MYANMAR
Humanitarian data and analysis landscape

Thematic Report
18 September 2025

INTRODUCTION

Myanmar's February 2021 military coup, escalating conflict, and recurrent climate hazards have contributed to a severe humanitarian crisis. Nearly 22 million (40%) of Myanmar's population of 55 million were predicted to have humanitarian needs in 2025 (OCHA 13/12/2024 a). By the beginning of the year, conflict had affected 13 of 15 states; by mid-2025, estimates pointed to the State Administrative Council (SAC) fully controlling less than 50% of Myanmar's territory (BBC 20/12/2024; COAR/Premise 03/04/2025).

The coup and subsequent conflict have helped deteriorate the humanitarian operating context. The resulting constraints on humanitarian access and challenges around data collection and sharing make all aspects of assessment and analysis difficult (New Myanmar Foundation 2025). This results in an opaque humanitarian data and analysis landscape that, despite the best efforts of local, national, and international humanitarian organisations, likely has notable gaps, although analysis of this is not possible since most data is shared informally rather than publicly (Reuters 16/12/2024). It is extremely difficult to have an accurate overview of needs and conditions. The localised nature of the response implies that local responders likely hold important knowledge that may not be shared given concerns about who would see it and how it could be used. Resource and capacity constraints also prevent many national and local organisations from delegating staff dedicated to information management or analysis, affecting the quality of the information available. This report examines the challenges of collecting, analysing, and sharing humanitarian data in Myanmar so users of this information have a greater understanding of the effort involved in making it available and interpret it in that light.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

Aim

This report examines the humanitarian data and analysis landscape in Myanmar to highlight the challenges facing the response that impede evidence-informed programming. It maps key data and analysis parties in the country; examines what is known about their production, sharing, and use of data; highlights gaps and challenges throughout the process; and recommends ways to safely strengthen the landscape. It builds on ACAPS' October 2023 Analysis Ecosystem report for Myanmar, identifying major changes in the humanitarian context and data and analysis landscape while emphasising local and non-humanitarian data collection and analysis.

Scope

This report covers from October 2023 (the publication date of ACAPS' previous report) to September 2025 This period involves several significant contextual developments: a deterioration in the humanitarian operating context, significant conflict escalation from October 2023, and the 28 March 2025 earthquake. Geographically, the report examines information and analysis products and processes with both a nationwide and subnational focus.

Methodology

Consultations

ACAPS consulted over 60 data collectors, analysts, researchers, information management (IM) professionals, humanitarian responders, donors, journalists, media representatives, and local governance representatives. Those consulted belonged to more than 30 different local, national, and international organisations working on the humanitarian response in Myanmar. These consultations took a mixture of forms, including individual interviews and small group discussions. Some were in person in Thailand, but most were remote. Consultations were conducted in English with international participants and in Burmese with national participants. In-text citations use CNSLT and the consultation date.

Secondary data review

The analysis involved logging publicly available humanitarian information and analysis products published between October 2023 and July 2025 in a database, categorised according to coverage (themes, geographic areas, and population groups) and methodology (type of data collection and analysis). There were 831 products in the database sourced almost exclusively from ReliefWeb and covering the humanitarian situation within Myanmar (including products that have an exclusively humanitarian focus and those that include humanitarian information as part of a broader analysis). Secondary data from the database and other sources was used to supplement the issues raised in consultations and included publications up to September 2025.

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Table 1. Selected terminology and abbreviations

TERM	DEFINITION
Humanitarian data and analysis landscape	The term is used here to refer collectively to all the elements, organisations, structures, data, information, relationships, and processes that exist in a humanitarian context that should lead to an informed response.
Local and national organisations (L/NNGOs)	Myanmar's humanitarian response includes a significant number of NNGOs (working nationwide or across multiple states and regions), LNGOs (working at the state or region level or below), and community-based organisations or CBOs (often informal, volunteer-based community groups located in areas presenting humanitarian access challenges). The report collectively refers to these organisations as 'local and national organisations'.
People's Defence Force (PDF)	The PDF is an umbrella term often used to refer to armed groups that have emerged in Myanmar since the coup. These include local defence forces (LDFs) and people's defence teams (PaKhaPha/PDTs), as well as other individual PDFs. Of these, PDFs refer to larger armed units formed or recognised by the National Unity Government (NUG) (USIP 03/11/2022).
Ethnic armed organisations (EAOs)	EAOs are armed groups linked to specific ethnic groups. There are 135 ethnic groups in Myanmar, and EAOs have been a feature of internal politics since 1948. Currently, there are over 25 EAOs, most of which oppose the SAC, although some support it and some observe a ceasefire. The NUG aims to consolidate command over as many EAOs as possible under central command with the PDF (Geopolitical Monitor 27/02/2024).
Multi-sector needs assessment (MSNA)	The MSNA is an annual assessment carried out across Myanmar under the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG) based on household-level surveys. It is a countrywide survey, representative at the national and state or regional level but not guaranteed to be representative at the township level, where findings are indicative (GiHA 03/2025). The 2025 MSNA comprises data from over 9,000 household interviews, more than 80% of which were conducted in person (CNSLT 01/09/2025).
Village tract	A village tract is the fourth-level rural administrative subdivision in Myanmar's administrative structure. These usually comprise several villages and come under a township.

Limitations

As discussed throughout this report, much of Myanmar's humanitarian data and analysis are not publicly available given well-founded security concerns. In respect of these concerns, the report avoids naming specific organisations, mindful that organisations assess risks differently and have differing risk tolerance. Even where some organisations expressed no objection to being named, ACAPS chose not to do so to avoid exposing others.

The widespread reluctance to make information openly available has created a humanitarian data and analysis landscape in which information is shared in ways that are less public and not always through the expected humanitarian information channels that are part of the globally accepted humanitarian coordination architecture. In practice, this means information is shared via multiple closed networks of stakeholders to minimise risk. ACAPS was able to tap into some of these through networks and the consultations, but a significant amount of non-public information was likely not included in the secondary data review. This also makes the landscape difficult to map out and explain. Reports like this usually aim for a diagrammatic overview of the landscape, including both formal and informal coordination structures and how they interact. For this report, it proved extremely difficult.

Conversations with grassroots responders revealed that the absence of documentation does not mean programmatic designs and decisions lack an evidence base. Undocumented local knowledge and contextual information are used, and a high degree of trust exists between some subnational responders and their international counterparts to facilitate funding and other support. This informal knowledge is difficult to measure and has not been the focus of this report but clearly plays a critical role in operational and programmatic decision-making in Myanmar.

KEY FINDINGS

A large proportion of the humanitarian data collected in Myanmar is not publicly available owing to the low visibility operational models many humanitarian responders adopt to minimise risks to staff and affected communities.

- Although all civil society organisations in Myanmar are required to register with the SAC, not all do or are able to do so, and even registered organisations sometimes operate outside the scope of their registration given challenges in getting the required permissions. This has led to many conducting activities under the radar, particularly activities that tend to be more visible, such as community-based data collection.
- The current default is the limited or confidential distribution of humanitarian data and analysis to specific networks. Sharing outside an organisation's network generally occurs only in response to specific requests and if the organisation feels comfortable with the assessed level of risk. There is significant mistrust between organisations at all levels, including fears that attendees at meetings, staff of peer organisations, or members of mailing lists may be SAC informants.
- Concerns about sharing data and information are often justified, as involvement in unsanctioned activities can endanger the safety and wellbeing of Burmese staff and affected communities.
- Data-sharing barriers challenge responders' access to information on new geographical areas, inhibiting the response to sudden-onset crises or changes in conditions.
- Despite available steps to minimise risks when sharing data and reports, many organisations lack the resources, capacity, and time necessary to ensure their information products are safely shareable to – and usable by – external stakeholders.

