ACCESS TO BASIC NEEDS IN YEMEN: SCENARIOS

Possible developments affecting Yemeni’s access to basic needs and services in 2020

October 2019
Scenario 1  Major offensive against the Houthis

Saudi-backed coalition offensive and airstrikes result in major conflict in and around Al Hudaydah with smaller clashes along other conflict frontlines. The fighting results in civilian casualties, displacement, and Al Hudaydah port closure. Saudi Arabia engages in increasing economic warfare, which leads to food and fuel price rises, particularly in the North.

Scenario 2  Economic warfare

Increased rivalry over control of hard currency leads the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden to demand full supervision over banks in Yemen. Houthis respond by blocking commercial trade between the north and south, which prompts the Central Bank to cut off all major banks’ international connectivity. Escalation in economic warfare leads to currency depreciation triggering fuel, water, and food price rises.

Scenario 3  Fracturing of conflict: increased violence and displacement

Conflict intensifies along existing frontlines and spreads to new territories. The Government of Yemen and STC alliance fails in the south and the coalition backed forces fight the Houthis in the north. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Islamic State escalate their efforts to spread territorially in the southern governorates. Increasing fragmentation leads to many civilian casualties and displacement.

Scenario 4  Continuing low-level conflict; failure of humanitarian access negotiations

The peace talks continue with limited progress. In the meantime, the conflict continues at a low level with conflict parties taking or losing ground without major shifts in the balance of forces. Access negotiations between the humanitarian community and parties to the conflict fail, resulting in increasingly difficult access and challenges providing services.

Scenario 5  Continuing low-level conflict; breakthrough in humanitarian access negotiations

The peace talks continue with limited progress. In the meantime, the conflict continues at a low level with active fighting becoming more predictable and confined to relatively few contested locations. Humanitarian access negotiations achieve a breakthrough, resulting in increased provision of services to people reliant on humanitarian assistance.

Scenario 6  Successful peace deal: unity government

Successful peace talks between the GoY, Houthis, and STC result in the formation of a unity government. Although the formal control of the territory remains with the GoY, key local actors like the STC and Houthis retain a degree of control over federalised areas. Tensions remain between the central government and regional authorities, which have more influence in their respective territories.
Introduction

Problem statement

Yemen has been in a state of protracted conflict since 2015. 24.1 million people, 80% of the population, are in need of humanitarian assistance. Taking into account a range of variables that affect Yemeni’s access to basic needs and services, these scenarios consider developments that could have humanitarian consequences and impact on access to basic needs within Yemen throughout 2020.

Scenarios for October 2019 – December 2020

These scenarios are not attempts to predict the future. Rather, they describe situations that could occur in the coming 15 months and are designed to highlight the possible impacts and humanitarian consequences associated with each scenario. The aim is to support strategic planning, create awareness, and promote preparedness activities for policymakers and others working in Yemen. The timeframe is until December 2020 although the scenarios may remain valid some months longer. See the Methodology section for more information on how these scenarios were developed.

Limitations

Scenarios can seem to oversimplify an issue as the analysis balances details against broader assumptions. Scenario-building is not an end in itself; it is a process for generating new ideas that should, in turn, lead to changes in project design or decision-making. These scenarios focus primarily on the potential ways in which people are able to access basic needs and services and the resultant impact and humanitarian consequences.

How to use this report

The six scenarios are summarised on page 2. Pages 4–9 provide more detail on the scenarios, including potential humanitarian consequences. Page 10 lists eight factors that could compound the humanitarian consequences of any of the scenarios. A brief summary of the current situation in Yemen, together with a description of the key actors involved is given on pages 11-14. Annexed is a summary of the trigger events that could lead towards the situations described in the scenarios.

How scenarios can be used

Scenarios are a set of different ways that a situation may develop. The aim of scenario building is not to try and accurately predict the future, but rather to understand the range of possible futures and then select a few that result in distinct situations with, usually, differing humanitarian outcomes that can:

• Support strategic planning for agencies and NGOs
• Identify assumptions underlying anticipated needs and related interventions
• Enhance the adaptability and design of detailed assessments
• Influence monitoring and surveillance systems
• Create awareness, provide early warning and promote preparedness activities among stakeholders

For more information on how to build scenarios, please see the ACAPS Technical Brief on Scenario Development in the Methodology section of ACAPS’ website.

Methodology

These scenarios were developed in October 2019, during a two-day workshop in Amman, Jordan. 23 experts from 13 humanitarian, academic, diplomatic, or policy organisations contributed to these scenarios through participation in the workshop or bilateral meetings.

Many variables that could cause change were mapped during the workshop. By making assumptions as to how these variables might plausibly change, six scenarios were identified. These scenarios were then expanded and the major impact of each scenario and its humanitarian consequences identified.

All scenarios except 2 are mutually exclusive. Scenario 2, economic warfare, could occur in conjunction with any of the others and was included because the probability, while low, is far from remote and the impact would be significant. Indeed it could contribute to triggering one of the other scenarios. A list of individual indicators/triggers is given on pages 15–17. It should be noted that a combination, but not necessarily all, of the triggers are required to reach any given scenario.

The estimated caseload for each scenario is an estimate of the additional caseload that could result should that scenario unfold. They are designed to give an order of magnitude only and are based on the current displacement and refugee return trends.

Thank you

These scenarios were produced by ACAPS. ACAPS would like to thank all organisations that provided input to these scenarios: both those that attended the workshop in Amman and those that contributed via bilateral meetings.
Scenarios

1. Major offensive against the Houthis

Seeking to end the war and wrest control from the Houthis, a Saudi-backed coalition offensive, supported by airstrikes, results in major conflict in and around Al Hudaydah for one to two months with smaller clashes along other conflict frontlines. Significant casualties and displacement ensue, and the port is closed. Humanitarian agencies largely cease operations in Al Hudaydah. Concurrently, Saudi Arabia launches economic warfare against the Houthis. Following the re-taking of Al Hudaydah city, the coalition focuses on pushing the Houthis from Al Hudaydah governorate and controlling the flow of goods into Houthi territory. Humanitarian activities are further constrained across the remainder of Houthi-held Yemen.

Possible indicators/triggers

Some or all of the following occur:

- Houthi attack(s) on Saudi Arabia cause civilian casualties
- Houthi attack(s) cause major damage to oil exports
- Stockholm peace process is declared a failure by one or more parties to the conflict
- Jeddah talks result in STC, GoY, Islah reconciliation
- The Saudi-led coalition announce their intention to retake Al Hudaydah
- Saudis and Emiratis align strategy in the south
- US provides political endorsement for an offensive
- Iran-US conflict provides cover for more violence in Yemen

Estimated additional caseload

250,000 displaced from Al Hudaydah for 1-2 months. 10.9 million food insecure people in Houthi controlled governorates pushed into severe negative coping strategies, 27% more people food deficient countrywide. Over 130% increase in the amount of food assistance needed.

