• Failure of peace talks leading to prolonged urban fighting in Aden

    Latest update: 03/09/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Renewed street fighting in Aden could result in up to 4,500 civilian casualties over three months and cut access to services and markets for one million people.

    RATIONALE

    Forces loyal to the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) ousted the internationally recognised government of Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi, took control of all strategic positions in Aden and declared a new government on 10 August 2019 after four days of intense street battles that left 40 people dead and 260 injured.?

    Saudia Arabia announced a ceasefire on 12 August 2019 which restored some calm to the southern capital. However, talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 20 August ended without a result. Clashes intensified in Shabwah and Abyan on 22 and 23 August 2019, spreading to Aden on 28 August 2019.? Social media reported retaliatory killing of civillians in Aden in late August and early September.

    IMPACT

    Failure of peace talks leading to prolonged urban fighting in Aden could result in up to 1,500 civilian casualties per month of sustained fighting. Casualties are likely to include civilians trapped by fighting, particularly in densely populated areas, and injured by explosive weapons, shelling, and airstrikes.

    Prolonged fighting is likely to have a major impact on WASH and health infrastructure, further aggravating humanitarian needs. All of Aden’s one million resident are likely to be in need of humanitarian assistance with food, protection, WASH, and health the most urgent needs.

    Aden's airport (one of only two still operating in Yemen) is an important lifeline for thousands of Yemenis who need to travel abroad to access medical services. Aden's port is also an important entry point for food, fuel and basic supplies. Both these pieces of key infrastructure would be closed by protracted conflict.

    More than 50,000 northern traders, workers, and IDPs are in need of international protection against execution, deportation and retaliatory violence. More than 45,000 IDPs currently residing in Aden originate from northern governorates, mainly Al Hudaydah and Taizz, along with several thousand northerners working in the services and trade sectors. Since 2 August 2019, STC aligned forces have detained, harassed and executed males from the north at checkpoints, Aden’s central markets and at work.?

    Read ACAPS' anticipatory briefing note - Aden: Collapse of ceasefire - to find out more.

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  • Escalation of inter-communal violence in central Mali leads to increased internal displacement and humanitarian needs

    Latest update: 16/08/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Violence has spiked significantly in Central Mali since the beginning of 2019, fueled by the spread of radical Islamist organisations and intercommunal tensions – particularly between members of the Dogon and Fulani ethnic groups. The Dogon, who are mostly farmers, and Fulani, who are mostly herders, have periodically fought one another over land, water, and other resources, though the frequency and intensity of violence has increased dramatically in recent months. In March, Dogon militias raided Ogossagou, a Fulani village in Mopti region, killing at least 157 people.? This was followed by a number of retaliatory attacks against the Dogon, the most violent attack in June in Sobane-Kou village leading to up to 95 deaths and a large number of houses destroyed.? Tensions between Dogon and Fulani groups have been exacerbated by fundamentalist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), and Islamic State, which have steadily expanded their presence in Central Mali in recent years, drawing recruits from local villages and becoming increasingly involved in local-level disputes.?   

    In light of recent attacks, there is a significant risk that violence will escalate further in the coming months. Attacks against Ogossagou and Sobane-Kou are among the deadliest since the start of Mali’s security crisis in 2012 and will almost certainly lead to a hardening of tensions between the Dogon and Fulani, potentially sparking a cycle of violence that would be difficult to reverse.?   The risk of further escalation of violence is made worse by the fact that the Malian military and international peacekeeping operations – notably MINUSMA, G5, and Operation Barkhane – have faced significant challenges in ensuring the protection of civilians.?   

    IMPACT

    Since January 2019, nearly 160,000 people have been displaced as a result of violence in Central and Northern Mali.?   If there is further escalation of violence in Central Mali, it is almost certain that thousands more people will be displaced, placing strain on host communities and social services in conflict-affected areas. Shelter and protection needs can be anticipated as a result of houses being destroyed in attacks and violence carried out against civilians. During the March attack in Ogossagou, more than 400 houses were destroyed and most of the violence was directed against civilian targets, including children and the elderly.? Central Mali is one of the poorest and least developed regions of the country, and pre-existing health, education, and WASH needs mean that people have a heightened level of vulnerability, even before the effects of violence are taken into account. Humanitarian access remains a challenge in Central Mali and is likely to get worse in the context of increased insecurity and intercommunal violence ?

    This risk was identified in the June Quarterly Risk Report

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  • Increasing violence and military presence in Papua province leads to further internal displacement and humanitarian needs

    Latest update: 05/08/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    A spike in violence has occurred in Papua province in recent months, in the context of a long-running separatist movement. Clashes between armed separatist groups and the military have led to a violent crackdown against both separatists and civilians. The Indonesian government also continues to suppress peaceful dissent by Papuan activists.?

    Military presence in Papua province increased after separatists killed 19 construction workers who were building the highly contentious Trans-Papua Highway in Nduga regency in December.?The highway is scheduled for completion in 2019 and is regarded by Papuan activists and separatists as a way for Jakarta to cement control and exploit the resource-rich region.?Following the attack – the deadliest in recent years – the Indonesian military launched a counterinsurgency campaign, prompting counterattacks by separatists.?Since December up to 37,000 people have been displaced from Nduga regency as a result of the conflict.?

    National elections took place in April but were widely boycotted in the province because of the unrest.?In May, Indonesian soldiers shot and killed four civilians in post-election related violence in Asmat regency.?Additional units were sent to the already heavily militarised area after the incident.?

    Disorder looks set to continue and further attacks by separatists, particularly if on a scale as seen in December, would likely result in a heavy-handed response from the Indonesian military, and more violence, casualties, and displacement.?

    IMPACT

    If fighting increases in intensity and frequency up to 50,000 additional people could be displaced and in need of humanitarian assistance over the coming six months. 37,000 people are already displaced in Nduga regency out of an estimated population of 100,000.?Neighbouring Asmat regency is also at risk of violence and displacement should the situation continue to deteriorate.

    Protection is a major concern. Indonesian rule in Papua province has been marked by human rights violations against the ethnic Melanesian population, including torture methods and extrajudicial killings of activists and peaceful protestors.?

    IDPs would have urgent protection, shelter, food, NFI and health needs. Conditions in existing IDP camps are reportedly poor. Food and water are lacking and some IDPs have died as a result. Protracted displacement is likely as IDPs are often afraid to return home.?

