

SUDAN

Escalation of violence

Since President Al-Bashir was overthrown in early April a transitional military council (TMC) has been in place. Talks between members of military and civil society with the stated intention of forming an interim government seem unlikely to progress. Demonstrations against military rule are ongoing as people call for a transfer of power to civilians. Since the demonstrations started in December 2018, protestors have faced severe human rights violations committed by Sudanese security forces. The situation escalated on 3 June when security forces violently raided peaceful sit-ins outside the military headquarters in Khartoum. On 3 June, at least 118 people were killed, more than 780 people injured and at least 70 rape cases reported. Protection concerns in Khartoum and elsewhere remain extremely high, as security forces continue to violently repress protestors.

The chaotic political and security situation in Khartoum is seemingly spreading to other parts of the country. Since mid-May an increase in incidents of civil unrest, including inter-communal fighting sometimes involving refugees or IDPs, and clashes between armed groups and security forces have been reported in Darfur, Kassala, South Kordofan and White Nile. A quick resolution for a peaceful transition to a civilian-led government is very unlikely. The economic crisis that began early 2018, is drastically worsening, and further exacerbating humanitarian need including access and availability of health care and food.

CrisisInSight

We have identified three crises in Sudan: **Complex crisis, South Sudanese refugees, and Eritrean refugees.**

This recent escalation of violence risks exacerbating the Complex crisis in Sudan which currently scores **3.6/5 severity rating in the INFORM Global Crisis Severity Index.**

[See more about Sudan](#)

Anticipated scope and scale

The situation remains highly insecure. It is unlikely that talks between protestors and the transitional military council (TMC) will agree on a peaceful solution soon. **Security forces are likely to continue to commit acts of violence and human rights violations against civilians.** The overall security situation is likely to worsen if the TMC splits in two competing factions and begins to vie for power. As has happened, a deteriorating security situation in Khartoum may have further knock on effects in other parts of the country. Various armed groups active across Sudan may become more likely to take advantage of the chaos and attempt to reinforce their own standing through violent means. There is therefore an **increased risk of an escalation** of countrywide.

Floods caused by rains with the start of the approaching raining season (June to September) will increase the need of humanitarian response.

Key priorities



+118 killed, 780 wounded
following events of 3 June



High protection concerns
as security situation is volatile



High health needs
due to limited medical supplies

Humanitarian constraints



Access is very limited in Sudan. Many humanitarian workers were evacuated from Khartoum and elsewhere following the escalation of violence at the beginning of June. Humanitarian operations, especially in Darfur, have been suspended until security improves. Road blocks, strikes at ports and administrative burdens challenge the delivery of aid. The Internet has been shut down since 10 June.

Limitations

Detailed security updates are missing. Information about ongoing humanitarian operations in Sudan is lacking. The situation in conflict affected areas, especially in Darfur, remains unclear. The total number of people killed and injured in the protests since December 2018 is not available.

Crisis impact

After four months of demonstrations President Al-Bashir was ousted on 11 April 2019 and the Transitional Military Council (TMC) took power. Protests quickly spread countrywide as people called for the TMC to transfer power to civilians (ACLEL 24/05/2019). Negotiations to hand over power have stalled and the TMC shows little commitment to a regime change. Meanwhile, the security forces, mainly the Rapid Sudan Forces (RSF), continue to respond to the ongoing but peaceful demonstrations with excessive force (International Crisis Group 05/2019; Human Rights Watch 07/06/2019; Sudan Tribune 15/06/2019).

The TMC consists of members of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This includes the new Vice President who is head of the RSF, and along with other members of the TMC is linked to war crimes committed in Darfur (see section “key drivers of the conflict”, p. 5) (The New York Times 15/06/2019; BBC 05/06/2019).

On June 3 at around 6 am., the RSF, stormed the peaceful sit-ins and violently dispersed unarmed protesters in front of the military headquarters in Khartoum, as well as in nine other provinces in Sudan. It is estimated that close to 10,000 RSF soldiers were involved in the violent events in Khartoum (Sudanrise, via Instagram, 12/06/2019). On 9 June, the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA) called for national civil disobedience and a countrywide strike. From 9 to 11 June, many hospitals, banks, ports, shops, as well as some ministries were closed countrywide. Both security forces and protesters blocked roads and public transport was barely functioning (Al Jazeera 14/06/2019; OCHA 09/06/2019; Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 11/06/2019; Amnesty International 13/06/2019; Sudan Tribune 15/06/2019). The ‘campaign of disobedience’ had an estimated response rate of 80-90% of civilians in Sudan (Radio Dabanga 12/06/2019). An Internet shut down in place since 10 June makes it harder to access information and therefore understand the evolving security situation (DW 14/06/2019; Al Jazeera 16/06/2019; The New Humanitarian 14/06/2019).

