters 29/11/2021; Al Jazeera 08/01/2022). Access into Tigray has been challenging since mid-December because of active fighting in Afar, which is blocking the Semera-Abala-Mekelle road into Tigray (OCHA 10/02/2022). Fuel and cash have largely been depleted in Tigray, resulting in the suspension and reduction of humanitarian operations. Water-trucking operations are affected and cover only 19% of needs among IDPs. Stocks of nutrition supplies have been depleted, and stocks of food commodities are very low. By the end of January 2022, an estimated 80% of Tigray's population are food insecure, with half of them suffering from an extreme lack of food (OCHA 27/01/2022; WFP 28/01/2022).

**HAITI/CENTRAL AMERICA — Medium risk level**

Worsening insecurity and deteriorating living conditions in Haiti increase displacement through Central America, resulting in high food, shelter, and protection needs for migrants and asylum seekers

As ACAPS anticipated, the assassination of the prime minister and the spread of the territorial control of gangs increased violence and political instability in Haiti during the second half of 2021. Gangs control approximately 60% of the country,
affecting ports, roads, and food storage areas (Insecurity Insight 12/11/2021; TNH 07/02/2022). Aside from the impact of the 14 August 2021 earthquake, roadblocks erected by gangs also affect the southern departments, and there are no alternative routes (TNH 07/02/2022; ACLED 03/03/2022). As ACAPS also anticipated, the continued escalation of violence in Haiti has increased migration flows to the US through Central America, mainly Colombia and Panama (La Patilla 08/09/2021; El Economista 20/09/2021; Excelsior 13/09/2021). In 2021, over 126,000 Haitians crossed the border between Colombia and Panama. This number is more than the total in the previous 11 years (118,000 between 2009–2020) (AméricaEconomía 31/12/2021). In 2022, 100–150 Haitians have been arriving weekly at the Colombia-Panama border (Caracol Radio 19/01/2022). Several boats with migrants have been shipwrecked in the Caribbean Sea while en route to Panama (SWI 12/10/2021; Caracol Radio 20/12/2021). Although not anticipated by ACAPS, Mexico is receiving a high number of migrants. 14,000 Haitian asylum seekers have been deported to the country to await the US Government’s response (Vox 20/01/2022; HRP 08/02/2022). Shelters at Mexico’s borders have overflowed, and migrants lack WASH, health, education, and food security services (Al Jazeera 18/01/2022).

**NIGER — Medium risk level**

**An increase in attacks targeting civilians leads to displacement and further deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the Tillabéri region**

The population created several self-defence militias following increased attacks targeting civilians in Tillabéri region and the intensification of tax collection by armed groups. The growing involvement of civilians in armed fighting resulted in the deaths of 69 civilians belonging to a self-defence militia in Banibangou department on 2 November 2021. They were hunting down armed men they accused of attacking their villages and stealing cattle. Despite calls from the president of the republic to rely on the army, this event reinforced the will of civilians to defend themselves (VOA 04/11/2021; France 24 04/11/2021; DW 25/11/2021).

Attacks by armed groups remain frequent, pushing the population to move. Regardless, the number of displaced people in the region remained stable at around 99,870 as at 31 January 2022. Return movements were the main reason for the stability of this figure (UNHCR 31/01/2022). Access to education in Tillabéri has particularly deteriorated since the increase in attacks. 579 schools closed at the end of 2021, up from 377 in 2020. The closures affected 53,500 children (OCHA 20/12/2021). As at 1 October 2021, an estimated 600,000 people were at risk of food insecurity because of recurrent attacks by armed groups against farmers, forcing them to flee their fields. These attacks particularly affected Banibangou department, with more than 79,000 people at risk of food insecurity (OCHA 01/10/2021). WASH needs remain very high, particularly because of the widespread practice of open defecation and the use of an unimproved water source as the main source of drinking (REACH 13/01/2022).

