Increased fighting in Taizz and Al Hudaydah governorates has led to the displacement of more than 80,000 people between December 2017 and mid-March 2018. The Saudi-led coalition launched the offensive following the death on 4 December of former president Saleh, with the aim of advancing north along the Red Sea coastline and capturing new territories from the Houthis including Al Hudaydah port. After some advancement, frontlines have remained stalled since January, with conflict parties largely consolidating their positions. Spikes in violence have driven further displacement. Many of the recently displaced are seeking safety away from the active frontlines in Al Hudaydah and Taizz. They are residing with their relatives, in rental accommodations, or in spontaneous settlements, while others are moving towards Aden and southern governorates. Fighting continues against the backdrop of a country strained by disrupted markets and limited food availability, a collapsing health system, and severely damaged WASH infrastructure. As Yemen enters its fourth year of war, both IDPs and host communities are exhausting their coping capacity. Taizz and Al Hudaydah are among the governorates at high risk of famine in Yemen.

About this report

This report aims to cover the cross-sectoral needs related to the large-scale conflict driven displacement in Taizz and Al Hudaydah since December 2017. It places these developments into a wider context by looking at the drivers of the conflict and the displacement in these two governorates since the escalation of conflict in March 2015.

The report is based on available secondary data as well as discussions with key stakeholders. Information gained from interviews or documents that are not publicly available have been indicated in the source.

Key priorities

- **Limited food availability, disrupted livelihoods**
- **Access to health services, cholera and diphtheria outbreaks**
- **WASH infrastructure damage and water shortage**
- **New airstrikes and ground offensives impacting civilians**

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Limitations

Limited information is available on displacement numbers, both past and present. Information is limited on many sectoral needs, particularly those concerning IDPs.
Crisis overview

While conflict has spread across Yemen, notably in Al Jawaf, Hajjah and Shabwah, the worst fighting over the past three months has been in Taizz and Al Hudaydah governorates. In December 2017, military operations and airstrikes escalated in an attempt by the Government of Yemen, backed by coalition forces, to recapture areas of Taizz and Al Hudaydah under Houthi control, with the ultimate aim of taking the strategically important Al Hudaydah port (Critical Threats 21/12/2017). The port accounts for 70-80% of commercial imports into Yemen (HNO 2018). The operation was prompted by a perceived weakening of the Houthis following the split with forces loyal to former president Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, Yemen’s long-time authoritarian ruler, after his assassination. Armed clashes and airstrikes were reported in Al-Khawkhah, Hays, Zabid, and Al-Tuhayat districts of Al Hudaydah as hostilities in the governorate escalated through the first half of December. Frontlines remained stalled in January, with conflict parties largely consolidating their positions and occasional spikes in violence occurring (CIMP 28/02/2018). In February and early March, the conflict expanded from Hays to neighbouring districts, including Al Garrahi and Jabal Ras, which were already hosting IDPs (Shelter/CCCM Cluster 26/02/2018, Shelter/CCCM Clusters 20/02/2018, OCHA 18/03/2018).

In Taizz, ground fighting and indiscriminate shelling affected Al Mukha, Mawza, Maqbanah, Al Waziyah, Jabal Habashy, Sabir A -Wadim, Dhubab, and At Taiziyah districts, as well as residential areas of Taizz city. (OCHA 27/02/2018, CIMP 28/02/2018, UNHCR 09/02/2018). The fighting in Al Hudaydah and Taizz governorates continues against the backdrop of a country strained by three years of protracted crisis. In Taizz there was already a major deterioration in humanitarian situation after increased fighting in early 2017, and the governorate has been a major conflict hotspot since 2015 (Mwatna for Human Rights 11/2016).

The main needs of the displaced and other conflict-affected populations are shelter, health, food, protection, and water and sanitation assistance (UNHCR 09/02/2018). In Al Hudaydah, almost 456,000 people are estimated to have restricted access to basic services (health, education), and civilian infrastructure (transport, telecommunication, fuel) due to the conflict (CIMP 28/02/2018).

The current conflict in Yemen began in 2015, thought it stems from many years of insurgency by the Houthis, a Zaidi group known as Ansar Allah, which began in 2004. In 2011, following the Arab Spring uprising, Saleh handed over power to his deputy Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, in a single-party election (boycotted by the Houthis). The Houthi movement, subsequently took control of their northern heartland of Saada governorate and neighbouring areas. In late 2014 the Houthis were joined by forces loyal to ex-president Saleh and attempted to take control of the whole country, forcing President Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia. This prompted Saudi Arabia and eight other mostly Sunni Arab states to begin an air campaign, followed by a land campaign in August 2015, aimed at restoring Mr Hadi’s government. The subsequent two and a half years have seen the conflict become entrenched, three UN peace initiatives fail, and a growing humanitarian crisis (BBC 30/01/2018). Saleh and the Houthis parted ways in late 2017, with Saleh opening a dialogue with the Saudi-led coalition. This prompted the Houthis to assassinate him in the outskirts of Sanaa on 4 December 2017, while he was attempting to flee (Al Jazeera 10/12/2017).

Crisis impact

Displacement

Between 1 December 2017 and mid-March 2018, more than 100,000 people have been displaced throughout Yemen. Of these, an estimated 80,000 (80%) originated from Al Hudaydah and Taizz governorates. 22,000 of those fleeing violence are in Al Hudaydah. More than 21,000 have fled further south to Abyan, while others have been displaced closer to the frontlines within Taizz (20,000). Other governorates hosting IDPs from Taizz and Al Hudaydah include Lahj, Al Maharah, Aden, Ibb, Dhamar, Hadramaut and Shabwah (UNHCR 09/02/2018, Shelter/CCCM Clusters 04/03/2018, Protection Cluster 12/03/2018). Preliminary findings reveal that only 40,000 people remain in Hays district, one of the most affected districts in Al Hudaydah, out of a total population of 67,000 people (OCHA 11/03/2018).

Displacement in Yemen is mainly a result of insecurity caused by the fighting between the Houthis and pro-government forces. The majority of IDPs in Yemen were displaced within the first six months from the start of the conflict in March 2015, but the dynamics of the displacement in Yemen have changed over time with constant shifts in the conflict situation. (TFPM 01/2017).

