IMPACT OF INSURGENCY IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA: SCENARIOS

Possible developments in northeast Nigeria over the next 9 months (to June 2017)

03 October 2016
SUMMARY

Scenario 1: Continued low-level conflict, increasing returns

**Overview:** The conflict continues with neither the military or insurgents making significant territorial gains. Many areas of Borno remain insecure, with access a severe constraint. Few new IDPs emerge, while increasing numbers of IDPs return to the ‘safer’ LGAs, especially in early 2017, to prepare agricultural land. Almost all IDPs/refugees from Adamawa and Yobe return.

Duration of crisis: More than 15 months

Scenario 2: Increasing security, multiple displacement flows

**Overview:** Initial military success enables the government to retake control of all urban areas, although much of rural Borno remains insecure. Insurgents regroup and increase the number and frequency of targeted attacks on state institutions and civilians in some areas. Almost all IDPs/refugees from Adamawa and Yobe states return, as do many from Borno. However, the increased insurgent activity in some areas of Borno and Yobe cause re-displacement of returnees.

Duration of crisis: More than 15 months

Scenario 3: Widespread insecurity, famine

**Overview:** At least one of the insurgent factions changes tactics and regains popular support in some rural areas, increasing in strength. The conflict escalates, and spreads again into other states. Displacement increases significantly. Across the northeast, humanitarian access reduces as does the state’s already limited capacity to provide services.

Duration of crisis: More than 2 years

Scenario 4: Negotiated settlement, large-scale returns

**Overview:** A negotiated settlement between the government and the main insurgent factions results in a sustained ceasefire, and precipitating large-scale returns to all areas. This overwhelms the state services in many LGAs. Access to land improves. Localised insecurity persists due to splinter groups rejecting the ceasefire. Humanitarian access improves slowly. Less media coverage leads to a fall in humanitarian funding, limiting the medium-term response.

Duration of crisis: 12–18 months
ACAPS Scenarios – Impact of insurgency in northeast Nigeria, October 2016

SITUATION MAP AND HUMANITARIAN PROFILE

Security incidents and humanitarian access, end September 2016

- 5.8M in Borno, OCHA Projection
- 3.02M in Yobe, OCHA Projection
- 4.2M in Adamawa, OCHA Projection

- 1.65M Host Population
- 2.10M Inaccessible
- 1.45M IDPs
- 0.19M IDPs other States
- 0.14M Refugees
- 0.27M Returnees
- 3.16 M (58%) severely food insecure (IPC Phases 3-5) (08/2016 Cardre Harmonised)
- 0.63 M (15%) severely food insecure (IPC Phases 3-5) (08/2016 Cardre Harmonised)
- 0.65 M (20%) severely food insecure (IPC Phases 3-5) (08/2016 Cardre Harmonised)

- LGA Government HQs [OCHA]
- Conflict Incidents (06-09/2016) [ACLED]
- BH attacks on civilians
- BH attacks on humanitarian
- BH v military
- BH inter-faction clash

Access [OCHA]
- Accessible with no restriction
- Accessible with varying restrictions
- No humanitarian access
- Primary/Secondary Roads [OCHA]
- Local Government Areas [GADM]
- NE State Boundaries [GADM]
- Other State Boundary [GADM]

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INTRODUCTION

PROBLEM STATEMENT
Over five years of conflict in northeast Nigeria has resulted in critical levels of malnutrition and food insecurity. The military offensive in 2016 has resulted in the recapture of many urban areas and increased humanitarian access. While the government of Nigeria and humanitarian community are scaling up, the response remains inadequate. Driven by a lack of food and livelihoods in their places of displacement, many of the displaced are returning home to locations lacking critical infrastructure and essential services. The ongoing conflict has the potential to continue to cause further displacement and reduce food security.

There is an urgent need to ensure a coherent and robust response strategy that takes into account future developments to guide the current scale-up of operations.

SCENARIOS FOR OCTOBER 2016 – JUNE 2017
The scenarios within this document are not attempts to predict the future. Rather they are a description of situations that could occur in the coming nine months, and are designed to highlight the possible impacts, and resulting humanitarian consequences, of the insurgency in northeast Nigeria. It is intended that they be used to:

- Support planning by anticipating needs and related interventions;
- Provide a framework for improved monitoring and surveillance systems; and
- Create awareness, provide early warning, and promote preparedness activities among stakeholders.

While the scenarios consider possible developments from October 2016 until the end of June 2017, any impact on access to basic needs will likely be felt by households beyond June, at least until the main harvest in late 2017.

