YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT

BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS **JANUARY 2026 - REPORT #12**

KEY MESSAGES

- Yemen is the fourth most food-insecure country in the world, with over half its population, 18.3 million people, projected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse food insecurity levels by early 2026, including 41,000 people in governorates under Ansar Allah (AA) control projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), the highest level of the food insecurity classification.
- Food consumption levels in Yemen remain deeply concerning, with 61% of households nationwide unable to meet their minimum food needs in November 2025. Severe food deprivation (poor food consumption) persists among 35% of families nationwide, with a higher prevalence in AA-controlled governorates, particularly Al Bayda (52%), Raymah (47%), Al Jawf (46%), and Hajjah (45%). In areas under the Government of Yemen (GoY), Ad Dali' has a poor food consumption prevalence of 51%, followed by Abyan with 42%, and then Lahj and Shabwah with 40%.
- Risk indicator alerts in October and November were only slightly higher than in August and September, with a similar pattern across the indicators. The proxy food imports indicator, measuring divergence between local and global food commodity prices, continued to raise the highest number of alerts (162 critical and 114 heightened), with the vast majority in AA-controlled governorates, where the US dollar (USD) value of food commodities is much higher than global prices. Food price alerts were raised in most AA governorates, with 62 alerts at heightened risk. While the fuel prices indicator did not record any alerts, the price divergence between local and global fuel commodity prices raised proxy fuel imports alerts, all in AA areas. Displacement alerts were the highest since November 2023, with three critical and seven heightened risk alerts, reflecting the high number of newly displaced households in November 2025, up to 462, almost all owing to conflict. Violent incidents, however, resulted in only 14 conflict alerts, all in AA-controlled governorates. The exchange rate indicator recorded zero alerts for the fourth consecutive month following the appreciation of the Yemeni rial (YER) in GoY areas since August. The drought indicator did not raise any alerts in November.
- Yemen's outlook in the short to medium term remains highly fragile countrywide. In GoY areas, recent political and security developments point to elevated risks of further instability. In early December 2025, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which was backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), launched an offensive across southern and eastern governorates, including Hadramawt and Al Maharah, seizing strategic cities and oil-producing areas from Saudi-aligned government forces. Saudi Arabia responded with air strikes and ground operations against STC positions, and by early January 2026, GoY- and Saudi-aligned Homeland Shield forces had retaken key areas, such as Al Mukalla. In AA areas, the outlook is expected to worsen as the lean season approaches and humanitarian assistance is lacking. These factors may further erode household coping capacity, increasing the likelihood of IPC Phase 4 and the emergence of larger pockets of IPC Phase 5 pockets in the absence of timely, sustained humanitarian support.
- The consolidation of rival spheres of influence in southern Yemen heightens the risk of further escalation and undermines governance. For civilians, energy insecurity, weakened state capacity, and fragmented authority threaten living conditions. These dynamics are likely to deepen humanitarian risks, with persistent electricity outages, potential fuel shortages, and declining state capacity aggravating already-strained essential services, including water systems and healthcare. Further disruptions or increased insecurity could worsen living conditions, deepen food insecurity, and constrain humanitarian access, particularly in contested areas.

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Pre-assessment for the Yemen Food Security Crisis Preparedness Plan

In November 2025, estimates based on the Joint Monitoring Report (JMR) model of people living in areas at risk of experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse food security levels reached 14 million (35%), with 7.6 million living in AA-controlled governorates and 6.4 million in GoY areas. This indicator takes into consideration overall risk indicator trends over the previous 11 months, even in the absence of escalation-driven alerts. This total is lower than during the previous two months and, on average, compared to the rest of 2025. Given the current data, triggering the preparedness plan is not suggested at this stage. It is important to emphasize, however, that the Yemeni context remains highly volatile; the shrinking humanitarian space in the north means less access for delivering assistance and monitoring risks, while the potential for widespread conflict countrywide is the highest in recent years, with likely severe humanitarian consequences, including protection concerns, higher food insecurity, reduced access, and increased displacement. Continuous close monitoring of the situation remains critical for a timely response should severe escalation occur.

AGGREGATED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ALERTS AND RISK SEVERITY

This section summarizes the heightened and critical alerts recorded based on JMR key indicators of deteriorating food and nutrition security.[1] For a more detailed breakdown of indicator alerts by governorate and district, please refer to Annexes I and II.