Widespread use of explosive weapons in populated areas by both Houthis and pro-government forces has largely contributed to driving people from their homes, and also preventing their return (INEW 16/05/2016). There have been at least 15,400 air raids, an average of about 474 a month, since the conflict escalated in March 2015, and about one-third of those hit civilian targets (Washington Post 29/12/2017). Airstrikes and shelling have been in many cases followed by heavy ground fighting, and both Taizz and Al

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1 See Contextual information on p.8 for more information on the stakeholders and background to the conflict.
2 This number was calculated by multiplying the household number per six, which is the average household size among IDPs and returnees in Yemen, according to DTM-IOM (DTM-IOM 10/2017). This is applied consistently throughout the report where displacement numbers are only available per household.
3 See Figure 3 on p. 15 about drivers of displacement in Yemen.
Hudaydah have been some of the main frontlines of conflict in Yemen since 2015, with increasing displacement and protection needs as fighting has forced people to leave their homes (LSE 21/07/2017, Mwatana 13/12/2017, BBC 01/12/2016, NY Times 01/04/2015).

Persecution based on political, religious, and ethnic divides has also been causing displacement, though information about the extent to which persecution has driven displacement is limited. The conflict has created an environment where religious extremism (including sectarian tensions), hate speech, and targeted attacks on religious communities has increased (Minority Rights Group 12/01/2016, Carnegie 29/12/2015).

Food security and livelihoods

Food access and availability: Market systems have been disrupted in affected districts of Al Hudaydah, especially for IDPs. This is reflected by assessment results in Hays, Al Garrahi, and Jabal Ras, although this is likely also the case in other conflict-affected districts of Al Hudaydah governorate as well as in Taizz governorates (FAO 15/01/2018). Traders face logistical hurdles, with the main road between Hays and Al Garrahi remaining blocked (OCHA 27/02/2018). Food storage facilities have been damaged (CIMP 28/02/2018). Prices of basic food items continue to increase. The average cost of the minimum food basket in Al Hudaydah has risen by almost 15% since November, while in Taizz the rise is around 12%. The availability of basic food commodities in markets decreased in both governorates between November and January (FEWS NET 02/2018, WFP 25/02/2018). Inflation continues to rise, with a country-wide increase of 3% between December and January, reflecting the low availability of food in the markets (FAO 15/03/2018).

The rainy season (March to May) in Yemen is starting, yet production is expected below-average owing to a lack of availability and access to agricultural inputs, and limited access to fields in conflict zones (FEWS NET 11/2017). Large-scale humanitarian assistance plays an important role in reducing the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes in Yemen as domestic cereal production covers less than 20% of the Yemen's total food requirements (FEWS NET 02/2018, GIEWS 28/11/2017). As of 26 March, Yemen's major seaports remain open following the blockade on imports in November and December 2017, but imports of food and fuel remain well below required levels (WFP 21/03/2018, FEWS NET 02/2018).

Reduced purchasing power, disrupted livelihoods, and restricted imports are fuelling acute malnutrition. An IPC analysis undertaken in March 2017 found GAM to be above 15% in both Al Hudaydah and Taizz governorates. Both governorates were classified as IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) in February 2018, but significant declines in commercial imports below requirement levels, and conflict that cuts populations off from trade and humanitarian assistance for an extended period could drive food security outcomes in line with Famine (IPC Phase 5) (FEWS NET 02/2018, IPC 01/03/2017).

Livelihoods: The conflict in the western coastal region has impacted livestock holders in multiple ways. Lack of pasture, shelter, and water, high price of fodder, and absence of veterinary services are the main challenges. Pre-crisis, most livestock traditionally grazed freely or were herded over vast arid and semi-arid desert grazing land. Lack of freedom of movement and reduced access to traditional grazing areas has led to competition between IDP and host community livestock holders for both pasture and water. IDP livestock holders also lack shelter for their animals. Animal disease control, including disease surveillance and vaccination campaigns, is non-existent (FAO 15/01/2018).

The conflict has also reduced the number of functioning livestock markets and the recent escalation in conflict has forced households to sell their livestock as they seek to cover their basic needs. An assessment of Al Garrahi, Hays, and Jabal Ras districts in Al Hudaydah in late December 2017 found a 50-80% increase in livestock sales at a market and a decrease in prices of 50-60% following general decrease in purchasing power (FEWS NET 02/2018, FAO 15/01/2018). Farming and fishing activities have also been disrupted. These are major sources of livelihoods in the coastal areas such as Tuhatay district, where the majority of the population (around 102,000 people) work in the fisheries and agriculture sectors (OCHA 12/02/2018). Prior to 2015, the agriculture and fishery sectors employed more than 54% of the rural workforce and was the main source of income for 73% of the population in Yemen (HNO 2018).

As of November 2017, household income from sources other than fishing and agriculture, like public sector salaries, pensions, and remittances also remained below average. Compared to 2014, the average income in Taizz and Al Hudaydah had already decreased by more than 50% by August 2017 (FEWS NET 11/2017).

Health

Both Taizz and Al Hudaydah governorates are struggling with large scale cholera and diphtheria outbreaks, while the health system has collapsed due to conflict, import restrictions on medicines and supplies, and critical shortages of health staff. Health facilities have been repeatedly targeted by airstrikes (MSF 27/09/2016, MSF 03/12/2015). Moreover, fighting and airstrikes are taking a toll on the mental health of the civilian population (CIMP 28/02/2018).

4 See figure 1 on p. 14 on Seasonal calendar for a typical year in Yemen
5 See figure 2 on p. 14 on monthly quantities discharged (in tons) by type of cargo.
Up-to-date information on the status of medical facilities is not available, though reports indicate that many hospitals are overwhelmed by the increase in patients. Hays hospital, the main health facility in Hays district, has not been operational since 10 December 2017, after being hit by airstrikes (OCHA 12/02/2018). It served to up to 10,000 households, and is one of three health facilities impacted by the current fighting (CIMP 28/02/2018). An assessment mission to the Taizz coastal districts of Al Mukha and Dhubab found an urgent need to scale-up health activities in these districts and to establish an effective referral mechanism (OCHA 27/02/2018). Ten out of 14 health facilities are not functioning in Taizz governorate, with Al Mukha rural hospital being the only health facility providing primary healthcare. However, it lacks of medical staff and supplies and does not provide secondary health services (OCHA 11/03/2018).

