

# YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT

BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS

APRIL 2026 - REPORT #14

## KEY MESSAGES

- Yemen saw a seasonal improvement in [food consumption](#) in February 2026, with inadequate food consumption declining to 57% from 63% in January 2025, driven by Ramadan-related support (reaching the same percentage as during Ramadan 2025), remittances, currency appreciation in areas under Government of Yemen (GoY) control, and partial public sector salary payments. That said, severe food deprivation remained high at 30% nationwide, with all governorates above critical thresholds. At the same time, reliance on coping strategies persisted or worsened; severe food-based coping increased to up to 43% in areas under the control of Ansar Allah (AA) and 39% in GoY areas, while 62–69% of households resorted to Crisis or Emergency strategies. This underscores that gains in food consumption were temporary and insufficient to offset structural economic constraints and limited livelihood opportunities.
- According to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network ([FEWS NET](#)), severe food insecurity is expected to persist through September 2026, with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in parts of AA areas and widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) nationwide. Limited income opportunities, high prices, and regional tensions related to the conflict between US–Israel and Iran and its impact on global trade routes affecting energy markets are likely to deepen food consumption gaps, while poor households continue to face insufficient job opportunities and livelihood disruptions.
- In March 2026, the Joint Monitoring Report (JMR) recorded 16 critical and 544 heightened risk alerts, with the proxy food imports indicator accounting for the largest share (16 critical and 276 heightened), reflecting continued divergence between local and global food prices in districts across Abyan, Ad Dali', Al Jawf, Al Maharah, and Lahj (where critical alerts were recorded). The proxy fuel imports indicator recorded 215 heightened alerts, all in AA-controlled areas, where local fuel prices remained above global benchmarks despite limited monthly changes up to March, and in Socotra, where average fuel prices started decreasing from October 2025, although the indicator remained above the heightened risk threshold. Food prices triggered 30 heightened alerts across both areas of control, with increases ranging from 2–16% above the five-month moving average in governorates including Hadramawt, Ma'rib, Shabwah, and Socotra. Displacement and conflict indicators recorded a small number of heightened alerts linked to earlier displacement spikes

and persistent localized violence in Ta'iz and Al Jawf. Exchange rate alerts (14 heightened) were also driven by data adjustments rather than market changes, while fuel price alerts remained minimal until the end of March. Food import volumes reached record highs through both Red Sea and southern ports, while fuel imports declined significantly through southern ports, and no fuel was imported through Red Sea ports in March, reflecting continuing regional disruptions.

### Pre-assessment for triggering the Food Security Crisis Preparedness Plan for Yemen

Up until March 2026, the JMR Risk Team did not recommend triggering the plan but advised continued close monitoring, as a range of compounding risks could further deteriorate food security conditions. Both model results and broader qualitative analysis pointed to a highly fragile context: while key food outcome indicators, such as the Food Consumption Score and reduced Coping Strategies Index, remained well above critical thresholds, they showed a temporary improvement that month likely linked to seasonal factors, including Ramadan and a short-lived appreciation of the Yemeni rial in GoY areas. That said, this improvement must be interpreted cautiously. Yemen continues to face one of the most severe food crises globally, with 18.3 million people acutely food-insecure and a large share of the population in emergency conditions, driven by protracted conflict, economic decline, and heavy reliance on imports.





Emerging pressures are expected to reverse recent gains. Rising regional tensions have disrupted trade through the Strait of Hormuz and contributed to higher fuel and transport costs, reflected in a 24% increase in fuel prices in GoY areas after the reporting period, with likely knock-on effects on food prices and access to essential services. Additional risks include potential flooding during the upcoming rainy season and persistent constraints on humanitarian operations, particularly in AA-controlled areas, alongside severe funding gaps. It is also important to note that the reduced number of critical alerts in March largely reflects a change in the underlying food price dataset, which affected multiple indicators, including food and fuel prices, and proxy import indicators, limiting comparability with previous months. Overall, despite some short-term improvements captured by the model, the broader analysis indicates a high likelihood of worsening conditions in the coming months, especially as the lean season approaches.