Geographic areas of most concern

Major conflict in Al Hudaydah governorate. Lower intensity conflict in other fronts, Al Bayda, Al Dhale’e, Hajjah, Al Jawf. Air bombardment on Al Hudaydah and Sa’dah cities. Food insecurity and fuel shortages in Houthi controlled areas.

Impact

Al Hudaydah port closes for 1-2 months, severely restricting imports of food, fuel and humanitarian goods. Food and oil prices rise sharply and fuel shortages are widespread throughout the country. Hospitals lack supplies and, in Al Hudaydah, struggle to cope with the casualties of the conflict. Fuel shortages result in cuts to water and electricity. Tensions between host communities and IDPs rise.

Following the conflict and partial reopening of the damaged port, imports resume. Goods bound for Houthi-controlled areas need to negotiate access across conflict frontlines and are taxed multiple times, fuelling inflation. Damage to Al Hudaydah city affects power and water networks as well as health and education infrastructure. Solid waste collects throughout the city. Fuel shortages and price rises disrupt transport, health, water and electricity services in Sana’a, Sa’dah, Hajjah, Amran, and other cities in the north.

Humanitarian consequences

Renewed conflict in, and airstrikes on, Al Hudaydah leads to high displacement and civilian casualties. Civilian houses and critical infrastructure are damaged. Increased disease outbreaks are caused by water shortages, water contamination, and (in Al Hudaydah city) accumulation of solid waste.

Up to 250,000 people are displaced within or from Al Hudaydah, of whom 40% require shelter assistance. Vulnerable IDP households repeatedly displaced by conflict since 2018 are affected the most and adopt negative coping mechanisms like skipping meals, early marriage or forced recruitment.

Disruptions to Al Hudaydah port cause food prices to double and increase fuel prices by 800% across the country for several months, until supply chains adjust. In Houthi-controlled areas 10.9 million people would need ongoing food assistance due to price rises and shortages from the economic blockade. Increased pressure on water and basic services in areas of displacement fuels tensions with host communities exacerbating protection issues.

Southern and eastern parts of the country will move towards greater stability, with a shift in focus towards rebuilding livelihoods, support for agriculture and sustainable access to water and energy.

Operational constraints

Humanitarian access in Al Hudaydah is severely reduced due to ongoing conflict. Medical supply chains are disrupted. Imports of relief items are disrupted for 2-6 months due to conflict around Al Hudaydah port. Long term, humanitarian actors will need to negotiate access across conflict frontlines to bring medical supplies, food and fuel into Houthi controlled areas, increasing the complexity and cost of operations. Issuance of humanitarian visas by the GoY remains a lengthy process while the number issued by the Houthis reduces significantly.
2. Economic warfare

The Central Bank of Yemen in Aden demands full supervision over banks in order to exert control over hard currency. Houthis block commercial trade between the north and south in retaliation. The Central Bank cuts off all major banks from its international connectivity (SWIFT). The currency depreciates. Food prices rise. Fuel shortages lead to electricity cuts, making it harder to run health and water facilities. The price of water increases.

Possible indicators/triggers:
- Reduced capacity of money lenders/banks to provide liquidity to the private sector and humanitarians
- Reduced capacity of the Central Bank to carry out its functions (providing foreign exchange, regulating the banking sector)
- Central Bank moves to Shabwah, but staff are unable to relocate
- Inflation runs out of control
- Saudis stop depositing, or reduce deposits, in the Central Bank
- Reduction in international humanitarian funding to the Yemen response
- New sanctions or restrictions on the Yemeni banking sector
- De-risking agenda: international banks decide to further restrict banking transactions with Yemen
- Central Bank shuts down SWIFT accounts for major banks
- Central Bank continues to print money to finance its debts

Estimated additional caseload
Increases to 29 million people in need, more than 90% of the population. Over 200% increase in the amount of food assistance needed.

Geographic areas of most concern
Major cities are most affected, including Sana’a, Aden, Lahj, Taiz, Ibb (city, not the countryside), and Hajjah. Rural areas are slightly more resilient because of some local production. This may trigger reverse migration from the cities. Marib, Shabwah and Hadramaut may be slightly less affected due to their links to Saudi Arabia and their natural resources.

Impact
Food and fuel shortages, due to the inability of banks to lend to importers, result in price rises. Hospitals and clinics are shut down due to electricity cuts severely reducing health service provision. Water costs increase. The Yemeni Rial depreciates rapidly, leading to a reliance on the US dollar and Saudi Riyals, and there is an increased use of the informal money transfer system, which becomes more expensive. Public sector salaries devalue in real terms.

Protests, civil unrest, and looting ensue; law and order begins to break down, triggering a harsh response from local authorities in some areas. There is increased demand on the international community to cover the gap. Increasing insecurity and criminality of armed actors create opportunities for more aid loss and diversion.

Increasing poverty is likely to fuel the conflict as more people take up arms to access aid and armed groups seek to control resources.

Humanitarian consequences
Food insecurity would increase significantly with more than 90% of the population unable to meet their basic food needs and many falling further into poverty. The number of malnourished children and severity of malnutrition increase. Waterborne disease, especially acute watery diarrhoea and cholera increases due to significantly reduced access to safe water. The spread of disease combines with the breakdown of the health system to drive increased mortality. GBV and harassment increases.

Operational constraints
Operational costs increase due to higher fuel, electricity, and transport costs. Growing challenges transferring humanitarian funds into the country. Increased criminality restricts humanitarian operations.
3. Fracturing of conflict: increased violence and displacement

Fuelled by a lack of hope in the peace process and mistrust between key actors, the GoY – STC alliance fails and conflict intensifies on existing frontlines while new ones open. In the north, Saudi Arabia backed forces attack Houthi forces while STC aligned forces expand control in the south. Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) or Islamic State (IS) also seek to take and hold population centres in the south. The country fragments. The escalating conflict causes many casualties and much displacement and disrupts humanitarian and commercial traffic, resulting in severe shortages of food, health supplies, water, electricity and fuel.