    Displaced children will have educational needs as schools are frequently damaged in clashes. Children often avoid school for fear of being caught in violence.?

    Access would likely be an issue as the Indonesian government is traditionally reluctant to utilise outside help to cope with disasters and crises. NGO presence is limited however the Indonesian Red Cross is present. Given the politically sensitive nature of the separatist movement, the government would likely restrict humanitarian access. Media and human rights groups’ access to Papua is already severely restricted and information is controlled by the military.?Mountainous terrain and poor infrastructure would further hamper access.

    This risk was identified in the June Quarterly Risk Report.

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  • Heightened tensions between Iran and US and their allies spark conflict between regional proxies in the Middle East leading to new humanitarian needs in the region

    Latest update: 17/07/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    A series of events have raised fears of an escalation of proxy conflict between the US, Iran and their allies in the Middle East. Countries particularly at risk of being affected are Iraq and Yemen as well as, to a smaller extent, Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iran itself.

    Attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf in recent weeks have provoked threatening rhetoric between the US and Iran.? The US blamed the incidents on Iran and deployed 2,500 troops, an aircraft carrier and bomber planes to the Middle East to counter “Iranian threats”. ? The US also recently tightened economic sanctions on Iran and labelled the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran’s elite military force, as a “foreign terrorist organisation”. ?  Iran denied involvement in the attacks but stated it will retaliate against aggression towards its interests.? The Special Forces unit of the IRGC reportedly called on allied militias to prepare for a proxy conflict.?

    Relations between Iran and the US have deteriorated significantly over the last year since the Trump administration withdrew from a nuclear deal between Iran and seven world powers, including the US and EU.? Iran recently stopped complying with parts of the nuclear agreement in attempt to bargain European support against the sanctions, fueling existing tensions. ?

    Neither country is interested in direct military confrontation. The US may be increasing economic and military pressure to suppress Iran’s growing regional influence and to leverage a new nuclear agreement, more aligned to its own terms. However, lack of diplomacy amid heightened tensions may result in a miscalculation possibly leading to an accidental escalation of conflict. Conflict would most likely remain small-scale and concentrated in areas with a large presence of Iranian proxies.

    Iraq and Yemen are the most vulnerable to an escalation. In Iraq, the US and Iran have been vying for influence following the defeat of the Islamic State. Iraq has a large presence of Iran-backed Shia militias and the US has some 5,000 troops stationed in the country, raising the risk of a local confrontation. Regional actors are often trying to frame Yemen's conflict, which is predominantly based on local grievances, as part of the broader Saudi-Iranian rivalry. A recent upsurge in attacks from the Iran-backed Houthis on targets in Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have raised tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, increasing the risk of retaliatory attacks and escalation in Yemen.

    Impact 

    An escalation of proxy-conflict between the US and Iran and their allies in the Middle East could potentially have a far-reaching impact. However, more likely, the impact would remain localised and mainly affect areas with large presence of Iranian proxies.

    A conflict between US forces and Iranian proxies in Iraq would impact a population already fatigued by war. Some 6.7 million people are in need of assistance. Particularly vulnerable are the 1.7 million IDP’s and 4.2 million IDP returnees in Iraq. New conflict would likely exacerbate their needs and trigger new internal displacement. Past conflict and political instability have strained basic health and WASH services. An outbreak of violence between the US and Iranian backed militias could disrupt gas, electricity and food supplies as Iraq heavily relies on imports from Iran. ?

    In case of an escalation of conflict in Yemen, existing humanitarian needs, including food security, health and WASH would likely worsen. Retaliatory attacks would likely cause an increase in civilian casualties. In the past Saudi Arabia, which has warships positioned in the red sea and the Gulf of Aden, has blocked imports of goods, including aid supplies. An escalation could trigger a new naval blockade hindering humanitarian access. 

    Involvement in an escalation of proxy conflict would further harm Iran’s economy. Large parts of Iran were hit by flash floods in April and March affecting over 40 million people, 2 million of who remain in need of assistance. Increased needs and growing political and socio-economic frustrations among the population could lead to a new wave of protests if Iran were to engage in a new conflict. ?

    This risk was identified in the June Quarterly Risk Report.

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  • Heightened tensions between Iran and US and their allies spark conflict between regional proxies in the Middle East leading to new humanitarian needs in the region

    Latest update: 17/07/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    A series of events have raised fears of an escalation of proxy conflict between the US, Iran and their allies in the Middle East. Countries particularly at risk of being affected are Iraq and Yemen as well as, to a smaller extent, Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iran itself.

    Attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf in recent weeks have provoked threatening rhetoric between the US and Iran.? The US blamed the incidents on Iran and deployed 2,500 troops, an aircraft carrier and bomber planes to the Middle East to counter “Iranian threats”. ? The US also recently tightened economic sanctions on Iran and labelled the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran’s elite military force, as a “foreign terrorist organisation”. ?  Iran denied involvement in the attacks but stated it will retaliate against aggression towards its interests.? The Special Forces unit of the IRGC reportedly called on allied militias to prepare for a proxy conflict.?

    Relations between Iran and the US have deteriorated significantly over the last year since the Trump administration withdrew from a nuclear deal between Iran and seven world powers, including the US and EU.? Iran recently stopped complying with parts of the nuclear agreement in attempt to bargain European support against the sanctions, fueling existing tensions. ?

    Neither country is interested in direct military confrontation. The US may be increasing economic and military pressure to suppress Iran’s growing regional influence and to leverage a new nuclear agreement, more aligned to its own terms. However, lack of diplomacy amid heightened tensions may result in a miscalculation possibly leading to an accidental escalation of conflict. Conflict would most likely remain small-scale and concentrated in areas with a large presence of Iranian proxies.

    Iraq and Yemen are the most vulnerable to an escalation. In Iraq, the US and Iran have been vying for influence following the defeat of the Islamic State. Iraq has a large presence of Iran-backed Shia militias and the US has some 5,000 troops stationed in the country, raising the risk of a local confrontation. Regional actors are often trying to frame Yemen's conflict, which is predominantly based on local grievances, as part of the broader Saudi-Iranian rivalry. A recent upsurge in attacks from the Iran-backed Houthis on targets in Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have raised tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, increasing the risk of retaliatory attacks and escalation in Yemen.

