Following the signing of the peace agreement between the Government and the FARC in 2016, there has been a reshuffling of illegal armed groups such as the ELN and EPL, with an escalation of fighting for the control of land and illicit crop production in areas vacated by FARC. Over 30,000 people were displaced in mass displacements in 2018, double the amount recorded in 2017. Attacks against human rights activists and community leaders also increased in 2018. The Venezuelan refugee crisis, with over 1 million Venezuelans now living in Colombia, is aggravating the overall humanitarian situation. The convergence of both crises is particularly severe in the Catatumbo region, Norte de Santander, where the presence of armed groups is causing displacement and increasing protection needs for Venezuelan migrants.

**Anticipated scope and scale**

Clashes among rival armed groups like the ELN, EPL, AGC and dissident FARC groups are likely to continue causing mass displacement in the Pacific departments and in the regions at the border with Venezuela. Killings of community leaders and human rights activists increased in 2018, with Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities being more affected. The criminal activities of the ELN have been expanding into Venezuela and along the border, affecting Venezuelans refugees, who are at high risk of falling in the ranks of the militia, due to lack of other livelihood opportunities. The presence of Venezuelan migrants is likely to aggravate the IDP situation due to limited capacity of local authorities, especially at the border.

**Key figures**

- **+30,000** New IDPs in 2018 (mass displacements)
- **+1,600** attacks against civilians in 2018
- **+1 million people** with access and mobility constraints

**Humanitarian constraints**

High insecurity levels hinder humanitarian access to affected areas like in Norte de Santander, Antioquia, Cauca, Valle, Choco and Narino. Active hostilities and threats confine the population or pose high mobility constraints. During the rainy season, from April to November, floods and landslides make roads inaccessible.

**Limitations**

Due to insecurity it is difficult to conduct assessments, therefore there is limited data on the specific needs of IDPs making it hard to assess the severity and scale of the situation.
Crisis impact

Conflict dynamics after the peace agreement

Despite the signing of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and FARC in 2016, other armed groups as well as dissidents of FARC have not yet put down arms. A reconfiguration of armed groups in different regions, like the Pacific and Norte de Santander, has been ongoing since 2016, when the former FARC group ceased its activities and signed a peace deal with the government. All throughout 2018 armed groups such as the National Liberation Army (ELN), Popular Liberation Army (EPL), dissident groups of FARC and Autodefensas Geitanistas de Colombia (AGC) among others, have been fighting with the government and among themselves to gain control of the territories previously controlled by FARC, especially in the departments of Nariño, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Chocó, Antioquia and Norte de Santander. The Frente Primero dissident group from FARC and the ELN in Arauca department have recently revitalised an old alliance, through a pact of no aggression and land division for the control of illegal economies, including extortion and smuggling activities. People living in the border regions between Colombia and Venezuela are further affected by another illegal armed group called Colectivo de Seguridad Fronteriza (Border Security Collective); military investigations have shown how this group has managed to coexist along with different armed groups such as ELN, EPL, FBL and paramilitary groups. (El Colombiano 05/12/2018) These groups operate and infiltrate rural communities through radio, magazines, and direct recruitment of children. At the border, vulnerable migrants from Venezuela are likely to fall victim of armed groups. People living at the border between Colombia and Ecuador are also threatened by the presence of the Frente Oliver Sinisterra, another FARC dissident group, under the lead of alias ‘Guacho’, who operates in both countries for the control of narco-traffic. (El Colombiano 05/12/2018) Tumaco in Nariño has been particularly affected by this ongoing new configuration of forces, with a 50% increase in murder rates in 2018, and fourfold the national rate in 2017. Sexual abuses are also particularly high in Tumaco compared with other areas. (HRW 13/12/2018)

Displacement trends throughout 2018

From January to December 2018, more than 30,000 people were displaced in mass displacements; almost double the number in 2017, when 15,350 people were displaced, and rising from 11,300 people in 2016, reflecting the increase in episodes of violence and prolonged clashes. (OCHA 30/11/2018; UNHCR 05/12/2018; UNHCR 12/2018) Reporting on Colombia often distinguishes between mass displacements, with over 50 people moving together, and other situations of displacement calculated by expulsion and reception. In 2018, individual displacement was estimated at 145,000 people in 2018. (OCHA 31/10/2018) Displacement within cities constitutes a significant dynamic of violence in the country. People are displaced from one neighborhood to another because of extortion, physical and sexual violence, homicide, and to evade forced recruitment.