In November 2025, the JMR recorded 165 critical and 412 heightened risk alerts. The proxy food imports indicator recorded the highest number of alerts, with 162 critical and 114 heightened risk alerts, followed by the proxy fuel imports indicator, which recorded 215 heightened alerts. Displacement raised both heightened and critical risk alerts, while food prices recorded 62 heightened risk alerts in total. The exchange rate indicator did not record any alerts for the fourth consecutive month, although the sustainability of this stabilization remains uncertain. Please refer to Table 1 for an overview of the heightened and critical food and nutrition security risk alerts countrywide by indicator.

Table 1. Critical and heightened food security risk alerts countrywide by indicator in November 2025

INDICATOR	CRITICAL RISK ALERTS	HEIGHTENED RISK ALERTS	GOVERNORATE
Proxy food imports	162	114	All governorates except Socotra
Proxy fuel imports	0	215	All AA-controlled governorates and Socotra
Food prices	0	62	Al Hodeidah, Al Jawf, Al Mahwit, Amran, Dhamar, Hajjah, Ma'rib, Sa'dah, Sana'a, Sana'a City, Ta'iz
Conflict	0	14	Al Jawf, Hadramawt, Sa'dah, Sana'a City
Displacement	3	7	Ad Dali', Al Hodeidah, Ibb, Shabwah, Ta'iz

1 Critical alerts identify areas where a deterioration in food security is almost certain based on historical trends. Decision makers should consider these areas high priority. Heightened alerts identify areas where there is a high chance of deterioration in food and nutrition security and provide decision makers with a good overview of current food and nutrition security trends countrywide.

INDICATOR	CRITICAL RISK ALERTS	HEIGHTENED RISK ALERTS	GOVERNORATE
Drought	0	0	
Exchange rate	0	0	
Fuel prices	0	0	
Total	**165**	**412**	

JMR modeling shows that, by November 2025, there were 14 million people (35% of the population) residing in areas at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or worse food insecurity levels, with 7.6 million residing in AA areas and 6.4 million in GoY areas, corresponding to 25% and 60% of the respective populations in each area of control.[2] This is a decrease compared to September and October, when the numbers of people residing in areas at risk were 15.7 million and 16 million, respectively.[3] For a comprehensive historical overview of the population at risk of a decline in food and nutrition security (such as transitioning to IPC 4 or worse) from October 2014 to November 2025, please refer to Annex IV.

SELECTED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ANALYSIS

This section offers context-specific details related to each crisis risk indicator, providing a more detailed analysis of the factors triggering risk alerts.

Proxy food imports

The proxy food imports indicator looks at the difference between the global and local prices (in USD) of five food commodities: beans, cooking oil, rice, sugar, and wheat. Risk alerts are raised when the divergence between the two prices exceeds the calculated pass-through average.[4] In November 2025, the proxy food imports indicator raised 161 critical alerts in all AA-controlled governorates (except Ibb and Ta'iz) and Ad Dulay'ah district in Hadramawt (under GoY control). It also recorded 114 heightened risk alerts, 64 in GoY areas and 50 in AA governorates.

In AA-controlled areas, between October and November, the divergence between the local and global prices of the five selected food commodities increased significantly, surpassing the critical threshold by 14% and reaching the highest value since April 2019. The indicator value was highest in Al Jawf governorate, where it was 49% above the critical risk threshold.

In GoY-controlled areas, all alerts except one were heightened risk alerts, recorded in all governorates but Ma'rib, Socotra, and Ta'iz. On average, the indicator value was 25% above the heightened alert threshold, with the divergence between local and global prices larger than that from September and October but below the spike recorded in August, when food prices did not decline proportionally to the exchange rate appreciation.

2 The JMR calculates the probability of food and nutrition insecurity across different districts using a statistical model known as a generalized linear model. This involves the analysis of various risk alerts and their predictive significance for estimating a potential decline in food and nutrition security. A confidence score determines the likelihood of such deterioration, multiplied by the population of the district, to project the anticipated number of people residing in areas vulnerable to a deterioration in food and nutrition security (e.g. transitioning to IPC 4 or worse). It is essential to understand that this process involves prediction (forecasting) and clarify that the JMR does not formally classify IPC phases for districts.