Severe security, logistical, and bureaucratic constraints that impede nationwide data collection also hamper humanitarian responders' ability to understand differences in humanitarian needs and conditions across the country.

- These barriers limit the number of large-scale (nationwide or state- and region-level) assessments conducted in Myanmar. Indeed, given the current operating restrictions on civil society organisations and security barriers, it is difficult to conceive that more large-scale assessments would be possible unless conditions dramatically change.
- Remote data collection methods, such as internet or phone-based approaches, and/or the use of key informants (KIs) can help organisations access information on areas presenting humanitarian access constraints or in situations where in-person data collection is too risky or a low-visibility approach is preferred. That said, these approaches increase the risk of sample and response bias. Of particular concern is the extent to which they capture the voices of communities and groups most a risk of protection threats, exclusion from basic services, and unmet basic needs.

Despite data collection challenges, it appears that significantly more data exists than is currently used, especially in areas with fewer access barriers. Yet, diverse collection and analysis methods make it difficult to harmonise available data.

- Assessments are difficult to harmonise because they are often conducted using varied methodologies, use different indicators, primarily serve programmatic purposes (aligning with an organisation's programmatic needs), and are typically conducted with limited or no coordination nor the aim of obtaining a big-picture overview.
- Harmonisation challenges, coupled with humanitarians' reluctance to share information outside trusted networks, make joint analysis exercises extremely challenging and prevent localised data compilation and triangulation across wider geographical areas.
- A more comprehensive understanding of humanitarian needs and conditions and the creation of overview products may be possible in areas with existing localised data sources without the need for additional primary data collection. This would require dedicated analysis capacity and trust-building to ensure data is shared among organisations with the time, skills, and resources to use it. This kind of analysis would support the humanitarian response to highlight and advocate innovative ways to address gaps.

L/NNGOs collect most of Myanmar's humanitarian data but are not resourced nor enabled to analyse, use, or share this data effectively.

- Despite conducting much of the data collection in Myanmar, L/NNGOs are generally not funded to maintain and capacitate staff members solely dedicated to information management, analysis, and assessments. Grassroots or national staff responsible for IM and assessments report spending a significant portion of their limited time fulfilling different donors' and clusters' reporting requirements instead of using data for their own purposes.
- This results in a relatively transactional (or what grassroots responders consider often-extractive) relationship between international and local/national organisations. L/NNGOs feed collected data up into the international system but are rarely involved in the joint analysis of this data nor included in making decisions based on this analysis.
- Many local/national responders do not have the capacity or experience to analyse the large datasets international organisations produce because of the significant brain drain and displacement of professionals since the 2021 coup. INGOs recognise a need for greater capacity development in relation to data collection and analysis, but the training sessions they provide are generally one-off or annual and limited to basic practices, with no sustained support or coverage of more complex topics, such as data verification and misinformation.

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CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

Following the 2021 coup, the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) established the SAC as the de facto governing authority. The SAC is opposed by the NUG, a parallel government formed in opposition to the coup, which has established PDFs across the country, allied with other SAC-opposed groups. Conflict with armed operations involving the PDFs or EAOs in most states and regions affects almost all of the country (OCHA 15/01/2023). A recent overview of territorial control saw the SAC in control of 35–40% of the area, controlling cities, highways, and some central regions. The groups opposed to it controlled 60–65% of the territory, mostly in rural and border areas as shown generally in Map 1 (COAR accessed 15/09/2025).

Map 1. General division of Myanmar's territory between SAC and opposition control



Source: COAR (accessed 15/09/2025)

Displacement has been a major feature of the conflict with an estimated 3.3 million people displaced since the coup (UN 17/09/2024). Fighting remains widespread across the country and, as the opposition's strength grows, MAF tactics have evolved to concentrate their physical presence on defending major urban areas while relying on increased use of air strikes. Observers have noted a disregard for distinguishing between civilian and military targets (Tearline 23/06/2025; CIR 28/04/2025; AOAV 04/09/2025; UN 02/05/2025). These dynamics contribute to a frequently shifting humanitarian context and make humanitarian operations, including data collection, extremely challenging and risky. Protests in SAC-controlled areas are violently suppressed, and the state of emergency imposed on 1 February 2021 at the start of the coup has been repeatedly extended until July 2025, when it was lifted in anticipation of elections in December (NYT 31/07/2025; AJ 01/08/2022; CFR accessed 15/09/2025).

The conflict has left widespread humanitarian needs, which the 28 March 2025 earthquake aggravated by increasing the number of people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance and protection from 4.3 million to 6.3 million (OCHA 13/12/2024 a). The earthquake is just one of multiple hazards that have triggered displacement, elevated humanitarian needs, and reduced humanitarian access. Myanmar ranked among the ten countries most affected by climate change between 1992–2022, with the country facing multiple risks, including from extreme heat, drought, flooding, storm surges, landslides, and cyclones (Germanwatch 12/02/2025; ThinkHazard! accessed 30/07/2025). Although some of these events are cyclical and can be anticipated to some degree, others are less predictable in scope and scale. Sudden-onset events require rapid assessments to determine their impact and related needs; with conflict and the significant movement of people from induced displacement, any emergency preparedness is challenging.

A highly restrictive operating environment for humanitarian responders further compounds the conflict and climate change challenges. The SAC has imposed multiple restrictions on humanitarian access, diminishing the humanitarian space and causing international organisations to rely heavily on L/NNGOs for support in the extremely complex and dangerous environment (Hou 30/11/2024).

These local organisations also face constraints under policies such as the 2022 Registration of Associations Law, which bans any direct or indirect contact between aid providers and groups that have taken up arms or been designated as committing terrorist acts against, or are unlawful according to, the SAC (The Guardian 03/11/2022; ICJ 11/2022; Allen & Gledhill 07/12/2022). Although there has been no measurable decline in humanitarian access since the start of 2025, Myanmar continues to have the most severe access score attainable in ACAPS' humanitarian access model since July 2021 (ACAPS 19/07/2021, 05/08/2024, and 20/08/2025). Humanitarian responder and specialist assessment and analyst parties continue to collect data, but both in-person and remote collection remain extremely challenging.

Maps 2 and 3 show the administrative divisions for state and regional boundaries together and a more granular look at the areas of control by armed parties than in Map 1. Areas not fully under the control of the SAC or the opposition are more likely to be locations of active conflict, with areas under opposition control subject to MAF aerial attacks.

Map 2: Myanmar's states and regions Areas of control including contestedd and partially controlled areas



Source: (MIMU 12/2007; COAR accessed 15/09/2025)

WHO COLLECTS AND ANALYSES HUMANITARIAN INFORMATION?

Humanitarian responders

National-level coordination bodies in Myanmar, including the ICCG and sectoral clusters and working groups, facilitate IM activities, assessments, and analysis. A critical aim is to develop Myanmar's annual Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans (HNRPs) in support of the humanitarian programme cycle Most of these coordination bodies have an information management officer (IMO) or IM focal point (CNSLT 10/06/2025 b; CNSLT 20/06/2025).

