

### OVERVIEW

On 10 March 2025, the US Government announced its cancellation of more than 80% of all United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programmes globally. The announcement came only seven weeks into the 90-day pause and foreign aid review announced by executive order on 20 January 2025 (Reuters 10/03/2025; WH 20/01/2025).

US-funded aid, including humanitarian, development, and stabilisation assistance, was paused on 24 January, when the new US administration began sending stop-work orders (SWOs) to foreign aid recipients, including Ukrainian central and local governments, UN organisations, INGOs, national NGOs (NNGOs), and civil society organisations (CSOs), ordering them to suspend all US-funded activities (OSW 27/01/2025). A waiver ‘for lifesaving humanitarian assistance’ was announced on 28 January for some programme categories – including core lifesaving medicine, medical services, food, shelter, and subsistence assistance, as well as supplies and reasonable administrative costs to deliver such assistance – but has been ineffectively implemented and communicated (US DOS 28/01/2025). Some organisations already started receiving termination notices in late February. Some limited projects received notices that allowed them to continue working in late March (KII 25/02/2025; IRC 27/02/2025).

Ukraine has been among the top recipients of US foreign assistance since 2022, with overall support for the country’s humanitarian, development, and government sectors (excluding military assistance) reaching more than USD 38 billion (FTS accessed 11/03/2025; OIG 12/02/2025; ISAR Ednannia unpublished). The suspension of US foreign aid has had a sudden and disruptive impact on both the operational and programmatic aspects of humanitarian, development, and governance work in Ukraine. Most of this funding was committed through USAID, which has been present in Ukraine since 1992 and increased its support after Russia’s full-scale invasion

in February 2022. USAID provided critical assistance and support to the Ukrainian Government, allowing it to continue operations and provide public services. In addition, USAID-funded humanitarian programmes kept people safe and alive, while development and stabilisation aid has continued to fund an independent and free media, key infrastructure projects, and (to some degree) Ukraine’s agricultural capacities (Kyiv Independent 31/01/2025). The implications of the funding cuts on humanitarian, development, and government programmes are closely intertwined. With the majority of this funding now at risk, the impact of the suspension and cuts to US foreign assistance will likely generate critical gaps in service provision, which will translate into affected communities’ increasingly unmet basic needs, threatening both immediate humanitarian outcomes and the longer-term safety and wellbeing of millions of Ukrainians.

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## ABOUT THIS REPORT

This report provides an overview of the implications of the US foreign assistance freeze and subsequent cuts on Ukraine's humanitarian, development, and government programmes, with a focus on the impacts on humanitarian response capacity and affected communities. This report aims to support donor contingency planning and the advocacy efforts of affected organisations.


### Methodology

This report is based on analysis of primary data, including 23 key informant interviews with clusters, INGOs, NNGOs, and representatives of the Ukrainian Government; one focus group discussion with Ukrainian CSOs; a review of international and Ukrainian media sources, reports and briefings from humanitarian, development, and stabilisation responders, and public documents published by the US and Ukrainian authorities; analysis of primary data collected by clusters, working groups, and NGO coordination forums; and analysis of funding data from OCHA's Financial Tracking Service (FTS) and US government sources.

### Limitations

Data on the financial, operational, and programmatic impact of the US foreign assistance freeze and subsequent cuts remains fragmented and incomplete. This report was produced between February–March 2025, when the situation was still rapidly evolving. There are varying sources of information on the scale of US foreign assistance and significant information gaps on which funding has been affected by the freeze and cuts. Looking forward, the extent to which other donors will step in to fill emerging gaps remains unclear, as well as exactly how organisations and the response will re-prioritise remaining funding. This overall uncertainty is further compounded by limited information sharing, as USAID has imposed communication restrictions. Several NGOs flagged that USAID had directly prohibited them from discussing the scale and impact of the US funding freeze and cuts. In Ukraine, the uncertainty around the evolution of the war, the resulting scope and scale of humanitarian needs, and to what extent such needs can be met is aggravated by high-level political developments, particularly around future military aid from Ukraine's international allies and if and how negotiations to resolve the war progress.

Figure 1. Timeline



Source: ACAPS using data from WH 20/01/2025; NPR 24/01/2025; US DOS 28/01/2025; The Guardian 3/02/2025; Reuters 5/02/2025; The Guardian 1/03/2025; FT 04/03/2025; Reuters 10/03/2025.