Funds for operational health costs, including salaries, remain unavailable (HNO 2018). This is the case especially in Houthi-controlled areas, including contested areas in Al Hudaydah and Taizz, where the government refuses to pay salaries, accusing the Houthis of putting their fighters on the government payroll (The Guardian 02/08/2017; Reuters 21/01/2018).

Insufficient fuel has impacted the functionality of health facilities, and prices in Al Hudaydah and Taizz remained 140-160% higher than pre-crisis as of February, rising again after a slight drop from December to January (FAO 15/03/2018). As of early February, 17% of all fuel requirements for health facilities in Yemen were for Taizz and Al Hudaydah, with the latter having the second highest requirements of all governorates (OCHA 06/02/2018). Of the fuel donated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in mid-January and allocated to Al Hudaydah, none had been delivered by mid-February (OCHA 18/02/2018, Bloomberg 22/01/2018).

Requirements for both governorates combined represent 27% of the total fuel requirements for Yemen (OCHA 06/02/2018). Water shortages have been reported at a majority of collective centres and spontaneous settlements in governorates where IDPs from Taizz and Al Hudaydah tend to settle: Taizz, Aden, Ibb, Lahj, Hadramaut, Shabwan, and Abyan. IDP sites in Taizz, Ibb, Lahj, Hadramaut, Shabwan, and Abyan also lack latrines (Shelter/CCCM Cluster/REACH 08/2017).

Water sources have traditionally been scarce in Yemen, and the country is among the most water-stressed in the world (IRIN 23/03/2010, Foreign Affairs 23/07/2013). This is due to a naturally dry climate, regional drought in recent years and falling groundwater levels due to unsustainable drilling and increased water needs because of population growth (WASH Cluster/REACH 07/2017). Prior to the conflict, an estimated 13 million Yemenis struggled daily to find or buy enough clean water to drink or buy food (Guardian 02/04/2015). Instead of collecting and storing rainwater, drilling for limited groundwater is common (IRIN 14/01/2010). Only a small proportion of Yemenis are connected to the municipal supply, and the pipe network is old. Large amounts of water is lost through leaks (Guardian 02/04/2015).

WASH

Access to water facilities is restricted in Al Hudaydah (CIMP 28/02/2018). The Water Desalination Plant in Al Khawkhah Junction in Hays, Al Hudaydah governorate is operating at half capacity after the main generator was damaged, with its pumps needing urgent repair or replacement (OCHA 12/02/2018). In 2017, prior to this escalation, 59% of households in Taizz and 88% in Al Hudaydah had access to improved water sources, with the piped water network being the main source (WASH Cluster/REACH 07/2017). Piped water systems rely on electricity, and its provision has been a concern in Al Hudaydah and Taizz following the conflict escalation (ICRC 09/12/2018, HNO 2018). Fuel shortages also affect the functionality of water networks, and in Taizz and Al Hudaydah fuel prices are high (FAO 31/01/2018). As of early February, Al Hudaydah was the governorate with the highest fuel requirements for water, sanitation, and cold chains, with over 738,000 litres needed. Taizz requirements amounted to 200,000 litres.

SHELTER

Due to the government’s no camp policy, services at IDP sites (collective centres and spontaneous settlements) are often limited. In 2017, many IDP sites in Taizz, Aden, Ibb, Lahj, Hadramaut, Shabwan, and Abyan have reported critical or high severity of needs.
In Taizz, Aden, Hadramaut, Shabwan, and Abyan, the majority of sites have no management. Significant percentages of IDPs sleep in the open or in makeshift/emergency shelters in Taizz (28%), Aden (40%), Abyan (50%), and Shabwan (49%) (Shelter/CCCM Cluster/REACH 08/2017).

An estimated 23% (417,600) of IDPs are living in public buildings, collective centres, or in dispersed spontaneous settlements in Yemen. As of January 2018, Yemen counted 536 collective centres (of which one in Al Hudaydah and 79 in Taizz) and 318 spontaneous settlements (of which none in Al Hudaydah, and 53 in Taizz) (Shelter/CCCM Cluster 27/01/2017; Shelter/CCCM Cluster/REACH 08/2017).

Overall, 89% of IDPs in Yemen are estimated to have been displaced for more than a year, and the prolonged period of displacement is placing pressure on both host communities and IDPs (OCHA 04/12/2017, Shelter Cluster 01/10/2017). An increasing number of IDP families in rental accommodation owe landlords money while others were forced to leave or left under duress, and moved to IDP sites or spontaneous settlements (UNHCR 08/11/2017). The percentage of IDPs in sites rose from 19% at the end of 2016 to 23% at the end of the September 2017, indicating that people are running out of adequate shelter options (OCHA 04/12/2017).

Protection

Civilians face serious protection concerns. In both Al Hudaydah and Taizz, Al Hudaydah recorded 284 civilian casualties in December and January, concentrated in southern districts such as Al-Khawkhah and along the main north-south route from Hays to Al Hudaydah city, where the fighting has been most intense. 96% of casualties in the governorate occurred here. These were in large part the result of airstrikes hitting civilian targets, such as houses, farms, markets, restaurants, fuel stations and civilian vehicles (CIMP 28/02/2018). Airstrikes remain the leading cause of death and injury in Yemen (Protection Cluster 11/2017).

As well as being exposed to gunfire and rockets, ambulances are at times forced to make payments at checkpoints on their way to hospitals and health centres (UNHCR 31/12/2017). IDP families, and likely also the rest of the civilian population in Taizz have been subjected to indiscriminate attacks, including on civilian infrastructure, and exposure to unexploded ordinance (UXOs) and mines (UNHCR 18/02/2017, UNHCR 31/12/2017). Contamination has been reported in Mokha, Taizz, Al Khawaka, and Hays, Al Hudaydah (Reuters 08/03/2018).

The Saudi-led coalition has used cluster munitions, while Houthis forces have used antipersonnel landmines, both of which are banned by international treaties (HRW 01/2018, Guardian 19/12/2016).

Forced recruitment, including of children, by all conflict parties has also been reported (UNICEF 28/02/2018, Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen 27/02/2018). Residents of IDP sites face significant protection risks, including exploitation, harassment, and gender-based violence (Shelter/CCCM Cluster/REACH 08/2017).