    Impact 

    An escalation of proxy-conflict between the US and Iran and their allies in the Middle East could potentially have a far-reaching impact. However, more likely, the impact would remain localised and mainly affect areas with large presence of Iranian proxies.

    A conflict between US forces and Iranian proxies in Iraq would impact a population already fatigued by war. Some 6.7 million people are in need of assistance. Particularly vulnerable are the 1.7 million IDP’s and 4.2 million IDP returnees in Iraq. New conflict would likely exacerbate their needs and trigger new internal displacement. Past conflict and political instability have strained basic health and WASH services. An outbreak of violence between the US and Iranian backed militias could disrupt gas, electricity and food supplies as Iraq heavily relies on imports from Iran. ?

    In case of an escalation of conflict in Yemen, existing humanitarian needs, including food security, health and WASH would likely worsen. Retaliatory attacks would likely cause an increase in civilian casualties. In the past Saudi Arabia, which has warships positioned in the red sea and the Gulf of Aden, has blocked imports of goods, including aid supplies. An escalation could trigger a new naval blockade hindering humanitarian access. 

    Involvement in an escalation of proxy conflict would further harm Iran’s economy. Large parts of Iran were hit by flash floods in April and March affecting over 40 million people, 2 million of who remain in need of assistance. Increased needs and growing political and socio-economic frustrations among the population could lead to a new wave of protests if Iran were to engage in a new conflict. ?

    This risk was identified in the June Quarterly Risk Report.

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  • Risk: Oil spill of floating storage and offloading vessel could cause high environmental impact in the Red Sea and Yemen

    Latest update: 17/07/2019

    No. of people affected

    Current situation
    0
    Future situation
    9.5 million

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Rationale

    The floating storage and offloading (FSO) terminal SAFER, a previously converted oil tanker, is moored in the Red Sea off the coast of Ras Issa, 50km northwest of Al Hudaydah port. Since 2015, the FSO has been under Houthi control; however, they have stopped maintaining the structure. The FSO has been  neglected probably due to lack of capacity, coupled with the fact that following the Saudi-led coalition naval blockade in 2015 and airstrikes on the Al Hudaydah port’s infrastructure, the Houthis were unable to carry out any type of oil operation.

    The Houthis have been demanding a share of the one million barrels of oil on board the vessel. Until recently, they had prevented experts from Yemen’s Ministry of Oil or the UN from accessing the FSO SAFER. Some Saudi experts have proposed moving the vessel to Bahrain for maintenance, however the Houthis have refused.  The Houthis are demanding a share of the oil revenues as a condition for allowing access to the vessel for maintenance work and unloading. However, on 10 June they allowed access to UN officials for an assessment. Without intervention for maintenance in the coming months, the vessel is likely to break or even explode, because of the lack of inert gas. Topping up the vessel with inert gas during maintenance is essential to avoid the vessel being in contact with hydrocarbon gases, which would cause a fire or explosion.

    The possibility of a serious leakage or even explosion increases year on year due to continued lack of maintenance. Furthermore, even small accidents or fires on board have the potential to spiral out of control. If Hadi government experts attempt to approach the vessel, there is a risk of conflict on or near the vessel.

    Sources: Debriefer 14/07/2019; Middle East Eye 17/06/2019; Reuters 01/05/2019; CEOBS 01/05/2019; Adenpress 09/05/2019; The National 09/05/2019; Atlantic Council 11/04/2019; UNOPS 2018.

    Impact

    The vessel contains an estimated 1.14 million barrels of crude oil. If an oil spill occurs, the environmental impact will be catastrophic, affecting people living in the coastal area of Yemen (est. 8.9 million) and the coastal regions of Eritrea (est. 517,200) (ACAPS projections based on IOM and Eritrea baseline population figures). In Yemen, the most affected area will likely be Al Hudaydah governorate as the FSO terminal is 50km northwest of al Hudaydah port.

    An oil spill would certainly lead to the pollution of the Red Sea and eventually groundwater and soil contamination as the oil evaporates. This would change the entire ecosystem, and pollute the fishing and agricultural food chain. In addition, the shipping traffic in the Red Sea might be blocked for oil spill containment and cleanup. The most vulnerable are the inhabitants of the coastal region because they will be directly affected by pollution of waters and halt of imports of basic commodities. An explosion of the facility will also change the Red Sea marine environment, possibly reducing fishing yields for generations.

    The vessel oil spill or explosion is likely to lead to the disruption of economic activities, such as fishing, one of the main livelihood activities for households living in the Red Sea coastal region of Yemen, as well as agriculture, and trade. This will further affect the already dire livelihood conditions of households in the region, reducing their income and ability to meet basic needs.

    The closure of the area will also halt imports through Al Hudaydah ports. The majority of food (70% of all imports) and fuel (40-50% of all imports), as well as the majority of medicines and humanitarian aid, enter through Al Hudaydah ports. As Yemen is an import and aid dependent economy, a possible explosion of the vessel or oil spill will aggravate the food and health crisis in the country.

    On top of the the potential environmental devastation and economic impact, an oil spill or explosion of the FSO SAFER will likely break the fragile ceasefire in Al Hudaydah established under Stockholm Agreement, and lead to possible escalation of conflict in the governorate, due to increased tensions between the Houthis and Hadi’s government

    Sources: Environmental Pollution Centers 04/06/2019; Atlantic Council 11/04/2019; UNOPS 2018.

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  • Escalation of conflict between Myanmar Army and Arakan Army group in Rakhine

    Latest update: 23/06/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Episodes of violence between the Myanmar Army and the Arakan Army (AA) group have continued, as have the related flows of internal displacement.? While not a major escalation since the publication of ACAPS’ previous risk report, the clashes between the two parties have caused civilian deaths and created new humanitarian needs, or exacerbated existing ones.? The latest figures show that at least 27,000 people remain displaced as of late May, a slight decrease compared to earlier figures at the beginning of the month.? 

    In May the AA was again excluded by the Army in a unilateral ceasefire extension in May, thus the likelihood of fighting continuing over the coming months seems high.?

    This risk was identified in the ACAPS March Quarterly Risk Report.