## KEY FINDINGS

- The sudden and disruptive nature of the suspension and subsequent termination of the majority of US foreign assistance means considerable gaps in funding for humanitarian, development, and governance-related programmes across Ukraine. This will create a compounding cycle of increasingly unmet needs. While the overall scale of humanitarian funding is smaller compared to US budgetary and development support, it plays a critical role in addressing urgent gaps that the crisis-affected Government cannot fill. With the simultaneous reduction in government and development funding, government capacities will be further overstretched, forcing the Ukrainian authorities to seek additional support from humanitarian responders, whose own resources are also severely depleted. This cascading effect threatens both the immediate and long-term wellbeing of a significant number of Ukrainians.
- At the end of 2024, USAID operated 39 active humanitarian and development programmes in Ukraine, with a total budget of USD 4.28 billion. By late March 2025, only approximately USD 1.27 billion (30%) of these awards remained active. The biggest cuts have been reported in the development sector, affecting Ukraine's critical energy infrastructure projects, health system, economic recovery, media, and local governance and civil society.
- By 27 March, at least USD 322 million current and planned humanitarian funding had been confirmed suspended and at risk of termination, affecting around 3.5 million people in, predominantly, southern and eastern oblasts. US funding covered around 30% of all coordinated humanitarian funding plans in Ukraine in 2022, 2023, and 2024; as such, the cuts will have a drastic impact on the response's capacity to cover humanitarian needs in 2025.
- The US had already committed over USD 65 million to Ukraine's 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, constituting 14.5% of all funds committed by 30 March. Committed funds make up more than 55% of existing funding for the multipurpose cash assistance (MPCA) response, around 23% of existing funding for health response, and about 15% of existing funding for shelter response. The sectors where funding gaps are likely to be largest include WASH and MPCA – US contributions to both these sectors have reached or exceeded 40% of total reported contributions since 2022. That said, the funding freeze will likely affect all clusters and coordination mechanisms.
- All clusters, INGOs, and humanitarian and development-focused NNGOs interviewed for this report said they were directly affected by the suspension and subsequent termination of US funding. Uncertainty and/or funding cuts resulted in organisations proceeding with immediate layoffs, giving staff notice, putting staff on administrative or unpaid leave, and/or attempting to cover costs from other funding sources. Some organisations have had to reduce their workforce by as much as half. 25% of Ukrainian CSOs surveyed in February 2025 had been forced to reduce staff, 19% had put staff on unpaid leave, and 42% had been forced to suspend or partially close programmes because of the funding freeze.
- Unclear communication from USAID regarding the suspension and termination of programmes has resulted in incomplete information, creating uncertainty about the scale and impact of the US funding cuts. In some cases, this has resulted in programmes being pre-emptively suspended out of fear that outstanding payments and incurred costs will not be fully reimbursed, while other organisations have been forced to terminate staff contracts and projects, only to later have their terminations rescinded by USAID. The overall uncertainty is further compounded by the limited sharing of information resulting from USAID-imposed communication restrictions. This risk will be further aggravated by the reduction in assessment capacity, data collection, and monitoring observed across the response following the funding freeze and cuts.
- People living in frontline areas and areas most affected by the war will be particularly affected by the decreased capacity to support safe evacuations, which all expert interviewees underlined as the main anticipated gap. People living in temporarily occupied territories (TOTs) will also be particularly affected by the cuts, as USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) was one of the main donors funding assistance programmes in these areas.
- Some Ukrainian organisations that lost funding as a result of the USAID cuts continue to operate without additional funding, noting that they are driven by their mission and people's needs. That said, these organisations also noted that the funding freeze and cuts have had severe implications on their ability to pay rent, salaries, and buy equipment, restricting their ability to provide lifesaving assistance. In most cases, NNGOs anticipated that they will be unable to sustain their current level of operations beyond April–May 2025, and some of them are at risk of closing down, which directly threatens efforts to localise Ukraine's humanitarian response.

## IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN, DEVELOPMENT, AND GOVERNMENT FUNDING

Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the largest share of US foreign assistance funding (over USD 30 billion) was provided in the form of direct budget support to the Ukrainian Government, so that it could continue operations and provide public services. Development funding (over USD 5 billion) was invested in democracy, human rights, and governance-related programmes, economic development, critical infrastructure, and healthcare. Finally, over USD 3 billion was provided in humanitarian assistance, covering approximately 30% of Ukraine's humanitarian response costs between 2022 and the end of 2024 (FTS accessed 11/03/2025; OIG 12/02/2025; ISAR Ednannia unpublished; Kyiv Independent 31/01/2025).