HOW TO USE THIS DOCUMENT
The four scenarios developed are summarised on page 2. Pages 6 to 9 give more detail on the scenarios. Page 10 lists some factors that could compound the humanitarian consequences of any of the scenarios. Page 11 outlines actions recommended by workshop participants to mitigate the impact of the scenario. Pages 12 and 13 list possible trigger events that, should they occur, might lead towards the situations described in the scenarios.

CURRENT SITUATION
Over 14 million people are affected by conflict in northeast Nigeria and more than 7 million are in need. A growing number are in urgent need of food assistance, with Famine recorded in some areas (IPC Phase 5). 4.4 million people are severely food insecure. Alarming rates of acute malnutrition are emerging in Borno and Yobe, with deaths reported (FEWSNET 18/08/2016). Meanwhile, an estimated 2.1 million people remain trapped in areas controlled by Boko Haram (BH) with no access to humanitarian assistance, and are thought to have little food. 80% of the state remains inaccessible, mainly the north and east, leaving very limited space for humanitarian operations.

Both inaccessible and many accessible communities face severe protection needs, and an absence of basic services. IDPs within host communities or informal camps (around 90% of the total IDP population) report the highest needs, followed by those in formal (government-run) camps. The gaps in assistance to host communities are also critical. Tensions have arisen between host communities and IDPs in some locations over competition for scarce resources and unequal access to assistance.

A movement of return towards ‘safer’ LGAs in Borno is encouraged by the government despite the near-total destruction of homes and civil infrastructure and extremely limited state and humanitarian presence in many areas. This has resulted in almost one million people receiving no assistance (IOM 31/08/2016; OCHA 05/09/2016).

Borno is most affected: 1.44 million people are displaced, 3.16 million people (more than 50% of the estimated population) are severely food insecure, and 2.1 million people remain inaccessible. In Yobe and northern Adamawa, pockets of insecurity persist. In Yobe, 135,000 people are displaced and 655,000 people are severely food insecure (more than 20% of the estimated population). In Adamawa, 629,000 people are severely food insecure and 160,000 displaced (IOM 31/08/2016; OCHA 31/08/2016; FEWSNET 18/08/2016).

Health is emerging as a major need: most health centres across Borno are only partially functioning, or not functioning at all. At the same time polio, measles, and acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) are being reported (OCHA 17/08/2016, WHO 21/09/2016).

BH activity is falling and the military is taking more areas, yet BH attacks persist and its division in mid-2016 makes its future operations harder to predict. Conflict is expected to escalate after the end of the rainy season. Little is known either about BH’s Sambisa forest faction or about ISWAP, although ISWAP has made threats against humanitarian organisations and the Nigerian government (Washington Post 24/08/2016).

1 See the methodology section for more information on how these scenarios were developed.
POPULATION IN NEED
The current estimated population in need exceeds 7 million, 4.4 million of whom are severely food insecure. These scenarios consider how this population in need could change both in terms of caseload and profile (displaced, non-displaced, returnees, host population; see Annex A for the estimated population figures).

GEOGRAPHY
Northern Borno and Yobe states are part of the Sahel zone, where annual rainfall is low and the rainy season lasts between three and four months, leaving minimal surface water during the dry season, and making access to water a challenge. The vegetation is sparse and the grasses are very short (FAO 2005). In the Sahel zone, people live from cultivating cereals and livestock. Large parts of Yobe and Borno cultivate millet, cowpeas, and sesame. Floodplains in Yobe are important for rice production, vegetables, and wheat.

Adamawa is a mainly agricultural state, where rice, maize, sorghum, yam and cassava are cultivated (FEWSNET 05/2015).

The destruction of perennial tree cover for firewood, bush fires caused by hunters and pastoralists, and overgrazing have led to serious degradation of pastoral resources and an irreversible process of desertification (FAO 2005). Landslides, storms, and extreme temperatures are have also had a humanitarian impact in the past (Preventionweb 2014).

The northeastern regions have the highest proportion of poverty in Nigeria, and were ranked below southern states on most key socioeconomic indicators even before the conflict. Poverty is higher in rural areas (WFP and IFPRI, 07/2013). In 2010, the absolute poverty rate in the northeast stood at 69%, among the highest in Nigeria (NBS 2010).

The 2010 Nigeria Education Data Survey reports literacy rates of 52% for the whole of Nigeria, and 28% across the northeastern states (Borno, Yobe, Gombe, Bauchi, Taraba, and Adamawa). Most key education indicators in northeastern states were significantly below national averages (NEDS, 2010).

