

OVERVIEW

Since 15 April 2023, the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has left 30.4 million people – at least 51% (15.6 million) of whom are children – in need of assistance, including for food, nutrition, health, WASH, and protection (UNICEF 20/02/2025; OCHA 31/12/2024). Clashes between SAF, RSF, and allied militias have disrupted the provision of essential services, especially healthcare, and led to a widespread economic crisis, loss of livelihoods, supply chain disruptions, and cash shortages. By July 2025, the conflict had internally displaced 7.66 million people, adding to the 2.39 million people displaced internally prior to April 2023, leading to a total of 10.01 million IDPs (IOM 09/07/2025).

Since January 2025, conflict dynamics have shifted, with armed clashes decreasing in some areas and increasing in others, such as North Darfur and Kordofan region (SCR 01/06/2025). As a result, around 645,000 previously conflict-displaced IDPs and refugees have returned to their areas of origin, especially to Al Jazirah, Khartoum, and Sennar, while areas of increased conflict, including Al Fasher, North Darfur, are seeing new displacement (IOM 20/05/2025 and 28/04/2025).

In 2025, protection remains a critical concern across the country, with civilians continuing to experience a wide range of protection risks (committed by all parties to the conflict) that threaten their immediate and longer-term safety and wellbeing. Some protection risks, such as air strikes, are indiscriminate and threaten whole communities, while others are targeted, with specific groups or categories of people at heightened risk depending on their sex, age, disability status, ethnicity, or displacement status. In 2025, 11.3 million children are expected to need protection services (OCHA 31/12/2024).

KEY FINDINGS

- **Ethnically motivated physical and sexual violence continues to pose a significant threat to civilians.** While there are information gaps relating to which ethnic groups are specifically affected in 2025, since the start of the conflict, these have included, but are not limited to, the Dajo, Fur, Kanabi, Massalit, and Zaghawa.
- **SAF, RSF, and other armed groups have also targeted humanitarian responders and health personnel,** who face the risk of death, detention, or abduction.
- **While protection violations are occurring nationwide, certain locations are associated with an increased likelihood of protection risks,** specifically those experiencing active conflict or recent shifts in control, such as Al Jazirah, Blue Nile, the Darfur states, Khartoum, and Kordofan region.
- **IDPs are at heightened risk of protection threats,** including attacks on civilians while fleeing conflict, explosive ordnance (EO), gender-based violence (GBV), the forced recruitment of adults and children, family separation while fleeing, and abduction.
- **Women and girls are at heightened risk of multiple protection threats,** including conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), early and forced marriage, and intimate partner violence. They are also vulnerable to kidnapping and abduction and forced recruitment. CRSV continues to be used as a tactic of community/familial humiliation or retribution, with women and girls systematically targeted based on their perceived ethnic, tribal, or political affiliations. While boys have also been subjected to sexual violence, such cases are reported less frequently.
- **In 2025, boys and girls continue to be subjected to gross violations,** including association with armed forces and groups, sexual violence, and abduction. Although monitoring and reporting challenges mean the scale of these violations remains unclear, findings from the UNSG's annual reports on children and armed conflict for 2022, 2023, and 2024 and anecdotal evidence from child protection actors indicate a rising trend across all categories of grave violations against children countrywide.
- **Limitations on data collection and reporting have resulted in significant gaps in information about key protection risks** and their scope and scale. This includes insufficient information about the prevalence of certain risks (such as mine accidents and the forced recruitment of adults and children) and insufficient information about targeted and higher-risk population groups, such as people with disabilities. The unprecedented stop-work orders issued to USAID implementing partners in January 2025 further reduced access and suspended or reduced data collection, limiting the amount of secondary data available on protection risks.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

Aim

This report highlights eight key protection risks identified as the most severe in 2025 by responders, with special focus on at-risk population groups, high-risk areas, and information gaps. It also aims to delve into the dynamics of each protection risk in 2025.

Scope

The eight protection risks cover all geographic areas and population groups in Sudan from 1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025. Where there are gaps in 2025 data, the report used 2024 data instead. The protection risks are ordered alphabetically.

Methodology

The eight risks outlined in this report were selected through a prioritisation exercise conducted by the Sudan Protection Cluster in July 2025. Responders were asked to rank the 15 protection risks developed by the Global Protection Cluster based on their knowledge of protection risks in their communities. Because protection risks are typically interconnected, people in Sudan often experience multiple protection violations, either concurrently or consecutively.

The analysis is based on a review of over 100 publicly available reports, including UN, NGO, and media reports. The team conducted an additional eight interviews with cluster leads, INGOs, and NGOs.

Limitations

This report relies primarily on secondary data, which may limit its ability to capture emerging or evolving protection risks. In Sudan, protection-related secondary data for 2025 remains extremely limited – particularly regarding the exact scale and dynamics of human rights violations. This is largely because of restricted access resulting from conflict and bureaucratic impediments and significant reporting barriers, including fear of stigma or retaliation. As a result, the report does not include prevalence estimates for protection risks where incident data is likely to be significantly underreported, such as GBV, child recruitment, and abduction.

In many cases, secondary data lacks clear distinctions between the different types of protection violations, often because of insufficient information about the legal and contextual specifics of each incident. For instance, distinctions between arbitrary and unlawful arrest are frequently unclear, and it is not always clear if forced recruitment involves children or adults. To preserve accuracy and consistency, this report reflects the terminology used in the source material, though this may not fully represent the actual dynamics of the incident.

Although the team chose the eight protection risks following a consultative process, this may not have fully captured changing or emerging protection risks at a local level.

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2025 FUNDING CUTS¹

On 20 January 2025, US President Donald Trump ordered a global 90-day pause on US foreign aid, including stop-work orders for humanitarian assistance (WH 20/01/2025). Although the US Government later issued a waiver on 28 January for life-saving humanitarian assistance, lack of clarity resulted in the continued suspension of life-saving programmes across Sudan, even those granted waivers (US DOS 28/01/2025). Given that the US was Sudan's largest humanitarian donor in 2024 (accounting for nearly 44% of all humanitarian funding) and had committed nearly half of all humanitarian funding to Sudan in 2025, humanitarian responders were forced to terminate staff, reduce aid, and cut essential and life-saving programmes (ACAPS 13/03/2025; OCHA accessed 11/06/2025 a). The US also provided 70–80% of the flexible funding for multipurpose cash assistance (BP 11/03/2025; The Conversation 10/04/2025). The USAID cuts came alongside other cuts from key donor countries, including France, Germany, and the UK – who announced a 40% reduction in aid to Sudan (CFR 14/04/2025). Some funding has since resumed, with the US committing approximately 30% of all humanitarian funding (624 million) to Sudan by 11 June (OCHA accessed 11/06/2025 b). In absolute numbers, however, US funding dropped from approximately USD 875 million in 2024 to USD 186 million in the first half of 2025 (OCHA accessed 11/06/2025 a; OCHA accessed 11/06/2025 b).