Active hostilities among armed groups are responsible for 69% of displacement. More than 1 million people are affected by mobility restrictions and 20,500 by confinement, with 56% of the total confined people in Chocó. Armed groups commonly impose “invisible borders” around territory they control, with anyone crossing these borders facing reprisal. (El Colombiano 22/08/2017) There has also been a year-on-year increase in the number of municipalities where these events have taken place, from 30 in 2017 to 37 in 2018. (OCHA 30/11/2018)

Social leaders’ targeting increased in 2018

In addition to mass displacements, killings of community leaders and human rights activists have been on the rise in the two years following the peace agreement. Research shows that the increase of killings post peace agreement cannot be explained by the overall increase in the homicide rate, nor is it due to an increase in reporting from previously FARC-controlled areas. The challenges to the implementation of the agreement, along with the State inability to build institutional capacity in former FARC strongholds, and the consequent expansion of armed groups in relation to a land-owning conflict have resulted in the targeting of social leaders who stand up for community rights and are seen as an obstacle by criminal groups. (LSE 09/01/2019) Between January 2011 and December 2017 almost 500 social leaders were killed in Colombia, with a significant increase in killings at the beginning of 2015, when the FARC implemented a permanent ceasefire as agreed in the peace negotiations. (LSE 09/01/2019) The killing of social leaders protecting their lands and communities is not a new phenomenon but it is
worsened by these new conflict dynamics, with armed groups imposing their control by frightening the population. (Indepaz 03/02/2019)

In 2018, more than 1,700 attacks against civilians were registered, including intentional killings, casualties during active clashes, kidnappings and threats. Arauca, Norte de Santander, Antioquia, Cauca and Nariño have been the most affected by these attacks. (OCHA 14/11/2018) Among these incidents, 252 social leaders were killed, an increase from 191 in 2017 and 116 in 2016. (Indepaz 11/01/2019) Figures around the numbers of social leaders killed vary among different organizations and the government; however, they all report more than 150 victims. Social leaders advocating against expropriation of lands are an obstacle especially in areas where ‘narco traffickers’ are fighting for power and control. (CINEP 03/05/2018) Environmental activists claiming the risks of petrol exploitation on water resources are also targeted. Even though many cases of assassination remain under investigation with the perpetrators unknown, a report shows that in many cases the perpetrators are not only members of opposition armed groups, but also paramilitary groups and governmental authorities, making the classification of some cases as extrajudicial killings. (CINEP 03/05/2018) As the conflict continues to revolve around contested territory, the assassination of social leaders by armed groups is intended to reduce the collective action of the local communities so they can gain control of the areas more easily. The trend has been confirmed in the first month of 2019 with 18 people killed as of 12 February 2019. (El Tiempo 12/02/2019)

Protection: Killing of community leaders, recruitment of children, extortion, threats and abuses by the illegal armed groups are common practices in areas of Cauca, Norte de Santander, Arauca, Nariño, Chocó and Antioquia among others. Perpetrators are rarely held accountable for their actions. (NRC 11/2017) Activists are targeted for supporting the peace deal, and for protecting their communities’ lands, which armed groups are trying to obtain to control illegal economies instead of the FARC. (InSight Crime 21/03/2018) Former FARC combatants have also been targeted, with 71 dead since the signing of the peace agreement. OCHA 30/11/2018

Forced recruitment by armed groups has been an issue throughout the conflict. FARC dissidents allegedly recruited minors throughout 2017, and the ELN has continued to do so in 2018 as well. (El Colombiano 07/03/2018)

Despite a national campaign for the eradication of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) by 2021, some 176 victims related to landmines were registered in 2018, more than double the 57 victims in 2017. (DAICMA last access 25/02/2018) The number of unexploded ordinances (UXO) and ERW in Norte de Santander, especially in Catatumbo region, increased in 2018, leading to restrictions of movement of the communities and IDPs living in the area. (OCHA 10/07/2018) Rival armed groups resort to these means to affirm control over territories. In 2017 and 2018, FARC dissidents seized and damaged vehicles for humanitarian demining operations, resulting in suspension of the activities in some cases. (Landmine Monitor 2018 20/11/2018) The profile of the victims in 2017 and 2018 has also changed, with an increased in civilian victims, which represented 64% of the total, while public forces were the 35%. (DAICMA last access 14/12/2018) This change is due to the new dynamics of the conflict, and the use of landmines by armed groups to avoid the eradication of illegal crops, in areas not yet included in the humanitarian demining program. (La Opinion 27/11/2018) So far in 2019, there have been 8 people injured including only one civilian. (DAICMA last access 22/02/2019)