OVERALL ASSUMPTIONS
For all the scenarios, the following assumptions have been made:

- A good but limited harvest, reinforced by the mild rainy season in 2016, will temporarily ease food insecurity for some host communities and IDPs across the affected area. More land has been cultivated this year than in 2015, although many IDPs still have had no or very little access to land.
- No major flooding. However, there is a possibility that Cameroon will open the Lagdo dam within the next month as water levels are critically high, and this would result in serious flooding in Adamawa. In 2012, the worst-hit areas were Fufure, Girei, Yola south, Yola North, Demsa, Numan, Lamorde, Shelleng, Michika, Guyuk, and Ganye LGAs.
- Continuing food insecurity and high malnutrition rates.
- Up to 40% of IDPs are unlikely to return to their place of origin, having established livelihoods and homes among the host community in their displaced locations, and resulting in a permanent increase in the urban population.
- Any impact on local dynamics and on the political scene should Local Government elections take place has not been considered.
- Affected households’ coping capacity is already weak. Almost all displaced households, and many host families, have lost income and adopted negative coping mechanisms.
**SCENARIOS**

**Scenario 1**

**Continued low-level conflict, increasing returns**

**Possible triggers**
The following scenario could result, if some or all of the following occur:
- The military make no significant gains
- Military forces are withdrawn from the northeast due to unrest elsewhere in Nigeria, or the financial crisis
- Morale/discipline of the military reduces
- One or more insurgent groups cease targeting civilians
- Authorities force or increase incentives for IDPs to return
- Provision of assistance to returnees increases
- Cooperation between Federal and State authorities weakens or does not improve

**Description**
Military operations continue but without significant territorial gains. Insurgents still occupy and move throughout most of rural Borno, targeting civilian state institutions and possibly other insurgent groups. However, they avoid contact with the military, make no significant territorial gains, and attacks on civilians do not increase. In Borno, there are few new IDPs, and increasing numbers of IDPs return to the ‘safer’ LGAs, especially in early 2017. Almost all the displaced from Adamawa and Yobe return.

**Geographic areas of most concern**
Newly accessible areas; hard to reach areas; Maiduguri.

**Impact**
Most (80%) of Borno state remains inaccessible to humanitarian actors, who continue to focus on IDPs in the major urban centres that are accessible. Overcrowding in these accessible urban centres persists, although there is an increase in the services provided both to IDPs and host communities. The government focuses on the provision of security and basic services to returnees. There is significant environmental damage and deforestation in and around major urban centres. Tensions over limited shelter, water, land and other resources arise between returnees and IDPs in places of return, as well as between IDPs and host communities. Returnees are exposed to IEDs/mines. Increasing humanitarian assistance in Borno encourages those displaced outside the state to return to areas of Borno served by humanitarian actors. Most of the estimated 2.1 million in inaccessible areas remain without access to food, clean water and basic services. Some of the people who lost humanitarian assistance on their return to less accessible locations re-displace to locations with humanitarian services.

**Humanitarian consequences**
Increasing international attention increases available funding for Borno, but needs of returnees in Adamawa and Yobe are largely overlooked. Disease outbreaks occur in many places of return due to contaminated water sources, poor shelter, and overstretched health services. Mortality and morbidity in inaccessible areas increases, and humanitarian agencies face pressure from donors to operate in less accessible areas. Protection concerns for returnees include the risk of exposure to landmines and IEDs and recruitment by insurgents. Land and property rights issues arise as returnees find their houses and land occupied.

**Operational constraints**
Access and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and relief items remain major constraints. Lack of coordination between civil and military actors and poor information exchange between humanitarian organisations and government departments inhibit effective response and increase tensions; bureaucratic hurdles increase. Funding increases slightly but is a constraint. Mishandling and looting of aid pose logistical challenges. Weak capacity of local NGOs limits the available partners.

**Change in population in need**
Additional 230,000 returnees in Adamawa and Yobe. 150,000 returnees, primarily men, in Borno. IDP populations decrease accordingly.

