Eritrea
National service, exit, and return

Country of Origin Information Report

September 2019

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- Germany, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), Country Analysis
- Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Section for Information Analysis

It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.
Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................................... 3
Contents .......................................................................................................................................................... 4
Disclaimer ................................................................................................................................................... 6
Glossary and abbreviations .......................................................................................................................... 7
Executive summary ....................................................................................................................................... 9
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 11
  Methodology ........................................................................................................................................... 11
    Defining the terms of reference ........................................................................................................... 11
    Collecting information ......................................................................................................................... 11
    Source assessment ............................................................................................................................... 13
    Quality control ................................................................................................................................... 14
  Structure and use of the report ................................................................................................................ 14
Map ............................................................................................................................................................ 15
1. Overview: developments 2016-2019 ...................................................................................................... 16
  1.1. Peace with Ethiopia and foreign affairs ....................................................................................... 16
  1.2. Internal affairs ............................................................................................................................... 17
  1.3. Religious issues ............................................................................................................................. 18
  1.4. Legal framework ........................................................................................................................... 20
2. National service ....................................................................................................................................... 22
  2.1. Recent developments .................................................................................................................... 22
  2.2. Structure ....................................................................................................................................... 24
  2.3. Recruitment .................................................................................................................................. 26
    2.3.1. Through schooling system .................................................................................................... 26
    2.3.2. Recruitment of school drop-outs ........................................................................................... 28
    2.3.3. Exemptions ................................................................................................................................ 31
    2.3.4. Recruitment of minors ............................................................................................................ 32
  2.4. Duration and discharge .................................................................................................................... 33
  2.5. Remuneration .................................................................................................................................. 35
  2.6. Treatment of conscripts .................................................................................................................. 37
    2.6.1. Civilian national service .......................................................................................................... 37
2.6.2. Military national service ................................................................. 37
2.6.3. Situation of women in military ....................................................... 38
2.7. Treatment of deserters and draft evaders ........................................ 40
  2.7.1. Treatment of family members ...................................................... 41
3. Exit from Eritrea ...................................................................................... 42
  3.1. Travel inside Eritrea and to the border ............................................. 42
  3.2. Legal exit ............................................................................................ 43
    3.2.1. Exit visa ......................................................................................... 43
    3.2.2. Exit by land to Sudan ................................................................. 45
    3.2.3. Exit by land to Ethiopia ............................................................... 45
    3.2.4. Exit by air ...................................................................................... 49
  3.3. Illegal exit .......................................................................................... 49
    3.3.1. Illegal exit to Sudan ................................................................. 49
    3.3.2. Illegal exit to Ethiopia ............................................................... 51
  3.4. Treatment of persons crossing the border illegally .............................. 52
4. Treatment of returnees ........................................................................... 55
  4.1. Voluntary return .............................................................................. 55
    4.1.1. Conditions for return ................................................................. 55
    4.1.2. Follow-up upon arrival ............................................................... 56
    4.1.3. ‘Diaspora status’ .......................................................................... 57
    4.1.4. Return as a visitor ........................................................................ 58
    4.1.5. Permanent return .......................................................................... 59
    4.1.6. Return from Ethiopia ................................................................. 61
  4.2. Forced return ................................................................................... 62
Annex 1: Bibliography .................................................................................. 65
Annex 2: Terms of Reference ...................................................................... 81
Disclaimer

This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019). The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report.

The drafting of this report was finalised in August 2019. Any event taking place after this date is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of the introduction.

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1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI), 2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: http://www.easo.europa.eu
Glossary and abbreviations

ARRA | Agency for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (Ethiopia)
--- | ---
COI | Country of Origin Information
EPLF | Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, predecessor of PFDJ
ERN | Eritrean Nakfa
ESECE | Eritrean Secondary Education Certificate Examinations; final exam after the 12th grade
Form 4/4.2 | Form of Repentance, Letter of Regret
giffa | Round-up, razzia
hagerawi aqelqot | National service
hizbawi serawit | People’s Army
ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross
kebabì | Third-tier administrative unit
matrik | Eritrean Secondary Education Certificate Examinations (ESECE); final exam after the 12th grade
mefanewi | Release letter
menqesqaqesi | Travel permit, laissez-passer
metayesi | Demobilisation card
mifinaw | Release from national service
mimihdar | Administration
mitiyas | Demobilisation from the military component of national service
NGO | Non-governmental organisation
Nus-Zoba | Second-tier administrative unit
PDFJ | People’s Front for Justice and Democracy
RRT | Rehabilitation and Construction Tax (‘diaspora tax’, ‘2 % tax’)
teff | Staple cereal cultivated in the Horn of Africa
tegadelti | Former EPLF fighters (tegadelai in singular)
TVET | Technical and Vocational Education Training
UN | United Nations
UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UPR | Universal Periodic Review
USD | U.S. Dollar
warsay | Conscript. Literal meaning in Tigrinya: ‘my heir’, i.e. inheritor of the EPLF veterans’ legacy
WYDC | Warsay-Yikealo Development Campaign
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yiakl</td>
<td>Diaspora-based opposition campaign, ‘enough’ in Tigrinya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yikealo</td>
<td>Younger fighter generation, ‘heir’ in Tigrinya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoba</td>
<td>First-tier administrative unit</td>
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Executive summary

In July 2018, Eritrea and Ethiopia signed a peace declaration, after 18 years of a ‘no war, no peace’ situation that had followed the border war of 1998-2000. The two neighbours re-established diplomatic relations, communication and transport channels. Eritrea announced peace with Djibouti and Somalia as well, boosting its regional integration. In November 2018, the UN lifted the sanctions, which had been in place since 2009. On a domestic level, as of August 2019, peace has not yet led to any significant policy changes. Government critics and members of unrecognised religious denominations continue to be detained. The constitution ratified in 1997 and the civil and penal codes published in 2015 remain unimplemented; the provisional codes of 1991 continue to be applied while no constitution is in place.

The open-ended national service has not yet been reformed. The Eritrean government stresses that reforms are planned, but that more time is needed: before releasing hundreds of thousands of young people from national service to the job market, opportunities had to be created for them. Furthermore, Ethiopia has not yet retreated from the disputed border territories. As a consequence, there are no indications of changes in terms of conditions, recruitment or policies in national service. Most notably, the unlimited duration of national service remains in place. The remuneration reform announced in 2015 and 2016 has partly been implemented. However, due to substantial deductions introduced simultaneously, net salaries remained on a similar level as before for many beneficiaries.

Exit visa requirements remain in place, making it difficult for many Eritreans to leave the country legally. From September 2018 until December 2018, however, visa requirements were de facto lifted for Eritreans travelling to Ethiopia using the newly opened land border crossings. A large number of Eritreans took this opportunity to visit the neighbour, to seek labour, or for family reunification. Since December 2018 (central areas) and April 2019 (peripheral areas), respectively, the land border crossings have been closed again. As of July 2019, crossing the Eritrean-Ethiopian border irregularly has been reported to be much easier than prior to the border opening. Many restrictions on internal movement within Eritrea have been lifted, too. The land border crossings to Sudan have been closed in January 2018. In January and July 2019, the two governments announced the re-opening of the border crossings.

Persons returning to Eritrea after living abroad are required to fulfil a number of conditions, most notably the payment of the 2 % Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Tax and the signing of the ‘Letter of Regret’ for those who had left without fulfilling their national service duty. De facto, the Eritrean authorities also expect a minimum of loyalty, i.e. no oppositional political activities abroad. Returnees who fulfil these conditions are eligible for a privileged status, which allows them to leave Eritrea without an exit visa and relieves them from national service duty. However, this status is primarily meant for visiting diaspora Eritreans. Persons who stay in Eritrea for longer than six to twelve months (depending on the source) are considered residents again and liable to national service duty. Eritrea does not accept forced returns of failed asylum seekers. Sporadic events of deportations have nevertheless been recorded in the last four years, mainly across its land borders.

The punishment for desertion from national service, draft evasion, and illegal exit continues to be applied arbitrarily and inconsistently, mostly by military commanders and other representatives of the security forces. Transgressors can be arrested during giffas (round-ups), through searches, when trying to cross the border, or after returning from abroad. According to many sources, arrested persons are screened, profiled and treated accordingly. Deserters and draft evaders are reported to be sent to prison, mostly for terms between one and twelve months, during which interrogations and torture may occur. Prison terms for repeated offenders, document forgers and persons who have left the country illegally or have tried to do so are reportedly higher, up to three years. Draft evaders are afterwards sent to military trainings, while military deserters are sent back to their unit. Their
commander decides arbitrarily whether to further punish them or reintegrate them into the unit. Deserters from the civilian national service are often transferred to a military unit as a punishment, in addition to time in prison. Persons who have returned from abroad or been deported are reported to be treated similarly to those arrested within Eritrea. Returnees who have paid the 2% tax and signed the ‘Letter of Regret’ are usually not arrested upon arrival. After the expiry of their privileged status, however, (re-)conscription into national service and punishment occur at the discretion of the authorities.

No official information is available on the *de facto* treatment of deserters, draft evaders and persons who leave Eritrea illegally. The information on the respective punishments presented in this report is largely based on anecdotal accounts. Therefore, and because of the arbitrary and inconsistent application of the punishment, the treatment may deviate from it in individual cases. As of August 2019, there are no indications that the end of the ‘no war, no peace’ situation with Ethiopia has led to more leniency when it comes to punishments for the above-mentioned offenses. One change that has happened is that, as of July 2019, almost no irregular migrants are apprehended anymore at the border to Ethiopia, making their potential treatment difficult to assess.
Introduction

This report was drafted by Länderanalyse SEM, the Country of Origin Information (COI) unit of the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) of Switzerland. It provides a full update of the SEM’s findings on national service, exit, and return, which were first published by EASO in November 2016.

This report is produced in line with the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019) and the EASO COI Writing andReferencing Style Guide (2019).

Methodology

Defining the terms of reference

Länderanalyse SEM, the SEM’s COI unit continually monitors new reports from international organisations, NGOs, the academic community, the media and other reputable sources. It also maintains contact with experts on Eritrea in a variety of fields, with representatives of the Eritrean government and its neighbouring countries, and with partner agencies in other European countries. The SEM conducts official visits to Eritrea and to neighbouring countries, where many Eritrean migrants stay. In 2015, EASO has published an overview of the results drafted by the SEM. In 2016, a more detailed assessment of the aspects relevant for refugee status determination was published.

In mid-2018, Eritrea and Ethiopia made peace, ending an 18-year-old situation of ‘no war, no peace’. Before 2018, Eritrea was justifying several measures by this situation, such as the unlimited duration of national service or the harsh treatment of deserters and draft evaders – the topics addressed in the 2016 report. Hence, an update on this situation was necessary. The present report again focuses on the questions which were identified in 2016 as most relevant for refugee status determination. These questions have been specified by the asylum policy makers of the Swiss State Secretariat for Migration (SEM). Participation in conferences on European level and discussions in the EASO COI Specialist Network meetings have shown that the same questions are relevant for the other EU+ states which treat Eritrean asylum cases. A new question added to the Terms of Reference is the treatment of persons who have left and re-entered Eritrea legally during the time the border with Ethiopia was open and no exit visa requirement was in place, i.e. between September 2018 and December 2018/April 2019 (see Terms of Reference).

Collecting information

Public sources

In accordance with EASO COI methodology, a range of different available sources has been consulted on the relevant topics published in the period between August 2016 and August 2019. These include:

- Country of Origin Information (COI) reports by governments;
- information from advocacy groups;
- human rights reports by governments and advocacy groups, including annual updates on the human rights situation;
- UN reports produced by the Security Council, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, and in the framework of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR);
- Eritrean government publications, such as statements on the situation of human rights for the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and for UPR; official speeches and comments.
published on Shabait, the website of the Eritrean Ministry of Information; and comments made to foreign journalists;
• academic publications (books and journal articles);
• media reports.

Reports published prior to August 2016 were included as sources, when no newer information was available, to corroborate information which was otherwise only given by oral sources, or when referring to events and situations in the past.

The Swiss COI unit conducted a full review of available publications to the extent possible, though gaps cannot be discounted. For an assessment of the different categories of sources, see the next section Source assessment.

Oral sources

After assessing these publications, some information gaps remained.

In order to complete the desk research, the SEM has conducted a number of interviews with sources who have information about Eritrea. In order to obtain a broad base of information and to avoid a bias as much as possible, these interviews were conducted in three sequences in three different places:

• interviews with 34 refugees and 9 local sources in Tigray regional state and Addis Ababa, on the occasion of a research visit to Ethiopia in May 2019;
• 22 interviews with government officials, diplomats and representatives of international organisations and the civil society in Asmara, on the occasion of a research visit to Eritrea in July 2019;
• 6 interviews with academic Eritrea experts and human rights advocates by phone and email in July 2019. Five of the selected experts are researchers, whose publications are often quoted in COI reports; the sixth is a legal expert.

Most of the interviewed sources wish to be quoted anonymously. They are described in the Bibliography.

To fill still persisting information gaps on particular issues, further experts and organisations have been contacted via email.

Challenges in collecting information

Access to information about Eritrea, particularly on human rights issues, is difficult. The Eritrean Ministry of Information controls all media in Eritrea. Academic researchers, journalists, and representatives of human rights organisations are generally unable to conduct research in the country, or can do so only to a very limited degree. The Eritrean authorities publish little detailed information about the national service. There is a similar lack of transparency regarding the implementation of legislation on national service and illegal exit; and the authorities do not publish any guidelines or implementing provisions. A monitoring of returned former asylum seekers is not possible. This means that there is a lack of essential sources of information on the topics identified in the Terms of Reference.

A major challenge in researching public sources is to find current information which is complete. Most of the above-mentioned public sources have not yet published detailed reports of the situation after the Eritrean-Ethiopian peace declaration. Furthermore, most of these sources focus on different issues than those relevant for the asylum procedure, or do not delve as much into the details to correspond with the COI needs.

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The information provided by oral sources through interviews is by and large more current than any other published information as of August 2019. Often, the oral information is very similar to the published and hence mainly shows that there has been no change in a subject. Despite the described efforts, some information gaps and uncertainties remain. They are mentioned in the text. This mostly concerns the military component of national service, potentially adjusted punishments after the end of the ‘no war, no peace’ situation with Ethiopia, and the treatment of returnees.

Source assessment

The information available and used in this report is based on the following categories of sources:

- **Eritrean government (including official legal framework):** The Eritrean government mostly dismisses allegations of human rights violations. Information published by the Eritrean government or given by government officials is rather consistently in line with the official position. Detailed information – particularly on military issues – is often not accessible. Eritrean laws, proclamations, and regulations are partly accessible, but often not online.

- **Foreigners in Eritrea:** Foreign residents of Eritrea are well placed to report on the current situation in the country. However, in the experience of the SEM, their knowledge has some limits. For example, expatriates in Asmara have no access to prisons or military camps, or to internal documents of the Eritrean authorities on justice or national service. This means that the information they provide is mostly based on oral accounts from acquaintances. Many of them concede that their assessments are based on anecdotal information from rather small samples. Their own sources tend to relate the situation in Asmara and its surroundings, which is often different from other parts of the country, and, when it comes to national service, to its civilian component, which is more present in the capital than the military component. Due to the small size of the expatriate community in Asmara, information round tripping and false confirmations occur. Furthermore, some expatriates in Eritrea are cautious when talking to foreign delegations, as they want to preserve their access and working relations with the Eritrean authorities. Accordingly, situation reports provided by foreign observers tend to be more positive than those e.g. provided by exiled Eritreans.

- **Eritrean migrants and human rights advocates outside Eritrea:** Reports by human rights organisations in particular are based to a considerable extent on statements by people who have left Eritrea. In the experience of the SEM, these organisations are mainly contacted by people who claim to have had very negative experiences before leaving the country or who, for other reasons, would like to draw attention on abuses in Eritrea. Likewise, opposition media based in the diaspora use such information to criticise the Eritrean government. According to the SEM’s experience, recently arrived Eritrean refugees such as those interviewed in Ethiopia are less sensitised for politics and hence less likely to provide biased information. Like the sources inside Eritrea, information by persons who have left Eritrea is to a large extent anecdotal. To a certain degree, Eritreans abroad are able to fill information gaps regarding the situation outside Asmara and in the military component of national service, because their background is more diverse than the sources of expatriates in Asmara.

- **Academic experts:** Academic publications strive for sound and balanced research. They are supposed to be consistent with a number of methodological and scientific criteria, such as peer review. Hence, academic researchers are probably also more sensitised to these quality standards when interviewed. On the other hand, academic publications are rarely reflecting currently unfolding events, and due to lacking opportunities to do research on the ground, information access for academic researchers is often difficult or delayed. Nevertheless, they tend to use broader and more balanced samples than the two source groups described above.

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5 cf. Landinfo, Repons Eritrea: Faktagrunnlag og kildekritikk [Response Eritrea: Fact base and source criticism], 14 January 2019, url, p. 2; Røsberg, A.H. and Tronvoll, K., Migrants or Refugees? ILPI, 14 February 2017, url, p. 15
• **Media reports** are current, but often based on a small range of interlocutors inside and/or outside of Eritrea. Many journalists have a limited time budget for such researches and equally limited previous knowledge on the issue. Hence there is a risk they overly reflect the point of view of their interlocutors, which in some cases lead to one-sided reports.

As shown, all categories of sources have advantages and disadvantages. By using all of these diverse sources, the SEM has used all means available in order to mitigate a potential bias and draft a balanced report. The present report should therefore be read in the light of the source assessment provided here.

