

CRISISINSIGHT

QUARTERLY RISK ANALYSIS

June 2019



INTRODUCTION

ACAPS Quarterly risk analysis outlines a number of key contexts where a notable deterioration may occur within the next six months, leading to a spike in humanitarian needs.

ACAPS analysts conduct daily monitoring and independent analysis of more than 150 countries to support evidence-based decision-making in the humanitarian sector.

Risk analysis depends on a solid understanding of the context and on investigating the interaction of the variables that cause or resist change. Risk analysis is a process that should be repeated at regular intervals and the change in risk recorded over time. Regular reviews of risks that analyse why previously identified risks did or did not materialise will help strengthen the analyst's ability to create chains of events that point towards the emergence of a hazard and assess probability (see update from previous risks identified).

For the next six months, ACAPS has identified the following nine risks:

HIGH RISK LEVEL

SUDAN
SYRIA
YEMEN

MODERATE RISK LEVEL

BURKINA FASO
DRC
INDONESIA
MALI
MIDDLE EAST (IRAN/US)

LOW RISK LEVEL

CHAD

What is a risk?

Risk is a function of impact and probability: i.e. the risk posed by a potential hazard increases as either the expected impact of the hazard increases or the probability that it will occur increases. Risk analysis is not an exact science.

The occurrence of a risk prompts a change from the status quo that leads to a notable deterioration in the humanitarian situation and a higher number of people in need (exposure), or a higher severity of need (intensity). The crises identified in the quarterly report are selected because there are certain triggers that may emerge over the coming six months that point towards this potential shift.

A deteriorating humanitarian situation that continues at the same rate is considered a trend rather than a risk. Such crises are not included in the report, as while the humanitarian situation may be deteriorating, the rate of deterioration is not expected to exceed the current trend.

Objective of risk analysis

The objective of ACAPS Quarterly risk analysis is to **enable humanitarian decision makers to understand potential future changes** that would likely have humanitarian consequences. By exposing the more probable developments and understanding their impact, **they can be included in planning and preparedness** which should improve response.

At ACAPS, risk analysis enables us to:

- ensure our monitoring of countries and crises is forward-looking and our consequent analysis more informed;
- gain advance warning about countries and crises on which we ought to report in more depth;
- respond to specific requests for risk reports.

All of which aim to inform the ACAPS audience, and thus the humanitarian community, of likely future events.

INTRODUCTION

Key principles of risk analysis

Risk analysis depends on a **solid understanding of the context** and on investigating the interaction of the variables that cause or resist change.

Risk analysis is a **process that should be repeated** at regular intervals and the change in risk recorded over time.

Risk analysis improves with time: regular reviews of risks that analyse why previously identified risks did or did not materialise will help strengthen the analyst's ability to create chains of events and assess probabilities. Documenting this builds the evidence base for ACAPS as a whole.

Risk analysis **is not an exact science**: an event identified by one analyst as a hazard, might be identified by another as a trigger for different event which the second analyst considers the hazard. This is of little consequence; the important issue is that the sequence of events and a hazard are identified.

Risk is a **function of Severity and Probability**: i.e. the risk posed by a potential event increases as either the expected severity of the event increases or the probability that it will occur increases.

The probability of a risk does not need to be high for it to be of concern. That a hazardous event is estimated to have a 50% probability of occurring should be cause for concern for humanitarians. In some cases a probability as low as 30% (just under a one in three chance of occurrence) may be a concern.

Risk analysis aims to prompt preparedness by providing early warning of potential crises.


Limitations

Considering the diversity and complexity of the crises, it has not been possible to cover each crisis in detail. Instead, we have highlighted the broad evolution of the crises to flag potential deteriorations and inform operational, strategic, and policy decision-makers.

The focus on risk analysis means that we have not considered multiple possible factors that could lead to an improvement in a given context. Unforeseen circumstances that may change the course of events have not received attention in this report, such as natural hazards and sudden onset events.

Information gaps also limit the analysis. Additionally, while efforts were made to ensure that all information was up to date at the time of publishing, the fluidity of situations in some countries means that significant changes are often observed from one week to another.

[Read more about our risk methodology](#)




RISK LEVEL

- High
- Medium
- Low
- Regional risk

*The risks identified on this map are expected to materialise within the next six months.

BURKINA FASO

Government loses control of southwestern and eastern regions, leading to internal displacement and increased food insecurity



RATIONALE

Internal conflict has increased in the north (Sahel, Nord and Centre-Nord regions) in 2019, with a 5,700% increase in civilian fatalities compared to the first half of 2018 and 123,000 people newly displaced since January (ACLEDD 2019; OCHA 06/06/2019). Since April, fighting has intensified between Islamist armed groups and different civilian tribes, along with more targeted attacks against Christian communities and schools. Attacks are spreading east and southwest (The New Humanitarian 17/04/2019; RFI 26/05/2019; BBC 26/04/2019). If the intensity and frequency of intercommunal fighting and attacks by Islamic groups continues to escalate in Est, Centre-Est and Hauts Bassins, Sud-Ouest, and Cascades regions, the government risks losing control of these areas, as it did in the north.