USAID has been present in Ukraine since 1992 and invested considerable resources to support Ukraine's Government and civil society, providing social, humanitarian, technical, and financial assistance to both. At the end of 2024, USAID was operating 39 active programmes in Ukraine, with a total budget of USD 4.28 billion (ISAR Ednannia unpublished). These programmes fell into five key categories:

- democracy, human rights, and governance
- economic development
- critical infrastructure
- healthcare
- transition and humanitarian assistance.

By late March 2025, only approximately USD 1.27 billion (30%) of these awards remained active (USAID 24/03/2025). The sudden and disruptive nature of the suspension and subsequent termination of the majority of US foreign assistance programmes means considerable gaps in funding for humanitarian, development, and governance-related programmes across Ukraine (Kyiv Independent 31/01/2025; USAID 19/09/2024).

The implications of the funding cuts on humanitarian, development, and government programmes are closely intertwined. Although the scale of disruption to development and government sector funding remains unclear, it is likely to have considerable short and longer-term effects on Ukraine's capacity to deliver essential services while retaining high defence and security budgets. Resulting service gaps will be further aggravated by the cuts to humanitarian funding, decreasing humanitarian responders' capacity to cover these gaps and address increasing humanitarian needs.


## Humanitarian funding

According to the Office of the Inspector General, the US Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available USD 4.11 billion for humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since 2022 through the Department of State, USAID, and Department of Agriculture (OIG 12/02/2025). The FTS has tracked more than USD 3 billion provided to the humanitarian response since February 2022 through funds committed by USAID and the Department of State (FTS accessed 11/03/2025).

USAID's BHA supported the implementation of approximately USD 1.1 billion in active awards for humanitarian assistance in the first quarter of 2025 (OIG 12/02/2025). By the end of March, at least USD 322 million, likely more, was suspended and at risk of termination (KII 11/03/2025).

US funding covered around 30% of all coordinated humanitarian funding plans in Ukraine in 2022, 2023, and 2024. Despite Ukraine being one of the highest funded humanitarian responses globally, the US funding cuts will have a drastic impact on the response's capacity to cover humanitarian needs. Most of Ukraine's other main institutional donors have already announced planned global funding cuts, further undermining the possibility of substantial gap coverage by other donors (FTS accessed 11/03/2025; Chatham House 05/03/2025; Refugees International 19/12/2024).

Figure 2. Total humanitarian funding to Ukraine reported to FTS (in billion USD)




Source: ACAPS using data from FTS (accessed 27/03/2025)

The US had already committed over USD 65 million to Ukraine's 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, constituting 14.5% of all funds committed by 11 March. Committed funds make up more than 55% of existing funding for the MPCA response, around 23% of existing funding for health response, and about 15% of existing funding for shelter response (FTS accessed 11/03/2025). As of this report's writing, the current status of these funds remained unclear - many organisations have already received terminations, others were still awaiting them, and some terminations were getting rescinded, which makes it difficult to ascertain which funding will continue.

However, some organisations were allowed to continue their projects in late March and started to receive payments after a prolonged pause in disbursements, which were put on hold during the review process (KII 25/02/2025; NYT 12/02/2025). There is no openly accessible information regarding which humanitarian programmes will be allowed to continue and where, following the announcement that 83% of all USAID-funded programmes have been cut (AP 11/03/2025). Funding gaps for WASH and MPCA are likely to be the largest, as US contributions to these sectors have reached or exceeded 40% of total reported contributions since 2022 (FTS accessed 11/03/2025). That said, the funding freeze and subsequent cuts will likely affect all clusters and coordination mechanisms, profoundly affecting Ukraine's funding environment.

Figure 3. US funding contributions to most affected clusters in 2024, as reported to FTS



Source: ACAPS using data from FTS (accessed 27/03/2025)

## Cash

By the beginning of March 2025, MPCA activities were approximately 20% funded, with more than 55% of existing funds committed by the US (FTS accessed 07/03/2025). In the past, the US was the biggest contributor to cash assistance, with its estimated 2024 contribution reaching 56% (CWG unpublished; FTS accessed 07/03/2025).

## WASH

By the beginning of March 2025, WASH Cluster activities were under 2% funded, with no funding committed by the US. The WASH Cluster had already experienced significant funding gaps in 2024, with less than 30% of the target funding received by the end of the year. The US had committed more than 40% of this limited funding for the WASH Cluster in 2024 (FTS accessed 11/03/2025).

## Health

By the beginning of March 2025, Health Cluster activities were 27% funded. 23% of committed funds, however, were to come from the US and are at risk. In 2024, 16% of Health Cluster funding came from the US (OCHA 06/03/2025; FTS accessed 11/03/2025). Funding for Ukraine's health system and reforms had been terminated, further aggravating the gaps in the availability of health services (USAID 24/03/2025).

