

YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT

BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS

MARCH 2026 - REPORT #13

KEY MESSAGES

- Food security in Yemen remains dire. In December 2025, 64% of households were unable to meet minimum food needs, with severe food deprivation affecting 37% of the population nationwide and higher prevalence in the Government of Yemen (GoY)-controlled areas of Ma'rib (55%), Ad Dali' (48%), and Abyan (45%) and the Ansar Allah (AA)-controlled areas of Al Bayda (46%) and Al Jawf (44%). Inadequate food consumption affected 66% of households in GoY areas and 63% in AA areas. Households nationwide spent around 72% of income on food, leaving little for other needs, and 59% resorted to crisis or emergency coping strategies, including begging, particularly in AA areas (62%) versus GoY areas (53%).
- Malnutrition remains critical, with 2.5 million children under five acutely malnourished, including 500,000 with severe acute malnutrition (SAM), and 1.3 million pregnant and lactating women affected. Rising cases in Hajjah and Ma'rib reflect worsening food insecurity, disease, income loss, and service disruptions. Funding shortfalls have forced major reductions in nutrition response. Targets for 2025 fell from 7.8 million to 2 million people, with SAM treatment coverage at 64–65% and moderate acute malnutrition below 28%.
- In Yemen, many households in the highlands have exhausted their cereal harvest and are reliant on markets, while work is limited until farming resumes in March–April. In coastal, eastern plateau, and desert areas, labor opportunities are rising and expected to continue through May, with the March mango season providing extra income. Food security typically sees a temporary boost also during Ramadan (February–March) as a result of increased zakat, remittances, and food aid, slightly improving access to food for poor households. Escalating conflict after the United States and Israel began bombing Iran heightens spillover risks for Yemen. Renewed hostilities are already drawing forces into regional fighting. Strikes on Yemen, more likely if AA forces resume attacks in the Red Sea, may trigger displacement, civilian casualties, and damage to vital infrastructure, including ports and storage facilities, deepening humanitarian needs nationwide.
- In January 2026, the Joint Monitoring Report (JMR) documented 188 critical and 432 heightened risk alerts, with the proxy food imports indicator generating the highest number (181 critical and 117 heightened alerts), primarily in AA-controlled governorates, where local food prices in USD remained significantly above global levels, while GoY areas recorded only heightened alerts. The

proxy fuel imports indicator recorded 215 heightened alerts in AA areas, with average local petrol and cooking gas prices reaching nearly double global prices, while GoY areas remained below alert levels. Food prices triggered 87 heightened alerts, especially in Al Jawf, Hadramawt, Hajjah, Sana'a, Shabwah, and Ta'iz, reflecting increases above the five-month moving averages of 3–5% in AA governorates and 6–15% in GoY areas. Displacement alerts showed critical and heightened risks, driven by conflict, insecurity, and economic pressures, particularly in Hadramawt (GoY), Ma'rib (GoY), and Ta'iz (AA and GoY). Conflict alerts were raised in AA-controlled Al Jawf and the GoY-controlled areas of Hadramawt, Ma'rib, and Shabwah, linked to Southern Transitional Council (STC)–GoY clashes, tribal incidents, and counterterrorism operations. Drought alerts were minimal, with only two heightened alerts in Al Hodeidah. Exchange rates remained stable in both GoY and AA areas, while food volumes increased at ports in both areas of control, with Red Sea ports recording some of the highest levels. Fuel imports were below average at both Red Sea and southern ports.

Pre-assessment for triggering the Food Security Crisis Preparedness Plan for Yemen









By January 2026, a number of risk indicators in the JMR model saw a reduced number of alerts. The exchange rate indicator had not raised any alerts since August 2025, conflict saw an overall decrease in alerts from July 2025, and fuel prices had raised no alerts since October 2025. On the other hand, despite an improvement in food price trends in GoY areas since August, in line with the appreciation of the Yemeni rial in those areas, alerts for this indicator started to increase again in January. The proxy food imports indicator, which measures the divergence between local and global prices for selected commodities, remained the main driver behind the total number of alerts in both GoY (heightened alerts) and AA governorates (critical alerts). The proxy fuel imports indicator also continued to raise heightened alerts in AA districts. Levels of food insecurity also remained extremely high at around 64% nationwide, well beyond the 'very high' threshold of 40%. Overall, while the total number of alerts is gradually increasing, it remains lower than the most recent peak in June 2025 and below historical averages between March 2015 and April 2022. The JMR does not recommend triggering the plan at this stage, but advocates for continued close monitoring of the situation.