**Quality control**

In order to ensure that the EASO COI Report Methodology and the EASO Writing and Referencing Guide were respected, a review was carried out by COI specialists from Germany and Sweden and by EASO staff. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration.

**Structure and use of the report**

Chapter 1 provides a brief overview about the developments in Eritrea’s foreign affairs, internal affairs, religious issues and legal framework since 2016, including the peace declaration with Ethiopia of 2018.

The subsequent three chapters provide a COI update on the topics relevant for international protection determination: national service, legal and illegal exit, and return. These chapters mostly describe the relevant legal framework governing the concerned issue, the government position on the issue (if available), followed by information from the used publications and by the interlocutors interviewed in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Europe.

The report is designed to deliver relevant information for international protection determination in Europe. The report is not meant to give a complete view of the current political or human rights situation in Eritrea.
Map 1: General map of Eritrea, © State Secretariat for Migration SEM. All borders and names used on this and other maps in this report do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by Switzerland or the European Union.

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7 Map created by the State Secretariat for Migration SEM (Switzerland), 2019, based on Eritrean Demining Authority et al., Landmine Impact Survey – 2004 [map], 2004; UN Cartographic Section, Eritrea [map], n.d., url; Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, International Boundary between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia [map], 2002, url
1. Overview: developments 2016-2019

1.1. Peace with Ethiopia and foreign affairs

The most crucial event in Eritrean foreign politics in the last couple of years was the peace declaration with Ethiopia in mid-2018. On 5 June 2018, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced that Ethiopia was willing to accept the 2002 UN decision on the Eritrean-Ethiopian border unconditionally, which Ethiopia previously had refused to do.8 In the following weeks, several mutual visits of high-level delegations ensued, culminating in the signing of a five-point Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship by Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on 9 July 2018 in Asmara.9 The signing of the peace declaration led to a chain of events which normalised the relations between the two countries:

- On 9 July 2018, Ethiopia and Eritrea opened the phone lines between each other, which had been blocked for 20 years.10
- On 16 July 2018, the Eritrean embassy in Addis Ababa reopened.11
- On 18 July 2018, the first regular flight between Addis Ababa and Asmara in 20 years took off.12
- On 6 September 2018, the Ethiopian embassy in Asmara reopened.13
- On 11 September 2018, the land border crossings in Debay Sima/Bure and Serha/Zalambessa were reopened.14
- On 16 September 2018, President Isaias Afwerki and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed another peace declaration in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.15

Peace with Ethiopia boosted Eritrea’s regional integration. On 30 July 2018, Eritrea and Somalia signed an agreement to restore diplomatic relations, concluding a three-day visit of Somalia’s President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed ‘Farmaajo’ to Eritrea.16 On 6 September 2018, another peace declaration was signed with Djibouti. Eritrean relations with Djibouti had been strained after a brief border war in 2008.17 However, the disputed border between the two countries remains unsettled and the two countries have not yet agreed on Djiboutian soldiers missing in action.18 Eritrea has also intensified ties with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which both maintain a military...

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8 BBC, Ethiopia ‘accepts peace deal’ to end Eritrea border war, 5 June 2018, url
9 Shabait, Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship between Eritrea and Ethiopia, 9 July 2018, url; BBC, Ethiopia’s Abiy and Eritrea’s Afwerki declare end of war, 9 July 2018, url
10 CNN, People in Ethiopia are calling strangers in Eritrea as phone lines are opened after 20 years, 10 July 2018, url
11 Reuters, Eritrea reopens embassy in Addis Ababa in fresh sign of thaw with Ethiopia, 16 July 2018, url
12 Guardian, The, Champagne and roses on first Ethiopia-Eritrea flight in two decades, 18 July 2018, url
13 Fana BC, Ethiopia reopens embassy in Asmara, 6 September 2018, url
14 Reuters, UPDATE 5-Ethiopia, Eritrea reopen border points for first time in 20 years, 11 September 2018, url
15 Reuters, Ethiopian, Eritrean leaders sign peace agreement in Jeddah, 16 September 2018, url
16 Al Jazeera, Eritrea and Somalia agree to restore diplomatic relations, 30 July 2018, url
17 Al Jazeera, Eritrea consolidates Horn of Africa peace, 11 September 2018, url; Reuters, Djibouti, Eritrea agree to normalize ties strained since 2008, 6 September 2018, url
presence at the port of Assab. These countries also played an important role facilitating the peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

On the multilateral stage, Eritrea made a breakthrough as well. On 14 November 2018, the UN Security council voted unanimously to lift the sanctions against Eritrea, which had been in place since 2009. Already on 12 October 2018, the UN General Assembly had elected Eritrea as a member of the Human Rights Council. The visit of Donald Yamamoto, the United States' most senior diplomat in Africa, to Eritrea in April 2018 was the first such envoy in over a decade and marked improved relations with the United States.

Later in 2018 and in 2019, the peace process with Ethiopia suffered some setbacks. Some inhabitants of Tigray, Ethiopia’s northernmost regional state bordering Eritrea, demonstrated against the announced retreat of Ethiopia from the disputed territories at the border, thus far under Ethiopian control. Particularly the residents of Irob and Badme, two of the disputed territories, opposed the move. In two steps in December 2018 and April 2019 respectively, Eritrea unilaterally closed the land border crossings again, although a reopening has been announced (see Chapter 3.2.3.). As of July 2019, Ethiopia has not retreated from the disputed territories, the border issue remains de facto unresolved.

1.2. Internal affairs

As of August 2019, peace with Ethiopia and the increased regional and international integration did not yet translate into significant changes in terms of internal politics. This includes the human rights situation, especially the repressive measures that had been put in place after the border war with Ethiopia such as unlimited national service (see Chapter 2.1.).

21 Economist (The), Sanctions on Eritrea are lifted, 15 November 2018, UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, 16 May 2019, para. 7
22 UN General Assembly, Election of the Human Rights Council (12 October 2018), 12 October 2018
25 Reuters, Eritrea closes border crossing to Ethiopians, official and residents say, 28 December 2018, Eritrean Press [Facebook], Eritrea Closes Assab Road to Ethiopia, posted on: 22 April 2019, AfricaNews, Eritrea shuts all borders with Ethiopia – unilaterally, 23 April 2019
26 Economist (The), Eritrea’s gulag state is crumbling, 11 July 2019, NZZ (Neue Zürcher Zeitung), Ein Jahr nach dem Friedensschluss zwischen Eritrea und Äthiopien ist Ernüchterung eingekernt [one year after the peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, disillusion has come back], 26 July 2019
According to human rights reports, arbitrary arrests of political dissenters and members of unregistered religious groups continue.29 Most prominent is the case of Berhane Abrehe, the former finance minister. In September 2018, Berhane published a book abroad in which he criticised the government. Berhane was detained shortly after the publication, on 16 September 2018; his whereabouts remain unknown. His wife had already been arrested in February 2018.30 Persons arrested in previous years generally remained in detention.31 An exception was made for 35 members of unregistered evangelical churches, who were released in July and August 2018 after they had renounced their religion four years earlier.32

In 2019, young diaspora Eritreans, disappointed by the apparent lack of a ‘dividend of peace’, started a social media campaign under the hashtag #yiakl (‘enough’ in Tigrinya), in which they share videos speaking out against President Isaias and the government, trying to mobilise people and put pressure on the government. Meanwhile, the yiakl campaign reaches out to Eritrea as well, with pamphlets being distributed at night in downtown Asmara and some anti-government graffiti.33 Inside Eritrea, some youths are reportedly resolved to disobey the 2019 summons to the 12th schooling year, which for almost all 12th graders (except for those studying at technical schools) takes place at the Sawa military camp.34 The government has reacted by blocking social media35 and with round-ups in several parts of Eritrea.36

1.3. Religious issues

Eritrea officially allows freedom of religion. However, only the four denominations that are recognised and registered may be freely followed for the most part: Eritrean Orthodox, Catholic and Lutheran Christianity, and Sunni Islam. Since 2002, the practising of non-registered religions is unlawful. Therefore, activities of all other religious groups, such as Pentecostal Churches or Jehovah’s Witnesses, can be persecuted.37

Arrests of members of unregistered evangelical churches continue to be reported. In 2016, there were reports about the detention of eight persons during a raid in Asmara.38 In 2017, several arrests of evangelical Christians were reported either during prayer meetings or at their homes.39 An advocacy

33 CNN, The social media campaign that aims to topple leader of ‘Africa’s North Korea’, 14 June 2019, url; Ethiopia Insight, Charting a way forward for Eritrea, 28 April 2019, url; Economist (The), Eritrea’s gulag state is crumbling, 11 July 2019, url; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; African Arguments, Eritrea: Is political change really on the horizon?, 13 August 2019, url; Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019
34 Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019
35 Economist (The), Eritrea’s gulag state is crumbling, 11 July 2019, url
36 BBC Tigrinya, ኢትዮጵያዊ ሎማዊ ኣጋብ ካርበተ እርትራ በርቅ ኯስ ኪሬክ በርካ ካርቡ的概念 [Reports about intense round-ups in several areas of Eritrea], 22 July 2019, url
37 EASO, Eritrea Country Focus, May 2015, url, pp. 48-49
group claimed that between May and August 2017, approximately 210 evangelical Christians had been arrested; in addition to 35 Jehovah’s Witnesses in July 2017. Some releases were also reported: in October 2017, a Jehovah’s Witness was released from Adi Kuala prison; in July and August 2018, 35 evangelical Christians were released from May Serwa prison after they had renounced their religion four years earlier. In May and June 2019, 171 members of unregistered evangelical churches, mainly Pentecostals, were reportedly detained. In June 2019, a Methodist church in Keren was raided and all faithful present arrested, half of them were released shortly after. Further arrests of evangelicals were reported in June and August 2019 in Keren and in August 2019 in Asmara.

In 2017, the government announced the conversion of all schools administered by religious groups into government-administered institutions. Several committee members of Asmara’s Islamic Al Diaa school, among them the 93-year-old Haji Musa Mohammed Nur, criticised these measures, whereupon they were detained. This triggered street protests of Al Diaa students in October 2017. The government suppressed the protests and detained many participants in the aftermath and in house raids during the following days. In March 2018, Haji Musa died in detention. His funeral was followed by new street protests, after which again many participants, including children, were detained. Most arrested persons were released during the next three months, but some school leaders, parents, and students reportedly remained imprisoned as of early 2019.

The Catholic bishops have repeatedly criticised the Eritrean government openly, e.g. in open letters in May 2014 and April 2019. The bishops have not been detained. Government measures targeting the Catholic Church, however, do occur. In October 2017, the Catholic seminar in Asmara was closed and a nun and a priest were detained for several months. In 2018, the authorities closed five clinics

40 CSW, Eritrean Christian mother dies in prison, 11 August 2017, url
44 Persecution/International Christian Concern, Eritrea Continues to Crackdown on Pentecostal Christians – 30 Christians Arrested, 7 June 2019, url
45 RFI (Radio France Internationale), En Érythrée, les évêques appellent à la prière et au jeûne contre la répression [In Eritrea, the bishops call for praying and fasting against the repression], 25 June 2019, url
46 Sight, At least 150 Christians arrested in Eritrea clampdown, 26 August 2019, url
51 AMECEA, Eritrea: Reading Recent Developments from The Context of 29th April 2019 Pastoral Letter of Eritrean Catholic Bishops, 21 June 2019, url; RFI (Radio France Internationale), En Érythrée, les évêques appellent à la prière et au jeûne contre la répression [In Eritrea, the bishops call for praying and fasting against the repression], 25 June 2019, url
run by the Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{53} In June 2019, a government directive forced the remaining approximately 30 Catholic clinics to close.\textsuperscript{54} The Eritrean government justified the measures with Regulation 73/1995\textsuperscript{55}, which limited the developmental activities of the religious institutions to certain areas indicated by the government. It claimed that the operational/administrative authority of the clinics was to be transferred to the respective regional branches of the Ministry of Health.\textsuperscript{56} As of July 2019, however, the clinics remain closed.\textsuperscript{57}

In July 2019, the former patriarch of the Eritrean-Orthodox Church, Abune Antonios, was expelled from the church upon accusation of ‘heresy’. Antonios had been the head of the Orthodox Church until being deposed in 2006; since then he was in house arrest.\textsuperscript{58} In June 2019, five Orthodox priests from Debre Bizen monastery had been arrested for alleged support of Abune Antonios.\textsuperscript{59}

\section*{1.4. Legal framework}

The legal situation remains largely unchanged over the last couple of years. The Eritrean government stated at the end of 2018 that the main source of law are the transitional codes of 1991 (Civil Code, Civil Procedure Code, Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code, Commercial Code and Maritime Code) as well as 178 proclamations and 125 legal notices.\textsuperscript{60}

The constitution of 1997 remains unimplemented. In 2014 and 2015, Eritrean officials announced the establishment of a body to draft a new constitution. As of June 2019, no follow-up on this announcement is known.\textsuperscript{61} In May 2015, the Eritrean government published a new Penal Code, Civil Code, and their related procedure codes. These codes remain largely unimplemented.\textsuperscript{62} The Eritrean government communicated that ‘campaigns aimed at raising awareness on rights and duties guaranteed by law in particular on the new National Codes’ were ongoing.\textsuperscript{63}

Due to this situation, the following chapters will refer only to the formally implemented laws and not to the largely unimplemented constitution and codes.

The judiciary comprises civil courts (community courts, \textit{zoba} courts and the Court of Last Appeal) and a special court. The Special Court was established to fight corruption, but in the meantime deals with

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{53} UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, 25 June 2018, \url{url}, para. 73
\item\textsuperscript{54} BBC, Eritrea’s seizure of Roman Catholic Church properties criticised, 17 June 2019, \url{url}; RFI (Radio France Internationale), En Érythrée, les évêques appellent à la prière et au jeûne contre la répression [In Eritrea, the bishops call for praying and fasting against the repression], 25 June 2019, \url{url}
\item\textsuperscript{55} Eritrea, Proclamation No. 73/1995, Proclamation to legally standardize and articulate religious institutions and activities, 15 July 1995, \url{url}
\item\textsuperscript{56} Shabait, Permanent Mission of the State of Eritrea to the United Nations Geneva, 27 June 2019, \url{url}
\item\textsuperscript{57} Diplomatic source 9, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Civil society source 2, Asmara, interview, July 2019
\item\textsuperscript{58} BBC, Eritrea Orthodox Church ex-leader expelled for ‘heresy’, 19 July 2018, \url{url}
\item\textsuperscript{59} CSW, Concern at seizure of Catholic properties and arrests of Orthodox Priests, 19 June 2019, \url{url}
\item\textsuperscript{60} UN Human Rights Council, National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21, Eritrea, 12 November 2018, \url{url}, para. 6, 72
\item\textsuperscript{63} UN Human Rights Council, National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21, Eritrea, 12 November 2018, \url{url}, para. 73
\end{itemize}
a wide range of issue of political relevance. It is subjugated to the President’s Office and hence under its influence.

Infringements related to national service such as desertion or draft evasion as well as illegal exit and a range of other offenses are not treated in the formal justice system. Punishments are imposed by military commanders instead. Such procedures are to a large degree arbitrary and inconsistent. Eritreans are therefore often unaware what the policies of their authorities are, what the potential consequences of an action is and why they are treated in a certain way.

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64 EASO, Eritrea Country Focus, May 2015, url, pp. 27-28; Eritrea, Proclamation No. 85/1996, A Proclamation to Establish the Special Court, 6 April 1996
2. National service

2.1. Recent developments

Since Eritrea’s border war with Ethiopia, the Eritrean government justified the necessity of the infinite duration of national service (Tigrinya: Hagerawi Agelglot) by the threat posed by Ethiopia. Ethiopia was unwilling to accept the decision of the UN Boundary Commission of 2002, demanded further negotiations, and consequently had not withdrawn its troops from territories awarded to Eritrea by the Boundary Commission. On the grounds of a de facto state of emergency, which was introduced in 1998 and never after has been lifted, the duration of national service has been extended indefinitely as provided by Article 21(1) of the National Service Proclamation of 1995.

In June 2018, Ethiopia finally announced to accept the 2002 Boundary Commission decision. As detailed in Chapter 1.1, on 9 July 2018, Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a declaration to end the war, followed by a similar declaration on 16 September 2018. Peace with Ethiopia raised expectations of reforms in national service. At the graduation ceremony of the 31st round of recruitment, held on 13 July 2018 in Sawa military camp, officials told the recruits that their service duty would be reduced to the 18 months as provided by the National Service Proclamation.