Possible indicators/triggers:

- Jeddah talks fail
- Houthi attack(s) on Saudi Arabia cause civilian casualties
- Internal divisions within the Houthis
- Saudi Arabia retaliates with more airstrikes and possibly incursions across the northern border
- STC expands to Shabwah leading to sustained conflict in the south
- Al Qaeda and IS continue to push towards Al Mukalla port triggering a US response
- Conflict continues in Taiz between GoY-aligned forces
- Saudi Arabia enlists the support of additional foreign forces (likely Sudanese)
- UAE enlists the support of additional foreign forces to support STC
- Iran provides additional support to the Houthis
- Increased regional tension (Saudi Arabia/UAE/Iran)
- Iran-US conflict provides cover for more violence in Yemen
- New tribal sheiks, funded by foreign powers, push out traditional leaders

Estimated additional caseload

An additional 1 million displaced, ongoing growth of people in need to 27.5 million (up from 24.1 million). Up to 25% increase in food deficient population and 100% increase in needed food assistance.

Geographic areas of most concern

Mukalla, Shabwa, Abyan, Lahj, al Dhaleh, Sa’dah (especially border areas with Saudi Arabia).

Impact

Increasingly widespread and intense conflict gives rise to high numbers of civilian casualties, and reduces freedom of movement, both between and within north and south. The GoY’s authority further degrades, deportations and detentions rise across the country, and social instability rises. Targeted airstrikes damage key infrastructure; ports and airports close. The possibility of a negotiated end to the conflict recedes as power becomes dispersed across a wider range of local actors. Fuel shortages impact water provision, electricity, and health services. Healthcare facilities are overwhelmed. Incidents of disease, especially cholera increases as response teams are unable to access affected areas. Inflation spirals as the Yemeni Riyal collapses.

Humanitarian consequences

As the conflict fractures and intensifies, the number of civilian casualties increases. Food security decreases for up to 4 million people due to the unavailability of humanitarian food assistance. Protection needs increase as incidents of GBV, harassment, and forced recruitment increase. Much of the population loses access to sufficient safe water, threatening a cholera epidemic.

Operational constraints

Humanitarian access decreases as humanitarian actors need to negotiate access with a plethora of new local actors (in addition to the Ministry of Planning and International Coordination (MoPIC) and the National Authority for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Recovery (NAMCHA)) who are motivated by financial gain and a desire to exert control over local territory. Increase in kidnapping for money. Al Qaeda/IS increase attacks on civilians and humanitarians. Access for international staff is more difficult and humanitarian projects are harder and more expensive to implement. Physical insecurity reduces access. Lack of electricity hampers operations.
4. Continuing low-level conflict; failure of humanitarian access negotiations

The conflict continues at a low level with the active conflict locations moving as parties to the conflict continue to take or lose ground. While there is no major change in the balance of forces, some strategic locations continue to change hands. The peace talks continue with limited progress. Localised displacement continues and an increasing number of Yemenis rely on humanitarian assistance. However, humanitarian access negotiations fail and humanitarians face increasing restrictions, resulting in decreased provision of services.

Possible indicators/triggers:
- Increased sanctions against the Houthis
- Increased bureaucratic constraints
- Increased corruption
- Change in conflict dynamics: targeting of humanitarian actors
- Humanitarian banking access impeded
- Increased interference in aid delivery by local authorities
- Increased restrictions on aid programming, or restrictive compliance rules, imposed by donors
- US Office of Inspector General investigation results in humanitarian organisations shut down or scaling back in Yemen

Estimated additional caseload

Humanitarian caseload increases slightly to 25.5 million people in need as humanitarian operations are unable to respond effectively to disease outbreaks and new displacement. Up to 50% increase in the amount of needed food assistance.

Geographic areas of most concern

Houthi-controlled areas. Aden, Abyan and Shabwa

Impact

Some conflict-driven displacement continues at a local level as the conflict moves and intensifies in particular areas with many of the displaced living in makeshift camps. Others, who either lack resources or are tired of displacing, opt to remain in unsafe locations. Countrywide, a lack of employment and income drives young men and boys to fight, as access to the limited assistance is determined by parties to the conflict. Continued inflation, fuel shortages, food (especially in urban areas), and the spiralling cost of water continues to drive an increasing number of Yemenis into poverty. The number of humanitarian visas granted by the GoY gradually decreases, while the number of those declared persona non grata (PNG) increases. Restrictions on humanitarian assistance forces many INGOs to leave Houthi-controlled areas, increasing reliance on national NGOs. Others compromise on humanitarian principles to continue operating, reducing community acceptance. The costs of humanitarian assistance increase as capacity and access reduces. An increased tolerance for compromises, coupled with reduced oversight of assistance, results in increased aid diversion which contributes to fuelling the conflict. Increased negative media reports on aid diversion trigger donor-imposed restrictions and investigations, diverting resources away from operational response. The public no longer perceive the humanitarian community as impartial.

Humanitarian consequences

The number of Yemenis unable to meet their basic needs steadily increases. Additionally, the severity of need increases across the country, especially in Houthi-controlled areas. While people directly exposed to the conflict and displacement continue to be the most affected, decreasing levels of humanitarian aid exacerbates the vulnerability of discriminated groups such as the Muhamasheen. Life-saving assistance to the most vulnerable reduces and protection needs increase as increasing numbers of boys join the conflict for financial reasons. Harassment, SGBV, and exploitation increase as conflict increasingly becomes a part of the social fabric of the country.

Operational constraints

Physical security of humanitarian staff remains a major constraint in much of the country as does port and road capacity. Issuance of humanitarian visas by the GoY remains a lengthy process, while the number issued by the Houthis gradually reduces. Tighter compliance rules make it more costly and difficult to deliver aid, especially in Houthi controlled areas.
5. Continuing low-level conflict; breakthrough in humanitarian access negotiations

The conflict continues but with active conflict becoming more predictable and confined to relatively few, contested locations. No major change in the balance of forces. The peace talks continue with limited progress. Limited localised displacement continues while large numbers of Yemenis remain reliant on humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian access negotiations achieve a breakthrough, resulting in increased provision of some basic services across the country.

Possible indicators/triggers

Some or all of the following occur:

- Humanitarian negotiations successfully reduce bureaucratic constraints
- Number of active conflict areas reduce
- Improved local governance results in improved local security
- Improved coordination of humanitarian access between local and central authorities
- Improved access for humanitarian organisations to fairer and cheaper financial services
- Reduced political interference in humanitarian programming and beneficiary selection
- Ease of passage through checkpoints improves

Estimated additional caseload

None: the humanitarian caseload remains steady at 24.1 million people in need due to continuous presence of the root causes of the crisis.

Impact

Displacement reduces significantly while there is increased return movement to previously contested areas. Both the GoY and Houthis increase provision of timely humanitarian visas, leading to more international humanitarian staff in country. While some local authorities in the south continue to fail to recognise NGO staff travel approvals, most do. Combined with the more predictable conflict, this results in increased humanitarian freedom of movement. Lack of employment and income, continued inflation, and spiralling cost of water continues to keep large numbers of Yemenis in poverty. Access is also granted for international experts to the SAFER oil terminal, removing the risk of an environmental disaster.