In Khartoum, the total number of people killed in the events linked to 3 June is at least 118. Dead bodies have been found in the river Nile. At least 784 people have been reported as injured and many people have been raped amidst the recent violence. Higher numbers of wounded people and incidents of sexual and gender based violence (SGVB) must be assumed, as cases remain unreported (UN Security Council 11/06/2019; The Guardian 11/06/2019; Amnesty International 04/06/2019). At least four additional people were killed by security forces during the strike from 9 to 11 June (UPI 10/06/2019; RFI 10/06/2019).

Across Sudan, an increase in violent incidents has been reported since 3 June. This includes attacks on refugees, renewed and intensified inter-communal and/or armed group violence in eastern Sudan as well as in Darfur. Tensions and fear among civilians are rising as some members of the TMC were perpetrators of the Darfur genocide and other conflicts in Sudan (OCHA 11/06/2019; The Independent 10/06/2019; The New York Times 15/06/2019).

In Darfur, in particular there has been a spike in violent incidents. At least 4,000 people (900 families) have been displaced in violent attacks and burning of houses in Darfur (ECHO 15/06/2019). Since 3 June an increase in civilian casualties as a result of live ammunition have been reported due to violent activities between SLA-AW (Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdel Wahid Al Nur (SLM-AW)), splinter factions and continuous clashes between the SLA-AW and RSF/Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) (OCHA 09/06/2019). On 9 June intercommunal clashes between nomads and residents resulted in at least 17 fatalities, 18 injuries and more than 100 houses burnt in Deleij village (OCHA 13/06/2019; Reuters 14/06/2019). Local media linked this event to RSF attacks (Radio Dabanga 12/06/2019). Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), part of the TMC, have been deployed, but the situation remains tense in many rural areas in Central Darfur. In East Darfur, in East of El Daein, on 5 and 6 June intercommunal fighting resulted in at least five people killed and 15 people injured (OCHA 13/06/2019). As UNAMID (Joint UN/African Union Mission in Darfur) is already retreating and due to withdraw in 2020, if not decided differently on 27 June, IPD camps have been handed over to the government, administered by RSF commanders (UN Security Council 14/06/2019; Amnesty International 11/06/2019; OCHA 11/06/2019; AAWSAT 12/06/2019). On 14 June, however, UNAMID suspended the handover of IDP camps in Darfur due to the worsening security situation in the country, raising tension with the TMC who reject the postponing of UNAMID’s exit (UN News 14/06/2019; Washington Post 15/06/2019).

In East Kassala State, several inter-tribal clashes between refugees in different refugee camps were reported on 5 and 6 June, killing at least 5 people and injuring at least 31 (OCHA 11/06/2019).

Protection. Human rights violations are frequent in Sudan with unknown numbers of protestors facing excessive violence and being exposed to arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, and killings. Between December 2018 and 13 June 2019, at least 208 protestors were killed, and over 2,000 protestors arbitrarily arrested and detained by the National Intelligence Security Service (NISS) (The New York Times 15/06/2019; Human Rights Watch, accessed 10/06/2019; Al Jazeera 20/04/2019; ACLED 24/05/2019; Sudan Tribune 15/06/2019, Amnesty international 13/06/2019). Social media sources state that around 650 people have been arrested and over 1,000 people missing since 3 June (MEMO 12/06/2019; Sudanrise, via Instagram, 12/06/2019). These numbers are based on estimations and are most likely higher in reality. Several people have reportedly died after being tortured in custody (Human Rights Watch 11/06/2019; ACLED 24/05/2019).

State-affiliated security forces are patrolling the streets in Khartoum and twin city Omdurman to subdue protests, increasing protection concerns of civilians. Since the 3 June events, a drastic increase of cases of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) has been reported. Around 70 cases were reported in the immediate aftermath of the violent events in Khartoum. The full extent of SGBV is unknown. Both, men and women have

been targeted (The Guardian 11/06/2019; The New York Times 15/06/2019). In (central) Jebel Marra locality where the SLA-AW and RSF/SAF have been fighting, sexual violence, abduction and torture against local population by both sides have been increasing (OCHA 09/06/2019; UNICEF 11/06/2019).