Subnational coordination bodies play a somewhat increasing role in information collection and analysis. Area-level humanitarian country teams and ICCGs were initiated in 2023 in four geographic areas (the northeast, northwest, and southeast regions and Rakhine state) (OCHA 13/12/2024 a).

In July 2025, there were no coordination or cluster staff dedicated to IM full-time at the subnational level, limiting subnational capacity to lead on local information collection and analysis or provide comprehensive support to subnational counterparts (CNSLT 10/06/2025 b; CNSLT 20/06/2025; CNSLT 01/07/2025 b).

The ICCG leads the **Needs Monitoring and Analysis Working Group (NMAWG).** Made up of technical and IM focal points from each cluster and the Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), the NMAWG's main focus has been on the Joint and Intersectoral Analysis Framework process used to develop the humanitarian situation analysis, including the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance and the severity of their needs, for the HNRP. One of the key sources of information for the HNRP is the MSNA, along with other assessments (OCHA 13/12/2024 b). Some of the consultations saw the role of the NMAWG as almost exclusively making sure the MSNA was ready to inform the HNRP, although they also indicated an expectation that from July 2025, the NMAWG scope will expand to include increased focus on information-sharing outside the MSNA cycle and the facilitation of joint analysis (CNSLT 20/06/2025; CNSLT 18/07/2025). Details were unknown to participants, but the expansion can lead to the production of overview products that update on overall humanitarian needs and are accessible to all interested parties in-between MSNAs/HNRPs.

Several UN agencies have units or teams dedicated to information management, assessment, and analysis in Myanmar. Probably the most well known is UNDP's MIMU, which collects and analyses data and information to support humanitarian and development activities. Its data repository covers all sectors across Myanmar. MIMU resources include a Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus 5W shared every six months, a dataset of baseline indicators related to the sustainable development goals, a collection of maps of different parts of the country, a township profiles dashboard, and a dedicated set of geographic information system and mapping resources, including place codes aimed at ensuring consistency across stakeholders (MIMU accessed 20/07/2025). Other UN agencies working in Myanmar with significant data collection, information management, and analysis capacity include IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix and UNHCR, which both have country-specific accessible data portals (UNHCR accessed 10/09/2025; IOM accessed 10/09/2025).

Several international parties dedicated to information management, assessment, and humanitarian analysis from outside the UN also cover Myanmar. These include social enterprises, consultancies, research organisations, and think tanks. Some of their analysis is confidential or for limited distribution. Sometimes the analysis has been produced as part of a contractual arrangement for a specific client requiring bespoke analysis. It is then up to the contracting organisation how and with whom they share the analysis. Security concerns that constrain information-sharing are discussed elsewhere in this report (CNSLT 02/06/2025; CNSLT 05/06/2025; CNSLT 11/06/2025).

Myanmar's clusters regularly solicit information from grassroots responders, primarily related to the 5Ws that the MIMU updates every six months (MIMU accessed 19/08/2025). Clusters share information from these counterparts, including response figures, with the national ICCG according to an information-sharing protocol, contributing to regular humanitarian updates OCHA produces for the ICCG (OCHA 14/08/2025; CNSLT 10/06/2025 b; CNSLT 20/06/2025). As this product is produced twice a year, it may not reflect humanitarian operations that adjust in response to rapidly changing conditions, potentially reducing the 5Ws' utility in reducing duplication and maintaining up-to-date referral pathways.

INGOs conduct assessments and analysis to support project and programme proposals, design, implementation, and evaluation. These assessments often focus on a geographically small area, such as a village tract, where the relevant project is implemented. Most of these assessments, including monitoring and evaluation reports, are not shared openly, but INGOs will share findings with trusted clusters, peer organisations, and donors when they request it or see the value of doing so (CNSLT 21/07/2025 b; CNSLT 22/07/2025 a; CNSLT 22/07/2025 c; CNSLT 18/06/2025).

L/NNGOs, including NGOs, civil society organisations, and CBOs, conduct assessments to support their programming or at the request of INGO or UN agency counterparts. Sharing of this information depends on security concerns (as protection of grassroots responders and communities) and resource and capacity constraints. Consultations specifically mentioned the lack of dedicated IM capacity in local organisations, with staff often having multiple roles and responsibilities (CNSLT 25/06/2025; CNSLT 01/07/2025 b; CNSLT 03/07/2025 b; CNSLT 16/06/2025 b; CNSLT 18/07/2025; CNSLT 22/07/2025 a). This lack can affect all parts of an assessment cycle – design, data collection, analysis, report writing, and sharing findings.

As well as involvement in the clusters, L/NNGOs (including NGOs of all sizes, CBOs, and smaller groups) meet regularly at a national organisation coordination forum, and there is also a Myanmar INGO Forum (MIMU accessed 19/08/2025). Besides these formalised mechanisms to assist I/NGO coordination, there are multiple other groups and consortia of different sizes and purposes. Some of these include a mixture of INGOs and their NGO counterparts and serve as a way to both fund and coordinate local activities. They facilitate information collection, analysis, and sharing on an ad hoc basis. Extreme caution is typically taken when sharing information, even within cluster meetings or smaller groups, owing to the security implications on organisations, subnational responders, and aid recipients. For example, one cluster coordinator said that responders report incidents or concerns bilaterally, highlighting a lack of trust even among peers (CNSLT 18/06/2025; CNSLT 04/07/2025).

Non-humanitarian responders

Research institutions, think tanks, and academic resources do not appear to be systematically used to inform humanitarian decision-making processes. Various development and non-humanitarian research institutions and think tanks publish on topics that could inform the humanitarian response in Myanmar, including conflict dynamics, cultural and social dynamics, and the economy, but these often do not reflect the rapidly changing context. They do provide thorough insights into the context, which can informal humanitarian programming. Consultations highlighted that humanitarian engagement with these sources is low, mostly because of insufficient time to consume additional information and consider its relevance, coupled with – at times – a lack of awareness that the information exists. Consultation participants also noted that academic reports tend to use technical language or focus on longer-term structural issues, which may not be immediately actionable for emergency responders (CNSLT 03/07/2025 d; CNSLT 18/07/2025).

The SAC, NUG, and EAOs

The SAC, the NUG, and some EAO governance and political wings have varying data collection and analysis capacities, generally limited by conflict, fragmented territorial control, and limited resources. The Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) within the Ministry of Planning and Finance houses the national socioeconomic statistics (MONP accessed 19/08/2025). While data is available through its online platform, some important information for humanitarians is out-of-date, and the web platform generally does not disaggregate data below the state or regional level. Even where recent data is available, there is very limited information about data collection and no publicly available details to assist humanitarians to contact the CSO for more information (CSO accessed 19/08/2025). Consultations with humanitarians indicated that the needed baseline information was generally unavailable or out-of-date and is not shared with humanitarian responders (CNSLT 25/06/2025; CNSLT 03/07/2025 b; CNSLT 21/07/2025 a).

Some humanitarians said the NUG and other SAC-opposed groups produce some helpful data (e.g. on health, displacement, and other needs), which they are willing to share directly upon request. Consultations indicated that while it is sometimes incorporated into analysis, most humanitarians approach this data with caution given concerns over the data's quality and independence (CNSLT 05/06/2025; CNSLT 11/06/2025; CNSLT 13/06/2025).

