YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT

BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS **NOVEMBER 2025 - REPORT #11**

KEY MESSAGES

- Yemen is the third-most food insecure country in the world, with over half its population, **18.1 million people,** projected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or above levels of food insecurity between September 2025 and February 2026, including 41,000 people in Ansar Allah (AA)-controlled governorates projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), the highest level of the food insecurity classification. The 2025 Global Hunger Index indicates that hunger remains alarming in Yemen, with available indicators pointing to deteriorating conditions and that the country is likely to fall into the 'extremely alarming' category.
- **Food consumption levels** in Yemen remain deeply concerning, with 61% of households unable to meet their minimum food needs in September 2025. Although this marks a seasonal improvement from the record-high 70% in July, severe food deprivation (poor food consumption) persists for 33% of families. Peaks of inadequate food consumption were reported in Ad Dali', Lahj, and Raymah at 75%, in Al Bayda at 73%, in Abyan and Shabwah at 68%, and in Hajjah at 67%. The prevalence of poor food consumption was higher in Al Bayda and Lahj at 48% and in Raymah and Hajjah at 46% and 45%, respectively. In response to continued food consumption gaps, 42% of households nationwide resorted to severe food-based coping strategies, with the highest prevalence in areas under AA control. The most common strategies include limiting portion sizes (67%), reducing the number of meals (60%), and restricting adult consumption to prioritize children (50%), highlighting widespread coping exhaustion. Malnutrition remains widespread and deeply interlinked with food insecurity. Nutrition Cluster projections suggest a potential increase of 15–30% in acute malnutrition within lowland and coastal areas by the end of 2025. This rise is primarily driven by elevated levels of food insecurity, persistent nutrition supply constraints, and high disease burden.
- The Joint Monitoring Report (JMR)-modeled estimates of **people living in areas at risk of experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or above levels of food security** reached 9.4 million (27%), of whom 7.3 million live in AA-controlled governorates and two million in Government of Yemen (GoY) areas. This indicator takes into consideration overall risk indicator trends for the previous 11 months, even in absence of escalation-driven alerts. While this figure is higher compared to July and August, it is still below most of the values recorded since April 2024 (see Annex VI for more information on JMR modeling updates).
- Risk indicator alerts in September were lower than previous months, with only 36 critical and 459 heightened risk alerts. The **exchange rate** indicator recorded zero alerts for the second consecutive month following the appreciation of the Yemeni rial (YER) in GoY areas since August. On the other hand, the divergence between local and global food commodity prices (**proxy food imports** indicator) continued to raise the highest number of alerts, with the large majority raised in AA-controlled governorates, where the US dollar (USD) value of food commodities is much higher than global prices. This, however, was not reflected in the **food prices** indicator to the same extent as the price of the monthly food basket (MFB) in Yemeni rial in AA areas, which was the lowest since March 2021, and only 19 districts raised food prices alerts. The same dynamic, albeit at a reduced scale, applies to fuel prices in AA-controlled governorates, where average **fuel prices** in YER saw no major fluctuations, but the price divergence raised alerts for the proxy fuel imports indicator when converted into USD. **Conflict** also saw a considerable decline, with the lowest number of alerts in September since at least February 2024. Yet, **displacement** alerts saw a slight increase in August and September compared to previous months, with a total of 120 households displaced, raising alerts in Al Hodeidah, Hadramawt, Ibb, Shabwah, and Ta'iz. In September, flooding cause 40% of displaced households to flee, while conflict and economic reasons accounted for 31% and 27% respectively. The **drought** indicator raised ten critical and two heightened risk alerts resulting from the rainfall deficit in Al Maharah and parts of Hadramawt; while the Agricultural Stress Index (ASI) marks these areas as off season or with no crops, it is likely the drought could pose risks for livestock by reducing natural forage availability.
- **Looking forward,** a number of variables have the potential to lead to a deterioration of the food security situation. Shrinking humanitarian space in the north, resulting from reduced funding and following the recent detention of humanitarian staff by AA forces in Sana'a and Al Hodeidah in October, is likely to result in a further reduction in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, with severe unmet needs increasing in AA-controlled areas.

This is also likely to lead to a significant reallocation of human and financial resources from AA-controlled areas to those under GoY control, reflecting operational shifts but not funding increases, often as a result of pauses or suspensions in interventions. Decreasing fuel imports through Red Sea ports is also a major trend to monitor, as a fuel supply crisis and an increase in fuel prices will have clear impacts on food security. In GoY areas, despite recent currency appreciation, the sustainability of these gains remains uncertain. Without broader economic reforms to strengthen reserves and address trade deficits, renewed currency depreciation and rising food prices are likely, leaving many families increasingly unable to afford basic food items.