The local population in eastern and southwestern regions has high mistrust in the government due to low development with limited opportunities, and continuous arbitrary arrests and human rights violations by government security forces (HRW 22/05/2019; ACAPS 22/03/2019). In counter-terrorism operations, military forces have been killing three times more civilians than jihadists (The New Humanitarian 31/05/2019). Countrywide, the Burkinabe army morale has declined due to limited training, lack of human and logistical capacity, and high death tolls among government forces in recent months. Rivalry among agencies adds to internal tensions, increasing the risk of another military coup d'état (Crisis Group 28/01/2019). Another regime change, as seen in the past, will prohibit effective measures against the increasing violence.

Islamic groups including Ansaroul Islam and the Support Group to Islam and Muslims (JNIM) seem more organised, with increased human and financial capacity and alliances with new local militants and criminal networks. As the civilian population's frustration

RISK LEVEL
MEDIUM

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



increases, more people are seeking safety in self-defense militia groups. Islamist armed groups are leveraging intercommunal tensions between pastoralists and farmers, creating resentment and mistrust among communities and increasing the risk of conflict escalation (ACAPS 22/03/2019; Crisis Group 28/01/2019).

IMPACT


Further loss of governmental control in Burkina Faso's eastern and southwestern regions will intensify intercommunal conflict, triggering large-scale displacement. As of 15 February, 76,000 people are in need of humanitarian assistance in the southwestern regions of Haut Bassins, Cascades and Sud-Ouest, and 137,000 in the Est and Centre Est regions (OCHA 15/02/2019).

An escalation of violence in these areas, home to respectively 3.5 million and 4.6 million people, will drastically increase the number of people relying on aid. Humanitarian response capacity is already under-equipped to serve all people in need, including 170,000 IDPs countrywide (OCHA 06/06/2019). A drastic decline in safety and security in Burkina Faso will worsen humanitarian access and aid delivery. As access to fields, markets and other livelihood activities decline, the number of people depending on food assistance during the lean season (June to mid-September) is likely to surpass estimations of 676,000 people in IPC-3 (Crisis) and IPC-4 (Emergency) by mid-September. At least some of the 38,000 people projected to face Crisis in the Est and Centre-Est region are likely to fall into Emergency if violence spreads (Cadre Harmonisé 22/03/2019; FEWS NET 06/2019).

Concerns that the Islamist armed groups' influence will cross borders and affect neighbouring Ghana, Togo, and Benin are high. Some 200 suspected extremists, 95 of whom were Togolese, were arrested in mid-May (Jeune Afrique 16/04/2019). When the government loses control of parts of Burkina Faso, joint government military operations from Togo, Burkina Faso, Benin, and Ghana become less feasible due to lesser influence in the area, increasing the risk of violence spreading.

CHAD

Increased violence between government forces and non-state armed groups in Tibesti leads to worsening of food and protection needs



RISK LEVEL
LOW

PROBABILITY

Negligible

Medium

Very high

IMPACT

Very low

Moderate

Major

RATIONALE

Violent conflict has spiked in Tibesti since late 2018, involving a wide variety of different groups including the Chadian military, opposition factions such as the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR) and Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) which seek to overthrow the government, as well as local self-defense militias. In January 2019, several dozen people were killed following clashes in a gold mining area which pitted CCMSR soldiers against Sudanese militias aligned with the Chadian government (BBC 14/01/2019). Approximately one month later in February, a large group of UFR fighters entered northern Chad from their base in Libya, clashing with government troops. Fighting moved towards N'Djamena until French military jets intervened at the request of the Chadian government (Jeune Afrique 06/02/2019). Separately, tensions between the Chadian government and self-defense militias have continued to escalate near Miski and have occasionally turned violent over local grievances such as the distribution of gold mining revenues and border disputes, further contributing to the unstable situation (ICG 17/05/2019).

Considering events that have unfolded in recent months, there appears to be a growing risk the security situation in Tibesti and other areas of northern Chad will deteriorate further. Government forces are currently stationed outside Miski and are prepared to launch another offensive to clear the area of anti-government forces and self-defense militia groups (ICG 17/05/2019). Unaddressed local grievances and Chad's ongoing economic crisis will likely increase support for non-state armed groups in the north,

possibly leading to an escalation of attacks against the military (Africa News 16/02/2018). There is also an increasing risk that Chadian opposition groups, which have historically maintained a presence in neighbouring countries, will be able to increase the frequency of their cross-border operations as a result of ongoing political crises and recent security deterioration in Libya and Sudan.

IMPACT

Humanitarian needs are already very high in Tibesti as a result of persistent instability and violence. In December 2018, 18,000 people – approximately half of Tibesti's population – were reported in need of humanitarian assistance; this number has likely risen in recent months (OCHA 22/12/2019). If government forces were to launch another offensive in the region or if armed groups were to increase the frequency of their attacks this would almost certainly cause a spike in food needs by reducing civilian access to markets, which are the main source of food for most households. Tibesti is already facing Crisis (IPC-3) levels of food insecurity, among the highest of all regions in Chad (FEWS Net 31/05/2019). Based on past experience, protection needs will also be of concern, particularly for miners in the region who typically come from other parts of Chad, and are often accused by the government of being criminals or "rebel sympathisers." A potential escalation of violence can be expected to increase humanitarian access constraints in Tibesti, which is already one of the most remote and hardest to reach areas in the country.