As of August 2019 though, there have not been any official statements announcing concrete plans to limit the duration of national service to the statutory 18 months. Most notably, President Isaias did not concretely address the issue in any of his public speeches and media interviews since signing the peace declaration. In July 2018, ministers had announced plans to reduce the size of the army and concentrate national service on developmental work; the officials however made clear that no decision had been taken yet to shorten national service to 18 months. In July 2019, during an event celebrating the 25th anniversary of national service, officials said that a ‘study was conducted to bring back national service to its origins’, but that it was not possible to implement this immediately. Similarly, Filipos Woldeyohannes, Chief of Staff of the Eritrean Defence Forces, stated in a TV interview in July 2019, that national service would continue to exist, but there would be demobilisation. At the end of July 2019, President Isaias gave a long TV interview about national service. Referring to the

71 BBC, Ethiopia ‘accepts peace deal’ to end Eritrea border war, 5 June 2018, url
72 Shabait18a; BBC, Ethiopia’s Abiy and Eritrea’s Afwerki declare end of war, 9 July 2018, url
73 Reuters, Ethiopian, Eritrean leaders sign peace agreement in Jeddah, 16 September 2018, url
74 Reuters, Eritrean conscripts told unlimited national service will end: sources, 23 July 2018, url
75 Shabait, Interview of President Isaias Afwerki; 1st Part, 10 November 2018, url; Shabait, President Isaias’ Speech on Martyrs Day, 20 June 2019, url; ERI-TV, President Isaias Afwerki interview on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Sawa [in Tigrinya], 31 July 2019, url and url, min. 30:00 – 32:40
76 Bloomberg, Eritrea May Alter Army Draft That Forced Thousands to Europe, 03 September 2018, url; Reuters, Eritrean conscripts told unlimited national service will end: sources, 23 July 2018, url
77 Hadas Ertra, እንወት የልክፈት ለቅልታ ለክፈት ከእርትራ ከሚስክ ከሚስክ ከሚስክ ከሚስክ [Seminar in Asmara on the occasion of the silver jubilee of Sawa], 28 July 2019, url
78 ERI-TV, እንወት ለእርትራ ይታና ከሚስክ ከሚስክ ከሚስክ ከሚስክ ከሚስክ ከሚስክ ከሚስክ ከሚስክ ከሚስክ [Sayda: Conversation with general Filipos Woldeyohannes about the stories of Gabriela Hanneso and common women in the Eritrean army], 7 July 2019, url, min. 17:45 – 20:35
future, Isaias vaguely stated that it was necessary to explain the purpose of national service to the new generation and to show its benefits and achievements; the new generation was needed for the build-up of the country and much remained to be done. Isaias said that there the quality of national service needed to be improved.79 Government officials have reiterated on several occasions the position that there will be reforms in national service also regarding its duration, but more time was needed to implement changes.80

The major reason mentioned by Eritrean officials why more time was needed for reforms is the circumstance that the sudden release of a huge number of conscripts would cause serious socioeconomic problems for the country. Many new jobs would be needed to accommodate the released conscripts, such opportunities first needed to be created. The government is not interested in having thousands of unemployed ‘idling’ in Eritrea’s cities.81

According to observers, another important reason revolves around the concern for regional stability. The political situation in Ethiopia is volatile, with tensions between the federal government and several regional states (and among them), particularly Tigray, which shares the long and disputed border with Eritrea.82 As of July 2019, Ethiopia has yet to fulfil its promise to hand over the territories allotted to Eritrea by the Boundary Commission in 2002.83 Though not an official position, Eritrean officials have reportedly mentioned these circumstances in the context of the slow pace of reforms in national service.84

As of July 2019, all interviewed interlocutors in Eritrea stated that there was no indication of any reforms or changes in national service by then85; published reports agree with that.86 This observation has been confirmed by the Eritrean government.87

79 ERI-TV, President Isaias Afwerki interview on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Sawa [in Tigrinya], 31 July 2019, url and url, min. 30:00 – 32:40
80 Yemane Gebremeskel, Minister of Information, Asmara, interview, 2 July 2019; Diplomatic source 8, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 5, Asmara, interview, July 2019
82 Diplomatic source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 7, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 1, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 2, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 9, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Plaut, M., Understanding Eritrea, 2016/2019, p. 225; Erena, “ምስሓብ ሴራዊት እንገነት ከሚስት ከትምክር ከትምክር ከባድመ ከፋል ከትምክር ከጠቅላላ እንገነት” ከም የማነ የገብርኣብ [We claim: ‘the retreat of Ethiopian troops from Badme has been delayed’], 15 April 2019, url
83 Economist (The), Eritrea’s gulag state is crumbling, 11 July 2019, url; NZZ (Neue Zürcher Zeitung), Ein Jahr nach dem Friedensschluss zwischen Eritrea und Äthiopien ist Ernüchterung eingekehrt [one year after the peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, disillusion has come back], 26 July 2019, url; Plaut, M., Understanding Eritrea, 2016/2019, p. 224; Erena, “ምስሓብ ሴራዊት እንገነት ከሚስት ከትምክር ከትምክር ከባድመ ከፋል ከትምክር ከጠቅላላ እንገነት” ከም የማነ የገብርኣብ [We claim: ‘the retreat of Ethiopian troops from Badme has been delayed’], 15 April 2019, url
84 Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Eritrea, 15 February 2019, p. 8
85 Diplomatic source 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Civil society source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 7, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 1, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 6, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 9, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 5, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Horn of Africa expert, email interview, 23 July 2019
87 Yemane Gebremeskel, Minister of Information, Asmara, interview, 2 July 2019; Diplomatic source 6, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 9, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 1, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 5, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Horn of Africa expert, email interview, 23 July 2019
89 Yemane Gebremeskel, Minister of Information, Asmara, interview, 2 July 2019
2.2. Structure

Eritrea’s national service has been introduced in 1994, shortly after independence. Its overall aim is not only to defend the country, but also to rebuild it following the war of independence and to propagate the national ideology. National service is regarded as the ‘school of the nation’ in Eritrea.88 According to the National Service Proclamation of 1995, its aims89 are:

- ‘To establish a strong defence force... [to] ensure a free and sovereign Eritrea.
- To preserve and entrust future generations with the courage, resoluteness and heroic episodes shown by our people in the past thirty years.
- To create a new generation characterised by love of work, discipline and a willingness to participate and serve in the reconstruction of the nation.
- To develop [...] the economy of the nation by investing in the development of our people as a potential wealth.
- To foster national unity among our people by eliminating sub-national feelings.’

Due to the mixed civilian-military nature of national service, national service can roughly be divided into a military and a civilian component. All conscripts first undergo a military training and are then assigned either to the military component under the Ministry of Defence, or to a civilian task, administered by one of the other ministries. Part of the conscripts are assigned to one of the approximately 30 companies owned by the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) or the army, which are active in fields such as agriculture, construction, transport, tourism, or trade.90 The SEM has no reliable information whether the conscripts in these companies belong to the military or civilian component of national service. The Ministry of Defence is in charge of assigning the conscripts to either the military or civilian component, while the respective ministries are responsible to assign the persons deployed under them to concrete tasks.91

The Eritrean government gives few indications on how many of its citizens are currently enrolled in national service. Col. Ezra Woldegebriel said in a speech held at the EriYouth Festival 2010 at Sawa military camp that the total number of conscripts from 1994 until 2010 was 400 00092; in a similar speech in 2014, the number was put at 500 000.93 In 2016, government media related that Eritrea ‘can field an army of 300,000 plus within 48 to 72 hours in the event hostilities break out’.94 Estimates by experts are mostly based on demographic and education statistics as well as assumptions about the number of persons in national service-age who have left the country. Most sources estimate the number of national service conscripts at 300 000 to 400 000.95

The respective numbers of members of the military and civilian components of national service are disputed. Two sources state that a bit less than half of them serve in the military (army, navy or air force), bringing their number to about 150 000.96 The World Bank’s armed forces personnel database

89 Eritrea, Proclamation on National Service No. 82/1995, 23 October 1995, url, article 5
91 Human Rights Watch, “They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us”, August 2019, url, p. 22
92 Shabait, 23rd Round National Service Graduate and 4th ERI-Youth Festival Officially Opened, 16 July 2010, url
93 Shabait, 6th National Youth Festival opens, 18 July 2014, url
94 Shabait, Sawa: Eritrea’s Cultural Boot Camp, 30 September 2016, url
96 Diplomatic source 5, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019
put the number at 202 000 in 2017.\textsuperscript{97} In September 2018, Presidential Adviser Yemane Gebreab claimed that less than a fifth of those in national service were in the military, while 80\% had a civilian role.\textsuperscript{98} Due to the high number of deserters, many army units are said to be rather depleted by now; some currently running at just one third or one quarter of their required number.\textsuperscript{99}

No statistics are available on the assignment of new conscripts. The Eritrean government generally claims that nowadays, most new conscripts are assigned to civilian functions\textsuperscript{100}; adviser Yemane Gebreab put the number at 85\% in 2016.\textsuperscript{101} The government’s narrative, however, tends to focus on those recruited through the schooling system (see \textit{Chapter 2.3.1.}).\textsuperscript{102} Many other sources contradict these claims and state that a substantial part of the conscripts are still recruited into the military.\textsuperscript{103} Eritrean refugees interviewed in Ethiopia claimed those in the military to be the majority\textsuperscript{104}, while foreign observers generally refrained from making any estimations. Several factors seem to be relevant within this context:

- Conscripts who are recruited after the 12\textsuperscript{th} schooling year are more likely to enter civilian service than school drop-outs who are recruited by the local administration or through a round-up (see \textit{Chapter 2.3.2.}).\textsuperscript{105}
- Among those recruited after the 12\textsuperscript{th} schooling year, the marks in the Eritrean Secondary Education Certificate Examinations (ESECE) play a decisive role for their assignment (see \textit{Chapter 2.3.1.}).\textsuperscript{106}
- Women are more likely to be assigned to civilian jobs than men.\textsuperscript{107} However, Eritrean officials such as Filipos Woldeyohannes, Chief of Staff of the army, publicly stated that women continue to be conscripted into the army.\textsuperscript{108}
- The rural population is more likely to be conscripted into military, which is possibly linked to their inferior access to education than the urban population.\textsuperscript{109}
- Children of freedom fighters and persons with contacts to influential people are more likely to be assigned to the civilian component.\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{97} World Bank, Armed forces personnel, total, n.d. (2017), url
\textsuperscript{98} Bloomberg, Eritrea May Alter Army Draft That Forced Thousands to Europe, 03 September 2018, url
\textsuperscript{99} Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Awate, Crisis in the Eritrean Army, 3 April 2014, url
\textsuperscript{100} Yemane Gebremeskel, Minister of Information, Asmara, interview, 2 July 2019
\textsuperscript{102} Eritrea, MoFA, Eritrea: Initial National Report (1999-2016), 28 March 2017, para. 72
\textsuperscript{103} UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, 16 May 2019, url, para. 28; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Horn of Africa expert, email interview, 23 July 2019
\textsuperscript{104} Eritrean asylum seekers, Rama (Ethiopia), group interview, 18 May 2019; Eritrean asylum seeker, Rama (Ethiopia), individual interview, 18 May 2019
\textsuperscript{105} Røsberg, A.H. and Tronvoll, K., Migrants or Refugees? ILPI, 14 February 2017, url, p. 52, Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Local source 2, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019
\textsuperscript{106} Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019; Eritrean refugees, Addis Ababa, individual interviews, 21 May 2019; Amnesty International, Eritrea: Shadow report to the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, 17 April 2018, url, p. 8
\textsuperscript{107} Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Eritrean refugees, Addis Ababa, individual interviews, 21 May 2019
\textsuperscript{108} ERI-TV, ሐይዳ: በላልምስ ሃንሶን ጋር እርትራ ሁክምነት እቁ ከጋወት ጒልታት ትርጉል ትርጉል ሁኔታ ከጋወት ከጋወት ሁኔታ ከጋወት ከጋወት [Sayda: Conversation with general Filipos Woldeyohannes about the stories of Gabriela Hanneso and common women in the Eritrean army], 7 July 2019, url
\textsuperscript{109} Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019
\textsuperscript{110} Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019
National service members on civilian duty remain members of the armed forces. They can be called back into the army at any time. Therefore, they have to participate at military training ‘refreshers’ from time to time. As provided by Article 23 of the National Service Proclamation, discharged soldiers are liable to serve in the National Reserve Army up to the age of 50 years. In 2012, the Eritrean government established the People’s Army (Tigrinya: Hizbawi Serawit), in which all persons formally released from national service have to serve for a couple of days of weeks per year. Its activities encompass military trainings and work assignments in irregular intervals. The People’s Army is not part of the formal national service structure. Around 2015, the People’s Army was merged with the National Reserve Army. Its activities are since then more interwoven with the army’s. For example, members of the civilian component of national service may undergo military training ‘refreshers’ together with members of the People’s Army.

2.3. Recruitment

For an overview, see Chart 1 in Chapter 2.3.2.

2.3.1. Through schooling system

Eritrea’s schooling system is designed to channel as many students as possible to the 12th grade, immediately after which recruitment into national service takes place; in some cases by way of additional education in colleges or vocational schools. The Eritrean government portrays this way of recruitment as the regular one. Official statistics, however, show that a rather small percentage of each age cohort enter the 12th grade and the colleges. In 2012/13, 87,618 students were enrolled in 1st grade, with only 17,417 pupils in 12th grade.

Most of those Eritrean students who stay in school up to the end of the grade school curriculum enrol at Warsay-Yikealo School at Sawa military training camp for their 12th grade. The year at Sawa usually encompasses physical fitness training, four months of military and political training and six to eight months of academic education, which ends in March of each year with the Eritrean Secondary Education Certificate Examinations (ESECE), colloquially known as matrik. According to government media reports, the number of participants was between 11,000 and 18,000 in the last couple of years. In 2019, the Eritrean authorities communicated that 16,064 students had participated in the...
ESECE. This number includes students of technical schools (TVET), whose 12th grade does not take place in Sawa (see below). 40.8% passed, i.e. qualified to study in one of the colleges. Human Rights Watch holds that 60 to 65%, i.e. between 6,000 and 9,000 students per year, do not get the results needed for further studies.

Although the Eritrean government states that the students of Warsay-Yikealo School are not part of national service, government media call the students ‘National Service Program participants’. Recruitment into Warsay-Yikealo School in Sawa has continued after the peace declaration with Ethiopia. In July and August 2019, the 33rd round has been summoned.

The results of the final exam ESECE determine further education possibilities and the assignment to the national service:

- The batch with the highest marks enters one of Eritrea’s nine higher learning institutes (colleges). A condition for graduation at these colleges is the participation of nine months of ‘community service’ in civilian jobs. After graduation, the graduates are assigned jobs in the civilian component of national service. In 2018, approximately 3,200 students graduated from the nine colleges.

- The batch with medium marks enters Sawa Center for Technical and Vocational Education. Since its creation in 2009, between 900 and 3,700 students graduated annually, on average

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July 2016, url; Shabait, 8th Eri-Youth Festival Opens with the Graduation of 31st Round Nationals Service Members, 13 July 2018, url; cf. Human Rights Watch, “They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us”, August 2019, url, p. 31
121 Shabait, Press Release, 6 August 2019, url
122 Human Rights Watch, “They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us”, August 2019, url, p. 45
124 Shabait, 6th National Youth Festival opens, 18 July 2014, url
125 Diplomatic source 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 7, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Shabait, Students from Central region leave for Sawa, 21 August 2019, url; Shabait, Students from Southern region leave for Sawa, 17 August 2019, url
129 Estimate based on the graduation numbers of the nine colleges provided by the government media: Shabait, 11th Commencement of Eritrea Institute of Technology, July 2018, url; Shabait, Colleges in Adi Keih graduate 521 students, 8 September 2018, url; Shabait, College of Marine Science and Technology graduates 94 students, 10 June 2018, url; Shabait, Hamelmalo College of Agriculture graduates 393 students, 8 July 2018, url; Shabait, 9th commencement of Asmara College of Health Science, 8 July 2017, url; Shabait, Halhale College of Business and Economics graduates 315 students, 3 July 2017, url; Shabait, A Look at 8th Commencement of Orotta School of Medicine and Dentistry, January 2019, url
132 Shabait, Sawa Vocational Training Center provides training for 2,500 students in 19 disciplines, 14 March 2012, url; Shabait, 26th round members of National Service and 6th round Vocational Training Center students graduate, 13 July 2013, url; Shabait, Sawa Vocational Training Center admits more than 3,000 students, 24 December 2013, url; Shabait, Participants of 28th round National Service and 7th course Vocational Training Centre in Sawa graduate, 11 July 2015, url; Shabait, Capacity Building in Sawa Vocational Training Center, 2017, url; Shabait, 8th Eri-Youth Festival Opens with the Graduation of 31st Round Nationals Service Members, 13 July 2018, url; Shabait, Sawa Vocational Training Center graduates 909 students, 3 August 2019, url
2,000 per year\textsuperscript{133}, in 2019 it was 909 students.\textsuperscript{134} The participants are assigned jobs in the civilian or military components of national service afterwards.\textsuperscript{135}

- The batch with the lowest marks is either sent to newly established vocational schools or directly into national service. According to the Eritrean government, these schools have a capacity of 6,000 trainees at a time.\textsuperscript{136} Those sent directly into national service are assigned to the civilian or military component or to construction/agricultural work in the party-owned companies.\textsuperscript{137} According to some sources, men are mostly sent to the military, while women are mostly assigned to civilian functions.\textsuperscript{138}

Students who are assigned to a Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET)\textsuperscript{139} at the end of grade 10 spend grades 11 and 12 at the TVET schools, not in Sawa.\textsuperscript{140} After ESECE, they undergo six months of military training, usually at Sawa. In late 2016 and early 2017, 1,460 TVET graduates participated in this training.\textsuperscript{141} After the military training, they are assigned tasks within the in civilian national service,\textsuperscript{142}

### 2.3.2. Recruitment of school drop-outs

As shown in Chapter 2.3.1., the majority of each age cohort drops out of school before reaching 12\textsuperscript{th} grade and ‘regular’ recruitment. The number of drop-outs is significantly higher in rural areas than in towns.\textsuperscript{143} This group is recruited by the local administration, rounded up by the army or exempted from national service (see Chapter 2.3.3.); a part of the youth also manages to avoid conscription or flees abroad before being conscripted. As the government communication focuses on the ‘regular’ way of recruitment, there is no official information on the recruitment of drop-outs.