Members of the host community attacked South Sudanese refugees in and around Khartoum and Omdurman on 6 and 7 June, causing secondary displacement for some refugees as their homes were looted. The two separate attacks on South Sudanese refugees in Khartoum caused at least three deaths and 64 injuries, including cases of SGBV (OCHA 09/06/2019; ECHO 15/06/2019).

Health: Access to health facilities is severely limited. On 3 June, ambulances and wounded people were prevented from reaching hospitals. Hospitals have been looted and health personnel have been receiving threats by security forces (NRP 10/06/2019; OCHA 07/06/2019). As of 13 June out of 14 main hospitals in Khartoum, 13 resumed worked and only one remains closed (OCHA 13/06/2019; The New Humanitarian 14/06/2019). Concerns over access to medical treatments are high as the economic crisis directly affects the availability of essential medicines, other supplies and qualified doctors (ECHO 05/06/2019; WHO 07/06/2019). The availability of life-saving maternal health commodities (rehydration, spinal anesthesia for caesarian section, etc.) is limited in most public hospitals (OCHA 11/06/2019). OCHA estimates that a minimum of 500,000 people could be directly affected by medical shortages in the coming weeks. Maternal services are of particular concern, putting an estimated additional 280,000 people at risk (WHO 07/06/2019; OCHA 08/06/2019; OCHA 09/06/2019).

Shelter and NFIs: Gangs in urban areas, particularly in Omdurman and Khartoum have been looting private property (OCHA 09/06/2019). The number of affected people remains unknown. Intertribal fighting, involving the burning of 100 houses in Deleij village, Central Darfur, leaves people in need of shelter and NFI support (OCHA 13/06/2019; Reuters 14/06/2019).

Livelihoods: As the security situation in urban areas remains fragile, many shops and markets remain closed. The volatile political situation, resulting in an environment of uncertainty has a direct impact on trade, especially those businesses that depend on partners outside Khartoum. If security does not improve in rural areas, planting (typically from June to July) may be interrupted. An already below average harvest is expected due to fuel shortages (FEWS NET 05/2019).

Food: The deteriorating security situation resulting in less access to fields and markets will affect food security levels in Sudan. At least 5.57 million people in Sudan, 13% of its total population depends on food assistance (OCHA 01/03/2019). Food prices are constantly rising, currently at 280-350% above average (Fewsnet 04/2019; OCHA 22/05/2019). Around 124,000 IDPs in SPLM-N controlled areas South Kordofan and in the Jebel Marra, Darfur,

are already at high risk of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food security outcomes at the peak of the lean season (August/September, see map on p. 7) (FEWS NET 05/2019).

Education: Some schools have been targeted, looted and destroyed. Some schools have consequently closed since the recent escalation security deterioration and it remains unclear how accessible and operational educational facilities are, particularly in Khartoum (UNICEF 11/06/2019; The New Humanitarian 14/06/2019).

Vulnerable groups affected

Protection concerns are high for activists, political leaders, members of the opposition Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) and civilians affiliated with the protests. The total number of people protesting remains unclear. Sit-ins in Khartoum counted between 5,000-10,000 in April and May (Radio Dabanga 12/06/2019; PressTV 15/04/2019; BBC 09/04/2019; Sudanrise, via Instagram, 12/06/2019).

In total 8 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Sudan (ECHO 05/06/2019). Food insecurity levels are high after more than a year of continuous price rises and reduced harvests. People with already heightened vulnerabilities, in particular those living in conflict-affected areas, will be affected most by the recession and access constraints to basic services (FEWS NET 05/2019). IPDs, returnees and refugees, especially unaccompanied minors, are at heightened risk of discrimination and anger from hosting communities. In light of the attacks on South Sudanese refugees in Khartoum, UNHCR advised refugees especially in urban areas to limit their movements (OCHA 08/06/2019; OCHA 11/06/2019).

Pregnant and lactating women are particularly vulnerable as access to adequate health services and treatment is decreasing.

In times of increased intercommunal fighting and an increase of armed group activity youth, especially males in rural areas, are at higher risk of recruitment. There are reports of children being detained, recruited to fight and being exposed to sexual abuse in relation to the events of 3 June (UNICEF 11/06/2019).

