• Risk

    COVID-19 epidemic in Yemen Latest update: 11/05/2020

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Rationale

    As the COVID-19 virus continues to spread globally and international travel reduces, the virus continues to spread to neighbouring countries. Despite precautions by national authorities and WHO to minimise the risk of virus transmission, identification of an infected person already in Yemen, fails to self-isolate effectively and infects others. Due to a lack of test kits and fear of reporting, the virus spreads to many others before the authorities realise it is in country. Before long, crisis-affected vulnerable populations become infected. The virus spreads rapidly due to poor living conditions, high population density and poor hygiene practice.  The close proximity of dwellings, insufficient hygiene products and clean water access, and lack of public awareness continue to spread the virus to vulnerable people groups in Yemen.

    Possible Indicators/Triggers:

    1. Confirmed cases increase surrounding countries
    2. Confirmed cases increase among humanitarian staff connected to Yemen
    3. Confirmed case in Yemen
    4. Insufficient test kits in Yemen
    5. Insufficient hygiene items
    6. Water prices rise
    7. Continued air travel into Yemen
    8. Lack of purchasing power among households to buy hygiene kits
    9. Poor health infrastructure

    Impact

    COVID-19 spreads rapidly through the population. A proportion of cases are hospitalised as hospitals struggle to implement sufficient protective measures for COVID-19 treatment wards. Within a month, many deaths are reported and increasingly stringent movement restrictions begin to be observed, but the number of infections and deaths continues to rise sharply. Death rates are higher than the global average due to the underlying poor health conditions, lowered immunity among malnourished population, and limited medical resilience in the general population.

     

     

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  • Risk

    Increased violence between armed groups leads to confinement, displacement and humanitarian needs in rural areas in Norte de Santander, Chocó and Nariño Latest update: 07/04/2020

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Colombia’s government signed a peace agreement with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in 2016 but armed conflict has continued, leaving people with unmet humanitarian needs in Norte de Santander, Chocó and Nariño departments. After the peace agreement, competing armed groups fought for control over areas previously controlled by FARC and conflict intensified. At the beginning of 2018 the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) declared war on the National Liberation Army (ELN). Their clashes intensified in 2019, fuelled also by the presence of FARC dissidents and paramilitary groups such as the Clan del Golfo. Escalation of armed conflict is probable in the coming months, owing to the slow implementation of the peace agreement, the absence of dialogue between the government and armed groups, and the presence of new armed groups. The population has been affected by disruption of access to services and livelihoods, displacement, presence of antipersonnel mines, and forced recruitment. ?

    Conflict-driven internal displacement is expected to continue over the next six months. According to government figures, around 27,000 people were internally displaced in Norte de Santander, Chocó, and Nariño departments in 2019, though the actual number is likely higher due to a lag in government registries. Displacement has continued in 2020 particularly in Norte de Santander and Nariño, where IDPs need shelter and food. ?

    The situation worsened after 13 February, when armed groups held an “armed strike”, sparking additional clashes. In Catatumbo (Norte de Santander) around 20,000 people in rural areas suffered severe movement restrictions as the armed groups controlling the territory cut access to roads, health facilities, education, and crops, and stopped public transport. Such confinement also affected around 23,000 people in Choco during 2018. ?

    Higher rates of confinement and displacement in rural areas are probable as armed groups gain control of territory. The municipalities of Tibu, San Calixto, El Tarra, Sardinata, Abrego, La Playa and Bojaya Tumaco Roberto Payán, Magüí Payán y Olaya Herrera, where conflict has been most active, have an estimated population of 494,000 people. ?

    Further confinement and more “armed strikes”, combined with use of antipersonnel mines, will likely create significant access constraints for people living in the affected areas, and for humanitarian actors present. In rural areas safe access to potable water and basic sanitation, as well as access to crops, transport, education, and health institutions will be hindered, leading to food insecurity, livelihood, and protection concerns; decreased access to education and healthcare.

    Increased violence will likely lead to security and access challenges for aid workers, creating difficulties in reaching affected populations or resulting in temporary suspension of humanitarian activities in certain regions. Protection issues related to sexual and gender-based violence, forced recruitment, and forced labour are likely if the conflict continues and armed groups expand their presence in the department. Norte de Santander hosts around 202,000 Venezuelan refugees and migrants, who are particularly vulnerable to such human rights violations. ?

