YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT

BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS **JULY 2026 - REPORT #16**

KEY MESSAGES

- Food insecurity continued to deteriorate in June 2026, with **inadequate food consumption increasing to 64% and severe food deprivation to 36% nationwide.** This deterioration has been driven primarily by rising food and fuel prices, reduced purchasing power, and weakening livelihoods rather than a nationwide food shortage. Household coping capacity also continued to erode, particularly in Ansar Allah (AA)-controlled areas, amid prolonged gaps in humanitarian assistance resulting from the loss of humanitarian operational space and funding.
- In July 2026, **the Joint Monitoring Report (JMR) recorded 23 critical and 453 heightened risk alerts,** with the largest share generated by the proxy food imports indicator (one critical and 310 heightened), followed by fuel prices (20 critical and 84 heightened) and food prices (45 heightened).
- **Food price pressures increased in July,** with food price alerts more than doubling compared to May. The proxy food import indicator also began to deteriorate again as local food prices increased more than global prices, widening the gap between domestic and international prices.
- **Fuel prices remained elevated in Government of Yemen (GoY)-controlled areas,** while fuel imports remained below their longer-term average. Continued high fuel costs are likely to sustain pressure on transport, food prices, and essential services.
- **Conflict and displacement risks increased in several governorates,** with alerts concentrated around existing front lines and renewed tribal–AA clashes, particularly in Al Jawf. Regional tensions also continue to increase the risk of renewed escalation involving AA and Saudi Arabia, and increased frontline escalation between AA and GoY forces also increases the risk of renewed internal conflict.
- **Maritime insecurity poses an increasing risk to Yemen's food and fuel supply chains.** While current AA threats have largely focused on Saudi-linked shipping and do not necessarily imply the disruption of food and fuel vessels bound for Yemen, a broader deterioration in security around the Bab Al Mandab Strait could further increase freight, insurance, and security costs and disrupt shipping.
- **Climate risks such as El Niño are expected to compound existing food-related vulnerabilities,** with below-average rainfall and above-average temperatures increasing the likelihood of drought-related impacts on agriculture and livestock during the Kharif season. Because a strong El Niño could also depress production in global food-exporting regions, international price hikes would severely strain Yemen, which imports 85% of its food needs. As a result, even moderate increases in international food prices could reduce household purchasing power and food access.
- Overall, **food security risks are expected to remain elevated over the coming months,** as worsening economic access, depleted coping capacity, reduced humanitarian assistance and operational space, conflict, maritime insecurity, and climate risks interact in a context where more than half of the population is already projected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or above levels of food insecurity.

Pre-assessment for triggering the Food Security Crisis Preparedness Plan for Yemen

As of July 2026, the JMR Risk Team advises continued close monitoring of food security risks in Yemen, particularly in relation to heightened domestic and regional tensions, with increased risks of renewed largescale fighting between AA fighters and GoY and Saudi forces. The situation is further aggravated by El Niño-related climatic risks occurring while 53% of the population is already projected to experience IPC 3 or above levels of food insecurity. Rising fuel costs, limited livelihoods, and eroding coping capacities leave households highly vulnerable to forecasted drought conditions, supply chain disruptions, and conflict- and climate-induced displacement.

acaps · Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations · unicef · WORLD BANK GROUP · WFP · World Health Organization

AGGREGATED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ALERTS AND RISK SEVERITY

This section summarizes the heightened and critical alerts recorded based on the JMR key indicators of deteriorating food and nutrition security.[1] For a more detailed breakdown of indicator alerts by governorate and district, please refer to Annexes I and II.

In July 2026, the JMR recorded 23 critical and 453 heightened risk alerts. The proxy food imports indicator recorded the highest number of alerts, with one critical and 310 heightened risk alerts across all governorates. Fuel prices recorded 20 critical and 84 heightened risk alerts, affecting nine governorates under GoY control. Food prices raised 45 heightened risk alerts in five governorates across GoY-controlled areas. Conflict generated one critical alert in AA-controlled Dhamar and 12 heightened risk alerts in nine AA areas and three in GoY governorates, while displacement generated one critical and two heightened risk alerts in GoY areas.

As in the previous report, **significant data gaps remain for AA-controlled governorates.** The JMR model uses the latest available FAO data for GoY-controlled governorates and World Bank food price and exchange rate forecasts for AA-controlled governorates. While World Bank forecasts help fill temporal and geographical gaps, they are modeled estimates, not observed data**. As a result, caution should be exercised when interpreting food prices and exchange rate alerts** (or lack of alerts) for AA-controlled governorates.