Pre-assessment for the Yemen Food Security Crisis Preparedness Plan

The latest JMR analysis indicates that around 9.4 million people (27% of the population) are currently living in areas at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or above levels of food insecurity. Of these, approximately 7.3 million are in AA-controlled areas and two million in GoY areas. While this figure is slightly higher than in July and August, it remains below the levels recorded since April 2024. The prevalence of poor food consumption, risk alerts, and conflict-related triggers all declined, while food prices and the exchange rate stabilized, particularly in GoY-controlled areas. Of the four districts with projected pockets of population in IPC 5 between September 2025 and February 2026, two districts (Abs and Al Ashah) saw a deterioration of 18 and five percentage points respectively between Q2 and Q3 of 2025, while the other two districts (Kushar and Az Zuhrah) experienced some improvement despite remaining persistently severe. The additional two districts at risk of experiencing IPC 5 conditions also saw a mild improvement in Q3.

Given the current data, triggering the preparedness plan is not suggested at this stage. It is important to emphasize, however, that this progress remains fragile and largely seasonal, reflecting a temporary easing rather than a sustained recovery, as household coping capacities remain heavily strained and malnutrition continues at critical levels. Close monitoring of the context is necessary as significant concerns remain around the deterioration of humanitarian access in AA areas, with the risk of humanitarian programs pausing or suspending operations following repeated AA-led detentions of UN staff in recent weeks. Red Sea import volumes and macroeconomic stability in GoY-controlled areas also require continuous monitoring.

AGGREGATED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ALERTS AND RISK SEVERITY

This section summarizes the heightened and critical alerts recorded based on JMR key indicators of deteriorating food and nutrition security.[1] For a more detailed breakdown of indicator alerts by governorate and district, please refer to Annexes I and II.

In September 2025, the JMR recorded 36 critical and 459 heightened risk alerts. The proxy food imports indicator recorded the highest number of alerts, with 21 critical and 209 heightened risk alerts, followed by the proxy fuel imports indicator, which recorded 214 heightened alerts. Critical alerts were also raised for drought (ten) and displacement (four), while heightened alerts were raised for food prices (19) and conflict (11). The exchange rate indicator did not record any alerts for the second consecutive month, although the sustainability of this stabilization remains uncertain. Please refer to Table 1 for an overview of heightened and critical food and nutrition security risk alerts countrywide by indicator.

Table 1. Critical and heightened food security risk alerts countrywide by indicator in September 2025

INDICATOR	CRITICAL RISK ALERTS	HEIGHTENED RISK ALERTS	GOVERNORATE
Proxy food imports	21	209	All governorates except Aden and Socotra
Drought	10	2	Al Maharah and Hadramawt
Displacement	4	2	Al Hodeidah, Hadramawt, Ibb, Shabwah, and Ta'iz
Conflict	1	11	Sana'a and Sana'a City
Proxy fuel imports	0	214	All AA governorates and Socotra
Food prices	0	19	Al Hodeidah, Al Mahwit, Dhamar, Hajjah, Sa'dah, and Sana'a
Fuel prices	0	2	Socotra
Total	36	459	

JMR modeling shows that, by September 2025, there were 9.4 million people (27% of the population) residing in areas at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or above levels of food insecurity, 7.3 million of whom reside in AA areas and two million in GoY areas, corresponding to 30% and 20% of the respective populations in each area of control. For a comprehensive historical overview of the population at risk of a decline in food and nutrition security (such as transitioning to IPC 4 or above) from October 2014 to September 2025, please refer to Annex IV.[2]

1 Critical alerts identify areas where a deterioration in food security is almost certain based on historical trends. Decision makers should consider these areas high priority. Heightened alerts identify areas where there is a high chance of deterioration in food and nutrition security and provide decision makers with a good overview of current food and nutrition security trends countrywide.

2 The JMR calculates the probability of food and nutrition insecurity across different districts using a statistical model known as a generalized linear model. This involves the analysis of various risk alerts and their predictive significance in estimating a potential decline in food and nutrition security. A confidence score determines the likelihood of such deterioration, multiplied by the population of the district, to project the anticipated number of people residing in areas vulnerable to a deterioration in food and nutrition security

SELECTED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ANALYSIS

This section offers context-specific details related to each crisis risk indicator, providing a more detailed analysis of the factors triggering risk alerts.

Proxy food imports

The proxy food imports indicator looks at the difference between the global and local prices (in USD) of five food commodities: beans, cooking oil, rice, sugar, and wheat. Risk alerts are raised when the divergence in the two prices is larger than the calculated pass-through average.[3] In September 2025, the proxy food imports indicator raised 21 critical alerts in Abyan, Al Mahwit, Amran, Hadramawt, Hajjah, and Sa'dah governorates and a total of 209 heightened risk alerts, 170 in AA governorates and 39 in GoY governorates.

In AA-controlled areas, in September, the average local price of the five selected food commodities was 138% higher than the average global price. This divergence kept the indicator value above the heightened risk threshold, and above the critical threshold for 21 districts, despite being slightly smaller compared to the divergence percentage of the past 12 months, which was around 140% on average.

In GoY-controlled areas, the average local price diverged significantly from average global prices in August, reaching a 127% difference before starting to reduce again in September, with local prices being 115% higher than global, the second-highest value since January 2024. This was mostly the result of the time it took for prices to adjust to the exchange rate appreciation, indicating partial and delayed pass-through.