3 In the previous report published in November 2025, the number of people residing in areas at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or worse food insecurity levels in September was 9.4 million (27% of the population). The change is related to backdated changes to data sources used in the JMR modeling, in this case mostly related to food price data.

4 In economics, 'pass-through' refers to the degree to which changes in one economic factor – such as exchange rate or production costs – are reflected in another, such as consumer prices or inflation. Pass-through describes how much a shift in one variable influences another.

Figure 1. Global and local prices (on the Yemeni market) of beans, vegetable oil, rice, sugar, and wheat in USD



Note: the value measures the cumulative price for 1kg of beans, rice, sugar, and wheat and 1L of vegetable oil.

Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 12/11/2025); FAO (accessed 12/11/2025)

Food prices

The food prices indicator recorded 62 heightened risk alerts in Al Hodeidah, Al Jawf, Al Mahwit, Amran, Dhamar, Hajjah, Ma'rib, Sa'dah, Sana'a, and Sana'a City, all under AA control.

In Bajil district in Al Hodeidah, the minimum food basket (MFB) price in November was the same as in October but 8.6% higher than in August and 7% higher than the five-month moving average (the period used to calculate an escalation). By comparison, districts in Al Hodeidah that did not record any alerts saw a reduction during the same period, falling 5% lower than the heightened alert threshold. In all districts of Al Jawf, the MFB price increased by 15% from September to the October–November period, driven by higher prices for beans and vegetable oil, and was 7% above the five-month moving average. In the districts that recorded alerts in Al Mahwit, Ahmar, Dhamar, and Hajjah, the MFB was between 5–7% above the five-month moving average. In Ma'rib, the three districts with food price alerts recorded an MFB price that was, on average, 10% higher than the five-month moving average. In Sa'dah, only Kitaf wa Al Boqa' district recorded a heightened risk alert, a result of prices being 9% higher than the five-month moving average. In Sana'a and Sana'a City, the MFB was 7–8% higher than the five-month moving average in November.

After experiencing a significant drop in August, driven by the appreciation of the YER in GoY-controlled areas, the average MFB[5] price in GoY-controlled areas experienced small fluctuations, reaching YER 128,000 (USD 78) in November, marking a 36% reduction compared to the highest recorded value in July 2025, which stood at YER 199,000 (USD 70), and 20% lower year-on-year. The price reduction was driven by the appreciation of the YER seen in GoY areas since August. In USD values, the MFB cost in November increased by 11% compared to July and remained the same year-on-year.[6]

5 The MFB composition calculated in the JMR model comprises 10kg beans, 8L vegetable oil, 1kg salt, 2.5kg sugar, and 75kg wheat flour for an estimated household size of seven people.

6 Yemen operates under a split exchange rate system, with monetary policy administered separately by authorities in Sana'a, under AA, and by the GoY based in Aden. This situation emerged after the Aden-based Central Bank began issuing new banknotes in late 2019, a decision that was not recognized by the Sana'a authorities, who banned the new currency in areas under their control. As a result, the YER sharply weakened against the USD in GoY-controlled areas, while remaining comparatively stable in AA-controlled regions. These differing exchange rates have contributed to a clear divergence in food prices: costs rose significantly in GoY-controlled areas after November 2019 but stayed largely steady in AA-controlled areas. Despite food prices appearing much higher in local currency terms in GoY-controlled areas, their value in USD is higher in AA-controlled areas.

Figure 2. MFB price in GoY-controlled areas in YER and USD between November 2024 and November 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from FAO (accessed 12/11/2025); WB (accessed 12/11/2025)

On the other hand, MFB prices in YER and USD in AA-controlled areas are more aligned thanks to the nominal stability of the Sana'a-based YER. From October–November, the MFB price was 2.5% higher than in September but remained the same year-on-year at YER 46,454 (USD 86).

Figure 3. MFB price in AA-controlled areas in YER and USD between November 2024 and November 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from FAO (accessed 12/11/2025); WB (accessed 12/11/2025)

Proxy fuel imports

The proxy fuel imports indicator recorded 215 heightened risk alerts in November 2025, all in AA-controlled governorates and two in Socotra. On average, the indicator value for proxy fuel imports in AA areas in November was 17% above the heightened alert threshold. The cumulative price per 1L of petrol and 1kg of cooking gas in AA-controlled areas was USD 1.63 on average, higher than the global equivalent of USD 0.79.