The local administration (\textit{mimihdar kebabi} in Tigrinya) is responsible for the conscription of school drop-outs.\textsuperscript{144} There is no consistent practice for this kind of recruitment for all Eritrea.\textsuperscript{145} Generally, the local administrations keep track of the school drop-outs and their age, and these are often reported by the schools.\textsuperscript{146} The army instructs the local administrations periodically to summon drop-outs at a certain place and time, from where they are brought to military training; or at least to hand over a list of eligible youth.\textsuperscript{147} One source mentions that the local administrations are ordered to fulfil a certain quota of conscripts.\textsuperscript{148} The summons are communicated by the local administrations by
various means, such as notice boards, letters, house visits or radio announcements. The People’s Army or local militia often help the administration to round up the conscripts. Persons conscripted by the local authorities are mostly, but not exclusively, assigned to the military component of national service. Their training usually does not take place in Sawa, but in smaller training camps. The sources name camps in Gergera, Hashenkit, Gahtelay, Kiloma, May Seraw, May Dima, Himberti, Nakfa, Wia, Afabet. One source mentions that women recruited by local administrations often go to the civilian national service. According to one source, 5,000 to 8,000 persons are conscripted annually this way.

Map 2: Prisons and military sites mentioned in this report, © State Secretariat for Migration SEM

149 Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Local source 2, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019

150 Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Local source 2, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019


152 Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019

153 Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019

154 Map created by the State Secretariat for Migration SEM (Switzerland), 2019, based on Eritrean Demining Authority et al., Landmine Impact Survey – 2004 [map], 2004; UN Cartographic Section, Eritrea [map], n.d., url; Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary
Another way of conscription are the so-called *giffas*: Round-ups by the security forces, during which an area or village is blocked and all persons present are checked. Mostly, these checks aim at rounding up persons roughly in national service age, i.e. persons who have evaded draft, deserted, or who have not been drafted.  

However, the term *giffa* does not exclusively apply to military round-ups. In December 2018 and May 2019 respectively, *giffas* in and around Asmara were carried out in reaction to the attack on Gen. Sebhat Efrem and in order to ensure the security of the Independence Day celebrations on 24 May.  

Diplomatic and international sources in Asmara have not observed military *giffas* since the peace declaration in mid-2018. Several sources indicate however that especially outside of Asmara there has been no significant policy change in this regard and that *giffas* continue to take place, particularly since the border with Ethiopia has been closed again. In mid-2019, *giffas* focussed on presumed sympathisers of the *yiakl* campaign, at least partially with the aim to round these persons up for the army. Those rounded up in *giffas* are usually first put in a prison for some days or weeks and then sent to military training in one of the camps mentioned above. One source reports that in recent years, youth rounded up were initially imprisoned until a new military training round begun.

School drop-outs who are apprehended while trying to leave the country are usually recruited into national service (see Chapter 3.4.), which constitutes a further way of recruitment.

Quite a big number of school drop-outs are not conscripted into national service for various reasons. A part of them is formally or *de facto* exempted from national service (see Chapter 2.3.3.). Others avoid being put on the local administration’s list by bribing or through personal connections, or are simply overlooked. Some young Eritreans hide in the houses of relatives or in remote places outside of their villages, in order not to be summoned or rounded up. Furthermore, in some lowland areas summons and *giffas* are a very rare occurrence. The local administrations summon some of the youth who are not in national service into the People’s Army instead.

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155 EASO, Eritrea Country Focus, May 2015, [url], p. 35; Human Rights Watch, “They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us”, August 2019, [url], p. 20

156 International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Academic expert, email interview, 21 July 2019; Local source 2, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019

157 Diplomatic source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 7, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 8, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 1, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 6, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019

158 Civil society source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 2, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Academic expert, email interview, 21 July 2019; Horn of Africa expert, email interview, 23 July 2019; Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019; Local source 2, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019

159 Academic expert, email interview, 21 July 2019; BBC Tigrinya, እንታላቸው የከባቢታት የኤርትራ ዓለም ፈጠራ ያቻለ ከም ያለ ተፈላጌ [Reports about intense round-ups in several areas of Eritrea], 22 July 2019, [url]

160 BBC Tigrinya, እንታላቸው የከባቢታት ያቻለ ያለ ከም ያለ ተፈላጌ [Reports about intense round-ups in several areas of Eritrea], 22 July 2019, [url]

161 Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019, EASO, Eritrea Country Focus, May 2015, [url], p. 35

162 Human Rights Watch, “They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us”, August 2019, [url], p. 48

163 Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; SFH, Rekrutierung in den “National Service” durch die Kebabi Verwaltung [Recruitment into national service by kebabi administrations], 27 July 2017, [url], p. 4

164 Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Human Rights Watch, “They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us”, August 2019, [url], p. 47
2.3.3. Exemptions

According to the National Service Proclamation of 1995, all Eritreans between the age of 18 and 40 are obliged to serve in national service (Article 6). Fully exempt are only those who fought in the liberation struggle (Article 12) and disabled, visually impaired, and mentally ill persons (Article 15). Those who are unfit for military service are granted an exemption from the military programme but are obliged to serve in civilian service instead (Article 13).165

Apart from these de jure exemptions, which reportedly are not systematically applied166, de facto exemptions for some categories of persons apply. While these exemptions are generally observed by the responsible authorities, they are not legally obliged to do so and there may be diverging policies on an individual base. Most commonly, women who are pregnant or have a child are exempt.167 Even an official statement by the Eritrean Ministry of Foreign affairs lists motherhood

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165 Eritrea, Proclamation on National Service No. 82/1995, 23 October 1995, url
166 Human Rights Watch, “They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us”, August 2019, url, p. 18
167 Human Rights Watch, “They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us”, August 2019, url, p. 18; EASO, Eritrea Country Focus, May 2015, url, p. 34; SFH, Rekrutierung in den “National Service” durch die Kebabi Verwaltung | Recruitment into
as a ground for exemption. In many cases, however, mothers are exempted only from military service, not from civilian service.

Married women who are not mothers or pregnant are also often exempted from national service. This policy is not followed consistently. In early 2017, the religious communities have reportedly been instructed not to wed women who have not fulfilled their national service duty. According to one of the sources of the Norwegian COI unit Landinfo, they are still allowed to marry after going to the 12th schooling year in Sawa and doing some military training.

Further de facto exemptions, which are however applied inconsistently, include:

- Muslim women from rural areas such as Gash-Barka or Southern Red Sea;
- members of nomadic tribes and the Rashaida ethnic group;
- religious staff such as priests, imams, students in religious seminars or nuns (very inconsistently).

Persons de facto exempted from national service usually do not get exemption letters. Since such documents are required for any formal employment, their activities are limited to the informal economy. Furthermore, there is a risk that they are caught in giffas.

2.3.4. Recruitment of minors

Conscription starts at the age of 18 according to the National Service Proclamation of 1995 (Article 6). Furthermore, Eritrea has ratified the Optional Protocol of the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, which prohibits recruitment or conscription of children under 18 by government forces.

However, students who have finished 11th grade are called to Sawa, regardless of their age. Participants of the 12th grade at Warsay-Yikealo School, which includes military training, may therefore be 17 years or younger. Although Eritrean government holds that the 12th schooling year...
at Sawa does not belong to national service\textsuperscript{181}, government media call the students ‘National Service Program participants’.\textsuperscript{181}

During \textit{giffas}, minors are reportedly sometimes recruited into military service.\textsuperscript{183} The NGO \textit{Human Rights Concern Eritrea} documented the cases of Eritreans between 14 and 17, who have been recruited through \textit{giffas}.\textsuperscript{184} Some sources state that during \textit{giffas} at schools, underage students are sometimes conscripted if they look physically fit.\textsuperscript{185} Also local administrations are reported to fill their quota (see \textit{Chapter 2.3.2.}) by rounding up minors.\textsuperscript{186} One interlocutor told SEM that he was conscripted into military service at the age of 14.\textsuperscript{187} Minors apprehended while trying to cross the border illegally are also sometimes conscripted.\textsuperscript{188}

2.4. Duration and discharge

According to the National Service Proclamation of 1995 (Article 8), active national service duty lasts 18 months, including six months of military training and 12 months of service. At times of war, persons in active national service may be required to serve beyond this time limit (Article 21(1)).\textsuperscript{189} This provision has been applied since the start of the border war with Ethiopia in 1998 and the subsequent ‘no war, no peace’ situation.\textsuperscript{190} In 2002, the \textit{Warsay-Yikealo} Development Campaign was introduced as a post-war reconstruction and development program. National service members were supposed to continue their service for this campaign beyond the statutory 18 months.\textsuperscript{191} The \textit{Warsay-Yikealo} Development Campaign was terminated in 2014 and replaced by the National Indicative Development Plan, which lasted until 2018.\textsuperscript{192}

As shown in \textit{Chapter 2.1.}, even after the peace declaration with Ethiopia, Article 21(1) providing for unlimited national service continues to be applied. No mass demobilisation has happened and the duration of service is still open-ended.\textsuperscript{193} The actual duration of service varies enormously. Sources
report that in some cases, national service members have been released already after the statutory 18 months\textsuperscript{194}, while many have served continuously since the inception of war in 1998 or for other long ranges of time. Interlocutors mentioned all time ranges in between these extremes as typical and were mostly unable to give an average of the actual duration. Duty times of 10 or 20 years are reported to be common.\textsuperscript{195} Several factors seem influence the duration:

- Women are usually released earlier than men. Often release happens after the birth of the first child, in some cases also after marriage.\textsuperscript{196} According to some sources, this applies only to the military component, while mothers in the civilian component stay in duty.\textsuperscript{197} An informal age limit of 27 years seems to be applied often\textsuperscript{198}, but there are also women above 40 still serving.\textsuperscript{199}

- The place of duty is important, as in some places, too many conscripts are assigned, while in others the skills and workforce of the conscripts are really needed.\textsuperscript{200} According to one source, teachers are told that they would be released after four years.\textsuperscript{201} There are, however, no indications that this is in fact applied.\textsuperscript{202}

- In the military component, serious illnesses or injuries seem to be the only way to get a formal discharge.\textsuperscript{203}

- In order to be released, the superior/commander has to agree and sign the release application. Hence the superior and an individual’s relation to the superior have an influence on discharge.\textsuperscript{204} There are cases of bribery and abuse of power positions.\textsuperscript{205}

- Personal contacts with other influential persons also seem to play a factor.\textsuperscript{206}

In Eritrean national service, there are two crucially different forms of discharge: Demobilisation (Tigrinya: mitiyas) means the transfer from the military to the civilian component of national service with a continued obligation to serve in the army reserve, usually in the form of periodical military

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\textsuperscript{194} Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019
\textsuperscript{196} Diplomatic source 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019, Diplomatic source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019, Diplomatic source 1, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 6, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 9, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Eritrean asylum seekers, Rama (Ethiopia), group interview, 18 May 2019; Eritrean refugees, Addis Ababa, individual interviews, 21 May 2019
\textsuperscript{197} Eritrean asylum seekers, Rama (Ethiopia), group interview, 18 May 2019; Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019; Eritrean refugees, Addis Ababa, individual interviews, 21 May 2019
\textsuperscript{198} Røsberg, A.H. and Tronvoll, K., Migrants or Refugees? ILPI, 14 February 2017, \url{url}, p. 75, Bozzini, D., National Service and State Structures in Eritrea, 28 June 2012, \url{url}, p. 9
\textsuperscript{199} Diplomatic source 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrean asylum seeker, Rama (Ethiopia), individual interviews, 18 May 2019; Eritrean refugees, Addis Ababa, individual interviews, 21 May 2019
\textsuperscript{200} Diplomatic source 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019, Diplomatic source 8, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019
\textsuperscript{201} Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019
\textsuperscript{202} Human Rights Watch, “They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us”, August 2019, \url{url}, pp. 32, 36
\textsuperscript{203} International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Eritrean asylum seekers, Rama (Ethiopia), group interview, 18 May 2019; Eritrean refugees, Addis Ababa, individual interviews, 21 May 2019
\textsuperscript{204} Diplomatic source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 9, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrean asylum seekers, Rama (Ethiopia), group interview, 18 May 2019
\textsuperscript{205} Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019.
\textsuperscript{206} International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 6, Asmara, interview, July 2019
training ‘refreshers’. Release (Tigrinya: mifinaw) means a full release from national service duty. Since 2012, released persons usually enter the People’s Army (see Chapter 2.1.).\textsuperscript{207} The factors mentioned above may apply to both kinds of discharge.

Although there has been no release on a big scale, discharges do happen in individual cases according to the criteria mentioned above.\textsuperscript{208} For an individual demobilisation or release, the superior has to sign a form and send it to the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence issues a demobilisation card (Tigrinya: metayesi in Tigrinya) in case of a demobilisation from military service with or without transfer to civilian service; and a release letter (Tigrinya: mefanewi) for those fully released.\textsuperscript{209} Eritrean citizens need a release letter or a formal exemption from national service in order to be employed. Reportedly, in some cases, the release letter is issued with a significant delay or not at all.\textsuperscript{210}

2.5. Remuneration

In 2015, the Eritrean government announced the introduction of a new remuneration scheme for civil servants, including those in the civilian component of national service.\textsuperscript{211} The new scheme stipulates significantly higher salaries depending on the education: Each year of tertiary level education after 12\textsuperscript{th} grade earns ERN 500 (ca. EUR 30 according to the official exchange rate\textsuperscript{212}) more on the monthly salary.\textsuperscript{213} No information is given regarding civil servants who have not completed 12\textsuperscript{th} grade.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
Qualification & Former Salary & New Salary \\
\hline Certificate & ERN 910 (ca. EUR 55) & ERN 2 000 (ca. EUR 120) \\
12+1 & ERN 1 200 (ca. EUR 72) & ERN 2 500 (ca. EUR 150) \\
12+2 & ERN 1 200 (ca. EUR 72) & ERN 3 000 (ca. EUR 180) \\
12+3 & ERN 1 420 (ca. EUR 85) & ERN 3 500 (ca. EUR 210) \\
12+4 & ERN 1 420 (ca. EUR 85) & ERN 4 000 (ca. EUR 240) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{New remuneration scheme in civilian national service of 2015\textsuperscript{214}}
\end{table}

As of 2019, implementation of the new scheme is still ongoing. In two official statements, the Eritrean government stressed that the effort ‘requires some time to finalize’.\textsuperscript{215} Minister of Information Yemane Gebremeskel said that the new scheme was not yet implemented fully, but that civil servants

\textsuperscript{208} Diplomatic source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 8, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 1, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 6, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Horn of Africa expert, email interview, 23 July 2019; Eritrean asylum seeker, Rama (Ethiopia), individual interview, 18 May 2019
\textsuperscript{209} Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Human Rights Watch, “They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us”, August 2019, \url{url}, p. 22
\textsuperscript{210} International organisation 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Eritrea expert, Addis Ababa, individual interviews, 21 May 2019; Returnees from Sudan and Israel, Keren, interview, 9 March 2016
\textsuperscript{212} All equivalents in EUR in this report are given according to the official exchange rate. The black market exchange rate may diverge from that rate substantially
\textsuperscript{214} Eritrea, MoE, Eritrea Education Report 2017, December 2017, \url{url}, p. 89
in national service were given priority and most of them were already benefitting from the new scheme.\textsuperscript{216} Sources inside and outside Eritrea confirmed that the new scheme has been partially implemented, especially for newly recruited and for those with higher education. Estimations about the progress of the implementation diverged.\textsuperscript{217}

Most sources indicate that at the same time as the new remuneration scheme, new deductions have been introduced.\textsuperscript{218} Deductions reportedly apply for taxes, retirement provision, logistics, building savings, party membership, food etc.\textsuperscript{219} Sources stress that after deductions, the salaries remain on the same level as before\textsuperscript{220} or are even lower.\textsuperscript{221} Two sources mentioned recent slight real increases in salaries.\textsuperscript{222}

This remuneration scheme does not apply to the military component of national service. One source indicates that the salary in military national service has been increased to ERN 1 800 (ca. EUR 108) in October 2016.\textsuperscript{223} In 2017, President Isaias said the salary for lowest ranked military personnel was ERN 1 800.\textsuperscript{224} Sources in Eritrea and abroad stated lower figures, ranging from ERN 300 to 1 500 (ca. EUR 18 to 90).\textsuperscript{225} Substantial deductions were reported for military salaries, too.\textsuperscript{226}

Human rights defenders deem the national service remuneration to be too low to cover basic living costs.\textsuperscript{227}

\textsuperscript{216} Yemane Gebremeskel, Minister of Information, Asmara, interview, 2 July 2019


\textsuperscript{220} Diplomatic source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, 24 July 2017, \url{url}, para. 16; Røsberg, A.H. and Tronvoll, K., Migrants or Refugees? ILPI, 14 February 2017, \url{url}, p. 54

\textsuperscript{221} Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; United States, USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 – Eritrea, 13 March 2019, \url{url}, p. 25

\textsuperscript{222} Diplomatic source 7, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; SFH, Eritrea: Nationaldienst [Eritrea: National service], 30 June 2017, \url{url}, p. 16

\textsuperscript{223} Shabait, Local Media Interview with President Isaias Afwerki: Excerpts Part II, 8 February 2017, \url{url}


\textsuperscript{226} Shabait, Local Media Interview with President Isaias Afwerki: Excerpts Part II, 8 February 2017, \url{url}

\textsuperscript{227} Shabait, Local Media Interview with President Isaias Afwerki: Excerpts Part II, 8 February 2017, \url{url}
2.6. Treatment of conscripts

2.6.1. Civilian national service

The situation of conscripts in civilian national service is regarded as better than in military service. Conscripts mainly bring forward the following complaints:

- They are not free to choose their place of assignment/job, which can be opposed to their education, skills, and personal interest.
- Salaries are too low for making a living, especially in Asmara.
- They are not allowed to travel abroad.228

The Eritrean government does not contradict these claims.229 The working and living conditions of civilian national service members are largely the same as for persons outside of the national service. This particularly applies to persons assigned to jobs in the same town or village where their family lives.230 For some jobs (such as teaching), national service members are assigned to remote and unfamiliar places, which causes more hardship and impedes founding an own family.231 Furthermore, national service members who have studied at one of the colleges are not issued their degree certificate before completing national service.232 Some national service members are able to privately work in another job, due to low workloads in their assigned jobs.233

Disciplinary measures are not as harsh as in military service; the sources did not report incidents of torture. Re-assignment to the military component, or arrest, or both, are potential punishments, though.234 One possible exception are the PFDJ-owned companies, part of which have own prisons with unknown conditions.235

2.6.2. Military national service

The situation of conscripts in the military component of national service is much harder than in the civilian component. To some extent, this is due to the circumstance that military commanders have almost unlimited power over their subordinates. There are no known regulations or guidelines that define the powers of the commanders, the treatment of subordinates or measures against the abuse of power.236 According to one source, an internal directive of 2005 delegated the power for punishments in military service from military courts to the commanders.237

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229 Yemane Gebremeskel, Minister of Information, Asmara, interview, 2 July 2019


231 Diplomatic source 9, Asmara, interview, July 2019; cf. Human Rights Watch, “They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us”, August 2019, url, p. 59

232 Human Rights Watch, “They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us”, August 2019, url, p. 59


234 Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Academic expert, email interview, 21 July 2019; Horn of Africa expert, email interview, 23 July 2019

235 Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019

236 Kibreab, G., Sexual Violence in the Eritrean National Service, April 2017, url, p. 131

Problematic circumstances in military service are described below.