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  • Escalation of conflict amid fragile peace process leads to displacement and civilian casualties

    Latest update: 21/06/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Peace talks between the US and the Taliban have seen some progress in 2019, most notably a draft agreement on the timeline for US troop withdrawal and the Taliban’s commitment to prevent militants from attacking US targets from Afghanistan.? Conceding to a potential ceasefire agreement would likely undermine the Taliban’s favourable negotiating position, for which military gains have seemingly been crucial in the past.? Targeted attacks to exert pressure on negotiations have occurred from both sides and are likely to continue.? Furthermore, the premature withdrawal of foreign forces risks leading to (non-state) armed groups expanding their offensives.? There is a general perception that the current talks are focused on lowering US financial and military involvement rather than on finding sustainable peace. This perception is reinforced by the absence of the Afghan government from talks and a lack of clarity over the content, as well as unclear discussion on the possibility of an interim government in the run up to the elections which have been postponed from July to September. If elections proceed without including the Taliban, the group is likely to violently disrupt the process.

    IMPACT
    A new escalation of hostilities will likely spark temporary and prolonged displacement and maintain the record-high levels of civilian casualties as seen in 2018. Major Taliban assaults on the strategic cities Farah, Ghazni and Kunduz in 2016 and 2018 led to the displacement of tens of thousands of people and several hundred civilian casualties, and these are in particular remain at risk of future assaults.? A spike in conflict will likely hamper access in a country where the humanitarian space is already limited. Uncertainty about the outcomes of peace negotiations and the upcoming Presidential elections – likely to be heavily contested – add to the extremely uncertain operating environment. Protection is a major concern for the civilian population. IDPs will also likely have urgent shelter, food, NFI and health needs. New displacement will add a strain to limited host community capacities. Resources will be further stretched due to high numbers of undocumented returnees that continue to return from Iran. Humanitarian needs will be exacerbated by decades of conflict, protracted poverty, and a severe drought in 2018 that left 13.5 million people severely food insecure.?

    This risk was identified in our April Quarterly Risk Report. Read the June Risk Update here.

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  • Gaps in Ebola response and population movement lead to the spreading of Ebola to new territories and neighbouring countries

    Latest update: 21/06/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    On 2 June 2019, the Ebola outbreak in northeast DRC surpassed 2,000 cases including nearly 1,400 deaths.? The rapid increase in case numbers since late March has been linked to widespread insecurity resulting from some 120 active armed groups in the area and violence against response workers by armed groups and villagers, that lead to temporary suspension of response activities. Community distrust due to misinformation, scepticism against the government, and a reluctance to seek treatment and adhere to preventative measures is widening gaps in Ebola treatment and tracking; it is estimated that only 75% of cases are detected.? High population mobility and frequent internal and cross-border conflict displacement aggravate the situation and increase the risk of Ebola spreading to neighbouring provinces and countries, including Rwanda, South Sudan and Tanzania. ? On 11 June, an Ebola outbreak was declared in Uganda as several people infected with the virus returned from DRC to Uganda via informal crossings to avoid health checkpoints. ? The spread to more densely populated, economic centres is particularly concerning and will make it harder to contain the outbreak. Nord Kivu’s capital Goma is a high-risk location, given its proximity to the border with Rwanda, frequent movement of goods and people, and limited preparedness. Despite response adjustments including communication campaigns that target community mistrust, an extension of the vaccination campaign, and the activation of the “Humanitarian System-wide Scale-Up” in late May, the risk of Ebola spreading remains high, with a high probability of the disease reaching Goma and then becoming even more challenging to contain. ?

    IMPACT

    This geographical spread will make it harder to gain control of the outbreak and increase the loss of human life. The case fatality rate has risen in recent months, from 61% in early January to 67% in mid-June. ? The first EVD cases in Uganda and the threat of Ebola reaching Goma near the Rwandan border mean that the declaration of a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC)” is likely. This would place restrictions on trade and travel.

    Trade, employment and family ties see several tens of thousands of people cross the DRC-Rwanda-Uganda borders every day. Restrictions on movement will likely impact livelihoods, food security, and nutrition. Disruptions are likely to increase reluctance towards response efforts and increase informal crossings where no screening is in place, thus further impeding humanitarian operations.? Although preparedness and response capacity was previously estimated to be good in some neighbouring countries, several factors could aggravate the situation: including other disease outbreaks that display similar symptoms such as cholera; the ongoing rainy season hindering access in Uganda and South Sudan; and the volatile security situation in South Sudan. As in the ACAPS’ Global risk analysis published in December 2018, IDP and refugee populations are anticipated to be at a higher risk due to congested displacement sites and limited access to adequate WASH facilities.

    This risk was identified in the June Quarterly Risk Report.

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  • Gaps in Ebola response and population movement lead to the spreading of Ebola to new territories and neighbouring countries

    Latest update: 21/06/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    On 2 June 2019, the Ebola outbreak in northeast DRC surpassed 2,000 cases including nearly 1,400 deaths.? The rapid increase in case numbers since late March has been linked to widespread insecurity resulting from some 120 active armed groups in the area and violence against response workers by armed groups and villagers, that lead to temporary suspension of response activities. Community distrust due to misinformation, scepticism against the government, and a reluctance to seek treatment and adhere to preventative measures is widening gaps in Ebola treatment and tracking; it is estimated that only 75% of cases are detected.? High population mobility and frequent internal and cross-border conflict displacement aggravate the situation and increase the risk of Ebola spreading to neighbouring provinces and countries, including Rwanda, South Sudan and Tanzania. ? On 11 June, an Ebola outbreak was declared in Uganda as several people infected with the virus returned from DRC to Uganda via informal crossings to avoid health checkpoints. ? The spread to more densely populated, economic centres is particularly concerning and will make it harder to contain the outbreak. Nord Kivu’s capital Goma is a high-risk location, given its proximity to the border with Rwanda, frequent movement of goods and people, and limited preparedness. Despite response adjustments including communication campaigns that target community mistrust, an extension of the vaccination campaign, and the activation of the “Humanitarian System-wide Scale-Up” in late May, the risk of Ebola spreading remains high, with a high probability of the disease reaching Goma and then becoming even more challenging to contain. ?

    IMPACT

    This geographical spread will make it harder to gain control of the outbreak and increase the loss of human life. The case fatality rate has risen in recent months, from 61% in early January to 67% in mid-June. ? The first EVD cases in Uganda and the threat of Ebola reaching Goma near the Rwandan border mean that the declaration of a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC)” is likely. This would place restrictions on trade and travel.