DRC

Gaps in Ebola response and population movement lead to the spreading of Ebola to new territories and neighbouring countries



RATIONALE

On 2 June 2019, the Ebola outbreak in northeast DRC surpassed 2,000 cases including nearly 1,400 deaths (TNH 04/06/2019; MoH 16/06/2019). The rapid increase in case numbers since late March has been linked to widespread insecurity resulting from some 120 active armed groups in the area and violence against response workers by armed groups and villagers, that lead to temporary suspension of response activities. Community distrust due to misinformation, scepticism against the government, and a reluctance to seek treatment and adhere to preventative measures is widening gaps in Ebola treatment and tracking; it is estimated that only 75% of cases are detected (WHO 21/05/2019 Actualite 09/05/2019; CFR 13/06/2019).

High population mobility and frequent internal and cross-border conflict displacement aggravate the situation and increase the risk of Ebola spreading to neighbouring provinces and countries, including Rwanda, South Sudan and Tanzania (UNICEF 18/02/2019; IRIN 07/05/2019; TNH 23/05/2019). On 11 June, an Ebola outbreak was declared in Uganda as several people infected with the virus returned from DRC to Uganda via informal crossings to avoid health checkpoints (DRC MoH 11/06/2019; TNH 12/06/2019). The spread to more densely populated, economic centres is particularly concerning and will make it harder to contain the outbreak. Nord Kivu's capital Goma is a high-risk location, given its proximity to the border with Rwanda, frequent movement of goods and people, and limited preparedness.

Despite response adjustments including communication campaigns that target community mistrust, an extension of the vaccination campaign, and the activation of the "Humanitarian System-wide Scale-Up" in late May, the risk of Ebola spreading remains high, with a high probability of the disease reaching Goma and then becoming even more challenging to contain (WHO 23/05/2019; The Lancet 25/05/2019; SAGE 07/05/2019; IRIN 07/05/2019).

RISK LEVEL
MEDIUM

PROBABILITY

Negligible

Medium

Very high

IMPACT

Very low

Moderate

Major

IMPACT

This geographical spread will make it harder to gain control of the outbreak and increase the loss of human life. The case fatality rate has risen in recent months, from 61% in early January to 67% in mid-June (WHO 10/01/2019; WHO 13/06/2019). The first EVD cases in Uganda and the threat of Ebola reaching Goma near the Rwandan border mean that the declaration of a "Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC)" is likely. This would place restrictions on trade and travel.

Trade, employment and family ties see several tens of thousands of people cross the DRC-Rwanda-Uganda borders every day. Restrictions on movement will likely impact livelihoods, food security, and nutrition. Disruptions are likely to increase reluctance towards response efforts and increase informal crossings where no screening is in place, thus further impeding humanitarian operations (SSHAP April 2019).

Although preparedness and response capacity was previously estimated to be good in some neighbouring countries, several factors could aggravate the situation: including other disease outbreaks that display similar symptoms such as cholera; the ongoing rainy season hindering access in Uganda and South Sudan; and the volatile security situation in South Sudan.

As in the ACAPS' Global risk analysis published in December 2018, IDP and refugee populations are anticipated to be at a higher risk due to congested displacement sites and limited access to adequate WASH facilities.

INDONESIA

Increasing violence and military presence in Papua province leads to further internal displacement and humanitarian needs



RATIONALE

A spike in violence has occurred in Papua province in recent months, in the context of a long-running separatist movement. Clashes between armed separatist groups and the military have led to a violent crackdown against both separatists and civilians. The Indonesian government also continues to suppress peaceful dissent by Papuan activists (Benar News 28/05/2019; ACLED 11/04/2019; Reuters 08/03/2019).

Military presence in Papua province increased after separatists killed 19 construction workers who were building the highly contentious Trans-Papua Highway in Nduga regency in December (Equal Times 12/03/2019; Benar News 06/03/2019). The highway is scheduled for completion in 2019 and is regarded by Papuan activists and separatists as a way for Jakarta to cement control and exploit the resource-rich region (Peoples Dispatch 14/03/2019; The Diplomat 08/03/2019). Following the attack – the deadliest in recent years – the Indonesian military launched a counterinsurgency campaign, prompting counterattacks by separatists (The Guardian 29/04/2019; Benar News 06/03/2019). Since December up to 37,000 people have been displaced from Nduga regency as a result of the conflict (Agencia EFE 03/04/2019; Radio New Zealand 03/04/2019).

National elections took place in April but were widely boycotted in the province because of the unrest (ACLED 11/04/2019; Asia Pacific Report 19/04/2019). In May, Indonesian soldiers shot and killed four civilians in post-election related violence in Asmat regency (Radio New Zealand 31/05/2019). Additional units were sent to the already heavily militarised area after the incident (Asia Times 31/05/2019).

Disorder looks set to continue and further attacks by separatists, particularly if on a scale as seen in December, would likely result in a heavy-handed response from the Indonesian military, and more violence, casualties, and displacement (ACLED 11/04/2019; Agencia EFE 03/04/2019).

RISK LEVEL
MEDIUM

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



IMPACT

If fighting increases in intensity and frequency up to 50,000 additional people could be displaced and in need of humanitarian assistance over the coming six months. 37,000 people are already displaced in Nduga regency out of an estimated population of 100,000 (Peoples Dispatch 14/03/2019). Neighbouring Asmat regency is also at risk of violence and displacement should the situation continue to deteriorate.

Protection is a major concern. Indonesian rule in Papua province has been marked by human rights violations against the ethnic Melanesian population, including torture methods and extrajudicial killings of activists and peaceful protestors (Peoples Dispatch 14/03/2019; The Guardian 08/03/2019; France 24 07/03/2019).