AGGREGATED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ALERTS AND RISK SEVERITY

This section summarizes the heightened and critical alerts recorded based on JMR key indicators of deteriorating food and nutrition security.¹ For a more detailed breakdown of indicator alerts by governorate and district, please refer to Annexes I and II.

In January 2026, the JMR recorded 188 critical and 432 heightened risk alerts. The proxy food imports indicator recorded the highest number of alerts, with 181 critical and 117 heightened risk alerts, followed by the proxy fuel imports indicator, which recorded 215 heightened alerts. Displacement raised both heightened and critical risk alerts, while food prices recorded 87 heightened risk alerts in total. Drought only recorded two heightened risk alerts. The exchange rate and fuel prices indicators did not record any alerts. Please refer to Table 1 for an overview of the heightened and critical food and nutrition security risk alerts countrywide by indicator.

Table 1. Critical and heightened food security risk alerts countrywide by indicator in January 2026

INDICATOR	CRITICAL RISK ALERTS	HEIGHTENED RISK ALERTS	GOVERNORATE
 Proxy food imports	181	117	All governorates except Socotra
 Proxy fuel imports	0	215	All AA-controlled governorates and Socotra
 Food prices	0	87	Abyan, Al Jawf, Al Mahwit, Amran, Hadramawt, Hajjah, Lahj, Ma'rib, Sa'dah, Sana'a, Sana'a City, Shabwah, Ta'iz
 Displacement	4	4	Ad Dali', Hadramawt, Ma'rib, Shabwah, Ta'iz
 Conflict	3	7	Al Jawf, Hadramawt, Shabwah
 Drought	0	2	Al Hodeidah
 Exchange rate	0	0	
 Fuel prices	0	0	
Total	188	432	

¹ Critical alerts identify areas where a deterioration in food security is almost certain based on historical trends. Decision makers should consider these areas high priority. Heightened alerts identify areas where there is a high chance of deterioration in food and nutrition security and provide decision makers with a good overview of current food and nutrition security trends countrywide.

SELECTED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ANALYSIS

This section offers context-specific details related to each crisis risk indicator, providing a more detailed analysis of the factors triggering risk alerts.


Proxy food imports

The proxy food imports indicator looks at the difference between the global and local prices (in USD) of five food commodities: beans, cooking oil, rice, sugar, and wheat. Risk alerts are raised when the divergence between the two prices exceeds the calculated pass-through average.² In January 2026, the proxy food imports indicator raised 181 critical alerts in AA-controlled governorates (except Ibb) and 117 heightened risk alerts, 85 in GoY-controlled areas and 32 in AA governorates.

In AA-controlled areas, the indicator value was 16% higher on average than the critical alert threshold. The indicator value was highest in Al Jawf and Sana'a governorates, where it stood at 44% and 31% above the critical risk threshold respectively.

In GoY-controlled areas, all alerts were heightened risk alerts, recorded in all governorates except Aden, Ma'rib, and Socotra. On average, the indicator value was 40% above the heightened alert threshold. The divergence was higher in Al Hodeidah governorate, at 119% higher than the heightened alert threshold and approaching critical levels.

Figure 1. Global and local prices (in the Yemeni market) of beans, vegetable oil, rice, sugar, and wheat in USD



Note: the value measures the cumulative price for 1kg of beans, rice, sugar, and wheat and 1L of vegetable oil.

Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 02/13/2026); FAO (accessed 02/13/2026)

Food prices

The food prices indicator recorded 87 heightened risk alerts in districts in Al Jawf, Al Mahwit, Amran, Hajjah, Ma'rib, Sa'dah, Sana'a, and Sana'a City under AA control, and in the GoY-controlled areas of Hadramwat, Lahj, Ma'rib, Shabwah, and Ta'iz.