The continued absence of observed price data, a result of insecurity and funding shortages hampering humanitarian assistance activities (including price monitoring) in AA-controlled areas, is expected to create increasingly large **information gaps** in the coming months, potentially **affecting the accuracy of food security assessments and the interpretation of emerging risks.**

Table 1. Critical and heightened food security risk alerts countrywide by indicator in July 2026

INDICATOR	CRITICAL RISK ALERTS	HEIGHTENED RISK ALERTS	GOVERNORATE
Proxy food imports	1	310	All governorates
Fuel prices	20	84	Abyan, Ad Dali', Aden, Al Hodeidah, Al Maharah, Hadramawt, Lahj, Shabwah, Ta'iz
Conflict	1	12	Al Hodeidah, Al Jawf, Dhamar, Lahj, Sa'dah, Ta'iz
Displacement	1	2	Al Hodeidah, Ta'iz
Food prices	0	45	Abyan, Al Maharah, Hadramawt, Ma'rib, Shabwah
Drought	0	0	
Exchange rate	0	0	
Proxy fuel imports	0	0	
Total	**23**	**453**	

1 Critical alerts identify areas where a deterioration in food security is almost certain based on historical trends. Decision makers should consider these areas a high priority. Heightened alerts identify areas where there is a high chance of deterioration in food and nutrition security and provide decision makers with a good overview of current food and nutrition security trends countrywide.

SELECTED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ANALYSIS

This section offers context-specific details related to each crisis risk indicator, providing a more detailed analysis of the factors triggering risk alerts.

Proxy food imports

The proxy food imports indicator looks at the difference between the global and local prices (in USD) of five food commodities: beans, cooking oil, rice, sugar, and wheat. Risk alerts are raised when the divergence between the two prices exceeds the calculated pass-through average.[2] In July 2026, the proxy food imports indicator recorded one critical (in one AA-controlled district) and 310 heightened risk alerts across all governorates (212 of which were in AA areas), compared with seven critical and 282 heightened alerts in May. Although the number of critical alerts declined, the indicator remained above the risk threshold across almost the entire country, indicating continued divergence between global and local food prices. The temporary improvement observed earlier in 2026, with the indicator value declining between February–June 2026 (while remaining above the heighted alert threshold), has also begun to reverse. Global prices declined slightly between May–July, while local prices in USD terms increased in GoY-controlled areas and remained broadly stable in AA-controlled areas. As a result, the gap between global and local prices widened again, particularly in GoY areas.

In GoY-controlled areas, the cumulative price of the five monitored commodities increased from around USD 7.03 in May to USD 7.16 in July, while the global equivalent declined from around USD 3.20 to USD 3.10. In AA-controlled areas, local prices remained broadly stable at around USD 7.63 in July. This suggests that the improvement in the indicator observed earlier in 2026 was partly driven by the increase in global commodity prices rather than a sustained reduction in domestic food prices. As global prices have subsequently eased, the divergence has widened again.

The July trend is particularly concerning in light of the renewed deterioration in maritime security. The increasing risk of disruption along the Bab Al Mandab Strait caused by AA threats to maritime security could further increase international freight, insurance, and handling costs and delay deliveries, potentially increasing the landed cost of imported commodities. If these additional costs are passed through to Yemeni markets, the existing divergence between global and local prices could widen further. This would increase pressure on household purchasing power even in the absence of a major physical shortage of food.

Figure 1. Global and Yemeni market prices of beans, vegetable oil, rice, sugar, and wheat (in USD)



Note: the value measures the cumulative price for 1kg of beans, rice, sugar, and wheat and 1L of vegetable oil.

Sources: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 08/10/2026); FAO (accessed 08/10/2026)

2 In economics, 'pass-through' refers to the degree to which changes in one economic factor – such as exchange rate or production costs – are reflected in another, such as consumer prices or inflation. Pass-through describes how much a shift in one variable influences another.

Food prices

The food prices indicator recorded 45 heightened risk alerts in July, compared to 19 in May, with alerts concentrated in GoY-controlled areas, particularly Abyan, Al Maharah, Hadramawt, Ma'rib, and Shabwah. No critical alerts were recorded. The increase in the number of heightened alerts indicates a broader deterioration in local food price conditions compared to May, despite the absence of a sharp nationwide increase in the minimum food basket (MFB).