Figure 1. Global and local prices of beans, vegetable oil, rice, sugar, and wheat



Note: the value measures the cumulative price for 1kg of beans, rice, sugar, and wheat and 1L of vegetable oil.

Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 10/14/2025) and FAO (accessed 10/14/2025)

(e.g. transitioning to IPC 4 or above). It is essential to understand that this process involves prediction (forecasting) and clarify that the JMR does not formally classify IPC phases for districts.

3 In economics, 'pass-through' refers to the degree to which changes in one economic factor – such as exchange rate or production costs – are reflected in another, such as consumer prices or inflation. Pass-through describes how much a shift in one variable influences another.

Food prices

The food prices indicator recorded 19 heightened risk alerts in Al Hodeidah, Al Mahwit, Dhamar, Hajjah, Sa'dah, and Sana'a, all under AA control. This is the lowest number of alerts for this indicator since August 2017.

In Al Hodeidah governorate, the MFB price increased by 2.7% in September compared to the previous five-month moving average (the period considered to calculate an escalation). By comparison, districts in Al Hodeidah that did not record any alerts saw a reduction during the same period. In Al Mahwit, only the districts of Hufash and Melhan experienced an MFB price increase of 2.4% compared to the five-month moving average, recording two of the heightened risk alerts. In Dhamar governorate, Al Hada, Dwran Anis, and Jahran districts saw an increase of 4% compared to the five-month moving average, while all other districts in the governorate experienced a decrease. In Hajjah governorate, the MFB price increased by 3.7% in Abs, Aslam, Hayran, and Midi, while decreasing in the governorate's other districts. In Sa'dah, the MFB price increased by 4.8% in Kitaf wa Al Boqa' district while increasing by 1% in the rest of the governorate. In Sana'a, Al Hissn and Bilad Ar Rus districts experienced a 4% increase while the rest of the governorate saw an overall decrease. In all other AA-controlled governorates, the MFB price in September decreased by 3.5% compared to the five-month moving average and was 4% lower year-on-year.

In September, the average MFB[4] price in GoY-controlled areas experienced a significant drop, reaching the lowest value since February 2024 at YER 129,000 (USD 79), marking a 33% reduction compared to the highest recorded value in July 2025, which stood at YER 199,000 (USD 70), and 13% lower year-on-year. The price reduction was driven by the appreciation of the Yemeni rial seen in GoY areas since August; since prices took slightly longer to adjust to the new exchange rate, the MFB value in USD in GoY areas recorded a 6% increase in August compared to July, reflecting that food prices decreased disproportionately to the exchange rate appreciation. In summary, the nominal value in YER decreased between July–September, but, because of a partial pass-through, the corresponding USD price was higher in September.

Figure 2. MFB price in GoY-controlled areas in YER and USD between September 2024 and September 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from FAO (accessed 14/10/2025) and WB (accessed 14/10/2025)

4 The MFB composition calculated in the JMR model comprises 10kg beans, 8L vegetable oil, 1kg salt, 2.5kg sugar, and 75kg wheat flour for an estimated household size of seven people.

Figure 3. MFB price in AA-controlled areas in YER and USD between September 2024 and September 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from FAO (accessed 14/10/2025) and WB (accessed 14/10/2025)

In September 2025, the FAO Food Price Index averaged 128.8 points, down 0.7% from August but 3.4% higher compared to September 2024, though still 19.6% below its March 2022 peak. Price indices for meat rose, offsetting declines in cereals, vegetable oils, dairy, and sugar. The FAO Cereal Price Index was down 0.6% from August and 7.5% below last year, as large wheat and maize harvests in major exporters and weak demand kept prices low. The FAO Vegetable Oil Price Index fell by 0.7% in September compared to August, with lower palm and soybean oil quotations outweighing gains in sunflower and rapeseed oils. The FAO Meat Price Index rose by 0.7% to a record 127.8 points, driven by stronger beef and lamb prices amid limited export supplies and firm global demand. The FAO Dairy Price Index fell 2.6%, its third monthly drop, as butter and milk powder prices eased with rising seasonal output. The FAO Sugar Price Index declined 4.1% to its lowest level since March 2021, pressured by robust production in Brazil and favorable crop prospects in India and Thailand.

Proxy fuel imports

The proxy fuel imports indicator recorded 214 heightened risk alerts in September 2025, all in AA-controlled governorates and two in Socotra. On average, the indicator value for proxy fuel imports in AA areas in September was 7% above the heightened alert threshold. The cumulative price per 1L of petrol and 1kg of cooking gas in AA-controlled areas was USD 1.58 on average, comparted to the global equivalent of USD 0.83.

The local price of cooking gas and petrol in GoY areas decreased at a slower rate than exchange rate appreciation, leading to an increase in corresponding USD values. This, however, did not lead to any alerts in GoY areas, as the indicator value remained well below the risk threshold despite the spike. Socotra, on the other hand, saw a significant increase in the price of cooking gas and petrol (see the fuel prices section below), bringing the indicator value to 53% above the heightened alert threshold.

Figure 4. Global and local prices of cooking gas and petrol in USD



Note: the value measures the cumulative price for 1kg of gas and 1L of petrol.