The funding freeze and cuts had immediate impacts on protection programming in Sudan, with some activities suspended fully or partially in 15 states and 54 localities. In late February, the Protection Cluster estimated that 318,000 people lost access to protection services, including women, children, and people with disabilities. Funding cuts also disrupted access to information and data collection, including protection reporting and monitoring activities (KII 28/07/2025). These services included case management, psychosocial support, cash for protection, individual protection assistance, and more. The temporary freeze and reduction in protection support also likely resulted in the absence of essential assistance for thousands of women and children, increasing their risk of abuse, exploitation, and human trafficking (Protection Cluster 26/02/2025; UNFPA 19/06/2025).

PROTECTION RISKS

Abduction, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary or unlawful arrest and/or detention

While there is some data on forced disappearances, comprehensive and updated figures for 2025 are lacking. There is also less systematic information about SAF-perpetrated abductions and arbitrary detentions compared to those by RSF, especially in recently retaken areas where reporting is more restricted.

In 2025, abductions, kidnappings, detentions, and arbitrary or unlawful arrests perpetrated by SAF, RSF, and affiliated groups remain a significant protection risk for civilians, including men, boys, women, and girls (KII 17/07/2025; KII 05/06/2025; UNICEF 15/04/2025; Insecurity Insight 31/03/2025; UNHCR 11/02/2025). Both RSF and SAF have arrested, abducted, and killed civilians for alleged collaborations with the other side (Amnesty International 10/04/2025; Insecurity Insight 24/02/2025). There were 2,309 documented cases of disappearances between 16 December 2023 and 15 November 2024 (UN HRC 20/01/2025). The actual number is likely much higher, estimated to be as high as 50,000 according to the Sudanese Group for Defending Rights and Freedoms, mostly in East and South Darfur, Khartoum, Sennar, and White Nile (ST 29/03/2025).

In 2025, RSF abducted civilians in East and North Darfur, Khartoum, and White Nile, with reports of women, girls, aid workers, medical staff, and activists among those targeted (KII 21/07/2025 b; CFJ 06/05/2025; ST 27/04/2025; Amnesty International 10/04/2025). Motivations for abductions and kidnappings include forced recruitment, exploitative labour (including agricultural labour), ethnic targeting, reprisal attacks, and ransom or financial gain (KII 05/06/2025; MEE 02/06/2025; UNHCR 28/04/2025; MSF 03/07/2025). People have been taken from IDP camps, markets, public spaces, homes, and shelters, and while fleeing active fighting. Civilians have also been held in their own homes for ransom and sexual slavery (OHCHR 14/05/2025 and 25/04/2025; MSF 03/07/2025; ACJPS 22/01/2025). There have been reported cases of RSF abducting and kidnapping women and girls for sexual slavery and sexual exploitation, especially in Khartoum. Women and girls have been held for up to a month, potentially leading to stigma, physical injury, unintended pregnancies, sexually transmitted infections, and mental health disorders. Those who are targeted are often accused of collaboration with SAF (Insecurity Insight 19/02/2025; Amnesty International 10/04/2025).

¹ For more on the immediate ramifications of the USAID freeze, please see ACAPS' report on the implications of the US aid funding cuts.

The scale of SAF violations is less clear because of insufficient data, but there are reports of SAF abducting civilians in 2025, especially in recently retaken areas, including parts of Al Jazirah state (ISHR 21/01/2025; Dabanga Sudan 14/01/2025). At the same time, women and girls in SAF-controlled areas have been arbitrarily detained, accused of collaborating with RSF based on photos, messages, and posts on social media. These women and girls are being held in Gedaref, Kassala, Northern, Port Sudan, and River Nile state prisons without due process, evidence, or defence (KII 21/07/2025 b; ISHR 14/04/2025). The ages of these women and girls are unknown, but one key informant noted that in some cases, they are there with their children and babies and that conditions in detention centres are inadequate, lacking basic necessities including food and sanitary kits (KII 21/07/2025 b).

In 2025, there are reports of both SAF and RSF committing grave human rights violations in both prisons and detention facilities, including torture and inhumane living conditions (OHCHR 06/03/2025; UNHCR 11/02/2025). The detention and torture of civilians by RSF has been especially prevalent in Greater Darfur, with cases reported in January in Nyala, South Darfur (ACJPS 21/01/2025 and 22/01/2025). Detention conditions in RSF-controlled areas are reported to be inhumane, with some detainees being freed once a ransom has been paid but others dying from lack of medical attention and hunger. In May, at least 465 people were found to have died in a school used by RSF for detention in Salha neighbourhood of Khartoum (ST 29/03/2025; Sudanese Echo X 24/05/2025; ACJPS 22/01/2025). In SAF-controlled territories, detention conditions also violate human rights standards, with many detainees tortured and held without access to fair trials, including in Sinja, Sennar (ST 17/05/2025; ACJPS 29/04/2025). As of May 2025, at least 1,600 detainees were being held in inhumane conditions in Port Sudan, with limited access to basic needs or legal support (ST 17/05/2025; ISHR 14/04/2025). Detainees in some situations were detained based only on phone messages where they voiced opinions deemed controversial by SAF (ST 17/05/2025). Lawyers attempting to provide legal support to detainees face the risk of arrest or harassment, while the family members of detainees have been subject to arrests and intimidation (ISHR 14/04/2025).

The abduction and detention of aid workers by SAF, RSF, and allied armed groups have continued in 2025, with reports that healthcare professionals in Khartoum and Darfur have been especially targeted (WMA 30/04/2025; UNISFA 17/03/2025; Insecurity Insight 14/01/2025 and 24/02/2025). At least 17 aid workers have been kidnapped since 1 January 2025 (AWSD accessed 17/06/2025). Like other civilians, aid workers detained by RSF have been held in inhumane conditions, without access to basic necessities or medical care, sometimes resulting in death, including in Khartoum (CFJ 28/04/2025).

Attacks on civilians and other unlawful killings and attacks on civilian objects

Significant information gaps exist, including a lack of disaggregated data on civilian casualties by age, gender, and ethnicity, and limited attribution of responsibility for several attacks. Details on the specific ethnic groups targeted in certain areas remain unclear, as does the full geographic spread of violence.