The local price of cooking gas and petrol in GoY areas decreased in November from its high value in August, reaching USD 1.06. This, however, did not lead to any alerts in GoY areas, as the indicator value remained well below the risk threshold despite the spike. In Socotra, the prices of cooking gas and petrol decreased between October–November, after the high prices recorded from August–September, with the indicator value decreasing slightly after surpassing the critical alert threshold in October.

Figure 4. Global and local prices of cooking gas and petrol in USD



Source: ACAPS using data from FAO (accessed 12/11/2025); WB (accessed 12/11/2025)

Note: the value measures the cumulative price for 1kg of gas and 1L of petrol.

Fuel prices

The fuel price indicator did not raise any alerts in November. The average fuel prices in GoY-controlled governorates decreased by 8.5% in November compared to September, reaching USD 1.07, marking an 11% reduction year-on-year. In AA-controlled governorates, the average price of cooking gas, diesel, and petrol in November 2025 was 3% higher than in September 2025 and at a similar level to November 2024.

Figure 5. Diesel, gas, and petrol prices in YER and USD in GoY-controlled areas between November 2024 and November 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from FAO (accessed 12/11/2025); WB (accessed 12/11/2025)

Figure 6. Diesel, gas, and petrol prices in YER in AA-controlled areas between November 2024 and November 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from FAO (accessed 12/11/2025); WB (accessed 12/11/2025)

Conflict

In November, the conflict indicator raised heightened risk alerts for districts in Al Jawf, Hadramawt, Sa'dah, and Sana'a City. The conflict events related to the alerts are reported below, based on ACAPS' analysis of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) for Yemen.

In November 2025, Al Jawf governorate witnessed repeated clashes between GoY forces and AA fighters in the Jawas sector of the Eastern Desert front. On 3, 18, and 22 November, GoY forces reported preventing AA infiltration and attack attempts using medium and heavy weapons. These engagements resulted in heavy human and material losses among AA forces, including the destruction of several military vehicles, with at least 30 unclear AA fatalities recorded across the three incidents. During the 22 November fighting, a GoY drone strike and a landmine explosion hit retreating AA forces. Separately, on 10 November, AA forces shot and killed a tribesman from the Dhu Husayn tribe at a checkpoint in Al Yatimah. These incidents caused the alerts in Al Jawf, Hadramawt, and Sa'dah. In Sana'a City, the alerts were raised by several deadly incidents that occurred in mid-November. On 13 November, protesters gathered outside a court to denounce alleged land seizures affecting the Al Madais family in Al Jaraf area. AA forces deployed around 50 military vehicles and used live fire to disperse the crowd, killing and injuring protesters and abducting dozens to unknown locations; at least three fatalities were reported. Separately, on 12 November, Al Matri tribesmen shot and killed a woman outside her parents' home in Sana'a for unknown reasons. Later, on 26 November, AA Security and Intelligence Service forces shot and killed a tribal sheikh from the Jahm tribe on Khawlan Street in Sana'a, with motives unclear; some reports place the incident on 27 November.

Displacement

In November, the displacement indicator recorded three critical alerts, the highest number since November 2023, one each in the districts of Markhah Al Olya (Shabwah) and Al Qahirah and Salah (Ta'iz), and seven heightened risk alerts in Ad Dali' and Qa'tabah districts (Ad Dali'), Al Mina (Al Hodeidah), Ibb (Ibb), and Al Mudhaffar, Maqbanah, and Mawiyah (Ta'iz). Conflict was the main driver of displacement for these alerts.