Source: ACAPS using data from FAO (accessed 14/10/2025) and WB (accessed 10/14/2025)

Fuel prices

In September 2025, the fuel prices indicator recorded only two heightened risk alerts for Socotra, where the average price of cooking gas, diesel, and petrol reached the highest value since February 2022 at YER 2,242 (USD 1.37), marking a 44% increase compared to September 2024. Since early 2025, fuel and gas prices in Socotra have steadily increased because of the continued monopoly of United Arab Emirates-affiliated companies, which control all imports and sales of petroleum and gas products on the island. After the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company and Eastern Triangle raised prices repeatedly between February–May, the cost of a 20L jerrycan rose from YER 40,000 (USD 15) in May to YER 48,000–52,000 (USD 19–21) by June, while household gas cylinders exceeded YER 60,000 (USD 24). The hikes provoked protests and public anger over the lack of competition and government oversight.

Community-level committees and leaders have repeatedly demanded price reductions to align with mainland Yemen, but enforcement has been weak. Although the Yemen Petroleum Company in Aden announced nationwide fuel price cuts in August 2025 following a stronger rial, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company refused to comply, prompting the Socotra Reconciliation and Settlement Committee to issue warnings. The Eastern Triangle company again raised gas prices to YER 50,000 per cylinder (USD 30, a significant increase considered the appreciation of the currency in August), deepening hardship for residents and raising concern over increased reliance on alternative fuels such as firewood.

On the other hand, all other GoY-controlled governorates recorded lower fuel prices in August and September thanks to the exchange rate appreciation, marking a 14% reduction year-on-year.

In AA-controlled governorates, the average price of cooking gas, diesel, and petrol in September 2025 was 4% lower than in September 2024, although the price of cooking gas saw an increase to its highest value in 2025. Overall, the indicator did not record any alerts in AA areas.

Figure 5. Diesel, gas, and petrol prices in YER and USD in GoY-controlled areas between September 2024 and September 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from FAO (accessed 10/14/2025) and WB (accessed 10/14/2025)

Figure 6. Diesel, gas, and petrol prices in YER in AA-controlled areas between September 2024 and September 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from FAO (accessed 10/14/2025) and WB (accessed 10/14/2025)

Drought

In September 2025, the Standardized Precipitation Index-based drought indicator flagged ten critical alerts in Al Maharah and two heightened risk alerts in Hadramawt. In Al Maharah, the indicator value shows that September has been the only month consistently recording a precipitation deficit, reflecting a multi-year seasonal pattern and raising a critical alert in the governorate. Lower rainfall in September comes after abundant rainfall in August. Al Qaff and Thamud districts in Hadramawt follow a similar pattern, but rainfall levels in these two districts in September 2025, while still signaling dryness, were the highest compared to the same month in the years since 2012 (when the dataset became available), recording only heightened alerts.

The ASI, a remote sensing-based tool designed to rapidly detect agricultural water stress, indicated between 40–55% of cropland was stressed in small parts of Abyan, Al Bayda, and Lahj. The two governorates that recorded JMR alerts were either off season or without cropland, which partly explains why, despite meteorological dryness, ASI-detected stress was concentrated only in a few active agricultural areas.

Figure 7. ASI estimates for September 2025

Note: the ASI legend illustrates the percentage of cropland within each area experiencing significant vegetation stress. Higher percentages indicate more widespread stress, typically as a result of drought or unfavorable growing conditions. The ASI helps identify regions at risk of reduced agricultural productivity, guiding early warning and response efforts.

Source: FAO (accessed 10/30/2025)

Displacement

In September, the displacement indicator recorded four critical alerts, one each in the districts of Ibb (Ibb), Mayfa'ah (Shabwah), Salah (Ta'iz), and Wadi Al Ayn (Hadramawt), and two heightened risk alerts in Al Mina and Hays districts in Al Hodeidah. In Wadi Al Ayn, the alert was raised in August, when 38 households were displaced within the district by heavy rains and flooding, which resulted in the indicator value remaining above the critical alert threshold for September as well. Rains and flooding were also cited by the 19 households displaced within Mayfa'ah in September. In Ibb, the alert was raised in August when 33 households were displaced, followed by another 11 in September, with 89% of households displaced citing insecurity and moving to Ta'iz governorate, while the remaining displaced households cited economic reasons and were displaced from Ibb to Ma'rib. In September, Salah district received 19 households displaced from Ibb and Ta'iz by conflict. In Al Hodeidah, Al Mina district (under AA control) has continued recording a heightened risk alert since June 2024; the indicator value surpassed the critical alert threshold following the displacement of 44 households in May 2025. The district also saw 13 and four households displaced in August and September respectively. In Hays district (under GoY control), the heightened risk alert was driven by the displacement of 113 households, of which 89 originated from within the district in August.

Overall, in September, a total of 272 households were displaced compared to the monthly average of 263 households between January–September. In total, 2,372 households have been displaced in 2025.