- Punishment for lack of discipline – including inability to learn skills correctly – is often harsh and arbitrary, being imposed by military commanders. Conscripts are reported to be beaten or tied up for hours or days.  
  
- Most military units have their own prisons, in which conditions are reportedly precarious. Some prisons are located underground or in shipping containers. They are often overcrowded, with tenuous hygienic, medical and nutrition conditions.

- Work assignments are hard; 72-hour work weeks are reported. Also military exercises are reported to be overly demanding.

- Leaves are unregulated: they are prolonged, shortened or denied at the will of commanders.

- Many female conscripts are subjected to sexual abuse (see Chapter 2.6.3.).

- The duration is not limited, and conscripts do not know their release date. Duty times of 10 or 20 years are common (see Chapter 2.4.).

These circumstances are credibly documented. Although few updated information is available on the subject, there are no indications that the situation has changed significantly. Neither are there indications to what extent and how systematically such hardship occurs. Circumstances in military service depend heavily on the commander. While the documented treatment by some commanders presumably happens, normal (i.e. non-abusive) treatment is usually not reported. Hence, even a rough estimation of the share of conscripts who are subjected to the mentioned abuses would be pretentious.

2.6.3. Situation of women in military

Women in military are often, but not exclusively, assigned to positions such as cooks, cleaners, launderers, personal assistants of commanders, or office workers. Filipos Woldeyohannes, Chief of Staff of the Eritrean Defense Forces, stressed in a TV interview in July 2019 that women also continue to be conscripted into the combat units. One source reports that during his time in the army, the commanders selected the best-looking women to work personally for them. In such positions as well as in military units, they are vulnerable to sexual misconduct by their superiors. No known rules

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242 Kibreab, G., Sexual Violence in the Eritrean National Service, April 2017, url, pp. 131, 137

243 See Footnotes 238-242

244 cf. Landinfo, Repons Eritrea: Faktagrunnlag og kildekritikk [Response Eritrea: Fact base and source criticism], 14 January 2019, url, p. 3

245 Kibreab, G., Sexual Violence in the Eritrean National Service, April 2017, url, p. 131

246 ERI-TV, ወይራ ከጋ ያላ ሳላን ማለራን ምልም ጋር ከጋ ሳላን ማለራን ምልም ጋር ከጋ ሳላን ማለራን ከጋ ሳላን ማለራን ከጋ ሳላን ማለራን ከጋ ሳላን ማለራን ከጋ ሳላን ማለራን [Sayda: Conversation with general Filipos Woldeyohannes about the stories of Gabriela Hanneso and common women in the Eritrean army], 7 July 2019, url

247 Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019

248 International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 9, Asmara, interview, July 2019;
or guidelines are in place that forbid such conduct of commanders against conscripts, which effectively gives them impunity.249

Sexual exploitation by commanders happens in different contexts and circumstances. Several sources indicate that some female conscripts try to avoid harsh assignments by offering sexual ‘favours’ to their superiors, are offered easier treatment in return for sex, or are threatened with an unpopular assignment (e.g. to the front line) if they do not offer such favours.250 Once assigned, in order to maintain a good relationship to their superior or to avoid punishments, sexual services are demanded by commanders, sometimes under the threat of harsh punishments or other disadvantages.251 One source mentions that such pressure occasionally happens in the civilian component, too.252 Some sources also report even more direct abuses.253 There are reports of women who successfully withstood sexual advances by their commanders.254 Some sources mention that sexual exploitation also happens during the 12th grade at the Warsay-Yikealo School in Sawa.255

The Eritrean government opposes the allegations of sexual harassment in national service.256 Interlocutors of a UK fact-finding mission claimed in 2016 that the government would not tolerate sexual violence in national service because it would undermine the program.257 23 out of 190 respondents of an academic study published in 2017 made similar statements, while 167 respondents acknowledged the prevalence of sexual violence; the respondents were female former conscripts of national service.258

Extramarital sex in general and sexual violence in particular is stigmatised in the Eritrean society,259 while sexual violence within marriage is not criminalised and authorities rarely intervene.260 As a result, sexual abuse in national service is potentially underreported, as it might bring shame and dishonour to a family.261 One source however states that sometimes, women who get pregnant unintentionally in Sawa or in national service falsely explain this as the result of forced sex by a commander.262 While almost no sources except for the government deny that sexual violence exists, it is again impossible to quantify how systematically it happens.

252 Horn of Africa expert, email interview, 23 July 2019
256 Røsberg, A.H. and Tronvoll, K., Migrants or Refugees? ILPI, 14 February 2017, url, p. 76; Expressen 257 United Kingdom, Home Office, Home Office’s Fact-Finding Mission to Eritrea, 7-20 February 2016, 7 August 2019, url, para. 9.10
262 Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019
2.7. Treatment of deserters and draft evaders

In accordance with Article 37(1) of the Proclamation on National Service of 1995, any infringement of that proclamation (including desertion and draft evasion) is punishable by two years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of 3 000 Birr\textsuperscript{263} (ca. EUR 180). Under Article 37(2), the same punishment applies to people who fraudulently avoid performing their national service, inter alia, by infliction of self-harm. The right is reserved to apply stricter penalties according to the Eritrean Penal Code of 1991.\textsuperscript{264} Article 297(2) of the Penal Code of 1991 outlines a five-year term of imprisonment for draft evasion during wartime. Article 300 stipulates that desertion is punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to five years. During wartime, the term of imprisonment varies between five years and life imprisonment; in serious cases, the death penalty is imposed.\textsuperscript{265}

Although a state of war or emergency as provided by the penal code has not been formally declared, the government referred to the circumstances after the border war with Ethiopia as a ‘no war, no peace’ situation, and justified measures such as the unlimited duty time in national service on that basis.\textsuperscript{266} Since signing the peace declaration with Ethiopia in 2018, Eritrean officials do not refer to such a situation anymore. However, there are no indications that the related measures have been lifted or adapted (see Chapter 2.1. \textit{De facto}, punishment for national service-related infringements is imposed arbitrarily by military commanders.\textsuperscript{267} No reliable information is available regarding a possible adjustment of these punishments in reaction to the peace declaration. Most contacted sources had no indications of a change in policy.\textsuperscript{268}

Eritrean authorities continue to search for deserters and draft evaders. Different measures are in place to apprehend them:

- Military commanders send soldiers to the house or village of deserters to look for them.\textsuperscript{269}
- Civil and military officials or militia members go from house to house with lists of deserters and draft evaders and ask for them.\textsuperscript{270}
- During \textit{giffas} (round-ups, see Chapter 2.3.2.), deserters and draft evaders are arrested.\textsuperscript{271}
- Deserters and draft evaders are arrested when trying to leave the country illegally (see Chapter 3.4.).
- Sometimes, parents or siblings of deserters are arrested to put pressure on the deserter to return to the unit (see Chapter 2.7.1.).

Despite these measures, not all deserters and draft evaders are caught. According to several sources, deserters and draft evaders hide at their homes, at homes of relatives or outside of populated places.\textsuperscript{272}

\textsuperscript{263} The Eritrean currency nakfa (ERN) was introduced in 1997 with a ratio of 1:1 to the Ethiopian Birr (ETB). The official exchange rate is pegged to the US dollar in the ration 15:1, the black market exchange rate diverges from that.
\textsuperscript{264} Eritrea, Proclamation on National Service No. 82/1995, 23 October 1995, url
\textsuperscript{267} Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; further sources
\textsuperscript{268} Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Horn of Africa expert, email interview, 23 July 2019
\textsuperscript{269} Diplomatic source 9, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019
\textsuperscript{271} International organisation 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019
Deserters from the military component of national service who are apprehended by soldiers from their own unit are brought to the commander, who decides on further measures. 273 Deserters from the military or civilian component and draft evaders apprehended during house-to-house searches, *giffas* or while attempting to leave the country illegally are sent to prison. In prison, they are interrogated and sometimes tortured as a measure of interrogation or as a punishment. 274 The contacted sources mentioned prison terms between one and twelve months as typical, with longer terms of up to three years for repeated offenders and document forgers. 275 From prison, deserters are sent back to their units, while draft evaders usually first undergo military training. 276 Once deserters are back to their military unit, commanders decide arbitrarily on the follow-up. This may be additional prison time in the unit’s prison, potentially including torture, or reintegration into the unit. In some units, committees are in place to decide on the punishment. 277 Reports on the treatment of deserters from civilian national service are scarce. Some sources also indicate that after their time in prison, they are usually transferred to a military unit. Some are also returned to their previous working place. 278

### 2.7.1. Treatment of family members

Family members of deserters or draft evaders are sometimes imprisoned for a couple of weeks or months in order to put pressure on the searched persons to report back to the unit. This applies as long as the searched person is believed to be still inside Eritrea. Once the person has left the country, the relatives are usually released. 279

From 2005 until approximately 2010, family members of deserters and draft evaders who had left the country had to pay a fine of ERN 50 000 (ca. EUR 3 000). If they could not pay that fine, they were imprisoned for up to one year; in some cases, business licences were revoked or property seized. 280 In the recent years, such persecution has become less consistently applied. As of 2019, it is only sporadically reported, but continues to happen in some cases. 281

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273 Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019
275 Diplomatic source 7, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 9, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019; Landinfo, Repons Eritrea: Faktgrunnlag og kildekritikk [Response Eritrea: Fact base and source criticism], 14 January 2019, url, p. 3
276 Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019; Local source 2, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019
277 Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019
278 Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019; Local source 2, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019; Human Rights Watch, “They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us”, August 2019, url, p. 62
3. Exit from Eritrea

3.1. Travel inside Eritrea and to the border

Until 2018, Eritrean citizens in national service age and sometimes also below and beyond that age needed permits to travel inside Eritrea. The Ministry of Defence issued travel permits (Tigrinya: menqesaqesi) to persons in the military component of national service, whereas persons in the civilian component and other employees were issued this document by their employer, school, or local administration. Travel permits mentioned the holder and exact date and time of the trip as well as the number of an identity document\(^{282}\), but were rarely cross-checked against other identity documents. Small children, women and elderly were often, but not consistently allowed to travel without permit. They still needed identity documents and, if applicable, a proof of discharge or exemption from national service. As a rule, passengers had to prove that they were fulfilling their national service duty and allowed to travel, or that they had already done so.\(^{283}\)

Until approximately 2010, a dense network of checkpoints was in place to check travel permits and generally the backgrounds of travellers. These checkpoints were also intended to stop potential migrants before they reached the border areas or to check goods coming in from the border areas. Persons without proper documentation were arrested.\(^{284}\) After 2010, most checkpoints – with a few exceptions, such as in Keren or Tesseney – have no longer been operative. Instead, temporary roadblocks appeared at some places and times, particularly before major holidays such as Independence Day. Travel permits for Eritreans in national service age remained obligatory for travelling within Eritrea, but controls became more sporadic.\(^{285}\)

When the land borders to Ethiopia opened on 11 September 2018, travel restrictions within Eritrea were lifted for most Eritreans (not for foreigners). Some sources mention that this applied also to national service members. There were no checks between Asmara and the newly opened border crossing points.\(^{286}\) In April 2019, the last remaining land border crossings closed again. As of July 2019, sources inside and outside Eritrea mostly report that travel restrictions within Eritrea have not been reintroduced\(^{287}\); some of the recently arrived migrants in Ethiopia interviewed by SEM however reported that travel permits were needed to travel to the border area.\(^{288}\) It is not clear if national service members still do not need travel permits. Checkpoints and temporary roadblocks still exist;

\(^{282}\) For an overview on Eritrea’s identity documents, see EASO, Eritrea Country Focus, May 2015, url, pp. 50-56; Sweden, Migrationsverket, Eritrea – Folkbokföring, medborgarskap och identitetshandlingar (version 1.2) [Eritrea – population registration, citizenship, and identity documents (version 1.2)], 18 July 2018, url, pp. 9-47


\(^{286}\) International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 2, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrean asylum seekers, Rama (Ethiopia), group interview, 18 May 2019

\(^{287}\) Diplomatic source 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 6, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 2, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrean asylum seekers, Rama (Ethiopia), group interview, 18 May 2019

\(^{288}\) Local source 5, Tigray regional state, interview, May 2019; Eritrean asylum seekers, Rama (Ethiopia), group interview, 18 May 2019
security forces continue to check the identity documents of the passengers of passing-by vehicles and to ask about the purpose of travel. Checkpoints are particularly prevalent on roads close to the border, such as Senafe-Serha or Adi Kuala-Mereb.

### 3.2. Legal exit

#### 3.2.1. Exit visa

The entry and exit requirements of Eritrea are laid down in Proclamation 24/1992. In accordance with Article 11 of the Proclamation, a valid travel document, a valid exit visa and a valid international health certificate are required in order to leave Eritrea legally. The exit visa regime is regulated by Regulation No 4/1992, which has not been amended since 1992 and hence does not contain rules regarding national service, which has been introduced later. The National Service Proclamation (Article 17) defines the fulfilment of national service or the legal exemption from it as a precondition for the issuance of exit visas.

As of 2019, the exit visa de facto seems to be issued according to the following criteria:

- **Being released and in possession of a release letter (Tigrinya: *mefanewi*) or being exempted with proper documentation is generally a precondition for being eligible for exit visas.** In exceptional cases, national service members can be granted an exit visa with the written consent of their commander or employer.

- In addition to that, sources also mention age limits. According to two sources, men must be at least 40 years old to be issued an exit visa; women at least 30 years, unless they have children. Other sources mention higher age limits around 50 years or none at all.

- Children above a certain age are not granted an exit visa because of the approaching national service age. Currently, most sources state the age of 5 years as the maximum age to be issued an exit visa.

- Persons serving in the People’s Army are not generally forbidden to travel abroad, but they need the written consent of their commander, which may be difficult to obtain.

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289 Diplomatic source 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrean asylum seekers, Rama (Ethiopia), group interview, 18 May 2019; Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019.

290 Local source 5, Tigray regional state, interview, May 2019; Eritrean asylum seekers, Rama (Ethiopia), group interview, 18 May 2019; Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019.