The situation regarding limited, out-of-date baseline data remains unchanged since ACAPS' previous review of the landscape (ACAPS 10/10/2023). Decreased SAC territorial control and security concerns restricted the SAC's December 2024 census attempt (which was not supported by the UN) to less than 50% (145) of Myanmar's 330 townships, with only partial counts in 127 townships and no counts in around 60 townships (HRW 11/03/2025; The Irrawaddy 02/01/2025; Myanmar NOW 15/09/2023). The last credible census remains the UNFPA-supported 2014 exercise, which some operational responders attempt to use to estimate demographic trends (CNSLT 18/06/2025; UNFPA accessed 19/07/2025). This leaves organisations with limited data on basic demographics, which one consultation participant argued complicated targeting (CNSLT 18/06/2025). For population data, organisations instead generally rely on UNFPA population projections and indicative UNHCR data on displacement, which may lead to inaccuracies, including overestimates of people in need, because of large formal and informal migrations over the last three years (CNSLT 18/07/2025; CNSLT 27/08/2025).

Media

The media is a further source of data on humanitarian conditions across Myanmar. Journalists operate in the same insecure environments as humanitarians, taking notable personal risks to gather information and share stories. Reflecting the l**imited media freedoms in Myanmar,** in areas under SAC control, the only independent reporting is journalists operating 'underground' (GI-TOC 24/02/2025; Athan 04/03/2025; ICG 28/04/2025). By June 2025, EAOs in states including Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, and Rakhine also announced policies restricting journalists' activities and freedom of movement (CNSLT 01/07/2025 a). As a result, they f**ace many of the same challenges as humanitarians when collecting, verifying, and analysing information and are forced to obtain information** using local knowledge, strong networks, trusted sources, their ability to operate covertly, and the knowledge of which communication channels to use (CNSLT 11/06/2025; CNSLT 16/06/2025 a).

Specialist humanitarian analysis organisations emphasised that the media can be a vital source of humanitarian information in Myanmar, particularly where there are severe humanitarian access constraints. For instance, one consultation participant argued that it is generally easier for journalists to obtain and verify information in non-SAC-controlled areas, although others noted that some EAOs and PDFs are hostile to media, particularly when they report on these groups' human rights violations (CNSLT 03/07/2025 a). Consultation participants noted that **some information-sharing does occur between L/NNGOS and journalists on humanitarian conditions, security risks, and contextual changes,** which informs where and how L/NNGOs respond (CNSLT 04/07/2025; CNSLT 11/06/2025).

Yet, it appears **that humanitarian responders generally do not maximise media entities as a source of information** since there is often insufficient trust between the two. For instance, participants noted that humanitarian organisations fear SAC interference and reprisals if unsanctioned humanitarian operations are exposed, even unintentionally, making it harder to build trusting relationships (CNSLT 11/06/2025; CNSLT 10/06/2025 a). Participants also highlighted that **independent media (non-SAC-controlled media outlets in non-SAC-controlled areas) often reflect varying degrees of bias** in favour of PDFs and EAOs, which has implications for the independence of their reporting and **undermines humanitarian trust in media as a reliable data source** (CNSLT 11/06/2025; CNSLT 10/06/2025 a).

Participants also voiced concerns that the 2025 US funding cuts have threatened the media's ability to provide high-quality, independent reporting, likely affecting the value of media-generated information for the humanitarian response (CNSLT 11/06/2025; CNSLT 16/06/2025 a). Following the coup, independent media in Myanmar lost advertising revenue and became heavily reliant on donor funding, particularly from USAID (CNSLT 03/07/2025 a). Cuts to this funding have contributed to **widespread job losses among independent journalists** (CNSLT 03/07/2025 a; CNSLT 01/07/2025 a). The funding cuts have also **disrupted efforts related to information verification policies and those that combat mis- and disinformation,** which may increase the risk of incorrect information being included in media reports. Participants suggested that without funding, media outlets will look to alternate revenue streams and may monetise social media, possibly producing sensationalist content to attract online engagement (CNSLT 10/06/2025 a; CNSLT 11/06/2025; CNSLT 03/07/2025 a; CNSLT 03/07/2025 c). This will make it more challenging for humanitarians using media sources to understand the context.

Social media

Social media is another possible data source for humanitarians and can provide a platform for people in crises to share information and promote greater inclusion. That said, it can also emphasise power imbalances and create risks, as well as skew information towards people in socioeconomic, age, or other groups more motivated or able to engage with social media platforms (HPG/ODI 05/2022). Facebook is the most popular social media platform in Myanmar, with 18.5 million active users (compared to TikTok with 16 million active users and Instagram with over 1.5 million active users) (Nan Oo Markting 01/10/2024).

In Myanmar, rumours posted on social media can spread fear, distrust, and violence (CDAC 08/2025). The influence information shared on Facebook has had in Myanmar is illustrated by its use after the coup in 2021, with democracy activists communicating and organising in the platform, which was also used to promote hate speech against the Rohingya (LSE 23/06/2021; Schissler 01/08/2024; UNHRC 12/09/2018). The SAC has since weaponised the platform (OHCHR 13/03/2023).

The humanitarian consequences of harmful information shared on social media include panic, displacement, and even the rejection of aid based on the misinformation that scares people (CDAC 08/2025).

Following the coup, there was a rapid uptake in the use of virtual private networks (VPNs) and Telegram for communication, mainly to safely access and share information, as the SAC began shutting down the internet and restricting other platforms, such as Facebook, Messenger, and WhatsApp (Melbourne Asia Review 26/08/2025). In May 2024, the SAC's January 2025 Cybersecurity Law imposed further restrictions, including banning VPNs, limiting remote data collection opportunities (UNHRC 26/05/2025; East-West Center 26/03/2025).

Other challenges linked to social media data are language barriers, since internet translation services often perform poorly in Burmese and do not translate other ethnic languages.

This requires individuals with specific language skills for analysis. Humanitarians consulted for this report also expressed concerns that Facebook and other platform policies and standards to limit the spread of information on violence may involve automatic censorship, decreasing the amount of information relevant to the humanitarian situation (CNSLT 05/06/2025; CNSLT 30/06/2025).

Recognising the value of social media as a source of current information, humanitarians have engaged in attempts to extract useful information. Analysis of the information shared on Facebook was typically done using CrowdTangle, a tool that assisted the exploration and monitoring of social media content. But, in August 2024, Meta discontinued the tool and replaced it with The Meta Content Library, which presented more access restrictions and is less useful (AP 15/08/2024; Meta 16/08/2024). As a result, analyst and researcher use of and capacity to analyse social media data have decreased, meaning that the pool of information shared on Facebook is currently largely not analysed nor used (CNSLT 05/06/2025; CNSLT 10/06/2025).

DATA COLLECTION

Challenges for humanitarian data collection and analysis

Humanitarian responders' engagement with different governance representatives complicates data collection.