IDPs would have urgent protection, shelter, food, NFI and health needs. Conditions in existing IDP camps are reportedly poor. Food and water are lacking and some IDPs have died as a result. Protracted displacement is likely as IDPs are often afraid to return home (Radio New Zealand 25/03/2019; Benar News 06/03/2019; Radio New Zealand 03/04/2019).

Displaced children will have educational needs as schools are frequently damaged in clashes. Children often avoid school for fear of being caught in violence (Al Jazeera 05/06/2019; Radio New Zealand 03/04/2019; Jakarta Post 16/03/2019).

Access would likely be an issue as the Indonesian government is traditionally reluctant to utilise outside help to cope with disasters and crises. NGO presence is limited however the Indonesian Red Cross is present. Given the politically sensitive nature of the separatist movement, the government would likely restrict humanitarian access. Media and human rights groups' access to Papua is already severely restricted and information is controlled by the military (CNN 17/04/2019; Equal Times 12/03/2019; The Guardian 06/12/2018). Mountainous terrain and poor infrastructure would further hamper access.

MALI

Escalation of inter-communal violence in central Mali leads to increased internal displacement and humanitarian needs



RATIONALE

Violence has spiked significantly in Central Mali since the beginning of 2019, fueled by the spread of radical Islamist organisations and intercommunal tensions – particularly between members of the Dogon and Fulani ethnic groups. The Dogon, who are mostly farmers, and Fulani, who are mostly herders, have periodically fought one another over land, water, and other resources, though the frequency and intensity of violence has increased dramatically in recent months. In March, Dogon militias raided Ogossagou, a Fulani village in Mopti region, killing at least 157 people (RFI 03/05/2019). This was followed by a number of retaliatory attacks against the Dogon, the most violent attack in June in Sobane-Kou village leading to up to 95 deaths and a large number of houses destroyed (NYT 12/06/2019). Tensions between Dogon and Fulani groups have been exacerbated by fundamentalist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), and Islamic State, which have steadily expanded their presence in Central Mali in recent years, drawing recruits from local villages and becoming increasingly involved in local-level disputes (Defense Post 30/05/2019).

In light of recent attacks, there is a significant risk that violence will escalate further in the coming months. Attacks against Ogossagou and Sobane-Kou are among the deadliest since the start of Mali's security crisis in 2012 and will almost certainly lead to a hardening of tensions between the Dogon and Fulani, potentially sparking a cycle of violence that would be difficult to reverse (Al Jazeera 11/06/2019). The risk of further escalation of violence is made worse by the fact that the Malian military and international peacekeeping operations – notably MINUSMA, G5, and Operation Barkhane – have faced

RISK LEVEL
MEDIUM

PROBABILITY

Negligable

Medium

Very high

IMPACT

Very low

Moderate


Major

significant challenges in ensuring the protection of civilians (Quartz 31/03/2019). This may lead to the creation of additional ethnic self-defense militias as communities seek to provide their own protection.

IMPACT

Since January 2019, nearly 160,000 people have been displaced as a result of violence in Central and Northern Mali (ECHO 12/06/2019). If there is further escalation of violence in Central Mali, it is almost certain that thousands more people will be displaced, placing strain on host communities and social services in conflict-affected areas. Shelter and protection needs can be anticipated as a result of houses being destroyed in attacks and violence carried out against civilians. During the March attack in Ogossagou, more than 400 houses were destroyed and most of the violence was directed against civilian targets, including children and the elderly (OCHA 27/03/2019). Central Mali is one of the poorest and least developed regions of the country, and pre-existing health, education, and WASH needs mean that people have a heightened level of vulnerability, even before the effects of violence are taken into account. Humanitarian access remains a challenge in Central Mali and is likely to get worse in the context of increased insecurity and intercommunal violence (ACAPS 02/05/2019).

MIDDLE EAST (IRAN/US)



Heightened tensions between Iran and US and their allies spark conflict between regional proxies in the Middle East leading to new humanitarian needs in the region

RATIONALE

A series of events have raised fears of an escalation of proxy conflict between the US, Iran and their allies in the Middle East. Countries particularly at risk of being affected are Iraq and Yemen as well as, to a smaller extent, Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iran itself.

Attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf in recent weeks have provoked threatening rhetoric between the US and Iran (REUTERS 13/06/2019). The US blamed the incidents on Iran and deployed 2,500 troops, an aircraft carrier and bomber planes to the Middle East to counter “Iranian threats” (REUTERS 24/05/2019; REUTERS 18/06/2019). The US also recently tightened economic sanctions on Iran and labelled the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran’s elite military force, as a “foreign terrorist organisation” (BBC 08/04/2019). Iran denied involvement in the attacks but stated it will retaliate against aggression towards its interests (Crisis Group 15/05/2019). The Special Forces unit of the IRGC reportedly called on allied militias to prepare for a proxy conflict (The Guardian 16/05/2019; REUTERS 08/06/2019).

Relations between Iran and the US have deteriorated significantly over the last year since the Trump administration withdrew from a nuclear deal between Iran and seven world powers, including the US and EU (The Guardian 09/05/2018; REUTERS 08/06/2019). Iran recently stopped complying with parts of the nuclear agreement in attempt to bargain European support against the sanctions, fueling existing tensions (Al Jazeera 17/06/2019).