On average, AA-controlled districts that recorded alerts reached a minimum food basket (MFB) cost of between YER 45,550 and YER 48,700, marking a percentage increase over the last five-month-moving average of 3% and 6%.³ In GoY-controlled districts with food price risk alerts, prices increased on average between 6–9% compared to the five-month-moving average, with remarkable exceptions in Shabwah, where most alerts were driven by increases up to 15% and 25% in Dahr district specifically.

² In economics, 'pass-through' refers to the degree to which changes in one economic factor – such as exchange rate or production costs – are reflected in another, such as consumer prices or inflation. Pass-through describes how much a shift in one variable influences another.

³ The MFB composition calculated in the JMR model comprises 10kg beans, 8L vegetable oil, 1kg salt, 2.5kg sugar, and 75kg wheat flour for an estimated household size of seven people.

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
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The average MFB price in AA governorates remained stable at around YER 46,453 (USD 86) in January 2026 compared to January 2025, with only minor fluctuations throughout the year, but slightly higher than the five-month moving average percentage, which included August and September 2025 when prices were lower in all these districts.

Prices in US dollars in AA areas followed the same trend as the Yemeni rial as a result of the nominal stability of the Sana'a-based currency.


Figure 2. MFB price in AA-controlled areas in YER and USD between January 2025 and January 2026



Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 02/13/2026); FAO (accessed 02/13/2026)

After experiencing a significant drop in August 2025, driven by the appreciation of the Yemeni rial in GoY-controlled areas following the implementation of policy measures and external support, the average MFB price in GoY-controlled areas began increasing again from November, reaching YER 133,000 (USD 78) in January 2026 and approaching the heightened risk alert threshold, while remaining 18% lower year-on-year.⁴

Figure 3. MFB price in GoY-controlled areas in YER and USD between January 2025 and January 2026



Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 02/13/2026); FAO (accessed 02/13/2026)


⁴ Yemen operates under a split exchange rate system, with monetary policy administered separately by authorities in Sana'a, under AA control, and the GoY based in Aden. This situation emerged after the Aden-based Central Bank began issuing new banknotes in late 2019, a decision that was not recognized by the Sana'a authorities, who banned the new currency in areas under their control. As a result, the Yemeni rial sharply weakened against the US dollar in GoY-controlled areas, while remaining comparatively stable in AA-controlled areas. These differing exchange rates have contributed to a clear divergence in food prices: costs rose significantly in GoY-controlled areas after November 2019 but stayed largely steady in AA-controlled areas. Despite food prices appearing much higher in local currency terms in GoY-controlled areas, their USD value is higher in AA-controlled areas.

Proxy fuel imports

The proxy fuel imports indicator recorded 215 heightened risk alerts in November 2025, all in AA-controlled districts and two in Socotra (GoY). On average, the indicator value for proxy fuel imports in AA areas in January 2026 was 26% above the heightened alert threshold. The cumulative price of 1L of petrol and 1kg of cooking gas in AA-controlled areas was USD 1.63 on average, higher than the global equivalent of USD 0.88.

The local price of cooking gas and petrol in GoY areas increased by 1.9% in January compared to November, reaching USD 1.09. This, however, did not lead to any alerts in GoY areas, as the indicator value remained well below the risk threshold. In Socotra, the prices of cooking gas and petrol have remained stable since October, following the high prices recorded in August–September, which kept the indicator above the heightened risk threshold.

Figure 4. Global and local prices of cooking gas and petrol in USD between January 2025 and January 2026



Note: the value measures the cumulative price of 1kg of gas and 1L of petrol.

Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 02/13/2026); FAO (accessed 02/13/2026)

Fuel prices

The fuel price indicator did not raise any alerts in January 2026. The YER price of diesel and petrol in GoY areas decreased significantly after July 2025, driven by currency appreciation, and has remained largely stable since, showing an 18% and 21% decrease in January 2026 compared to January 2025. Gas prices, on the other hand, were 19% higher in YER year-on-year. In AA-controlled governorates, the average price of cooking gas, diesel, and petrol has remained stable since October 2025, although 1.8% higher year-on-year.


In December 2025, Aden experienced [gas shortages](#), including on black markets, worsening living conditions for residents in relation to both household needs and transportation. Lack of gas has often led people in Yemen to employ [unsafe ways of cooking food](#), such as burning plastic bottles. The gas shortages lasted more than 40 days and also affected public transport, as many buses run on gas, leaving residents reliant on more costly private transport. On January 16, the [Yemen Gas Company](#), working with district, military, and security officials, sent 406 gas trailers to Aden and other southern governorates to help mitigate the shortage, but fears remain that this may still be insufficient.