**Duration of need for support**
More than 15 months:
- for returnees and others with access to land: at least until the until harvest in October–December 2017.
- for longer-term displaced/returnees without access to land/employment: beyond December 2017.
Scenario 2
Increasing security, multiple displacement flows

**Probability**

- Highly unlikely
- Likely

**Impact**

- Improvement
- Status quo
- Deterioration

**Possible triggers**
The following scenario could result, if some or all of the following occur:

- Capacity of military is enhanced
- Increased military successes weaken the insurgent groups
- Military prevents armed group access to supplies and strategic routes
- In-fighting weakens the insurgent groups
- One or more insurgent groups withdraws or surrenders
- One or more insurgent groups ceases targeting civilians
- Dialogue is initiated between government and insurgent groups
- Provision of assistance to returnees increases
- Host communities increase vigilance (CJTF strength increases)
- Coordination and information sharing among all stakeholders increases

**Description**
The military successfully regains control of all major towns throughout the northeast. As security is established, more IDPs and refugees are encouraged to return to their areas of origin. Almost all IDPs and refugees from Adamawa and Yobe return. Rehabilitation of essential infrastructure begins but is inadequate for the returning population. Agricultural activities resume in a small radius around urban centres.

However, as insurgent groups change tactics, attacks on villages and rural areas and small-scale, targeted attacks on urban centres in some LGAs increase significantly from late 2016 causing new localised displacement back to the state capital and other safer LGA capitals.

**Geographic areas of most concern**
Maiduguri and LGAs headquarters, where displaced populations are gathering. Traditional BH strongholds. Remote LGAs of Borno, southeast Yobe and north Adamawa where access is a challenge.

**Impact**
The initial return movement and temporarily improved security situation lead the government and the humanitarian agencies to scale up response in ‘safer’ return locations, although response is minimal in areas subject to insurgent attacks. Maiduguri and other major towns witness a high level of movement of IDPs, with many leaving for their home LGA, but some returning to Maiduguri due to insecurity, and others returning to Maiduguri from Adamawa and Yobe. The total IDP population in Maiduguri remains above 100,000, although the profile changes slightly due to the higher proportion of men leaving for their LGA of origin to assess the viability of return. Tensions arise between host communities, IDPs (including new arrivals), and returnees in both displacement locations and places of return over limited resources and land.

**Humanitarian consequences**
Increased returns alleviate the pressure on IDP camps and host communities in Maiduguri and LGA capitals; camps in Yobe and Adamawa empty. Structures and services in places of return, including water points, sanitation facilities, shelter, health centres, and schools, are overstretched due to the continuous population movement. The humanitarian needs of the displaced and the people who remain trapped in the newly targeted areas increase significantly. IDPs face ongoing protection issues and gender violence due to negative coping strategies such as begging, prostitution, etc. Returnees are vulnerable to recruitment by insurgent groups. People displaced multiple times face particular difficulty regaining livelihoods and accessing income and services. Food security and malnutrition levels remain at/return to critical thresholds. Needs of returnees in Adamawa and Yobe are largely overlooked.

**Operational constraints**
Existing infrastructure is further damaged due to targeted attacks. Humanitarian space remains limited, and movement of goods and people restricted, in some areas. National and state authorities move to exert greater control over aid delivery.

**Change in population in need**
Additional 230,000 returnees in Adamawa and Yobe. Up to 500,000 returnees, primarily men, in Borno. IDP populations decrease accordingly. Up to 150,000 re-displace.

**Duration of need for support:** more than 15 months.
Scenario 3
Widespread insecurity, famine

Possible triggers
The following scenario could result, if some or all of the following occur:

- Military forces are withdrawn from the northeast due to unrest elsewhere in Nigeria, or the financial crisis
- The military make no significant gains
- Morale/discipline of the military falls
- The government declares that the insurgent groups are defeated.
- Insurgent groups are successful in neighbouring countries
- Capacity of one or more of the insurgent groups increases, either through reunification/agreement or through external reinforcement
- ISWAP receives increasing external support
- Media coverage sympathy to insurgents increases
- ISWAP initiates social assistance activities to civilians, rebuilding popular support and increasing recruitment
- Authorities force or increase incentives for IDPs to return
- Returnees face poverty and unemployment and join insurgents groups
- Cooperation between Federal and State authorities weakens or does not improve
- Cooperation between Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria weakens or does not improve
- Relations between the government and INGOs worsen significantly

Description
At least one of the insurgent factions changes tactics and regains popular support in some rural areas: their security improves, they increase targeted attacks and regain territory. Civilians in territory controlled by insurgents benefit from slightly increased assistance from the insurgents, but they remain inaccessible to mainstream humanitarian organisations. The conflict spreads back into other states. This general escalation in the conflict increases displacement, including to Maiduguri, Adamawa, Gombe, and Yobe, and traps others.