In 2025, attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure remains a considerable protection risk across Sudan, with indiscriminate and targeted attacks, including ethnically motivated violence, mass killings and massacres, and extrajudicial killings, including reprisal attacks, continuing to threaten the population. Besides RSF and SAF, affiliated militias involved in civilian attacks include Islamist SAF-aligned groups such as the Al Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, the Sudan Shield Forces, RSF-backed militias, anti-RSF tribal groups in Darfur, and unidentified armed groups active in multiple regions (ACLEDA accessed 04/06/2025; AJ 14/04/2025; HRW 25/02/2025; UN 31/01/2025). Civilians most at risk of attacks are those close to areas of conflict, those accused of aligning with opposing groups, and those from specific ethnic groups, as discussed below. Girls and boys are also highly at risk of attacks against civilians, including targeted or accidental maiming; in 2024, an estimated 24 million children were exposed to human rights violations, including 752 verified cases of children being killed and 987 being maimed (UNSC 17/06/2025; KII 05/06/2025; OCHA 31/12/2024; OHCHR 18/03/2024).

Indiscriminate attacks, including air and drone strikes, grenade attacks, EO incidents, and shelling, artillery, and missile attacks, killed least 3,245 civilians between 1 January 2025 and 30 June (ACLEDA accessed 07/07/2025). Between 1 January and 30 June, SAF conducted over 305 air/drone strikes, killing more than 1,335 people. These air strikes included the use of unguided airdropped bombs, which posed a particularly high risk to civilian safety on residential and commercial neighbourhoods, such as Nyala (HRW 04/06/2025). RSF has also increased drone use in 2025, with 95 air/drone strikes conducted between 1 January and 30 June, leading to 242 fatalities. In comparison, RSF only conducted 18 air/drone strikes in all of 2024, indicating an increase in drone capabilities and an increased risk for civilians in areas of conflict (ACLEDA accessed 07/07/2025). Since the start of 2025, drone strikes by both SAF and RSF have resulted in civilian deaths in Abu Abad and Al Fula, West Kordofan; Al Fasher, North Darfur; Al Obeid, North Kordofan; Khartoum city and Um Durman, Khartoum state; and Nyala, South Darfur. Civilians living near military targets are particularly exposed, with many residents forced to flee their homes (ST 21/07/2025; OHCHR 17/07/2025; HRW 04/06/2025; UNICEF 05/02/2025; MSF 05/02/2025; The Star 11/05/2025; OCHA 24/04/2025).

Targeted attacks on civilians remain features of the violence as RSF, SAF, and aligned armed groups continue to target civilians based on their ethnic background or perceived political and tribal affiliations. Attacks include massacres and reprisal attacks. A July report by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) found that in North Darfur, RSF were physically assaulting or killing men from non-Arab communities (particularly the Zaghawa) whom they believed to have collaborated with SAF. In April, there were reports of RSF specifically killing Zaghawa people in Darfur (Insecurity Insight 20/05/2025; MSF 03/07/2025). According to ACLED data, more than 520 violent attacks against civilians across Sudan killed at least 1,865 people between 1 January and 30 June (ACLED accessed 07/07/2025). It is not clear how many were children, women, or individuals from ethnic groups given a lack of disaggregation. In February, there were reports of children and women being used as human shields during hostilities in Kadugli, South Kordofan, although it is not clear who the perpetrators were (OCHA/UN RC/HC Sudan 06/02/2025).

In early 2025, the US State Department determined that RSF and allied militia were committing genocide in Sudan based on observations of systematic violence against ethnic groups. Since the start of the conflict in April 2023, there have been reports of violence against various groups, including the Dajo, Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa (US DOS 07/01/2025; HRW 09/05/2024; Amnesty International 10/04/2025; DNHR 10/01/2025 and 03/11/2024; UN 17/01/2025; USHMM 22/01/2025). For instance, following SAF's recapture of Wad Madani, Al Jazirah, in January, RSF initiated ethnicity-based attacks on civilians in other areas of the state, including Abugoota, Abu Ushar, Albashagra, and Rufaa. It is not clear which ethnic groups they specifically targeted (ISHR 21/01/2025).

Since early 2025, SAF have committed reprisal attacks and targeted ethnic communities from western Sudan, Darfur, and South Sudan in Al Jazirah after they regained control of Wad Madani. They have subjected these communities, including the Kanabi group, to killings and abuse, including violence against women and girls (UN 17/01/2025; ISHR 21/01/2025). After recapturing parts of Khartoum in early January and February, SAF also conducted reprisal attacks, including killings, against civilians perceived to be RSF collaborators (Amnesty International 07/02/2025; DNHR 04/04/2025). In early 2025, the Sudan Shield Forces, allied with SAF, intentionally targeted civilians based on their perceived support for RSF in Tayba, Al Jazirah (HRW 25/02/2025). These are some of the more widely reported incidents, but there are likely more.

In 2025, SAF and RSF continue to target civilian infrastructure with frequent air strikes, affecting power plants, schools, airports, hospitals, and irrigation channels, damaging essential infrastructure, and disrupting access to education, healthcare, and clean water (Insecurity Insight 05/06/2025; ISW 09/05/2025; OCHA 05/02/2025; Sudan Violations 18/01/2025). The attacks have particularly affected healthcare, with 38 confirmed or probable acts of violence or obstruction interfering with the availability, access, or delivery of health services between

1 January and 30 June (WHO accessed 18/07/2025). More than 70% of health facilities in conflict-affected areas of Sudan are nonfunctional (ICRC 10/04/2025). These statistics are likely an underreporting of the actual situation. The targeting of power stations and fuel facilities has led to widespread electricity outages, which, in turn, have disrupted vital services, such as healthcare, for civilians (OCHA 22/01/2025; ST 13/01/2025). In May 2025, coordinated drone attacks by RSF in Port Sudan severely damaged critical infrastructure, including the international airport (which had to close from 4–6 May), a major fuel depot (causing massive fires and explosions), and a key electricity substation, leading to a citywide blackout that disrupted both civilian movement and humanitarian operations (UN 08/05/2025; Reuters 06/05/2025; AJ 06/05/2025). These attacks displaced over 3,000 people (IOM 14/05/2025).

There have also been **32 reported attacks on aid workers** by RSF, SAF, and unknown perpetrators, killing 35 people between 1 January and 30 June (AWSO accessed 17/06/2025). Among these was an attack on an aid convoy of 15 trucks carrying essential food, nutrition, and other supplies on 2 June that killed five responders, although responsibility for this attack has not been assigned to a specific group (OCHA/UN RC/HC Sudan 03/06/2025). In 2025, violence and insecurity have led to the suspension of life-saving humanitarian activities in North Darfur and Khartoum. These include the suspension of WFP food distributions in Zamzam camp on 26 February, which has not resumed as of 28 July, and MSF's operations in Bashair Teaching Hospital, one of the last functional hospitals in Khartoum, between 10 January and 9 May (MSF 09/05/2025 and 10/01/2025; WFP 26/02/2025).