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
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Figure 5. Diesel, gas, and petrol prices in YER and USD in GoY-controlled areas between January 2025 and January 2026



Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 02/13/2026); FAO (accessed 02/13/2026)

Figure 6. Diesel, gas, and petrol prices in YER in AA-controlled areas between January 2025 and January 2026



Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 02/13/2026); FAO (accessed 02/13/2026)

Displacement


In January, the displacement indicator recorded four critical and four heightened risk alerts. Al Abr district, in GoY-controlled Hadramawt governorate, recorded a critical alert driven by the displacement of 14 households to the district from elsewhere in the governorate, with general insecurity cited as the main reason for displacement.

Sayun district also recorded a critical alert in January when 102 households left, 100 as a result of conflict and two after receiving threats because they were unable to repay debts, all relocating to Ma'rib. Conversely, 38 households left Ma'rib for Sayun, likely displaced people returning to their area of origin. A critical alert was also recorded in GoY-controlled Salah district in Ta'iz governorate, where general insecurity caused 62 households to displace to from other Ta'iz districts. Conflict also caused 23 household to displace to the AA-controlled district of At Ta'iziyah, Ta'iz governorate, from Salah district in January. The

GoY-controlled district of Ad Dali' saw the displacement of 16 households in January, recording a heightened risk alert. Conflict also caused the displacement of 26 households from Wadi Al Ayn to districts in AA-controlled Al Jawf and GoY-controlled Hadramawt and Ma'rib. 145 households were displaced to GoY-controlled Ma'rib City from Hadramawt, with the vast majority citing economic reasons. Finally, the heightened risk alert recorded in Markhah Al Olya in GoY-controlled Shabwah related to the displacement of 35 households in November 2025 as a result of conflict. This incident raised the indicator value above the critical alert threshold, but as December 2025 and January 2026 saw no new displacements, the indicator has slowly been decreasing.

December 2025 recorded the highest number of people displaced since October 2023, when Cyclone Tej displaced 4,655 households in Al Maharah. 1,374 households were displaced in December, 80% of whom from Hadramawt as a result of the escalation of conflict between the STC and GoY-affiliated forces. In January, 468 households were displaced, of whom 52% were in Ma'rib, 21% in Ta'iz, and 15% in Hadramawt.⁵

Figure 7. Number of households displaced between January 2025 and January 2026



Source: IOM (02/02/2026)

Conflict

In early December 2025, the STC, backed by the United Arab Emirates, launched a major military offensive across southern and eastern Yemen, taking control of most of the former South Yemen territory, including oil-rich Hadramawt and Al Maharah governorates. This marked a break from cooperation with the GoY-led Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).

Saudi Arabia, which backs the PLC, viewed the STC advance as a security threat and unilateral escalation. Saudi forces launched airstrikes on STC positions, including operations targeting weapons shipments allegedly destined for the STC. Fighting intensified in Hadramawt and other southern areas, with clashes between STC units and GoY or Saudi-aligned forces. In early January 2026, the PLC and Saudi-backed forces launched a counter-offensive, seizing key military sites and retaking territory previously held by the STC. On January 7, 2026, GoY forces recaptured Aden, the former STC stronghold and temporary capital, effectively collapsing the STC's hold on the south. The STC announced its subsequent dissolution on January 9, 2026, though reports indicate continued presence and support in Yemen's south. The divergence between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, once aligned in supporting anti-AA efforts, played out in Yemen as a proxy contest, with Riyadh ultimately pressuring the STC and backing the PLC counter-offensive.

In January, the conflict indicator raised three critical and four heightened risk alerts in Hadramawt, two heightened alerts in Al Jawf, and one heightened alert in Shabwah. The related conflict events are reported below, based on analysis of Armed Conflict Location and Event Data for Yemen.

⁵ These figures only represent displacement to or within GoY areas, as the IOM only collects data in governorates under GoY control. Displacement 'from' can also include districts in AA areas, but not displacement within AA areas.