• Persons suffering from a disease or injury for which treatment is not available in Eritrea. 301
• Persons travelling abroad for studies, for a conference, and in some cases, as businessmen or sportsmen. 302
• Former freedom fighters (Tigrinya: tegadelti) and their family members. 303
• Authority representatives in leading positions and their family members. 304
• De facto: persons who bribe the officials in charge of issuing exit visas, or with personal connections to them. 305

In practice, the issuance of exit visas is inconsistent; persons fulfilling the mentioned criteria are not always issued an exit visa. 306 According to pre-2016 information, the issuance of exit visas may be denied to government critics, relatives of persons who have left the country illegally or failed to pay diaspora tax while abroad, whole families or parents travelling together, and members of non-recognised religious communities. 307

In order to obtain an exit visa, applicants generally have to file in the following documents:

• completed application form;
• statement on the reasons for travelling;
• valid passport, or identity card for travelling to Ethiopia or Sudan;
• valid entry visa of the destination country, if needed;
• proof of exemption or release from national service;
• further identity documents such as identity cards, birth certificates, health certificates etc.;
• supporting letter issued by the local administration and/or the employer. 308

Additionally:

• for medical treatment abroad, a confirmation by the medical board under the Ministry of Health stating that a treatment abroad is necessary; as well as further medical documentation. 309
• some sources report that for Eritreans whose spouse lives abroad, a proof of their payment of the diaspora tax (2% tax) is needed. 310
• one source stated that in order to obtain the passport, she further had to file in copies of the identity cards of the parents and a proof that she had no liabilities with banks and service providers. 311

301 Eritrean asylum seekers, Rama (Ethiopia), group interview, 18 May 2019
303 EASO, Eritrea Country Focus, May 2015, url, p. 52
304 EASO, Eritrea Country Focus, May 2015, url, p. 52
307 EASO, Eritrea Country Focus, May 2015, url, p. 53
311 Eritrean refugees, Addis Ababa, individual interviews, 21 May 2019
Exit visas are either put as a stamp or a sticker in the passport or – if travelling with an identity card only – on a separate piece of paper.\footnote{312} The date range on which the individual will leave Eritrea is fixed, but returning is possible at any time.\footnote{313} The visa fee is not defined in the relevant regulation.\footnote{314} It seems to depend on the circumstances. Sources name prices between ERN 200 and 700 (EUR 12 and 42).\footnote{315}

From September until December 2018, an exit visa was \textit{de facto} not needed to cross by land from Eritrea into Ethiopia (see \textit{Chapter 3.2.3.}).

### 3.2.2. Exit by land to Sudan

Regulation 4/1992 specifies three border crossings with Sudan as legal land entry points: Talatasher – the main border crossing between Tesseney and Kassala –, Girmaika, and Karora.\footnote{316} As of 2013, the Eritrean Department for Immigration and Nationality mentioned the Talatasher and Girmaika border crossings above plus one more in Adebra as open, while Karora was closed.\footnote{317}

On 5 January 2018, Sudan closed its land border with Eritrea, indicating security concerns.\footnote{318} At the end of January 2019, Sudan announced the reopening of the Eritrean border.\footnote{319} In July 2019, both countries discussed the issue again and notified the upcoming reopening.\footnote{320} As of August 2019, however, SEM is not aware of any reports that the border has actually opened.

In 2011, Sudan and Eritrea signed a bilateral agreement allowing mutual visa-free travel with identity cards only for stays of up to three months.\footnote{321} Eritreans and Sudanese were indeed able to cross with identity cards only until the border closure in January 2018. Most sources agree that despite the agreement, Eritreans needed an exit visa.\footnote{322} Two among the interlocutors interviewed by a Swedish fact-finding mission in 2018 reported, however, that no exit visa was needed; one of them referring only to people from the border area. Other interlocutors stated it was needed.\footnote{323}

### 3.2.3. Exit by land to Ethiopia

From the outbreak of the border war in 1998 until September 2018, the land border between Eritrea and Ethiopia was \textit{de jure} closed to all traffic except for a couple of family reunifications arranged by ICRC.\footnote{324} Starting from 11 September 2018, the border crossings between the two countries were

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\footnote{312}{Norway, Landinfo, Eritrea: Utreise [Eritrea: exit], 2 April 2019, \url{url}, p. 3}
\footnote{313}{EASO, Eritrea Country Focus, May 2015, \url{url}, p. 52; Eritrean refugees, Addis Ababa, individual interviews, 21 May 2019; cf. Eritrea, Regulation No 4/1992 on Travel Documents and Immigration, 15 July 1992, \url{url}, article 17(7)}
\footnote{314}{cf. Eritrea, Regulation No 4/1992 on Travel Documents and Immigration, 15 July 1992, \url{url}, article 17(13)}
\footnote{315}{Norway, Landinfo, Eritrea: Utreise [Eritrea: exit], 02 April 2019, \url{url}, p. 3, EASO, Eritrea Country Focus, May 2015, \url{url}, p. 52; Eritrean refugees, Addis Ababa, individual interviews, 21 May 2019}
\footnote{316}{Eritrea, Regulation No 4/1992 on Travel Documents and Immigration, 15 July 1992, \url{url}, article 3(3).}
\footnote{317}{EASO, Eritrea Country Focus, May 2015, \url{url}, p. 52}
\footnote{318}{Reuters, Sudan closes border with Eritrea, 6 January 2018, \url{url}; Sudan Tribune, Sudan shut down border with Eritrea, 7 January 2018, \url{url}}
\footnote{319}{Reuters, Looking for friends, Sudan’s Bashir reopens Eritrea border, 31 January 2019, \url{url}, RFI (Radio France Internationale), Bashir reopens Sudan border with Eritrea, dismisses protests, 1 February 2019, \url{url}}
\footnote{320}{Shabait, President Isaias meets Deputy Chairman of Sudanese TMC, 2 July 2019, \url{url}; Sudan Tribune, Sudan, Eritrea discuss border reopening, 8 July 2019, \url{url}}
\footnote{321}{Sudan Tribune, Sudan and Eritrea agreed to remove entry visa requirements for citizens, 12 May 2011, \url{url}; Sweden, Migrationsverket, Eritrea: Familtmedlemmars kontakt med eritreanska beskickningar i utlandet [Eritrea: Family members’ contact with Eritrean representations abroad], 26 April 2018, \url{url}, p. 17}
\footnote{322}{Norway, Landinfo, Eritrea: Utreise [Eritrea: exit], 2 April 2019, \url{url}, p. 3; Sweden, Migrationsverket, Eritrea: Familtmedlemmars kontakt med eritreanska beskickningar i utlandet [Eritrea: Family members’ contact with Eritrean representations abroad], 26 April 2018, \url{url}, p. 17; Eritrea, Department for Immigration and Nationality, interview, Asmara, 6 November 2013}
\footnote{323}{Sweden, Migrationsverket, Eritrea: Familtmedlemmars kontakt med eritreanska beskickningar i utlandet [Eritrea: Family members’ contact with Eritrean representations abroad], 26 April 2018, \url{url}, p. 17}
\footnote{324}{Plaut, M., Understanding Eritrea, 2016/2019, p. 41}
opened, until closing again a couple of months later. The following four entry points were the main road border crossings during that period:

- **Debay Sima (Eritrea) – Bure (Ethiopia) south of Assab**, opened on 11 September 2018, closed on 22 April 2019.
- **Serha (Eritrea) – Zalambessa (Ethiopia) south of Senafe**, opened on 11 September 2018, closed on 26 December 2018.
- **Ksadika (Eritrea) – Rama (Ethiopia) on Mereb river**, opened on 17 September 2018, closed on 26 December 2018.
- **Omhajer (Eritrea) – Humera (Ethiopia) close to the border tripoint with Sudan**, opened on 7 January 2019, closed on 19 April 2019.

In addition to these border crossings, Regulation 4/1992 mentions entry points at Shilalo, Tsorona, and Thio. There are no reports about an opening or closure of these border crossings. One source mentioned that several minor border crossings for pedestrians were open roughly in the same period as the road border crossings, and were closed afterwards.

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325 Reuters, UPDATE 5-Ethiopia, Eritrea reopen border points for first time in 20 years, 11 September 2018, [url](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eritrea-ethiopia-reopen-idUSKCN1JS1WZ)
326 Eritrean Press [Facebook], Eritrea Closes Assab Road to Ethiopia, posted on: 22 April 2019, [url](https://www.facebook.com/eritreanpress/)
327 Reuters, UPDATE 5-Ethiopia, Eritrea reopen border points for first time in 20 years, 11 September 2018, [url](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eritrea-ethiopia-reopen-idUSKCN1JS1WZ)
328 Reuters, Eritrea closes border crossing to Ethiopians, official and residents say, 28 December 2018, [url](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eritrea-ethiopia-reopen-idUSKCN1JS1WZ)
329 TesfaNews [Twitter], posted on: 17 September 2018, [url](https://twitter.com/TesfaNews/status/1039457974905126402)
330 Reuters, Eritrea closes border crossing to Ethiopians, official and residents say, 28 December 2018, [url](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eritrea-ethiopia-reopen-idUSKCN1JS1WZ)
331 TesfaNews, Omhajer-Humera border point re-opened, 7 January 2019, [url](https://twitter.com/TesfaNews/status/1151745975100717312)
332 BBC Tigrinya, የሉመራ-ኦምሓጀር ግማሽ [The route Humera-Omhajer was closed again], 18 April 2019, [url](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h29tPd4E_eY)
335 Local source 1, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019
In the days immediately after the first border opening in September 2018, there were no controls whatsoever on neither side of the border. Persons who crossed the border reported that the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia was not discernible and that travellers, goods and vehicles were not checked.336

A few days or weeks after the border opening – SEM has no knowledge of the exact date – a rather lax form of checks was introduced. The policy was not consistent and varied over time and place of the border crossing. Sources report that soldiers wrote down the names of persons crossing, but in some cases only the names of the driver or the car plate of the vehicle.337 The soldiers sometimes did

335 Map created by the State Secretariat for Migration SEM (Switzerland), 2019, based on Eritrean Demining Authority et al., Landmine Impact Survey – 2004 [map], 2004; UN Cartographic Section, Eritrea [map], n.d., url; Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, International Boundary between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia [map], 2002, url; and the sources mentioned in Chapter 3 of this report.


337 Diplomatic source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 7, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 1, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 6, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Local source 5, Tigray regional state, interview, May 2019; Local source 1, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019; Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019; Norway, Landinfo, Eritrea: Utreise [Eritrea: exit], 2 April 2019, url, p. 2
check identity documents, but they let people pass who had no passport or identity card; they would just ask for the name and the purpose of travel instead.\textsuperscript{338} During that period, \textit{de facto} no exit visa was needed.\textsuperscript{339} National service members were not stopped from crossing.\textsuperscript{340} One source mentioned that they were allowed to stay in Ethiopia for 20 days\textsuperscript{341}, another for a ‘specific period’ depending on individual circumstances.\textsuperscript{342}

In December 2018 – the sources do not agree on an exact date – stricter procedures were introduced at the borders. Exit visas or other forms of written permission such as letters issued by the local administration were now required in order to cross into Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{343} National service members were no more allowed to cross.\textsuperscript{344} In early 2019, only the peripheral border crossings in Omhajer and Debay Sima remained open. Controls were in place at these checkpoints, but the exit visa requirement was not necessarily enforced at all times.\textsuperscript{345}

On 26 December 2018, the two centrally located border crossings Serha and Ksadika (Mereb) were closed. In April 2019, the crossings in Omhajer and Debay Sima were closed, too (see above). The government called the measure a ‘restriction for legal measures’.\textsuperscript{346} Legal border crossing by land into Ethiopia is no more possible since then. As of July 2019, the return of Eritreans who had crossed into Ethiopia when the border was open seemed to be still tolerated, though.\textsuperscript{347} Illegal border crossings, however, have become much easier than prior to the border opening and appear to be tolerated to a certain degree by the border guards (see \textsection{Chapter 3.3.2}.)

The border opening had significant consequences for migration and the economy. Immediately after the border opening, thousands of Eritreans travelled to Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{348} Between 11 September 2018 and the 20 December 2018, 27 500 Eritreans have registered as refugees in Ethiopia according to figures of the European Union\textsuperscript{349}, the UN Special Rapporteur mentioned 45 000 for the same period.\textsuperscript{350} Many more have left Eritrea and established themselves in Ethiopian cities without registering, their number

\begin{footnotes}
\item 338 International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 6, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019; United States, USDOS, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 – Eritrea, 13 March 2019, url, p. 14; Economist (The), For the first time in years, Eritreans can leave their country freely, 11 October 2018, url
\item 340 Local source 1, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019; Civil society source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Horn of Africa expert, email interview, 23 July 2019
\item 341 International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019
\item 342 Horn of Africa expert, email interview, 23 July 2019
\item 344 Diplomatic source 1, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019
\item 345 NZZ (Neue Zürcher Zeitung), Flucht aus dem Kasernenstaat [flight from the garrison state], 20 February 2019, url; Local source 1, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019; Diplomatic source 1, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Horn of Africa expert, email interview, 23 July 2019
\item 346 Shabait, Sawa Vocational Training Center graduates 909 students, 3 August 2019, url
\item 347 Diplomatic source 9, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Civil society source 2, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019
\item 348 New Humanitarian (The), Eritrea-Ethiopia peace leads to a refugee surge, 15 November 2018, url; Guardian, The, ‘I was euphoric’: Eritrea’s joy becomes Ethiopia’s burden amid huge exodus, 12 October 2018, url
\item 349 European Commission, Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), Ethiopia, Influx of Eritrean refugees, December 2018, url
\item 350 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, 16 May 2019, url, para. 64
\end{footnotes}
is unknown. The free flow of goods in the first months after the border opening led to a decrease of prices in Eritrea. Some staples such as teff (a cereal cultivated in the Horn of Africa) suddenly became four or five times cheaper. The Eritrean economy, however, struggled to compete with the much cheaper Ethiopian products. After the closure of the border, prices increased again.

Eritrea and Ethiopia are currently discussing on trade agreements, which reportedly include a reopening of the land border crossings. Issues include the regulation of the previously unregulated movement of persons and goods as well as technical issues such as the construction of formal border checkpoints, its staff, and the exchange rate.

3.2.4. Exit by air

As of August 2019, the only legal entry point by air was Asmara International Airport. Asmara currently has scheduled flight services to Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey. Regulation 4/1992 mentions two additional international airports in Massawa and Assab. These airports have no scheduled international air services.

Eritrean citizens need exit visas for all international air travel, including to Ethiopia and Sudan.

3.3. Illegal exit

3.3.1. Illegal exit to Sudan

For many years, the migration route into Sudan was more popular than the one into Ethiopia, due to its comparatively low military presence and well-established smuggling networks. Eritreans travelling illegally into Sudan use diverse modi operandi. Most common are the following:

- The cheapest way for getting into Sudan is to travel by public transport to a border town, such as Tesseney, Guluj, or Omhajer, and to continue by foot — often in small groups with other migrants.
- Some Eritreans travel on their own — by public transport or by foot — to one of the border towns, from where they continue accompanied by a facilitator in order to get across the border to Kassala, Gedaref, or other Sudanese towns.

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351 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, 16 May 2019, para. 64; Diplomatic source 9, Asmara, interview, July 2019
352 Diplomatic source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 2, Asmara, interview, July 2019
353 Diplomatic source 1, Asmara, interview, July 2019
354 Diplomatic source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 2, Asmara, interview, July 2019
355 Borkena, Eritrea-Ethiopia trade agreements under preparation, 26 July 2019, url; TesfaNews, Ethiopia, Eritrea to Open Four Commercial Border Checkpoints, 16 January 2019, url; New Delhi Times, Eritrea-Ethiopia road border to open probably within six months, 12 August 2019, url; Yemane Gebremeskel, Minister of Information, Asmara, interview, 2 July 2019
356 Yemane Gebremeskel, Minister of Information, Asmara, interview, 2 July 2019; Diplomatic source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; New Delhi Times, Eritrea-Ethiopia road border to open probably within six months, 12 August 2019, url; Ezega News, Ethiopia Finalizing Legal Documents for Trade with Eritrea - Official, 26 July 2019, url
357 Diplomatic source 7, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 1, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019
358 Airportia, Asmara International Airport ASM Departures, n.d., url
359 Eritrea, Regulation No 4/1992 on Travel Documents and Immigration, 15 July 1992, article 3(1)
361 CMI, Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Eastern Sudan, September 2017, url, p. 27, 32; Expertise France et al., Eritrea country statement, September 2017, url, pp. 6-7
Another, more expensive option is to travel with a facilitator all the way from Asmara to Kassala or Khartoum.362

As reported in 2017, costs for facilitation ranged between USD 100 for a short journey across the border, up to almost USD 10 000 to travel directly from Asmara to Sudan; for the latter, however, costs between USD 3 000 and 6 000 were reported to be more typical.363

Well-organised smuggling and trafficking networks operate at the Eritrean-Sudanese border. Groups involved in smuggling and trafficking include ethnic groups living on both sides of the border who know the area well, particularly the Rashaida. Also the Eritrean military units in charge of controlling the border as well as Sudanese officials are reported to be involved.364 In the border area, particularly migrants travelling on their own or in small groups are in risk of attacks by human traffickers. Informants provide the traffickers hints on the movement of migrants, enabling the traffickers to abduct them. In some cases, the traffickers have arrangements with facilitators for that purpose.365

Migrants who reach Sudan either register at the UNHCR refugee camp at Shagerab or travel on to Khartoum without registration.366

Due to these risks and the fact that the border with Ethiopia has become increasingly easy to cross, the flow of migrants across the Eritrean-Sudanese border has decreased in the last couple of years (see chart below).367 However, these numbers do not show the full extent of migration across the border, since only approximately one third of the migrants register as refugees at the UNHCR camps.368

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362 CMI, Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Eastern Sudan, September 2017, url, p. 27, 32; Expertise France et al., Eritrea country statement, September 2017, url, pp. 6-7
363 Expertise France et al., Eritrea country statement, September 2017, url, pp. 6-7; CMI, Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Eastern Sudan, September 2017, url, p. 28
365 CMI, Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Eastern Sudan, September 2017, url, pp. 31, 38
366 Expertise France et al., Eritrea country statement, September 2017, url, p. 6
367 Economist (The), Migration from Eritrea slows, 25 May 2017, url; Africa Monitors, Sudanese Authorities deport 115 Eritreans and Ethiopians Migrant, 1 March 2017, url
368 Economist (The), Migration from Eritrea slows, 25 May 2017, url
3.3.2. Illegal exit to Ethiopia

Prior to the peace declaration with Ethiopia in 2018, the Eritrean-Ethiopian border was a military front line with no legal border crossings. Even though the border had become increasingly porous in the years before the peace declaration, crossing was still a considerable risk. Therefore, many migrants travelled in groups or with facilitators. Nevertheless, it was common for migrants to be apprehended by border guards and detained. According to UNHCR, it was mostly young men who crossed.