Humanitarian and operational constraints

Humanitarian response and ongoing operations in Sudan have been heavily impacted by the increased security concerns in Sudan. Some UN officers and humanitarian workers have been evacuated Khartoum but it remains unknown to what extent international staff have been relocated (The New Humanitarian 14/06/2019).

On 3 June the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), an arm of Sudan's intelligence service and known for interfering with aid work, was looted in Khartoum. Some aid workers had their passports stolen whilst they were still being processed by the HAC for visas (OCHA 08/06/2019; The New Humanitarian 14/06/2019). Warehouses on several occasions in

Darfur region have also been looted. Furthermore, due to the strikes humanitarian organisations are facing increased administrative burdens when importing goods from Port Sudan, due to long customs clearance and obtaining correct documentation. Although customs have been operating again since 12 June delays are still reported (OCHA 08/06/2019; OCHA 11/06/2019).

At other borders, there have also been some delays reported (OCHA 09/06/2019). Transportation remains limited in Sudan as protestors set up temporary roadblocks. In Kassala and North Darfur access to refugees and IDP camps due to military interferences is restricted since 3 June. Roadblocks hinder the effective delivery of aid (OCHA 11/06/2019).

The security situation has forced many NGOs and agencies to evacuate their personnel. This has placed some projects on hold including in Kalma and Beliel camp, South Darfur, hosting a total of 128,000 IPDs. Most humanitarian assistance has been temporarily suspended in these areas after a series of violent incidents took place at the end of May (OCHA 08/06/2019; OCHA 10/06/2019).

Since the 3 June events, access to telecommunication has been severely limited with a complete Internet blackout since 10 June, hampering humanitarian response (Netblocks 10/06/2019; The New Humanitarian 14/06/2019). Information about the security situation remains unclear.

Cash and fuel shortages attributed to the economic crisis as well as general strikes are hindering humanitarian operations (OCHA 11/06/2019).

Aggravating factors

Economic crisis

Sudan has faced an economic crisis since the beginning of 2018, resulting in continuously rising prices and shortages of essential items including cash, medicines, fuel, and flour. Deteriorating living standards triggered countrywide demonstrations in December and finally led to the ouster of Al-Bashir, ruling president for 30 years. Protesters do not believe that the TMC will holistically address the economic challenges. With no functioning government, the economic crisis is likely to worsen. Foreign investment is unlikely as the country is expected to remain classified as a 'state sponsor of terror'. Continuous strikes and high-security concerns are exacerbating the risks of a drastic economic decline, especially when the oil trades with South Sudan, one of Sudan's major income source, is affected (ACAPS 13/02/2019; Al Jazeera 14/06/2019). For further details read [ACAPS's report on Sudan's economic crisis](#).

Start of the rainy season

Sudan is prone to heavy rainfall causing floods. With the start of the rainy season (June to September), torrential rainfall and storms have caused damage to houses and livestock in Darfur. On 4 June in Tawilla, North Darfur, rain and flooding destroyed at minimum of 485 homes affecting 2,470 IPDs and further damaging 760 houses. The destruction of latrines constitute an immediate health threat. On 7 June in Leiba East Jebel Marra, South Darfur, 300 to 400 houses of IDPs and returnees were destroyed by torrential rainfall. A total of 11 people have been injured and schools, health facilities and latrines have been damaged. These events put stress on the already high vulnerability of IPDs and returnees. With no or limited government and humanitarian response, these events can add to rising tensions among civilians (OCHA 09/06/2019; OCHA 13/06/2019; Radio Dabanga 12/06/2019; UN NEWS 14/06/2019).

Contextual information

Key drivers of the conflict

Fractions of the old regime still in power, yet divided

The new military government that came into power after 11 April, faces much distrust from the Sudanese population as its current members have strong ties to the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Many members were involved in severe human rights violations under Al-Bashir's regime (The New York Times 15/06/2019; International Crisis Group 05/2019; The Independent 10/06/2019; Sudan Tribune 15/06/2019).