**SOMALIA — Low risk level**

**Conflict in Mogadishu between pro-government and pro-opposition military forces and increased Al-Shabaab attacks result in displacement and humanitarian access constraints**

In December 2021, there was a renewed political dispute between the president and prime minister, with both blaming each other for stalled elections. President Mohamed Farmajo attempted to suspend Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble, leading to the mobilisation of security forces in Mogadishu in support of the prime minister. Opposition leaders supported the prime minister and called for the resignation of President Farmajo. Mediation by local leaders and the international community helped deescalate tensions and prevent armed conflict in Mogadishu (Al Jazeera 09/01/2022; Garowe Online 26/12/2021; Reuters 28/12/2021; UNSOM 27/12/2021). Somalia’s leaders set 15 March 2022 as the new deadline for the conclusion of parliamentary elections. By 13 March, a few seats remained to reach the 275 seats in the Lower House. There are accusations against the president and his allies of interference in the electoral process.
Some candidates linked to the National Intelligence and Security Agency were elected (Al Jazeera 09/01/2022; UN 15/02/2022; Garowe Online 17/02/2022; The East African 13/03/2022).

Al-Shabaab has attempted to disrupt the electoral process through targeted attacks. Some attacks in Mogadishu targeted high-profile figures, such as Somalia’s government spokesperson and election delegates. Al-Shabaab also attacked Barawe town (Southwest state) on the same day elections were scheduled to take place (VOA 15/02/2022; Garowe Online 09/02/2022 and 10/02/2022; Al Jazeera 16/01/2022).

SUDAN — Low risk level

Escalation of conflict between Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces and Ethiopian National Defense Force in Al Fashaga district, Gedaref state, results in violence against civilians, displacement, disruption of agricultural activities, and protection concerns

Except for a few clashes between Sudanese and Ethiopian troops in the border area of Al Fashaga district, this risk did not materialise. On 27 November 2021, members of the Ethiopian army launched attacks in Al Fashaga district to intimidate farmers and spoil the harvest season. The attack killed at least 20 soldiers of the Sudanese Armed Forces (Al Jazeera 28/11/2021; Dabanga 29/11/2021). Ethiopia denied that their forces engaged with Sudanese soldiers (Addis Standard 29/11/2021). Clashes between Sudanese and Ethiopian troops resumed between 30 November and 1 December, but there were no casualties or damages to crops (Dabanga 01/12/2021 and 02/12/2021). The third filling of the GERD dam was suggested as a trigger of increasing tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia, leading to clashes in Al Fashaga, but it did not take place in early 2022. The Ethiopian Government announced rescheduling it to July, after the removal of 17,000 hectares of forests around the dam in February in preparation for the third filling (Al-Monitor 27/01/2022). There are no reports of crops failing in Al Fashaga or clashes displacing people.

TUNISIA — Low risk level

Prolonged sociopolitical unrest leads to violent protests and localised violence resulting in protection and human rights concerns, humanitarian access impediments, and disruption of the COVID-19 response

The Tunisian president Kais Saied extended the parliament suspension until a new election on 17 December 2022 and announced a constitutional referendum to be held on July 2022 (MEE 13/12/2021; SWI 13/12/2021; ICG 27/01/2022). The president also terminated the Supreme Judicial Council and named a new temporary one (SWI 13/02/2022; DW 06/02/2022). These exceptional measures, and general social and political dissatisfaction, led to violent protests between November 2021 and January 2022. There were reports of riot police using tear gas, sticks, and water cannons against protesters, resulting in one death and several injuries (Reuters 14/11/2021; Al Jazeera 17/12/2021 and 20/01/2022; DW 14/01/2022). Opposition movements have faced human rights violations and arbitrary arrests (CNN 22/12/2021; Amnesty 14/01/2022). There have been no reports of the sociopolitical and economic situation disrupting the COVID-19 response. Tunisia announced a loan of USD 7 billion from foreign lenders for their 2022 budget, making government debt 83% of gross domestic product (Africanews 29/12/2021; The Jordan Times 28/12/2021). The deterioration of the socioeconomic situation has affected population groups already in humanitarian need, including migrants and refugees. Many of them are without jobs. They also remain subject to different forms of exploitation, such as human trafficking, forced labour, and arbitrary arrests. Migrants protested on 14 February asking for evacuation from Tunisia (InfoMigrants 15/02/2022; Africanews 15/02/2022). Migrants have also continued attempting to cross to Europe by sea for better opportunities (InfoMigrants 21/01/2022 and 28/01/2022; Reuters 26/11/2021; Arab News 22/01/2022).
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ACAPS
Avenue de France 23
5th floor
CH 1202 Geneva
+41 22 338 15 90
info@acaps.org

acaps
www.acaps.org