Education

Schools and education facilities are targeted by all conflict parties. Five attacks on schools and hospitals were verified in Taizz in February, and two attacks in January (UNICEF 28/02/2018). 177 schools in Hays, Al Khawkhah and Al Garrahi districts of Al Hudaydah governorate, serving an estimated 65,000 students, have been affected by the ongoing hostilities and are currently closed (OCHA 20/02/2018). This represents a significant increase from September 2017, when 34 schools were estimated to be non-functional in the whole governorate due to damages, hosting of IDPs, or occupation by armed groups (HNO 2018). In 2017, Taizz was the governorate with the highest number of schools damaged or occupied and not functioning (HNO 2018).

Nearly three-quarters of public school teachers have not received their salaries in Yemen for over a year. This has disrupted schooling and contributed to a 20% increase in the number of out-of-school children, from 1.6 million pre-crisis to 2 million today (UNICEF 28/02/2018).

Vulnerable groups affected

IDPs: Generally, women and children constitute three quarters of IDPs in Yemen. IDPs that belong to vulnerable groups, such as the elderly and disabled, or marginalised groups, such as the Muhamasheen, have limited shelter choices, due to physical barriers and discrimination (OCHA 04/12/2017).

Children: In 2017, the relative majority of child victims of abuse were in Taizz. Violations include sexual violence and other forms of physical abuse, recruitment, and attacks on health and education facilities. Incidents are believed to be underreported. Some children remain out of school or have less time to spend on their education, because they are tasked with fetching water (OCHA 04/12/2017). While all children in Yemen risk not accessing education, IDP children are at a higher risk. Boys are more likely to be recruited by armed groups, while girls face higher risk of being held back from school as they are needed for domestic support. Similarly, children from marginalised groups and with disabilities are more likely to not have access to education (OCHA 04/12/2017).

Women: Women affected by displacement in Taizz during previous escalations have been exposed to multiple experiences of trauma, including gender-based violence,
These include female and Yemenis in most indicators, including literacy and access to basic services, such as trauma. Women, children, the elderly and disabled are at greater risk of losing access to improved water sources, sanitation, immunisations, and social welfare programmes. They are considered particularly vulnerable, as their access to humanitarian aid has been constrained by prejudices entrenched in Yemeni society and the lack of tribal and informal patronage systems. Many of them do not have documentation, which limits their possibility to move around and access land in safer locations to resettle more permanently, which forces them to constantly change locations. In 2014, a UNICEF survey showed how the Muhamasheen community was doing substantially worse than other Yemenis in most indicators, including literacy and access to basic services, such as improved water sources, sanitation, immunisations, and social welfare programmes. Women, children, the elderly and disabled are at greater risk of losing access to humanitarian aid, because of armed violence and damage to infrastructure. At least one aid facility was impacted by the current conflict. Low running stocks have been reported by agencies operating from Al Hudaydah response hub at the end of February.

After the Saudi blockade of ports in November 2017, clearance delays have been reported, resulting in higher costs. Concerns about future port restrictions continue to discourage shipping companies from using the ports. As a result, imports remain lower than they were in November.

Humanitarian and operational constraints

Humanitarian operations face both physical and administrative hurdles. The main road from Al Hudaydah to Taizz governorates through Al Garrahi district remained closed as of March, while the main road connecting Ibb and Taizz through Dimnat Khadir Al Misrakh is at risk of being blocked by fighting. If that happens, then access from Ibb to Taizz city may change to Al-Taiziyah–Jabal Habashi district, which is currently a frontline area. The coastal road connecting Al Khawkhah to Mokha has also been closed, and part of the road connecting Mokha to Taizz. In Hays and Al Khawkhah districts, insecurity along the road has hampered assistance in early March, with convoys exposed to indiscriminate shelling and the risk of landmines. The Ministry of Health attempted to deliver 15 tons of medicines from Aden to frontline governorates, but did not succeed because of insecurity. Airstrikes have targeted transport routes heavily, in particular those leading to the frontlines. Other infrastructure, such as telecommunication, fuel, and government buildings have been also impacted in Al Hudaydah. Civilians have difficulties accessing aid, because of armed violence and damage to infrastructure. At least one aid facility was impacted by the current conflict.

Refugees: There are more than 280,000 refugees in the country. The majority are Somali nationals, and refugee movement has continued despite the deteriorating conflict, with an estimated 100,000 arrivals in 2017. The majority of the refugee population lives in Aden and Lahj governorates, but Taizz hosts a number of refugees. They are vulnerable to violence and exploitation partly because they lack tribal or other local support mechanisms.

More than 1.2 million civilians in Yemen have specific needs. These include female and minor heads of households, persons with disabilities, including UXO and IED survivors, elderly people, conflict-affected children, women, marginalised groups and survivors of trauma. Women, children, the elderly and disabled are at greater risk of losing access to health services as they require specialised services, such as separated spaces and the availability of female health workers.

Aggravating factors

Cholera and Diphtheria

Along with the rest of the country, Taizz and Al Hudaydah have been affected by the cholera outbreak that started in April 2017. Between 27 April 2017 and 18 February 2018 more than 150,000 cholera cases have been reported in Al Hudaydah and more than 63,000 in Taizz. The outbreak was caused by an overall disruption of basic services, including healthcare and WASH facilities. The lack of commercial transportation into the country is also problematic, and aid workers have to rely on UN chartered flights and ships, which offer a limited number of slots.

Attack rate is calculated by dividing the number of cases by the population at risk. In the outbreak setting, the term attack rate is often used as a synonym for risk, referring to the risk of getting the disease during a specified period in a specific area.
the current fighting and displacement. Zabid and Al Garrahi districts have reported attack rates of 31–40% (EOC 27/02/2018).

There has been an overall decreasing trend in the number of new suspected cholera cases per week between September 2017 and March 2018, partly because of humanitarian assistance. However, the situation is likely to deteriorate with the rainy season, normally occurring over March–May (EOC 17/03/2018, FEWS NET 12/2013, Reuters 26/02/2018). In August 2017, Taizz and Ibb governorates experienced heavy flooding, and both Taizz and Al Hudaydah have experienced above average rainfall during the previous rainy season (ECHO 01/09/2017).