## AGGREGATED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ALERTS AND RISK SEVERITY

This section summarizes the heightened and critical alerts recorded based on JMR key indicators of deteriorating food and nutrition security.<sup>1</sup> For a more detailed breakdown of indicator alerts by governorate and district, please refer to Annexes I and II.

In March 2026, the JMR recorded 16 critical and 544 heightened risk alerts. The proxy food imports indicator recorded the highest number of alerts, with 16 critical and 276 heightened risk alerts, followed by the proxy fuel imports indicator, which recorded 215 heightened alerts. Food prices raised heightened risk alerts in 30 districts across both areas of control. The 14 heightened risk alerts for the exchange rate raised in AA-controlled governorates are related to a change in the dataset used. In the previous report, we used FAO data where available for AA governorates and filled gaps with food price predictions from the World Bank. For this report, the latest available FAO data for AA-controlled areas is from October 2025, making the gap too big to continue using the same data. While World Bank data fills temporal and geographical gaps, the values are predictions rather than collected data, giving it medium-low reliability. For GoY areas, FAO price data is up-to-date and acceptable for the JMR modeling. More information on overall exchange rate trends is available in the dedicated section below. The change in the dataset used also affected the proxy food imports indicator, resulting in fewer critical alerts than in the previous report, when 181 were recorded. Overall, the lack of price data from AA-controlled areas will create larger information gaps in the coming months, which can affect the assessment of the situation.

Table 1. Critical and heightened food security risk alerts countrywide by indicator in March 2026

INDICATOR	CRITICAL RISK ALERTS	HEIGHTENED RISK ALERTS	GOVERNORATE
 Proxy food imports	16	276	All governorates
 Proxy fuel imports	0	215	All AA-controlled governorates and Socotra
 Food prices	0	30	Abyan, Hadramawt, Hajjah, Lahj, Ma'rib, Sa'dah, Shabwah, Socotra
 Exchange rate	0	14	Hajjah, Sa'dah
 Conflict	0	5	Al Jawf, Ta'iz
 Displacement	0	3	Hadramawt, Ta'iz
 Fuel prices	0	1	Hajjah
 Drought	0	0	
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>544</b>	

<sup>1</sup> Critical alerts identify areas where a deterioration in food security is almost certain based on historical trends. Decision makers should consider these areas high-priority. Heightened alerts identify areas where there is a high chance of deterioration in food and nutrition security and provide decision makers with a good overview of current food and nutrition security trends countrywide.

## SELECTED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ANALYSIS


This section offers context-specific details for each crisis risk indicator, providing a more detailed analysis of the factors that trigger risk alerts.

### Proxy food imports

The proxy food imports indicator examines the difference between the global and local prices (in USD) of five food commodities: beans, cooking oil, rice, sugar, and wheat. Risk alerts are raised when the divergence between the two prices exceeds the calculated pass-through average.<sup>2</sup> In March 2026, the proxy food imports indicator raised 16 critical alerts in districts in Abyan, Ad Dali', Al Maharah, and Lahj governorates under GoY control and in Al Jawf under AA control, as well as 276 heightened risk alerts – 175 in AA-controlled areas and 101 in AA governorates.

In districts in Abyan, Ad Dali', and Lahj governorate (where critical alerts were recorded), food prices in March increased by 1.6% compared to the previous month. Overall, the indicator value started to decrease in March but remained above the critical alert threshold owing to prices being significantly higher than the global rates for the same commodities. A similar trend was observed in Al Maharah, where prices increased by 0.26% from February–March and were 1.6% higher than the critical alert threshold. In the two districts of Al Jawf that recorded critical alerts, food price increases were above the critical alert threshold.