On 4 June, the TMC announced plans to form a government and hold elections in nine months. Critics state that this time period is not long enough to facilitate and organise fair elections (Al Jazeera 4/06/2019; Sudanrise, via Instagram, 12/06/2019). In general, high scepticism remains over whether al-Burhan, head of the TMC, intends to facilitate this transition (Crisis Group International 07/06/2019; Al Jazeera 20/04/2019). The stronghold of the TMC is fragile. It is widely thought that the Vice-President Dagalo, known as Hemedti and leader of the RSF, is the power behind the scene due to relations to foreign governments, including US and EU diplomats (BBC 05/06/2019). In early June al-Burhan seemed to initiate restarting talks with the opposition alliance FFC The RSF and other factions of the TMC reportedly disapproved of this, as it would promise too much power to civilians. Consequently the RSF disperse the protesters without consulting al-Burhan (Crisis Group International 07/06/2019; The New York Times 15/06/2019; Sudan Tribune 15/06/2019). This however remains speculative. It is possible that Sudan's TMC may split and different factions vie for power.

Risk of armed groups taken advantage of the political chaos

The unrest in Khartoum creates a general atmosphere of chaos in Sudan. In a situation of increasing instability, it is more likely that armed groups are motivated to take advantage of the fragile political context and growing social unrest and become more active in attempt to reassert their own positioning. Clashes with security forces may intensify raising protection concerns for civilians living in the affected areas, especially because there are no longer any ceasefire agreements in place with any armed group in Sudan. Without a stable government in place, there is a high risk of the general security situation descending countrywide. Furthermore, armed groups joining the talks between TMC and the opposition alliance FFC may cause tensions among other parties.

Key Stakeholder

Transitional Military Council (TMC): General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan is the current head of the TMC and leader of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). The SAF and the RSF joined to form the transitional government put in place on 13 April after Al-Bashir's ouster on 11 April in order to facilitate an ordinary handover of power to civilians and creating of democratic leadership. The initial time period of the current TMC was set to be three years as agreed on 15 May. The TMC is backed by other elements of the security forces, including the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) (Al Jazeera 13/06/2019; BBC 05/06/2019; Sudan Tribune 15/06/2019).

Sudan Armed Forces (SAF): The SAF include land, navy and air forces. It is estimated to comprise around 80,000 troops, more than half of whom are stationed in the Darfur region. Al-Burhan, the head of the TMC, is leading the SAF, too. Historically the SAF have received financial support, and been provided arms by Russia and China (Sudan Tribune 2019; World Factbook 2019).

Rapid Sudanese Forces (RSF): The RSF is a militia group that was created in 2013 to help the government to defeat opposition armed groups, primarily active in the Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The RSF evolved from groups that were armed by the government in 1980s. Members of the group are generally considered as responsible for having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity during the war in Darfur. The RSF is under command of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) but since some time it has been questioned as to how much influence the NISS still has (BBC 05/06/2019; The New York Times 15/06/2019). RSF troops are estimated to comprise more than 10,000 (The Independent 10/06/2019). Some reports estimates 50,000 to 70,000 people. The latter number includes troops fighting for Saudi Arabia in Yemen (The New York Times 15/06/2019; Sudanrise, via Instagram, 12/06/2019).

The RSF is headed by General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. He has been a close ally to previous president al-Bashir. The RSF is mainly responsible for the human rights violations against protesters since December 2018. Due to his coalitions in

Saudi Arabia, and with the funding from the EU allocated for migration control under the Khartoum process he is estimated to be the most powerful men in Sudan (France 24 05/06/2019; Sudanrise, via Instagram, 12/06/2019, The New York Times 15/06/2019).

Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC): The FFC is an alliance of main opposition parties, including traditional political parties, the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA), a group of doctors, health workers and lawyers, who mainly organised the protests, as well as active armed group movements, united under the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) (Paanuelwel 11/06/2019; Crisis Group International 07/06/2019; Al Jazeera 10/06/2019). On 10 June the FFC announced eight members, including a potential prime minister, to form part of a transitional government (Reuters 10/06/2019). The FFC is a fragile alliance, and at risk of falling apart over different visions for Sudan's future. The SRF threatens to negotiate directly with the TMC in pursuit of their own agenda, without consulting with the FFC (Sudan Tribune 16/06/2019; Radio Dabanga 01/05/2019).

Armed groups are still present in Sudan. Ceasefire agreements have not been renewed since al-Bashir was overthrown. Conflict is ongoing in Darfur and the Two Areas between various armed groups and Sudanese security forces aligned with the TMC.

Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF): The SRF is an alliance that was formed in 2011, with the shared goal of overthrowing al-Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP). The SRF consists of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) and Darfur's three main armed groups: the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and both the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) groups, led by Abdel Wahid Al Nur (SLM-AW), and by Minni Arkou Minnawi (SLM-MM). The JEM is largely a cohesive group. It has a national agenda and operates through a centralised leadership structure. The SLM-AW and SLM-MM, are more fragmented in their composition and operate more as a fragile allegiance. Factions within these groups have been more focused on fair resource distribution to their specific home regions and ethnic communities (The New Humanitarian 26/07/2012; African Arguments 09/11/2015; Radio Dabanga 31/10/2018).

Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM): The SLM is a Darfur armed group that formed in 2001. The group were also aggrieved by the fact that the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement failed to give concessions to Darfur. The SLM formed as an alliance predominately between Fur and Zaghawa ethnic groups. The Fur's main goal was to achieve a decentralised system of governance. The Zaghawa were mainly preoccupied with defeating Arab militia groups with whom they were in economic competition (The New Humanitarian 26/07/2012). As a result of the lack of a shared goal, the group split in to two main factions in 2006: **The Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdel Wahid Al Nur (SLM-AW)**, is the Fur faction and this group controls parts of the central Jebel Marra mountain area. The group has refused to take part in peace talks since 2006 and continues to refuse to join negotiations until they perceive the situation on the ground to be more secure.

Despite allowing humanitarian access into the area in September 2018, insecurity remains; the **Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Arkou Minnawi (SLM-MM)**, is the Zaghawa faction of the former SLM (Global Security 21/06/2016; Sudan Tribune 2019).

Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N): The SPLM-N wants greater autonomy for South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The SPLM-N was initially the northern wing of the SPLM, who led the political uprising in the south during the 1983 to 2005 civil war. The SPLM has governed the south since independence. The SPLM-N continues to operate as an armed group in Sudanese territory, controlling areas in Blue Nile and South Kordofan. The SPLM-N is estimated to comprise between 25,000 to 40,000 troops who are mostly Nuba people from various tribes. The failure of the 2005 CPA to include concessions for the people of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, but being included to Sudan without any consultations and elections, united previously opposing tribes, in the region. This triggered significant recruitment to the SPLM-N after South Sudanese secession in 2011 (The New Humanitarian 26/07/2012; Sudan Tribune 2019). Clashes between the Sudanese government forces and the SPLM-N reduced in 2018, though a high level of insecurity remains. The SPLM-N is part of the alliance of opposition Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC). On 6 June, three high ranked officials of the SPLM-N have been deported to Juba, South Sudan's capital. These actions add to the tensions prior renewed talks between the TMC and FFC (Paanuelwel 11/06/2019; The Defence post 05/06/2019).

United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID): The hybrid African Union and UN mission was implemented in 2007. UNAMID consisted in 2007 of 25,900 uniformed peacekeepers (UNAMID 2019). Following the decision to close UNAMID in June 2020, the size of the operation has been reduced to currently only 5,470 military and 2,283 police troops. It was planned that On 30 June, UNAMID reduces its military personnel to 4,050 (UNAMID 05/03/2019; Washington Post 15/06/2019). However due to the political situation and pressure from INGOs, on 14 June it was announced that the withdrawal needed to stop. On 27 June there will be another vote on its extension (UN Security Council 14/06/2019; Amnesty International 11/06/2019AAWSAT 12/06/2019). The African Union (AU) already extended its mandate for the joint mission for another 12 month, following the deteriorating security situation and the political changes in Sudan (Radio Dabanga 16/06/2019). UNAMID suspended the handover IDP camps in Darfur to the RSF authorities. This is creating high tensions with the TMC, who do not see the reason and justification for UNAMID's continuous presence in Darfur (UN News 14/06/2019; Washington Post 15/06/2019). China and Russia rejected UNAMID's decision to pause UNAMID's retreat and handover of IDP camps (CNA 15/06/2019).

International and neighboring countries' relationship to the conflict

Sudan is of strategic importance for the international community as it is a key transit country for migrants from the Horn of Africa heading to Europe, and it is important for the regional stability (Sudan Tribune 10/12/2018; The New Humanitarian 30/01/2019).

On 6 June, the African Union's Peace and Security Council suspended Sudan's membership until a civilian-led government is in place. The EU and the US supported this demand (The Guardian 06/06/2019; Al Jazeera 07/06/2019). On 4 June the UN Security Council held a vote in attempt to put an end to the recent violence and condemn the crackdown against civilians and the associated killings. However the vote was vetoed by China and Russia (Al Jazeera 05/06/2019).