In Markhah Al Olya (GoY), 35 households were displaced within the district in November, citing general insecurity concerns as the main driver for displacement, after multiple conflict incidents occurred between AA and STC forces. The district has not recorded any displacement events since April 2023. In Al Qahirah (GoY), 25 households were displaced from multiple districts in Ibb owing to conflict; this is the highest number of people displaced to the district since October 2021. Salah (GoY) received 28 households displaced from Ta'iz also because of insecurity. Ad Dali' (GoY) saw the displacement of eight households from other districts in the same governorate and from Ibb, although the indicator value actually surpassed the heightened alert threshold in October, when 17 households were displaced on account of combat and general insecurity. Qatabah district (GoY) also experienced displacement, with ten households displaced internally and six toward Ad Dali' in November; conflict was the main reason for displacement. Al Mina in Al Hodeidah (AA) saw the displacement of seven households toward a neighboring district and to Al Mukalla City because of conflict, although the indicator remained above the heightened alert threshold given the displacement of 21 households in October. Ibb district (AA) also saw the displacement of 27 households because of conflict in November toward multiple districts in different governorates. Finally, Maqbanah and Mawiyah districts (AA) saw the displacement of 84 and 16 households, respectively, while Al Mudhaffar (GoY) received 15 households displaced from Ibb in November.

Overall, in November, a total of 462 households were displaced, higher than the monthly average of 296 households between January–September and the highest figure in 2025.

Figure 7. Number of households displaced per month in Yemen between January–November 2025



Source: IOM (10/06/2025)

Drought

In November 2025, the drought indicator based on the Standardized Precipitation Index registered mildly negative values in parts of Amran, Hajjah, and Sana'a governorates. While these anomalies suggest below-average rainfall conditions, their magnitude and persistence were insufficient to flag any alert.

The Agricultural Stress Index (ASI), a remote-sensing-based tool designed to rapidly detect agricultural water stress, showed that approximately 40–70% of cropland experienced stress in localized areas of Abyan, Al Bayda, and Lahj between October–November. This stress likely reflects a combination of factors, including uneven rainfall distribution, high evapotranspiration demand, and constraints in irrigation water availability. Importantly, the spatially fragmented nature of the ASI signals suggests localized agricultural impacts rather than a widespread or systemic drought affecting crop production at the national or regional scale.

Figure 8. ASI estimates for November 2025



Source: FAO (accessed 10/30/2025)
Note: the ASI legend illustrates the percentage of cropland within each area experiencing significant vegetation stress. Higher percentages indicate more widespread stress, typically as a result of drought or unfavorable growing conditions. The ASI helps identify regions at risk of reduced agricultural productivity, guiding early warning and response efforts.

Exchange rate

In GoY areas, the monthly average exchange rate has remained stable at around YER 1,632 to USD 1 since August 2025, when it experienced a sudden appreciation of 73% from an exchange rate of YER 2,837 to USD 1 in July. As a result of this appreciation, the JMR raised no exchange rate alerts in GoY areas for the fourth consecutive month. In AA areas, the average exchange rate in November remained stable, at around YER 538 to USD 1.

Figure 9. YER–USD exchange rate in Aden (GoY) and Sana'a (AA) from November 2024 to November 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 12/11/2025)

OTHER INDICATORS

This section covers additional contextual information on pertinent food and nutrition security indicators in Yemen.

Food imports

In October and November 2025, food imports through Red Sea ports (under AA control) amounted to 521,000MT and 596,000MT, respectively, both significantly above the 12-month moving average and 28% higher year-on-year in November. On the other hand, southern ports (under GoY control) saw a decline in food imports compared to September, falling 5.7% and 32% below the 12-month moving average in October and November, respectively.

Figure 10. Monthly food imports by port between November 2024 and November 2025



Source: ACAPS (accessed 12/11/2025)

Fuel imports

In November, fuel import volumes through Red Sea ports were 41% below the 12-month moving average and 66% lower year-on-year. Fuel imports via southern ports in September were also low, at 15% below the 12-month moving average but 98% higher year-on-year.

Figure 11. Monthly fuel imports by port between November 2024 and November 2025



Source: ACAPS (accessed 12/11/2025)

Throughout much of 2025, electricity outages persisted across Abyan, Aden, Lahj, and parts of Hadramawt. Road blockages in Abyan and Ma'rib repeatedly disrupted fuel deliveries to southern power stations. Abyan and Lahj experienced near-total power cuts for almost two months, severely affecting water pumping, healthcare facilities, and livelihoods.

The situation deteriorated further toward the end of the year when political tensions in eastern Yemen turned violent. In Hadramawt, armed factions seized control of the PetroMasila oil facilities, halting fuel production and triggering new electricity disruptions across the governorate. Fuel supplies destined for Abyan, Aden, and Lahj were also cut off, heightening shortages in already-fragile urban centres.