    Trade, employment and family ties see several tens of thousands of people cross the DRC-Rwanda-Uganda borders every day. Restrictions on movement will likely impact livelihoods, food security, and nutrition. Disruptions are likely to increase reluctance towards response efforts and increase informal crossings where no screening is in place, thus further impeding humanitarian operations.? Although preparedness and response capacity was previously estimated to be good in some neighbouring countries, several factors could aggravate the situation: including other disease outbreaks that display similar symptoms such as cholera; the ongoing rainy season hindering access in Uganda and South Sudan; and the volatile security situation in South Sudan. As in the ACAPS’ Global risk analysis published in December 2018, IDP and refugee populations are anticipated to be at a higher risk due to congested displacement sites and limited access to adequate WASH facilities.

    This risk was identified in the June Quarterly Risk Report.

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  • Increased violence between government forces and non-state armed groups in Tibesti leads to worsening of food and protection needs

    Latest update: 21/06/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Violent conflict has spiked in Tibesti since late 2018, involving a wide variety of different groups including the Chadian military, opposition factions such as the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR) and Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) which seek to overthrow the government, as well as local self-defense militias. In January 2019, several dozen people were killed following clashes in a gold mining area which pitted CCMSR soldiers against Sudanese militias aligned with the Chadian government.? Approximately one month later in February, a large group of UFR fighters entered northern Chad from their base in Libya, clashing with government troops. Fighting moved towards N’Djamena until French military jets intervened at the request of the Chadian government?   Separately, tensions between the Chadian government and self-defense militias have continued to escalate near Miski and have occasionally turned violent over local grievances such as the distribution of gold mining revenues and border disputes, further contributing to the unstable situation.?

    Considering events that have unfolded in recent months, there appears to be a growing risk the security situation in Tibesti and other areas of northern Chad will deteriorate further. Government forces are currently stationed outside Miski and are prepared to launch another offensive to clear the area of anti-government forces and self-defense militia groups ? Unaddressed local grievances and Chad’s ongoing economic crisis will likely increase support for non-state armed groups in the north,  possibly leading to an escalation of attacks against the military.? There is also an increasing risk that Chadian opposition groups, which have historically maintained a presence in neighbouring countries, will be able to increase the frequency of their cross-border operations as a result of ongoing political crises and recent security deterioration in Libya and Sudan.

    IMPACT

    Humanitarian needs are already very high in Tibesti as a result of persistent instability and violence. In December 2018, 18,000 people – approximately half of Tibesti’s population – were reported in need of humanitarian assistance; this number has likely risen in recent months.? If government forces were to launch another offensive in the region or if armed groups were to increase the frequency of their attacks this would almost certainly cause a spike in food needs by reducing civilian access to markets, which are the main source of food for most households. Tibesti is already facing Crisis (IPC-3) levels of food insecurity, among the highest of all regions in Chad.? Based on past experience, protection needs will also be of concern, particularly for miners in the region who typically come from other parts of Chad, and are often accused by the government of being criminals or “rebel sympathisers.” A potential escalation of violence can be expected to increase humanitarian access constraints in Tibesti, which is already one of the most remote and hardest to reach areas in the country.

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  • Establishment of military regime leads to increased conflict and spread of violence countrywide

    Latest update: 21/06/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    After President Al-Bashir was ousted in April 2019 a transitional military government (Transitional Military Council or TMC) was installed. Many TMC members, including the new Vice President, are aligned to the Bashir regime and are guilty of committing human rights violations during the conflict in Darfur in the early 2000s. This is exacerbating anger and frustration among civilians who have been protesting since December. ?Dialogue between the TMC and opposition alliance Force for Freedom and Change (FFC) to ensure a transition to civilian government is not progressing and protests have been dispersed with increasing violence. On 3 June, peaceful sit-ins were violently dispersed countrywide by the Rapid Sudanese Forces (RSF), leaving around 118 people dead and at least 780 injured. ? However, the TMC appears fragile, due to internal differences in opinion. This increases the likelihood of different factions of the security apparatus splitting and vying for power, further destabilising the country.

    Following recent escalation in Khartoum, increased violence and inter-communal fighting between civilians, armed groups and security forces has been observed countrywide? A military government is unlikely to pursue peace talks with armed groups in either Darfur or the Two Areas due to historical disagreements. With reduced government influence, armed groups in these regions are likely to take advantage of the volatile security situation and reassert their position through increased used of violence.

    IMPACT

    Protection concerns, especially for opposition-group members and activists affiliated with protests, are very high. ? With an established autocratic military rule, arbitrary arrests and human rights violations are very likely to increase. Waves of displacement including highly skilled personnel to neighbouring countries, particularly South Sudan, are anticipated.

    A minimum of 8 million people already rely on humanitarian assistance. Access to health services are at highest risk, as health facilities face severe shortages of medicines and medical supplies, and hospitals treating wounded protestors have been targeted by security forces. ?

    The economic situation is very likely to worsen amid the unpredictable political and security situation. The TMC has limited capacity and anticipated low commitment to deal with rising prices for basic commodities. With the start of the lean season (May to September) food prices are 280-320% higher than the five-year average. There is a high probability that a minimum of 124,000 IDPs in conflict-affected South Kordofan and Jebel Marra will experience Emergency (IPC-4) levels of food insecurity during the peak lean season (August/September); conflict escalation will likely cause this number to rise significantly.?

    Humanitarian access overall will deteriorate due to the unpredictable security situation, a government with neither the capacity nor commitment to respond to humanitarian needs, and potentially new limitations to operate in Sudan. People living in conflict-affected areas, as well as increased numbers of IDPs, are expected to face high constraints to access basic services and humanitarian aid.

    This risk was identified in the June Quarterly Risk Report

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  • Breakdown in the peace process leads to escalation of conflict in Al Hudaydah, exacerbating food insecurity and increasing the spread of cholera

    Latest update: 21/06/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Increased mistrust in the peace process by Hadi government and intense fighting between Houthi and pro-Hadi forces in the rest of Yemen is likely to lead to breakdown of the Stockholm Agreement and fragile ceasefire in place in Al Hudaydah since 2018. This will likely lead to escalation of conflict in Al Hudaydah. ? Houthi forces withdrew from Al Hudaydah ports over 10-14 May, and the UAE and Saudi Arabia, who back the Yemeni government, have continued to be party to the peace process, indicating a willingness to avoid a military escalation. However, government forces complain the Houthi have handed the ports to a local Coast Guard that is actually under Houthi influence. In addition, while a fragile ceasefire remains in place in Al Hudaydah, intense fighting between Houthi and pro-Hadi forces and retaliation airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition are ongoing in the rest of Yemen.? In this climate an offensive by the pro-Hadi forces in Al Hudaydah and a battle over the control of the ports and city cannot be excluded.?