Ethiopia is part of new mediations efforts. First successes can be seen as the opposition alliance FFC agreed on 11 June to resume talks with the TMC following Ethiopia's consultations. (RTE 07/06/2019, Reuters 07/06/2019 Radio Dabanga 12/06/2019). After Ethiopia's visit, some Sudanese opposition leaders have been arrested and expelled to Juba, including leaders of the SPLM-N (Al Jazeera 08/06/2019; The Defence post 05/06/2019). This could create further tensions among the FFC, especially for the armed group alliance SRF, who may split from the FFC over different objectives.

Sudan is of great interest to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as these countries want to keep Sudan as their allies in the region. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have promised aid and support to the TMC in return for continuous support to the Saudi coalition against the Houthis in Yemen. It is possible that neighbouring countries such as Egypt are fearful of a successful transition to a democratic, civilian-led government in Sudan, should it prompt a similar movement elsewhere and lead to civil unrest. Further international support to the TMC from these neighbouring countries can be assumed in order to protect their own objectives (The Independent 10/06/2019; The New York Times 11/06/2019; Crisis Group International 07/06/2019; Al Jazeera 08/06/2019).

Key characteristics

Population of Sudan: 43.7 Million (OCHA 01/03/2019). Around 70% of Sudan's population is rural. The urban population is spread amongst a few cities and towns, almost all of which lie along the River Nile or one of its tributaries, or along the Red Sea coast (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 06/2019) Sudan has a young population with 40% under 14 years of age (CIA World Factbook, 06/2019).

People in Need: 8 million (ECHO 05/06/2019)

Displacement in Sudan: Violence, food insecurity, malnutrition and lack of access to basic services have caused large-scale internal displacement of 1.9 million IDPs. Additionally, Sudan hosts around 1.2 million refugees, including **850,000 refugees from South Sudan** and **120,000 refugees from Eritrea**.

Food security: At least 5.57 million people in Sudan, 13% of its total population depends on food assistance (OCHA 01/03/2019)

Nutrition levels: Malnutrition is widespread in Sudan, with 11 out of 18 states experiencing global acute malnutrition rates at or above the emergency threshold. The GAM caseload stands at 2.47 Million and the SAM Caseload at 694,000 (HNO 2018, UNICEF 04/2019).

WASH: 4.9 million people across Sudan do not have access to adequate drinking water and safe access to latrines (HNO 2018).

Health: 3.66 million people are in need of health assistance (OCHA 01/03/2019). Maternal mortality rate currently stands at 311 of 100,000 live births (OCHA 07/06/2019).

Response capacity

Local and national response capacity

Local initiatives are supporting wounded protestors by setting up emergency health centres. However, these activities are risky as they have been previously targeted by the RSF.

UNHCR has informed Sudan's Commission of Refugees (COR) about the attacks. Together with national NGO Al Manar Voluntary Organization (AMVO) they are trying to ensure protection and treatment of wounded people. A hotline has been established. (OCHA 07/06/2019).

International response capacity

The humanitarian response has been hampered and operations have reduced with some staff, including non-essential UN personnel, having been evacuated following 3 June


events (The New Humanitarian 14/06/2019). The extent to which aid agencies have been hampered is unclear and where possible organisations continue to respond to the needs of people affected by the recent crackdown.

On 7 June OCHA established an emergency operation centers in Khartoum. WHO and ICRC have been providing emergency care kits and necessary medicines and supplies to help the wounded in Khartoum and Omdurman. The Ministry of Health and WHO are coordinating the health response. WHO is providing meals to civilian supporters to attract more volunteers and health personnel (OCHA 09/06/2019; OCHA 13/06/2019).

Information gaps and needs


- Lack of information about the security situation in all areas of Sudan, including Khartoum and conflict-affected areas.
- Numbers of affected people, including fatalities and wounded people, remain estimations.
- It remains unclear if intercommunal and gang violence has intensified or if it is just being more frequently reported on.
- Information about ongoing humanitarian operations in Sudan is lacking.
- The level of access to public services is often unclear in rural and remote areas.
- Amidst the ongoing unrest in Khartoum the level of access to health care and hospitals is unclear.
- Lack of regular gender-sensitive needs assessments across all sectors.

Map 1: Humanitarian Needs Severity Overview



Source: OCHA 01/03/2019

Map 2: Food Security Outlook June- September 2019



Source: FEWS NET 05/2019