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  • Risk

    Escalation of banditry in the northwest leading to increased protection, food security and displacement concerns Latest update: 31/03/2020

    No. of people affected

    Current situation
    245,499
    Future situation
    300,000

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    RATIONALE

    Banditry (village raids, kidnapping and cattle rustling) in northwest Nigeria since 2018 has led to the internal displacement of 210,000 people, and an additional 35,000 fleeing to Maradi, in Niger (UNHCR 03/2020). Activity has increased in recent months with attacks in several states including Zamfara, Katsina, Kebbi, Kaduna, Sokoto and Niger. The government responded with aerial bombardments in February, killing over 250 armed men.?Escalation of the crisis is connected to the failure of an amnesty programme in October 2019 initiated by Katsina and Zamfara states. The two most powerful groups, Buharin Daji and Dogo Gedi reportedly did not participate.?It appears that some bandits accepted amnesty because the rainy season – an obstacle to their activities – was imminent. Many participated in the exchange of small arms for money and moved to other states in northern Nigeria such as Kaduna and Niger. Peace processes appearing to grant more concessions to the Fulani (more closely linked to banditry) while neglecting some of their Hausa victims is a potential aggravating factor likely to stir up Hausa/Fulani ethnic conflicts.?These concessions stem from beliefs that the Fulani ‘aggressors’ were rewarded for violence through amnesty, while the Hausas were not compensated enough for economic losses such as farmlands and crop destruction. Fears that bandits may be in contact with elements of Boko Haram and Ansaru living in the northwest adds to protection concerns for over 27 million people exposed to the violence. 

    IMPACT

    The government’s adoption of a more aggressive stance through aerial bombardment is likely to spark reprisal attacks by the bandits on civilians, raising protection concerns and leading to an increase in the number of IDPs and refugees. Security forces’ preoccupation with Boko Haram in the northeast will likely reduce the availability of manpower and other resources to combat banditry in the northwest. Disruption of agriculture will leave the affected population no longer able to rely on own-produced cereals for subsistence and commercial farming, and cattle rustling will continue to hamper animal husbandry, increasing risk of food insecurity. About 70% of IDPs surveyed in Sokoto, Katsina and Zamfara previously reported insufficient food, with global acute malnutrition rates among children as high as 31%.?Some 1.4 million people in Katsina (18.08% of the state population), 452,000 people in Sokoto (8.84%) and 451,000 in Zamfara (10.02%) have insufficient food intake.?An escalation of this crisis with a disruption of livelihoods is likely to worsen nutrition levels, especially for women and children. Most INGOs are focused in the northeast and have not yet established a presence in the northwest. Continued armed attacks and government military response are likely to prevent humanitarian access, especially in the rural areas. 

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  • Risk

    Deteriorating drought conditions in the Dry Corridor lead to 24% of population in severe food insecurity and increased outward migration Latest update: 26/03/2020

    No. of people affected

    Current situation
    280,000
    Future situation
    1,220,000

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Rainfall in Honduras has been irregular and below-average over four consecutive years, affecting crops and food insecurity in the South and West regions.? At least one million people in the country suffer chronic food insecurity at Crisis and Emergency levels (IPC Phases 3 and 4)?, while 638,000 Hondurans lack access to safe water.? The economy of Honduras is heavily dependent on agriculture, with one-third of the Hondurans depending on it for their livelihoods.? Subsistence farmers in drought-affected regions are depleting their food stocks and have become more dependent on seasonal employment in the coffee sector. However, coffee sector wages have been dropping for the past seven years, affecting the livelihoods of these seasonal workers. The estimated coffee production volume for the 2020 season are 12% lower than in 2019.

    Some 3.5 million people (total pop.) are living in the most affected departments in the South and West regions: Santa Barbara, Copan, Octopeque, Lempira, Intibuca, Comayagua, Francisco Morazan, La Paz, Valle, El Paraiso, and Choluteca. The US has not resumed aid funding in the region since halting it in March 2019.? The funding focused on cash transfers for food and increasing the capacity of droughtaffected communities.? The total number of beneficiaries fell from 1.5 million in March 2019 to an estimated 18,000 by December 2020.?

    Food insecurity and crop failures are increasingly being recognised as drivers of migration. A survey led by Creative Associates International found that 46% of Honduran respondents under age 29 intend to migrate; 67% of respondents cite economic concerns as a primary reason.? In 2014, when the drought began, the number of people from Honduras trying to cross the Mexico-US border spiked, with around 91,000 people apprehended. Numbers have rapidly increased, with 254,000 Hondurans apprehended in 2019.?