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Conflict risk alerts in Hadramawt were driven by a series of incidents across multiple districts in January 2026. On January 18, an improvised explosive device (IED) of unknown origin targeted GoY Nation Shield Forces on the international road in Al Abr district, killing two soldiers and injuring another. Earlier, on January 2, Nation Shield Forces clashed with STC forces in Wadi Al Ayn district, and subsequently took control of an STC camp. During the fighting, Saudi forces conducted seven airstrikes on STC positions, resulting in at least four STC fatalities. STC sources claimed they repelled the assault and captured members of the GoY-affiliated Raddad Brigade. On the same day in Al Qatn city, Saudi forces carried out at least one additional airstrike targeting STC reinforcements, destroying military vehicles and causing at least three STC fatalities, alongside injuries and civilian harm.

In GoY-controlled Ma'rib, tensions were similarly high. On January 5, Al Arada and Fujayh tribesmen, supported by Islah-affiliated GoY forces, attacked a GoY military camp in Al Thanyiah, killing at least ten GoY soldiers. A subsequent Saudi airstrike aimed at preventing further advances resulted in unconfirmed casualties. Counterterrorism activity also intensified: a US drone strike on January 11 killed two Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) militants in GoY-controlled As Samda, while another strike on January 25 killed three AQAP members. On or around January 14, an unexploded projectile detonated in Al Marda, killing three civilians.

The two alerts in AA-controlled Al Jawf, in Al Humaydat and Al Mutun districts, were driven by an incident that occurred in the neighboring Khab wa Ash Sha'f district. On January 13, 2026, GoY forces clashed with AA forces on the Jabal Qanaw front, thwarting an AA attack. During the fighting, a previously planted AA landmine exploded as AA fighters were retreating, destroying one vehicle. The clashes resulted in heavy human and material losses on the AA side, with at least ten AA fighters killed.

In Shabwah's Jordan district, the alert was driven by heightened conflict in neighboring Ma'rib and multiple fatal security incidents in Ataq district. On January 7, 2026, an AQAP-planted IED targeted a Giants Brigade vehicle near the entrance of Murrah camp, killing three soldiers and injuring between three to seven others. On January 9, gunmen with unknown affiliation and motive shot and killed one civilian in Ataq. On January 13, another IED exploded near Ataq city, targeting a Saudi military convoy en route to meet the governor of Shabwah, killing one Saudi soldier and injuring several others.


Drought

In January 2026, the drought indicator – based on the Standardized Precipitation Index – registered two heightened risk alerts in Al Mansuriyah and As Sukhnah districts in Al Hodeidah governorate. The [Agricultural Stress Index](#), a remote-sensing-based tool designed to rapidly detect agricultural water stress, registered no impact on crops, as the affected districts were off season.

Exchange rate

In GoY areas, the monthly average exchange rate has remained stable at around YER 1,632/USD 1 since August 2025, when it experienced a sudden appreciation of 42.5% on the July exchange rate of YER 2,837/USD 1 as a result of policy measures and external support from Saudi Arabia. As a result of this appreciation, the JMR raised no exchange rate alerts in GoY areas. In AA areas, the average exchange rate in January 2026 remained stable at around YER 538/USD 1. In mid-January, Saudi Arabia granted [USD 90 million](#) to the GoY for urgent support, which was used to pay public sector salaries and support financial stability.

Figure 9. YER/USD exchange rate in Aden (GoY) and Sana'a (AA) from January 2025 and January 2026



Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 02/13/2025)

OTHER INDICATORS


This section covers additional contextual information on pertinent food and nutrition security indicators in Yemen.

Food imports

In December 2025 and January 2026, **food imports** through AA-controlled Red Sea ports reached the highest levels recorded (based on available data since August 2017). Food imports significantly surpassed the 12-month moving average by 64% and 78%, with 600,000MT and 690,000MT imported in December and January respectively. Since August 2025, food imports in AA-controlled areas have been primarily conducted through Saleef port, with increased imports (although in smaller percentages) also through Ras Issa. Overall, imports through Al Hodeidah also increased in January.

GoY-controlled southern ports also saw increased food imports in December and January compared to the previous two months, at 40% and 15% above the 12-month moving average respectively, primarily through Aden port. Higher food import volumes across all ports are likely related to the beginning of Ramadan in February 2026.