Humanitarian consequences

Improved humanitarian access across the country results in significantly increased support to healthcare facilities; provision of food, and NFIs, as well as increased capacity to address protection concerns. Access to water remains a key challenge, which combined with poor sanitation and hygiene practice continues to drive outbreaks of waterborne diseases. However, humanitarian actors are able to respond more quickly, stopping outbreaks more quickly and reducing mortality. People exposed to active conflict and displacement continue to be the most affected. Continuous conflict and economic warfare continue to deplete resources of Yemenis, with the poorest households remaining reliant on humanitarian assistance. However, better capacity to assess needs on the ground allows for better targeting.

Operational constraints

Donor fatigue and less space for advocacy lead to funding shortages. Insecurity remains a constraint on humanitarian staff, especially near conflict frontlines. The capacity of the port and status of the roads also limit the ability to distribute assistance. However, improved humanitarian access allows actors to expand humanitarian operations in most areas of the country, including shifting focus towards rebuilding livelihoods, support for agriculture, and sustainable access to water and energy for non-conflict affected areas.
6. Successful peace deal: unity government

Successful peace talks between the GoY, Houthis, and STC result in the formation of a unity government based on the outcomes of a second National Dialogue Conference. Formal control of the country’s territory remains with the GoY but key local actors, like the STC in the South, the Houthis in the North, and sub-national power brokers have a stake in the success of the new political order. While negotiations to determine the process of federalisation of the country are initiated at the capital-level, de facto federalisation materialises as regional authorities exert influence faster than the newly formed national government.

Possible indicators/triggers:

- Regional push for de-escalation of tensions between US and Iran
- Public opinion and lobbying in the US for a resolution to the Yemen crisis
- International pressure from US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Oman
- Jeddah talks result in STC, GoY, Islah reconciliation
- Conflict fatigue and economic downturn
- Increasing risk of environmental disaster creates a platform for cooperation
- Internal divisions within the Houthis
- Houthis acknowledging the issue of SAFER oil terminal and allowing access to protect it

Estimated caseload

Reduces to 15 million people in need of humanitarian assistance (down from 24.1 million)

Humanitarian consequences

Many remain in need of humanitarian support, specifically food, shelter, water and protection, primarily due to their lack of income. Returnees will place stress on services, jobs, and water networks in former conflict areas. There will be a need to support livelihoods; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; social cohesion, and psychosocial support. Land rights issues also arise in some areas. GBV and harassment will continue until local authorities can gain control of law and order.

The health system continues to struggle and requires external support, especially to access medicines and equipment.

Interventions will need to focus on addressing sustainable access to water and electricity, livelihoods, and supporting effective local governance structures.

Operational constraints

Unexploded ordnance in areas along the former frontlines, especially in Hodeidah, Dhale’e, Taiz, Ibb, Amran restrict access. Local actors will maintain a large degree of authority. Humanitarians will need to continue to negotiate access at both local and national levels, while regional and national actors take time to sort out their roles and responsibilities.
Compounding factors

1. Disease outbreak

Waterborne diseases, combined with displacement, reduced access to water and health services, and poor hygiene practice, significantly increases the probability of a major disease outbreak which authorities would struggle to contain under any of the scenarios outlined in this report (especially scenarios 1 (major offensive), 3 (restrictions) and 4 (fragmentation)).

Cholera and acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) are ever-present in Yemen. An outbreak in 2017 saw more than 1.3 people infected and over 2,800 die. Over 400,000 AWD/suspected cholera cases were registered during the first half of 2109, more than during the whole of 2018. Diphtheria, measles and dengue fever are also endemic. A sharp decline in coverage of measles and rubella vaccination poses a substantial threat to people’s health ((UNICEF 2019, Hadramaut University 08/10/2018).

2. Natural disaster (cyclone; earthquake, volcanic eruption)

Yemen is prone to earthquakes, flash floods, floods (coastal storm surge and tsunami), landslides, rockslides, and volcanoes. The World Bank reports that at least one disaster strikes the country every year. In May 2018 Yemen was hit by cyclone 'Mekunu' sweeping through the island of Socotra, causing heavy floods and displacing over 60,000 people (World Bank 2010, UNICEF 05/2018).

3. Income loss: failed harvest

Agriculture in Yemen is subject to a number of threats (locust plagues, cyclones, droughts) while an oil spill in the Red Sea would severely shock the fishing industry. There are around 1.2 million landowners in Yemen, owning an average of 1.36 hectares. Domestic production satisfies a significant part of the population’s food needs and helps reduce poverty in rural communities. A failed harvest would directly impact up to 7 million people and contribute to food shortages.

4. Reduction in funding

Yemen is currently the largest humanitarian appeal by the UN, with a request for USD 4.2 billion in 2019. It is comparatively well funded, with 65% (USD 2.7 billion) secured as of 21 October 2019, against a global average of 48%. Donor fatigue, a new large-scale crisis in another part of the world, or major political changes among Yemen’s major donors, such as leadership change in Saudi or UAE (largest and third largest donors), or cuts to aid budgets in the US or UK (second and fourth largest donors) could reduce funding in the coming 18 months. Loss of donor confidence, or a major corruption scandal, could also see donor funds frozen or tightly earmarked to donor priorities. This could force a reduction in humanitarian operations, and potential backlash from local communities if not handled carefully, under any scenario (Financial Tracking System 21/10/2019).

5. Water – need for sustainable response options

The water availability in Yemen is 150 cubic metres per person per year (average of 1250m3 for MENA). All surface water and groundwater resources are exploited beyond the level of recharge. The agriculture industry uses 93% of Yemen’s potable water and does not actively encourage sustainable water saving techniques. Qat cultivation uses 40% of potable water. The water crisis could be mitigated by reducing qat production and promoting water reuse of treated wastewater for irrigation (Researchgate 2006).

In 2011, the rate of water consumption from the Sana’a Basin exceeded the rate of natural recharge by a factor of five. Much of the country’s 68 billion cubic meters of annual rainwater is wasted due to mismanagement and inadequate dams. Swift adoption of more sustainable water management policies should be prioritised immediately, irrespective of the status of the conflict.

6. Iran-US relations

The rising temperature of rhetoric between the US and Iran increases the risk that Yemen could be pulled into a broader regional conflict. This would particularly impact on scenario 1 (major offensive) and 4 (fragmentation), as a broader conflict in the region could distract attention from events in Yemen and provide coverage for more violence.