    IMPACT
    Breakdown in the peace process and conflict over Al Hudaydah ports would likely result in increased food insecurity for at least 7.5 million people, and also worsen the cholera crisis across Yemen.? Around 70% of monthly food imports and 40-50% of fuel imports enter Yemen through Saleef and Al Hudaydah ports (Al Hudaydah governorate).? Fighting around the ports and in Al Hudaydah city is highly likely to result in the ports’ closure, disruption of the market-supply chain, and limited access to aid.? Closure of ports would halt these fuel, medicine, and food imports. Road blockades, access restrictions, and insecurity would hamper access to imported essential commodities normally distributed from Al Hudaydah to the rest of Yemen. Since May 2019, fighting, bureaucratic constraints, and checkpoints have already severely disrupted the distribution networks in the rest of Yemen.? Closure of the Al Hudaydah ports will only exacerbate this situation. Increased fighting in Al Hudaydah is also likely to add to fuel shortages. Fuelis essential to run health facilities and for pumping and trucking of water.Inability to access water and health facilities due to fuel shortagesincreases the risk of spread of AWD and cholera.? On 9 June, the total number of suspected cholera cases across the countrywas 759,464, with 1,163 associated deaths (CFR 0.15%). The northwesterngovernorates of Amanat Al Asimah, Sana’a, and Al Hudaydah are the mostaffected.?

    This risk was identified in the June Quarterly Risk Report

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  • Government loses control of southwestern and eastern regions, leading to internal displacement and increased food insecurity

    Latest update: 21/06/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Internal conflict has increased in the north (Sahel, Nord and Centre-Nord regions) in 2019, with a 5,700% increase in civilian fatalities compared to the first half of 2018 and 123,000 people newly displaced since January. ? Since April, fighting has intensified between Islamist armed groups and different civilian tribes, along with more targeted attacks against Christian communities and schools. Attacks are spreading east and southwest. ? If the intensity and frequency of intercommunal fighting and attacks by Islamic groups continues to escalate in Est, Centre-Est and Hauts Bassins, Sud-Ouest, and Cascades regions, the government risks losing control of these areas, as it did in the north.

    The local population in eastern and southwestern regions has high mistrust in the government due to low development with limited opportunities, and continuous arbitrary arrests and human rights violations by government security forces. ?In counter-terrorism operations, military forces have been killing three times more civilians than jihadists. ? Countrywide, the Burkinabe army morale has declined due to limited training, lack of human and logistical capacity, and high death tolls among government forces in recent months. Rivalry among agencies adds to internal tensions, increasing the risk of another military coup d’état. ? Another regime change, as seen in the past, will prohibit effective measures against the increasing violence.

    Islamic groups including Ansaroul Islam and the Support Group to Islam and Muslims (JNIM) seem more organised, with increased human and financial capacity and alliances with new local militants and criminal networks. As the civilian population’s frustration increases, more people are seeking safety in self-defense militia groups. Islamist armed groups are leveraging intercommunal tensions between pastoralists and farmers, creating resentment and mistrust among communities and increasing the risk of conflict escalation. ?

    IMPACT

    Further loss of governmental control in Burkina Faso’s eastern and southwestern regions will intensify intercommunal conflict, triggering large-scale displacement. As of 15 February, 76,000 people are in need of humanitarian assistance in the southwestern regions of Haut Bassins, Cascades and Sud-Ouest, and 137,000 in the Est and Centre Est regions. ?

    An escalation of violence in these areas, home to respectively 3.5 million and 4.6 million people, will drastically increase the number of people relying on aid. Humanitarian response capacity is already underequipped to serve all people in need, including 170,000 IDPs countrywide? A drastic decline in safety and security in Burkina Faso will worsen humanitarian access and aid delivery. As access to fields ,markets and other livelihood activities decline, the number of people depending on food assistance during the lean season (June to mid-September) is likely to surpass estimations of 676,000 people in IPC-3 (Crisis) and IPC- 4 (Emergency) by mid-September. At least some of the 38,000 people projected to face Crisis in the Est and Centre-Est region are likely to fall into Emergency if violence spreads. ?

    Concerns that the Islamist armed groups’ influence will cross borders and affect neighbouring Ghana, Togo, and Benin are high. Some 200 suspected extremists, 95 of whom were Togolese, were arrested in mid-May. ? When the government loses control of parts of Burkina Faso, joint government military operations from Togo, Burkina Faso, Benin, and Ghana become less feasible due to lesser influence in the area, increasing the risk of violence spreading.

    This risk was identified in the June Quarterly Risk Report

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  • Drought as a result of the poor rains followed by a harsh dry season leads to increased levels of food insecurity

    Latest update: 21/06/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Recurrent droughts have left people with unmet humanitarian needs, compounded by the armed conflict. Across much of Somalia, the 2018 Deyr rainy season (October-December) was below average, and the Jilaal dry season (January-March) has been harsher than average. Dry weather conditions and relatively high temperatures prevail and little rainfall is forecast in the coming weeks.?Pasture and water availability are already deteriorating, particularly in the northern and central regions.?139,000 people countrywide are currently facing Emergency (IPC-4) levels of food insecurity.?

    The situation is expected to deteriorate until June, especially in northern and central pastoral livelihood zones. Should the Gu rainy season (April-June) perform poorly it will be more difficult for the food security situation to recover and further deterioration will be likely through late 2019.?In terms of nutrition, 903,100 children under five are likely to be acutely malnourished (GAM) including 138,200 severely (SAM) in 2019 (Jan-Dec).?

    IMPACT
    An estimated 1.5 million people are currently facing Crisis (IPC 3) or Emergency (IPC 4) through to June 2019, this includes around 139,000 people who are facing Emergency (IPC 4). Poor Gu season rainfall could result in crop failure and livestock deaths, thereby reducing food availability and access among pastoral and agropastoral livelihoods.