## Food security and livelihoods

In 2024, US funding accounted for about 27% of Ukraine's total funding for food security and livelihood assistance (FTS accessed 11/03/2025). While no US funding has been committed beyond March 2025, the suspension of agricultural and livelihood support, along with the decrease in cash for food programmes, is expected to severely affect the sector's capacity to deliver assistance (FTS accessed 11/03/2025; KII 04/03/2025 a; CWG unpublished).

## Protection

By the beginning of March 2025, Protection Cluster activities were funded at about 23%, with about 7% of funds committed by the US (FTS accessed 11/03/2025). In 2024, US-funded protection services reached 650,000 people. It is expected that at least as many people are at risk of not receiving critical protection services and assistance in 2025 (KII 07/03/2025 c). Programmes related to gender-based violence (GBV) and sexual and reproductive health and rights are most at risk of facing funding shortages.





## Shelter and NFIs

By the beginning of March 2025, Shelter Cluster activities were under 5% funded, with up to 15% of 2025 funding committed by the US. The Shelter Cluster already experienced a 50% funding gap in 2024, with about 15% of 2024 Shelter Cluster funding committed by the US (FTS accessed 11/03/2025).

## Camp coordination and camp management

By the beginning of March 2025, Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster activities were under 2% funded, with no funding committed by the US. The US also did not fund any CCCM Cluster activities in 2024 (FTS accessed 11/03/2025).

## Education

USAID had not committed any funding to humanitarian education activities for 2025. In 2024, only 1% of Education Cluster activities were funded by the US (FTS accessed 11/03/2025). The US did support the education system in Ukraine, however, through direct budget support to the Government and development programmes, which are now at risk of termination.

## US direct budget support to Ukraine

According to the Office of the Inspector General, the US Congress has appropriated more than USD 44 billion for governance and development programming in Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022.<sup>1</sup> By the end of December 2024, over USD 30 billion had been disbursed by USAID as direct budget support to the Ukrainian Government, predominantly through World Bank mechanisms (OIG 12/02/2025). The vast majority of direct US budget support funds have already been disbursed to Ukraine and are unlikely to be terminated (Ukraine Oversight accessed 18/03/2025). In the past, however, USAID has withheld the right to review or evaluate activities financed by World Bank funds (OIG 05/09/2024).

USAID's direct budget support was channelled through the World Bank and provided the Government of Ukraine with assistance for displaced people, school employee salaries, people with disabilities, civil servant salaries, low-income families, housing and utility subsidies, medical staff salaries, and first responder salaries (OIG 12/02/2025). The World Bank's Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance Fund received the largest US support, totalling approximately USD 27.5 billion, and remained the only mechanism still funded by USAID in 2024. The other mechanisms that received US support in 2022 were the 'Transfer Out' Single Donor Trust Fund (USD 1.7 billion) and Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Ukraine (USD 1 billion) (CRS 13/01/2025).

There is significant concern around the scale of US support for the Ukrainian Government moving forward, considering that USAID grants covered approximately 26% of external funding for Ukraine's state budget between 2022–2024 (MoF 25/02/2025). US direct budget support contributions amounted to almost 15% of Ukraine's state budget in 2024 (MoF 25/02/2025). The 2025 Ukrainian budget law adopted a budget totalling approximately USD 88 billion, with expected state revenues of approximately USD 49.3 billion (MoF 19/11/2024). Non-military expenditures were expected to be covered by other international donors (MoF 28/11/2024). If new US funding is not committed, this could lead to an increase in state debt or a significant disruption in state service provision (ISAR Ednannia unpublished).

## Development funding

Between 2022 and 2024, the US had allocated approximately USD 5 billion to various development-related projects across Ukraine (Le Monde 02/02/2025; ISAR Ednannia unpublished). USAID and the Department of State obligated at least USD 2.9 billion in development funding to Ukraine in 2025 (OIG 12/02/2025). This funding, which was supposed to cover economic growth activities, peace and security, democracy, human rights, and governance as well as support for the health system, education, and social services, may never be disbursed as a result of US foreign aid cuts. Remaining previously active awards are also at high risk of termination, as projects focused on energy infrastructure, health system support, e-governance, and legislative support have already been terminated (Interfax 13/03/2025; KII 18/03/2025; RCC 03/2025).

## IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

### Financial implications for humanitarian responders

All clusters, INGOs, and humanitarian and development-focused NNGOs interviewed for this report said they were directly affected by the suspension and subsequent termination of US funding. The scale of impact varied across responders, but according to surveys conducted by the NGO Platform and the Alliance of Ukrainian CSOs, more than 50% of NGOs received US funding, at an average rate of around 26% of organisational budgets. Notably, some survey respondents stated that up to 90% of their funding had been provided by the US Government and, as such, were forced to shut down (KII 03/03/2025; KII 09/03/2025; NGO Platform unpublished; Alliance UA CSO unpublished). Another survey of over 70 Ukrainian CSOs delivering both humanitarian and development projects, conducted during the funding freeze, showed that more than half of all CSOs had been directly affected but were actively adapting and seeking alternative funding. 34% said the freeze was catastrophic for civil society (Open Space Works 17/02/2025).

<sup>1</sup> USD 44.22 billion in funding for governance and development programmes was administered by the Department of State, USAID, Department of the Treasury, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, U.S. Agency for Global Media, and Export-Import Bank of the United States.

Both national and international organisations consulted for this report were equally concerned with their ability to adapt to the funding challenges. Some clusters raised concerns about NNGOs' narrowed donor base, while others said INGOs are more vulnerable because they are less agile, less able to adapt and find alternative funding. Interviewed organisations also flagged that US funding terminations coincide with the end of other donors' financial year, such as the European Commission and the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, resulting in terminations of multiple baseline funding projects at once (KII 07/03/2025 a; KII 05/03/2025 b). One interviewee underlined the cascading impact of the funding cuts on national and local NGOs, as although they are not usually funded directly by USAID, they still depend on US funding received through UN organisations and/or INGOs and, as such, are more vulnerable to multiple prioritisation cuts by primary grantees (KII 14/03/2025).

### Implications for humanitarian operations

By the end of March 2025, there was no comprehensive data on the scale of suspensions or terminations of humanitarian programmes. Data collection activities by clusters and other coordination bodies during the funding freeze suggest that 50% or more of respondents to the above-mentioned surveys were affected by US funding suspensions or terminations; there was only one cluster that registered lower-level impacts. The direct impact was reported on at least eight UN organisations, 22 INGOs, and 99 NNGOs (KII 11/03/2025; KII 03/03/2025; KII 05/03/2025 b; KII 04/03/2025 b; KII 05/03/2025 c; NGO Platform unpublished).

USAID's lack of clear and comprehensive communication has complicated assessment of the scale of programme suspensions and terminations. Most interviewees for this report noted a lack of clarity or missing information on the state of their awards; some organisations never received an initial SWO but received a waiver, others received a waiver only to have their award terminated after incurring additional programmatic costs, which may not be covered, and others suspended activities pre-emptively because of uncertainty around whether incurred costs would be reimbursed. In March 2025, some organisations reported that terminations they had previously received were rescinded after they were forced to end programmes and terminate staff contracts (KII 14/03/2025). Some NNGOs said they had not known their funding came from the US, as UN organisations or INGOs were their primary donors, acting as intermediaries (KII 05/03/2025 a; KII 05/03/2025 b; KII 06/03/2025 c).

The overall uncertainty is further compounded by the limited sharing of information resulting from USAID-imposed communication restrictions. Several NGOs flagged that USAID had directly prohibited them from discussing the scale and impact of the funding freeze and cuts. The communication ban was formulated in a very vague manner, but threatened grantees with personal and organisational sanctions at national and global levels. As a result of these sensitivities, other organisations and donors also requested to limit data collection and sharing (KII 14/03/2025; KII 26/02/2025).

### Impact on staff

By the end of March 2025, contract terminations had been widely reported across all types of humanitarian organisations. Uncertainty and/or funding cuts resulted in NGOs proceeding with immediate layoffs, giving staff notice, putting staff on administrative or unpaid leave, and/or attempting to cover costs from other funding sources (NGO Platform unpublished). One interviewee observed that some organisations have had to reduce their workforce by as much as half (KII 06/03/2025 a). In fact, most interviewees reported that the majority of US-funded organisations – UN organisations, INGOs, and NNGOs – have reduced their workforce.

Ukrainian NGOs have prioritised staff retention whenever possible, as staff are themselves often from affected communities and there are concerns about the loss of expertise and institutional knowledge. Several NNGOs reported that their staff have continued to come to work as usual despite layoffs or wages reduced up to 50%. That said, NNGOs underlined fears about increasing levels of poverty and debt among staff and said organisations will be unable to sustain contracts beyond April–May 2025 without additional donor support, undermining long-term service delivery (KII 26/02/2025; KII 05/03/2025 a; KII 05/03/2025 c).

Other implications likely to impede staff wellbeing and programme quality include recruitment freezes, the suspension of staff wellbeing programmes (such as mental health and psychosocial support services and health insurance), and capacity building and development opportunities (KII 06/03/2025 a; KII 06/03/2025 c; KII 17/03/2025).