Figure 1. Global and local prices (in the Yemeni market) of beans, vegetable oil, rice, sugar, and wheat in USD



Note: the value represents the cumulative price for 1kg of beans, rice, sugar, and wheat and 1L of vegetable oil.

Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 04/13/2026); FAO (accessed 04/13/2026)

### Food prices

The food prices indicator recorded 30 heightened risk alerts in districts in Abyan, Hadramawt, Lahj, Ma'rib, Shabwah, and Socotra under GoY control and in Hajjah and Sa'dah under AA control.

In Abyan and Lahj, the minimum food basket (MFB) price increased by 4% in March compared to the five-month moving average, reaching YER 128,550 (USD 82), which slightly surpassed the heightened risk alert. In Ad Dis, Al Mukalla, and Ghayl Bawazir districts in Hadramawt, the MFB price increased by 6% relative to the five-month moving average, while in Al Mukalla City, it increased by 4%. In Hajjah governorate, the districts that recorded heightened risk alerts saw the MFB price increase by 2–7%. In Ma'rib and Shabwah, the MFB price increased by 8–13%. In Socotra, the price increased by 16% compared to the five-month moving average. In Sa'dah, the price increased by 3%.

<sup>2</sup> In economics, 'pass-through' refers to the degree to which changes in one economic factor – such as exchange rate or production costs – are reflected in another, such as consumer prices or inflation. Pass-through describes how much a shift in one variable influences another.


# YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT

BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS

APRIL 2026 - REPORT #14

The average MFB price in AA governorates increased slightly since November, reaching around YER 45,000 (USD 85) in March 2026 while being 4% cheaper year-on-year.


Figure 2. MFB price in AA-controlled areas in YER and USD between March 2025 and March 2026



Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 04/13/2026); FAO (accessed 04/13/2026)

Thanks to the appreciation of the Yemeni rial in GoY areas since August 2025, food prices were 26% cheaper in March 2026 at around YER 132,000 (USD 84) compared to March 2025, although they increased in USD terms by 15%.<sup>3</sup>

Figure 3. MFB price in GoY-controlled areas in YER and USD between March 2025 and March 2026




Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 04/13/2026); FAO (accessed 04/13/2026)

<sup>3</sup> Yemen operates under a split exchange rate system, with monetary policy administered separately by authorities in Sana'a, under AA control, and the GoY based in Aden. This situation emerged after the Aden-based Central Bank began issuing new banknotes in late 2019, a decision not recognized by the Sana'a authorities, who banned the new currency in areas under their control. As a result, the Yemeni rial has sharply weakened against the US dollar in GoY-controlled areas, while remaining comparatively stable in AA-controlled areas. These differing exchange rates have contributed to a clear divergence in food prices: costs have risen significantly in GoY-controlled areas after November 2019 but stayed largely steady in AA-controlled areas. Despite food prices appearing much higher in local currency terms in GoY-controlled areas, their USD value is higher in AA-controlled areas.

## Proxy fuel imports

The proxy fuel imports indicator recorded 215 heightened risk alerts in March 2025, 213 in AA-controlled districts and two in Socotra (GoY), remaining steady since November 2025. On average, the indicator value for proxy fuel imports in AA areas decreased in February and March compared to January, while remaining 22% above the heightened alert threshold. The cumulative price of 1L of petrol and 1kg of cooking gas in AA-controlled areas was USD 1.70 on average, higher than the global equivalent of USD 1.17. Prices in AA areas remained stable month-on-month in March, while global fuel prices increased by 39% on average between February–March, driven by the war between US–Israel and Iran and by fuel export disruptions through the Strait of Hormuz. The local price of cooking gas and petrol in GoY areas reached USD 1.16 in March, 6% higher than in January 2026. This, however, did not lead to any alerts in GoY areas, as the indicator value remained well below the risk threshold.

Figure 4. Global and local prices of cooking gas and petrol in USD between March 2025 and March 2026



Note: the value represents the cumulative price of 1kg of gas and 1L of petrol.

Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 04/13/2026); FAO (accessed 04/13/2026)

## Fuel prices

The fuel price indicator raised only one alert in March 2026 for Harad district in Hajjah governorate. Here, the average fuel price increased by 13% relative to the six-month moving average, remaining at the critical alert threshold. The average YER prices of diesel and petrol in GoY areas decreased significantly after July 2025, driven by currency appreciation, and have since remained largely stable, showing a 26% and 27% decrease, respectively, in March 2026 compared to March 2025. Gas prices, on the other hand, were 7.5% higher in YER year-on-year. In AA-controlled governorates, the average prices of cooking gas, diesel, and petrol have remained stable since November 2025, although 10% higher year-on-year.

Aden continues to face a deepening electricity and domestic gas crisis, while higher temperatures are driving higher demand related to the use of cooling systems. Fuel shortages, aging infrastructure, and delays in externally funded energy projects continue to limit electricity supply. At the same time, a prolonged gas crisis driven by [disruptions to supply lines](#) from Ma'rib, rising demand, and weak distribution systems has left residents queuing for hours or turning to the black market. Limited oversight, price inconsistencies, and smuggling have further worsened access, placing additional strain on households already facing difficult economic conditions.

In [Hadramawt](#) (GoY), fuel and gas shortages are also intensifying, with long queues and inconsistent supply becoming a daily reality. Price disparities between coastal and inland areas point to deeper issues in distribution and pricing systems, while weak enforcement has allowed black-market activity to spread. The situation reflects broader problems in market management and oversight, with increasing calls for clearer regulation, unified pricing, and more reliable distribution to stabilize access and reduce pressure on households.

# YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT


BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS

APRIL 2026 - REPORT #14

In April, the [Yemen Petroleum Company \(YPC\) in Aden](#) announced an about 24% increase in gasoline and diesel prices, raising the per-liter cost from YER 1,190–1,200 to YER 1,475. This has brought up the cost of a 20L container to YER 29,500. YPC–Aden attributed the hike to escalating military tensions in the Gulf, disruptions to supply routes through the Strait of Hormuz, and higher transportation and maritime insurance costs.


The company stressed that the increase is temporary and intended to avoid fuel shortages while maintaining a steady supply amid continued global market instability.

Figure 5. Diesel, gas, and petrol prices in YER and USD in GoY-controlled areas between March 2025 and March 2026



Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 04/13/2026); FAO (accessed 04/13/2026)

Figure 6. Diesel, gas, and petrol prices in YER in AA-controlled areas between March 2025 and March 2026



Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 04/13/2026); FAO (accessed 04/13/2026)

## Displacement

In March, the displacement indicator recorded three heightened risk alerts, in Sayun and Wadi Al Ayn districts of Hadramawt and in Salah district in Ta'iz. Sayun did not record any new displacement in March, and the indicator value decreased but remained above the heightened risk threshold given the displacement of 102 households in January as a result of conflict and violence. Similarly, in Wadi Al Ayn, only one household was displaced in March, while the heightened alert risk was recorded after the indicator value spiked in January following the displacement of 26 households. Finally, in Salah, three households were displaced to the district in March, but the indicator was above the heightened risk alert because the displacement of 66 households to the district in January. Overall, in March, [91 households were displaced in Yemen](#), of which 69 were in Ma'rib, 14 in Al Hodeidah, and the rest in Ta'iz (5) and Hadramawt (3). Most displacement occurred as a result of increased conflict in Al Hodeidah, Ibb, Ma'rib, Sana'a, and Ta'iz.<sup>4</sup>

## Conflict

The conflict indicator recorded five heightened risk alerts in March: four in Ta'iz and one in Al Jawf. The incidents reflect a mix of tribal revenge killings, intertribal clashes, and sustained frontline fighting between AA and GoY forces, alongside attacks on civilians and livelihoods as recorded by the [Armed Conflict Location and Event Data \(ACLED\)](#) for Yemen.