Child and forced family separation

Although there is some data on UASC, it is not disaggregated, making it difficult to assess the full scale of the issue. Where data exists (such as for Sudanese children arriving at bordering countries or at the organisational or camp level), key informants indicate that it is incomplete and likely reflects an underrepresentation of the total number of UASC.

In 2025, child and forced family separation continues to be a significant concern, both in Sudan and neighbouring countries receiving refugees from Sudan. While there is no reliable figure for the number of UASC in Sudan, the Protection Cluster has set a target of supporting 22,000 UASC in 2025, suggesting at least this number (CP AOR Sudan unpublished 31/05/2025). Reflecting linkages between family separation and displacement, thousands of UASC have also been registered in neighbouring countries after fleeing Sudan. Between April 2023 and April 2025, more than 4,300 UASC were registered with UNHCR in Egypt; between April 2023 and January 6 2025, at least 3,564 were registered in Chad, and as of May 2025 approximately 2,990 UASC had crossed into South Sudan (UNHCR 17/04/2025 and

05/09/2024; UNHCR/IOM 10/06/2025). In January 2025, UNHCR documented a 10% increase in UASC displacing from Sudan to Egypt compared to December 2024, although it is not clear whether this increase in refugee UASC also reflects an increase in UASC within Sudan (UNHCR 13/02/2025; KII 17/07/2025; KII 20/07/2025). While there is no disaggregated data on UASC in Sudan, those who have displaced from Sudan to neighbouring countries have been as young as five years old (UNHCR 17/04/2025).

Conflict and displacement, along with the loss of guardians or family members (including during conflict and disease outbreaks), continue to be key factors increasing the risk of children being unaccompanied or separated (KII 17/07/2025; KII 20/07/2025; UNHCR 17/04/2025; CARE 02/06/2025; STC 05/06/2025; SOS Children's Villages 21/08/2024). In 2025, many reports of family separation have been unplanned, with families separated when fleeing security incidents, particularly in areas of active fighting (CARE 02/06/2025; MSF 04/06/2025). That said, there have also been cases where growing insecurity has forced caregivers to send their children to places of safety away from the family home, arranging for them to travel with neighbours, strangers, or alone (KII 17/07/2025; UNHCR 17/04/2025).

Children affected by forced family separation experience multidimensional challenges, which place them at increased risk of unmet basic needs and a range of protection threats. The latter includes physical violence, trafficking, association with armed groups, GBV, and child labour, with girls at particular risk of violence and trafficking and boys at particular risk of forced recruitment (KII 17/07/2025; STC 22/08/2024; ST 18/06/2025; PI 04/05/2023). Children crossing borders alone are also at especially high risk of experiencing violence and exploitation (KII 20/07/2025). Refugee UASC in Chad, for instance, have described travelling at night through active conflict areas to avoid confrontations with armed groups (WVI 31/03/2025). UASC are also at increased risk of insufficient access to basic services, such as education, health, food, and nutrition support (WVI 31/03/2025; KII 17/07/2025). Reflecting this, a UNHCR report notes that many UASC crossing the border into South Sudan arrive weak or malnourished and without documentation, potentially impeding their access to services before and after they leave Sudan (UNHCR 17/04/2025 and 05/09/2024). Highlighting challenges linked to longer-term shelter, one key informant affirmed that arranging alternative care for UASC is extremely difficult given gaps in child protection services across many parts of Sudan, particularly in East Darfur, North Darfur, and West Kordofan (CP AOR Sudan unpublished 31/05/2025; KII 20/07/2025).

Forced family separation can have a huge psychosocial toll on children, regardless of whether the separation lasts days or is permanent (UNICEF 01/04/2024). While children across Sudan are at risk of impeded psychosocial wellbeing owing to multiple stressors, including the impacts of conflict, hunger, disease, and witnessing traumatic events, UASC face additional stressors linked to the trauma of family loss or separation (STC 05/06/2025 and 10/07/2025). Some UASC may also find themselves forced to play the role of caregiver

to younger siblings, placing undue burden and stress on them and aggravating existing trauma (WVI 31/03/2025). UASC are also more likely to experience difficulties integrating into host communities or in IDP camps, affecting their ability to access community support (STC 10/07/2025; KII 17/07/2025).

Discrimination and stigmatisation, denial of resources, opportunities, services and/or humanitarian access

Key information gaps remain, including the lack of precise data on how many civilians are affected by service denial and sieges. There is insufficient detail on the extent and impact of discrimination in accessing essential services, especially for refugees, women, and girls facing stigma. The situation of besieged populations remains unclear in some areas, with outdated or incomplete figures.

In 2025, civilians across Sudan face widespread and often deliberate restrictions in access to essential services, driven by both conflict-related and systemic discrimination. Since the start of the conflict, both SAF and RSF have been evidently using starvation and the deprivation of water as a weapon of war, deliberately restricting civilian access to food and life-saving assistance. This has been achieved through siege, the destruction of critical infrastructure, including water supplies, aid delivery restrictions, and violence against civilians attempting to access essential services (USHMM 22/01/2025; NRC 02/09/2024; OHCHR 26/06/2024). Key informants also reported the denial of access to essential services, including GBV services, to refugees in certain states, including Al Jazirah, Khartoum, and White Nile. This is because host communities are more welcoming towards Sudanese people, and authorities prioritise support to IDPs and returnees over refugees (KII 28/07/2025; KII 17/07/2025; KII 08/07/2025). In areas of IDP return, one key informant reported that authorities have resumed reissuing lost documents to returning residents, but individuals with registered offences or suspected of affiliation with RSF are **denied document reissuance**, limiting their access to essential services (KII 20/05/2025).

Even where services are available, discrimination and possible stigma continue to prevent individuals from accessing vital protection services. Women and girls who have experienced CRSV or who give birth outside marriage are at risk of discrimination by their communities and families, including when the pregnancy is a result of rape. Out of fear of stigma, they often leave their communities and avoid accessing GBV or family planning services for the duration of the pregnancy. In some cases, the girls may be welcomed back home, but on the condition that the newborn baby is abandoned/given away (KII 21/07/2025 b; KII 20/07/2025; KII 17/07/2025).