### Impact on volunteers

Focus group participants noted that many Ukrainian CSOs and volunteers work on the front lines and in occupied territories, providing shelter to people fleeing insecurity and reconstructing schools and hospitals (FGD 10/03/2025). While volunteer-run services do not pay salaries, they require funding to provide volunteers with mental health support, pay rent for offices or centres, and conduct training sessions and workshops. One CSO working on the front lines said it had to suspend most of its programmes while searching for additional funding; in the meantime, the CSO was unable to provide its volunteers with much needed mental health and psychosocial support (FGD 10/03/2025; KII 17/03/2025).

### Impact on operational capacities

INGOs and NNGOs both reported that liquidity issues are impeding their ability to continue with procurement and cover expenses such as salaries, rent, cars, fuel, transportation, and administrative costs, resulting in challenges meeting their contractual obligations (Alliance UA CSOs unpublished; KII 25/02/2025; KII 05/03/2025 c; GIHA unpublished; NGO Platform unpublished). Many organisations reported facing logistical issues related to travel costs, limiting their ability to reach remote frontline areas (KII 14/03/2025; KII 05/03/2025 c). Some organisations said that liquidity issues may result in the closure of field offices, affecting capacity for future aid

delivery (KII 06/03/2025 a; NGO Platform unpublished). Others reported having to reduce monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning and human resources capacities, hindering their ability to monitor programme implementation and quality, ultimately affecting their ability to secure funding with other institutional donors (Alliance UA CSOs unpublished).

## Implications for coordination

### Cluster coordination

The coordination of the Ukraine humanitarian response has been significantly affected by funding cuts, staffing reductions, and restructuring efforts at both national and subnational levels. ACAPS interviewed five clusters and four working groups for this report, all of which have been affected, with at least two fully funded by the US before the USAID cuts (KII 03/03/2025; KII 05/03/2025 b). Almost all interviewed clusters and working groups reported losing NGO co-chairs or subnational coordination capacity. This included representatives of international and local NGOs, often those able to speak Ukrainian and successfully liaise with national and local NGOs and CSOs at the subnational level, posing significant risks to localisation efforts (KII 04/03/2025 b; KII 06/03/2025 a).

The funding cuts are very likely to affect existing discussions on changing the coordination of the Ukraine response. Prior to the freeze, there were already discussions about streamlining coordination at the subnational level through the creation of subnational operational coordination hubs (KII 11/03/2025). A few clusters raised concerns that the impact of US funding cuts and decreasing cluster capacity will fast track this process and reduce clusters' capacity and space to provide feedback, even leading to the deactivation of some clusters without appropriate consultation with existing coordination mechanisms.

### Data and information management (IM)

IM functions have been severely affected by the complete closure of iMMAP, which supported clusters through data management, analysis, and visualisation. All interviewed clusters had lost their IM capacities as a result of this closure, including data analysis and support for existing databases and data management systems. Although cluster and working group leading organisations have stepped in to fund some of these positions, key informants noted that there is still significant risk that clusters and working groups will have insufficient capacity to produce reliable data and inform strategic decisions (KII 13/03/2025 a; KII 06/03/2025 a; KII 03/03/2025). Several key informants observed that this risk will be further aggravated by the reduction in assessment capacity, data collection, and monitoring observed across the response following the funding freeze and cuts. The 2025 Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment has already been delayed and is likely to be much more limited in scope compared to last year (KII 13/03/2025 a; KII 18/03/2025).

## IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMING

The US has been supporting development and stabilisation programmes in Ukraine since 1992, including significant support for anti-corruption efforts, economic growth, peace and security, democracy, human rights, and governance (Kyiv Independent 31/01/2025; ePravda 29/01/2025; FGD 10/03/2025).

The US funding freeze and cuts risk severe implications for the Government (GoU), UN, and NGOs' capacity to deliver essential services and support infrastructure, energy, media, agriculture, and civil society strengthening projects (OSW 27/01/2025; Reuters 30/01/2025). USAID previously provided financial, technical, and capacity-building support to the Ukrainian authorities at the local, subnational, and national levels. Some governmental positions have already been terminated as a result of the US funding cuts (Pravda 07/02/2025; KII 18/03/2025).