Shelter: Following mass displacements, people struggle to find alternative shelter. Displaced people are often hosted in education facilities for weeks or among friends and families. Many regions are exposed to floods and landslides during the rainy season (May to November), affecting displaced and host communities, with a major impact on the Venezuelan transit population, who struggle to find shelter.

Unsuitable materials for building as well as inadequate construction sites have often led to the complete loss of shelter for many households, as well as casualties. The Caribbean coastal regions along with the Andean regions are usually the most affected by natural disasters. (Telesur 03/10/2018)

Food and livelihoods: In the immediate aftermath of a displacement, people rely mainly on food distribution and solidarity from local communities. During prolonged displacement, people struggle to find livelihood alternatives, and farmers who cannot access their lands risk missing the planting or harvest season. Natural disasters and environmental contamination, drought, and floods have also negatively affected agricultural production. (OCHA 15/01/2018) Further, the influx of Venezuelans and returning Colombians affects the border region with Venezuela, increasing pressure on the food security of the host communities. Around 80% of the Venezuelans living in the country are considered food insecure. (UN news 14/09/2018)

Education: Displacement, interruptions in the school year due to insecurity and active hostilities, poverty, long travel distances, lack of supplies, and poor infrastructures hamper schooling in most departments of Colombia. (OCHA 14/07/2018) In the border departments of La Guajira, Norte de Santander, Arauca and Vichada access to education is restricted by the risk of UXOs, poor infrastructures and schools being used as shelters during mass displacements, in addition to insecurity due to the presence of armed groups. In the southern departments of Putumayo, Nariño and Caquetá a higher rate of school drop-outs is reported among teenagers, who are recruited in illegal activities, often to support their families meet basic needs. (OCHA 14/01/2019) Children out of school are more vulnerable to forced recruitment by armed groups, abuses, and forced labor. (NRC 10/07/2018)

Health: Over 1.4 million people in Colombia are in need of health assistance, particularly in the Pacific regions. (HRP 19/01/2018) Civilians injured during clashes are often left...
unattended because active hostilities and mobility restrictions prevent ambulances and health workers from reaching the affected. Psychosocial support is highly needed, especially for children and teenagers who have experienced acts of violence. This service is usually provided by local organisations in bigger cities but is harder to provide as part of an emergency response.

Impact on critical infrastructure

The ELN, FARC dissidents, and other criminal groups tied to the illegal drugs trade have been carrying out attacks against the oil pipeline Caño Limón Coveñas, in Arauca department transporting crude oil to the Caribbean port of Covenas. This type of attack has been increasing significantly, from 22 attacks in 2015, to 42 in 2016, and 62 in 2017; they constitute a great revenue loss for the government. At the beginning of 2018 the ELN carried out an ‘armed strike’ which impacted national infrastructure. They torched trucks and buses in Antioquia and Arauca, and bombed roads in Norte de Santander and Cesar, in an attempt to shut down the country. (Colombia Reports 12/02/2018)

As of 22 November 2018, a total of 84 attacks had been carried out on the same pipeline since the beginning of the year, often leading to oil spills into water sources and affecting the environment and ecosystems as well as communities in Norte de Santander, Arauca, Boyacá, and Cesar departments. (El Tiempo 22/11/2018) In 2018 the pipeline stopped pumping oil for 268 days. The ELN claims that oil pumping and mining activities exploit the country’s natural resources without the Colombian people benefitting from it. (Reuters 13/11/2018, Channel NewsAsia 10/01/2019) The Transandino crude pipeline in southern Colombia has also suffered multiple attacks. In addition, numerous illegal valves have been put in place to steal oil, often used by traffickers to process coca. (Argus 12/11/2018)