    The worsening drought, expected to continue in 2020, and its impact on production of coffee, corn, and maize crops, in combination with the lack of aid programmes, will increase the number of food insecure people. Around 1.22 million people are projected in severe acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and higher), including 258,000 people projected in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) by June 2020, the highest number since 2016 and an four-fold increase compared to 0.28 million during the same period in 2019.? The 2020 basic grain agricultural season is estimated to be below normal. Losses in subsistence agriculture will affect food supply, leading to price increases. Some households will be barely able to meet their needs unless they adopt emergency coping strategies, increasing their vulnerability and their dependence on food assistance.? As the situation deteriorates, more displacement and outgoing migration are expected.? A spike in migration in the coming months will create significant needs, particularly for protection and shelter, along migration routes in Mexico and Guatemala.

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  • Risk

    Increasing insecurity and displacement cause a deterioration of food security in the Central North, East, North, and Sahel regions Latest update: 26/03/2020

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    RATIONALE

    Conflict in Burkina Faso intensified in 2019 and an increase of attacks against civilians by armed groups and intercommunal attacks led to a surge of displacement. The number of IDPs rose from 90,000 in January 2019 to over 760,000 in mid-February 2020.? IDPs fleeing conflict-affected regions are living mainly in Central North and Sahel regions but increasingly in North region and across the eastern part of the country.?
    high risk level
    Insecurity and forced displacement, coupled with rain shortages in 2019 are the main drivers of growing food insecurity in Burkina Faso, contributing to reduced agricultural production and disruption of livelihoods and market activities.? Over 1.2 million people were categorised in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or higher and needed immediate food assistance in the October-December period, compared to 300,000 people during the same period of 2018.? Insecurity is particularly impacting agricultural production in Central North and North regions,? decreasing humanitarian access, and hampering food assistance especially in East, North, and Sahel regions. Food assistance concentrates on accessible urban centres? and on northern parts of the country where humanitarian response has been focused so far, leaving gaps in food assistance in other regions.? IDPs and impoverished host households are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity.? Rapid SMART surveys in October 2019 among hosts and IDPs in four conflict-affected regions found acute malnutrition rates for children above the alert threshold of 10% in three of six communes: 12.7% in Arbinda (Sahel region), 11.7% in Matiacoali (East region), and 11.2% in Titao (North region). The critical threshold of 15% was exceeded in Barsalogho (Central North region), both in the IDP reception site (19.7%) and the municipality (17.2%), and in Djibo (Sahel region) (16.9%).? 

    IMPACT 

    Food insecurity will rise as violence persists and mass displacement continues. At the current rate, about 900,000 people will be displaced by April 2020? but there is a risk displacement will exceed planning figures. Large-scale displacement will lead to further deterioration of livelihoods and a reduction in food availability among poor households, both hosts and IDPs. IDPs will be increasingly dependent on food assistance.? Additionally, impoverished host households face increased vulnerability to food insecurity. They have limited sources of income apart from the sale of livestock and are at risk of early depletion of their crop stocks.? Overall agricultural production during the 2019/20 season is expected to decline by up to 15% compared to 2018/19? and livestock value will probably decrease, particularly impacting the livelihoods of households in conflict-affected areas in the north.? Around 1.8 million people in Burkina Faso are projected in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and above during the lean season of June-August 2020, compared to 0.7 million during the same period in 2019?. The figure includes over 80,000 people in Centre-North, East, North, and Sahel regions projected in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Without the planned humanitarian response, 15 provinces face Emergency level.? Exponential rise in displacement combined with shrinking humanitarian access will exacerbate food insecurity.
     
    Methodology note

    This risk was initially identified in the ACAPS March 2019 Risk Report and materialised as violence and displacement resulted in a significant increase of food insecurity in Burkina Faso.? A further, significant increase in the number of food insecure people due to rapid deterioration of humanitarian conditions comprises a new risk.