Yemen is facing the largest diphtheria outbreak since 1989, and Al Hudaydah is the governorate with the second highest number cases. The highest number of cases has been reported in Ibb governorate, where some IDPs from Al Hudaydah and Taizz have sought refuge (EOC 17/03/2018, OCHA 20/02/2018). Diphtheria is a respiratory-tract illness, transmitted from person to person through close physical and respiratory contact (WHO). While transmission rates are usually higher during winter when people spend more time inside, the disease is likely to continue to spread due to overcrowding, especially in the congested IDP sites, and time spent inside sheltering from fighting and shelling (WHO 2017).

Pre-existing vulnerabilities

According to the HNO 2018, data for which was collected prior to December, some of the districts affected by the current escalation had the highest cross-sectoral severity of needs (6 on a scale of 1 to 6). These were Al Mukha, Maqbanah, At Taiziyah in Taizz governorate, and Al-Khawkhah in Al Hudaydah governorate. Others, like Al Waziyyah and Dhubab in Taizz and Al Tuhayat, Zabid, and Al Garrahi in Al Hudaydah governorate had the second highest score on the scale (5) (OCHA 04/12/2018). This shows that conflict is affecting areas that were already badly affected by the crisis, and where the coping mechanisms of the population are likely to be already strained.

Some of these areas have also reported the highest severity of sectoral needs in Yemen. Taizz governorate faces Crisis (IPC Phase 3) levels of food insecurity but would likely be at least one phase worse without humanitarian assistance. Al Hudaydah also has Crisis (IPC Phase 3) levels of food insecurity (FEWS NET 02/2018). According to the latest HNO, Maqbanah, At Taiziyah, and Al Waziyyah in Taizz, and Al-Khawkhah, Al Tuhayat, Zabid, and Al Garrahi in Al Hudaydah are at heightened risk of famine (OCHA 04/12/2018).

Underlying health needs have also been particularly severe, with many districts affected by the current crisis having a 6 or 5 score on 6-points scale (OCHA 04/12/2018). This is even more worrisome due to the high incidence of cholera and diphtheria.

The western coastal areas of Yemen have also been affected by high levels of malnutrition, including all districts of Al Hudaydah and Al Mukha in Taizz. Here, GAM rates at above emergency levels were reported, and as of February 2018 some districts in Al Hudaydah and Taizz reported up to 6,000 untreated SAM cases and up to 36,000 untreated MAM cases (USAID 09/03/2018, OCHA 04/12/2018).

Growing secessionist movement in the South

Fighting in Aden, one of the main response hubs for displacement in Taizz and Al Hudaydah, erupted at the end of January, when the Southern Resistance Movement, took control of several government buildings in Aden city in protest to the refusal of President Hadi to dismiss Prime Minister Ahmed bin Dagher (BBC 29/01/2018). The Southern Resistance movement is a coalition of allied militias, based in the governorates that constituted South Yemen before unification (Muftah 25/06/2017). While the situation has now calmed, humanitarian operations from Aden hub, including assessments, were put on hold while conflict was escalating. Should conflict escalate again in this area, humanitarian operations for Taizz and Al Hudaydah are likely to be affected (OCHA 29/01/2018, OCHA 31/01/2018). Moreover, some IDPs are moving towards Aden governorate in order to get away from the frontline governorates (Shelter Cluster 23/03/2018, UNHCR 18/02/2018).

Long-term impact of the November blockade

In November 2017, the Saudi-led coalition announced a temporary closure of all airports, seaports, and land crossings in Yemen after the Houthis launched a missile from Yemen into Saudi Arabia towards Riyadh. Following international pressure, Saudi Arabia agreed to ease the blockade and re-open Al Hudaydah port, currently under Houthi control and the main entry point for food imports. However, inspections continue to delay both humanitarian and commercial shipments (USAID 09/03/2018, FEWS NET 02/2018). The resulting higher costs and concerns about future restrictions have discouraged shipping companies from using the ports; consequently, in early March 2018 the total commercial imports into Yemen were still 30% lower than before November 2017 (USAID 09/03/2018). This is problematic as Yemen imports 80–90% of its staple foods, and around 70% of Yemenis have no food stocks and buy food daily from the markets where possible (OCHA 04/12/2018; OCHA 11/11/2017). The situation remains
tense as Houthis continue to target Saudi territory and most recently launched seven ballistic missiles on 25 March, targeting at least four Saudi cities including Riyadh, but all missiles were destroyed by Saudi Arabian air defences (NY Times 25/03/2018).

**Contextual information**

**Conflict background**

The conflict in Yemen derives from the challenges related to a political transition supposed to bring stability to Yemen following an Arab Spring uprising that forced President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been ruling the country for 33 years, to hand over power to his deputy Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, in 2011 (BBC 30/01/2018, Mwatana 13/12/2017).

President Hadi struggled to deal with a variety of problems, including attacks by al-Qaeda, growing secessionist movement in the south, the continuing loyalty of many military officers to Mr Saleh, as well as corruption, unemployment, and food insecurity – many of the challenges that existed prior to 2011 (BBC 30/01/2018, Chatham House 08/11/2016). During the transitional period after 2011, many Yemenis became increasingly disappointed with the political process as the standards of living, security and basic governance continued to decline, creating more support for anti-government stakeholders including Houthis, the Southern Resistance Movement, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Chatham House 08/11/2016).

In 2013, Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference was launched, and was tasked with writing a new constitution and creating a federal political system. The Houthis withdrew from the process because it left Yemen’s transitional government in place that had not managed to create change after 2011 (Al Jazeera 01/08/2016). The Houthi movement took advantage of the increasing discontent and started a military offensive by first taking control of Saada governorate, their traditional stronghold, then joining public protests in July 2014 against the government decision to lift fuel subsidies which increased public control of Saada governorate, their traditional stronghold, then joining public protests in unease and massive street protests (Al Jazeera 01/08/2016).

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The Houthi forces were most likely assisted in their advance by former President Saleh and forces loyal to him (Mwatana 13/12/2017). By March 2015, Houthi had proceeded to Taizz, and further to Aden. This advancement marked the start of a new level of violent conflict in the country (Mwatana 13/12/2017).