Bureaucratic barriers in their areas of operation often impede humanitarian organisations' freedom to collect data. In 2022, the SAC enacted the Registration of Associations Law, replacing and expanding the requirements for national and international NGOs and requiring humanitarian organisations of all sizes to formally register and provide information about their operations (Allen & Gledhill 07/12/2022; IBA 25/04/2023). Registration largely confines forms of humanitarian response to SAC-controlled areas and official IDP camps (Humanitarian Outcomes 04/2023). Consultation participants described the registration and associated processes for gaining approval of programmes and objectives, as well as any changes to these, as complex, time-consuming, and often unsuccessful, forcing organisations to build approval time and the risk of rejection into planning assumptions (OCHA 13/12/2024 a; CNSLT 10/06/2025 a; CNSLT 01/07/2025 a; CNSLT 24/07/2025). There are penalties for operating without registration or being registered and not having relevant approvals for activities, which could compromise other registered activities. The most severe is when a registered organisation contacts or supports organisations considered unlawful, the penalty for which is imprisonment of up to five years or a fine of up to MMK 5,000,000 (USD 2,373) (oanda accessed 18/09/2025). One of the consultations discussed that some registered organisations do not risk working in locations without approvals (CNSLT 02/06/2025). This reduces their flexibility and responsiveness in times of rapid-onset emergency, including their ability to conduct rapid assessments.

Because of the restrictions related to registration, some organisations do not register, and others that are registered sometimes work outside the scope of their registration (risking penalties). These organisations adopt a discreet, zero-profile or under-the-radar approach, which nonetheless exposes their staff to significant security risks, including arrest and detention by the SAC. Because data collection is difficult to do under the radar, consultant participants noted that organisations operating according to a zero-profile approach tend to avoid it. This may weaken the evidence base of their programming, forcing them to rely more heavily on informal observations or shared information and increasing the risk of unintended consequences and harm, especially when they are unable to gather data for risk assessments (CNSLT 02/06/2025; CNSLT 16/06/2025 b; CNSLT 10/06/2025 b; CNSLT 21/07/2025 a; CNSLT 21/07/2025 b; CNSLT 22/07/2025 c).

Consulted organisations reported that **in non-SAC-controlled areas, humanitarian responders negotiate data collection with EAOs and PDFs on a case-by-case basis.** These negotiations may be formal or informal, with organisations presenting proposed data collection activities and locations for approval (CNSLT 21/07/2025 b; CNSLT 22/07/2025 a; CNSLT 22/07/2025 c). Several participants explained that data collection can be harder in states and regions newly under PDF or EAO control (e.g. parts of Sagaing and Rakhine), as these groups may have less experience in collaborating with humanitarian responders, and it takes time to build relationships (CNSLT 02/06/2025; CNSLT 03/07/2025 c; CNSLT 21/07/2025 b; CNSLT 22/07/2025 a; CNSLT 22/07/2025 c; CNSLT 24/07/2025).

Security risks and fears limit in-person data collection.

Data collectors working for the humanitarian response risk being stopped and searched at checkpoints in both SAC- and non-SAC-controlled areas and when crossing lines of control. Data may be read and seized, and data collectors face arrest and detention. Many are young people eligible for conscription into the MAF, making data collection particularly risky in SAC-controlled areas (CNSLT 22/07/2025 c; CNSLT 20/06/2025; CNSLT 24/07/2025; CNSLT 21/07/2025 b; CNSLT 23/07/2025; CNSLT 24/07/2025). Using data collectors from other parts of Myanmar increases risks for both the data collector and their respondents. For instance, if poor connectivity prevents the data collector from transmitting their data immediately or they carry physical copies of the data, they and their respondents may face significant risk if searched at checkpoints on the way home (CNSLT 11/07/2025; CNSLT 02/06/2025; CNSLT 18/07/2025). Security risks such as this increase the likelihood for assessments to overlook areas with higher security risks despite having some of the highest needs.

Using data collectors from outside the locality also compromises community-level trust. Consultation participants noted that security fears may prevent some communities from answering questions from outsiders, whether they are of a different ethnicity or from a different village or region. Data collectors who have travelled from SAC-controlled to non-SAC-controlled areas also risk being perceived as SAC informants (CNSLT 04/07/2025; CNSLT 18/07/2025; CNSLT 02/06/2025).

Even where data collectors operate in their own communities, consultant participants noted that **safety and security fears may create challenges for building trust and gathering in-depth information on topics considered sensitive.** These include topics commonly found in humanitarian assessments and risk alienating community members and civic authorities given the safety implications of this information in the Myanmar context (CNSLT 16/06/2025; CNSLT 27/08/2025). Examples include:

- data on household size and composition, which reveals household residents who can be targeted for forced recruitment.
- household activity data, which reveals when various household members are away from home, exposing those who remain to protection or other risks.
- data on healthcare and education access, which can be used to pinpoint the location of informal healthcare or education facilities, heightening the risk of the MAF targeting these facilities.

Consultation participants consequently noted that respondents may skip questions they find too sensitive or which they fear could endanger themselves or their community, limiting both the accuracy and scope of collected data (CNSLT 07/08/2025).

Connectivity and digital security risks limit remote data collection.

Despite the security risks of in-person data collection and logistical challenges from conflict and climate hazards, **the 2025 MSNA collected over 80% of its data in person** (CNSLT 01/09/2025). Across the consultations, participants noted that **remote phone or internet modalities** are also being used to mitigate risks, lower costs, and increase data collection coverage. Yet, notable challenges remained linked to access and digital surveillance, both of which affect sampling.

Phone and internet access varies greatly across Myanmar, reducing the diversity of respondents who can be targeted for data collection and introducing sampling and response bias. Telecommunication access is linked to multiple factors, including respondents' gender, location, and socioeconomic status. For instance, a nationally representative survey conducted in 2020 found mobile phone ownership for 47% of men but just 33% of women, also skewing towards urban areas (GSMA 16/11/2025). This suggests that women living in rural areas may be at heightened risk of exclusion from phone surveys. In 2021, just over half the population (57%) had internet access, and then in early 2024, a price hike imposed by SAC on internet and mobile connectivity has since made access more prohibitive (WB accessed 29/08/2025). There have also been reports of people selling mobile devices to pay for basic needs (Freedom House31/05/2025).

Even when people have access to telecommunication devices, infrastructure challenges and blocks can impede digital data collection. Since the coup, the SAC – which controls all telecommunications – has regularly **shut down internet and phone networks,** both nationwide and locally, in conjunction with MAF air strikes and ground raids (Access Now 05/2024; UNHRC 26/05/2025; CNSLT 20/06/2025; CNSLT 11/07/2025; Freedom House 31/05/2025; Tech Policy Press 17/07/2025). In 2024 alone, Myanmar recorded 85 verified internet shutdowns, the highest worldwide, and the actual figure is likely higher. **Connectivity is especially poor in conflict-affected areas such as Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Rakhine, and Sagaing,** reducing the inclusion of affected populations from these locations in data collection exercises (CNSLT 10/06/2025 b; CNSLT 24/07/2025; CNSLT 27/08/2025).

Several consultation participants noted that although prohibited in SAC-controlled areas, **Starlink is emerging as an alternative internet provider in non-SAC areas** such as Sagaing, where the NUG has lifted restrictions on Starlink access and anti-SAC groups have set up Starlink systems, often accessible through internet cafes (Rest of World 23/10/2024; CNSLT 30/06/2025; CNSLT 03/07/2025 a; CNSLT 22/07/2025 a). Access still depends on sufficient resources, however, meaning digital data collection exercises are still likely to exclude those in the lowest economic brackets.