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  • Risk

    The opening of a new frontline along the Abu Qurayn-Tawergha-Misrata main road leads to displacement and protection violations, while threatening the livelihoods of the population of the three centres. Latest update: 25/03/2020

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    RATIONALE

    The road connecting Abu Qurayn and Misrata is a strategic artery, which might soon be subject to increasingly intense attacks by Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF). Peace efforts are stagnating, while the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) and its allies are under increasing economic and military pressure. With UN negotiations slowing down after the resignation of UN Envoy Ghassan Salamé and multiple ceasefire violations reported at the end of February, the new battlefront might be definitively opened.? Misrata is one of only five enclaves under GNA control and connects by road directly to Tripoli. This eastern front of GNA forces has been under pressure since the LAAF entered Sirte on 10 January and took its Ghardabiya military airbase, a vantage point for a military campaign.? Furthermore, Misratan militias have shown signs of internal division, as some of those responsible for the defence of Sirte withdrew, leaving the city to the LAAF.? Misratan militias have given essential military support to the GNA in Tripoli, including during the offensive started in April 2019.? An escalation of ground clashes from Abu Qurayn and more intense shelling along the main road up to and including Misrata would oblige the GNA to divert forces from the capital, thinning out its defences, and put further pressure on the Tripoli government, as it struggles economically with a LAAFimposed blockade of oil exports.?
    Routine violations of the 2011 arms embargo and continuous inflow of foreign weapons and personnel (benefitting both parties), are likely to result in the LAAF having enough resources to open the battlefront.?
     
    IMPACT

    The humanitarian consequences of the offensive would resemble those in Tripoli. The Misrata region already hosts the third highest number of people in need countrywide: 83,000 of the regional population of 580,000.? The number of people in need and overall level of need will grow. Based on recent displacement in the region, thousands from Abu Qurayn, Tawergha, and Misrata would be expected to flee to Misrata city and Sirte, adding to the 48,800 IDPs in both regions, with some thousands going as far east as Benghazi.? Civilians remaining in the cities to protect their homes and employment will risk injury or death related to shelling and crossfire, as well as human rights violations. Detainees will also be exposed.? Extreme economic and livelihoods losses would ensue. Some 70% of the 400,000 Misratans work in trade and industry. The insecurity will shrink production and increase unemployment.? One-third of Misratans already spend over 75% of their income on food and they lack coping capacity; the livelihoods of several of the 59,000 migrants in the region surviving on informal work  would also be affected.? Targeting of health facilities and personnel will further diminish access to medicines and specialised care. Disruption of waste management will increase the risk of disease outbreak.? Schools will likely become increasingly overcrowded - 11% of schools are already closed regionally - and children exposed to danger travelling to and from school.? As the Tripoli Mitiga airport is often non-operational, a closure of Misrata’s airport will deprive civilians of yet another exit and humanitarians of a supply route.? Impediments to cargo delivery due to attacks on the seaport will also undermine access.?

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  • Risk

    Escalating conflict and government restrictions in Rakhine lead to deterioration of humanitarian conditions for Rohingya, especially in northern and central townships. Latest update: 25/03/2020

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Risk Rationale

    The end of 2019 saw intensified conflict between the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) and the Arakan Army. Armed clashes resulted in 9,000 new displacements in November 2019 and mine contamination and shelling in Rohingya villages has caused a spike in civilian casualties in early 2020, particularly in the northern townships of Buthidaung, Rathedaung, and Kyauktaw. Units of the Arakan Army have advanced to more southern areas of Rakhine, which will likely cause an increase in humanitarian needs in townships previously less affected by the conflict.?

    Meanwhile, access constraints continue to pose challenges for humanitarian organisations and people in need. In 2020, the government added new restrictions for organisations wanting to access affected areas: 8 of 17 townships in Rakhine have become inaccessible or extremely restricted for most organisations, leaving at least 100,000 people with limited access to essential services and humanitarian assistance. Additionally, an IDP camp in Kyaukphu hosting nearly 1,000 people closed, the third camp closure since 2018, when the government announced plans to transfer IDPs to permanent settlements  2020 will likely see this policy expanded. Shifting from temporary to permanent settlements will further cement ethnic divisions by signalling a permanence to Rohingya displacement.?

    In January 2020, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) obliged Myanmar to provide reports of measures taken to protect the Rohingya from genocide. The first report deadline is 23 May 2020 and it is unclear how Myanmar will respond. The government has denied genocide allegations, blocked UN investigators, and constrained humanitarian organisations. As pressure mounts, an emboldened Arakan Army could intensify attacks, particularly in more southern townships. If the government is met with stronger militancy in Rakhine and higher risk of international interference, an intensified crackdown is probable.?

    The population in Rakhine has limited capacity to cope with worsened humanitarian conditions. Historical increases in need suggest an additional 50,000 to 100,000 people could see deteriorating in human conditions across the state.