Access barriers and the denial of access to resources has led to unmet needs among host communities, IDPs, and refugees worsening intercommunal tensions in areas like Kassala, where overcrowded schools and inflated costs are fuelling resentment among the host community in the face of perceived discrimination in favour of IDPs or refugees (KII 28/07/2025; CARE 24/06/2025).

Civilians also continue to be at risk of the denial of freedom of movement and siege from both RSF and SAF, especially in areas near or experiencing conflict. Since January 2025, multiple RSF sieges have restricted the movement of people and humanitarian aid delivery, resulting in dire living conditions, insufficient food and water, limited or no healthcare access, and disruptions to commerce and trade. These sieges include the following:

- **RSF has besieged Al Fasher and surrounding areas in North Darfur** since April 2024. In March 2025, an estimated 900,000 people were trapped in the area, at least half of whom were children (UNICEF 26/03/2025; ST 28/05/2025). In Zamzam camp, 15km south of Al Fasher, 750,000 people, half of them children, were also besieged. Access to food and other life-saving aid is almost nonexistent, leading to the confirmation of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in July 2024 and reports of children dying from starvation (OHCHR 14/04/2025; OCHA 08/04/2025; IPC 24/07/2024). In April 2025, an RSF ground offensive at the camp resulted in casualties and the mass displacement of more than 406,000 people by 2 May (OCHA 02/05/2025; MSF 18/04/2025). By 28 July, it was unclear how many people remained in the camp.
- **RSF besieged Al Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan**, for nearly two years. In February 2025, SAF broke the blockade, but RSF aerial drone attacks continue to pose risks to civilians and civilian infrastructure (AA 30/05/2025; SCR 01/03/2025; ST 25/02/2025). It is not clear how many people were trapped, but in 2008, the population of Al Obeid was estimated to be around 345,100 (Britannica accessed 18/06/2025).
- **Dilling and Kadugli, South Kordofan, have been experiencing an extended siege by RSF and Abdelaziz Adam Al Hilu's Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N/Al Hilu)** since mid-2023 (ACLED 15/04/2025; ST 24/02/2025; ISHR 10/01/2025). SAF partially broke the siege on 24 February, but until 28 May, RSF maintained control of key areas around Dilling (Sudans Post 28/05/2025; ST 24/02/2025). In February 2025, SPLM-N announced joining the Tasis alliance with RSF, where Abdelaziz Al Hilu was announced as RSF head Hemedti's deputy in heading the alliance (ST 01/07/2025).

Despite widespread and often acute humanitarian needs, in 2025, humanitarian responders continue to face access restrictions imposed by both SAF and RSF, which impede the timely delivery of critical humanitarian assistance. These restrictions limit humanitarian access and impede rapid response to emerging crises. In RSF-controlled areas, the Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations enforces cumbersome bureaucratic and administrative processes that potentially impede timely aid delivery (UN Sudan 10/02/2025). Similarly, in SAF-controlled areas, the authorities restrict humanitarian operations, forcing

organisations to navigate complex bureaucratic procedures at local and national levels to reach people in need (OCHA 04/06/2025; Logistics Cluster 19/05/2025; ISHR 28/02/2025; SUWRA 17/02/2025). Visa approvals for international humanitarian staff are difficult to obtain, and both state and local government administrations, the General Intelligence Service, the National Security Service, and the Humanitarian Aid Commission must approve access to specific locations (OCHA 11/05/2025; SUWRA 17/02/2025). Movements across conflict lines are also nearly impossible due to insecurity and bureaucratic impediments (KII 28/07/2025).

Forced recruitment and association of children with armed forces and groups

There is no available data capturing the full scope of forced recruitment, including of children. Verified numbers are widely understood to significantly underrepresent actual cases because of fear of reporting, access challenges, and inconsistent age verification methods.

Since 2023, SAF, RSF, and their allied militias have engaged in forced recruitment, including the association of children with armed forces and groups. This includes recruitment through abduction, which has continued throughout 2025 (UNSC 17/06/2025; EUAA 11/02/2025; UN HRC 22/03/2024; US DOS 24/06/2024; SHRH 05/2024; MSF 03/07/2025; Protection Cluster unpublished 30/06/2025). That said, the scale of children's association with armed forces and groups (CAAFAG) remains unclear, with the number of verified cases each year likely being a significant underrepresentation of the actual numbers (UNSC 17/06/2025; KII 05/06/2025). Factors contributing to an inaccurate understanding of the scale of CAAFAG include different cultural and social understandings of when a person becomes an adult, fear of reporting CAAFAG cases or seeking help, and, in some cases, an overreliance on visual assessments alone to determine if a member of an armed force or group is a child (KII 17/07/2025; KII 05/06/2025).

There is limited data on the dynamics of CAAFAG specific to 2025. That said, data from 2024 and from a key informant working on the issue indicates that boys work as combatants, man checkpoints, undertake reconnaissance, gather intelligence, transport munitions, care for stolen livestock, and serve as general labourers. There have also been reports of RSF using children as human shields (EUAA 11/02/2025; US DOS 23/04/2024; MSF 03/07/2025; KII 05/06/2025). Armed forces and groups also use girls in domestic roles or for sexual exploitation, including sexual slavery (OHCHR 16/10/2023; HRW 15/12/2024; Amnesty International 10/04/2025; KII 05/06/2025). The roles forced onto both boys and girls pose a substantive threat to their safety and wellbeing, including increased risk of death, injury, psychological trauma, detention, and stigmatisation (OSRSG-CAAC accessed 17/06/2025; Protection Cluster 26/03/2025). A

March 2025 report indicates that RSF is compensating new child recruits with stolen food and aid only instead of financially, resulting in a dynamic that constitutes forced labour and modern slavery. In 2024, there was an anecdotal report of older children associated with SAF receiving monetary payment, but it is not clear if this is widespread or applies to all children (SHRH 05/2024; Genocide Watch 18/03/2025; EUAA 11/02/2025; US DOS 23/04/2024).

Multiple, interlinked factors continue to drive CAAFAG, restricting children's ability to make free, informed decisions that prioritise their safety and wellbeing. In 2024 and 2025, these factors include the loss of educational opportunities, a desire to protect and defend their families and communities, family separation, encouragement by tribal leaders, avoidance of actual and threatened physical violence, and limited livelihood opportunities (ST 10/05/2025; Genocide Watch 18/03/2025; UN HRC 23/10/2024; KII 05/06/2025). Data specific to 2025 is limited, but in 2024, OHCHR indicated that the risk of being associated with armed forces and groups was particularly high for children in Darfur and eastern Sudan. That said, cases were also observed in Al Jazirah, Gedaref, Kassala, Khartoum, Northern, River Nile, Sennar, and West Kordofan states (OHCHR 18/03/2024; EUAA 11/02/2025; Genocide Watch 18/03/2025; STC 05/06/2025). In 2025, children in these areas will likely continue to be at risk of being forcibly recruited, particularly those in recently captured areas (KII 05/06/2025). Unaccompanied and separated children (UASC), children on the move, children in economically precarious positions, and children from Arab tribes in Darfur and West Kordofan continue to face an increased risk of association with armed forces and groups (OHCHR 16/10/2023; KII 05/06/2025).