Figure 8. Number of households displaced per month in Yemen between January–September 2025



Source: IOM (10/06/2025)

Conflict

In September, all districts in Sana'a City recorded heightened risk alerts for conflict, and one district in Sana'a governorate recorded a critical alert. The conflict events related to the alerts are reported below, based on the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

In September 2025, Israeli forces conducted multiple air and naval strikes across Sana'a City, targeting AA military and security facilities. On 10 September, airstrikes struck the media complex near At Tahrir Square housing the AA's Moral Guidance Department, the military's 26 September and Yemen newspapers, and the Yemen Petroleum Company's fuel depot and pumping stations in Al Wehdah district, which supports the medical sector. According to AA sources, the attacks killed at least 46 civilians and injured over 160 others. The Israeli military claimed to have targeted military installations, but AA officials stated the strikes hit civilian sites. On 25 September, Israeli jets and warships carried out a large-scale offensive, dropping more than 65 bombs on several locations across Sana'a City. These coordinated strikes caused significant destruction and civilian harm, with reports of at least 11 fatalities (including women and children) and over 200 injuries, alongside unverified claims of 20–30 AA deaths. These events drove the surge in alerts for Sana'a City in September.

Exchange rate

In September, the monthly average exchange rate in GoY areas reached its lowest value since February 2024, at YER 1,622 to USD 1, marking a 17% appreciation compared to September 2024 and reflecting policy measures and external support. On 20 September, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced a new support package of USD 368 million, which helped the GoY pay public sector salaries in October after a four-month suspension. While this appreciation also eased food and fuel prices somewhat, its durability remains in doubt amid continuing uncertainty over oil exports and the overall availability of foreign currency, which could lead to a renewed depreciation and increase in food prices. As a result of this appreciation, the JMR raised no exchange rate alerts in GoY areas for the second consecutive month. In September, the average exchange rate in AA-controlled areas remained stable, at around YER 536 to USD 1.

Figure 9. YER-USD exchange rate in Aden (GoY) and Sana'a (AA) from September 2024 to September 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from WB (accessed 10/14/2025)

OTHER INDICATORS

This section covers additional contextual information on pertinent food and nutrition security indicators in Yemen.

Food imports

In September 2025, total food imports to Yemen amounted to 515,000MT, slightly above recent months but still well below last year's volumes. Food imports through Red Sea ports (under AA control) in September were around 329,000MT, an increase compared to the previous two months but 10% below the 12-month moving average and 44% lower year-on-year. The decline in imports through Red Sea ports was linked to the damage and deterioration to port infrastructure caused by air strikes. The southern ports (under GoY control) saw the highest food import volumes since January 2025, 39% above the 12-month moving average and 121% higher year-on-year.

Figure 10. Monthly food imports by port between September 2024 and September 2025



Source: ACAPS YETI (accessed 10/08/2025)

Fuel imports

In September, fuel import volumes through Red Sea ports were the lowest since at least September 2024, at 52% below the 12-month moving average and 26% lower year-on-year. Fuel imports via southern ports in September were also low, at 21% below the 12-month moving average and 64% lower year-on-year.

Figure 11. Monthly fuel imports by port between September 2024 and September 2025



Source: ACAPS YETI (accessed 10/08/2025)

Acute watery diarrhea

In September, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported a sharp surge in acute watery diarrhea (AWD) cases across Al Hodeidah and Hajjah governorates, with a 65% increase from 7–14 September. Month on month, AWD cases in Abs General Hospital (Hajjah) doubled to over 400 patients compared to August, while Al Qanawis Hospital (Al Hodeidah) saw a 50% rise, averaging over 21 cases weekly, many among children under five, likely reflecting both higher caseload and improved reporting. Since July, more than 4,400 patients have been treated across both governorates. MSF reported that children often arrive severely dehydrated and malnourished, as the outbreak worsens amid aid cuts and deteriorating humanitarian conditions.

Years of conflict, collapsing infrastructure, contaminated water sources, and heavy rains have intensified the spread of AWD, threatening millions already in crisis. MSF is conducting community outreach and hygiene-awareness sessions, alongside ensuring access to safe water in hospitals.

FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY OUTCOMES

IPC analysis

Between September 2025 and February 2026, 18.1 million people – 52% of Yemen's population – are projected to face acute food insecurity of IPC 3 or above levels, with 5.5 million in IPC 4 and 41,000 in IPC 5, marking an increase of one million people (5.8%) compared to the period May–August 2025. This includes 12.8 million people in AA-controlled governorates (up by 5%) and 5.38 million people in GoY areas (up by 8.7%) (also corresponding to 52% and 53% of the populations in each area of control respectively). Overall, the governorates with the highest percentage of people in IPC 3 or above levels are Ma'rib with 61%, Al Jawf and Hajjah with 59%, and Amran with 58%. In terms of absolute values, the governorate with the highest number of food insecure people are Al Hodeidah with nearly two million, Ta'iz with 1.9 million, Sana'a City with 1.8 million, and Ibb and Hajjah with 1.5 million each. Twelve districts are of greatest concern, where more than 65% of people are in IPC 3 or above and some pockets face IPC 5. In AA-controlled areas, the districts worst affected include Abs and Kushar (Hajjah), Al Ashah (Amran), and Az Zuhrah (Al Hodeidah), all hosting projected pockets of populations in IPC 5, while Adh Dhahir (Sa'dah) and Suwayr (Amran) risk deterioration to that level (please see outcome indicators analysis on these areas in the section below). In GoY-controlled areas, the most critical districts are Ad Dali' and Al Azariq (Ad Dali'), Hays (Al Hodeidah), Khab wa Ash Sha'f (Al Jawf), Ma'rib City (Ma'rib), and Markhah Al Olya (Shabwah), where conflict, displacement, and floods compound food insecurity.