Several consultation participants noted that **fear of telephone and internet surveillance** impedes remote data collection by phone or online platforms by affecting respondents' willingness to pick up the phone or provide information via phone calls (CNSLT 24/07/2025; CNSLT 18/06/2025; CNSLT 16/06/2025 b; CNSLT 05/06/2025). The SAC monitor internet communications and track users – powers that the 2025 Cybersecurity Law have strengthened (EngageMedia 06/08/2025). Reports continue of individuals accused of using online platforms and communication channels to criticise and oppose the SAC, facing retribution (Justice for Myanmar 19/06/2024; Freedom House 31/05/2025). This generates understandable fear and suspicion of any digital engagement, making it more difficult to connect with possible respondents for data collection.

Despite or perhaps because of the acutely challenging environment, organisations continue to innovate and find ways to collect data. An example is the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey, a phone-based survey that reached most Myanmar townships, demonstrating that subnational representative surveys are possible even with significant challenges. There have been eight rounds of the survey since it began in December 2021, the most recent published in December 2024 (Lambrecht et al. 22/12/2023; IFPRI 02/05/2024).

Spotlight on L/NNGO data collection and analysis

- Consultations with L/NNGOs and CSOs showed that, given limited resources, organisations prioritise urgent humanitarian response over data collection, analysis, and reporting (CNSLT 06/05/2025; CNSLT 02/06/2025; CNSLT 16/06/2025 b; CNSLT 10/06/2025 b). They recognise that assessments would strengthen their understanding of local needs and support more targeted response but are time-consuming and costly and can pose safety risks. Because of funding constraints, they also rarely have dedicated staff for information management, analysis, and assessments. Where IM focal points exist, they generally cover multiple roles, with IM being only part of their job (CNSLT 01/07/2025 b; CNSLT 25/06/2025; CNSLT 03/07/2025 b; CNSLT 22/07/2025 a; CNSLT 22/07/2025 c).
- Local organisations in recently conflict-affected areas often have fewer staff with assessment and analysis skills and experience, as building this capacity takes time (CNSLT 01/07/2025 b; CNSLT 25/06/2025; CNSLT 03/07/2025 b; CNSLT 22/07/2025 a; CNSLT 22/07/2025 c). Disruptions to the education system since the coup and the outflow of young professionals – both men and women – fleeing conflict and conscription compound this situation (CNSLT 20/06/2025; CNSLT 25/06/2025).
- Consulted L/NNGOs noted that different reporting requirements from donors, clusters, and other stakeholders increase their burden. As a result, data collected using their limited resources is often aimed at meeting their different donors' requirements rather than their own needs, contributing to a cycle of generating data that is not always analysed or used for localised analysis. Discussions within the UN system about simplifying reporting for local organisations are underway (CNSLT 20/06/2025; CNSLT 01/07/2025 b; CNSLT 03/07/2025 b; CNSLT 21/07/2025 b).
- Consulted L/NNGOs noted a relatively transactional and extractive relationship between international and local organisations, wherein local organisations feed data up into the international system but rarely see its impact on operational and strategic decisions and are rarely involved in making these decisions (CNSLT 13/06/2025; CNSLT 18/06/2025; CNSLT 18/07/2025; CNSLT 20/06/2025).
- Even though tasked with collecting vital data, L/NNGOs have minimal opportunities and resources to attend data collection and analysis training (CNSLT 02/06/2025). Some organisations and clusters provide orientations and training sessions on basic data collection and reporting, but these are mostly one-off or annual, often online, target a limited number of staff, and are generally considered insufficient given the significant assessment challenges in Myanmar (CNSLT 03/07/2025 b; CNSLT 18/07/2025; CNSLT 21/07/2025 a; CNSLT 04/07/2025; CNSLT 24/07/2025; CNSLT 22/07/2025 c).

Current data collection and analysis despite challenges

Despite the challenges discussed throughout this report, data collection does take place.

Large-scale assessments

A small number of humanitarian organisations and dedicated analysis organisations working on behalf of humanitarian organisations conduct representative samples surveys across multiple states and regions, with the most notable being the annual MSNA. There is a perception echoed in some of the consultations that large-scale assessments are often conducted either partially or exclusively via telephone in Myanmar. This is not the case for the MSNA, which collected over 80% of the 2025 data from households in-person. Large-scale assessments typically provide broader geographical coverage and a larger sample, although they are also often extremely time- and resource-intensive (CNSLT 16/06/2025 b; CNSLT 18/07/2025; CNSLT 21/07/2025 a; CNSLT 01/09/2025).

Local assessments

Large-scale assessments cannot, nor do they intend to, meet detailed information needs at the local programming level. For this information, organisations tend to **rely on staff and subnational responders in affected communities to conduct small-scale assessments** at the village or village tract level. Most involve differing combinations of household-level interviews, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and direct observation (CNSLT 24/07/2025; CNSLT 11/06/2025; CNSLT 21/07/2025 b; CNSLT 03/06/2025; CNSLT 22/07/2025 c). In many ways, this is not significantly different to other humanitarian contexts, but in Myanmar, security concerns and vastly reduced humanitarian access make these assessments particularly localised (often relevant to a very small area), and coordination with other assessment locations is minimal owing to limited information sharing and harmonisation.

Data quality

Difficulties in capturing diversity

In Myanmar, participant selection for assessments and surveys is often based on purposive and snowball sampling, leading to potential sampling bias that limits the generalisability of findings. Consultations indicated that key informants were among the key information sources used in the Myanmar context. The use of KIs is often an efficient way to capture a rich understanding of needs and is particularly appropriate in challenging contexts (CNSLT 02/06/2025; CNSLT 17/06/2025; CNSLT 03/07/2025 d; CNSLT 05/06/2025; CNSLT 16/06/2025 a; CNSLT 18/06/2025; CNSLT 18/07/2025). Effective KIs need to be able to identify and share the varied

views, experiences, and needs of targeted communities in specific geographic areas. It should be noted, however, that their ability to do so effectively will likely vary based on their social positioning, motivations for participating in the assessment, and knowledge of more marginalised groups, coupled with the breadth of questions asked to them.

In Myanmar, KIs are often community leaders, business owners, or professionals, including doctors, teachers, and journalists, referred by existing network members or selected based on their community position. The security risks KIs face in different parts of the country are also likely to affect what information they feel comfortable providing. Six of the seven organisations with a specialisation in humanitarian assessment and analysis consulted for this report indicated that, despite their best efforts, they did not feel that their network of KIs represented the diversity present in communities in Myanmar. As such, they saw ensuring diversity and inclusion as a pervasive challenge (CNSLT 02/06/2025; CNSLT 03/06/2025; CNSLT 03/07/2025 d; CNSLT 22/07/2025 b; CNSLT 11/06/2025; CNSLT 18/07/2025). This implies KIs may not be able to accurately represent the lived experiences and needs of groups outside their own social milieu and may even be unaware of other groups' needs, rendering these groups invisible in the analysis. This makes it important to reflect on the social positioning of KIs when analysing and interpreting the data, which can sometimes be difficult as information about the individual KIs is not shared to protect their identities.