The Houthis proceeded to take over Sanaa, Yemen’s capital city, in September 2014, forcing the Hadi government to establish a temporary capital in Aden (Al Jazeera 01/08/2016, BBC 30/01/2018). The Houthis were most likely assisted in their advance by former President Saleh and forces loyal to him (Mwatana 13/12/2017). By March 2015, Houthi had proceeded to Taizz, and further to Aden. This advancement marked the start of a new level of violent conflict in the country (Mwatana 13/12/2017).

The governorate of Taizz has been one of the main frontlines of the Yemen conflict and has experienced major displacement since the beginning (LSE 21/07/2017, Mwatana 13/12/2017). In March 2015, the fighting was mainly concentrated in Taizz city, the capital of the governorate. Following the Houthi offensive to gain more territory in central and southern Yemen, they managed to take control of the government military bases in the city, and soon after reinforced their control of the city (Mwatana 13/12/2017). After President Saleh’s support to Houthis became more prominent, military units loyal to President Hadi started to receive increased support from local political and tribal militias in Taizz, who had fought against the Yemeni forces during the protests in 2011 calling to remove Saleh from power (Mwatana 13/12/2017).

The situation reached a point where government forces were able to take back control of the city and force the Houthis and Saleh’s fighters out of most of the city’s neighbourhoods. Houthis remained in control of the areas surrounding the city, including all entrances to the city (Mwatana 13/12/2017). They imposed a blockade, which deteriorated the humanitarian situation for the more than 200,000 civilians who were trapped (Guardian 28/12/2015, Al Jazeera 26/11/2015).

In the middle of March 2016, and with the support of the airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition, forces loyal to President Hadi were able to partially break the blockade (Mwatana 13/12/2017). As of July 2016 governorate hosted the largest displaced population in Yemen, more than 530,000 individuals (TFPM 07/2016). Since the siege of Taizz ended, the conflict situation in Taizz has been constantly changing, but conflict frontlines have become relatively fixed within the governorate because neither side has had the military strength to extend its influence significantly beyond the borders of its support base (Critical Threats 05/01/2018, Critical Threats 06/10/2016).

Another major displacement in Taizz and Al Hudaydah governorates was seen in January 2017 when the Hadi government launched offensive Operation Golden Arrow with the initial aim to retake the western coast from Houthis. The operation made initial gains around Dhubab and Al Mukha, but later stagnated around Taizz and Al Hudaydah (Doha Institute 08/03/2017). The fighting in these areas resulted in significant civilian casualties and more than 44,000 fled the conflict throughout Taizz Governorate in January and February 2017, including at least 25,000 from Al Mukha and Dhubab districts (OCHA 25/02/2017, TFPM 05/2017). Simultaneously, returnee figures in both governorates dropped and many returnees became re-displaced (TFPM 05/2017).

**Relevant stakeholders**

The conflict in Yemen is a result of the complexity of the relationships between the stakeholders involved and the country’s contentious history, and therefore it is far more complex than a Sunni–Shia conflict, or proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although the majority of the Houthi forces are Shia-led, religious grievances have not...
been a major factor in the war, and many of their demands towards Yemeni government have been economic and political (Al Jazeera 01/08/2016, ICG 10/06/2014).

While armed groups in Yemen are often put in a ‘pro-government’ or ‘pro-Houthi’ camp, in reality, many small groups are often organised along tribal lines, and have their own identity, ideology, and goals (Chatham House 25/05/2016, Chatham House 18/11/2015). The following is a simplified summary of the main stakeholders.

**Pro-government forces:** supported militarily and politically by a Saudi-led coalition, are formally led by President Hadi and his cabinet. However, pro-government forces are deeply divided including fighters with tribal and regional motivations, southern separatists as well as Sunni Islamists who perceive the war as coup attempt by Iran (Chatham House 17/11/2015). These actors have competing visions of Yemen’s political future, and are mainly united by a common enemy – the Houthis (Chatham House 25/05/2016). Pro-government forces aim to regain control of Houthi-controlled areas, and also started to carry out operations against Al Qaeda. President Hadi has limited support among the wider population and is currently in exile in Saudi Arabia (Reuters 30/01/2018).

**The Houthis:** A group of Zaydi fighters led by Abdul Malik al-Houthi, based in northern Yemen. They aligned with former President Saleh who was once the rival they rose against (Chatham House 25/05/2016). Houthis purported goals include combating economic underdevelopment and political marginalization in Yemen while seeking greater autonomy for Houthi-majority regions particularly in the north of the country (Chatham House 25/05/2016). The alliance between the Houthis and Saleh was considered pragmatic and ended in December 2017 after Saleh distanced himself from the Houthis’ ballistic missile campaign against Saudi Arabia and expressed interest in negotiating with President Hadi and the Saudi led coalition. The statement of Saleh was followed by heavy fighting between Houthi and Saleh forces, and Saleh was killed by Houthis 4 December 2017 (Critical Threats 04/12/2017).

**General People’s Congress (GPC):** Saleh was the long-time leader of the GPC, an influential political party within Yemeni politics (Critical Threats 2017). After Saleh’s death, the party has faced a power vacuum and is getting increasingly fragmented. Some of its supporters have turned to support the Yemeni president Hadi, while others continue to reframe the party agenda (Middle East Eye 23/01/2018, The New Arab 04/01/2018).

**The Southern Resistance movement:** A coalition of allied militias, based in the governorates that constituted South Yemen before unification. The Southern Resistance were used by the Hadi government to re-establish control in Aden, after the Houthis took control over large parts of the city in July 2015. The group continued to exercise considerable control in Aden and the southern governorates, where people feel they have been marginalised by the north. Following the dismissal of Southern Movement politicians from the Hadi government in April 2017, the Movement created the ‘Southern Transitional Council’ (STC), effectively creating a third government, which temporarily took control of some main government buildings in Aden in January 2018 after heavy fighting with pro-government forces (Al Jazeera 29/01/2018).

**Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP):** AQAP is based in the south and east of the country, and has expanded its support base within the local Sunni population by fighting the Houthis alongside local tribal forces in al Bayda in central Yemen (Critical Threats 05/01/2018). Initially AQAP capitalised on the security vacuums that emerged after fighting between pro-government and Houthi forces. Since April 2016, the Hadi government and Saudi-led coalition have increased operations against AQAP, seeking to diminish their physical presence especially in al Mukalla, which is one of AQAP’s stronghold areas. Despite this, AQAP has continued attacks particularly in Abyan, Aden, and Hadramawt governorates (Critical Threats 01/03/2018).