Vulnerable groups affected

Afro-Colombians and Indigenous communities are disproportionately more affected by displacement, accounting for nearly 45% of the total IDPs in 2018, and likely to experience more violence and intimidation. (OCHA 14/11/2018) The Afro-Colombian population in the Pacific region, particularly in Chocó and Cauca, is highly vulnerable due to the absence of institutions, even after the peace agreement. The indigenous population is exposed to the resurgence of dissident groups of the FARC under alias ‘Guacho’, as well as the AGC and Mexican cartels, who fight over the traffic of drugs and gold in the area. (El Espectador 05/12/2018)

Venezuelan migrants are also more likely to fall victim to the dissident armed groups operating at the border. There are seven official border crossings between Venezuela and Colombia and over 200 informal crossing points, known as trochas, often controlled by armed groups posing risks of extortion, theft, and violence for vulnerable Venezuelan migrants. Within the country, risks are higher especially among those migrants without legal status and access to basic services. Venezuelan children and women are even more vulnerable, with women being exploited in domestic services in coca production farms and children facing the risk of labour exploitation. (RMRP 14/12/2018)

Humanitarian and operational constraints

Conflict and violence are major obstacles to humanitarian access especially in Chocó and Norte de Santander. In remote rural areas, poor road infrastructure, as well as natural disasters such as flooding and landslides also hamper access. The presence of UXOs and landmines increases the risk of higher humanitarian impact, while making access for humanitarian assistance more difficult.

Aggravating factors

Illicit crop production

The armed groups currently active are strictly dependent on narco-traffic; in order to reduce violence and insecurity in conflict affected areas it is necessary to fight illegal economies. (UNVMC 26/12/2018) Coca production in the country has increased from 146,000 hectares in 2016 to 171,000 in 2017, the most ever recorded in Colombia, of which 27% is in Nariño and 26% in Norte de Santander. Eighty percent of these crops are in the same areas where they have been for the last 10 years. The reasons for the increased production vary; from one side the FARC used to play a regulating role within the system of production and sale, now left to less organised armed groups. Some farmers only started to cultivate coca plants after the peace agreement in order to adhere to the program of crop substitution and get subsidies from the government; proven the slow and sometimes absent support from the authorities, these farmers have just continued the illicit production. Another explanation relates to the increased coca confiscation by the authorities that could have led to a process of compensation, thus increasing the cultivation. (FIP 26/06/2018)

Revenues from the illegal trafficking of coca are very likely to undermine efforts towards peace in the country and a culture of legality, while empowering armed groups and enhancing corruption. (UNODC 09/2018) The government is carrying out a coca eradication campaign, aiming to destroy 65,000 hectares of coca in 2018. The plan includes both voluntary substitution of coca crops and forced eradication by state forces. (InSight Crime 18/12/2018) As of September 2018, only 26,000 hectares of coca were manually
eradicated; information regarding hectares of coca destroyed by fumigation is underreported and figures are conflictual. (FIP 08/2018) The strategies advanced by the government to destroy the illicit crop trade include fumigation by drones, and suggestions have been made to cut electricity or reduce fuel supplies, without taking into consideration the effects on civilians. Between 2016 and 2017, homicides by armed groups rose 33% in municipalities participating in coca crop substitution programmes, as a way of opposing the eradication of coca crops by threatening the local communities. (InSight Crime 22/02/2018) The municipalities most affected by this increase in homicides among those participating in the program for the substitution if illegal crop are Tumaco in Nariño, Montellibano in Cordoba and El Tambo in Cauca. (FIP 23/10/2018)

The main obstacle to the eradication of coca crops has been the inability of the government to provide adequate security measures and sustainable alternatives for rural Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities. (El Espectador 11/12/2018) Moreover, coca production is ten times more lucrative for farmers than any other crop. The pressure put on them by criminal groups for the interest of transnational drug traffickers is not worth the crop substitution plan in the long term.

Other illegal activities

Criminal groups have proven they can provide for their needs in other ways, leading toward more illegal activities, like smuggling fuel from other departments or neighbour countries. (El Colombiano 05/11/2018) Illegal gold mining is also a lucrative source of income for armed groups; a livelihood means for rural communities, but also cause of more fighting.