In GoY-controlled areas, the MFB increased from around YER 132,800 in May to YER 135,100 in June and YER 135,900 in July. In US dollar terms, the MFB reached approximately USD 86.5 in July, compared to USD 84.8 in May. The continued increase in the dollar value of the MFB indicates that the recent appreciation and relative stability of the Yemeni rial has not fully offset increases in underlying food and import costs. In AA-controlled areas, in contrast, the MFB remained broadly stable and declined slightly in July to around YER 44,550 (USD 83.9). While aggregate food prices in GoY areas remain substantially below their 2025 levels in Yemeni rial terms as a result of the rial's earlier appreciation, the recent upward trend in the MFB and the increase in food price alerts indicate renewed price pressures.[3]

Figure 2. MFB price in GoY-controlled areas in YER and USD



Sources: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 08/10/2026); FAO (accessed 08/10/2026)

Figure 3. MFB price in AA-controlled areas in YER and USD

Sources: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 08/10/2026); FAO (accessed 08/10/2026)

3 Yemen operates under a split exchange rate system, with monetary policy administered separately by AA authorities in Sana'a and the GoY based in Aden. This situation emerged after the Aden-based Central Bank of Yemen began issuing new banknotes in late 2019, a decision that was not recognized by AA authorities, who banned the new currency in areas under their control. As a result, the Yemeni rial sharply weakened against the US dollar in GoY-controlled areas, while remaining comparatively stable in AA-controlled areas. These differing exchange rates have contributed to a clear divergence in food prices: costs rose significantly in GoY-controlled areas after November 2019 but stayed largely steady in AA-controlled areas. Despite food prices appearing much higher in local currency terms in GoY-controlled areas, their US dollar value is higher in AA-controlled areas.

Fuel prices

The fuel price indicator recorded 20 critical and 84 heightened risk alerts in July, similar to May. Alerts remained concentrated in GoY-controlled areas, reflecting the continued impact of elevated fuel prices following the sharp increases recorded during April–June.

In GoY-controlled areas, diesel prices increased on average from around YER 1,650 (USD 1.05) per liter in May to YER 1,893 (USD 1.20) in July (with even higher prices recorded in June), while petrol prices increased from around YER 1,422 (USD 0.90) per liter in May to YER 1,635 (USD 1.04) in July. On the other hand, gas prices declined from approximately YER 624 (USD 0.40) to YER 562 (USD 0.36) during the same period. These values indicate that, after the sharp increases recorded since April, fuel prices remain elevated in GoY-controlled areas, with diesel and petrol continuing to place pressure on transport and operating costs.

In AA-controlled areas, official fuel prices remained unchanged throughout the recent period, at around YER 475 (USD 0.89) per liter for diesel and petrol and YER 361 (USD 0.68) for gas. Stable retail prices should not be interpreted as evidence of unchanged supply conditions, however, particularly given the limited visibility of informal fuel imports and the continued constraints on official imports.

The persistence of elevated fuel prices is likely to remain an important driver of food security risks. Higher diesel and petrol costs increase the cost of transporting food between ports, markets, and production areas and raise operating costs for agriculture, fisheries, water supply, and other essential services. As such, the effects are likely to extend beyond households purchasing fuel directly and contribute indirectly to higher food and NFI prices.

Figure 4. Diesel, gas, and petrol prices in YER and USD in GoY-controlled areas



Sources: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 08/10/2026); FAO (accessed 08/10/2026)

Figure 5. Diesel, gas, and petrol prices in YER in AA-controlled areas



Sources: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 08/10/2026); FAO (accessed 08/10/2026)

Proxy fuel imports

The proxy fuel imports indicator remained below the alert threshold in both areas of control in July, recording no alerts. This represents a different trend from the fuel price indicator, which continued to record critical and heightened alerts in GoY-controlled areas. The absence of proxy import alerts indicates that local and global fuel prices have not diverged enough to trigger the indicator, not that fuel supply conditions are returning to normal.

In GoY-controlled areas, the cumulative price of cooking gas and petrol increased substantially between March–June before declining slightly in July, from around USD 1.50 to USD 1.48. Global prices followed a different trajectory, declining in May and June after reaching a peak in April as a result of regional tensions from the war between US–Israel and Iran and associated maritime disruptions, while increasing again slightly in July. The resulting divergence remained below the proxy import alert threshold. In AA-controlled areas, local fuel prices remained broadly unchanged and under the alert threshold, despite remaining above global levels.

The absence of proxy fuel import alerts provides some indication that recent increases in global fuel prices have not yet generated significant additional divergence in Yemeni retail prices. The indicator does not capture physical constraints on fuel availability, however, and should be interpreted alongside actual fuel import volumes. This distinction is increasingly important given the decline in fuel imports through Red Sea ports and renewed escalation around the Bab Al Mandab Strait.

As a result, the outlook for this indicator is more uncertain than its current alert status suggests. A sustained disruption to maritime traffic could simultaneously increase global and local fuel costs, potentially limiting the divergence captured by the proxy indicator while still worsening household and market-level fuel access. As such, monitoring actual fuel import volumes and local fuel availability alongside the proxy indicator will be particularly important over the next two months.

Figure 6. Global and local prices of cooking gas and petrol in USD



Note: the value measures the cumulative price of 1kg of gas and 1L of petrol.

Sources: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 08/10/2026); FAO (accessed 08/10/2026)

Conflict

The conflict indicator recorded one critical and 12 heightened risk alerts in July. The alerts recorded in Al Hodeidah and Ta'iz governorates, including districts under both AA and GoY control, all related to frontline fighting between AA- and GoY-aligned forces that caused fatalities in At Tuhayta, Hays, and Jabal Ras. According to ACLED data, on 3–4 July, AA forces clashed with GoY-aligned Tihama Resistance forces across several positions, including Al Marir in Jabal Ras and other locations in At Tuhayta district, using heavy artillery, mortars, howitzers, and Katyusha rockets. The clashes resulted in 67 fatalities overall, including 52 AA fighters and 15 GoY soldiers, with a further 109 wounded.

On 17 July, GoY National Resistance forces clashed with AA forces along the southern Hays front after AA fighters attempted to clear mines to facilitate an attack on 13th Infantry Brigade positions, resulting in three reported AA fatalities. On the same day, an AA drone/mortar strike north of Hays city, killed one civilian and damaged property.

The alerts in Al Jawf and Sa'dah governorates (under AA control) were driven by incidents in Barat Al Anan and Khab wa Ash Sha'f districts. On 5 July, tribesmen ambushed an AA armored vehicle, killing three fighters and looting weapons and equipment. On 23 July, clashes erupted between AA forces and members of the Juzaylan and Dhu Musa tribes after an AA campaign attempted to demolish a tribesman's house over a land dispute. The fighting killed three tribesmen, four AA fighters, and wounded several others. AA forces subsequently deployed reinforcements to the governorate.

In Khab wa Ash Sha'f, clashes intensified between AA forces, GoY forces, and tribes. On 15 July, GoY forces repelled an AA attack on positions along the Qanaw front, causing unspecified AA casualties. On 25–27 July, a series of clashes and armed attacks involving the Al Juayd and Wahas tribes and AA forces occurred around checkpoints and Al Yatamah market, which resulted in at least 16 fatalities among AA forces and tribesmen.

Finally, the risk alert in Lahj governorate was caused by fighting in neighboring Ad Dali' district, where GoY and AA forces clashed on multiple occasions, resulting in fatalities on both sides inside the district and across Ad Dali' governorate.

Displacement

The displacement indicator recorded one critical alert in Sabir Al Mawadim in Ta'iz (GoY), which received 41 displaced households in July. The two heightened risk alerts were recorded in Hays district in Al Hodeidah and Al Makha district in Ta'iz (both under GoY control) as a result of the displacement of 81 and 30 households respectively, all because of conflict. Overall, 372 households were displaced in southern Yemen in July, the highest number since January 2026, 58% of whom for conflict reasons, 24% for economic reasons, and the remaining 8% because of natural hazards, specifically drought and desertification.

Exchange rate

In July 2026, the monthly average exchange rate in GoY-controlled areas remained relatively stable at YER 1,570/USD 1, continuing the appreciation observed since August 2025. As a result of this policy-driven stability, the JMR raised no exchange rate alerts in GoY-controlled areas. In AA-controlled areas, the average exchange rate also remained stable at around YER 531/USD 1 in July.

Figure 7. YER–USD exchange rate in Aden (GoY) and Sana'a (AA)

Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 08/10/2026)

Drought

In July 2026, the drought indicator – based on the Standardized Precipitation Index – recorded no alerts. The Standardized Precipitation Index revealed, however, predominantly negative anomalies across Yemen's agroecological zones in July, with extreme dry conditions registered in Al Bayda, Al Hodeidah, Al Mahwit, Hadramawt, and Raymah, indicating substantially lower precipitation compared to the long-term average (LTA), according to the FAO Agrometeorological Early Warning Bulletin of July 2026. Concurrently, the Agricultural Stress Index – a remotesensing metric designed for early detection of crop water stress – recorded moderate stress levels (25–40%) concentrated in Al Bayda, Raymah, and Sana'a governorates. Although meteorological indicators pointed to widespread rainfall deficits, with anomalies exceeding 40% below the LTA in several areas, the Vegetation Condition Index revealed that nearly 10% of cultivated lands experienced severe vegetation stress (scoring under 25%), predominantly in the Central Highlands and Southern Uplands, underscoring the heterogeneous spatial response of agricultural systems to rainfall variability during July 2026. The JMR drought indicator recorded no alerts in July, but did record 17 critical and 51 heightened risk alerts in June.

OTHER INDICATORS

This section covers additional contextual information on pertinent food and nutrition security indicators in Yemen.

Food imports

In July 2026, food imports through Red Sea ports declined slightly compared to June and were 16% below the 12-month moving average of 466,565MT, but were higher than July 2025. Imports through GoY-controlled southern ports stood at 92,135MT, 30% below the 12-month moving average of 130,982MT and 35% below June levels. As such, combined food imports declined by around 31% month-on-month and were approximately 19% below the combined 12-month moving average. Despite this decline, import volumes remained substantial and continued to support national food availability.

Figure 8. Monthly food imports by port

Source: ACAPS YETI (accessed 08/11/2026)

Fuel imports

In July, fuel imports remained volatile and below longer-term averages, with the latest available data indicating continued constraints across Yemen's maritime supply chains. Fuel imports through GoY-controlled southern ports rose sharply to 77,775MT in June, temporarily exceeding the 12-month moving average of 53,004MT before declining to 43,724MT in July, around 15% below the 12-month moving average of 51,699MT. The renewed decline in July is concerning given the continued dependence of electricity generation, transport, agriculture, fisheries, and water supply on imported fuel. AA-controlled ports received 73,751MT in July, below the monthly average of 102,438MT, after not officially importing any fuel in June. As for previous months, it is likely that supply has in reality remained steady because of the growing prevalence of dark vessels – ships calling at Red Sea ports with their automatic identification system transponders switched off – which official import data does not capture.

Figure 9. Monthly fuel imports by port



Source: ACAPS (accessed 08/11/2026)

FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY OUTCOMES

Food Consumption Score

Food consumption continued to deteriorate in June 2026, with the prevalence of inadequate food consumption increasing from 59% in April to 64% in June, indicating that nearly two-thirds of Yemeni households have been unable to meet their minimum food needs. All governorates exceeded the 'very high' threshold of 40%, with the highest prevalence recorded in Abyan, Ad Dali', Al Bayda, and Lahj. Severe food deprivation also increased for the second consecutive month, rising from 31% in April to 36% in June. Approximately 8% of households in AA areas and 6% in GoY areas reported that at least one household member had gone an entire day and night without eating because of lack of food. This deterioration was driven by the combined effects of rising food and fuel prices linked to the regional conflict, reduced household purchasing power, and prolonged electricity outages in GoY-controlled areas, which have affected livelihoods and income sources. The continued deterioration despite relatively adequate food import levels further highlights the importance of economic access constraints in driving food insecurity.

Reduced Coping Strategies Index

Continued reliance on coping strategies with potential harmful effects accompanied the worsening food security situation in June 2026. Deterioration in food consumption has accelerated following the curtailment of humanitarian assistance between 2024–2026, compared to the period of largescale food assistance between 2021–2023, reaching a prevalence of 39% in July. The continued depletion of household coping capacity, combined with rising food deprivation and reduced purchasing power, raises the risk that households will increasingly resort to coping strategies with potential harmful effects to meet their basic food needs. The WFP also highlights the positive impact of the Targeted Emergency Food Assistance program in GoY-controlled areas, where assisted households experienced a significant reduction in severe food deprivation alongside improvements in dietary diversity and coping capacity, underscoring the role of humanitarian assistance in preventing further deterioration.

OUTLOOK

Agrometeorological situation

According to the FAO Agrometeorological Early Warning Bulletin, the July–September 2026 Kharif season is facing a high probability of widespread drought in rainfed agricultural areas. The anticipated strengthening of El Niño further increases the likelihood that climatic shocks will compound existing food security pressures during the second half of 2026. Forecasts indicate below-average rainfall, with southern, central, and western agricultural zones experiencing rainfall deficits exceeding 40% of the long-term average, which is expected to constrain crop establishment and rangeland regeneration. The risk is particularly concerning because the Kharif season is critical for rainfed agricultural production and rural livelihoods. Above-average temperatures are expected to further increase evapotranspiration and water demand, potentially amplifying the effects of rainfall deficits on crops, pasture, and livestock. Given the already weak livelihood and food security situation, poor rainfall during the coming months could reduce agricultural income, increase demand for water and livestock feed, and further weaken household purchasing power. The impacts are likely to become more evident from the harvest period onwards, when reduced crop production and fodder availability translate into lower agricultural incomes and higher dependence on markets.

Food security

Approximately 53% of the population is projected to face IPC 3 or above levels of food insecurity through the end of 2026. In GoY-controlled areas, the latest IPC analysis projects a further deterioration during the June–September lean season, with 5.4 million people expected to face IPC 3 or worse conditions, including 1.6 million people experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels.

Food security conditions are expected to remain under significant pressure during the coming months, with several mutually reinforcing risks emerging. In GoY-controlled areas, persistently high living costs, elevated fuel and transport prices, and limited livelihood opportunities are likely to continue constraining household purchasing power despite relative exchange rate stability. In AA-controlled areas, the prolonged suspension of largescale humanitarian assistance, shrinking livelihood opportunities, liquidity constraints, and limited income-generating opportunities are expected to continue weakening household resilience. These pressures are likely to be compounded by the anticipated drought, which could reduce agricultural and livestock incomes while increasing household expenditure on food, water, and other basic needs. With coping capacity already significantly eroded, additional shocks are increasingly likely to translate into reductions in food consumption and more severe livelihood coping strategies. The latest FAO market analysis similarly highlights the continuing vulnerability of household food access to weak purchasing power, high fuel and transport costs, and limited income opportunities.

Regional conflict

Regional tensions escalated significantly in July, including renewed direct confrontation between AA and Saudi Arabia after several years of relative de-escalation. On 13 July, Saudi-led GoY forces struck Sana'a International Airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft carrying an AA delegation from landing. AA subsequently launched missiles towards Abha International Airport in Saudi Arabia. The escalation then extended to critical Saudi infrastructure and maritime activity, with AA announcing a maritime blockade targeting Saudi-linked shipping through the Red Sea and warning that tankers using Saudi ports could be attacked. AA forces subsequently claimed attacks against Saudi-linked oil tankers, while Saudi-linked shipping faced increased security concerns, with some vessels having to alter or delay their routes.

These developments significantly increase the risk of disruption along the Bab Al Mandab Strait, although its complete closure remains less likely than a scenario of partial disruption, reduced traffic, and increased shipping costs. The experience of the Red Sea crisis since 2023 demonstrates that attacks against a limited number of vessels can be enough to alter commercial shipping decisions without requiring a formal blockade. In the current context, the risk is higher because disruptions to the Bab Al Mandab Strait would compound existing instability around the Strait of Hormuz, increasing the incentive for shipping companies to reroute, delay voyages, or demand higher war-risk premiums. For Yemen, the principal food security risk is a progressive increase in the cost and uncertainty of importing food and fuel. If attacks expand beyond Saudi-linked vessels to a broader range of commercial shipping, or if shipping companies begin systematically avoiding the Bab Al Mandab Strait, the risk of more substantial supply disruptions would increase considerably.

ANNEXES

Annex I. Number of JMR alerts by governorate

Table 2 shows the number of JMR district alerts for each indicator by governorate.

Table 2. Number of JMR district alerts by governorate in July 2026

	CONFLICT		DISPLACEMENT		FOOD PRICES	FUEL PRICES		PROXY FOOD IMPORTS	
Governorate	C	H	C	H	H	C	H	C	H
Abyan					3	4	7		9
Ad Dali'							6		9
Aden					4		8		8
Al Bayda									20
Al Hodeidah		6		1			2	1	25
Al Jawf		3							12
Al Maharah					9		9		9
Al Mahwit									9
Amran									20
Dhamar	1								12
Hadramawt					21	2	26		27
Hajjah									31
Ibb									20
Lahj		1							13
Ma'rib					5		11		14
Raymah									6
Sa'dah		1							15
Sana'a									16
Sana'a City									10
Shabwah					3	14			4
Socotra									
Ta'iz		1	1	1			15		21
Total	1	12	1	2	45	20	84	1	310

Annex II. JMR alerts by district with a higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration

Table 3 shows JMR alerts by district. The districts with the highest alert levels out of 16 – three and four in this case – are included. The table highlights critical alerts (red), heightened alerts (yellow), and typical status (white) per food security risk indicator by district.

Table 3. JMR alerts by district with a higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration in July 2026

GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT	ALERT LEVEL	CONFLICT	DISPLACEMENT	DROUGHT	EXCHANGE RATE	FOOD PRICES	FUEL PRICES	PROXY FOOD IMPORTS	PROXY FUEL IMPORTS
Al Hodeidah	Hays	4								
Ta'iz	Sabir Al Mawadim	4								
Abyan	Al Wadi', Khanfar, Zinjibar	3								
Abyan	Jayshan, Mudiyah	3								
Aden	Al Mu'alla, At Tawahi, Khur Maksar, Kritar - Sirah	3								
Al Hodeidah	Al Khukhah	3								
Al Maharah	Al Ghaydhah, Al Masilah, Haswin, Hat, Hawf, Man'ar, Qishn, Sayhut, Shahin	3								
Dhamar	Wusab As Safil	3								
Hadramawt	Ad Dis, Ad Dulay'ah, Al Abr, Al Mukalla, Al Mukalla City, Al Qaff, Al Qatn, Amd, As Sawm, Ghayl Bawazir, Ghayl bin Yamin, Hajar As Say'ar, Haridah, Rakhyah, Rumah, Sah, Sayun, Shibam, Tarim, Thamud, Wadi Al Ayn, Zamakh wa Manwokh									
Lahj	Halmin									
Shabwah	Dahr									
Ta'iz	Al Makha									

Annex III. JMR historical heightened and critical risk alerts

The figures below show the percentage of the total possible heightened and critical risk alerts for all crisis risk indicators. The higher the score, the worse the deterioration in food and nutrition security.

Figure 10. Historical percentage of total JMR heightened and critical risk alerts (January 2015 to July 2026)

Annex IV. Historical overview of the population at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or worse food insecurity levels

Figure 11. Percentage of the population living in areas at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or worse food insecurity levels (January 2015 to July 2026)



Annex V. Sources and time frames of JMR risk indicators and target variables

Table 4. Indicator sources and time frames

	SOURCE	LINK	DATA FROM	DATA TO
RISK INDICATOR				
Conflict	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data	https://acleddata.com/data/	01/01/2015	07/31/2026
Displacement	IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix	https://dtm.iom.int/yemen	01/01/2014	07/31/2026
Drought	WFP	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/yem-rainfall-subnational	01/01/1981	07/31/2026
Exchange rate	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6159	01/01/2009	07/31/2026
Food prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4508	01/01/2009	07/31/2026
Fuel prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6133	01/01/2009	07/31/2026
Target variable				
FEWS NET	World Bank	https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0064614	07/01/2009	10/01/2024

ABOUT THIS REPORT

The JMR combines quantitative modeling and qualitative analysis to provide robust bimonthly food and nutrition security monitoring that identifies emerging crisis risks. The report aims to complement IPC analyses and facilitate early recognition and coordinated responses to emerging major food and nutrition security crises among humanitarian and development stakeholders. The JMR is the product of a core development team comprising members from ACAPS, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and the World Bank.

A detailed explanation of the empirical foundation the Yemen JMR uses is available in this World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. An updated version of this paper detailing the methodology behind the new indicators is forthcoming, and a copy can be made available upon request.

Disclaimer

This work is a product of the staff of the World Bank, FAO, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, and ACAPS. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors, the governments they represent, or the FAO, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, and ACAPS.

The World Bank, FAO, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, and ACAPS do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or currency of the data included in this work and do not assume responsibility for any errors, omissions, or discrepancies in the information or liability with respect to the use of or failure to use the information, methods, processes, or conclusions set forth. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Nothing herein shall constitute or be construed or considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunities of the World Bank, FAO, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, and ACAPS, all of which are specifically reserved.

Rights and permissions

The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the World Bank encourages the dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be used, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution is given.

Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, the World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; email: pubrights@worldbank.org

For questions or comments, please contact yahinfo@acaps.org.