**Islamic State (IS):** has a small branch in Yemen and has also profited from the security vacuum created by fighting between pro-government forces and Houthis. IS did not claim any attacks in 2017 until November, when IS fighters resumed suicide attacks in Aden. On 24 February 2018, IS claimed responsibility for an attack on the headquarters of a Yemeni counter-terrorism unit in Aden, killing 14 people and wounding at least 40 (Guardian 25/02/2018, Critical Threats 01/03/2018).

**International and neighbouring countries’ relationship to the conflict**

Saudi Arabia shares a long border with Yemen, and it fears what it sees as Iranian expansionism through its support for Shia armed groups including Shia-led Houthis in Yemen (Al Jazeera 01/08/2016). Multiple sources suggest that Houthis have received advanced weapons and other military support from Iran, but Iran has denied these allegations (Reuters 17/02/2018, Reuters 21/03/2017). To block Iran’s influence in the area, a coalition of Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia have been supporting Hadi’s pro-government forces since the beginning of the conflict mainly in form of airstrikes. In addition to Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Senegal, Morocco, Sudan, and Egypt are members of the coalition (ICG 09/02/2016).

Several western countries, including the US, UK and France, have been supplying weapons, including cluster munitions, to Saudi Arabia and its allies (Washington Post 09/11/2017). These weapons have also been used in airstrikes that have damaged civilian housing and critical infrastructure including hospitals (HRW 01/2018). US has also carried out airstrikes in central and southern Yemen against AQAP and IS, and the number from airstrikes increased significantly from 21 in 2016 to 131 recorded strikes in 2017 (NBC 01/02/2018, Independent 04/04/2017). In October 2017, UN blacklisted the pro-government...
forces, Saudi-led coalition, and Houthis for killing children and not taking enough measures to improve protection for children, who have been impacted by air strikes and shelling (Reuters 05/10/2017).

**Key characteristics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key indicator</th>
<th>Demographic profile</th>
<th>Food security</th>
<th>Nutrition</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>WASH</th>
<th>Lighting and cooking</th>
<th>Literacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total pop.</td>
<td>27,737,134</td>
<td>17.8 million are people food insecure, including 8.4 million in IPC 3 (Crisis) or worse.</td>
<td>1.8 million children and 1.1 million pregnant or lactating women are acutely malnourished including 400,000 children suffering severe acute malnutrition (SAM). The prevalence of moderate and severe stunting is 47%.</td>
<td>Infant mortality rate: 34/1000, under-five mortality rate: 42/1000, maternal mortality rate: 385/100,000</td>
<td>Population using unimproved water source or surface water: 34%, population using improved sanitation facilities: 24%, population practicing open defecation: 44%</td>
<td>Gas is the most commonly used cooking fuel, but has become scarce and expensive due to import restrictions</td>
<td>In 2015 the literacy rate for women stood at 54.8%, and for men at 85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Hudaydah:</td>
<td>3,238,199</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Taizz:</td>
<td>2,998,300</td>
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**Response capacity**

**International response capacity**

UN agencies, ICRC, and NGOs operating from hubs in Al Hudaydah, Aden, and Ibb have been responding. Around 37,500, 34,500, and 24,000 IDPs are located in areas covered by these hubs, respectively. As of 1 March, response reached around 30,000 IDPs, almost half of the total number (Shelter/CCCM Cluster 22/03/2018). National Red Crescent societies, such as the Emirati Red Crescent, have also been responding (OCHA 11/03/2018).

Response from Al Hudaydah has been addressing needs for emergency shelter, NFIs, cash, rental subsidies, and WASH needs. Localised assessments are taking place, but no comprehensive results have been published yet. (Shelter/CCCM Cluster 26/02/2018)

WHO has managed to deliver 20 tons of life-saving medicines and medical supplies to respond to the rising number of injuries received by hospitals in Al Hudaydah (OCHA 12/02/2018).

From Aden, humanitarian actors have been assessing shelter and NFI needs of IDPs in collective centres and informal settlements in Abyan governorate, where a majority of IDPs were from Taizz and Al Hudaydah. They have been building local capacity for cash for rental subsidies efforts. Rapid assessments have been carried out in Aden, Abyan, Lahj. Food and WASH kits have been distributed in Abyan governorate.

The Shelter/NFI/CCCM Sub-National Cluster in Ibb is currently coordinating with UNHCR, ACTED, IYCY and HFY to provide response to the newly displaced families in Ibb (Shelter/CCCM Clusters 20/02/2018). Food voucher distributions have taken place in both Al-Mudhaffar and Al-Qahirah districts, just outside of Taizz city (OCHA 11/03/2018).

Potential response in the coastal districts of Al Mukha and Dhubab, Taizz governorate, have been under review, with a focus on food security, health, nutrition and protection (OCHA 12/02/2018). As of early March, WFP has started a general food distribution for 5,000 new IDPs in these districts (OCHA 11/03/2018). The Saudi-led coalition has pledged 1.5 billion USD for the humanitarian response in Yemen, covering almost half of what was requested in the 2018 HRP (YCHO 08/02/2018).

**Population coping mechanisms**

Reported coping strategies include people using the last of their savings, selling their assets and/or taking loans to pay up to USD 250 per family to travel outside of conflict-affected areas (UNHCR 18/02/2017). Both Taizz and Al Hudaydah show a high score in the WFP mVAM reduced coping strategies index that takes into account indicators such as buying less expensive food, limiting portion sizes, reducing the number of meals, borrowing food, and restricting adults food consumption (WFP 01/2018).

**Information gaps**

**Impact and displacement:** The amount of available information on displacement numbers varies across governorates, and often the methodology for displacement tracking is not explained. IOMs DTM has been aiming to harmonise displacement tracking methodology and assessment tools for tracking population movement in Yemen. They have produced situation reports after July 2016, but have not provided any updates after October 2017 (IOM:DTM 2017).
Generally, information on needs is confined to a limited number of sources, often containing data on specific districts that cannot be generalised to all conflict-affected areas, or, conversely, very broad information on whole governorates with no specifics, making comparisons difficult. Despite evident gaps, the data gives an indication of the impact of the current conflict escalation on the civilian population. Available in-crisis data is triangulated with information on pre-crisis underlying vulnerabilities to offer a more complete picture of the situation.