    Risk Impact

    As conflict moves closer to Rohingya villages, civilian casualties will likely increase, with immediate risks highest in the northern townships of Buthidaung, Rathedaung, and Kyauktaw. A shift toward increased conflict in southern townships of Myebon, Ponnagyun, and Minbya will bring landmines and shelling to areas previously less affected by direct conflict.

    An increased Tatmadaw presence will likely increase protection risks, such as arbitrary detention of Rohingya, confiscation of property, and forced displacement; as well as movement restrictions limiting access to shelter, farmland, and education. Humanitarian organisations are likely to face additional access limitations, arising both from insecurity and the government seeking to restrict international involvement.?

    Food security and livelihoods will be affected as trade routes become disrupted by insecurity and warring parties attempting to control territory. In 2019, some 6,000 hectares of crops went unharvested, which could prove detrimental given that 36% of Rakhine’s population relies on small and medium farms for their livelihoods. As the 2020 May-October harvest approaches, food production is likely to decrease further as farmers avoid fields for fear of landmines, crossfire, and detention.?

    WASH needs will increase, particularly for IDPs with limited access to clean water. As water sources in the camps dry up during the March-May hot season, and water stagnation and flooding occurs during the May-October monsoon season, IDPs will become more dependent on contaminated water, increasing the risk of water-borne diseases.?

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  • Risk

    Additional government citizenship initiatives fuel intercommunal violence, embolden militancy in Kashmir, and lead to government oppression of Muslim communities, increasing protection concerns, access restrictions, and displacement. Latest update: 25/03/2020

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Risk Rationale

    Recent moves by Prime Minister Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have strained relations and incited new dissent from India’s Muslim population. In August 2019, a presidential decree revoked the autonomy status of Jammu and Kashmir, India’s only Muslim-majority state. A complete lockdown on communications and movement in the region followed. Simultaneously, the Assam National Register of Citizens (NRC) brought the citizenship status of 1.9 million people, mostly Muslims and minorities, into question, and efforts to establish a nationwide registry have been met with opposition. The situation was further aggravated by the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in December, designed to provide a pathway to citizenship for those fleeing religious persecution from certain countries, but did not include Muslims.?

    Anti-CAA demonstrations have fuelled violence between Hindu and Muslim communities. As of February 2020, nearly 80 people have died, including 53 in four consecutive days of violence in Delhi, which saw the torching of Muslim shops, homes, and mosques.?

    In 2020, Supreme Court rulings eased the internet shutdown in Jammu and Kashmir and allowed protests to continue. However, legal challenges against the CAA and questions about the NRC remain unanswered. The Supreme Court, rather than rule on the amendment’s constitutionality, has given the government an opportunity to respond to challenges. Statements from BJP leaders have indicated that no decision has been made regarding a nationwide registry, though a push to convene a National Population Register in April 2020 has raised concerns that demographic data will be used to identify non-citizens.?

    Any announcement of a nationwide citizenship registry or other moves perceived to alienate Muslims are likely to fuel intercommunal violence and embolden militancy in Kashmir, resulting in a strong response by the Indian government. This is particularly true if the Supreme Court is unwilling to address challenges to the CAA or Indian police do not ensure the safety of all Indian communities and protestors.

    Risk Impact

    Political unrest will disproportionately affect Muslims in Kashmir, Assam, and Uttar Pradesh, all of which have a history of deep ethnic tensions. Reports indicate that police have been slow to respond to, or even active participants in, violence in Muslim communities. Conflict trends suggest that 100,000 to 250,000 people could be significantly affected, either by displacement, access restrictions, or increased protection risks.?

    An increase in intercommunal violence and militancy will likely result in a strong response from Indian forces. Previous human rights violations by the Indian government included mass detention, excessive use of force to suppress dissent, and amplified military presence. Civilian attacks targeting Muslims will likely increase, leading to casualties, property damage, and loss of livelihoods if shops are destroyed.?

    Government response to violence will likely include restrictions on communications and/or movement. Kashmir has limited capacity to cope with further restrictions or conflict following the August 2019 lockdown, which strained public services and hindered access to healthcare, education, and livelihoods for 8 million people. Access to healthcare will be strained should road blockades impede access to hospitals. Threats from militants attempting to usurp control, as well as government-imposed restrictions, will likely result in school closures and fear of attending classes.?

    Displacement is likely. Conflict forced 170,000 people in India from their homes in 2018, the majority in Kashmir, and ethnic conflict in Assam has previously displaced 150,000 people in a single episode of violence. Conflict displacement in India is often temporary; however, recent intercommunal violence torched homes, creating longer-term displacement.?

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