Geographic areas of most concern
Most of Borno. North Adamawa. North and east Yobe

Impact
Increased displacement leads to overcrowding in urban areas, both in camps and host communities. Significant numbers of people remain inaccessible to humanitarian actors, and access is further restricted. Humanitarian and commercial convoys are disrupted. The state’s ability to provide essential services outside the LGA capitals is severely limited. Some humanitarian actors stop or reduce their activities due to the insecurity. The military resumes management of Borno, including Maiduguri. The total amount of land cultivated falls due to the new wave of displacement to urban areas, resulting in a reduced harvest in 2017 and reduction in income for many displaced households. Communities in locations that are inaccessible to, or very hard to access by, humanitarian actors experience famine by mid-2017.

Humanitarian consequences
Increasing numbers of IDPs are in need of humanitarian assistance. Further loss of property, household assets, livelihoods, reduced planting in 2017, and increased negative coping strategies push poorer communities further into poverty. Number of people in severe food insecurity increases. More people are in IPC Phase 5 and a famine is declared in Borno. Acute malnutrition in children under five worsens, and the overall nutritional status of IDPs, and some host communities, further deteriorates. Diseases such as diarrhoea, malaria, and polio increase significantly. Major protection concerns for people trapped in BH areas. No access to education.

Operational constraints
Access diminishes across Borno and some areas of other states. Logistical costs escalate. Delivery of assistance will only be possible via national actors, primarily the army, reducing accountability and monitoring. Information gaps increase.

Change in population in need
Another 1 million people are displaced; another 1 million people become food insecure and the severity of needs for those already in need increases.

Duration of need for support: more than two years.
Scenario 4

Negotiated settlement; large-scale returns

**Possible triggers**
The following scenario could result, if some or all of the following occur:

- International mediation leads to a peace agreement
- Capacity of military is enhanced
- Increased military successes weaken the insurgent groups
- The military prevents armed group access to supplies and strategic routes
- Military forces withdraw from the northeast due to unrest elsewhere in Nigeria, or the financial crisis
- Dialogue is initiated between the government and insurgent groups
- In-fighting weakens the insurgent groups
- One or more insurgent groups withdraws or surrenders
- Provision of assistance to returnees increases
- IDPs receive reliable info about the improvement in security in their areas of return

**Description**
A negotiated settlement between the government and both insurgent factions results in a sustained ceasefire precipitating large-scale returns to all areas. Humanitarian access improves slightly, although some parts of Borno remains inaccessible to international organisations. The crisis receives less coverage in the media and humanitarian funding falls, limiting the response. Large numbers of IDPs return home, overwhelming state services in many LGAs. Access to land improves.

**Geographic areas of most concern**
Smaller towns and rural areas of Borno.

**Impact**
Large-scale returns follow the successful implementation of a ceasefire. The majority of IDPs return to plant crops in time for the 2017 harvest. More land is available for cultivation, although most returnees lack sufficient agricultural inputs. Borno state authorities struggle to sufficiently rehabilitate facilities (schools, health centres, water sources, etc.) and staff essential services to meet demand. Incentives/humanitarian assistance given to IDPs is insufficient to last until the harvest. Tensions arise between returnees and IDPs in places of return and between IDPs and host communities. The pressure on facilities and services in main towns decreases and the remaining IDPs are well served by the state and humanitarian agencies. Local economies begin to recover. Large numbers of CJFT require retraining in a community policing role or alternative employment.

**Humanitarian consequences**
State services improve in all urban, and some rural, areas. Returnees lose access to free healthcare and are unable to afford state services where available. Returnees to rural areas have very limited access to clean water until authorities rehabilitate wells/water systems, and few have access to latrines and hygiene practices are poor. They are also exposed to IEDs/mines, The number of food insecure people falls rapidly although malnutrition rates, especially in hard-to-reach areas, remain high until the harvest. Returnees to more rural areas lack access to education. Land and property rights issues arise as returnees find their houses and land occupied. CJTF may attempt to prevent former insurgents reintegrating. Local communities may discriminate against people believed to be related to the insurgents.

**Operational constraints**
Unknown security situation and logistical challenges in scaling up the response beyond LGA capitals prevents humanitarian organisations from timely assistance in some places of return. Dispersal of the population in need as they return increases the cost of humanitarian assistance delivery. Humanitarian funding decreases as donors switch to funding medium and long-term interventions (livelihood support etc.). Poor coordination between state and international humanitarian actors prevents efficient delivery of services. National and state authorities move to exert greater control over aid delivery.

**Change in population in need**
More than 1 million returnees across all three states. The IDP population falls accordingly.

**Duration of need for additional support to affected households**
12 to 18 months (October 2016–harvest 2017).
**COMPOUNDING FACTORS**

The following developments could occur in parallel with any of the above scenarios and have the potential to significantly change the humanitarian situation.