Food Consumption Score

In September 2025, 61% of households across Yemen were unable to meet their minimum food needs, with 33% facing severe food deprivation levels similar to last year. This is a considerable decrease compared to July, when 70% of households in Yemen were facing inadequate food consumption, the highest level on record, reflecting a seasonal improvement while remaining at sustained severe levels. In GoY areas in September, 63% of households had inadequate food consumption, peaking in Abyan, Ad Dali', Lahj, and Shabwah (68–75%), while 61% faced inadequate consumption in AA areas, primarily in Al Bayda, Amran, Hajjah, and Raymah (66–75%). Food assistance distributed in August in 25 AA-controlled districts significantly reduced poor consumption levels from 54% in July to 35% in August, though food consumption deteriorated again when aid was interrupted. Among IDPs, 63% were unable to meet food needs, with 34% facing severe deprivation. Conditions were worse for IDPs in camps, where 39% had poor food consumption compared to 32% among IDPs in host communities, highlighting the extreme vulnerability of displaced households. Among IDPs in camps, the prevalence of poor food consumption was higher in AA areas (45%) then in GoY areas (33%).

Poor food consumption in districts with projected pockets of population in IPC 5 remained at very elevated levels in Q3 of 2025. Abs experienced a deterioration from 28% in Q2 to 46% in Q3 of households reporting severe food deprivation, mostly in relation to the impact of flooding and lack of food assistance. Al Ashah also saw a deterioration from 52% to 58% during the same period. Despite remaining at alarming levels, the share of households experiencing severe food deprivation saw a seasonal respite in Adh Dhahir, Az Zuhrah, Kushar, and Suwayr, down between seven–ten percentage points compared to Q2 2025. This reduction was primarily associated with the cereal grain harvest season and seasonal improvements in agricultural labor opportunities. These factors were reinforced by food assistance distributed in Suwayr in August under Targeted Emergency Food Assistance cycle 2, as well as growing reliance on crisis or emergency livelihood coping strategies in Adh Dhahir and Kushar (especially selling off homes or land and reduced health-related expenditures).

Reduced Coping Strategies Index

In September 2025, 42% of households nationwide relied on severe food-based coping strategies (rCSI ≥ 19), with a higher prevalence in AA areas (44%) than in GoY areas (39%). While this marks a 10% reduction compared to the previous year, coping capacity remains exhausted, with an increase in consumption patterns shifting towards less nutritious foods. Most families also reported limiting meal portions (66%) or skipping meals (59%), while nearly half (49%) are restricting adult consumption to feed children, illustrating persistent food insecurity.

Nationwide, 66% of households resorted to crisis or emergency livelihood strategies in September, such as begging or selling household assets, particularly in Al Bayda, Al Jawf, Hajjah, Sa'dah, and Sana'a. Among IDPs, coping pressure was even greater: 50% adopted severe food-based strategies and 73% used crisis or emergency livelihood strategies, compared to 63% of residents. Emergency coping was most common among IDPs in camps (24%), where 13% reported resorting to begging, nearly twice the rate of those living with host communities, underscoring the acute coping strategies vulnerability and exhaustion of mechanisms among displaced populations.

Malnutrition

The most recent reliable IPC acute malnutrition analysis (from the 2023–2024 period) categorized four districts as 'extremely critical' (global acute malnutrition rate of at least 30%) and projected further deterioration. While 2025 severity-indicative estimates are based on admission forecasts rather than full IPC evidence, they suggest that 24 districts will face 'very high' nutrition needs and 186 will face 'high' needs, together representing 210 of 333 districts in 20 governorates. Among the districts classified in Emergency (IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase 4), 72% also reported high levels of nutrition severity (severity 4 and 5), highlighting the strong convergence between acute food insecurity and malnutrition. The assessment also identified that the majority of districts, 150 of 210, showing 'high' and 'very high' nutrition needs were located in AA-controlled governorates, mainly in Ad Dali', Al Hodeidah, Al Jawf, and Hajjah, where up to 70% of the population is also classified in Crisis (IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase 3) or above, including some pockets in Catastrophe (IPC Acute Food Insecurity Phase 5). Nutrition Cluster projections suggest a potential increase of 15–30% in acute malnutrition within lowland and coastal areas, namely Al Hodeidah and Ta'iz, by the end of 2025 linked to persistent food insecurity and disease burden. WFP remote monitoring data collected during September 2025 also shows that children aged 6–23 months have extremely poor dietary diversity, with many consuming only one or two of the eight essential food groups, underscoring limited access to nutrient-rich foods despite market stabilization. Caregivers also reported that 34% of sick children under five are suffering from diarrhea, further increasing their risk of acute malnutrition. The prevalence of diarrhea was higher in AA-controlled areas (36%) than in GoY areas (29%).