Figure 10. Monthly food imports by port between January 2025 and January 2026




Source: ACAPS YETI (accessed 02/13/2026)

Fuel imports

Fuel import volumes through Red Sea ports continued a declining trend in both December and January compared to previous months, scoring 71% and 51% below the 12-month moving average respectively. Fuel imports via southern ports (mostly through Aden port) in January were the lowest since February 2025, at 48% below the 12-month moving average; in December, fuel imports were slightly higher than the previous three months.

Figure 11. Monthly fuel imports by port between January 2025 and January 2026



Source: ACAPS YETI (accessed 02/12/2026)

FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY OUTCOMES

Food Consumption Score

In December 2025, [WFP remote monitoring](#) showed that an average of 64% of households across Yemen were unable to meet their minimum food needs, similar to December 2024, underscoring persistently severe conditions. Inadequate food consumption affected 66% of households in GoY areas (up from 63% in November) and 63% in AA areas (an increase from 60% in November). Severe food deprivation continued to affect 37% of households nationwide (up from 35%), 38% in GoY-controlled areas and 36% in AA-controlled areas, peaking in Ma'rib (55%), Ad Dali' (48%), Al Bayda (46%), Abyan (45%), and Al Jawf (44%). Food Consumption Score indicators were higher in GoY-controlled areas in December 2025, as the severity of hunger and reliance on coping strategies were more pronounced in AA areas.

Reduced Coping Strategies Index

[Food-based coping strategies](#) measured by the Reduced Coping Strategies Index showed that 36% of surveyed households in December 2025 had adopted severe food-based coping strategies. Prevalence was higher in AA-controlled areas (38%) compared to GoY governorates (32%). 44% of households restricted adult consumption to provide food to children. Access to stable and sustainable livelihoods remained extremely difficult, with households spending around 72% of their income on food, leaving little for other basic needs. As a result, 59% resorted to crisis or emergency coping strategies, including begging and selling assets, particularly in AA areas (62%) compared to GoY areas (53%). Begging increased in several governorates, including Al Hodeidah, Al Jawf, Al Mahwit, Amran, Hajjah, Lahj, and Sana'a City.

Malnutrition

About [2.5 million children](#) under five are acutely malnourished across Yemen, including 500,000 with SAM, alongside 1.3 million malnourished pregnant and lactating women. Rising cases and reported deaths in Hajjah and Ma'rib reflect growing food insecurity, disease, income loss, and reduced food assistance, while service closures and supply shortages have left many children untreated.

As a result of funding cuts, nutrition responders reduced their 2025 target from [7.8 million to 2 million people](#). Treatment coverage fell to 64–65% for SAM and below 28% for moderate acute malnutrition. Thousands of feeding sites and mobile teams have closed or been scaled down, with aid focused only on the most severe districts. Although funding requirements were reduced from USD 238 million to USD 91.1 million in 2025, major shortfalls persist.

OUTLOOK

Food security situation

Food security indicators in Yemen typically show temporary improvement during Ramadan (February–March) as a result of increased zakat (charitable giving), remittances, and food aid. This causes a short-term reduction in food consumption gaps and better access to nutrient-dense food for poor households, but these gains are often short-lived.

According to [FEWS NET](#), poor households in highland areas have used up food from the last cereal harvest and are now dependent on markets, while work opportunities are also limited during the farming off-season through February. Farm labor is expected to increase in March and April with land preparation and planting. In coastal, eastern plateau, and desert areas, food and income access is improving because of the main cereal harvest and vegetable cultivation, but weak economic conditions offset positive seasonal changes. In coastal areas, labor opportunities typically rise from December with the start of the agricultural season and should continue through May, with mango season starting in March providing extra income.

Escalating tensions in the Middle East following [US and Israeli attacks on Iran](#), which began on February 28, and subsequent Iranian attacks on Israel and the US military presence in the region may further compound economic and food security pressures in Yemen. While AA forces had not resumed attacks in the Red Sea by March 3, the risk that they may join offensive actions in support of Iran and/or be targeted by US and Israeli attacks remains elevated. A resumption of strikes on Yemen would likely result in displacement, civilian casualties, and damage to critical infrastructure such as ports and storage facilities.

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ANNEXES

Annex I. Number of JMR alerts by governorate

Table 2 shows the number of JMR district alerts for each indicator by governorate.