**COMMUNICABLE DISEASE OUTBREAKS**

Northeast Nigeria faces outbreaks of endemic infectious diseases including malaria, measles, polio, and AWD. Three cases of polio, diagnosed in August 2016, were linked to disruptions in vaccination due to conflict. Some children born in BH-controlled areas have never been vaccinated. A mass vaccination campaign has been ongoing since late August, with the assistance of the military in inaccessible areas, although as many as 600,000 children remain inaccessible to polio vaccinators (UNICEF 17/08/2016; WHO 18/08/2016; GPEI 13/09/2016; GPEI 29/08/2016). A measles outbreak among children has been reported in Borno and Yobe states since April 2016, with an undetermined number of cases. Measles vaccination coverage for infants is 23.5% in Borno and 31.3% in Yobe (FEWSNET 07/07/2016; AFP 05/07/2016; MSF 27/07/2016; OCHA 06/04/2016). Crowded conditions in camps and urban centres allow diseases to spread faster. A large-scale disease outbreak is particularly of concern in Scenario 3, ‘Increasing insecurity’, as significant displacement would result in high concentrations of IDPs in state and LGA capitals, and in Scenario 4, ‘Negotiated settlement; large-scale returns’, during which significant numbers of IDPs return to places with damaged water systems and limited, and no longer free, healthcare services. In addition to increased morbidity and mortality, an outbreak results in additional healthcare costs at the national/local authority levels and diverts much of the international health assistance resources.

**ATTACKS ON HUMANITARIAN RESPONDERS**

Since July 2016, there have been several attacks on both commercial and humanitarian convoys, even along roads that are considered accessible (AFP 19/09/2016; AFP 17/08/2016; USAID 10/08/2016; OCHA 15/08/2016). A targeted attack on a UN agency or one of the INGOs could occur in any of the above scenarios, either as a reaction to a scale-up of humanitarian activities and presence or as a reaction to military successes. An attack on a humanitarian agency could result in suspension of activities or even withdrawal of the humanitarian community. Large numbers of people would be left without the necessary lifesaving assistance and displacement towards areas where aid is still distributed would occur.

**WORSENING ECONOMY AND STATE FINANCES**

Since 2015, Nigeria’s economy has experienced an economic slowdown, started by falling global oil prices. Since 70% of government revenues come from the oil sector, the slowdown has posed major challenges for public finances (WFP 31/07/2016). The dramatic fall in the value of the naira following its floatation on 20 June continues: between June and September, it depreciated by 40%. The depreciation, coupled with the global fall in oil prices, increased cost of imports (including rice, and livestock), and internal troubles in Nigeria’s oil production, has left the government struggling for resources. The cost of military operations against BH and the need to release food reserves to the northeast is a strain on the economy (FEWSNET 09/09/2016). An extreme change in exchange rates threatens the effectiveness of the humanitarian response.

In any of the scenarios outlined here, a further deterioration of the economy would have a detrimental impact on food security in the already food-insecure and conflict-affected northeastern states. Commodity prices could soar due to pressure on the currency and import restrictions. This could risk more than doubling the number of food insecure people in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states.

**REDUCED NATIONAL RESPONSE CAPACITY**

Possible developments that would result in an unavailability of national support on both the federal and state level include the worsening financial crisis, a political upheaval or the diversion of national resources due to conflict or other crisis outside the northeast.

**DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY**

Nigeria has a strong government, ruling the largest economy of Africa, and has historically been unwilling to draw attention to the BH insurgency in the northeast for fear that it might drive away economic partners and/or foreign investors. The federal government is not hostile to humanitarian intervention, however it does not ease or facilitate the process for international actors to carry out a coordinated humanitarian response. For example, INGOs cite difficulties obtaining visas for international staff and government restrictions. This position has delayed humanitarian response and prevents the standard scale-up mechanism (L3 declaration and cluster activation). Continued, or even a tightening of, restrictions on humanitarian assistance delivery by international organisations would negatively impact the provision food and essential services.
**RECOMMENDED ACTIONS**

Six recommendations are relevant to all scenarios:

1. Increased coordination, information-sharing and cooperation between the international humanitarian community and state and federal authorities.
2. Humanitarian response must be equitable, and sensitive to the different needs of IDPs, returnees, and host communities.
3. Management of IDP camps under military control should be transferred to civilian actors, with the military ensuring the security of the camps.
4. Enforce and harmonise humanitarian security policies.
5. Harmonise assessment methodologies.
6. Increase partnership with and capacity building of national partners, especially Nigerian Red Cross.
7. Durable solutions are valuable, focusing on local integration for IDPs who remain displaced.