The key drivers of acute malnutrition in Yemen are prolonged conflict, economic collapse, humanitarian access restrictions, disease outbreaks (such as cholera), and the breakdown of livelihoods, food production, and supply chains. Funding cuts have also forced the closure of neearly half of all lifesaving nutrition programming.

Table 2. Districts facing 'very high' nutrition needs in 2025

GOVERNORATE	DISTRICTS
Ad Dali'	Damt
Al Hodeidah	Ad Dohi, Al Khukhah, Al Munirah, Al Qanawis, As Salif, Az Zaydiah, Az Zuhrah, Hays
Al Jawf	Al Hazm, Al Maslub, Al Matammah
Hajjah	Abs, Bakil Al Mir
Lahj	Al Hawtah, Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah, Al Malah, Al Musaymir, Tuban, Tur Al Bahah
Ta'iz	Al Makha, Al Wazi'yah, Dhubab, Mawza'

Source: IPC (06/27/2025)

OUTLOOK

Food security situation

Yemen's food security outlook remains critical, with conditions expected to worsen in several regions. In GoY-controlled areas, despite the temporary stabilization of the Yemeni rial, the absence of sustained macroeconomic stabilization measures means that currency pressures may re-emerge, which, combined with low household incomes, will result in many families struggling to afford essential food items.

In AA-controlled areas, the situation is expected to deteriorate further as a result of declining rainfall, localized conflict, reduced imports, and limited wage opportunities. Agricultural production remains poor, and the resumption of large-scale humanitarian assistance appears unlikely. As a result, over 18.1 million people, 52% of Yemen's population, are projected to remain in severe food insecurity through early 2026, with risks of further escalation if economic or conflict conditions worsen.

Humanitarian environment

Since at least 2021, the AA have detained significant numbers of UN and INGO personnel in areas under its control. On 31 August 2025, the UN reported that at least 11 personnel had been arbitrarily detained following raids on UN offices in Sana'a and Al Hodeidah. In early October 2025, the UN confirmed nine more detentions, bringing the total to 53 staff held since 2021. In mid-October, another AA raid led to the detention of 20 UN employees (five Yemeni nationals and 15 international staff) in Sana'a, who were later released. The UN Secretary-General has condemned the detentions, called for the immediate and unconditional release of all personnel, and demanded the return of all seized UN premises and assets. The AA accuse some of the detained staff of espionage, allegedly linked to Israel, and these cases will be referred to domestic judicial processes.

These actions have seriously disrupted humanitarian operations in Yemen, undermined access and aid delivery, and raised concerns about the protection of humanitarian workers in conflict zones. Should such actions continue, operational presence and monitoring capacity may decline further.

ANNEXES

Annex I. Number of JMR alerts by governorate in September 2025

Table 3 shows the number of JMR district alerts for each indicator by governorate.

Table 3. Number of JMR district alerts by governorate in September 2025

	CONFLICT		DISPLACEMENT		DROUGHT		EXCHANGE RATE	FOOD PRICES	FUEL PRICES	PROXY FOOD IMPORTS		PROXY FUEL IMPORTS
GOVERNORATE	C	H	C	H	C	H	C	H	H	C	H	H
Abyan										1	7	
Ad Dali'											6	3
Aden												
Al Bayda											20	20
Al Hodeidah				2				7			26	24
Al Jawf											1	12
Al Maharah					9						9	
Al Mahwit								2		3	6	9
Amran										3	17	20
Dhamar								3			12	12
Hadramawt			1		1	2				5	3	
Hajjah								4		7	24	31
Ibb			1								20	20
Lahj											6	
Ma'rib											14	7
Raymah											5	6
Sa'dah								1		2	13	14
Sana'a		2						2			5	16
Sana'a City	1	9									10	10
Shabwah			1								1	
Socotra									2			2
Ta'iz			1								4	8
Total	**1**	**11**	**4**	**2**	**10**	**2**		**19**	**2**	**21**	**209**	**214**

Annex II. JMR alerts by district with higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration

Table 4 shows JMR alerts by district. The districts with the highest alert level out of 16 – four in this case – are included. The table highlights critical alerts (red), heightened alerts (yellow), and typical status (white) per food security risk indicator by district.

Table 4. JMR alerts by district with higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration in September 2025

GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT	ALERT LEVEL	CONFLICT	DISPLACEMENT	DROUGHT	EXCHANGE RATE	FOOD PRICES	FUEL PRICES	PROXY FOOD IMPORTS	PROXY FUEL IMPORTS
Al Mahwit	Hufash	4								
Al Mahwit	Melhan	4								
Hajjah	Abs	4								
Hajjah	Aslam	4								
Hajjah	Hayran	4								
Hajjah	Midi	4								
Ibb	Ibb	4								
Sana'a City	As Sab'in	4								

Annex III. JMR historical heightened and critical risk alerts

The figure below shows the historical breakdown of JMR food and nutrition security risk alerts by indicator for all districts. The graphs show the percentage of total possible heightened and critical risk alerts for all six food and nutrition security crisis risk indicators. The higher the score, the worse the deterioration in food and nutrition security.