Peace talks between the Colombian government and the ELN

In February 2017, after two years of exploratory negotiations, the government and the ELN started peace talks in Quito, Ecuador. After three months of ceasefire between October 2017 and January 2018, the ELN perpetrated new attacks, which froze the negotiations for few months until March, when negotiations slowly resumed. The last round of talks ended in August 2018, however the new administration of President Duque has refused to resume talks unless the ELN suspend all its violent activities, including attacks against oil infrastructure, killings, and abductions. For its part the ELN has declared willingness to reinitiate negotiations, but without any precondition. On 17 December 2018, the ELN declared a unilateral ceasefire from 23 December - 3 January, which wasn’t extended. The dissident armed group also renewed the willingness to resume peace negotiations and invited the government to send delegates to Cuba, where the talks were initiated and ELN elected delegates are already present. (El Tiempo 17/12/2018) On 11 January the ELN attacked a helicopter in the area of Hacari, kidnapping the three people on board. This event brings the number of people in custody of the ELN up to 17. The government has given one month to the ELN to show their willingness in resuming peace talks. (RCN 16/01/2019) The ELN also claimed responsibility for a car bomb attack at a police academy in Bogota on 17 January that left 21 people dead, after which the government decided to suspend the possibility to renew peace negotiations. (CNN 21/01/2019)

Venezuelan migrants in Colombia

The Venezuelan migrant population in Colombia at the beginning of 2019 stands at nearly 1.2 million, rising from less than 39,000 people in 2015. (R4V 01/02/2019) In addition, there are over 300,000 Colombian returnees in need of socioeconomic assistance. In 2017 the Colombian government started issuing a Special Permit of Stay (PEP by its acronym in Spanish) to registered Venezuelans who had entered the country by legal border points. Initially 182,000 people benefited from the PEP, which gives access to basic health services, education and work. From April to June 2018 the government also conducted a registration, the Registro Administrativo de Migrantes Venezolanos (RAMY), for undocumented Venezuelans. As of February 2019, nearly 700,000 Venezuelans (59%) have legalised their status in Colombia, and almost 500,000 (41%) are in an irregular situation. (R4V 01/02/2019) An additional 2.7 million Venezuelan people hold a Border Mobility Card (TMF), which allows them to stay in Colombia for up to one week, especially to acquire food and medicines. Despite the efforts of the Colombian government to regularise Venezuelan migrants and give them access to basic services, flaws in the system have left many people unable to apply for the PEP, adding to an imprecise number of migrants staying illegally in the country. The Venezuelan population has settled not only along the border but all across the country, including urban centres. The departments of Norte de Santander, Cesar, and La Guajira are the most affected by this major influx of migrants, putting the government of Colombia in a challenging situation as this adds to the existing humanitarian crisis of the country. The Venezuelan influx risks to sideline the response to IDPs, and undermine the peace process.

The Catatumbo region

The situation is particularly severe in the Catatumbo region, Norte de Santander where the influx of Venezuelan migrants and the armed conflict converge. An estimated 25,000 Venezuelans live in the area with an additional 8,000 people as pendular migrants from Venezuela reach the Tibu district to work in the cultivation of coca and palm plants. The refugees in the area are highly exposed to protection risks related to the presence of

ACAPS Briefing Note: Conflict
armed groups, and abuses ranging from forced recruitment, violence, human trafficking, smuggling, labour exploitation, abuse, and gender based violence. (OCHA 29/01/2019) The flow of IDPs and refugees has overstretched the services in the region; schools and hospitals are particularly overwhelmed. (Thomson Reuters Foundation 29/01/2019)

Double impact in the Catatumbo region, Source: OCHA 29/01/2019

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Contextual information

Drivers of the current conflict

In Colombia there are at least five internal armed conflicts, so classified based on the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), four of which are between the Government of Colombia and the ELN, the EPL, the AGC, also known as Clan del Golfo, and the Bloque Oriental of the FARC-EP, which did not recognise the peace agreement. The fifth is between the ELN and the EPL, in the Catatumbo region. (CRC 06/12/2018)

The vacuum left by the demobilised FARC has led to violent clashes between armed groups such as the ELN and the EPL to gain control over the lucrative and illicit crop production lands. The limitations in reintegrating former fighters of the FARC into society has made them more vulnerable to turn towards illegal activities or even take up arms again. (El Colombiano 26/11/2018) A report from the Ministry of Defence states the number of FARC dissidents at 1,750 out of more than 7,000 fighters who demobilised after the agreement, with a presence in 19 departments. (El Tiempo 21/12/2018) This return to arms has been mainly due to the threats received by other armed groups as well as the overall disillusion with the reintegration process. The economic crisis in Venezuela also has facilitated the growing power of the ELN, leading to new dynamics and increased insecurity along the border. (InSight Crime 20/12/2018)