Both SAF and RSF have also been accused of forcibly recruiting adults. As with CAAFAG, there is a lack of systematic reporting and insufficient data on the scope and scale of the forced recruitment of adults and their roles. That said, in April 2025, OCHA noted that humanitarian partners had reported a notable increase in cases of forced recruitment by RSF, although it was not specified if this also included children (OCHA 24/04/2025). Examples of forced recruitment have been reported across the country, although in 2024, Darfur region and Al Jazirah state were cited as notable sites of RSF forced recruitment. Forced recruitment reportedly acts as a driver of displacement within Darfur region, and this is likely to be the case in other affected locations, too (The Soufan Cente 23/01/2025; ST 11/12/2024). There have also been reports of forced recruitment in Nile, Northern, and Red Sea states, where gold mines have been seized and workers, often from Kordofan and Darfur regions, are forcibly recruited (Al Jazeera 20/04/2025). It is not clear whether these men were being forcibly conscripted or forced to work in the mines.

While data on the dynamics of the forced recruitment of adults in 2025 is extremely scarce, in May, the Sudan Doctors Network alleged that RSF has been abducting civilians in Al Du'ayn, including medical personnel, and either coercing them to enlist or forcing their families to pay a ransom for their release (Sudanese Echo X 28/05/2025). A July MSF report has found evidence of the forced recruitment of men and boys. RSF has also been pressuring men and

women – the latter to a lesser degree – to support the war effort through actions or financial contributions (MSF 03/07/2025). This adds to previous evidence of substantive coercion by both parties to the conflict to compel enlistment. Such evidence includes a 2024 report accusing SAF of forcing 40 miners in Darfur to enlist to disprove that they were collaborating with RSF. There have also been extensive reports of RSF using forced recruitment to bolster its military forces, such as their forced recruitment of IDP men in North Darfur in late 2024 (EUAA 11/02/2025). Other examples of coercion used by RSF as part of forced recruitment include the torture or public execution of individuals who refuse to enlist, withholding food and medicine, and the looting of homes and destruction of key infrastructure in locations where villagers refuse to enlist (CNN 21/03/2024; ST 11/12/2024). It is not clear if SAF are using similar approaches.

Gender-based violence

There is insufficient data on the extent of the involvement of armed groups other than RSF in CRSV. Information on CRSV by SAF and other affiliate groups remains limited or outdated, restricting a full understanding of crimes perpetrated by all parties to the conflict. It is not always clear if specific cases of sexual violence are directly or indirectly linked to the conflict.

GBV remains a pervasive risk across Sudan, with an estimated 12.1 million people – over 25% of the population – at risk in 2025 (KII 17/07/2025; UNFPA 29/04/2025; UN Women 27/09/2024; OCHA 31/12/2024). Secondary data on GBV in Sudan continues to focus heavily on CRSV, which has been widely reported across the country, especially in areas that have experienced active conflict. These areas include Al Jazirah, the Darfur region, and Khartoum state (ACLED accessed 04/06/2025; Amnesty International 10/04/2025; Insecurity Insight 19/02/2025, 20/03/2025, 31/03/2025, and 09/05/2025; OHCHR 14/05/2025). A May MSF report notes that CRSV is so widespread that women in Darfur talk about it as if it is unavoidable (MSF 28/05/2025). Reported incidents include rape (including child rape), gang rape (some involving more than 20 perpetrators), sexual harassment, forced marriage, and sexual slavery, during which survivors report being held for a few days to over a month (KII 21/07/2025 b; MSF 04/06/2025; Amnesty International 10/04/2025; Sudan War Updates X 29/01/2025; UNICEF 02/03/2025). There have also been reports of survivors being raped in front of family members, highlighting the use of CRSV as a tool for family or community humiliation and reprisal (Amnesty International 10/04/2025; OHCHR 14/05/2025 and 19/06/2025).

Most reported incidents of CRSV in the first half of 2025 have been attributed to RSF and affiliated groups, like in 2024. That said, in 2024, there were also reports of CRSV that implicated SAF and other armed groups, albeit to a lesser degree (UN HRC 20/01/2025;

HRW 2025; Amnesty International 10/04/2025; UNSC 17/06/2025; Insecurity Insight 11/06/2025). An MSF report on South Darfur found that over half of the survivors who received GBV health response services between January 2024 and March 2025 had been attacked by a member of the military, police, security forces, or armed groups. The report also highlights that sexual violence is perpetrated within communities and families, including by intimate partners (MSF 04/06/2025). Humanitarian responders have cited cases of sexual violence and sexual exploitation against IDPs perpetrated by host community members in shelters, informal IDPs sites, and surrounding communities (KII 21/07/2025 b; UNICEF 02/03/2025).

Women and adolescent girls continue to be most at risk of experiencing CRSV. Those experiencing particularly heightened risks are women and girls living in areas of shifting territorial control, detainees, IDPs, non-Sudanese migrants, those whose families are perceived to be aligned with SAF, and those from systematically targeted ethnic groups such as the Masalit (Amnesty International 10/04/2025; UNFPA 29/04/2025; UN HRC 20/01/2025; OHCHR 06/03/2025; UNSC 13/03/2025; ACJPS 29/04/2025). One key informant reported that Nuba tribes and non-Arabs in western Sudan were at particular risk, and that RSF have been targeting girls in North Darfur for commercial sexual exploitation, especially in IDP camps (KII 09/07/2025). There have been reports of women and adolescent girls being forced into marriage by RSF forces in areas under their control, including Al Jazirah, Khartoum, and Sennar states (ST 24/05/2025). Women and girls who have survived CRSV have also been forced into marriage by their families to avoid stigma from the community (KII 21/07/2025 b). In South Darfur, where MSF treated survivors of GBV, including sexual violence, 15% of survivors were aged between 5–14, and 2.6% were younger than five (MSF 04/06/2025). Escalating humanitarian needs in conflict- and famine-affected areas are also heightening the risk of sexual abuse and exploitation in IDP camps and child marriage, either as an attempt to ‘protect’ girls from CRSV or as an economic coping strategy with harmful consequences (KII 09/07/2025; CCCM Cluster 13/03/2025; ST 10/05/2025).