RISK LEVEL
MEDIUM

PROBABILITY



IMPACT




Neither country is interested in direct military confrontation. The US may be increasing economic and military pressure to suppress Iran’s growing regional influence and to leverage a new nuclear agreement, more aligned to its own terms. However, lack of diplomacy amid heightened tensions may result in a miscalculation possibly leading to an accidental escalation of conflict. Conflict would most likely remain small-scale and concentrated in areas with a large presence of Iranian proxies.

Iraq and Yemen are the most vulnerable to an escalation. In Iraq, the US and Iran have been vying for influence following the defeat of the Islamic State. Iraq has a large presence of Iran-backed Shia militias and the US has some 5,000 troops stationed in the country, raising the risk of a local confrontation. Regional actors are often trying to frame Yemen’s conflict, which is predominantly based on local grievances, as part of the broader Saudi-Iranian rivalry. A recent upsurge in attacks from the Iran-backed Houthis on targets in Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have raised tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, increasing the risk of retaliatory attacks and escalation in Yemen.

IMPACT

An escalation of proxy-conflict between the US and Iran and their allies in the Middle East could potentially have a far-reaching impact. However, more likely, the impact would remain localised and mainly affect areas with large presence of Iranian proxies.

MIDDLE EAST (IRAN/US)



RISK LEVEL
MEDIUM

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



A conflict between US forces and Iranian proxies in Iraq would impact a population already fatigued by war. Some 6.7 million people are in need of assistance. Particularly vulnerable are the 1.7 million IDPs and 4.2 million IDP returnees in Iraq. New conflict would likely exacerbate their needs and trigger new internal displacement. Past conflict and political instability have strained basic health and WASH services. An outbreak of violence between the US and Iranian backed militias could disrupt gas, electricity and food supplies as Iraq heavily relies on imports from Iran (IOM 20/06/2019).

In case of an escalation of conflict in Yemen, existing humanitarian needs, including food security, health and WASH would likely worsen. Retaliatory attacks would likely cause an increase in civilian casualties. In the past Saudi Arabia, which has warships positioned in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, has blocked imports of goods, including aid supplies. An escalation could trigger a new naval blockade hindering humanitarian access.

Involvement in an escalation of proxy conflict would further harm Iran's economy. Large parts of Iran were hit by flash floods in April and March affecting over 40 million people, 2 million of who remain in need of assistance. Increased needs and growing political and socio-economic frustrations among the population could lead to a new wave of protests if Iran were to engage in a new conflict (WHO 19/05/2019).

SUDAN

Establishment of military regime leads to increased conflict and spread of violence countrywide



RISK LEVEL
HIGH

PROBABILITY

Negligable

Medium

Very high

IMPACT

Very low

Moderate

Major

RATIONALE

After President Al-Bashir was ousted in April 2019 a transitional military government (Transitional Military Council or TMC) was installed. Many TMC members, including the new Vice President, are aligned to the Bashir regime and are guilty of committing human rights violations during the conflict in Darfur in the early 2000s. This is exacerbating anger and frustration among civilians who have been protesting since December (International Crisis Group 05/2019; The Independent 10/06/2019; NYT 15/06/2019). Dialogue between the TMC and opposition alliance Force for Freedom and Change (FFC) to ensure a transition to civilian government is not progressing and protests have been dispersed with increasing violence. On 3 June, peaceful sit-ins were violently dispersed countrywide by the Rapid Sudanese Forces (RSF), leaving around 118 people dead and at least 780 injured (ACAPS 17/06/2019). It appears likely that a military government will establish itself for the long term, and they are backed by international and regional alliances including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China and Russia (The Independent 11/06/2019; BBC 05/06/2019). However, the TMC appears fragile, due to internal differences in opinion. This increases the likelihood of different factions of the security apparatus splitting and vying for power, further destabilising the country.

Following recent escalation in Khartoum, increased violence and inter-communal fighting between civilians, armed groups and security forces has been observed countrywide (The East African 16/06/2019; OCHA 11/06/2019; UN NEWS 14/06/2019). A military government is unlikely to pursue peace talks with armed groups in either Darfur or the Two Areas due to historical disagreements. With reduced government influence, armed groups in these regions are likely to take advantage of the volatile security situation and reassert their position through increased use of violence.

IMPACT

Protection concerns, especially for opposition-group members and activists affiliated with protests, are very high (ACAPS 17/06/2019). With an established autocratic military rule, arbitrary arrests and human rights violations are very likely to increase. Waves of displacement including highly skilled personnel to neighbouring countries, particularly South Sudan, are anticipated.

A minimum of 8 million people already rely on humanitarian assistance. Access to health services are at highest risk, as health facilities face severe shortages of medicines and medical supplies, and hospitals treating wounded protestors have been targeted by security forces (ECHO 05/06/2019; WHO 07/06/2019).

The economic situation is very likely to worsen amid the unpredictable political and security situation. The TMC has limited capacity and anticipated low commitment to deal with rising prices for basic commodities. With the start of the lean season (May to September) food prices are 280-320% higher than the five-year average. There is a high probability that a minimum of 124,000 IDPs in conflict-affected South Kordofan and Jebel Marra will experience Emergency (IPC-4) levels of food insecurity during the peak lean season (August/September); conflict escalation will likely cause this number to rise significantly (Fewsnet 04/2019).