After the formal opening of the border in September 2018, crossing the border legally became possible even without exit visa or other travel documents (see Chapter 3.2.3.). Many Eritreans used that possibility, particularly women and minors with relatives who had migrated to Ethiopia and other countries in the years before. Some Eritreans continued to cross the border bypassing the official road border crossings.

In two steps in December 2018 and April 2019, the land border between Eritrea and Ethiopia closed again, making all land border crossings into Ethiopia illegal. Nevertheless, the border is no military front line anymore. Crossing illegally has become easier, as border guards reportedly tend to look away when people are attempting to cross. Some sources relate that they even point out which way to go. People cross illegally into Ethiopia just for visits or trade. Migrants now mostly travel without facilitators, but still in some cases in the company of persons who know the border area well. The UN Special Rapporteur mentions however that facilitators are still used. As opposed to the Sudanese border, facilitators at the Ethiopian border seem to operate on a small scale and individual base without connection to bigger networks.

The most common modus operandi in the first half of 2019 was to travel by bus to a town close to the border such as Serha, Tsortona or Adi Kuala, and then to continue on foot. Most popular is the Serha/Zalambessa crossing. Buses and private vehicles travel all the way from Asmara to Serha. From there, migrants, smugglers and other travellers continue on foot, avoiding the checkpoint at the road border crossing. After a short walk, they reach the bus stop in Zalambessa on the Ethiopian side, with onward connections to Adigrat and Mekelle. People also smuggle goods on donkeys. Another popular way is to take the bus to Adi Kuala and to continue by foot from there to Rama. The detour avoiding checkpoints is less well established there, and it takes a whole day to walk from Adi Kuala to
Rama. In order to return to Eritrea, the use of the official border crossings is mostly tolerated, as there are still people returning who are presumed having left legally when the border was open. Despite these circumstances, the policies of the Eritrean authorities regarding illegal border crossing formally remain in place and due to the border closure, crossing has become riskier again. There are border guards who are less lenient, and consequently sporadic reports that detentions still happen. In August 2019, social media entries claimed Eritrea had moved troops to the Serha/Zalambessa border crossing in order to stop the outflow of migrants. Persons crossing have reportedly been detained. There is no independent confirmation of this information and neither an indication whether this is a temporary or permanent measure.

Further obstacles include dangerous animals such as snakes, hyenas, scorpions or – in Tekeze river – crocodiles, and the torrent of rivers during rainy season.

As of June 2019, 250 to 300 Eritreans crossed the border per day, according to Ethiopian officials. On the Ethiopian side of the border, migrants who want to be registered as refugees report to the army, militia, police or civilian authorities. They are collected at several collection points along the border. From there, they are transferred to the registration centre of the Ethiopian refugee agency ARRA and UNHCR in Endabaguna and later to one of the four refugee camps in Tigray regional state; or to the parallel infrastructure in Afar regional state.

3.4. Treatment of persons crossing the border illegally

Pursuant to Proclamation 24/1992 (Article 29(2)), attempts to cross the border illegally or to help others to do so are punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to five years or a fine of up to 10 000 Birr (ca. EUR 600) or both. The provisions of the National Service Proclamation and of the penal code cited in Chapter 2.7, also apply to people who leave the country after deserting or evading the draft. According to Article 37(3) of the National Service Proclamation, records are kept of persons liable to serve in national service (‘any citizen [...] knowing that he has the duty of serving in the National Service’) who flee the country. If they do not return before their 40th birthday and complete their compulsory service, they may be imprisoned for five years up until their 50th birthday. They also lose the right to work and to own land. In this field, the law does not distinguish between legal and illegal exits.
De facto, the treatment of persons apprehended when crossing the border is arbitrary and depends on numerous factors, such as:

- the unit or the responsible commander making the arrest;
- the place of the arrest;
- the national service status (deserter, draft evader, exempted/completed, too young);
- for deserters: the unit they belong to;
- the time of the year (i.e. harsher treatment when national holidays are approaching).

The arrested person is usually held for some time in a cell at the border area and afterwards brought to prisons such as Barentu, Hashferay (for Gash-Barka), Adi Abeito, or Edaga (for Debub; see map in Chapter 2.3.2.). There, military and security officers investigate whether the person is a civilian or not. Torture such as beating or tying detainees up in painful positions is common during this investigation. The follow-up depends on their national service status. The following categorisation is based on the SEM’s assessment of the available information and on statements by the sources mentioned in the footnotes.

- Deserters and draft evaders are treated as described in Chapter 2.7. Due to their attempt to cross the border, the punishment may be more severe. In Assab, according to one source, deserters and draft evaders who are arrested while trying to leave the country illegally are detained for five years, while the commanders of other fronts are more lenient.

- For deserters from the civilian national service, the ministry for which they are working decides on the treatment. Usually, they spend some time in prison, after which they are either sent to a military unit or, in some cases, returned to their previous assignment.

- Persons in national service age who have never been summoned or drafted are treated the same as draft evaders, i.e. imprisoned and conscripted afterwards. According to one source, illegal exit at this age is considered as absconding from service duty. Referring to a prison in Zoba Debub, one source relates that women above 18 years have been released upon payment of a fee.

- Minors are usually not brought to these prisons for investigation, but rather detained for a couple of weeks in a place close to the border and incidentally beaten or tied up, particularly boys. For their release, family members have to prove that they are not yet 18 years old and in some cases have to sign a guarantee that they will remain in the country or pay a fee. There are recent reports of minors who – after spending time in prison – were brought to military training centres; or to a prison-like boarding school in Nakfa for re-education. At

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395 Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Local source 5, Tigray regional state, interview, May 2019; Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019
396 Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019; Local source 2, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019; Human Rights Watch, “They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us”, August 2019, url, p. 62
397 Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019; Eritrean refugees, Addis Ababa, individual interviews, 21 May 2019; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019
398 Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019
399 Eritrean refugees, Addis Ababa, individual interviews, 21 May 2019
400 Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Local source 2, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019; Eritrean refugees, Addis Ababa, individual interviews, 21 May 2019; Human Rights Watch, “They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us”, August 2019, url, p. 49
this school, the teachers are national service teachers who had equally been arrested while trying to leave illegally.  

- No recent information is available on the treatment of persons who had completed their national service duty or had been exempted from it, presumably since many of them were able to leave legally.  

Contrary to the SEM’s findings, the Norwegian COI unit Landinfo holds that it is not possible to categorise arrested persons in groups with higher or lower probability for short- or long-term imprisonment.

The information presented above primarily refers to the situation prior to the peace declaration with Ethiopia. Information on the treatment of persons crossing illegally after the closure of the border in December 2018/April 2019 is scarce, mainly due to the fact that the border guards are reluctant to interfere when people are crossing illegally, hence cases of arrest have become rare (see Chapter 3.3.2.). The former policy theoretically remains in place, though, and some border guards continue to follow it. According to anecdotal information by some sources, persons caught in the border areas are now often simply sent back to their places of origin. There have also been reports of persons detained, in which cases the treatment was similar as before peace with Ethiopia, including torture.

The shoot-to-kill order on persons attempting to leave the country illegally, which had been introduced in 2004, has been applied inconsistently and rather rarely for a couple of years. Sporadic incidents of shootings on persons at the border continue to be reported, even after the peace declaration with Ethiopia. In these latest cases, it was not clear whether the persons concerned had just accidentally walked into a military area, or if the border guards had shot at them for attempting to cross. There are reports of persons who have been taken back by Eritrean security forces after having crossed into Ethiopia (see Chapter 4.2.).

For the treatment of family members of persons arrested at the attempt of border crossing, see Chapter 2.7.1.

402 Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019; Local source 2, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019
403 Academic expert, email interview, 21 July 2019
404 Landinfo, Repons Eritrea: Faktarunnglag og kildekritikk [Response Eritrea: Fact base and source criticism], 14 January 2019, url, p. 3
405 Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Horn of Africa expert, email interview, 23 July 2019;
406 Diplomatic source 1, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrean asylum seekers, Rama (Ethiopia), group interview, 18 May 2019
407 Academic expert, email interview, 21 July 2019
410 Local source 5, Tigray regional state, interview, May 2019
411 International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Local source 4, Tigray regional state, interview, May 2019
4. Treatment of returnees

As provided by Proclamations 62/1994 and 67/1995, Eritreans residing abroad are liable to pay 2 % of their income as Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Tax (‘2 % tax’, see Chapter 4.1.1.).

A part of the Eritreans who return to their country have previously broken Eritrean laws – in particular Proclamation 24/1992, which lays down rules governing the entry to and exit from the country, and the National Service Proclamation on account of their desertion or draft evasion. The relevant provisions by these laws are described in Chapters 2.7 and 3.4. However, more severe conditions apply for citizens who have absconded abroad compared to deserters and draft evaders apprehended inside Eritrea. According to Article 37(3) of the National Service Proclamation, records are kept of persons liable to serve in national service (‘any citizen [...] knowing that he has the duty of serving in the National Service’) who flee the country. If they do not return before their 40th birthday and complete their compulsory duty, they may be imprisoned for up to five years until their 50th birthday. They also lose the right to work and to own land. In this field, the law does not distinguish between legal and illegal exits.

De facto, various factors are relevant for the way the Eritrean authorities treat returnees:

- the way of return: voluntarily or forced;
- the way of exit from Eritrea: legal or illegal;
- the year of exit from Eritrea (i.e. before or after independence, the border war with Ethiopia);
- payment of the 2 % tax and signing of Form 4/4.2;
- political activities abroad: none, pro-government, anti-government;
- their national service status prior to their exit from Eritrea;
- duration of stay in Eritrea: short-term visitor or permanent returnee;
- personal contacts in the responsible authorities;
- arbitrariness.

This chapter differentiates between voluntary and forced returnees, and between short-term and permanent returnees.

4.1. Voluntary return

4.1.1. Conditions for return

Eritrean representations abroad are reported to set two conditions for giving Eritreans clearance to return and offer other consular services:

All Eritreans residing abroad – regardless whether they have left the country legally or illegally – are obliged to pay 2 % of their income (salary or welfare payments) as Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Tax (RRT), colloquially known as 2 % tax or diaspora tax. The payment of this tax is regulated in

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413 Eritrea, Proclamation on National Service No. 82/1995, 23 October 1995, url
Proclamations 62/1994 and 67/1995; it was initially introduced by Proclamation 17/1991. Eritreans wishing to return have to pay the 2 % tax at the responsible representation for their country of residence. They get a receipt as a proof of payment.

Eritreans wishing to return who have not completed national service moreover have to sign Form 4/4.2, which is colloquially known as ‘form of repentance’ or ‘letter of regret’ and bears the title Immigration and Citizenship Services Request Form. In that form, they admit to having committed a criminal offence and accept the penalty for it. The English translation of the original text (in Tigrinya) reads: ‘I ... confirm [...] that I regret having committed an offence by not completing the national service and am ready to accept appropriate punishment in due course.’ This applies to all Eritreans who have left the country illegally without completing national service; only persons who are exempted from national service or who have fulfilled their service duty are not asked to sign.

De facto, a further condition applies: Persons wishing to return should have a minimum of loyalty towards the Eritrean government, i.e. not be politically active for the opposition abroad. Snitches in various countries are reported to collect information in this regard.

4.1.2. Follow-up upon arrival

Upon arrival at Asmara International Airport, the Eritrean immigration authorities usually screen and profile returning Eritreans. The screening includes checks on which Eritrean and foreign identity documents they have, if they have paid the 2 % tax and – if applicable – signed the Form 4/4.2. Sometimes, the officers have information on searched returnees. However, these procedures are inconsistent. When travelling with an Eritrean passport, the immigration authorities can easily spot a person who has previously left the country illegally, since such a person lacks an exit stamp in the passport. If the authorities are suspicious of a person, interrogations may follow. Possible reasons are incomplete documents (such as lacking an Eritrean ID card) or non-payment of the 2 % tax.

Some persons are arrested and brought to a police station or prison in downtown Asmara. According to some sources, this can happen if a returnee has not signed the Form 4/4.2 despite being required to do so. Also anti-government political activities abroad can have this consequence, as snitches in the diaspora countries are reportedly informing the authorities in Eritrea about such activities.
4.1.3. ‘Diaspora status’

Eritreans residing abroad are eligible to obtain a preferential status often referred to as ‘diaspora status’ from the Department for Immigration and Nationality. This status gives access to privileges: Holders are exempt from compulsory national service and – contrary to the provisions of Proclamation 24/1992 – may leave Eritrea again without an exit visa. On the other side, holders do not have access to government services meant for residents such as food coupons, or the right to buy and sell land.

In order to obtain the ‘diaspora status’, Eritreans have to file in the following documents:

- proof of payment of 2% tax;
- proof of signing Form 4/4.2 (if applicable);
- Eritrean ID card;
- an international travel document such as a passport or a 1954 Convention travel document;
- supporting letter from the responsible Eritrean representation abroad that proves that they have lived outside Eritrea for more than three years.

The Department of Immigration and Nationality then issues a computer printout titled Residence Clearance Form. SEM has knowledge of such documents issued between 2014 and 2018 with similar layouts.

The ‘diaspora status’ is primarily meant for Eritreans residing abroad and visiting Eritrea for short terms. According to information given by officials of the competent authority in 2016, it may also be obtained by persons who plan to resettle in Eritrea. According to the officials, applicants must have paid the 2% tax, signed the Form 4/4.2 and have resided abroad for at least three years. Independent sources add that informally, further conditions apply, such as unquestionable political

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427 Yemane Gebremeskel, Minister of Information, Asmara, interview, 2 July 2019; Academic expert with Eritrean origin A, email, 10 December 2018
428 EASO, Eritrea: National service and illegal exit, November 2016, url, p. 29-30; Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa, A Report to the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea, May 2015, url, p. 11; Eritrea, Department of Immigration and Nationality, Residence Clearance Form, issued in 2018 [scan shown above]
429 Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa, A Report to the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea, May 2015, url, p. 11; EASO, Eritrea: National service and illegal exit, November 2016, url, p. 30; Eritrea, Department of Immigration and Nationality, Residence Clearance Form, issued in 2018
431 EASO, Eritrea: National service and illegal exit, November 2016, url, p. 30
loyalty. Applicants who engaged in opposition activities abroad are not likely to obtain the status.\textsuperscript{432} Two sources note that applicants need a valid residence permit or foreign citizenship abroad.\textsuperscript{433} According to two sources, most of those who benefit from the ‘diaspora status’ had left Eritrea before 2001.\textsuperscript{434} However, in 2016, SEM has been shown a Residence Status Forms issued to a person who had left Eritrea after 2001 and who held no residence permit abroad.\textsuperscript{435}

Information about the term of validity of the ‘diaspora status’ and the Residence Clearance Form is contradictory. In 2016, officials stated a validity of three years.\textsuperscript{436} Independent sources named five or ten years, respectively.\textsuperscript{437} SEM has knowledge of a Residence Clearance Form issued in 2018 that has a term of validity of eight years (see photo above).\textsuperscript{438} The ‘diaspora status’ and Residence Clearance Form however do not authorize to stay uninterruptedly for its whole term of validity. Most sources contacted by the SEM as well as some publications mention that the permitted uninterrupted stay was limited either to six months\textsuperscript{439} or one year.\textsuperscript{440} One source reported that an uninterrupted stay of two years was possible.\textsuperscript{441} One source relates that persons working in the Gulf States were permitted an uninterrupted stay of six months, while others could stay twelve months.\textsuperscript{442} In 2016, the Department for Immigration and Nationality had communicated that an uninterrupted stay for the full three years of validity was permitted.\textsuperscript{443}

All sources agree that persons who stay longer than the term granted for permanent stay are considered Eritrean residents again, losing the privileges of the ‘diaspora status’.\textsuperscript{444} Their treatment is described in Chapter 4.1.5.