Categories and groups of people potentially excluded from data collection

- Older people
- People with disabilities
- People with chronic health issues
- Women
- Children
- People in areas with low digital connectivity
- People without access to mobile phones (e.g. because of low purchasing power)
- People at higher risk of being monitored (e.g. media, activists)
- Men who work (when data collection occurs in the daytime)
- IDPs and returnees
- People living in areas with certain access constraints

Certain categories and groups of people are also more likely to be excluded from data collection because of logistical, economic, and cultural barriers, particularly when data collection has not used a purposefully inclusive design (as specified in the box above). For instance, while some organisations include questions on disability in household-level surveys, there is limited time and capacity to capture detailed information, and data collectors often lack the necessary training to effectively use the Washington Group questions or to sample in a way that captures diversity. Multiple KIs mentioned that the most significant gap they face is obtaining information on people with disabilities (CNSLT 20/06/2025; CNSLT 03/07/2025 b; CNSLT 10/07/2025; OCHA 13/12/2024 c). Having a balanced gender perspective can also be an issue, depending on the time of interview and community dynamics. In some cases, men are considered the most appropriate sources of information as traditional household heads, although when interviews are conducted during the day at home, men may be out at work, leading to an overrepresentation of women (CNSLT 16/06/2025 b; CNSLT 18/07/2025; CNSLT 24/07/2025). In some communities, for example among the Rohingya, men are more likely to own and control access to phones than women (CNSLT 21/07/2025 a). The design of household-level surveys and assessments can also introduce or reinforce the exclusion of specific groups, with the social positioning of staff affecting how they decide what questions to ask, leading to information gaps on specific demographics and themes.

Displacement data poses a significant challenge. Organisations reported significant gaps between publicly reported displacement data and the situation observed by staff and responders in communities (CNSLT 18/07/2025; CNSLT 22/07/2025 a). These gaps are partly attributed to the multiple, cyclical nature of displacement in Myanmar, where people are displaced frequently for short periods, often to informal sites presenting access constraints. This makes it difficult to identify, categorise, contact, and follow up with both IDPs and returnees (CNSLT 18/07/2025; CNSLT 21/07/2025 b; CNSLT 22/07/2025 a; CNSLT 03/06/2025; CNSLT 24/07/2025). Several organisations mentioned that accessing reliable information on IDPs who have recently migrated to SAC-controlled urban areas, such as Yangon, is particularly challenging (CNSLT 21/07/2025 a; CNSLT 22/07/2025 c).

Opportunities for triangulation

Because data is not routinely shared between organisations, it is more difficult to triangulate findings. The use of different indicators across different datasets also complicates the triangulation of collected data. Organisations measure humanitarian needs in different ways – e.g. one organisation may assess whether a household 'has access to improved water sources', while another may assess whether the household has access to 'clean water sources', making the triangulation and combination of data difficult or impossible. Consultations indicated limited secondary sources that can be used to triangulate and corroborate data, as much of the highest-quality secondary data in Myanmar is not publicly available or widely shared (CNSLT 02/06/2025; CNSLT 16/06/2025 b).

Data harmonisation challenges

Linked to triangulation difficulties, data harmonisation is also challenging. Many organisations conducting small-scale needs assessments tailor data collection to a specific project, which is understandable. But then in cases where there is a need for a more joint up picture of needs, such as following a hazard affecting multiple communities, it is difficult to harmonise datasets. By July 2025, there were efforts to train L/NNGOs to use the agreed Myanmar Multi-Sector Initial Rapid Assessment templates, allowing for more harmonised data collection after sudden-onset crises (CNSLT 21/07/2025 a; CNSLT 21/07/2021 b; CNSLT 22/07/2025 a; CNSLT 22/07/2025 b; CNSLT 23/07/2025; CNSLT 25/06/2025). This provides an opportunity to harmonise assessment findings, with the caveat that it remains difficult to guarantee that the assessment methodology used by different organisations operating under severe constraints with insufficient resources is the same (CNSLT 02/06/2025).

Data relevance over time

The rapidly changing context in Myanmar and the extensive time required to collect and transmit high-quality data limit the length of time data will remain relevant for. Information on markets, access, and other key humanitarian conditions often changes daily and requires more regular monitoring than is possible given the constraints. To ensure up-to-date information, organisations may be required to reach out to communities multiple times and resample, which is time- and resource-intensive (CNSLT 18/06/2025; CNSLT 18/07/2025). While the MIMU 5W and the MSNA provide high-quality data at an overview level, their production schedules – every six months for the 5W and annually for the MSNA – mean they do not reflect changes that can occur rapidly.

Gaps in geographical coverage of data

As many organisations are only able to collect information on the villages or village tract in which they operate, **information is geographically fragmented and difficult to compare across states and regions, townships, and even villages and wards.** Very detailed information on some locations and significant gaps in others characterise the overall information landscape (CNSLT 18/06/2025; CNSLT 22/07/2025 a; CNSLT 03/07/2025 b). Harmonising such information to create an overview is time-consuming and requires dedicated staff and expertise.

Participants in consultations noted data is most limited in conflict-affected areas, with multiple consulted parties mentioning gaps in Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Rakhine, and Sagaing. They mentioned significant UN data gaps in Sagaing because of poor internet coverage and lack of physical responders, although non-UN entities, including some low-profile consortia, have developed networks to obtain data from these areas (CNSLT 16/06/2025 b; CNSLT 02/06/2025; CNSLT 10/06/2025 b; CNSLT 25/06/2025; CNSLT 11/07/2025). Border areas of Thailand are better represented in terms of data, while border areas of Bangladesh, China, and India have less data availability because of lower access (CNSLT 16/06/2025 a; CNSLT 25/06/2025). One analyst noted the absence of engagement with Chinese and Indian data sources that could provide a deeper understanding of border dynamics (CNSLT 11/06/2025). Areas likely to be most in need of humanitarian assistance are those where information and analysis are most limited. For operational responders, provided good contextual knowledge of the areas in which they work, this may not affect their project-level programming. But for broader decisions, such as resource prioritisation, geographical data gaps (including access constraints in certain areas) mean that specific pockets of need risk being overlooked and affected locations may be underresourced.

Challenges in achieving required data granularity

Having useful data is a c**ontinual balancing act between having sufficient granular data for need-driven programming and needing to have a broader overview to assist prioritisation and avoid gaps.** Some participants described available UN and other assessments as highly restricted in scope, often limited to broad figures on the number of people affected and houses damaged, without the subtownship detail needed for targeted interventions. They saw analysis aggregated above the township level as having limited operational value, reducing its utility for responders working in rapidly changing contexts (CNSLT 18/07/2025; CNSLT 18/06/2025). This highlights that although information users will never get everything they want from a single analysis product, some products are not designed to have the level of granularity that programming demands, and perhaps clarifying expectations for specific information products would be useful.

Sectoral gaps

The various barriers and challenges to data collection have resulted in gaps in data available across all sectors in Myanmar. The following table is limited to an overview of publicly available products between October 2023 and July 2025. While it does not reflect details, it does highlight the uneven thematic coverage of information.

Table 2. Products by theme from the database (831 products)

THEME	NUMBER OF PRODUCTS THAT COVER OR INCLUDE THE THEME	THEME	NUMBER OF PRODUCTS THAT COVER OR INCLUDE THE THEME
Economy	1	Safety and security	13
Elections	1	Humanitarian financing	14
Infrastructure	1	Contributions	18
Migration	1	Education	21
Displacement	3	Gender	28
Conflict	4	Mine action	29
Response	6	Peacekeeping and peacebuilding	47
Livelihoods	7	Agriculture	70
Camp coordination and camp management	8	Markets	96
Recovery and reconstruction	8	Coordination	104
Disaster management	9	Shelter and NFIs	126
Climate change and environment	10	Health	146
Logistics and telecommunications	10	Food and nutrition	190
		Protection and human rights	307

Consultation participants also discussed their perceptions of sectoral information gaps. Some selected examples are included here, but this list should not be viewed as exhaustive.