Humanitarian access overall will deteriorate due to the unpredictable security situation, a government with neither the capacity nor commitment to respond to humanitarian needs, and potentially new limitations to operate in Sudan. People living in conflict-affected areas, as well as increased numbers of IDPs, are expected to face high constraints to access basic services and humanitarian aid.

SYRIA

Full-scale offensive on northwest Syria leads to displacement of millions, a high number of civilian casualties, and severe humanitarian needs



RATIONALE

A full-scale offensive on opposition-held northwest Syria is looming, following conflict escalation between the Government of Syria (GoS) and opposition forces. Fighting in southern Idlib and northern Hama governorates intensified in January and has further escalated since April, when regime forces launched a series of barrel bomb attacks and artillery strikes on essential infrastructure, aiming to regain control over strategic points (REUTERS 06/05/2019). Fighting increased despite the de-escalation deal between Turkey and Russia that declared the region a demilitarised zone since September 2018.


An all-out escalation of conflict in the northwest has been anticipated since 2017, following evacuation deals between the GoS and opposition forces and civilians perceived to be opposition supporters, resulting in the transfer of large groups of people to Idlib and surrounding area. The GoS has been clear about wanting to retake the area at the earliest opportunity. A full-scale assault, however, would require a political decision supported by Russia, whose support largely depends on how this would impact their relations with Turkey. Turkey backs the opposition forces of the National Liberation Front (NLF) and wants to avoid a full-scale offensive close to its borders. Turkey and Russia's relationship has been strained by the recent conflict escalation. Russia allowed the GoS to attack Idlib and Hama without waiting for agreement with Turkey. Turkey then delivered weapons to opposition forces (REUTERS 25/05/2019). Recent attacks from the GoS on Turkish military posts in Idlib are likely to increase tensions (REUTERS 16/06/2019). Further advancement from government forces into Idlib without diplomatic coordination between Russia and Turkey may trigger Turkey to increase support to opposition. In such a scenario, the GoS would likely further intensify its own operations. While there is a risk of this situation materialising, the probability of a full-scale Russian-backed offensive

RISK LEVEL
HIGH

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



in the next six months is low. Such an operation would be militarily costly and draw unwanted attention to Russia's role in Syria. It is probable that Russia and Turkey seek to sustain their relationship and the conflict de-escalates after the GoS takes control over strategic targets.

IMPACT

A full-scale offensive on the northwest of Syria would have disastrous humanitarian consequences. The recent surge in violence displaced over 270,000 people in May, killed hundreds of civilians, and caused severe needs for healthcare, shelter, food, and protection. Airstrikes have targeted schools, medical facilities and busy places such as markets. Widespread displacement has placed further strain on camps. Many of the newly displaced are without shelter, living in open fields or under trees exposed to the elements. The conflict has destroyed vital food crops in the region, worsening food insecurity. Attacks against humanitarian responders and the ongoing fighting have severely restricted humanitarian access. Most aid activities in the conflict zones have been suspended (OCHA 31/05/2019).

Over 3.5 million people are living in the northwest, including 1.3 million existing IDPs, almost all of whom have existing humanitarian needs that would be severely compounded in the event of an escalation (Al Jazeera 08/03/2019). Further escalation in conflict would cause a staggering loss of civilian life and drive millions to the Turkish border. It is unclear whether Syrians would be able to cross the border. If entry to Turkey becomes impossible, multi-sectoral humanitarian needs would likely build along the border and overwhelm response capacity. Pre-existing vulnerabilities and reducing coping capacities following eight years of war in Syria would exacerbate the humanitarian situation.

YEMEN

Breakdown in the peace process leads to escalation of conflict in Al Hudaydah, exacerbating food insecurity and increasing the spread of cholera




RISK LEVEL
HIGH

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

Increased mistrust in the peace process by Hadi government and intense fighting between Houthi and pro-Hadi forces in the rest of Yemen is likely to lead to breakdown of the Stockholm Agreement and fragile ceasefire in place in Al Hudaydah since 2018. This will likely lead to escalation of conflict in Al Hudaydah (The New Humanitarian 20/05/2019; CT 24/05/2019; ACLED 28/05/2019).

Houthi forces withdrew from Al Hudaydah ports over 10-14 May, and the UAE and Saudi Arabia, who back the Yemeni government, have continued to be party to the peace process, indicating a willingness to avoid a military escalation. However, government forces complain the Houthi have handed the ports to a local Coast Guard that is actually under Houthi influence. In addition, while a fragile ceasefire remains in place in Al Hudaydah, intense fighting between Houthi and pro-Hadi forces and retaliation airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition are ongoing in the rest of Yemen (The New Humanitarian 20/05/2019; CT 24/05/2019; The Washington Institute 26/02/2019; ACLED 28/05/2019). In this climate an offensive by the pro-Hadi forces in Al Hudaydah and a battle over the control of the ports and city cannot be excluded (ICG 06/05/2019).

IMPACT

Breakdown in the peace process and conflict over Al Hudaydah ports would likely result in increased food insecurity for at least 7.5 million people, and also worsen the cholera crisis across Yemen (The Guardian 12/05/2019; BBC 14/06/2019).