Figure 12. Historical percentage of total JMR heightened and critical risk alerts (January 2015 to September 2025)



Annex IV. Historical overview of the population at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or above levels of food insecurity

Figure 13. Percentage of population living in areas at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or above levels of food insecurity (January 2015 to September 2025)



Annex V. Sources and timeframes of JMR risk indicators and target variables

Table 5. Indicator sources and timeframes

	SOURCE	LINK	DATA FROM	DATA TO
Risk indicator				
Conflict	ACLED	https://acleddata.com/data/	01/01/2015	10/31/2025
Displacement	IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix	https://dtm.iom.int/yemen	01/01/2014	10/31/2025
Drought	WFP	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/yem-rainfall-subnational	01/01/1981	10/31/2025
Exchange rate	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6159	01/01/2009	10/31/2025
Food prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4508	01/01/2009	10/31/2025
Fuel prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6133	01/01/2009	10/31/2025
Target variable				
FEWS NET	World Bank	https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0064614	07/01/2009	10/01/2024

Annex VI. JMR methodology updates

New method for calculating the generalized linear model score and percentage of people living in areas at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or above levels of food insecurity

JMR issue #10 published on 9 September 2025 indicated that 15 million people (37.5% of the population) resided in areas at risk of experiencing IPC 4 or above levels of food insecurity in July 2025, while the current modeling shows that, for the same month, there were 5.1 million people (14.7%). This difference stems from an updated multivariate modeling approach. While both methods use a generalized linear model to better estimate the share of the population living in areas at risk of high food insecurity (IPC 4+), the new model scores how well the percentage of the population living in areas at risk of experiencing IPC 4+ conditions matches the same value based on FEWS NET data at the country level, alongside scoring based on how well IPC 4+ areas are correctly classified. These two scores are combined into one final score. Instead of directly estimating the percentage of people at risk, this model links FEWS NET area classifications (which describe risk levels, not population shares) with population data to calculate the estimated population residing in at-risk areas. This replaces the previous Yemen JMR method, providing more reliable and consistent national estimates.

Proxy food and fuel import indicators

The two new indicators – proxy food imports and fuel imports – were included in the JMR food security monitoring model starting from the June 2025 publication (JMR #9). These indicators are based on divergences between domestic and global commodity prices, offering a novel method to detect import shocks affecting food security in import-reliant contexts such as Yemen.

The core concept builds on economic theory and prior research showing that, in open trade systems, local prices of imported commodities tend to align with global prices, while divergence signals market insulation or disruption. By integrating error correction terms, the model measures how quickly domestic prices revert to global benchmarks, flagging potential trade flow interruptions.

The inclusion of these import indicators significantly enhances the model's ability to anticipate and detect trade-related shocks, which are especially important in conflict-affected and import-dependent settings. By capturing the impact of disruptions in food and fuel imports, the model strengthens early warning capabilities for food security deterioration. Historical validation in Yemen demonstrates that these new indicators improve the detection of emerging crises, particularly in areas under AA control, where previous versions of the model were less effective. The updated model also reflects the effects of major geopolitical shocks – such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Red Sea blockade – with greater accuracy, enabling more timely and informed humanitarian interventions.

From a technical perspective, the new indicators were developed by combining commodity prices (for both food and fuel) with exchange rate data to account for the conversion of Yemeni rial to US dollars. This approach allows the model to estimate the degree of price convergence or divergence between local and global markets, providing a proxy for trade openness and potential disruptions.

While the updated model marks a significant step forward in capturing market dynamics and economic vulnerabilities, some limitations persist. For instance, reliance on global commodity data may overlook localized factors, and the absence of fuel import alerts suggests further investigation is needed to fully capture stabilizing influences or potential data gaps. Future model refinements should explore the integration of additional variables, including regional trade disruptions and evolving conflict dynamics, and assess compatibility with broader food security frameworks, such as the IPC. Continued collaboration with humanitarian responders and timely data updates will be essential to ensuring the model remains responsive to Yemen's complex and evolving humanitarian landscape.

In conclusion, the use of price divergence metrics offers a powerful tool for detecting trade shocks and significantly improves the performance of food security monitoring. This advancement is particularly valuable in fragile settings with limited access to direct trade data, supporting a more proactive and targeted policy and humanitarian response.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

The JMR combines quantitative modeling and qualitative analysis to provide robust bimonthly food and nutrition security monitoring that identifies emerging food and nutrition security crisis risks. The report aims to complement IPC analyses and facilitate early recognition and coordinated responses to emerging major food and nutrition security crises among humanitarian and development stakeholders. The JMR is the product of a core development team comprising members from ACAPS, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and the World Bank.

A detailed explanation of the empirical foundation the Yemen JMR uses is available in this World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. An updated version of the Policy Research Working Paper detailing the methodology behind the new indicators is forthcoming, and a copy can be made available upon request.

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