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**Scenario 1: Continued low-level conflict, increasing returns**

- Scale up advocacy activities at national and international level for famine response.
- Establish a common supply and procurement chain for food aid items.
- Increase support to returnees and work closely with state authorities to ensure food, nutrition, livelihoods, shelter, WASH, and health services are provided.
- Develop an inclusive return policy that will also cover further development steps and prepare aid packages for returning IDPs.
- Develop demining activities, mainly in areas of returns and rural areas.
- Set up a time-limited rapid response across a wide geographical area to support returnees as they rebuild homes and restart livelihoods.

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**Scenario 2: Increasing security, multiple displacement flows**

- Increase support to returnees and work closely with state authorities to ensure food, nutrition, livelihoods, shelter, WASH, and health services are provided.
- Harmonise humanitarian and developmental work.
- Harmonise biometrical registration of IDPs, in order to track displacement and availability of resources.
- Develop an inclusive return policy that will also include further development steps and prepare "aid packages" for returning IDPs.
- Develop demining activities, mainly in areas of returns and rural areas.
- Set up a time-limited rapid response across a wide geographical area to support returnees as they rebuild homes and restart livelihoods.

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**Scenario 3: Widespread insecurity, famine**

- Scale up advocacy activities at both national and international level to respond to the famine.
- Increase cross-border operations when safe to do so.
- Establish a common supply and procurement chain for food aid items.

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**Scenario 4: Negotiated settlement, large-scale returns**

- Set up a time-limited rapid response across a wide geographical area to support returnees as they rebuild homes and restart livelihoods.
- Develop demining activities, mainly in areas of returns and rural areas.
- Conduct a joint post disaster needs assessment.
- Establish strong DDRR programme for BH and retraining of CJTF in community policing.
- Increase support to returnees and work closely with state authorities to ensure food, nutrition, livelihoods, and shelter, WASH, and health services are provided.
- Focus on long-term programming and recovery activities.
- Develop an inclusive return policy that will also cover further development steps and prepare aid packages for returning IDPs.
- Solutions focused on local integration for IDPs not returning in their place of origin.
- Develop community peace building programmes.
**SCENARIO TRIGGERS**

**Return movement is likely to increase if:**

- One or more insurgent groups ceases targeting civilians
- Authorities force, or increase incentives for, IDPs to return
- International mediation leads to a peace agreement
- Increased military successes weaken the insurgent groups
- In-fighting weakens the insurgent groups
- Capacity of military is enhanced
- One or more insurgent groups withdraw or surrender
- Provision of assistance to returnees increases
- IDPs receive reliable info about the improvement in security in their areas of return

**Population movement is likely to remain the same if:**

- The military make no significant gains
- Host communities increase vigilance (CJTF strength increases)
- Military prevents armed group access to supplies and strategic routes

**Displacement is likely to increase if:**

- Insurgent groups are successful in neighbouring countries
- Capacity of one or more of the insurgent groups increases, either through reunification/agreement or through external reinforcement
- Military forces are withdrawn from the northeast due to unrest elsewhere in Nigeria, or the financial crisis

**Scenario/CF to which trigger applies**

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<td>2 = Increasing security; continued displacement</td>
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<td>3 = Increasing insecurity</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4 = Negotiated settlement; large-scale returns</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Background information**

- **Scenario 1:**
  - Boko Haram is believed to have split in two factions. The Sekau faction is based in Sambisa Forest and the Islamic State West African Province is based in north Borno and draws support from ISIS.

- **Scenario 2:**
  - The term population movement is used to include both displacement and returns to the area of origin.
  - The Civilian Joint Task Force has been created by locals in conflict-affected communities of Borno state and has been supported by the government.

- **Scenario 4:**
  - Boko Haram attacks have affected Niger, Cameroon, and Chad.
### Scenario/CF to which trigger applies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Morale/discipline of the military falls</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>CF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISWAP receives increasing external support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Media sympathy to insurgents increases</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISWAP initiates social assistance activities to civilians, rebuilding popular support and increasing recruitment</td>
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<tr>
<td>The government declares that the insurgent groups are defeated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Returnees face poverty and unemployment and join insurgents groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation between Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria weakens or does not improve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Humanitarian capacity to respond will increase if:**
- Coordination and information sharing among all stakeholders increases
- Dialogue is initiated between government and insurgent groups

**Humanitarian capacity to respond will be inadequate if:**
- Cooperation between Federal and State authorities weakens or does not improve
- Loss of acceptance of humanitarian actors by the local community
- Government–INGOs relations worsen significantly
- Humanitarian agencies scale up without appropriate security and acceptance strategies
HOW SCENARIOS CAN BE USED

PURPOSE OF SCENARIO BUILDING
Scenarios are a set of different ways in which a situation may develop. The aim of scenario building is not to try and accurately predict the future but rather to understand the range of possible futures and then select a few that result in distinct situations with, usually, differing humanitarian outcomes that can:

- Support strategic planning for agencies and NGOs.
- Identify assumptions underlying anticipated needs and related interventions.
- Enhance the adaptability and design of detailed assessments.
- Influence monitoring and surveillance systems.
- Create awareness, provide early warning, and promote preparedness activities among stakeholders.

For more information on how to build scenarios, please see the ACAPS Technical Brief on Scenario Development

METHODOLOGY

The scenarios were developed during workshops in Abuja and Maiduguri involving 25 organisations. A list of factors that might significantly change the humanitarian landscape were identified. Of these, the following five main factors were considered as influencing the development of the humanitarian situation in northeast Nigeria:

- Insecurity
- Population movement
- Household capital
- Capacity of humanitarian organisations
- Capacity of government to provide basic services

Different combinations of these factors were selected and four plausible scenarios developed, identifying the major impacts of each scenario and humanitarian consequences. A number of compounding factors that could affect more than one of the scenarios were also identified and their effects were considered separately (see page 9).

That food security will improve slightly following the 2016 harvest is a given; the relative improvement is not addressed in these scenarios as it applies equally to each.

Staff from the following 25 organisations participated in one or more of the workshops: Office of the Vice President, National Emergency management Authority, MWASD, ACF, Action Aid, Christian Aid, COOPI, CRS, DRC, GAIN, ICRC, IMC, INGO Forum, InterSOS, IOM, IRC, Mercy Corps, NRC, OCHA, OXFAM, Plan International, PUI, Save the Children, UNFPA, UNICEF.

LIMITATIONS

- Scenarios can seem to oversimplify an issue, as the analysis balances details with broader assumptions.
- Scenario-building is not an end in itself. It is a process for generating new ideas that should in turn lead to actual changes in project design or decision-making. For these scenarios to be of use, they should form the basis for improved information sharing to inform a collective understanding of the actual and potential situation and humanitarian needs.

THANK YOU

ACAPS would like to thank all organisations that provided input to these scenarios, especially those who attended the workshops in Abuja and Maiduguri, and OCHA, who hosted both workshops. For additional information, comments or questions, please email analysis@acaps.org
## ANNEX A. POPULATION ESTIMATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Borno</th>
<th>Adamawa</th>
<th>Yobe</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL PROJECTED POPULATION</strong>&lt;br&gt;(OCHA estimations based on pre-crisis indicators)</td>
<td>5,800,000</td>
<td>4,200,000</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td>13,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REFUGEES DEPARTED STATE</strong>&lt;br&gt;Total: Based on UNHCR data portal&lt;br&gt;State breakdown: ACAPS estimations</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDP POPULATION</strong>&lt;br&gt;(based on IOM DTM round 11)</td>
<td>1,446,000</td>
<td>163,000</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>1,740,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDPS FROM THIS STATE IN OTHER STATES</strong>&lt;br&gt;(based on IOM DTM round 11)</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>231,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RETURNNEES (FORMER IDPS)</strong>&lt;br&gt;(based on IOM DTM round 11)</td>
<td>273,000</td>
<td>551,000</td>
<td>86,000</td>
<td>910,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INACCESSIBLE PEOPLE</strong>&lt;br&gt;(based on OCHA estimations)</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HOST POPULATION (NON-DISPLACED)</strong>&lt;br&gt;(based on ACAPS estimations)</td>
<td>1,360,000</td>
<td>3,460,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>6,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL CURRENT ESTIMATED POPULATION IN THIS STATE</strong>&lt;br&gt;(ACAPS estimations from comparison of all available figures including the IPC figures of the August 2016 Cadre Harmonisé)</td>
<td>5,470,000</td>
<td>4,180,000</td>
<td>3,250,000</td>
<td>12,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEVERELY FOOD INSECURE (IPC PHASES 3–5)</strong>&lt;br&gt;(based on the August 2016 Cadre Harmonisé)</td>
<td>3,163,000</td>
<td>629,000</td>
<td>655,000</td>
<td>4,447,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% OF CURRENT ESTIMATED POPULATION SEVERELY FOOD INSECURE</strong>&lt;br&gt;(based on ACAPS estimations)</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>