    Should food insecurity worsen, rates of malnutrition rates may rise further, especially for groups with particular vulnerabilities such as children under 5, pregnant and lactating mothers, elderly people, and people living with disability.?

    Further displacement is likely among pastoralist communities in search of water and pasture, as well as rural to urban migration. In January, around 17,000 people were newly displaced, 53% due to drought-related causes.?Reduced water availability for humans and animals in northern and central pastoral livelihood zones is a major concern and has triggered earlier-than-normal water trucking at high prices (FEWS NET 01/2019). Outbreaks of communicable diseases such as acute watery diarrhoea will likely increase as a result of a potential drop in water availability.?

    This risk was identified in the March Quarterly Risk Report.

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  • Hyperinflation, drought, and a deteriorating political situation generates increased needs and further displacement

    Latest update: 21/06/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Venezuela’s economy is expected to continue spiralling, with inflation predicted to reach 10,000,000% by the end of 2019. The deepening political and socio-economic crisis within the country has led to the collapse of services, deterioration of health, food security, and nutrition among the population, and one of the biggest mass displacements in South America’s history. 2.7 million people have fled the country since 2014 and the number is expected to reach 5.3 million by the end of 2019. Tensions between Maduro’s government and the opposition escalated in the beginning of 2019. There is a risk that pressure from international stakeholders calling for change in Venezuela’s leadership and threatening armed intervention could lead to a potential armed confrontation between the government and the US-backed opposition. In addition, growing discontent is likely to lead to large-scale civil unrest, and there is a risk that mass protests could be violently repressed by Venezuelan authorities. The current drought in combination with an El Niño episode confirmed in the beginning of 2019 is also causing concern. ?

    IMPACT
    With inflation spiralling, the living situation for Venezuelans inside the country is likely to deteriorate significantly, with increased food and medicine shortages, increasing deaths caused by the failure of the health system, as well as paralysis of commerce, education, and increased poverty. Livelihoods and food security are also at risk of being disproportionately impacted by the current drought and El Niño episode. Armed confrontation and large scale civil unrest is likely to significantly worsen the humanitarian situation, create serious protection concerns for civilians, and trigger further displacement. Migration from Venezuela shows no signs of slowing down, and the continuing influx is likely to keep impacting neighbouring countries, straining capacities and leading to the deterioration of basic services. Potential pushback or change in migration policies from host countries would likely lead to increasing difficulties for Venezuelan refugees to access legal status or gain right to employment. ?

    This risk was identified in the March Quarterly Risk Report

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  • Violence increases in Cabo Delgado resulting in displacement, protection needs, and deteriorated access to food and livelihoods

    Latest update: 21/06/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Islamic extremists have been launching violent attacks on civilians in the northern province of Cabo Delgado since October 2017, resulting in at least 2,000 people displaced, nearly 300 people killed, and more than 1,000 properties destroyed. ? Events involving the group, known as Ahlu Sunna Wa-Jama, have been increasing, with 20 attacks in the first two months of 2019 compared with 50 in all of 2018. ?The group’s activities have been concentrated on the coast of Cabo Delgado from Pemba to the Tanzanian border, and recent events showed a possible shift in tactics from night-time attacks on isolated homes, to coordinated daytime attacks against employees of the foreign oil company Anadarko, currently leading the biggest liquefied natural gas project in the country worth 20 billion dollars?. Government response, however, is leading to human rights abuses. Government forces have detained journalists for covering events in Cabo Delgado and subjected civilians suspected of supporting the group to perquisitions, looting, and arbitrary detention. ? If the government fails to address the social, religious, and political dynamics behind the insurgency, the attacks are very likely to continue.

    IMPACT
    The attacks have already affected the food security situation in Cabo Delgado, where Stressed levels (IPC-2) are reported along the coast compared to Minimal (IPC-1) food insecurity in the rest of the province. ? The insurgents’ strategy has been focused on destruction of property, burning houses and stalls, leading to displacement and shelter needs. ? Should this type of attack continue, food insecurity is likely to increase as more households are displaced and unable to access food or engage in agricultural activities.  Livelihoods will be impacted due to insecurity and destruction. Education will likely be affected due to fear of attacks on public schools by the armed group in a show of dissent towards the State. Protection issues are likely to increase, arising from both the insurgent activity and the response of government forces. Currently there are no reported constraints on humanitarian access.

    This risk was identified in the March Quarterly Risk Report

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  • Full-scale offensive on northwest Syria leads to displacement of millions, a high number of civilian casualties, and severe humanitarian needs

    Latest update: 21/06/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    A full-scale offensive on opposition-held northwest Syria is looming, following conflict escalation between the Government of Syria (GoS) and opposition forces. Fighting in southern Idleb and northern Hama governorates intensified in January and has further escalated since April, when regime forces launched a series of barrel bomb attacks and artillery strikes on essential infrastructure, aiming to regain control over strategic points?. Fighting increased despite the de-escalation deal between Turkey and Russia that declared the region a demilitarised zone since September 2018.

    An all-out escalation of conflict in the northwest has been anticipated since 2017, following evacuation deals between the GoS and opposition forces and civilians perceived to be opposition supporters, resulting in the transfer of large groups of people to Idleb and surrounding area. The GoS has been clear about wanting to retake the area at the earliest opportunity. A full-scale assault, however, would require a political decision supported by Russia, whose support largely depends on how this would impact their relations with Turkey. Turkey backs the opposition forces of The National Liberation Front (NLF) and wants to avoid a full-scale offensive close to its borders. Turkey and Russia’s relationship has been strained by the recent conflict escalation. Russia allowed the GoS to attack Idleb and Hama without waiting for agreement with Turkey. Turkey then delivered weapons to opposition forces.? Recent attacks from the GoS on Turkish military posts in Idleb are likely to increase tensions.? Further advancement from government forces into Idleb without diplomatic coordination between Russia and Turkey may trigger Turkey to increase support to opposition. In such a scenario, the GoS would likely further intensify its own operations. While there is a risk of this situation materialising, the probability of a full-scale Russian-backed offensive in the next six months is low. Such an operation would be militarily costly and draw unwanted attention to Russia’s role in Syria. It is probable that Russia and Turkey seek to sustain their relationship and the conflict de-escalates after the GoS takes control over strategic targets.