The peace agreement signed between the Government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC in November 2016, is far from bringing lasting peace to the country. Despite the cessation of hostilities, and the Program of Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration, the real challenge for the government is to provide livelihood alternatives as well as security to the victims of the conflict. Already during the negotiations, attention was given to the issue of fighting the insurgence of new illegal armed groups in the areas previously occupied by the FARC forces. The main obstacles to durable solutions include victims’ compensation, land and property restitution, as well as implementation of the different points agreed upon in the peace deal related to issues such as integral agricultural reform, truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition.

Response capacity

Local and national response capacity

The main national actor for migration issues in Colombia is the Unidad Administrativa Especial Migración Colombia (UAEMC). (UAEMC 2015) Equipos Locales de Coordinación (ELC) have been running from 2006, previously called Equipos Humanitarios Locales. The ELCs provide a space for information sharing and strategic coordination among local and international actors active in each region. They also coordinate with the Unidad de Atención y Reparación Integral para las Víctimas (UARIV) and the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF), for the family welfare, in order to evaluate the security situation and carry out needs assessment. (UMAIC last access 13/12/2018)

Rural areas have very little government presence and it fails to provide rapid emergency response; small municipalities don’t always have the capacity to respond to the needs of the displaced population over a prolonged period of time. (NRC 11/2017) The process for compensating victims of the conflict is slow, with services being delivered often after one year. Government assistance is fragmented and lacks the capacity to understand what is really happening to people being displaced over a long period of time. (El Espectador 11/12/2018)

The recurrence of emergencies like displacements by conflict and natural disaster affects the capacity of local organisations, which also lack resources, to attend large numbers of displaced people, and usually focus more on long term services, providing psychosocial support, distribution of medicine and legal advice.

International response capacity

It is important to highlight the necessity for a multisectoral response, especially in the border areas, where different factors and population profiles with humanitarian needs exist and interact. Response to the Venezuelan influx must also give attention to the needs of the host communities, while responses especially during displacements should take into consideration the high vulnerability of Venezuelan migrants in areas affected. Following the peace agreement, donors started to reduce funds to humanitarian agencies considering the needs would decrease, while the reality proved to be different, with a shift in dynamics leading to an expanding displacement and protection crisis. (RI 01/2019)
**Information gaps and needs**

Limited information is available on the needs of returnees outside of displacement sites, including those who have returned to their areas of origin and those staying with family and friends. Also, it is hard to assess humanitarian needs of people confined due to violence and in hard to reach areas.

Although gender-based violence is widespread in Colombia, reporting of sexual abuses during displacements is very limited, and consequently leads to response gaps.

Numbers of IDPs reported are often conflictual, with big differences, both between government reports and NGOs, and among the latter. A distinction is made when counting displaced people, between mass or individual displacements. Figures are conflicting also in relation to the number of social leaders killed in the last years. *(CNN 11/07/2018)*

The Unit for Assistance and Integral Reparation to the Victims (UARIV) register does not exclude the victims of the conflict displaced between 1996 and 2015 that might have reached a stable situation by developing sustainable solutions. There is also inconsistency among numbers of social leaders killed in the periods both before and after the ceasefire, mostly due to a difference in databases used, although they all report an increase from 2016 onwards. *(El Espectador 24/09/2018)*

**Outlook for 2019**

The trends of mass displacements and killing of social leaders have so far been confirmed in 2019. Suspension of peace talks between the government and the ELN following the attack against the police school in Bogota, will likely lead to a harder line from the government towards the ELN, eventually resulting in more confrontations and protection needs for the population.

The continuing deterioration of the humanitarian situation within Venezuela is also likely to drive more people to emigrate. An increased influx to Colombia will further aggravate the humanitarian situation, particularly in areas with a high presence of IDPs and stretched services.

With new conflict dynamics among armed groups it is hard to assure peace and stability to the country. This factor, along with limitations and obstacles to land compensation, justice for the victims, reintegration programmes for former fighters and the absence of the State in many areas is likely to maintain insecurity in Colombia and push long-lasting peace far in the future. *(LSE 09/01/2019)*