- **Health.** Myanmar does not have a comprehensive disease monitoring and surveillance system, which means there is no reliable disease data. In non-SAC-controlled areas, there is minimal access to laboratories to confirm suspected cases of disease, while SAC-controlled laboratories do not necessarily share caseload information with humanitarian responders (CNSLT 25/06/2025). Between February 2021 and July 2025, 155 health workers were killed and 886 arrested, with three-quarters of these incidents attributed to the MAF (Insecurity Insight 22/07/2025; CNSLT 04/07/2025; CNSLT 22/07/2025 b; CNSLT 11/06/2025; CNSLT 18/06/2025).
- **Nutrition.** The coup and conflict have prevented the collection of credible, nationwide nutrition data – which requires physical presence and significant resources – since 2016. This means malnutrition prevalence is unknown (CNSLT 20/06/2025; CNSLT 18/07/2025; CNSLT 21/07/2025 a). Nutrition assessments are particularly difficult to carry out in low-profile ways.
- **Protection.** Assessments in Myanmar, particularly emergency assessments, often exclude questions on protection threats, including gender-based violence and child recruitment. Information on protection concerns and needs should be a priority in emergencies, but this is not always happening because of security risks to both data collectors and informants (CNSLT 01/07/2025 b; CNSLT 04/07/2025). A participant indicated that a broad range of factors, from security fears to stigmatisation risk, has created an environment where protection issues are often hidden from view, so even KIs may not be aware of them within the communities they are reporting on (CNSLT 05/06/2025). High-quality qualitative data that helps humanitarian responders to better understand the localised dynamics of protection risks and gives affected communities a voice would contribute to improved understanding of protection threats and resultant coping strategies, but this is resource-intensive and requires staff to be well trained on conducting protection-focused research and have direct contact with communities.
- **Education.** The coup and subsequent conflict have limited the availability of data on schools and students. Information provided by the SAC on public schools in SAC-controlled areas is generally out-of-date. Information on the increasing number of informal, community schools in non-SAC-controlled areas is challenging to obtain, because in the face of increased attacks on education facilities in these areas since the coup, education workers and families have become reluctant to share information for fear of further targeting (East Asia Forum 13/12/2024; CNSLT 03/07/2025 b; CNSLT 18/07/2025). Since the coup, more than 240 schools have been destroyed, with 91 hit by air strikes in Sagaing (UWN 29/05/2025).
- Shelter and WASH conditions in IDP camps. Information on conditions and needs is lacking because of limited access to these camps (CNSLT 18/07/2025).

SHARING DATA AND ANALYSIS

Limited distribution of confidential data and analysis is the default practice in Myanmar. One participant estimated that 80% of information is confidential and only 20% openly available (CNSLT 08/09/2025). Organisations consulted for this report use different ways of estimating the risks involved before determining how and with whom to share data. Most organisations said that they keep data and analysis within their close and well-established network of implementing responders, donors, clusters, and peer organisations and that sharing outside these networks **occurs mostly when something is specifically requested.** There is an information-sharing protocol that applies to all UN clusters, facilitating some information-sharing between them (CNSLT 20/06/2025; CNSLT 10/06/2025 a; CNSLT 03/07/2025 d).

Response and programme information is particularly limited in distribution to protect organisational identities. This includes 3, 4, and 5Ws and information on response activity below township level (CNSLT 10/06/2025 b; CNSLT 20/06/2025).

Sharing barriers

Organisations operating but not officially registered in Myanmar cannot safely publish or openly share information, as sharing information on their activities exposes them to being shut down or penalised for not having the necessary permits. For registered organisations, they also often respond to needs in areas that go beyond those they have official permission to carry out activities in, so they do not report on these activities and confine their reporting to the areas and activities for which they have official permission (CNSLT 21/07/2025 b; CNSLT 22/07/2025 c).

Security fears constitute a significant barrier to data publication and sharing. Beyond revealing unregistered operations, L/NNGOs and their staff members fear that any information shared will be leaked to the SAC and MAF and prompt reprisals against their operations, staff, and affected communities. Consultation participants discussed that the SAC's opacity and unpredictability have generated a climate of significant fear, where many responders have minimal information on the extent of surveillance and likelihood of reprisals, fearing the worst consequences by default. Two organisations consulted for this report confirmed that their national staff members have been arrested and detained because of collecting data (CNSLT 04/07/2025; CNSLT 22/07/2025 b; CNSLT 11/06/2025; CNSLT 18/06/2025). Myanmar is considered one of the most complex contexts for humanitarian aid delivery, with violence against aid workers one of the key factors (IRC 01/03/2024; ACAPS 20/08/2025).

These security fears feed into a severe lack of trust within the humanitarian response system of organisations, including between and within L/NNGOs and international organisations (CNSLT 20/06/2025; CNSLT 10/06/2025 b). Participants noted that many L/NNGOs are reluctant to share information with the UN system because of the UN's engagement with the SAC as the de facto government. These organisations fear that, despite information-sharing protocols, the SAC may gain access to their data through the UN (CNSLT 04/07/2025; CNSLT 18/06/2025; CNSLT 25/06/2025; CNSLT 03/07/2025 d; CNSLT 02/06/2025). Other organisations will only share information bilaterally with trusted cluster coordinators for it then to be anonymised but not with all cluster members because they are not sure who they can trust even within the cluster. One participant noted that the fragmentation and remoteness of the response, with most coordination meetings held online since the coup and COVID-19 pandemic, also prevents trust-building, including among L/NNGOs (CNSLT 18/06/2025).

Lack of resources, capacity, and time poses a barrier to data and analysis sharing, as many organisations lack dedicated information management and analysis staff to present information in a suitable format for sharing (CNSLT 20/06/2025). Even well-resourced organisations focus on data they need for programming and other internal functions, with little time or capacity to repackage, have it approved by management, and present it to external parties in a way that does not jeopardise the safety of their staff or the communities they work with or threaten their organisational presence (CNSLT 18/07/2025).

Impacts of limited sharing

Lack of sharing in general contributes to the duplication of data collection efforts, which can be counterproductive given the significant resource constraints and risks that accompany each data collection exercise. Organisations emphasised the importance of considering whether data collection is necessary before initiating an assessment given the risks it poses to data collectors. This requires knowing whether similar data collection efforts have been completed or are planned (CNSLT 18/07/2025; CNSLT 21/07/2025 b; CNSLT 22/07/2025 c). Given the limited data sharing, it is currently unclear how much duplication is occurring.

Limited, network-based sharing also makes it difficult for organisations to respond in new areas or sectors, particularly after sudden-onset crises. While it is easy for insiders on a specific sector or geographic area to obtain information, new responders may not have access to the necessary networks or even know whether these networks exist. This can lead to delays and duplication in programming after a crisis such as the March 2025 earthquake (CNSLT 10/06/2025 a; CNSLT 17/06/2025; CNSLT 11/06/2025).

Gaps in access to and the existence of humanitarian data and analysis impede strategic decisions about how and where to respond. This comes at a time when serious strategic analysis is required to respond to both changes in the global operating and funding context and longstanding response challenges in Myanmar (CNSLT 11/06/2025; CNSLT 05/06/2025).