Table 2. Number of JMR district alerts by governorate in January 2026

GOVERNORATE	CONFLICT		DISPLACEMENT		DROUGHT		EX-CHANGE RATE	FOOD PRICES	FUEL PRICES	PROXY FOOD IMPORTS		PROXY FUEL IMPORTS
	C	H	C	H	C	H	C	H	H	C	H	H
Abyan								4			9	
Ad Dali'				1						2	7	3
Aden												
Al Bayda										16	4	20
Al Hodeidah						2				24	2	24
Al Jawf		2						11		12		12
Al Maharah											9	
Al Mahwit								6		9		9
Amran								10		20		20
Dhamar										12		12
Hadramawt	3	4	2	1				8			13	
Hajjah								4		30	1	31
Ibb											20	20
Lahj								2			13	
Ma'rib				1				4		7	3	7
Raymah										6		6
Sa'dah								1		15		15
Sana'a								10		15	1	16
Sana'a City								10		10		10
Shabwah		1		1				14			15	
Socotra												2
Ta'iz			2					3		3	20	8
Total	3	7	4	4		2		87		181	117	215

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MARCH 2026 - REPORT #13

Annex II. JMR alerts by district with a higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration

Table 3 shows JMR alerts by district. The districts with the highest alert level out of 16 – four and five in this case – are included. The table highlights critical alerts (red), heightened alerts (yellow), and typical status (white) per food security risk indicator by district.


Table 3. JMR alerts by district with a higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration in January 2026

GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT	ALERT LEVEL	CONFLICT	DISPLACEMENT	DROUGHT	EXCHANGE RATE	FOOD PRICES	FUEL PRICES	PROXY FOOD IMPORTS	PROXY FUEL IMPORTS
Al Jawf	Al Humaydat, Al Mutun	5	Yellow				Yellow		Orange	Yellow
Al Hodeidah	Al Mansuriyah, As Sukhnah	4			Yellow				Orange	Yellow
Al Jawf	Al Ghayl, Al Hazm, Al Khablaq, Al Maslub, Al Matammah, Az Zahir, Khab wa Ash Sha'f, Kharab Al Marashi, Rajuzah	4					Yellow		Orange	Yellow
Al Mahwit	Al Mahwit, Al Mahwit City, Ar Rujum, At Tawilah, Bani Sa'd, Shibam Kawkaban	4					Yellow		Orange	Yellow
Amran	Amran, As Sawd, Dhibain, Eyal Surayh, Jabal Eyal Yazid, Khamir, Kharif, Maswar, Raydah, Thula	4					Yellow		Orange	Yellow
Hajjah	Bani Al Awam, Hajjah, Kuhlan Afar, Sharas	4					Yellow		Orange	Yellow
Ma'rib	Harib Al Qaramish, Majzar	4					Yellow		Orange	Yellow
Sa'dah	Kitaf wa Al Boqa'	4					Yellow		Orange	Yellow
Sana'a	Al Haymah Ad Dakhiliyah, Al Haymah Al Kharijyah, Arhab, Bani Hushaysh, Bani Matar, Nihm, Sa'fan	4					Yellow		Orange	Yellow
Sana'a City	Al Wehdah, As Sab'in, As Safiyah, At Tahrir, Ath Thawrah, Azaal, Bani Al Harith, Ma'in, Old City, Shu'ub	4					Yellow		Orange	Yellow
Ta'iz	At Taiziyah	4					Yellow		Orange	Yellow

Annex III. JMR historical heightened and critical risk alerts


The figure below shows the historical breakdown of JMR food and nutrition security risk alerts by indicator for all districts. The graphs show the percentage of the total possible heightened and critical risk alerts for all six food and nutrition security crisis risk indicators. The higher the score, the worse the deterioration in food and nutrition security.