7. Oil spill

An oil spill in the Red Sea, resulting from an attack on an oil tanker in the strategic Bab Al Mandab strait, or an explosion on the SAFER oil terminal could completely wipe out Yemen’s Red Sea fishing industry for 25 years. Fishing currently employs 500,000 people who support 1.7 million dependants and brings in USD 60 million per year to Yemen’s economy. An oil spill could also block access to Al Hudaydah port, doubling food prices and increasing fuel prices by 800%.

8. Regulatory constraints

New sanctions, additional terrorist listings against the Houthis or other parties to the conflict, or further de-risking by the international banking sector will hamper humanitarian operations under any scenario. De-risking by the international community in 2010 cut off Yemeni banks from foreign exchange and introduced imbalances which continue to wreak havoc on prices in Yemen today. If the US lists the entire Houthis movement as a terrorist organisation (currently only its leaders are listed) or expands sanctions, humanitarian actors and traders will face additional challenges moving money and goods into Yemen.
Current situation

Security and Conflict

After more than four years of conflict, the fragmentation of the country and the complexity of the war is increasing. Yemen has split into three geographical regions, with the Houthis controlling the majority of the north, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) controlling part of the south (Aden and part of Abyan), and the internationally-backed and recognised Yemeni government (GoY) controlling the remainder of the south.

Some 233,000 people have died due to the conflict. Around 100,000 died as a direct consequence of violence, including at least 12,000 civilians. Over 130,000 people were killed by indirect consequences, such as lack of food, health services, and infrastructure (ACLED 21/10/2019, UNDP 23/04/2019).

The conflict re-opened old tensions between the 'north' and 'south'. The uneasy coalition loyal to the officially recognised GoY began to break down in 2018 and by August 2019 the STC were in direct conflict with GoY forces in Aden (then interim capital of Yemen). Al Qaeda, present in Yemen since the mid 2000s, took advantage of the conflict and briefly seized Al Mukallah in Hadramaut in 2015 before being pushed out by local forces. Sporadic attacks by Al Qaeda continue to occur in the south.

The Houthis have launched regular drone and missile attacks on Saudi infrastructure. With increasingly heated rhetoric between the US and Iran, there are concerns that Yemen could be drawn into a regional conflict.

Political Negotiations

The Stockholm agreement in December 2018 called for a ceasefire and redeployment of troops from Al Hudaydah, the opening of a humanitarian corridor, and a prisoner exchange. The agreement averted an all-out offensive on Al Hudaydah (CIMP 3/09/2019). However, Al Hudaydah remains the governorate with the highest level of civilian casualties, accounting for more than 30% of all casualties reported country wide (ACAPS 25/09/2019).

After the September attack on Aramco oil facility in Saudi Arabia, the Houthis announced they would stop cross border attacks if the Saudis would stop the war in Yemen and open the ports and airports. Saudi Arabia indicated a willingness to negotiate.

The UAE-Saudi Arabia-initiated Jeddah negotiations, aimed at resolving the conflict between GoY and STC are reportedly close to a deal, but it is unclear whether the two sides will be able to cooperate peacefully on the ground.

Displacement

Today over 3.65 million people are displaced in Yemen, the majority in Marib, Ta’iz, Hajjah and Al Hudaydah. Most new displacement in 2019 has been from Hajjah, Al Hudaydah, and Al Dali’. Conflict is the main driver of displacement in Yemen. Two-thirds of IDPs rent accommodation or are hosted by a relative. IDPs in informal settlements are most vulnerable. Those newly displaced in 2019 are increasingly forced into informal settlements as host communities reach the limit of support they can provide.

Governance and rule of law

The current conflict has fractured Yemen along regional lines. Former President Saleh’s oil-funded, patronage networks are unravelling and reforming along new lines. Local elites in Al Maharah, Hadramaut, Al Jawf and Marib (all sparsely populated, but large, resource rich areas of Yemen) primarily govern according to local priorities. Little, if any, of Marib’s gas, or Shabwa and Hadramaut’s oil, ends up in the GoY treasury. Local tribes in Amran, Al Jawf, Al Dali’, Abyan and Al Bayda often play a leading role in mediating disputes and supporting people in need. However, traditional tribal leaders are being replaced by a myriad of new sheikhs on the payroll of foreign countries.

International actors (particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE) are funding a wide network of local proxy forces in the south. Humanitarians, civilians and traders have to negotiate access through multiple checkpoints manned by militias that do not respond to the GoY. Northerners face particular risks at checkpoints.

The northern authorities have a greater degree of coherence, but many civilians report harassment if they leave Houthi controlled areas for work, to collect salaries, or to visit relatives. Women report harassment if they travel without a guardian. Men risk detention.
Journalists have been arrested and intimidated by all sides to the conflict.

**Demographics**

Yemen is the youngest and fastest growing country in MENA with a population estimated at 30.5 million people (HNO 2019) of whom 60% are under 20.

The social structure in the north is based on tribal allegiance, dominated by the four main tribes (Bakhil, Hashid, Bonu Harith, and Hamdan). Many smaller tribes exist although they are geographically limited social organisations with interests primarily focused on their own local territories and the relative balance of power in their locality (CTC).

The Houthi movement is a Shia’ Islamic political and armed movement that emerged from the elite Sayeds in Sa’dah in the 1990s in response to decades of underdevelopment and Salafi encroachment. Since then they have been in conflict with the GoY.

Minority groups within Yemen include around 500,000 Muhamasheen, historically low-class labourers who live mainly in urban areas and 2,000 Baha’i who fear persecution both by the Houthis and STC. Fewer than 500 Yemenis are estimated to be Christian and all practise in secret. Other minority groups include Ismailis, Indians, Somalis, and Turks.

100,000 migrants, predominantly from Ethiopia and Somalia, arrive annually en route to Saudi Arabia, with around 50,000 per year transiting out via Yemen.

**Socio-economic conditions**

Yemen has historically been one of the poorest countries in the Middle East. An estimated 78% of Yemenis were living below the national poverty line in 2016 (up from 34% in 2005).

The current conflict led to the end of oil exports, damage to economic assets and networks, and the flight of billions of dollars in capital (much of it to Egypt or the Gulf). UNDP estimates that, by the end of 2019, the conflict has cost Yemen USD 89 billion in lost economic output, reversing human development by 21 years.

Yemen is extremely dependent on imports, with more than 90% of key commodities entering Yemen through two ports, Al Hudaydah and Aden. Both are vulnerable to conflict related interruptions which cause shortages in fuel and food and push up prices. Overland trade to and from Saudi Arabia and Oman has reduced significantly due to border restrictions.

The Yemeni riyal has more than halved in value in the past five years, dropping from a little over YER200 to the USD pre-conflict to around YER 590 – 610 as of October 2019.