Due to the limitations outlined above, it is difficult to make distinctions between host communities and IDPs, as well as between urban and rural areas. Moreover, there is limited information available about the tensions between IDPs and host communities as well as how IDPs are perceived in their host communities, recognising that many IDPs are moving south from Houthi-controlled areas to government-controlled areas and having their own political and religious views that might differ from common views within the host community. There is also limited information about factors other than insecurity causing displacement, for instance persecution. Needs-driven displacement (for food, healthcare, shelter) is rarely covered in the available information, though this is likely to increase as displacement is becoming increasingly protracted and IDPs are exhausting their coping capacity.

Sources tend to highlight Al Hudaydah governorate more often than Taizz largely because of its strategic location including the port, leading to a wider information gap on Taizz than on Al Hudaydah, despite Taizz having been a conflict hotspot since early in the crisis.

**Health:** The health system in Yemen has collapsed, and the country is experiencing large disease outbreaks with increasing numbers of patients. However, information about the state of health facilities after the escalation in Taizz and Al Hudaydah remains sparse and localised. There is a limited amount of information about the availability of medical supplies across the governorates. This information is important because of the centrality of health response in Yemen, where the healthcare system is very weak and there is a high vulnerability to health outbreaks.

**WASH:** Despite the relevance of WASH in the overall crisis in Yemen, little information is available on the state of water and sanitation infrastructures in Taizz and Al Hudaydah. Some conflict-affected districts showed a high cholera attack rate, and both governorates are at risk of flooding during the rainy season which just started, making the need for information on WASH more pressing.

**Shelter:** There is little information on how IDPs shelter, and if they tend to settle in urban or rural areas. There is no information as to how many IDPs live in private accommodation compared to IDP sites. This is especially important for Al Hudaydah which currently has only one reported collective centre, and no spontaneous settlement.

Al Hudaydah has the second highest caseload for diphtheria across all governorates, and information on situations of overcrowding is important to detect vulnerability to further spread of the disease.

**Education:** Information on the characteristics (primary, secondary) of the schools affected by the current escalation is limited, which makes the comparison with pre-crisis data, which tends to be very precise, fairly difficult. How the schools have been affected would also represent valuable information to compare with the situation before the December escalation. There is also little information on the payment of teachers in Al Hudaydah, and how this is directly affecting access to education.

**Vulnerable groups:** Vulnerable groups are rarely highlighted in reports about displacement in Taizz and Al Hudaydah. Despite the fact that 75% of IDPs in Yemen are women and children, reports on their specific needs and challenges are missing. Despite their presence in conflict-affected areas pre-crisis, information on the Muhamasheen is completely lacking from reports on Taizz and Al Hudaydah. The information gap on their settlement areas makes targeting them with specialised assistance difficult, despite them likely having the highest needs.

**Humanitarian and operational constraints:** Information products on road closures oftentimes do not specify the reasons behind the closures, which would be useful for planning operations. Information on physical hurdles is not always updated on a regular basis, making monitoring more difficult.

**National response capacity:** There is no specific information on response initiatives by the government bodies in government-controlled areas. Because vulnerabilities have risen significantly during three years of conflict, and recognising that Yemen was already the poorest country in the Middle East pre-crisis, the Government of Yemen has generally a limited capacity to respond to crises, as the health system and the provision of basic services has been crippled (HRP 2018). No information is available for the local authorities’ response in Houthi-controlled areas.

National NGOs have been active in the affected governorates, yet no specific information is available on response in place for this crisis (OCHA 31/12/2017). International agencies rely on local partners to implement their activities, and therefore this information would be valuable.

**Lessons learned**

Violent conflict in cities often leads to large fluctuation in the population typology, which complicates effective targeting. Any urban intervention risks quickly becoming irrelevant
or poorly programmed in a very short period of time, as the initially targeted population can be overlooked. (ECHO 01/2018).

There is a need to promote social cohesion between IDPs and host communities living in cities through dedicated, targeted interventions, together with development actors (ECHO 01/2018).

Urban populations grow during conflict as people seek safety, food and basic services, however cities are often the centres for conflict and thus suffer disproportionate damage (ICRC 04/04/2017). As a result, urban populations are often highly concentrated and there is increased pressure on damaged water, sewage and energy services. Communal tension are likely to rise as a result.

Engaging women in response plans remains a challenge, and incorporating gender in assessments and programming in Yemen is hampered by a lack of capacity, which tends to lead to have it neglected (Sarah J. Ahmed, Scholar and researcher specialized in women and gender in Yemen).

Experiences with IDP women in Taizz show an increasing need for psychosocial services to deal with trauma (Sarah J. Ahmed, Scholar and researcher specialized in women and gender in Yemen).

As the set-up of camps continues to be prohibited, finding alternative shelter solutions for IDPs remains a challenge, especially for IDPs currently living in schools (or other public buildings) and facing high pressure from the host community to vacate the premises. There needs to be increased focus in planning of alternative shelter solutions while providing support to capacity-building of national stakeholders, in shelter design, programming and camp management approaches. There is also increased need to take into account the integration of IDPs in their host communities, especially as the displacement is becoming increasingly protracted (Shelter/CCCM Cluster 04/2017).

High fuel prices make it extremely difficult to locate transporters for trucked water and other commodities; who, if located, ask for extremely high prices (Shelter/CCCM Cluster 04/2017). The provision of generators, spare parts for generations, fuel and financial support for running costs of generators has proved useful to provide water to urban populations in Sanaa, Aden and Taizz (ECHO 01/2018).
Figure 1: Seasonal calendar for a typical year in Yemen

Figure 2: Monthly quantities discharged (in tons) by type of cargo 2016-2018

Source: FEWS NET 02/2018
Figure 3: Drivers of displacement in Yemen

- Blockade
- Conflict
- Airstrikes
- Reduced health services
- Damaged water infrastructure
- Limited food availability, and disrupted livelihoods and markets
- Exhausing coping capacity
- Limited humanitarian access
- Lack of shelter options
- Increasing needs
- Increasing poverty
- Prolonged conflict
- Displacement
- Widespread use of explosive weapons
- Insecurity
- Persecutions, based on political, religious and ethnic divides
- Cholera outbreak
- Diphtheria outbreak