The humanitarian implications of these developments are severe. Prolonged power outages have reduced access to clean water, disrupted hospital operations, and increased household expenditure on private generators and water trucking. Fuel shortages and insecurity have also constrained humanitarian access, particularly in eastern governorates where control is contested and new checkpoints have emerged. Instability in oil-producing areas has broader knock-on effects, undermining government revenues and limiting the already-scarce resources available for public services and humanitarian response.

FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY OUTCOMES

Food Consumption Score

In November 2025, WFP remote monitoring showed that 61% of households across Yemen were unable to meet their minimum food needs, unchanged from a year earlier and underscoring persistently severe conditions despite the harvest season, reduced conflict, food assistance, declining food prices, and recent salary payments in some GoY-controlled areas. Inadequate food consumption affected 63% of households in GoY areas and 60% in AA areas. Severe food deprivation continued to impact more than one-third of households nationwide (35%), peaking in Ad Dali', Al Bayda, Al Jawf, Hajjah, and Raymah. Compared with November 2024, poor consumption increased by six percent points in AA areas but declined by 8% in GoY areas. Regardless, hunger severity remained higher in the north, where 32% of households reported moderate to severe hunger (Phase 3 or higher) compared to 25% in GoY areas.

Reduced Coping Strategies Index

Food-based coping strategies measured by the Reduced Coping Strategies Index showed a slight increase in October compared to the beginning of 2025 in AA-controlled areas, while they increased in GoY areas since February but remained slightly lower than in January 2025. The adoption of Crisis livelihood coping strategies in October reached its highest level in GoY since at least February 2023, being reported by 66% of surveyed households. In AA-controlled areas, it was the second-highest reported value (after March 2024) at 70.7%. On the other hand, the prevalence of Emergency livelihood coping strategies decreased in October in both areas of control.

Malnutrition

The most recent Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) acute malnutrition analysis (from the 2023–2024 period) categorized four districts as 'extremely critical' (with a global acute malnutrition rate of at least 30%) and projected further deterioration. While 2025 severity-indicative estimates are based on admission forecasts rather than full IPC evidence, they suggest that 24 districts will face 'very high' nutrition needs and 186 will face 'high' needs, together representing 210 of 333 districts in 20 governorates. Among the districts classified in Emergency (IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase 4), 72% also reported high levels of nutrition severity (severity 4 and 5), highlighting the strong convergence between acute food insecurity and malnutrition. The assessment also identified that the majority of districts, 150 of 210, showing 'high' and 'very high' nutrition needs were located in AA-controlled governorates, mainly in Ad Dali', Al Hodeidah, Al Jawf, and Hajjah, where up to 70% of the population is also classified in Crisis (IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase 3) or worse conditions, including some pockets in Catastrophe (IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase 5). Nutrition Cluster projections suggest a potential increase of 15–30% in acute malnutrition within lowland and coastal areas, namely Al Hodeidah and Ta'iz, by the end of 2025, linked to persistent food insecurity and disease burden, such as cholera. The key drivers of acute malnutrition in Yemen are prolonged conflict, economic collapse, humanitarian access restrictions, disease outbreaks (such as cholera), and the breakdown of livelihoods, food production, and supply chains. The Nutrition Information System reported the admission of 294,464 severe active malnutrition cases by October 2025. The SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-based) surveys done by the Ministry of Public Health and Population supported by CARE International in Abyan and Lahj lowlands in November 2025 showed levels of acute malnutrition of 17% and 17.7%, respectively.

OUTLOOK

Conflict and political developments

Yemen's conflict has recently seen an intra-anti-AA escalation, with the STC pressing a de facto independence push in the south, Saudi-backed government forces mounting counteroperations, and a broader rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE reshaping influence inside the country.

In early December 2025, the STC, a UAE-backed secessionist faction in southern Yemen, launched an offensive across southern and eastern governorates, including Hadramawt and Al Maharah, capturing key cities and oil-rich areas from Saudi-aligned government forces and deepening fragmentation within the anti-AA bloc. Saudi Arabia, which supports Yemen's internationally recognized government and opposes southern secession, launched air strikes and ground operations against STC positions, especially in Hadramawt and near the Saudi border, resulting in casualties and heightened clashes. In early January, GoY- and Saudi-aligned Homeland Shield forces retook key areas, including Al Mukalla, from the STC.