In Khab wa Ash Sha'f, the primary driver of violence was tribal dynamics. On 4 March, armed tribesmen ambushed a tribal sheikh's vehicle in Al Dhahirah, killing him and a companion in an apparent act of revenge. Later, on 24 March, clashes between Bani Hatban and Al Hazm tribesmen in Al Murais killed one person, though the trigger was unclear. Harf Sufyan district in Amran saw a combination of tribal and AA confrontations and targeted violence. On 7 March, large clashes between AA forces and Dhu Sumaym tribesmen in Al Amashiyah killed seven people and injured 13. The same day, tribesmen ambushed an AA supervisor, killing his son and two guards, in retaliation for a prior killing. On 27 March, AA forces shot at farmers in Wadi Mawr, killing one and injuring a child, to prevent cultivation. On 28 March, unidentified gunmen killed a tribal sheikh. Overall, the pattern shows retaliation cycles and coercive violence against civilians. These incidents triggered the risk alerts in Al Jawf.

The main drivers of risk alerts in Ta'iz were incidents in Al Mudhaffar and At Ta'iziyah districts. Al Mudhaffar experienced active frontline conflict. Between 8–13 March, repeated clashes between GoY and AA forces on Ta'iz's western fronts resulted in multiple fatalities on both sides, including an AA leader and several fighters. On 9 March, an improvised explosive device attack killed a GoY soldier. On 24 March, clashes between unidentified gunmen killed a girl, highlighting spillover risks to civilians even outside formal battle lines. In At Ta'iziyah, hostilities were intense and included both frontline fighting and civilian targeting. On 13 March, coordinated clashes across several fronts caused multiple casualties among both GoY and AA forces. Further clashes on 22 and 27 March resulted in the deaths of GoY personnel. Notably, on 15 March, AA shelling of a residential area killed five civilians and injured two, underscoring the continued impact of indiscriminate attacks on populated areas.

## Exchange rate

In GoY areas, the monthly average exchange rate saw a slight appreciation from YER 1,632/USD 1 in August 2025 to YER 1,569/USD 1 in March 2026. As a result, the JMR raised no exchange rate alerts in GoY areas. In AA areas, the average exchange rate in March remained stable at around YER 531/USD 1. The exchange rate indicator in March raised 14 heightened alerts for districts in Hajjah and Sa'dah, but as a result of a change in the dataset used to inform the indicator, which used FAO data until October 2025 and World Bank data from November–March.


<sup>4</sup> These figures only represent displacement to or within GoY areas, as the IOM only collects data in governorates under GoY control. They can indicate displacement from but not within districts in AA areas.

# YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT

BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS

APRIL 2026 - REPORT #14

Figure 7. YER–USD exchange rate in Aden (GoY) and Sana'a (AA) from March 2025 and March 2026



Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 04/13/2026)

## Drought

In March 2026, the drought indicator – based on the Standardized Precipitation Index – did not record any alerts. The [Agricultural Stress Index](#), a remote-sensing-based tool designed to rapidly detect agricultural water stress, registered no impact on crops.


## OTHER INDICATORS

This section covers additional contextual information on pertinent food and nutrition security indicators in Yemen.

### Food imports

In March, total [food imports](#) reached the highest levels recorded since August 2017 (based on available data). Food import volumes through Red Sea ports (661,000MT) were 62% higher than the 12-month moving average. GoY-controlled southern ports also saw increased food imports in March, the highest in the last 12 months, with 209,000MT imported, 65% above the 12-month moving average.

Figure 8. Monthly food imports by port between March 2025 and March 2026



Source: ACAPS (accessed 04/13/2026)

# YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT

BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS

APRIL 2026 - REPORT #14


## Fuel imports

In March 2026, [fuel import volumes](#) through southern ports (under GoY control) were the lowest since March 2024 at around 29,000MT, 59% below the 12-month moving average. The decrease was likely from severely reduced maritime traffic from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates following the disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. No fuel was imported through Red Sea ports in March, but fuel imports in February were higher than in January and December.

Satellite data suggests that official statistics may underestimate actual fuel inflows into AA-controlled areas. This is partly attributable to the growing prevalence of dark vessels, ships calling at Red Sea ports with their automatic identification system transponders switched off, which are not captured in official import data.

Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have also affected Yemen, including added [war-risk insurance premiums](#) of about USD 3,000 per container for cargo heading to Yemeni ports. Some shipments are also no longer sent directly by sea. Instead, they are transported overland from the Gulf through Oman and then re-shipped to Yemen by vessel. This rerouting increases costs by an estimated USD 5,000–9,500 per container plus storage and transit fees.

Figure 9. Monthly fuel imports by port between March 2025 and March 2026



Source: ACAPS (accessed 04/12/2026)

## FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY OUTCOMES

### Food Consumption Score

Yemen experienced a [seasonal improvement in food security in February 2026](#), primarily driven by increased religious charity during Ramadan, higher remittance inflows, the appreciation of the Yemeni rial in GoY areas, and the partial payment of public-sector salaries. These factors contributed to a 9% month-on-month improvement, reducing the prevalence of inadequate food consumption among surveyed households nationwide to 57% in February 2026 (61% in GoY areas and 55% in AA areas). This marks an improvement compared to December 2025, when 64% of households nationwide were unable to meet their minimum food needs, underscoring the seasonal nature of the gains. That said, the positive effect of Ramadan in both 2025 and 2026 remained less pronounced than in previous years, reflecting worsening economic conditions, reduced purchasing power, and limited humanitarian food assistance. Despite these improvements, severe food deprivation also continued to affect nearly one in three households (30%) in February 2026, although this represents a decline from 37% in December 2025. All governorates remained above the 'very high' threshold ( $\geq 20\%$ ), with the highest levels recorded in Abyan, Ad Dali', Al Jawf, Raymah, and Sa'dah.

### Reduced Coping Strategies Index

Despite the seasonal improvement in food consumption, [reliance on coping strategies remained widespread](#) and, in some cases, intensified. The adoption of severe food-based coping strategies increased from 36% in December 2025 to 41% in February 2026. Similarly, the share of households resorting to Crisis or Emergency coping strategies rose by 11% month-on-month,

# YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT

BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS

APRIL 2026 - REPORT #14

reaching 62% in GoY areas and 69% in AA areas, compared to 59% nationwide in December. This continued reliance reflects persistent economic pressures and limited access to stable livelihoods, with households spending approximately 72% of their income on food. As a result, many families continue to adopt potentially harmful coping mechanisms, including reducing adult food intake, selling assets, and increasingly resorting to begging in several governorates.

## OUTLOOK

### Food security

According to FEWS NET, food security conditions in Yemen are expected to remain severe between March–September 2026. In AA-controlled areas, IPC 4 outcomes are projected to persist in Al Hodeidah, Hajjah, and Ta'iz, with IPC 3 outcomes widespread elsewhere. Anticipated price increases linked to regional tensions are likely to further reduce purchasing power and widen food consumption gaps. In rural areas, deteriorating pasture conditions and high fodder costs are expected to force distress livestock sales during the June–August lean season.

In GoY-controlled areas, IPC 3 outcomes are expected to persist, with some households facing IPC 4. While agricultural labor may temporarily improve through May, overall income opportunities will remain insufficient, leaving poor households unable to meet basic food needs.

### Agrometeorological situation

The outlook for March–May 2026 points to increasing rainfall and rising temperatures as Yemen transitions into the Saif rainy season, creating both opportunities and significant risks. Above-average rainfall across coastal areas and highlands may support crop production, pasture regeneration, and fishing activities, but uneven rainfall and already-observed flooding between 27–31 March affecting Abyan, Aden, Al Hodeidah, Lahj, Ma'rib, and Ta'iz, killing at least 17 people and affecting around 68,700, highlight the growing threat of flooding. The floods damaged homes, farmland, infrastructure, and 49 IDP sites, and restricted road access hindered response efforts.

Looking ahead, intensifying rainfall is expected to increase the likelihood of flash floods, particularly in flood-prone wadis where over 409,000 hectares of cropland and 1.7 million livestock are exposed, especially in Al Hodeidah. Additional risks include soil erosion, crop diseases, livestock parasites, and desert locusts, all of which could disrupt livelihoods and markets. While seasonal improvements in agriculture are possible, they are unlikely to offset structural vulnerabilities, and food security is expected to remain fragile amid conflict, economic constraints, and climate-related shocks.

### Regional conflict

On 28 March 2026, AA forces sent a missile to Israel, de facto signaling their readiness to enter the conflict and open a new front. By 5 April, AA had attacked Israel seven times, claiming to target Ben Gurion Airport, central Israel, and other unspecified military targets concerning the Israeli Defense Forces in southern Israel. This posture shift by AA marks a potential escalation and increases risks to global shipping, as the group controls the Bab Al Mandab Strait in the Red Sea and has the capacity to attack vessels in the area, as previously demonstrated. This risk is currently low as the US and Iran agreed to a Pakistan-mediated ceasefire on April 8, but it remains plausible especially if the ceasefire breaks down and the parties fail to reach a permanent agreement.

If tensions escalate, Yemen is likely to be affected through multiple channels. As a highly import-dependent country, it would face rising costs and potential shortages of fuel, food, and agricultural inputs. Both GoY- and AA-controlled areas have limited fiscal space to absorb price shocks. While price controls may temporarily slow increases, they are unlikely to hold under prolonged disruption. AA areas are especially vulnerable given their near-total reliance on fuel imports, while GoY areas depend on imported refined fuels despite domestic crude production. Maritime disruptions, including rising shipping insurance premiums, are expected to further increase import costs and heighten food insecurity.

# YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT

BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS

APRIL 2026 - REPORT #14

## ANNEXES

### Annex I. Number of JMR alerts by governorate

Table 2 shows the number of JMR district alerts for each indicator by governorate.

Table 2. Number of JMR district alerts by governorate in March 2026

GOVERNORATE	CONFLICT	DISPLACEMENT	EXCHANGE RATE	FOOD PRICES	FUEL PRICES	PROXY FOOD IMPORTS		PROXY FUEL IMPORTS
	H	H	C	H	H	C	H	H
Abyan				2		2	9	
Ad Dali'						6	2	3
Aden							3	
Al Bayda							8	20
Al Hodeidah							26	24
Al Jawf	1					2	10	12
Al Maharah						2	7	
Al Mahwit							9	9
Amran							18	20
Dhamar							12	12
Hadramawt		2		4			28	
Hajjah			10	8	1		17	31
Ibb							20	20
Lahj				2		4	11	
Ma'rib				7			12	7
Raymah							6	6
Sa'dah			4	2			10	15
Sana'a							16	16
Sana'a City							10	10
Shabwah				3			17	
Socotra				2			2	2
Ta'iz	4	1					23	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>276</b>	<b>215</b>

# YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT

BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS

APRIL 2026 - REPORT #14

## Annex II. JMR alerts by district with a high risk of food and nutrition security deterioration

Table 3 shows JMR alerts by district. The districts with the highest alert level out of 16 – three and four in this case – are included. The table highlights critical alerts (red), heightened alerts (yellow), and typical status (white) per food security risk indicator by district.


Table 3. JMR alerts by district with a high risk of food and nutrition security deterioration in March 2026

GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT	ALERT LEVEL	CONFLICT	DISPLACEMENT	DROUGHT	EXCHANGE RATE	FOOD PRICES	FUEL PRICES	PROXY FOOD IMPORTS	PROXY FUEL IMPORTS
Hajjah	Harad	4	Yellow				Yellow	Yellow		Yellow
Al Jawf	Al Ghayl, Al Hazm	3							Orange	Yellow
Al Jawf	Al Humaydat	3	Yellow						Yellow	Yellow
Hajjah	Abs, Bakil Al Mir, Hayran, Midi, Mustaba, Qarah, Washhah	3				Yellow	Yellow		Yellow	
Sa'dah	Adh Dhahir, Shada'a	3				Yellow	Yellow			Yellow
Socotra	Hadibu, Qalansiyah wa Abd Al Kuri	3					Yellow		Yellow	Yellow
Ta'iz	Salah	3	Yellow	Yellow					Yellow	

## Annex III. JMR historical heightened and critical risk alerts


The figure below shows the historical breakdown of JMR food and nutrition security risk alerts by indicator for all districts. The graphs show the percentage of the total possible heightened and critical risk alerts for all six food and nutrition security crisis risk indicators. The higher the score, the worse the deterioration in food and nutrition security.

Figure 12. Historical percentage of total JMR heightened and critical risk alerts (January 2015 to March 2026)



## Annex IV. Historical overview of the population at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or worse food insecurity levels

Figure 13. Percentage of the population living in areas at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or worse food insecurity levels (January 2015 to March 2026)



## Annex V. Sources and time frames of JMR risk indicators and target variables

Table 4. Indicator sources and time frames

RISK INDICATOR	SOURCE	LINK	DATA FROM	DATA TO
Conflict	ACLED	<a href="https://acleddata.com/data/">https://acleddata.com/data/</a>	01/01/2015	04/13/2025
Displacement	IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix	<a href="https://dtm.iom.int/yemen">https://dtm.iom.int/yemen</a>	01/01/2014	04/13/2025
Drought	WFP	<a href="https://data.humdata.org/dataset/yem-rainfall-subnational">https://data.humdata.org/dataset/yem-rainfall-subnational</a>	01/01/1981	04/13/2025
Exchange rate	World Bank	<a href="https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6159">https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6159</a>	01/01/2009	04/13/2025
Food prices	World Bank	<a href="https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4508">https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4508</a>	01/01/2009	04/13/2025
Fuel prices	World Bank	<a href="https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6133">https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6133</a>	01/01/2009	04/13/2025
Target variable				
FEWS NET	World Bank	<a href="https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0064614">https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0064614</a>	07/01/2009	10/01/2024

## ABOUT THIS REPORT

The JMR combines quantitative modeling and qualitative analysis to provide robust bimonthly food and nutrition security monitoring that identifies emerging crisis risks. The report aims to complement IPC analyses and facilitate early recognition and coordinated responses to emerging major food and nutrition security crises among humanitarian and development stakeholders. The JMR is the product of a core development team comprising members from ACAPS, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and the World Bank.

A detailed explanation of the empirical foundation the Yemen JMR uses is available in this World Bank [Policy Research Working Paper](#). An updated version of the Policy Research Working Paper detailing the methodology behind the new indicators is forthcoming, and a copy can be made available upon request.

### Disclaimer

This work is a product of the staff of the World Bank, FAO, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, and ACAPS. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors, the governments they represent, or the FAO, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, and ACAPS.

The World Bank, FAO, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, and ACAPS do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or currency of the data included in this work and do not assume responsibility for any errors, omissions, or discrepancies in the information or liability with respect to the use of or failure to use the information, methods, processes, or conclusions set forth. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Nothing herein shall constitute or be construed or considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunities of the World Bank, FAO, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, and ACAPS, all of which are specifically reserved.

### Rights and permissions

The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because the World Bank encourages the dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be used, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution is given.

Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, the World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; email: [pubrights@worldbank.org](mailto:pubrights@worldbank.org).

For questions or comments, please contact [yahinfo@acaps.org](mailto:yahinfo@acaps.org).