Around 70% of monthly food imports and 40-50% of fuel imports enter Yemen through Saleef and Al Hudaydah ports (Al Hudaydah governorate) (FEWS NET 12/2018). Fighting around the ports and in Al Hudaydah city is highly likely to result in the ports' closure, disruption of the market-supply chain, and limited access to aid (BBC 14/06/2019). Closure of ports would halt these fuel, medicine, and food imports.

Road blockades, access restrictions, and insecurity would hamper access to imported essential commodities normally distributed from Al Hudaydah to the rest of Yemen. Since May 2019, fighting, bureaucratic constraints, and checkpoints have already severely disrupted the distribution networks in the rest of Yemen (OCHA 20/05/2019). Closure of the Al Hudaydah ports will only exacerbate this situation.

Increased fighting in Al Hudaydah is also likely to add to fuel shortages. Fuel is essential to run health facilities and for pumping and trucking of water. Inability to access water and health facilities due to fuel shortages increases the risk of spread of AWD and cholera (WHO 27/05/2019). On 9 June, the total number of suspected cholera cases across the country was 759,464, with 1,163 associated deaths (CFR 0.15%). The northwestern governorates of Amanat Al Asimah, Sana'a, and Al Hudaydah are the most affected (WHO 09/06/2019).

UPDATE FROM PREVIOUS QUARTERLY RISK ANALYSIS

The countries listed below refer to risks identified in ACAPS' previous *Quarterly risk analysis* published in March 2019, and therefore remain within the six month outlook period.

Two contexts have changed dramatically over the past three months: **Libya** and the offensive on Tripoli that began in April which can therefore no longer be considered a risk; and **Sudan** which has seen a significant shift in the overall political and security dynamic. In most other cases the risks continue to unfold as anticipated.

AFGHANISTAN (Moderate Risk Level in March 2019)

Escalation of conflict amid fragile peace process leads to displacement and civilian casualties

Since the publication of the last ACAPS Quarterly risk analysis the conflict further intensified, following the Taliban's announcement of their spring offensive in mid-April and more favourable climatic conditions (Reuters 12/04/2019). This did not translate into record levels of displacement overall, however heavy clashes between the Taliban and Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) in late April sparked large-scale displacement in Nangarhar province (OCHA 02/05/2019). Recent ISK-led attacks targeting civilians as well as recruitment among Taliban fighters increases concerns that ISK may increase its presence in the country, particularly if a peace deal sees former Taliban fighters joining its ranks (NYT 14/06/2019; ACLED 11/06/2019; Al Jazeera 13/06/2019). Meanwhile, a ceasefire continues to seem unlikely; the Taliban rejected calls for a truce during Ramadan, and a surge in civilian casualties was recorded (Reuters 01/06/2019; Al Jazeera 04/06/2019; UNAMA 09/06/2019; BBC 03/05/2019; ACLED 10/05/2019). Presidential elections scheduled for September continue to risk another spark in violence, including attacks on civilian infrastructure used as polling stations.

BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA (Low Risk Level in March 2019)

Up to 50,000 migrants, refugees and asylum seekers arrive in the country with humanitarian needs that push current response capacity to its limits

From January to the end of April 2019 6,201 migrant and refugee arrivals were recorded, almost twice the number detected over the same period in 2018 (these numbers are an underestimation as people are smuggled in and uncounted) (UNHCR 31/04/2019). Despite progress in scaling up the national response in preparation for arrivals in 2019, reception capacity remains limited. People remain in need of a range of humanitarian assistance—including shelter, WASH, food, and first aid – particularly families with children and unaccompanied and separated children sleeping in the open and exposed to heightened protection risks (UNICEF 31/03/2019; IFRC 30/05/2019; Reuters 30/05/2019). There remains a significant risk of increased arrivals in the summer as travel conditions become more favourable (UNHCR 31/03/2019).

BURKINA FASO (Moderate Risk Level in March 2019)

Increasing violence and displacement in the north result in a deterioration of food insecurity

Violence in the northern regions of Burkina Faso has been intensifying in magnitude and frequency. Since March 2019, around 40,000 people have been newly displaced, bringing the total number of IDPs to 170,000 IDPs as of mid-May (OCHA 17/05/2019; The New Humanitarian 31/05/2019). Soum province is of particular concern, accounting for most IDPs and affected host communities (FEWS NET 04/2019). The 2019 harvest is still expected to be low, most likely surpass the 676,00 people estimated to be food insecure during the peak of the lean season (August/September) (ECHO 22/03/2019; FEWS NET 04/2019). Due to the deteriorating humanitarian situation, a new risk analysis for Burkina Faso is included in this report (p 5), pointing at the government's decreasing influence in eastern and southern regions.

UPDATE FROM PREVIOUS QUARTERLY RISK ANALYSIS

ETHIOPIA (Moderate Risk Level in March 2019)

Escalation and spread of intercommunal violence leads to increased displacement and humanitarian needs

Since the publication of the last ACAPS' Quarterly risk analysis, intercommunal violence and related displacement has spiked in several regions of Ethiopia, notably Amhara and Benishangul Gumuz (Xinhua 31/05/2019; BBC 29/04/2019). Recent months have seen a resumption of conflict between splinter factions of the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ethiopian government (BBC 08/04/2019). Large demonstrations in favour of statehood in Sidama have taken place, indicating increased political pressure (Borkena 09/04/2019; Ethiopia Insight 05/05/2019). So far, the demonstrations have been mostly peaceful, though this may change in coming months depending on whether a referendum, which is the key demand of protestors, takes place as planned.