4.1.4. Return as a visitor

According to official figures, an average of 95,000 Eritreans living abroad travel to Eritrea yearly. This includes Eritreans who are residing abroad for decades and who have obtained other citizenships.\textsuperscript{445} International sources quote similar numbers\textsuperscript{446}, but both sources are not verifiable. Visitors usually meet the requirements set by the authorities (payment of 2\% tax, signing Form 4/4.2) and are

\textsuperscript{432} Mekonnen, SFH, Eritrea: Reflexverfolgung, Rückkehr und “Diaspora-Steuer” [Eritrea: Persecution of family members, return, and ‘diaspora tax’], 30 September 2018, url, p. 10;
\textsuperscript{433} Sweden, Migrationsverket, Landrapport Eritrea (version 1.0) [Country report Eritrea (version 1.0)], 15 December 2015, url, p. 21; Eritrea: Reflexverfolgung, Rückkehr und “Diaspora-Steuer” [Eritrea: Persecution of family members, return, and ‘diaspora tax’], 30 September 2018, url, p. 10;
\textsuperscript{434} SFH, Eritrea: Reflexverfolgung, Rückkehr und “Diaspora-Steuer” [Eritrea: Persecution of family members, return, and ‘diaspora tax’], 30 September 2018, url, p. 10; Mekonnen, D.R., email, 18 March 2019
\textsuperscript{435} Returnees from Israel and Yemen, Asmara, interview, 2 March 2016
\textsuperscript{436} EASO, Eritrea: National service and illegal exit, November 2016, url, p. 10
\textsuperscript{437} Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Academic expert, email interview, 21 July 2019
\textsuperscript{438} Eritrea, Department of Immigration and Nationality, Residence Clearance Form, issued in 2018
\textsuperscript{439} Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Former resident of Asmara, email, 11 September 2018; Academic expert with Eritrean origin A, email, 10 December 2018; Academic expert with Eritrean origin D, email, 21 December 2018
\textsuperscript{441} Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019
\textsuperscript{442} SFH, Eritrea: Reflexverfolgung, Rückkehr und “Diaspora-Steuer” [Eritrea: Persecution of family members, return, and ‘diaspora tax’], 30 September 2018, url, p. 10
\textsuperscript{443} EASO, Eritrea: National service and illegal exit, November 2016, url, p. 10
\textsuperscript{446} Netherlands, MoFA, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Eritrea [General official report Eritrea], 21 June 2018, p. 64; Australia, DFAT, DFAT country information report Eritrea, 08 February 2017, url, p. 29
therefore able to visit Eritrea temporarily. The Eritrean authorities say that although the signing of Form 4/4.2 is an admission of guilt, the punishment is de facto waived.447 The contacted sources generally confirm this policy; short-term visits of diaspora members to Eritrea under these terms are usually unproblematic.448

Meeting these conditions is, however, no guarantee against persecution.449 Some sources mentioned isolated events of visitors who were detained for reasons such as not signing the Form 4/4.2 or activities abroad which were perceived as anti-government450; and who were conscripted into national service or the People’s Army.451

4.1.5. Permanent return

In the recent years, Eritreans have returned to Eritrea on a more permanent base from several European countries, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Egypt and other countries. Returnees from Europe452 and Israel453 include rejected asylum seekers and voluntary returnees. Returnees from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are mostly persons whose work permit had expired.454 In the first months of 2019, 68 Eritreans were reported to have returned from Libya because of the civil war and the precarious situation in the migrants’ camps.455

The Eritrean government reported in 2018 that between 2013 and 2015 a total of 9 971 persons had returned to Eritrea and reintegrated into ‘normal daily life’.456 The Eritrean government stated repeatedly that migrants can come back from abroad and will face no problems.457 Yemane Gebremeskel, the Minister of Information, stated that there would not be a general clemency, as this would motivate others to do the same illicit acts. In practice, however, clemency would be granted in many cases, while others had to undergo ‘some kind of rehabilitation which is very lenient’.458

Most sources contacted by SEM had no recent information on the actual treatment of such returnees; their monitoring is not possible even for international organisations.459 Some sources had knowledge

450 Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019
451 Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019, Former resident of Asmara, email, 11 September 2018
452 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Die Schweiz weist immer mehr Eritreer weg [Switzerland sends more and more Eritreans away], 13 May 2019, url; Diplomatic source 1, Asmara, interview, July 2019
453 According to data of the Israeli Ministry of Interior, 2 318 Eritreans have returned voluntarily from Israel to Eritrea between January 2015 and the end of May 2018; Source: UNHCR Israel, email, 14 August 2019; cf. United Kingdom, Home Office, Home Office’s Fact-Finding Mission to Eritrea, 7-20 February 2016, 7 August 2019, url, para. 11.7.10; Haaretz, 5,667 African Refugees Who Left Israel Returned to Home Countries, 20 August 2015, url.
454 Netherlands, MoFA, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Eritrea [General official report Eritrea], 21 June 2018, p. 64
455 AfricaNews, Eritrea wants citizens home from Libya, summons UNHCR top official, 1 May 2019, url
458 Yemane Gebremeskel, Minister of Information, Asmara, interview, 2 July 2019; cf. Shabait, UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines: Factual Findings or Recycled Defamation? 17 December 2015, url
459 Diplomatic source 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Diplomatic source 7, Asmara, interview, July 2019; International organisation 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Academic expert, email interview, 21 July 2019; Netherlands, MoFA, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Eritrea [General official report Eritrea], 21 June 2018, p. 62-64; Plaut, M.,
of returnees who had successfully re-integrated into society. They were mostly pro-government and belonged to the older generation of migrants.

In 2015 and 2016, the Eritrean authorities arranged meetings of voluntary returnees with European delegations and other visitors. The returnees had left Eritrea illegally and spent time in Israel, Sudan, and Yemen. They said they had paid the 2% tax and signed the Form 4/4.2 prior to their return. The returnees claimed having not encountered any problems and being treated well. Government officials were present during these meetings; such statements are hence to be treated cautiously. Some sources share the view that returnees who previously fulfilled the return conditions and registered for ‘diaspora status’ are upon return initially treated the same as visitors from the diaspora (see Chapter 4.1.4.). Purportedly they get a ‘probation time’ before being summoned into national service, or do not encounter major problems as long as they had made an ‘arrangement’ prior to returning and do not expose themselves too much. After a certain period spent permanently in Eritrea – most sources mention six to twelve months, see Chapter 4.1.3. – their preferential treatment or ‘diaspora status’ expires and they are treated like normal Eritrean residents again, liable to national service duty. Some returnees are reported to having left again to Ethiopia or Sudan.

Returnees who are again considered residents and who have not fulfilled yet their national service duty can be summoned again into national service or People’s Army and eventually be punished for desertion, draft evasion or illegal exit. Whether they are effectively summoned or not is up to the discretion of the authorities; cases of summons are however reported. One source reports that even prior to the expiry of the diaspora status, they may be caught in *giffas*. Another source has anecdotal knowledge of cases of returnees from Libya, Egypt and other countries who have been detained shortly after arrival. Reportedly, they were interrogated and tortured in prison and later sent to a military unit; a part of them fled the country again. The source indicates that a part of these cases had paid the 2% tax and signed the Form 4/4.2 before returning. They had been treated somewhat better, but were still put into detention followed by military service. Other sources share the view of returnees who had successfully re-integrated into society. They were mostly pro-government and belonged to the older generation of migrants.

Understanding Eritrea, 2016/2019, p. 185; Deutsche Welle, Eritrea’s Foreign Minister Osman Saleh Mohammed says Eritreans are welcome home, 25 August 2018, url.


Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Former resident of Asmara, email, 11 September 2018


Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Former resident of Asmara, email, 11 September 2018

Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019
that such scenarios are possible. One source states that ‘according to rumours, some are detained and others not.’ In most cases, however, there is no information whatsoever (see above).

In a survey among 153 Eritreans in refugee camps in Ethiopia who had left Eritrea between 1998 and 2016, 96% of the male and 97% of the female respondents perceived returning to Eritrea to constitute a considerable threat to themselves and/or their families. 80% of the respondents claimed that they would be in danger of arrest and detention as they had left Eritrea illegally.

4.1.6. Return from Ethiopia

A special category of returnees are the Eritreans who left their country temporarily when the border to Ethiopia was open and mostly unregulated (see Chapter 3.2.3.) and returned home either during that period or afterwards. They left Eritrea unhindered, but had no exit stamp, exit visa or any other proof of legal exit as provided by Regulation 4/1992, which formally continues to be applied. Also, those who decided to return were reportedly neither checked nor registered. Sources report that many of those who returned to Eritrea after a couple of days or weeks in Ethiopia encountered no problems, because their stay in Ethiopia had not been explicitly known to the Eritrean authorities.

Among those travelling back and forth were also members of national service. Since there was no proper control at the border, they were generally not detected upon return to Eritrea. However, depending on the assignment within national service, time limits for the stay in Ethiopia applied informally. It was hence possible that their commander or ministry detected absences for overly long time frames or considered those not returning as deserters. One source reports that some teachers who had left to Ethiopia and eventually returned were first put in prison because of absconding. Due to the shortage of teaching staff, however, they were released after payment of a penalty and reinstated in their previous positions. Some incidents of forced returns from Ethiopia have also been reported. It is not known what happened to these returnees. Many national service members who had crossed the border opted to stay in Ethiopia. Three sources assessed that there would probably be repercussions against such returnees.

Sources reported that return to Eritrea was possible and unproblematic also after the border closure, even at the official entry points. One source however said that in some incidents, returnees have been mistreated by border guards. Furthermore, persons who wanted to return from Ethiopia either did not dare or had to pay fines. At the Omhajer/Humera crossing, minors were reported to

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474 Røsberg, A.H. and Tronvoll, K., Migrants or Refugees? ILPI, 14 February 2017, url, p. 92
475 Eritrea, Regulation No 4/1992 on Travel Documents and Immigration, 15 July 1992, url
476 Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Local source 1, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019; Civil society source 3, Asmara, interview, July 2019
477 Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019; Connell, D., telephone interview, 17 July 2019
478 International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Horn of Africa expert, email interview, 23 July 2019
480 International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Local source 4, Tigray regional state, interview, May 2019
481 Diplomatic source 9, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019;
482 Diplomatic source 9, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Eritrea expert, telephone interview, 12 July 2019; Local source 1, Tigray regional state (Ethiopia), interview, May 2019
483 Diplomatic source 9, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Civil society source 2, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Mekonnen, D.R., telephone interview, 17 July 2019
484 Academic expert, email interview, 21 July 2019
485 Academic expert, email interview, 21 July 2019; Eritrean refugees, Mai Aini (Ethiopia), group interview, 20 May 2019
stay on the Ethiopian side because they did not dare to return as they had left Eritrea without the necessary permission.486

4.2. Forced return

The Eritrean government opposes any forced return of its citizens.487 However, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told a delegation from the United Kingdom in 2016 that their policy was ‘to prefer voluntary returns. But if a host country decides to repatriate them by force, we will accept them. But we should negotiate this first.’488 Eritrea’s President Isaias Afewerki has criticised the countries, which send migrants back to Eritrea, for not supporting the returnees adequately. Isaias mentioned Israel’s policy of giving deportees USD 3 500 and said USD 50 000 would be more appropriate.489

Sporadic incidents of forced returns to Eritrea are recorded, mostly across the land borders. Between 2016 and 2019, they occurred rather seldomly. Forced returns prior to 2016 have been covered in EASO’s report National service and illegal migration (Chapter 3.4).490 SEM has knowledge of the following incidents:

- Most incidents of deportations to Eritrea are still known from Sudan. Multiple forced returns across the land border at Talatasher between Kassala and Tesseney were reported in 2016 and 2017: According to a number of sources, several hundred Eritrean migrants were repatriated from Sudan in 2016 alone.491 In early 2017, another 115 Eritreans and Ethiopians were reportedly deported across the land border.492 After the border closure in January 2018, no further incidents are documented.493

- One source reported in early 2017 that Egypt had deported 25 Eritreans to their home country. The source reported no further details.494

- Two interlocutors reported that during the time the Eritrean-Ethiopian border was open, Eritrean soldiers went in to Northern Ethiopia in search of absconded national service members. Some of them allegedly were taken back, while others remained in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian authorities were not reported to be actively involved in these incidents.495

- On 6 June 2019, France deported an Eritrean woman by air via Istanbul, escorted by French policemen. The woman had been arrested in possession of counterfeit ID documents.496 The

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486 NZZ (Neue Zürcher Zeitung), Flucht aus dem Kasernenstaat [flight from the garrison state], 20 February 2019, url
487 Eritrea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asmara, interview, 2 July 2019; Netherlands, MoFA, Algemeen Ambtsbericht Eritrea [General official report Eritrea], 21 June 2018, p. 65; New York Times, Trump Administration Punishes Countries That Refuse to Take Back Deported Citizens, 13 September 2017, url; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Die Schweiz will Eritreer wegweisen, aber ein Abkommen zur Rückübernahme bleibt unrealistisch [Switzerland wants to send Eritreans away, but a readmission agreement remains unrealistic], 5 April 2018, url; Amnesty International, Rückführungen nach Eritrea nicht möglich [repatriations to Eritrea not possible], 3 September 2018, url
488 United Kingdom, Home Office, Home Office’s Fact-Finding Mission to Eritrea, 7-20 February 2016, 7 August 2019, url, para. 11.7.21
489 Shabait, Interview with President Isaias Afwerki: Domestic Issues, 31 January 2018, url
490 EASO, Eritrea: National service and illegal exit, November 2016, url, p. 36
493 Legal expert, interview, Bern, 18 July 2019; Horn of Africa expert, email interview, 23 July 2019
494 Africa Monitors, Egypt: deportation of migrants to Eritrea, 25 February 2017, url
495 International organisation 4, Asmara, interview, July 2019; Local source 4, Tigray regional state, interview, May 2019
496 RFI (Radio France Internationale), France: une femme expulsée en Érythrée, un des pays les plus répressifs au monde [France: one woman deported to Eritrea, one of the most repressive countries in the world], 12 June 2019, url; Le Figaro, La France expulse une Érythréenne vers son pays, une «première» selon la Cimade, 12 June 2019, url; La Cimade, La France expulse vers l’Érythrée, 12 June 2019, url
French NGO *La Cimade* reported that she had applied for asylum after being arrested, which had been rejected.\(^{497}\) A media report states that she did not speak English well and her first indications suggested that she had no fear in case of return.\(^{498}\)

The United States announced in September 2017 the repatriation of 700 Eritreans.\(^ {499}\) At the same time, the U.S. government complained that Eritrea refused to take back deported citizens.\(^ {500}\) Nevertheless, the U.S. authorities reported to have ‘removed’ 41 Eritreans in 2017 and 62 in 2018.\(^ {501}\) These statistics do not show the destination country of the deportations; at least a part of the Eritreans were removed to third countries.\(^ {502}\) In some cases, they were deported to Cairo airport and handed over to the Egyptian police. In June 2018, an Eritrean deportee committed suicide in a cell at Cairo airport.\(^ {503}\) As of August 2019, discussions continue between the United States and Eritrea on means for returning nationals to their country of origin.\(^ {504}\) The SEM and a consulted U.S. non-governmental organisation have no knowledge of reports on any direct removals of Eritreans from the United States to Eritrea.\(^ {505}\)

Information about the treatment of the deported persons is scarce. Forced returnees usually have no opportunity to pay the 2% tax and sign Form 4/4.2 and to thereby ensure a more lenient treatment.\(^ {506}\) SEM observed that the fate of most deported persons upon arrival in Eritrea is unknown and undocumented. Information is available only regarding persons repatriated across the land borders from Sudan, and it is anecdotal. The available accounts describe that after arrival in Eritrea, most returnees were put in an underground prison near Tesseny, where the authorities screened and profiled them. Torture is reported from this prison.\(^ {507}\) According to the accounts of deportees from Sudan who have left Eritrea again and sources who have been in touch with them, the follow-up depended on the profile:

- Persons who had not been conscripted yet were sent to military training e.g. in Afabet and later deployed to military units.
- Persons who had already been in military were sent to other prisons such as Hashferay or Adi Abeito.
- Younger children were released to their families.


\(^ {498}\) *RFI (Radio France Internationale), France: une femme expulsée en Érythrée, un des pays les plus répressifs au monde [France: one woman deported to Eritrea, one of the most repressive countries in the world]*, 12 June 2019, [url](https://www.rfi.fr/fr/20190612-france-erythrée-flux-kabyle-conscription-


\(^ {502}\) *NGO, USA, email, 16 August 2019.


\(^ {504}\) *USA, government official, email, 19 August 2019.

\(^ {505}\) *NGO, USA, email, 16 August 2019.


Elderly were sent to the military or enlisted in the People’s Army.\textsuperscript{508}

Due to the small number of forced returns to Eritrea, the information on the treatment of the forced returnees from Sudan is based on a small sample of anecdotal information. However, these observations are generally in line with SEM’s findings published in 2016.\textsuperscript{509}


\textsuperscript{509} EASO, Eritrea: National service and illegal exit, November 2016, url, p. 36
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Oral sources, including anonymous sources

Most oral sources asked to remain anonymous due to different concerns such as security or access to Eritrea and its authorities. Due to the very small number of potential sources, it has not been possible to describe them in more detail than presented below, as this could reveal their identity.

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Academic expert with Eritrean origin D, email, 21 December 2018. Academic expert D has regular professional contact with newly arrived Eritrean migrants.

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Eritrean asylum seeker, Rama (Ethiopia), individual interview, 18 May 2019. The SEM conducted two individual interviews with participants of the group interview mentioned above.

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Annex 2: Terms of Reference

This report updates the questions dealt with in EASO’s 2016 report on national service and illegal exit in the light of the developments since 2016, most notably the peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2018. The following are the guiding questions:

1. Is there a punishment in place for deserters, draft evaders and persons who left the country illegally – be it when arrested in Eritrea, when trying to cross the border legally or illegally, or upon return to Eritrea? If so, how severe are the punishments?
2. Are the punishments meted out according to law and does legal certainty exist (procedural guarantees, written judgments, possibilities of appeal)?
3. Are the punishments and conditions of detention for deserters, draft evaders and people who left the country illegally more degrading and/or more brutal than those for people who have committed an offence under another generally applicable law?
4. Did the peace agreement with Ethiopia in 2018 lead to any change of policies in national service, particularly regarding recruitment, the duration of service and punishments?
5. Have the remuneration reforms announced in 2015 and 2016 been implemented?
6. What are or have been the possibilities for legally leaving and re-entering Eritrea upon the opening of the land border crossings with Ethiopia in 2018?