Since 2015, the north and south of Yemen have been engaged in economic competition, particularly to control hard currency. Saudi cash injections (over USD 2.2 billion) and better regulation by both Houthis and the GoY has helped to reduce currency fluctuation down from its peak of almost YER_300 in September 2018. However, economic competition between parties to the conflict to control hard currency (mainly aid and remittances) is a key driver of price fluctuations, particularly in fuel markets, and could spark future price rises if not handled carefully.

Because Yemen is so highly dependent on imports, any depreciation in the value of the Yemeni Rial is reflected almost directly in higher prices for consumers. Fuel prices are less directly tied to currency fluctuations, as the market is dominated by a small group of importers (Ahmad al-Essi dominates fuel imports in the south for example). Fuel shortages regularly spark protests and imports are subject to high levels of government intervention. (ACAPS 25/9/2019, World Bank 1/4/2019, Sana’a Centre 18/3/2019)

**Livelihoods and Food Insecurity**

Almost 16 million Yemenis, over half of the country, face severe acute food insecurity (IPC 3 – Crisis – or above) and over 20 million would be in need of urgent action without humanitarian food assistance.

Since 2015, the cost of living in Yemen has quadrupled while jobs have nearly halved. Food is available, but fewer and fewer Yemenis can afford to buy it. More than 40% of households have lost their primary income source and find it increasingly difficult to purchase their minimum food requirements. WFP reports that over a third of households in Yemen have inadequate food consumption.

Many Yemenis are employed in agriculture or low skilled work in the informal sector (68% of non-agricultural workers). Government salaries were a major source of income for almost a third of Yemeni workers pre-conflict, but few government officials have been paid consistently since 2015 (military personal have fared better). Female labour force participation is among the lowest in the world (6% in 2014). Many farmers have switched from food crops to Qat as it provides a higher rate of return, further exacerbating the water crisis as Qat requires more water than wheat or coffee.

Remittances play an important role in providing income to Yemenis, particularly from Yemenis in the Gulf and the US. ‘Saudisation’ policies in recent years have increased restrictions on Yemeni workers abroad and made it more challenging to transfer back salaries. However, remittances still likely inject USD 3 to 5 billion into the Yemeni economy each year. (UNDP 10/2019, World Bank 1/4/2019, ACAPS Oct 2019, WFP VAM, 48, 47, 46, 45, UNDP 10/2019, Sana’a Centre 18/03/2019, IPC 7/12/2008)

**Service Provision**

Fuel shortages, sporadic payment of public sector salaries, and conflict related damage to infrastructure have degraded Yemen’s infrastructure and social services.

An estimated 17.8 million people are without access to safe water and sanitation (up from 13m in 2014), and 19.7 million lack access to adequate healthcare (8.6m in 2014).

An estimated 19.7 million people lack access to basic healthcare in Yemen. Only 51% of health facilities are functioning due to staff shortages and lack of medicines, health
equipment, or access. Cases of communicable diseases such as cholera, diphtheria, measles, dengue, or chicken pox have re-emerged in Yemen since 2015. 57% of all deaths are attributed to non-communicable and chronic diseases aggravated by lack of access to health services and medicines.  (WHO Non-communicable Diseases (NCD) Countries Profile 2018)

Around 3.2 million Yemenis are acutely malnourished, including 2 million children below the age of five (up from 0.28m in 2014). At the same time, Yemen is grappling with outbreaks of preventable epidemics like cholera, diphtheria, measles and dengue fever.  (hNO 2019, World Bank 1/04/2019)

An estimated 4.7 million children are in need of education assistance and access to safe learning spaces and roughly 2 million children are out of school. Teachers in 10,000 schools (64%) are not being paid regularly and 2,000 schools have been damaged by conflict.  (hNO 2019, UNICEF 02/2019)

Protection

Yemen is facing a severe protection crisis, and civilians face serious risks to their safety, well-being, and basic rights. Movement restrictions are mainly affecting men as they are at a higher risk of being forcibly deported or detained. As a result, there have been reports of women having to travel alone to access services, increasing their risk of gender-based violence on the road or at checkpoints. 32% of children are married before their 18th birthday. Girls are increasingly being married off as a part of coping mechanism for their families. (Girlsnotbrides, 2019).

The conflicts in Aden and other southern governorates have increased protection concerns for people from the north residing in the south: since 2 August 2019, ‘northerners’ were subject to targeted killings, arrest, detention, physical assault, verbal abuse, seizure of personal valuables, forced closure of businesses and deportation by STC aligned forces. (ACAPS 25/09/2019).

Humanitarian Access

Yemen is one of the least accessible humanitarian crises in the world according to ACAPS global access ranking. Humanitarian operations face constraints along all aspects of the programme cycle, from gaining visas and permits, selecting beneficiaries, and monitoring projects. Humanitarian organisations reported 299 access incidents in June and July 2019, affecting 4.9 million people in need. 66 NGO projects were awaiting sub-agreements from local authorities, with the average wait exceeding 100 days. Funding shortfalls have affected humanitarian operations in 2019, particularly vaccination, shelter, and nutrition programmes. Late dispensals of funding from major donors such as UAE and Saudi Arabia put at risk at least 22 life-saving programmes amounting up to 19 million people. (OCHA 06/07/2019, Office of the RC/HC 21/08/2019).

The recent fighting in Aden disrupted the airport and port, temporarily restricting commercial and humanitarian imports and limiting access to medical services for Yemenis who needed to travel abroad to access medical services (the alternative airport, Sayun in Hadramaut, is over 24 hours’ drive on bad roads from Sana’a).

Stakeholders

Houthis (Ansar Allah): Emerged in Yemen as the opposition movement “Believing Youth Group” in the early 1990s protesting against social and economic marginalisation and Salafi encroachment on the Zaidi northern highlands. Between 2004 and 2010, the Houthis and the government fought six Sa’ada wars in northern Yemen. The Houthis participated in the Arab Spring in 2011 and the National Dialogue Conference, but kept hold of their weapons and built alliances, including with former President Saleh (until the breakdown in the relationship saw Saleh killed in December 2017). In September 2014, the Houthis seized Yemen’s capital Sana’a and swiftly expanded their control, almost capturing Aden in 2015. As of October 2019, the Houthis control the majority of northwest Yemen, including its capital Sana’a and 70% of the population. (ECFR 01/07/2019).

Internationally Recognised Government of Yemen (GoY): During the Arab Spring in 2011, President Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to step down, ending 33 years of rule. Abdu-Rabu Mansour Hadi became president in 2012. When Houthis seized the capital, Hadi resigned and fled to Saudi Arabia in January 2015. Saudi backing, including financial support, is key to the GoY’s survival. The Hadi government is the only government recognised by the international community. The GoY lost the southern capital, Aden, to STC forces in August 2019. The Riyadh agreement of 6 November 2019 appears to have put the GOY back in control, but implementation could be challenging.