Men and boys are also at risk of CRSV, but to a lesser degree than women and girls (KII 09/07/2025; KII 21/07/2025 b). In March 2025, approximately one in three cases of child sexual assault reported to UNICEF since the start of 2024 involved boys who may need additional help to overcome stigma and access GBV response services (UNICEF 02/03/2025). Although the specifics of these assaults are unclear, at least some have been linked to the conflict dynamics, occurring during city invasions, during raids on people’s homes, during detention, or when people are fleeing from safety threats (UNICEF 02/03/2025; KII 21/07/2025 b). A rapid assessment in Khartoum also found that boys were experiencing sexual violence, but the scale remains unknown (STC 05/06/2025). There have been anecdotal reports of men being subjected to sexual violence, but the scale and dynamics are unclear (OCHA 19/06/2025).

Other forms of GBV also continued to be reported throughout Sudan in the first half of 2025, including intimate partner violence, sexual exploitation (including survival sex), child marriage, and female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) (UNICEF 02/03/2025; UNSC 01/05/2025 and 27/06/2025; DNHR 07/02/2025). Despite less attention given to these forms of GBV in the secondary data compared to CRSV, these risks remain. For instance, Sudan’s FGM/C rate remains one of the highest globally, affecting over 86% of Sudanese women and girls ages 15–49 in 2014 (the most recent comprehensive data available). The country criminalised FGM/C in 2020, but it is unclear whether this criminalisation has challenged deep-rooted social and cultural norms that support the practice (DNHR 07/02/2025; UNFPA/UNICEF 2024). Girls may also experience heightened risk of FGM/C as conflict and access challenges continue to disrupt GBV prevention programmes, which typically rely on sustained engagement to encourage normative change. One key informant noted that some non-certified midwives believe women can use FGM/C to prevent unwanted pregnancies, leading to perceptions of the practice as offering protection for girls, especially those living in crowded IDP camps where sexual violence risks are perceived to be high (KII 09/07/2025).

There have also been reported incidents of technology-facilitated GBV in 2025, with cases of digital violence and disinformation campaigns by RSF-affiliated accounts targeting women activists for speaking out against GBV (SIHA 20/01/2025; Hopes & Actions Foundation 13/01/2025).

The possible consequences of GBV are severe, including sexually transmitted infections such as HIV, unintended pregnancies and the risk of unsafe abortions, emotional trauma (including suicidal ideation), serious physical injuries (including deliberate mutilation), stigma, and death (Amnesty International 10/04/2025; Darfur Women Action Group 2025; UNICEF 02/03/2025; UNFPA 19/06/2025). Many survivors are living in areas with limited access to timely potentially life-saving medical care given conflict-related disruptions to healthcare, which have left only 27% of 278 assessed service delivery points fully functional for the provision of the clinical management of rape (UNFPA 25/06/2025). This means that survivors are likely less to be able to mitigate any resulting harmful consequences of violence, impeding their recovery and future wellbeing (Suwra 30/05/2025).

Presence of mines and other explosive ordnance

Because of ongoing conflict and response-wide funding challenges in 2025, as well as access constraints, security concerns, and bureaucratic impediments, comprehensive surveys of suspected contaminated areas have not been conducted, especially in non-government-controlled areas. As a result, the full scale of EO contamination remains unknown, and many areas remain contaminated, posing threats to returning populations. There is no systematic, comprehensive reporting system of mine incidents and accidents. There is also incomplete information about EO contamination, accidents, and incidents in non-government-controlled areas because SAF do not allow humanitarian mine clearance activities (KII 10/06/2025).

In 2025, an estimated 13 million people will need mine action support, with the highest risk of EO incidents and accidents occurring in densely populated areas that have experienced high levels of conflict, especially with return movements (KII 10/06/2025; OCHA 31/12/2024). That said, access constraints limit comprehensive surveys of suspected areas of contamination. Mine action responders only have the resources and access to conduct limited assessments in high-priority areas (KII 10/06/2025). As a result, the scale, severity, and location of EO are unknown, although anecdotal evidence of EO incidents, combined with the type, intensity, and geographic distribution of conflict hotspots in 2025, suggests EO remains a major protection risk for civilians in 2025 (KII 29/06/2025; UNMAS unpublished 26/06/2025; KII 10/06/2025; DRC 11/04/2025).

Areas that have experienced high levels of conflict are most likely to be contaminated, especially urban and periurban areas, including roads, markets, homes, hospitals, and airstrips (KII 10/06/2025; OCHA 05/02/2025). Rural EO contamination is also prevalent, but is of lower priority for clearance compared to urban and periurban areas given the lower population density. It is also generally less complex to remove EOs from rural areas (KII 10/06/2025). To reduce EO risk, there is a need for comprehensive surveys, increased technical capacity, widespread risk awareness, training, removal expertise, and EO risk assessments (UNMAS unpublished 26/06/2025; UNHCR 27/01/2025). Areas of high priority are Al Jazirah, Khartoum, Sennar, and the Darfur and Kordofan states (UNMAS unpublished 26/06/2025; KII 10/06/2025).

Between March–April 2025, conflict in Khartoum state, North and South Darfur, and North Kordofan led to widespread EO contamination, including unexploded ordnance (UXO) and anti-vehicle mines. The use of anti-personnel mines could not be verified (KII 29/06/2025; UNMAS unpublished 26/06/2025). While consistent reporting is not possible, anecdotal reports demonstrate risks to civilians' lives in 2025. In Nyala, South Darfur, and Zalingei, Central Darfur, confirmed UXO incidents have resulted in civilian casualties, including children (UNHCR

27/01/2025). In Khartoum, possible EO presence is concentrated around bridges, industrial zones, and former front lines (UNMAS unpublished 26/06/2025; OCHA 10/04/2025). Exact figures on the number of casualties are unavailable, but it is reported that survivors are arriving at hospitals with EO-related injuries (KII 29/06/2025). Finally, in North Kordofan, particularly Al Obeid and the surrounding areas, intense aerial and artillery bombardment has led to high EO contamination, with confirmed civilian casualties. Other states facing a realistic possibility of EO contamination include Blue Nile, Central, East, and West Darfur, River Nile, and Sennar (UNMAS unpublished 29/05/2025).

In 2025, IDPs are returning to areas likely to have a high level of UXO contamination. In Al Jazirah, multiple UXO and anti-vehicle mine events were reported in March and April 2025 following months of fighting. Although some clearance has occurred in major towns in the state, many areas remain uncleared and dangerous (UNMAS unpublished 29/05/2025). In North Darfur, conflict has directly affected IDP camps such as Abu Shouk and Zamzam, forcing IDPs to return to rural areas heavily affected by UXO and other explosive remnants of war (UNMAS unpublished 29/05/2025; OCHA 05/02/2025; UNHCR 11/01/2025).

IDPs, IDP and refugee returnees, farmers, and children are disproportionately exposed to EO risks (UNMAS unpublished 29/05/2025; AP 30/04/2025). Among returnees – both IDPs and refugees – men are at higher risk of UXO exposure because they often return home first to assess the feasibility for the rest of the family to return (KII 10/06/2025). Children are especially at risk given their lack of knowledge about UXO and the possibility that they may play with unfamiliar objects, with several incidents in 2025 of children being killed or injured by unexploded or abandoned EO reported across Al Jazirah, North Darfur, Khartoum, and South Darfur (UNHCR 11/01/2025; OCHA 16/01/2025 and 23/01/2025; CCCM Cluster 13/03/2025). In agricultural areas, including Al Jazirah, farmers are also exposed to a higher risk of EO incidents when working in fields (KII 10/06/2025; DRC 11/04/2025). People living in areas not directly exposed to the previous conflict that affected Greater Darfur and the Kordofan states are less likely to be aware of EO threats and may be more at risk. Given limited healthcare capacity across the country, survivors of EO accidents are unlikely to receive adequate medium- or long-term care (KII 10/06/2025).



Theft, extortion, forced eviction, or destruction of personal property

There is limited available data regarding the scale and frequency of theft, looting, and extortion, and the number of civilians affected. It is unclear to what extent armed groups are involved in rent-based extortion, and there is limited data on the prevalence and impact of forced evictions. Reports of looting and destruction are widespread, but information on specific population groups affected is lacking. There is also limited publicly available information on the status of land disputes or the number of IDPs unable to reclaim property due to lost documents.

In 2025, people continue to be exposed to the risk of theft and looting, extortion, and the destruction of personal property by RSF, SAF, other militias, criminal groups, and civilians with unmet needs. Both RSF and SAF continue to commonly use extortion to exert control and extract resources from civilians, especially under the threat of violence or abduction. Civilians have reported being forced to pay ransom to secure the release of abducted family members or prevent violence against themselves or their property (UN HRC 20/01/2025; MSF 03/07/2025). IDPs have also been extorted by the host community in exchange for rent, especially through the sexual exploitation of women (KII 28/07/2025; KII 20/06/2025). It is not clear whether armed groups are also participating in extortion in exchange for rent (KII 28/08/2025). Acts of theft, looting, and destruction are also widespread. These are not isolated crimes but rather appear to be deliberate strategies used to displace populations, prevent returns, undermine community resilience, and fund military operations. There have been reports of civilians movement being restricted because of widespread looting, violence, and intimidation in conflict areas, especially in Kadugli, South Kordofan, and Al Fula in West Kordofan (OCHA 17/04/2025; SUWRA 17/02/2025). Those at heightened risk of experiencing this protection risk are IDPs and people living in conflict zones or recently recaptured areas (MSF 03/07/2025; USHMM 22/01/2025).

In 2025, RSF and affiliated militias have looted relief warehouses, homes, universities, hospitals, and markets across multiple regions, including Al Jazirah, North Darfur, and South and West Kordofan, often during or following attacks in civilian areas (AP 02/05/2025; Insecurity Insight 23/01/2025; OCHA 23/01/2025). IDP camps, such as Abu Shouk and Zamzam in North Darfur, have also experienced repeated instances of looting and the theft of livestock, vehicles, food stocks, and personal belongings by RSF (MSF 03/07/2025; UNHCR 14/05/2025). Camp residents have also reported being pressured to contribute financially to armed groups (MSF 03/07/2025). In 2024, RSF used looting and destruction to intentionally prevent displaced people, especially ethnic minorities such as the Masalit and Zaghawa, from returning home (USHMM 22/01/2025). According to key informant, this has continued in 2025, especially in the Kordofan and Darfur regions, with ethnic minorities – including the Zaghawa and Masalit – being targeted (KII 28/07/2025).

In 2025, SAF have also been accused of burning homes and looting humanitarian warehouses, hospitals, vehicles, and medical supplies, such as in South Kordofan (ST 15/01/2025). In Khartoum state, especially in recently recaptured areas, there are reports of SAF soldiers and allied militias looting homes at gunpoint, stealing furniture, appliances, and personal items, which they then reportedly sold in local markets (ST 05/06/2025; SAR 10/04/2025). SAF-aligned security forces also frequently conduct arbitrary searches and seizures of personal belongings during arrests (UN HRC 20/01/2025). There have also been reports of increased criminality in areas recently recaptured by SAF, including looting and theft committed by members of the armed forces and opportunists (ST 11/03/2025).

Forced evictions continue in 2025, particularly affecting IDPs, but this risk is believed to be decreasing owing to increased returns. There continue to be reports of IDPs experiencing forced eviction or the threat of eviction from temporary shelters in their areas of displacement, particularly in urban areas and informal settlements (KII 21/07/2025 a; KII 20/07/2025; UN HRC 20/01/2025; Africa Is a Country 02/07/2025). IDPs – especially those from West and East Darfur, those that are sheltering in schools that re-open, or those who have lower incomes and are unable to meet rent demands – are most at risk, notably in Gedaref, Sennar, Red Sea, Northern, and White Nile states (KII 20/07/2025). One key informant noted that the risk of forced eviction is decreasing in 2025 in some areas, including Gedaref and Red Sea, given increased rates of IDP returns. That said, some IDPs' returns are driven by the fact that they can no longer afford rent in their places of displacement (KII 20/07/2025).

In 2025, the conflict continues to heighten insecurity around land tenure, both in urban and rural settings. Official land registration pre-conflict was low, especially in rural areas across Sudan and especially in Darfur region, where in 2020, less than 1% of the land was registered (KII 21/07/2025 a; UN-Habitat 05/2024). IDPs returning to their areas of origin and who either displaced without property ownership documents or did not possess them originally are likely to face difficulties and uncertainty when reclaiming their properties upon return, whether urban or rural (KII 21/07/2025 a; KII 20/05/2025). In many states, official records were destroyed when government offices were targeted, meaning that even where land has been registered, the official documents have been lost (KII 21/07/2025 a). The conflict's impact on community-level land dispute resolution capacities further hinder these challenges, particularly when community elders, who traditionally enforce customary land tenure systems, have also been displaced (KII 21/07/2025 a; KII 20/05/2025).