LIBYA (High Risk Level in March 2019)

Escalation of violence in the northwest leads to large-scale displacement and shelter, protection, and health needs

Shortly after publication of the ACAPS' previous Quarterly risk analysis in March, conflict between the Libyan National Army (LNA) and the opposing UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) escalated significantly in and around the capital Tripoli. Conflict escalated after Khalifa Haftar, commander of the LNA, announced an offensive on Tripoli. Clashes between the opposing forces have affected 1.5 million people. The humanitarian impact is severe with over 90,500 people displaced as of 30 May and large-scale humanitarian needs. The fighting is having a severe impact on migrants and refugees, especially on those who are trapped in detention centres near the frontline (ACAPS 26/04/2019; IOM 11/06/2019).

MOZAMBIQUE (Moderate Risk Level in March 2019)

Violence increases in Cabo Delgado resulting in displacement, protection needs, and deteriorated access to food and livelihoods

Attacks in Cabo Delgado by the group known as Ahlu Sunna Wa-al Jamah (ASWJ) have intensified. 40 attacks occurred between 1 March and 31 May, bringing the total so far to 60 attacks and 130 fatalities in 2019, notably worse than in 2018 (ACLEDD). In some areas, attacks have hampered the registration process for elections in October (Club of Mozambique 08/05/2019). Tropical Cyclone Kenneth struck Cabo Delgado on 25 April and seems to have brought more attention to the issue of violence in the province as humanitarian organisations had to put in place security measures while planning aid distributions, with agencies having to decide whether to accept state security forces' protection or refuse it in order to gain credibility among the population (Zitamar 08/05/2019). Overall, aid organisations has not seemed to be a direct target of the insurgency (Club of Mozambique 07/05/2019; AlJazeera 15/05/2019).

MYANMAR (Moderate Risk Level in March 2019)

Escalation of conflict between Myanmar Army and Arakan Army group in Rakhine

Episodes of violence between the Myanmar Army and the Arakan Army (AA) group have continued, as have the related flows of internal displacement (RFA 22/05/2018; Irrawaddy 20/05/2019; Irrawaddy 02/05/2019). While not a major escalation since the publication of ACAPS' previous risk report, the clashes between the two parties have caused civilian deaths and created new humanitarian needs, or exacerbated existing ones (OCHA 14/05/2019; DT 14/05/2019). The latest figures show that at least 27,000 people remain displaced as of late May, a decrease compared to earlier figures at the beginning of the month (OCHA 26/05/2019; OCHA 07/05/2019; OCHA 21/04/2019). In May the AA was again excluded by the Army in a unilateral ceasefire extension in May, thus the likelihood of fighting continuing over the coming months seems high (Irrawaddy 01/05/2019).

UPDATE FROM PREVIOUS QUARTERLY RISK ANALYSIS

SOMALIA (Moderate Risk Level in March 2019)

Drought as a result of the poor rains followed by a harsh dry season leads to increased levels of food insecurity

Food security continues to deteriorate as prolonged drought conditions have caused widespread crop failure and accelerated a decline in livestock productivity. Out of the 5.4 million people expected to be food insecure by July, 2.2 million will be severely food insecure (IPC-3 and above), a 40% increase from January. Drought continues to drive displacement, with 53,000 people displaced so far in 2019 (OCHA 31/05/2019; FAO 23/05/2019). Gu rainfall (April-June) has been worse than predicted, meaning a more pronounced impact on humanitarian needs can be expected, including further increase in the number of people in IPC-3 and above (Somalia Drought Response Plan 20/05/2019). Rates of severe acute malnutrition are also increasing. The UN has warned of the risk of famine if the international community fails to scale-up its response to the alarming humanitarian situation (UN 05/06/2019; UN 05/06/2019).

SUDAN (High Risk Level in March 2019)

Economic crisis leads to increased food insecurity, socio-political instability, and protection concerns amid protests

ACAPS' previous Quarterly risk analysis did not foresee the ousting of President al-Bashir in April 2019. Since the last report the political situation has evolved significantly, amid the economic crisis which continues to worsen. The overall deterioration of the security situation following the violent raid of protestors by security forces in early June poses new risks likely to lead to elevated humanitarian needs countrywide (ACAPS 17/06/2019). Sudan has therefore been included in this quarterly risk report (p 12).

VENEZUELA (High Risk Level in March 2019)

Hyperinflation, drought, and a deteriorating political situation generates increased needs and further displacement

Violent repression of civilian protests materialised since the ACAPS' previous Quarterly risk analysis. On 30 April, Juan Guaido, leader of opposition-led National Assembly, appeared next to a group of military personnel calling for the 'last phase' of Operation Freedom (NYT 01/05/2019). Guaido supporters and armed forces loyal to Maduro clashed in Caracas, leading to dozens of people injured and five killed (BBC 30/04/2019). Although the uprising was later declared to have failed due to lack of support from senior military figures, the attempt again showed how protests against Maduro trigger protection concerns (The Guardian 01/05/2019; VenezuelaAnalysis 03/05/2019). The deteriorating humanitarian situation continues to drive displacement to neighbouring countries, which surpassed 4 million people in May 2019.

SEE THE CRISIS
CHANGE THE OUTCOME

ACAPS
Avenue de France 23
5th floor
CH 1202 Geneva
+41 22 338 15 90
info@acaps.org


acaps
www.acaps.org