Southern Transitional Council (STC): Ostensibly an ally to the GoY under the Saudi led Coalition, the STC seized control of Aden on 10 August 2019 on a pro-southern separatist and anti-Islah agenda. Southern groups retain historic grievances against Islah dating back to the violent North-South reunification in 1994. The Southern Transitional Council was formed by politicians, tribal leaders, and military figures on 11 May 2017. It harks back to the Hirak southern separatist movement of 2007. Other southern separatist groups sit outside the STC and view its rise to power with suspicion. STC is heavily backed by the United Arab Emirates. Armies aligned to the STC are the dominant force in many areas of the south, particularly Aden and Al Dhale’e. The Saudi led Riyadh agreement of 6 November 2019 granted STC a formal role in the government alongside the GOY, but implementation could be challenging. (Sana’a Centre 6/11/2019).

Islah: Formed in 1990 from tribal, Muslim brotherhood and Salafi elements. General Ali Mohsen, the current Vice President and second most powerful man in Yemen behind Saleh for 33 years, is closely associated with Islah. The party has close ties to Saudi Arabia. It is widely mistrusted by the UAE but has cooperated with UAE forces at the tactical level, including the 2018 offensive on Al Hudaydah. Southern groups have never
forgiven Ali Mohsen and his Islahi allies for their role in the violent takeover of Aden in 1994. Islah is the major force in Marib and parts of Taiz.

General People’s Congress (GPC): Saleh’s political party, the GPC functioned as a key patronage network and the main avenue for advancement for millions of Yemenis throughout Saleh’s 33 years of rule. Although it no longer plays a formal role in governing Yemen, the GPC retains a strong network across the country. The party is currently split between three groups with factions supporting President Hadi, others lining up behind former President Saleh’s son, Ahmed Ali, and a third faction still operating in Houthi controlled areas under Saleh Amin Abu Ras.

Al-Qaeda & IS in Yemen: The Yemen based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), is considered one of al-Qaeda’s most effective branches. During Yemen's Arab Spring in 2011, AQAP seized parts of the southern governorates of Abyan and Al Bayda. An Emirati-backed military offensive in spring 2016 succeeded in forcing AQAP to give up control of most of these territories. Nevertheless, the group still has a presence in many areas of the country including Hadramaut and Shabwah. At the same time, the Islamic State has exploited the deteriorating security situation in Yemen to establish a foothold in the country, particularly in the south. AQAP and ISIS are increasingly fighting each other in Al Bayda governorate (ECFR 01/07/2019).

Saudi Arabia: With the Houthis poised to take Aden in March 2015, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition of nine Arab countries, armed and funded local forces, deployed Sudanese ground troops, imposed an air and naval blockade and launched a ferocious air campaign which pushed back the Houthi offensive. Saudi budget support ($2.2 billion in the last 12 months) and extensive funding for the GOY military has played a crucial role in preventing the collapse of Yemen’s economy. Saudi is also a major aid donor, providing $3 billion in aid since 2015, more than half of it to humanitarian appeals. The Saudi led coalition split in August 2019, with Saudi backed forces squaring off against the UAE backed STC in Aden. The Saudi led Riyadh peace process reunified the warring parties on 6 November 2019, but implementation could be difficult (FTS 6/11/2019, Sana’a Centre 6/11/2019).

UAE: The UAE has heavily supported southern separatist forces, particularly in strategic locations in the south such as Aden, Al Mukallah and Soqotra. UAE backed forces played a key role in pushing Al Qaeda out of Al Mukallah in late 2016 and the push towards Al Hudaydah in mid 2018. UAE’s backing of the STC takeover of Aden in August 2019 strained relations with Saudi. UAE announced it was withdrawing from Yemen in early 2019 but would continue to support ‘counter-terrorism’, signalling a likely ongoing role in affairs in the south and centre of the country. The UAE is also a major donor, reporting $4 billion in aid since 2015, though most of its contributions go through the UAE Red Crescent and Emirati NGOs (only 22% of UAE funding goes through the UN appeals) (FTS 6/11/2019).

Iran: Iran’s support for the Houthis is often exaggerated, feeding into the broader narrative of an existential Shia-Sunni power struggle for the region favoured by hardline elements on both sides. Iran played no significant role in the Houthis rise and early military successes. However, most commentators do see evidence of growing (but small scale) financial and technical support from Iran in recent years. Iran has also provided strong political support for the Houthis, signing agreements to establish regular air services (currently blocked by the Saudi air embargo) and formally recognising a Houthi ambassador to Tehran on 24 August 2019 (Middle East Institute 06/12/2018, Panel of Experts 01/2019).

US/UK: The US and its Western allies have led a long running covert drone programming targeting Al Qaeda and ISIS in central Yemen, prompting a backlash from local tribes over civilian casualties. The US heavily supplied the Yemeni armed forces to increase their counter-terrorism capacity throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Much of this equipment is now in Houthi hands. The US and its allies continue to provide political and logistical support to Saudi and UAE operations, despite domestic opposition. The US is the second largest donor to Yemen behind Saudi, providing $2.4 billion since 2015. UK is the fourth, ($1.66 billion since 2015). The US coordinates policy on Yemen with the UK, Saudi and UAE through the Quad (FTS 6/11/2019).

This analysis benefited from support by the IMEDA programme, a UK Aid project funded by the UK government.

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1 Zaidism, which the core of the Houthi movement follow, technically falls under the Shia branch of Islam. However, in practice it is ideologically closer to mainstream branches of Sunni Islam. Religion is not a major factor in the conflict, Zaidis and Sunni Shafais can be found on all sides.
### Scenarios triggers

Scenario 1 = Major offensive against the Houthis  
Scenario 2 = Economic warfare  
Scenario 3 = Fracturing of conflict: increased violence and displacement  
Scenario 4 = Continuing low-level conflict: failure of humanitarian access negotiations  
Scenario 5 = Continuing low-level conflict; breakthrough in humanitarian access negotiations  
Scenario 6 = Successful peace deal: unity government