Figure 12. Historical percentage of total JMR heightened and critical risk alerts (January 2015 to January 2026)



Annex IV. Historical overview of the population at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or worse food insecurity levels

Figure 13. Percentage of the population living in areas at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or worse food insecurity levels (January 2015 to January 2026)



Annex V. Sources and time frames of JMR risk indicators and target variables

Table 4. Indicator sources and time frames

	SOURCE	LINK	DATA FROM	DATA TO
Risk indicator				
Conflict	ACLED	https://acleddata.com/data/	01/01/2015	02/13/2025
Displacement	IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix	https://dtm.iom.int/yemen	01/01/2014	02/13/2025
Drought	WFP	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/yem-rainfall-subnational	01/01/1981	02/13/2025
Exchange rate	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6159	01/01/2009	02/13/2025
Food prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4508	01/01/2009	02/13/2025
Fuel prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6133	01/01/2009	02/13/2025
Target variable				
Famine Early Warning Systems Network	World Bank	https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0064614	07/01/2009	10/01/2024

Annex VI. JMR methodology updates

New method for calculating the generalized linear model score and percentage of people living in areas at risk of experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse food insecurity levels.

In November 2025, the Yemen JMR team introduced a methodology change related to the multivariate modeling approach. While both the previous and current methods use a generalized linear model to better estimate the share of the population living in areas at risk of high food insecurity (IPC 4+), the new model scores how well the percentage of the population living in areas at risk of experiencing IPC 4+ conditions matches the same value based on data from FEWS NET at the country level, alongside scoring based on how well IPC 4+ areas are correctly classified. These two scores are combined into one final score. Instead of directly estimating the percentage of people at risk, this model links FEWS NET area classifications (which describe risk levels, not population shares) to population data to estimate the population residing in at-risk areas. This replaces the previous Yemen JMR method, providing more reliable and consistent national estimates.

Proxy food and fuel import indicators

The proxy food imports and fuel imports indicators were included in the JMR food security monitoring model starting from the June 2025 publication (JMR #9). These indicators are based on divergences between domestic and global commodity prices, offering a novel method for detecting import shocks that affect food security in import-reliant contexts such as Yemen.

The core concept builds on economic theory and prior research showing that in open trade systems, the local prices of imported commodities tend to align with global prices, while divergence signals market insulation or disruption. By integrating error correction terms, the model measures how quickly domestic prices revert to global benchmarks, flagging potential trade flow interruptions.

The inclusion of these import indicators significantly enhances the model's ability to anticipate and detect trade-related shocks, which are especially important in conflict-affected and import-dependent settings. By capturing the impact of disruptions in food and fuel imports, the model strengthens early warning capabilities for food security deterioration. Historical validation in Yemen demonstrates that these new indicators improve the detection of emerging crises, particularly in areas under AA control, where previous versions of the model were less effective. The updated model also reflects the effects of major geopolitical shocks – such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Red Sea blockade – with greater accuracy, enabling more timely and informed humanitarian interventions.

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From a technical perspective, the new indicators were developed by combining commodity prices (for both food and fuel) with exchange rate data to account for the conversion of YER to USD. This approach allows the model to estimate the degree of price convergence or divergence between local and global markets, providing a proxy for trade openness and potential disruptions.

While the updated model marks a significant step forward in capturing market dynamics and economic vulnerabilities, some limitations persist. For instance, reliance on global commodity data may overlook localized factors, and the absence of fuel import alerts suggests further investigation is needed to fully capture stabilizing influences or potential data gaps. Future model refinements should explore the integration of additional variables, including regional trade disruptions and evolving conflict dynamics, and assess compatibility with broader food security frameworks, such as the IPC. Continued collaboration with humanitarian responders and timely data updates will be essential to ensuring the model remains responsive to Yemen's complex and evolving humanitarian landscape.

In conclusion, the use of price divergence metrics offers a powerful tool for detecting trade shocks and significantly improves the performance of food security monitoring. This advancement is particularly valuable in fragile settings with limited access to direct trade data, supporting a more proactive and targeted policy and humanitarian response.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

The JMR combines quantitative modeling and qualitative analysis to provide robust bimonthly food and nutrition security monitoring that identifies emerging crisis risks. The report aims to complement IPC analyses and facilitate early recognition and coordinated responses to emerging major food and nutrition security crises among humanitarian and development stakeholders. The JMR is the product of a core development team comprising members from ACAPS, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and the World Bank.

A detailed explanation of the empirical foundation the Yemen JMR uses is available in this World Bank [Policy Research Working Paper](#). An updated version of the Policy Research Working Paper detailing the methodology behind the new indicators is forthcoming, and a copy can be made available upon request.

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