The entrenchment of rival spheres of influence in the south increases the likelihood of conflict escalation. From a humanitarian perspective, the combination of energy insecurity, fragmented authority, and declining state capacity raises the risk of further deterioration in living conditions during the coming months. Even in the absence of mass protests or large-scale displacement, the slow erosion of basic services is likely to deepen food insecurity, increase health risks, and further establish dependency on humanitarian assistance, while unclear military deployments and administrative arrangements may continue to hinder humanitarian operations and processes.

Agrometeorological situation

Yemen's food security outlook remains critical. Drier-than-average conditions forecast at the start of the 2025–2026 fall–winter season are likely to delay or restrict the next cropping cycle because of poor soil moisture, reduced irrigation water, and recurrent frost in highland areas. At the same time, declining staple crop yields observed by late November 2025, together with continuing conflict, economic strain, and market disruptions, are accelerating food insecurity and contributing to Yemen's projected 18.3 million people facing IPC 3 or worse by early 2026.

ANNEXES

Annex I. Number of JMR alerts by governorate

Table 2 shows the number of JMR district alerts for each indicator by governorate.

Table 2. Number of JMR district alerts by governorate in November 2025

	CONFLICT		DISPLACEMENT		DROUGHT		EXCHANGE RATE	FOOD PRICES	FUEL PRICES	PROXY FOOD IMPORTS		PROXY FUEL IMPORTS
GOVERNORATE	C	H	C	H	C	H	C	H	H	C	H	H
Abyan											11	
Ad Dali’				2						2	7	3
Aden											1	
Al Bayda										18	2	20
Al Hodeidah				1				1		13	13	24
Al Jawf		4						11		12		12
Al Maharah											9	
Al Mahwit								6		9		9
Amran								11		15	5	20
Dhamar								3		11	1	12
Hadramawt		1								1	14	
Hajjah								4		31		31
Ibb				1							20	20
Lahj											7	
Ma’rib								3		7		7
Raymah										6		6
Sa’dah		1						1		15		15
Sana’a								12		13	3	16
Sana’a City		8						10		9	1	10
Shabwah			1								14	
Socotra												2
Ta’iz			2	3							6	8
Total		14	3	7				62		138	114	215

Annex II. JMR alerts by district with a higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration

Table 3 shows JMR alerts by district. The districts with the highest alert level out of 16 – five in this case – are included. The table highlights critical alerts (red), heightened alerts (yellow), and typical status (white) per food security risk indicator by district.

Table 3. JMR alerts by district with a higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration in November 2025

GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT	ALERT LEVEL	CONFLICT	DISPLACEMENT	DROUGHT	EXCHANGE RATE	FOOD PRICES	FUEL PRICES	PROXY FOOD IMPORTS	PROXY FUEL IMPORTS
Al Jawf	Al Humaydat	5								
Al Jawf	Al Mutun	5								
Al Jawf	Rajuzah	5								
Sa'dah	Kitaf wa Al Boqa'	5								
Sana'a City	Al Wehdah	5								
Sana'a City	As Safiyah	5								
Sana'a City	At Tahrir	5								
Sana'a City	Ath Thawrah	5								
Sana'a City	Azaal	5								
Sana'a City	Ma'in	5								
Sana'a City	Old City	5								
Sana'a City	Shu'ub	5								

Annex III. JMR historical heightened and critical risk alerts

The figure below shows the historical breakdown of JMR food and nutrition security risk alerts by indicator for all districts. The graphs show the percentage of the total possible heightened and critical risk alerts for all six food and nutrition security crisis risk indicators. The higher the score, the worse the deterioration in food and nutrition security.