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<tr>
<th>Scenarios:</th>
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<th>Background information</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian access is likely to <strong>deteriorate</strong> if:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Houthi attack(s) on Saudi Arabia cause civilian casualties</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Houthi suspended their attacks on Saudi territory in September. Previous attacks caused limited civilian casualties. Attack on the Abha airport 12 June injured 26 civilians and killed one (BBC 24/06/2019).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Houthi attack(s) cause major damage to oil exports</td>
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<td>September attack on the Saudi Aramco oil facility, claimed by Houthis despite international scepticism, resulted in losses of around 5% of global oil supply and price of oil increasing temporarily by up to 20% (France24 16/09/2019).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stockholm peace process is declared a failure by one or more parties to the conflict</td>
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<td>The Stockholm Agreement remains in effect since 13 December 2018, despite many reported violations. Its biggest success has been halting a full scale offensive on Al Hudaydah, but it remains largely unimplemented (ACAPS 8/07/2019).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jeddah talks reconcile the STC, GoY and Islah in a new push against the North</td>
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<td>On 25 October STC and the GoY reached a preliminary deal (Riyadh Agreement), but the GoY delayed signing as fighting resumed in the southern province of Abyan in the end of October (Almasdar 27/10/2019).</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Saudi-led coalition announce their intention to retake Al Hudaydah</td>
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<td>In October 2019, UAE withdrew its forces from Aden, allowing Saudi Arabia to reposition and reinforce their military forces. However, UAE continues to hold influence over STC, and the tensions between southern separatists and the Saudi-supported GoY were not fully addressed. Al Soqotra is a key area of competition (MiddleEastEye 31/10/2019).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudis and Emiratis align strategy in the south, freeing up forces for a new offensive North</td>
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<tr>
<td>US provides political endorsement for a renewed Saudi offensive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran-US conflict provides cover for more violence in Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reduced capacity of money lenders/banks to provide liquidity to the private sector and humanitarians</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reduced capacity of the Central Bank to carry out its functions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Bank moves to Shabwah, but staff are unable to relocate</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inflation runs out of control</td>
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<td>The inflation rate for Yemen was 24.7% in 2017 and 41.8% in 2018 (statistica.com).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudis stop depositing, or reduce deposits, in the Central Bank</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>Saudi deposited two billion dollars to the Central Bank of Yemen in 2018 to regulate Yemeni market and currency. Currently, around 800 million dollars remain in the treasury. Saudi Arabia has the next deposit on hold to pressure both sides to sign the Riyadh Agreement (Almasdar 28/10/2019).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian access is likely to <strong>deteriorate if:</strong></td>
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<td>Background information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reduction in international humanitarian funding to the Yemen response</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Current funding to Yemen I 2019 is USD 3.36bn (88.1% via the HRP). (fts)</td>
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<tr>
<td>New sanctions or restrictions imposed on the Yemeni banking sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>De-risking agenda: international banks decide to further restrict banking transactions with Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Bank shuts down SWIFT accounts for major banks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Bank continues to print money to finance its debts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jeddah talks fail</td>
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<tr>
<td>STC expands to Shabwah leading to sustained conflict in the south</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda and IS continue to push towards Al Mukalla port triggering a US response</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict continues in Taiz between GoY-aligned forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia enlists the support of additional foreign forces (likely Sudanese)</td>
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<td>On 30 October it was reported that Sudanese forces started withdrawing from Yemen (Apnews 30/10/2019). This might be to pressure Saudi Arabia to deliver financial incentives to Sudan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE enlists the support of additional foreign forces to support the STC</td>
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<td>There is currently no evidence of UAE funding foreign (i.e. non-Yemeni) troops in the Yemen conflict.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran provides additional support to the Houthis</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>The most common support from Iran is technical expertise on weapons and strategy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased regional tension (Saudi Arabia/UAE/Iran)</td>
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<tr>
<td>New tribal sheiks, funded by foreign powers, push out traditional leaders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased sanctions against the Houthis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased bureaucratic constraints</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased corruption</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change in conflict dynamics: targeting of humanitarian actors</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian banking access impeded</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Widespread interference and restrictions of movement continue across the country. Interference in the implementation of humanitarian activities (e.g. beneficiary registration, restrictions on national staff movements) were the most common access challenges reported in June and July 2019. (OCHA June – July 2019)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased interference in aid delivery by local authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased restrictions on aid programming, or restrictive compliance rules, imposed by donors</td>
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<tr>
<td>US Office of Inspector General investigation results in humanitarian organisations shut down or scaling back in Yemen</td>
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## Scenarios:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian access is likely to improve if:</strong></td>
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<td>Humanitarian negotiations successfully reduce bureaucratic constraints</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>Lengthy delays by the authorities in approving projects continue to obstruct the scale-up of the humanitarian response. The average delay is more than 100 days from the date the sub-agreements are submitted to the authorities (OCHA June – July 2019).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of active conflict areas reduce</td>
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<td>Improved local governance results in improved local security</td>
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<td>Coordination of humanitarian access between local and central authorities improves</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improved access for humanitarian organisations leads to fairer and cheaper financial services</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political interference in humanitarian programming and beneficiary selection reduces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ease of passage through checkpoints improves</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional push for de-escalation of tensions between US and Iran succeeds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public opinion and lobbying in the US for a resolution to the Yemen crisis increases</td>
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<tr>
<td>International pressure from US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Oman for a resolution increases</td>
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<tr>
<td>STC and GoY come to an agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict fatigue and economic downturn reduces the capacity or will to fight</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increasing risk of environmental disaster creates a platform for cooperation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal divisions within the Houthis reduce the capacity or will to fight</td>
<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>The Houthis movement is divided internally with moderate and hard-line camps competing for influence. The influence of hard-line groups has reportedly been increasing in recent months. This is impacting on humanitarian agencies as hard-line Houthis are more likely to impose administrative and access constraints on humanitarian actors (ICG 28/01/2019).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houthis acknowledge the issue of SAFER oil terminal and allow access to protect it</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>The Safer floating storage and offloading terminal, estimated to contain around 1.14m barrels of crude oil, has not been operational since March 2015 when the region fell under the control of the Houthis. Corrosion, cessation of the heating/cooling systems, and lack of maintenance may result in a significant oil spill or fire.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Background information:**

- Lengthy delays by the authorities in approving projects continue to obstruct the scale-up of the humanitarian response. The average delay is more than 100 days from the date the sub-agreements are submitted to the authorities (OCHA June – July 2019).
- The Houthis movement is divided internally with moderate and hard-line camps competing for influence. The influence of hard-line groups has reportedly been increasing in recent months. This is impacting on humanitarian agencies as hard-line Houthis are more likely to impose administrative and access constraints on humanitarian actors (ICG 28/01/2019).
- The Safer floating storage and offloading terminal, estimated to contain around 1.14m barrels of crude oil, has not been operational since March 2015 when the region fell under the control of the Houthis. Corrosion, cessation of the heating/cooling systems, and lack of maintenance may result in a significant oil spill or fire.