    Impact

    A full-scale offensive on the northwest of Syria would have disastrous humanitarian consequences. The recent surge in violence displaced over 270,000 people in May, killed hundreds of civilians, and caused severe needs for healthcare, shelter, food, and protection. Airstrikes have targeted schools, medical facilities and busy places such as markets. Widespread displacement has placed further strain on camps. Many of the newly displaced are without shelter, living in open fields or under trees exposed to the elements. The conflict has destroyed vital food crops in the region, worsening food insecurity. Attacks against humanitarian responders and the ongoing fighting have severely restricted humanitarian access. Most aid activities in the conflict zones have been suspended. ?

    Over 3.5 million people are living in the northwest, including 1.3 million existing IDPs, almost all of whom have existing humanitarian needs that would be severely compounded in the event of an escalation. ? Further escalation in conflict would cause a staggering loss of civilian life and drive millions to the Turkish border. It is unclear whether Syrians would be able to cross the border. If entry to Turkey becomes impossible, multi-sectoral humanitarian needs would likely build along the border and overwhelm response capacity. Pre-existing vulnerabilities and reducing coping capacities following eight years of war in Syria would exacerbate the humanitarian situation.

    This risk was identified in the June Quarterly Risk Analysis report.

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  • Escalation and spread of intercommunal violence leads to increased displacement and humanitarian needs

    Latest update: 11/06/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Conflict-driven displacement increased throughout 2018, bringing the total of IDPs to nearly 3 million, up from 1.1 million at end of 2017 ?. Conflict has continued and there is a significant risk it will increase as a result of at least three factors. First, local elections scheduled for mid-2019 risk inflaming already high intercommunal tensions by spurring competition between different groups for power and resources. Originally scheduled for April 2018, these elections were already postponed due to fears of violence and unrest. ?Additionally, growing demands for autonomy among ethnic minority groups, such as the Sidama and Qemant, pose the risk of local-ised protests leading to violence.? In Sidama zone a proposed referendum to establish Sidama as an independent state sparked large-scale protests in February 2019, and continued clashes between pro-independence and anti-independ-ence factions are likely.? Finally, a breakdown in relations between the government and political opposition groups would likely trigger further violence – particularly in western Ethiopia, where the Oromo Liberation Front clashed with government forces in recent months and was accused of carrying out ethnically motivated attacks, despite formally agreeing in August 2018 to disarm.?

    IMPACT

    A further spike in intercommunal violence in Ethiopia is likely to lead to large-scale displacement in areas where IDPs are already present, such as Gedeo (SNNPR), west Guji (Oromia region), and Kamashi (Benishangul-Gumuz region) zones, and potentially new areas.

    Given that local and international response capacities are already stretched to their limit, it will likely be even more challenging to address the food, shelter, protection, and health needs of newly displaced people.?

    Access issues will likely be a concern as certain areas become unsafe due to conflict, and due to government limitations concerning the areas where humanitarians are allowed to operate. At present, humanitarian access is almost completely restricted in many of the areas that have experienced the most intense intercommunal conflict, such as Dawa zone (Somali region), Gedeo zone, and Guji zone.?

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  • Escalation of conflict amid fragile peace process leads to displacement and civilian casualties CARO TEST

    Latest update: 31/05/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Peace talks between the US and the Taliban have seen some progress in 2019, most notably a draft agreement on the timeline for US troop withdrawal and the Taliban’s commitment to prevent militants from attacking US targets from Afghanistan (Reuters 26/02/2019; DW 13/03/2019). Conceding to a potential ceasefire agreement would likely undermine the Taliban’s favourable negotiating position, for which military gains have seemingly been crucial in the past (Reuters 19/08/2018; ICG 19/06/2018; Al Jazeera 25/04/2018; NYT 18/07/2018; AAN 25/06/2018). Targeted attacks to exert pressure on negotiations have occurred from both sides and are likely to continue (NYT 01/03/2019). Furthermore, the premature withdrawal of foreign forces risks leading to (non-state) armed groups expanding their offensives (Guardian 21/12/2018).

    There is a general perception that the current talks are focused on lowering US financial and military involvement rather than on finding sustainable peace. This perception is reinforced by the absence of the Afghan government from talks and a lack of clarity over the content, as well as unclear discussion on the possibility of an interim government in the run up to the elections which have been postponed from July to September. If elections proceed without including the Taliban, the group is likely to violently disrupt the process.

    IMPACT

    A new escalation of hostilities will likely spark temporary and prolonged displacement and maintain the record-high levels of civilian casualties as seen in 2018. Major Taliban assaults on the strategic cities Farah, Ghazni and Kunduz in 2016 and 2018 led to the displacement of tens of thousands of people and several hundred civilian casualties, and these are in particular remain at risk of future assaults (DI 11/10/2016; AAN 16/12/2018).

    A spike in conflict will likely hamper access in a country where the humanitarian space is already limited. Uncertainty about the outcomes of peace negotiations and the upcoming Presidential elections – likely to be heavily contested – add to the extremely uncertain operating environment.

    Protection is a major concern for the civilian population. IDPs will also likely have urgent shelter, food, NFI and health needs. New displacement will add a strain to limited host community capacities. Resources will be further stretched due to high numbers of undocumented returnees that continue to return from Iran. Humanitarian needs will be exacerbated by decades of conflict, protracted poverty, and a severe drought in 2018 that left 13.5 million people severely food insecure (FAO March 2019).

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  • test

    Latest update: 16/05/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

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  • DRC: Political violence in urban centres

    Latest update: 01/05/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    Frequent and recurrent protests across the country in recent years indicate an already high level of political tension that is likely to grow in the lead up to presidential elections on 23 December.
    Since the beginning of 2015, over 700 protests across the country resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties, and the likelihood of further political violence is high.
    In addition to direct human rights and humanitarian protection concerns arising from violent responses to protests, increasing insecurity is also likely to drive health and livelihoods needs for urban populations, complicate access to services and constrain humanitarian efforts.

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  • Cameroon: Anglophone crisis

    Latest update: 26/04/2019

    Probability

    Highly unlikely Somewhat likely Highly likely

    Impact

    Very low Moderate Major

    The anglophone crisis in Cameroon has been deteriorating since the beginning of 2018, with brutal attacks and human rights violations continuing to be perpetrated by both armed secessionist groups and Cameroonian armed forces. The 2018 presidential election is approaching, and violence and insecurity are escalating in the lead up to this, fueling further displacement and disrupting basic services, livelihoods, and the economy.

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