Figure 12. Historical percentage of total JMR heightened and critical risk alerts (January 2015 to November 2025)



Annex IV. Historical overview of the population at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or worse food insecurity levels

Figure 13. Percentage of the population living in areas at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or worse food insecurity levels (January 2015 to November 2025)



Annex V. Sources and time frames of JMR risk indicators and target variables

Table 4. Indicator sources and time frames

	SOURCE	LINK	DATA FROM	DATA TO
Risk indicator				
Conflict	ACLED	https://acleddata.com/data/	01/01/2015	11/30/2025
Displacement	IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix	https://dtm.iom.int/yemen	01/01/2014	11/30/2025
Drought	WFP	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/yem-rainfall-subnational	01/01/1981	11/30/2025
Exchange rate	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6159	01/01/2009	11/30/2025
Food prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4508	01/01/2009	11/30/2025
Fuel prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6133	01/01/2009	11/30/2025
Target variable				
Famine Early Warning Systems Network	World Bank	https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0064614	07/01/2009	10/01/2024

Annex VI. JMR methodology updates

New method for calculating the generalized linear model score and percentage of people living in areas at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or worse food insecurity levels

In November 2025, the Yemen JMR team introduced a methodology change related to the multivariate modeling approach. While both the previous and current methods use a generalized linear model to better estimate the share of the population living in areas at risk of high food insecurity (IPC 4+), the new model scores how well the percentage of the population living in areas at risk of experiencing IPC 4+ conditions matches the same value based on data from the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) at the country level, alongside scoring based on how well IPC 4+ areas are correctly classified. These two scores are combined into one final score. Instead of directly estimating the percentage of people at risk, this model links FEWS NET area classifications (which describe risk levels, not population shares) to population data to estimate the population residing in at-risk areas. This replaces the previous Yemen JMR method, providing more reliable and consistent national estimates.

Proxy food and fuel import indicators

The proxy food imports and fuel imports were included in the JMR food security monitoring model starting from the June 2025 publication (JMR #9). These indicators are based on divergences between domestic and global commodity prices, offering a novel method for detecting import shocks that affect food security in import-reliant contexts such as Yemen.

The core concept builds on economic theory and prior research showing that in open trade systems, the local prices of imported commodities tend to align with global prices, while divergence signals market insulation or disruption. By integrating error correction terms, the model measures how quickly domestic prices revert to global benchmarks, flagging potential trade flow interruptions.

The inclusion of these import indicators significantly enhances the model's ability to anticipate and detect trade-related shocks, which are especially important in conflict-affected and import-dependent settings. By capturing the impact of disruptions in food and fuel imports, the model strengthens early warning capabilities for food security deterioration. Historical validation in Yemen demonstrates that these new indicators improve the detection of emerging crises, particularly in areas under AA control, where previous versions of the model were less effective. The updated model also reflects the effects of major geopolitical shocks – such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Red Sea blockade – with greater accuracy, enabling more timely and informed humanitarian interventions.

From a technical perspective, the new indicators were developed by combining commodity prices (for both food and fuel) with exchange rate data to account for the conversion of YER to USD. This approach allows the model to estimate the degree of price convergence or divergence between local and global markets, providing a proxy for trade openness and potential disruptions.

While the updated model marks a significant step forward in capturing market dynamics and economic vulnerabilities, some limitations persist. For instance, reliance on global commodity data may overlook localized factors, and the absence of fuel import alerts suggests further investigation is needed to fully capture stabilizing influences or potential data gaps. Future model refinements should explore the integration of additional variables, including regional trade disruptions and evolving conflict dynamics, and assess compatibility with broader food security frameworks, such as the IPC. Continued collaboration with humanitarian responders and timely data updates will be essential to ensuring the model remains responsive to Yemen's complex and evolving humanitarian landscape.

In conclusion, the use of price divergence metrics offers a powerful tool for detecting trade shocks and significantly improves the performance of food security monitoring. This advancement is particularly valuable in fragile settings with limited access to direct trade data, supporting a more proactive and targeted policy and humanitarian response.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

The JMR combines quantitative modeling and qualitative analysis to provide robust bimonthly food and nutrition security monitoring that identifies emerging crisis risks. The report aims to complement IPC analyses and facilitate early recognition and coordinated responses to emerging major food and nutrition security crises among humanitarian and development stakeholders. The JMR is the product of a core development team comprising members from ACAPS, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and the World Bank.

A detailed explanation of the empirical foundation the Yemen JMR uses is available in this World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. An updated version of the Policy Research Working Paper detailing the methodology behind the new indicators is forthcoming, and a copy can be made available upon request.

For questions or comments, please contact yahinfo@acaps.org.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations