

MAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE BETWEEN 1 JANUARY AND 30 APRIL 2025

- Between January–April 2025, humanitarian access in Ukraine continued to deteriorate amid continuing frontline shifts, direct attacks on responders, disruptions to basic services, and escalating administrative and security barriers across both frontline and occupied territories.
- While monthly territorial advances by Russia slowed compared to Q4 2024, continued frontline shifts in January–April 2025 rendered new hromadas inaccessible to responders, resulting in reduced assistance to affected populations.
- Amid deteriorating security conditions in frontline areas, reduced humanitarian access was compounded by the limited availability of government services, which put the population at increased risk of protection concerns and significantly limited access to administrative, medical, and legal support.
- The increased deployment of fibre-optic drones, the communications of which are largely unaffected by electronic warfare jamming, further increased security risks for humanitarians providing assistance on the front lines and in areas along the border with the Russian Federation.
- In January–April, Russian forces continued to attack humanitarian workers in frontline areas, resulting in casualties and damage to vehicles and premises. The highest number of incidents occurred in Donetsk and Khersonska oblasts (ACAPS accessed 17/04/2025).
- Critical infrastructure across the country came under Russian shelling, leading to the disruption of basic utilities such as water, electricity, gas, and heating (ACAPS accessed 17/04/2025).
- Conscription continued to affect the operations and capacity of humanitarian responders, particularly for organisations and staff who have been unable to obtain exemptions (KII 08/04/2025; KII 09/04/2025 a; KII 09/04/2025 b; KII 17/04/2025).
- People's access to essential services continued to be constrained in Russian-occupied territories as a result of Russian passport requirements, deteriorated infrastructure, staff shortages, and movement restrictions (UNN 13/01/2025; HRW 25/03/2025; ; Zmina 13/04/2025; KII 10/04/2025).
- New mandatory evacuation orders were issued for Chernihivska, Donetsk, Kharkivska, and Sumska oblasts (Suspilne 16/04/2025, 12/02/2025, Slovo I Dilo 05/03/2025; UNN 23/01/2025; Ukrinform 11/04/2025).

Map 1. Humanitarian access severity at the oblast level by 30 April 2025



*Maps showing access severity at the raion level are available further in this report

Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 30 April 2025)

ABOUT THIS REPORT

Aim

This report compares access challenges across Ukrainian oblasts and raions to inform humanitarian responders and support decision-making. It is part of the ACAPS regular analysis of access constraints, with the latest report published on 6 February 2025.

Methodology

This analysis is based on changes in the access severity model between 1 January and 30 April 2025. ACAPS developed these updates using data collected from secondary sources and 12 key informant interviews conducted in March 2025 with international and regional humanitarian responders.

The last section of this report provides a short description of the methodology. The complete methodology, access events dataset, and access severity model API are available on the [ACAPS Ukraine hub website](#).

This report contains the scoring and mapping of access constraints at the raion level. Scores are based on the application of ACAPS's subnational access model for raion-level data collection of access events, with minor modifications.

As a result of reduced capacity, access reports are now published on a four-month cycle. Datasets will continue to be published monthly and relevant access information will be included in other thematic reports.

Limitations


This analysis relies primarily on publicly available data, which, as a result of the dynamic situation, is unlikely to be comprehensive. Access severity scores at the raion level may be lower than expected in Russian-occupied territories owing to extremely limited response, fewer reported incidents, and lower conflict intensity.

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
ACCESS TRENDS IN OBLASTS AND RAIONS FACING THE HIGHEST CONSTRAINTS

Map 2. Severity of restrictions to people's access to services and assistance by 30 April 2025




Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 30 April 2025)

Map 3. Severity of access constraints for humanitarians by 30 April 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 30 April 2025)


Map 4. Severity of physical and security constraints across Ukraine by 30 April 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 30 April 2025)

Donetska oblast

Map 5. Access severity at the raion level in Donetska oblast by 30 April 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 30 April 2025)

Table 1. Access severity at the raion level in Donetska oblast by 30 April 2025

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Bakhmutskiyi	5.0	3.3	2.0	3.4
Donetskyyi	3.5	3.3	1.7	2.8
Horlivskyyi	3.5	3.3	1.7	2.8
Kalmiuskyyi	3.5	3.3	1.0	2.6
Kramatorskyyi	5.0	5.0	3.7	4.6
Mariupolskyyi	5.0	3.3	1.0	3.1
Pokrovskyyi	5.0	5.0	3.7	4.6
Volnovaskyyi	5.0	3.3	2.4	3.6

*A lack of physical response in Russian-occupied territories, where fewer incidents are reported, may have led to lower-than-expected scores.

- **Access severity score trend since Q4 of 2024:** deterioration in Donetskyyi raion
- **Raions with the highest number of events:** Pokrovskyyi and Kramatorskyyi
- **Most recurrent access event:** restriction and obstruction of access to services

In January–April 2025, Russian forces continued advancing in Donetska oblast, particularly in the Kostiantynivka, Kurakhove, Pokrovsk, and Toretsk directions. Russian advances throughout Ukraine slowed in January–March 2025 overall, however, compared to November–December 2024, a trend also observed in Donetska oblast (Texty 01/04/2025). Since March, successful Ukrainian defence of the areas south of Pokrovsk town and tactical counterattacks have nearly halted Russian forces' northwards advances towards Pokrovsk, despite repeated offensives (ISW 06/04/2025; Ukrainska Pravda 22/04/2025). Overall, conflict intensity remained at a similar level in January–April 2025 across the oblast compared to October–December 2024, with new areas coming under increased attack as the front lines shifted. Hrodivska, Komarska, Kostiantynivska, and Pokrovska hromadas had the highest increase in air, drone, and shelling attacks between these two periods, worsening conditions for civilians and further constraining humanitarian operations (ACLED accessed 23/04/2025).

In the coming May–August period, Russian forces are likely to advance westwards and northwards from the Kostiantynopil and Udachne directions as they seek to achieve the primarily symbolic goal of reaching the Dnipropetrovska oblast border. Russian forces are also likely to continue to pressure Kostiantynivka, an important railway logistics hub, from

the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk direction and further disrupt the T-0504 highway connecting Kostiantynivka to Pokrovsk (Babel 22/04/2025). Significant Russian advances into Pokrovsk town itself are unlikely given the effectiveness of Ukrainian defences against current Russian tactics and the operational challenges of advancing in an increasingly urbanised environment, as the front line moves toward the town. It is also likely that the initial wave of civilian displacement from Pokrovska hromada caused by the approaching front line has slowed, suggesting that a significant number of people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance remain in the hromada. As security conditions deteriorate and evacuation efforts face operational challenges, humanitarian access to these civilians is expected to remain extremely constrained.

Access constraints for humanitarians: shifting front lines put new areas under immediate threat and led to a dynamic humanitarian access situation, as access to areas now near the front lines is deteriorating:


- In the Kurakhove-Velyka Novosilka direction, access has deteriorated particularly in the eastern and southern parts of Velykonovosilkivska hromada, where most settlements are now occupied by Russian forces. Velyka Novosilka village itself was occupied in late January (Suspilne 08/02/2025; Deep State accessed 17/4/2025; KII 08/04/2025). In settlements under Ukrainian control, delivery of assistance is hampered by security risks, such as attacks by fibre-optic, first-person view (FPV) drones, which are largely unaffected by electronic countermeasures (Suspilne 08/02/2025).
- In Pokrovska hromada, increased insecurity, including along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka highway, has forced responders to use bypass roads, complicating logistical planning, increasing delivery times, and hampering assistance to the 3,700 remaining people (KII 17/04/2025; Ukrinform 16/04/2025).
- By early April, just over 200 people remained in Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, where organisations have been unable to deliver any assistance, including water and medical aid (V-Variant 03/04/2025).
- In northern Donetsk oblast, security concerns also affected access to Verkhonokamianske in Zvanivska hromada, Fedorivka in Soledarska hromada, and Lymanska hromada, all located within 5km of the front lines (KII 08/04/2025).
- More generally, humanitarian access constraints and disruption to services have left civilians within 20km of the front lines with reduced access to essential services, including medical, psychological, and gender-based violence services (KII 08/04/2025).

Attack on humanitarian responders and facilities: attacks on humanitarian responders continued in the oblast at a rate similar to Q4 2024, specifically in Pokrovskiyi and Kramatorskiyi raions. Five incidents were publicly reported, the majority of which involved FPV drone attacks on vehicles conducting evacuations (Suspilne 30/01/2025, 01/02/2025,

08/03/2025 a, and 08/03/2025 b; Zmina 20/04/2025). Such attacks have heightened operational risks for humanitarian evacuation efforts and aid delivery. Donetsk remains the oblast with the second-highest number of incidents targeting humanitarian responders and facilities, after Khersonska (ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025).

Damage to civilian infrastructure: continued attacks caused an increase in newly reported civilian infrastructure damage in January–April 2025 (883) compared to September–December 2024 (629), with the highest concentration in Kramatorskiyi and Pokrovskiyi raions. New damage to electrical infrastructure, gas supply systems, education facilities, and health facilities was reported at more than double during this period (ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025). As a result of attacks and subsequent damage, the provision of gas, heating, electricity, and water were disrupted across the oblast and further aggravated humanitarian needs (Suspilne 11/03/2025 and 19/01/2025; Bahmut 22/01/2025; Slovo i Dilo 05/03/2025; Ukrainska Pravda 18/03/2025).

Figure 1. Main damage per type of infrastructure in Donetsk oblast, September–December 2024 vs. January–April 2025



Source: ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025

Mandatory evacuation: oblast authorities expanded the scope of mandatory evacuation for minors and at least one guardian as a result of the advancing front lines and rising insecurity. In late January, 25 additional settlements in Komarska and Kryvorizka hromadas were under such orders (Ukrainski Novyny 24/01/2025). On 27 March, mandatory evacuation was expanded to additional settlements in Dobropilska, Druzhkivska, Kryvorizka, and Lymanska hromadas, where 500 children remained (Donetsk Region Military Administration Facebook 27/03/2025). By 16 April, 207 children still remained in areas under mandatory evacuation orders, marking a rise in protection risks and constrained access to essential services (Ukrinform 16/04/2025).

Disrupted water supply in Russian-occupied territories: the water supply in Donetsk city has been constrained and only available on a limited schedule (Ukrinform 22/04/2025). Constrained water supply and overall inadequate WASH infrastructure were also reported in Mariupol (V-Variant 15/04/2025). Russian-installed authorities have acknowledged difficulties regarding the water supply, stating that a dry summer could further worsen the situation (ND 21/04/2025). The compounded impact of water shortages, deteriorating WASH infrastructure, and expected severe weather conditions may heighten health risks for affected populations.

Kharkivska oblast


Table 2. Access severity at the raion level in Kharkivska oblast by 30 April 2025

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Berestynskyi	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.2
Bohodudivskyi	2.0	1.1	3.5	2.2
Chuhuivskyi	5.0	4.4	3.4	4.3
Iziumskyi	2.0	1.9	3.6	2.5
Kharkivskyi	2.0	3.0	3.8	2.9
Kupianskyi	5.0	3.3	3.0	3.8
Lozivskyi	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.2

*A lack of physical response in Russian-occupied territories, where fewer incidents are reported, may have led to lower-than-expected scores.

- **Access severity score trend since Q4 of 2024:** deterioration in Chuhuivskyi raion
- **Raions with the highest number of events:** Chuhuivskyi, Iziumskyi, and Kupianskyi
- **Most recurrent access event:** presence of mines and explosive devices

Map 6. Access severity at the raion level in Kharkivska by 30 April 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 30 April 2025)

In January–April 2025, Russian forces concentrated their offensive operations on attempting to secure a bridgehead on the left bank of the Oskil River north of Kupiansk, as well as reaching the river's right bank east of Kupiansk (The Kyiv Independent 07/04/2025; Radio Svoboda 12/04/2025). Borivska, Kupianska and its surrounding hromadas, and Vovchanska hromada on the border with the Russian Federation accounted for nearly all (95%) of the armed clashes reported in the oblast in January–April (ACLED accessed 23/04/2025). Simultaneously, Zolochivska hromada (Bohodudivskyi raion) alone saw 37% of all air, drone, and missile strikes on the oblast (ACLED accessed 23/04/2025).

Conflict intensity is likely to remain highest in Kupianska and its surrounding hromadas, where Russian forces are likely to continue their efforts in the May–August period. Active fighting and the continued presence of FPV drones will also drive heightened security concerns for responders in the north of the oblast, along the border with the Russian Federation, resulting in further restricting access to affected populations.

Access constraints for humanitarian responders: humanitarian access was severely constrained in areas within 10km of the front lines, especially in hromadas affected by Russian operations near Kupiansk and the Oskil River (KII 08/04/2025). Access to Kupianska hromada in particular has remained extremely restricted since December as a result of security constraints, while several settlements in Kindrashivska hromada have become completely inaccessible (Suspilne 19/02/2025; KII 08/04/2025; KII 24/01/2025).


Attacks on humanitarian responders: there were two publicly reported attacks on responders in this period, both of which involved FPV drones and occurred near the border with the Russian Federation. In Bilyi Kolodiaz (Chuhuivskyi raion), an FPV drone dropped explosives while aid was being distributed, while in Ivashky (Bohodukhivskyi raion), two vehicles delivering humanitarian assistance were targeted by FPV drones, highlighting the growing security risks for humanitarian operations in border areas (Suspilne 08/04/2025; Ukrinform 11/04/2025).

Damage to civilian infrastructure: continued air attacks throughout the oblast caused an increase in the number of damage incidents reported in January–April 2025 (448) compared to September–December 2024 (339). Most new damage was reported in Kharkivskyi raion (44%), followed by Bohodukhivskyi, Iziumskyi, and Kupianskyi raions (ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025).

New damage to critical infrastructure increased in January–April 2025, with damage to electric supply systems doubling, disrupting service provision in Bohodukhivskyi, Iziumskyi, Kharkivskyi, and Kupianskyi raions (ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025). For example, on 9 February, a glide bomb damaged seven residential houses and a power line, leaving five settlements without electricity, affecting approximately 1,902 subscribers in Kharkivskyi raion (Suspilne 09/02/2025). On 5 March, damage to a high-pressure gas pipeline caused gas supply disruption for 1,500 civilians in 25 settlements of Velykoburlutska and Vilkhuvatska hromadas in Kupianskyi raion (Suspilne 05/03/2025).

Locations closer to the front lines faced more sustained disruptions to basic utilities as a result of the scale of damage. Settlements on the left bank of the Oskil River were left without electricity, water, gas, or heating supply (Suspilne 15/01/2025). Many border settlements in Zolochivska hromada also faced water, electricity, and gas supply disruptions (Suspilne 12/02/2025). The deteriorated security situation and service disruptions aggravated living conditions and heightened displacement risks among affected populations, specifically among families with children, while older people preferred to remain (Suspilne 04/03/2025).

Figure 2. Main damage per type of infrastructure in Kharkivska oblast, Q1 2025 vs. Q4 2024



Source: ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025

Access to basic services: restricted humanitarian access resulting from security constraints and the curtailment of humanitarian programming as a result of funding cuts left civilians without access to critical services, including medical and hygiene assistance (KII 08/04/2025). Security considerations also affected the provision of state services, with Ukrposhta closing its mobile offices in several settlements across Bohodukhivskyi, Chuhuivskyi, Iziumskyi, Kharkivskyi, and Kupianskyi raions in early April, leaving civilians without access to postal services, including pension distributions (Kharkivska Oblast Military Administration 07/04/2025).

Mandatory evacuation: amid January's significantly worsened security situation, mandatory evacuation orders for 267 minors and at least one guardian were expanded to a further 16 settlements in Kupianska hromada (UNN 23/01/2025). These evacuation measures aimed to mitigate protection risks for children as frontline hostilities intensified in Kupianska hromada.

Khersonska oblast

Map of the Kherson region showing assessed Russian advance, assessed Russian-controlled territory, cities, and raion-level access scores by pillar.

Legend:

- Assessed Russian advance (hatched pattern)
- Assessed Russian-controlled territory (dark red)
- Cities (blue triangle)
- Raion-level access scores by pillar:
 - P1 - access of people in need to humanitarian aid
 - P2 - access of humanitarian organisations to people in need
 - P3 - physical, environmental, and security constraints

Access scores by pillar (indicated by dots):

- Low access constraints (light red)
- Moderate access constraints (medium red)
- High access constraints (dark red)
- Very high constraints (black)
- Extreme access constraints (dark brown)

Scale: 0km, 25km, 50km

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RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Beryslavskyi	1.5	3.0	3.4	2.6
Henicheskyi	5.0	3.3	1.7	3.4
Kakhovskyi	5.0	4.4	2.5	4.0
Khersonskyi	5.0	5.0	4.1	4.7
Skadovskyi	5.0	3.3	2.0	3.5


- **Access severity score trend since Q4 of 2024:** deterioration in all raions
- **Raion with the highest number of events:** Khersonskyi
- **Most recurrent access event:** restriction and obstruction of access to services

In the May–August 2025 period, the Dnipro River will likely continue to prevent any form of ground advance, but the security situation in the oblast will likely remain extremely severe, particularly on the right bank of the Dnipro River. Even without advances, shelling and the increasing use of fibre-optic drones from Russian positions across the river will continue to pose major risks to civilians and responders on the right bank.

Attack on humanitarian responders and facilities: Khersonska remains the most dangerous oblast for humanitarian responders. In January–April 2025, there were eight publicly reported attacks on humanitarian responders and facilities, the same number as in September–December 2024, all in Khersonskyi and Beryslavskyi raions. At least four of these incidents involved drones (ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025). The targeting of humanitarian responders continues to severely restrict their operational presence and access to frontline areas.

Damage to civilian infrastructure: the number of reports of new civilian infrastructure damage decreased in January–April 2025 compared to September–December 2024. Despite this decrease, however, the rate of new damage remained high in the oblast (247 incidents in January–April), and the targeting of gas and electrical infrastructure continued to disrupt the provision of basic services, especially in areas closest to the right bank of the Dnipro River (ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025). Nearly 25% of settlements on the right bank remained without electricity by mid-April, as the high rate of attacks prevented rapid repairs (Ukrinform 11/04/2025; 24 Kanal 17/04/2025; Suspilne 05/04/2025). Extreme weather events in late March and early April further compounded service disruptions, with settlements in both Ukrainian-controlled and Russian-occupied areas left without electricity as a result of strong winds (Rayon Kakhovka 30/03/2025; Suspilne 11/04/2025). These service interruptions likely led to constrained access to heat, healthcare, and communication services, particularly critical to affected populations.

Figure 3. Main damage per type of infrastructure in Khersonska oblast, Q1 2025 vs. Q4 2024



Source: ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025

Transportation impediments: increased threat of Russian drone attacks on 8 January led to the suspension of transportation to three villages in Khersonska hromada (Inzhenerne, Molodizhne, and Naddniprianske), likely limiting civilian access to essential services and mobility (Suspilne 08/01/2025).

Russian passport requirements in Russian-occupied territories: according to Ukrainian authorities, Russian authorities restricted the provision of fuel to residents holding Russian passports, leaving others without heating during the cold winter months. This measure aggravates vulnerabilities to cold-related health risks among affected populations, specifically among children and older people (UNN 13/01/2025).

Luhanska oblast


Table 4. Access severity at the raion level in Luhanska oblast by 30 April 2025

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Alchevskyi	5.0	3.3	1.5	3.3
Dovzhanskyi	5.0	3.3	1.4	3.2
Luhanskyi	5.0	3.3	1.5	3.3
Rovenkivskyi	5.0	3.3	1.4	3.3
Shchastynskyi	5.0	3.3	1.4	3.2
Sievierodonetskyi	5.0	3.3	3.0	3.8
Starobilskyi	5.0	3.3	1.4	3.2
Svativskyi	5.0	3.3	2.2	3.5

*A lack of physical response in Russian-occupied territories, where fewer incidents are reported, may have led to lower-than-expected scores.

- **Access severity score trend since Q4 of 2024:** deterioration in all raions
- **Raion with the highest number of events:** Sievierodonetskyi
- **Most recurrent access event:** presence of Russian-occupied territories

Map 8. Access severity at the raion level in Luhanska oblast by 30 April 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 30 April 2025)

Most of Luhanska oblast remains occupied by Russian forces, limiting reporting on incidents affecting humanitarian access. In January–April 2025, Russian troops focused on a counteroffensive on the Kharkivska-Luhanska administrative border. Access remains extremely constrained in Russian-occupied territories; movement restrictions and constrained access to healthcare led to a deterioration in the access severity score for all raions.

The overall number of violent incidents in the oblast decreased from 538 in September–December 2024 to 343 in January–April 2025, likely because of the logistical and mobility issues Russian forces faced (ACLEDA accessed 23/04/2025; Army Inform 02/03/2025). Most (79%) reported events were armed clashes, most of which occurred in Krasnorichenska and Kolomyichyska hromadas (Svativskyi raion) (ACLEDA accessed 23/04/2025).


Restrictions on civilian movement: Russian-installed authorities have implemented new bureaucratic impediments to free civilian movement in the oblast. According to Ukrainian oblast authorities, civilian entry into Lysychansk in January 2025 was only possible with local registration and Russian documents (Ukrinform 10/01/2025). In March, the same rules were applied for entry into Rubizhne, likely as a filtration measure (Novosti 16/03/2025).

Access to healthcare: staff shortages meant that access to medical services remained constrained in Russian-occupied areas, continuing an existing trend and likely aggravating health risks for people with chronic conditions, such as cancer, and older people (ACAPS 28/10/2024; Realna Gazeta 31/03/2025; Zmina 20/01/2025).

Constrained provision of basic utilities: insufficient provision of basic utilities – such as water, gas, electricity, and telecommunications – resulting from poor infrastructure, lack of repairs, and damage from forest fires was reported across the oblast, creating access barriers to water, electricity, gas, communications, and medicine (V-Variant 10/03/2025, 08/04/2025, and 10/04/2025; Ukrinform 22/04/2025).

Sumska oblast

Map 9. Access severity at the raion level in Sumska oblast by 30 April 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 30 April 2025)

Table 5. Access severity at the raion level in Sumska oblast by 30 April 2025

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Konotopskiy	1.5	0.8	2.6	1.7
Okhtyrskiy	2.0	0.8	3.4	2.1
Romenskiy	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.5
Shostkynskiy	1.5	0.8	2.7	1.7
Sumskiy	2.0	1.4	4.3	2.6

- **Access severity score trend since Q4 of 2024:** deterioration across Okhtyrskiy raion
- **Raion with the highest number of events:** Sumskiy
- **Most recurrent access event:** presence of mines and explosive devices


After retaking Ukrainian-held Russian territory in Kursk oblast, Russian forces advanced towards Basivka, Veselivka, and Zhuravka settlements, putting Yunakivska and Khotinska hromadas at higher risk of attack and triggering additional evacuations (Radio Svoboda 10/04/2025; Suspilne 09/03/2025; Deep State accessed 16/04/2025; Ukrinform 11/04/2025). Attacks – mainly using artillery, loitering munitions, and FPV drones – significantly deteriorated the oblast's security situation, resulting in additional civilian evacuations and limiting humanitarian access to people in need, namely in Shostkynskiy and Sumskiy raions (OCHA 19/03/2025; Ukrainska Pravda 13/02/2025). The large number of attacks also left behind extensive UXO contamination, which must be neutralised by state services and poses a continuing security threat to civilians and responders. A Russian ballistic missile attack on Sumy city on 13 April resulted in the highest number of civilian fatalities in the city from a single missile strike since the beginning of full-scale invasion in 2022 (BBC 13/04/2025).

The overall number of air and drone strikes on the oblast slightly increased in January–April 2025 compared to September–December 2024, primarily focused on areas near the border with the Russian Federation. The number of such attacks significantly increased in Krasnopilska (+90%), Seredyno-Budska (+65%), Esmanska (+46%), and Velykopysarivska (+22%) hromadas (ACLED accessed 23/04/2025). Increased air and drone strikes have severely restricted both civilian and humanitarian movements, particularly in settlements of hromadas in Shostkynskiy raion located within 5km of the Russia-Ukraine border (Suspilne 17/01/2025; KII 09/09/2025 a; KII 09/09/2025 b). In May–August 2025, insecurity is likely to continue constraining humanitarian access in border areas.

Access constraints for humanitarian responders: the security situation in hromadas located within 20km of the border limits humanitarian operations in these areas, including evacuation missions (KII 09/09/2025 b; Suspilne 21/03/2025). In at least one case, temporary road closures forced NGOs delivering humanitarian aid to reroute through farm roads, such as unpaved rural roads, placing responders at heightened risk of drone attack or of hitting a landmine, leading to reduced operational reach and logistics issues, slowing delivery times (KII 07/04/2025).

Damage to civilian infrastructure: constant attacks on the oblast led to an increase in damage to civilian infrastructure in January–April 2025 (287) compared to September–December 2024 (216). Sumskyi raion, bordering Russia, accounted for 60% of new civilian infrastructure damage, while the overall number of damage-producing incidents in Sumska decreased in Q1 2025 (ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025). Persistent disruptions to electricity and heating services have compounded vulnerabilities, limiting access to safe water, healthcare, and emergency assistance in Sumy city and neighbouring hromadas (EPravda 13/01/2025; Ukrainska Pravda 14/03/2025; Suspilne 26/03/2025; Ukrinform 13/04/2025).

Figure 4. Main damage per type of infrastructure in Sumska oblast, Q1 2025 vs. Q4 2024



Source: ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025


Disrupted access to utilities: in Krasnopilska, Myropilska, and Velykopysarivska hromadas, damage to critical infrastructure and medical facilities meant that civilians have not had access to electricity, water, gas, medical aid, heating, communications, and governmental services such as resilience centres. The closest medical services are in Lebedyn, Okhtyrka, and Sumy, with potential delays in medical aid delivery as a result of security risks, logistical issues, and transport costs (KII 09/04/2025 a).

Disruption of basic services: the relocation of government services away from certain hromadas because of increasing insecurity has left the remaining population without access to administrative services. Civilians travelling to other towns to access services often face transportation and financial difficulties. For example, the tax office, employment centre, pension fund, and legal aid services were relocated from Sveska hromada to Yampil (10km away), while banking and notary services were relocated to Shostka (30km away) (KII 09/09/2025 b). Facing financial hardship and a lack of safe transport, civilians must travel longer distances to access services. At the same time, one key informant mentioned that authorities in Hlukhiv, Krolevets, and Shostka have struggled to address all civilian needs because most humanitarian organisations operate in Sumy (KII 07/04/2025). In Esmanska hromada, people have no access to services and are forced to travel to Hlukhiv (KII 09/04/2025 b). As a result of the security situation, there is no direct transportation between Seredyna-Buda and Shostka, leaving civilians without access to humanitarian, medical, and legal aid, while responders reroute delivery operations (KII 09/04/2025 b). All public transport to Shalyhyne has also been halted, as carriers deem the settlement too unsafe. The worsened security situation and significant damage to infrastructure in Shalyhynska hromada has led civilians to try to leave the settlement either on their own or with help from local NGOs (Suspilne 14/04/2025 and 22/04/2025).

Mandatory evacuations: in January, oblast authorities announced that 20,000 residents still needed to be evacuated from the oblast's border areas (Zmina 23/01/2025). In March, as a result of worsening security and increased protection risks, mandatory evacuation orders were also issued for 543 civilians from eight settlements in Yunakivska and Myropilska hromadas, along with 23 settlements in Krasnopilska hromada (Pravda 13/03/2025; Suspilne 18/03/2025 and 26/03/2025).

Zaporizka oblast

Map 10. Access severity at the raion level in Zaporizka oblast by 30 April 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 30 April 2025)

Table 6. Access severity at the raion level in Zaporizka oblast by 30 April 2025

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Berdianskyi	5.0	3.3	0.8	3.0
Melitopolskyi	3.5	3.3	1.0	2.6
Polohivskyi	5.0	4.4	2.2	3.9
Vasylivskyi	5.0	3.3	1.6	3.3
Zaporizkyi	2.0	2.5	3.6	2.7

*A lack of physical response in Russian-occupied territories, where fewer incidents are reported, may have led to lower-than-expected scores.

- **Access severity score trend since Q4 of 2024:** deterioration in Polohivskyi raion
- **Raions with the highest number of events:** Berdianskyi and Vasylivskyi
- **Most recurrent access event:** restriction and obstruction of access to services

During January–April 2025, Russian forces continued attacking the road between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia city, aiming to reach the administrative borders of Dnipropetrovska oblast and cut Ukrainian forces off from their logistics point in Novopavlivka (12km from the current front line) (ISW 14/04/2025). By April, Russian forces had conducted ground attacks northwest of Robotyne and southwest of Orikhiv toward Lobkove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Stepove, and are likely aiming to cross the Yanchekrak River to approach Kamianske village (ISW 15/04/2025; Radio Svoboda 16/04/2025). The continued Russian advance will likely further deteriorate humanitarian access in Zaporizka's frontline areas.

Between January–April 2025, the overall number of attacks on the oblast increased slightly, although the same areas remained the main targets: Huliaipilska, Malotokmachanska, Malynivska, Orikhivska, Stepnohirska, Vasylivska, and Zaporizka hromadas, reflecting the high level of hostilities in the Orikhiv and Huliaipole directions (ACLED accessed 23/04/2025). This trend points to continued Russian efforts to occupy the rest of Zaporizka, with increased hostilities in the west of the oblast resulting in increasing damage in Stepnohirska and Orikhivska hromadas (ISW 28/03/2025; ACAPS accessed 10/04/2025).

Access constraints for humanitarians: as a result of intensified shelling and drone attacks on cities and frontline areas, humanitarian organisations limit their activities within the oblast, specifically to Orikhiv town and Mala Tokmachka (KII 08/04/2025). If such hostilities continue, humanitarian responders' access to frontline communities will likely remain extremely limited.


Attacks on humanitarian responders and facilities: two attacks on humanitarian responders and facilities were reported in January–April 2025, compared to one in September–December 2024. On 1 February, the humanitarian hub for IDPs from Enerhodar, Zaporizhzhia city, was damaged during a Russian drone attack, while on 12 March, a vehicle was attacked by a drone (Suspilne 01/02/2025 and 12/03/2025). These attacks heightened security risks for humanitarian personnel working in the oblast.

Disruptions to basic utilities: continued attacks on the oblast disrupted the provision of basic utilities, such as water and electricity, in January–April 2025 in both Zaporizhzhia city and frontline areas (Suspilne 01/02/2025 and 27/03/2025; Ukrinform 23/01/2025, 18/04/2025, and 16/03/2025; Ukrainska Pravda 17/03/2025).

REPORTED ACCESS CONSTRAINTS IN OTHER UKRAINIAN OBLASTS

Chernihivska oblast

Map 11. Access severity at the raion level in Chernihivska oblast by 30 April 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 30 April 2025)

Table 7. Access severity at the raion level in Chernihivska oblast by 30 April 2025

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Chernihivskiy	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.6
Koriukivskiy	0.0	0.0	2.1	0.7
Nizhynskiy	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.4
Novhorod-Siverskiy	1.5	0.0	2.3	1.3
Prylutskiy	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.3


- **Access severity score trend since Q4 of 2024:** no significant changes
- **Raion with the highest number of events:** Novhorod-Siverskiy
- **Most recurrent access event:** presence of mines and explosive devices

The security situation in Chernihivska oblast deteriorated in January–April 2025 compared to September–December 2024. While frequent shelling continued, the overall trend shifted to the increasing use of various types of drones, including loitering munitions, radio-controlled FPV drones, and fibre-optic FPV drones (Suspilne 06/03/2025). The number of air and drone attacks increased sharply from 510 to 844 (ACLEd accessed 23/04/2025). Most such incidents occurred in Semeniivska (52%), Snovska (20%), and Novhorod-Siverska (19%) hromadas, resulting in civilian casualties and damage to critical infrastructure, telecommunication services, and residential buildings (Suspilne 17/03/2025; ACAPS accessed 23/04/2025; ACLEd accessed 23/04/2025).

These developments have not yet led to a deterioration in humanitarian access or the oblast's overall access severity scores, but could be indicators of a worsening access situation in the May–August 2025 period should the war continue to intensify in the oblast.

Damage to civilian infrastructure: as a result of increasing attacks, new damage to civilian infrastructure more than doubled in January–April 2025 (69) compared to September–December 2024 (27), primarily affecting businesses. This aggravated economic hardship and increased humanitarian needs across the oblast, particularly affecting access to services in affected communities.

Figure 5. Main damage per type of infrastructure in Chernihivska oblast, Q1 2025 vs. Q4 2024



Source: ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025


Evacuations: in Q1 2025, Russian troops frequently attacked the border hromadas of Horodnianska, Semenivska, and Snovska with various types of weapons, including mortar fire, artillery shelling, FPV drone strikes, and explosives from unmanned aerial vehicles (Suspilne 05/03/2025; ACLED accessed 23/04/2025). As a result, 60 residents of Semenivska hromada were evacuated (RBC Ukraine 12/01/2025; Suspilne 10/02/2025). One of the organisations operating in the oblast reported that IDPs prefer to stay in Zhadove and Chernihiv city (KII 09/04/2025). As a result of underdeveloped infrastructure in Zhadove, however, civilians may face limited access to shelter and healthcare services (Suspilne 22/01/2025).

Disruption to services and utilities: increased attacks on the oblast led to disruptions in basic services, utilities, and rail services in January 2025. As a result of Russian shelling, several villages on the border of Semenivska hromada were left without gas (Suspilne 27/01/2025). In March, a drone attack on a cell phone partially disrupted internet connectivity in Semenivka town (Suspilne 16/03/2025; KII 09/04/2025). In Semenivska hromada, civilians had limited access to administrative services and legal aid because local government relocated its offices to more secure locations (KII 09/04/2025). In April, train services were temporarily halted by increased shelling, including the cancellation of trains to Semenivka town near the border

with the Russian Federation (Suspilne 14/04/2025 and 16/04/2025). These service disruptions compounded protection risks and further restricted affected populations' mobility and access to services.

Dnipropetrovska oblast

Map 12. Access severity at the raion level in Dnipropetrovska oblast by 30 April 2025



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 30 April 2025)

Table 8. Access severity at the raion level in Dnipropetrovska oblast by 30 April 2025

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Dniprovskiyi	0.0	1.7	1.7	1.1
Kamianskyi	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.2
Kryvorizkyi	0.0	1.7	1.5	1.0
Nikopolskyi	1.5	1.4	2.5	1.8
Pavlohradskyi	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.2
Samarivskyi	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1
Synelnykivskyi	1.5	0.0	2.3	1.3

- **Access severity score trend since Q4 of 2024:** deterioration in Nikopolskyi raion
- **Raions with the highest number of events:** Synelnykivskyi and Dniprovskiyi
- **Most recurrent access event:** restriction and obstruction of access to services

Shifting front lines in Donetska began altering the security situation in eastern areas of Dnipropetrovska oblast in January–April 2025, while Nikopolskyi raion continued to be heavily affected by the spillover of the war in Zaporizka oblast. While the overall number of air, drone, missile, and shelling attacks on Dnipropetrovska did not drastically change between September–December 2024 and January–April 2025, the increased use of guided bombs caused a sense of insecurity in pre-frontline areas and led to heightened protection needs in affected communities (ACLED accessed 23/04/2025; KII 22/04/2025). Shifting front lines and increasing insecurity resulted in the issuing of mandatory evacuation orders for families with children and children accompanied by their legal representatives in Mezhyivska and Novopavlivska hromadas (Censor 29/04/2025).


By April 2025, the changing dynamics had not yet resulted in either the large-scale unavailability of services and assistance for civilians or physical access constraints for humanitarians, although some constraints related to the remote nature of some villages were reported (KII 17/04/2025; KII 22/04/2025). The situation could continue to worsen in May–August, especially if Russian forces continue advancing in Donetska oblast towards

Dnipropetrovska's administrative border. For example, more than 75% of residents have left the villages of Mezhyivska, Novopavlivska, and Velykomykhailivska hromadas, all located within 20km of the approaching front line (Nashe Misto 13/02/2025). Continued escalation will likely significantly heighten humanitarian needs, restrict service provision, and further constrain access to affected communities.

Attacks on humanitarian responders: two attacks on humanitarian responders were publicly reported in January–April 2025, compared to none in the September–December 2024 period (ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025). A deteriorating security environment and increasing protection risks may lead to worsening humanitarian access, specifically in areas near the shifting front lines.

Damage to civilian infrastructure: Dnipropetrovska is the oblast with the second-highest level of new damage to civilian infrastructure (664 new damage incidents in January–April), after Donetska. Half of all new damage occurred in Nikopolskyi raion, reflecting the heavy shelling of the area. Throughout the oblast, most damage was done to industrial and business facilities, with likely knock-on effects on people's access to livelihoods (ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025).

Figure 5. Main damage per type of infrastructure in Dnipropetrovska oblast, Q1 2025 vs. Q4 2024



Source: ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025

Power and heating disruptions: Russian attacks on critical infrastructure resulted in disruptions to heating, electricity, and water supplies in Dnipropetrovsk's southern raions, namely Dniprovskiy, Nikopolskiy, Pavlohradskiy, and Synelnykivskiy (ACAPS accessed 30/04/2025). In February, for example, over 9,000 families in the oblast were left without electricity as a result of Russian shelling, while residents of Zelenodolska hromada faced heating issues with the potential to increase health and protection risks in winter months (Suspilne 13/02/2025 and 25/01/2025; Ukrinform 02/02/2025). Despite rapid repair, targeting of critical infrastructure could affect access to safe water, social services, and drive further displacement from eastern parts of the oblast.

METHODOLOGY

The data used in this report comes from publicly available and unpublished sources circulated within the response. The narrative presented is based on data analysis and a secondary data review. Access severity scores were calculated using oblast- and raion-level data collection of events related to access constraints. The collected access events are available in the [Ukraine hub humanitarian access events dashboard and dataset](#). ACAPS has predefined 75 event types and grouped them into 35 subindicators, nine indicators (I1–9), and three pillars (P1–3). Indicators receive a score between 0–3 and pillars receive a score between 0–5. The final access severity score is an average of the three pillar scores.

Pillar 1: access of people in need to humanitarian aid

- I1. Denial of existence of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance
- I2. Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance

Pillar 2: access of humanitarian organisations to people in need

- I3. Impediments to enter the country (bureaucratic and administrative)
- I4. Restriction of movement within the country (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions)
- I5. Interference into implementation of humanitarian activities
- I6. Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets

Pillar 3: physical, environmental, and security constraints

- I7. Insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance
- I8. Presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices, explosive remnants of war, and unexploded ordnance
- I9. Physical constraints in the environment (obstacles related to terrain, climate, lack of infrastructure, etc.)

More information on ACAPS's humanitarian events monitoring and access scoring system is available in [this methodology note](#). For Ukraine's oblast-level scoring, calculations were done on a continuous numerical scale instead of thresholds, allowing for decimals and a more nuanced result. The resulting scores were classified into the following groups:

- 0–1 low access constraints
- 1–2 moderate access constraints
- 2–3 high access constraints
- 3–4 very high access constraints
- 4–5 extreme access constraints.

Changes for raion-level access severity scoring

When applying the oblast-level model to raions, the following changes were made to the methodology.

- Only events logged at the raion level were taken into account, with the exception of subindicators S9.1, S9.3, and S9.4 (weather events, logistical constraints on consumable goods, and presence of remote locations), as information for these is mostly reported at the oblast level. For these subindicators, scores were taken from computing all entries in the oblast.
- Thresholds for scoring subindicators S7.1, S7.2, and S9.2 and indicator I6 were recalibrated to reflect the number of events at the raion level.
- I3 (impediments to enter the country) was not included when computing scores, as it is not relevant to the raion level.

Limitations

The analysis relies on publicly available data, which is unlikely to be comprehensive in a dynamic war situation such as Ukraine. Reported data may come with a delay, meaning some published data may no longer be applicable at the time of analysis. This analysis collected data through a review process to ensure that selected subindicators for a given oblast were still relevant. The evolving situation and amount of data collected mean that some inaccuracies will likely remain.

Detailed information is lacking on the humanitarian response and access constraints faced by humanitarians in Russian-occupied areas, including Crimea and Sevastopol.

As there is lower conflict intensity in Russian-occupied raions, raion-level access scores for such areas may be lower than expected. For these raions, P1 and P2 scores may be more accurate reflections of the actual access severity.