### Programming to support economic growth

USAID's Economic Resilience Activity (ERA), which amounted to USD 325 million and supported the GoU to upgrade Ukraine's border crossings and facilitate economic growth and resilience in Ukraine, has been reportedly terminated (USAID 24/03/2025). Other US-funded projects on economic growth have typically included direct financing or technology for local businesses, especially in the agricultural sector, which makes up 60% of Ukraine's commodity exports. For instance, approximately 15,000 Ukrainian farmers have benefited from US assistance for fertiliser, seeds, and machinery (El Pais 11/02/2025; Kyiv Independent 31/01/2025). Following the funding freeze, some of these projects were suspended, and several significant grants supporting agriculture and small and medium-sized businesses have already been terminated (USAID 24/03/2025). USAID had also previously funded economic associations promoting regional businesses and supporting private sector development in frontline and recently liberated territories in Kharkivska and elsewhere. These projects included purchasing computers for schools, repairing or rebuilding bomb shelters, and providing generators to communities (Suspilne 31/01/2025). The immediate effect and longer-term impact of the funding cuts on these activities remain unknown.

### Programming to strengthen civil society

Prior to the freeze, US funding for CSOs primarily supported health programming, veterans services, media programming, and services for children and youth organisations, among others (ePravda 29/01/2025). A rapid analysis conducted by Open Space Works between 13–17 February 2025 found that 25% of Ukrainian CSOs had been forced to reduce staff, 19% had put staff on unpaid leave, and 42% had been forced to suspend or partially close programmes because of the funding freeze (Open Space Works 17/02/2025).



Several big USAID-funded projects supporting Ukrainian civil society, including the Ukraine Confidence Building Initiative, have been terminated. One of the main goal of this initiative was to enable civil society to respond to recovery and reintegration needs and strengthen social cohesion (USAID 24/03/2025; USAID 15/01/2025). The suspension of US-funded activities – such as healthcare and infrastructure – further stretches the capacities of CSOs, which now face reduced resources alongside escalating community needs (FGD 10/03/2025).

Some Ukrainian CSOs affected by the funding freeze and SWOs have been reluctant to crowd-source funding or fundraise within Ukraine because they feel strongly that donating to and supporting the war effort is more important. One focus group participant noted, “People who donate now will have to split their funding – for military, media campaigns, impact on people, and volunteers – but with less resources” (FGD 10/03/2025).

### Programming to support local governance and digitalisation

The USAID-funded HOVERLA project, which amounted to about USD 150 million in support of the increased transparency, accountability, accessibility, and social engagement of local governance in Ukraine, has been terminated (Decentralization accessed 26/03/2025; USAID 24/03/2025). An estimated one-third of Ukrainian GovTech projects, including the Diia platform and eRecovery, were also funded by USAID, and at least part of this funding has also been terminated, slowing down Ukraine’s digital transformation (ePravda 29/01/2025; DOU 28/01/2025). GovTech projects also included a focus on e-democracy, aiming to increase participation and transparency in governance and public life (Global Government Technology Centre accessed 17/03/2025). A US-funded project to develop an AI platform to identify corruption risks across the country is also at risk of termination. Without the project, anticorruption officers will lack the resources to tackle corruption as effectively (FGD 10/03/2025).

### Programming to support the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure

Prior to the funding freeze, USAID had provided support for Ukraine’s central and local governments to develop and/or rebuild critical infrastructure. US-funded activities included rebuilding damaged and destroyed buildings, providing industrial generators to supply damaged electrical grids, and cybersecurity for critical infrastructure and energy (ePravda 29/01/2025). Following the freeze and cuts, municipal governments will likely no longer receive critical supplies – such as mobile hot water tanks and other equipment – and will have to suspend US-funded community strategies and spatial development plans (El Pais 11/02/2025; Suspilne 29/01/2025 and 13/02/2025).

## Energy

The Ukraine Energy Security Project, which was funded by the US Department of State, and several other USAID-funded energy infrastructure projects have been terminated. The amount of terminated awards that were supposed to support Ukraine’s energy infrastructure exceeded USD 1 billion (USAID 24/03/2025; NBC 28/02/2025). Russian forces have systematically attacked Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, reducing its capacity to generate electricity and leading to temporary emergency and scheduled power outages, which are likely to continue or worsen following the funding cuts (OHCHR 17/02/2025; UNN 24/02/2025). The US had funded programmes to repair and rehabilitate Ukraine’s energy infrastructure by providing equipment, materials, and technical assistance to address the continued provision of basic services to Ukrainian citizens – including electricity, heat, and water – and strengthen the resilience of the grid (OIG 12/02/2025).

## Water

Water utility companies (Vodokanals) are bracing for a 20% loss in funding as a result of the USAID cuts, and humanitarian organisations have lost funding to continue providing chlorine supplies and technical support to Vodokanals in high-risk areas (WASH Cluster 14/02/2025). The WASH Cluster has noted that projects supporting water utility infrastructure are very expensive and unlikely to be covered by other donors (WASH Cluster 14/02/2025). Projects to modernise and repair hot water-based district heating infrastructure have also been stalled, jeopardising heat and electricity provision across the country (REACH 18/09/2024; WASH Cluster 14/02/2025).

## Health

USAID has provided support for the Ministry of Health to strengthen governance and continue providing healthcare services and analysis of the healthcare situation. US support for the National Health Services of Ukraine has already been affected by the funding freeze and cuts, and USAID projects supporting the reform of the health system have been terminated (USAID 24/03/2025). Ukraine’s health system has been heavily affected by the war, as there have been direct attacks on health facilities and infrastructure, power shortages, supply chain disruptions, and staff shortages (Rutgers 17/05/2024; Shkodina et al. 31/07/2022). 76% of healthcare facilities surveyed in March indicated reduced funding, although it is unclear how much of this reduction is a direct result of US funding cuts (RCC 03/2025; KII 05/03/2025 b). If USAID support for the Ministry of Health is significantly affected, this will have knock-on effects on the ministry’s capacity to support hospitals and other health facilities, pay staff salaries, and supply medications – especially in frontline areas (KII 05/03/2025 b). Large-scale and innovative MHPSS and rehabilitation programmes focused on transforming mental health and physical rehabilitation services and supporting long-term recovery were also partially USAID funded (Ти як accessed 12/03/2025; Superhumans accessed 12/03/2025; KII 05/03/2025 b). It is not clear if this funding has been terminated.

## Programming to support independent media

More than half of independent media outlets in Ukraine are at risk of closure following the USAID funding cuts, with regional media most affected (Suspilne 20/03/2025). Around 80% of Ukrainian media outlets have received US funding since 2022 (IMI 28/01/2025). While the amount of funding received from the US is unclear – sources suggest up to 50–80% – it is significant (NYT 28/01/2025; WP 07/02/2025; FGD 10/03/2025).

A significant amount of funding to Ukrainian independent media appears to have been cut, affecting people's access to accurate and reliable information about what is happening in Ukraine – both in occupied and unoccupied territories – likely leading to a rise in disinformation (WP 07/02/2025; RSF 14/10/2024). Some independent media have started online fundraising appeals in an attempt to bridge funding gaps, but many are unlikely to survive the cuts (El Pais 11/02/2025; The Guardian 29/01/2025; WP 07/02/2025).

Focus group participants noted that US funding cuts will worsen people's access to information, especially those in areas difficult to reach and news deserts. Participants also expressed concern that the cuts may provide Russia with the opportunity to purchase independent outlets or make media inroads of their own, which some participants feared may increase the risk of future election interference (FGD 10/03/2025).

Since the full-scale invasion, most media have become reliant on grants, including corruption investigative outlets “instrumental in scrutinizing power” (El Pais 11/02/2025; Kyiv Independent 31/01/2025; Peace Insight 27/02/2025; Suspilne 07/02/2025). Hundreds of Ukrainian media outlets have closed since the full-scale invasion, primarily those operating in oblasts closest to the front lines (IMI 19/11/2024; RSF 14/10/2024). Social media has since increasingly become the preferred news source and disinformation has proliferated. US-funded projects played an enormous role in countering this disinformation online (RSF 14/10/2024; FGD 10/03/2025; IMI 19/11/2024). Media – traditional and social – play an important role in anti-corruption efforts and promoting transparency, which feeds directly into strengthening democratic institutions (U4 13/05/2019). The funding cuts risk rolling back Ukrainian efforts since 2014 to address corruption, considered “the single biggest obstacle to successful development, creating economic inefficiencies and deterring investment” (prior to the full-scale invasion) (Chatham House 18/07/2023; IMF 04/04/2017).

## IMPLICATIONS FOR AFFECTED COMMUNITIES

The impact of the USAID suspension of humanitarian, development, and government programmes will likely create critical gaps in service provision, translating into communities' increasingly unmet basic needs. The scale of these gaps will only be fully understood when more data is available on which governmental, development, and humanitarian programmes have been terminated and how available funding has been reprioritised. One key informant provided examples of local governments' loss of funding for the provision of fuel to local hospitals and these authorities reaching out to humanitarian responders to fill the gaps; a challenge given the termination of humanitarian projects (KII 06/03/2025 c). While humanitarian responders could have previously been called upon to fill gaps in basic state services, funding cuts to the humanitarian response mean this is now less likely.

By the end of March 2025, efforts to coordinate a strategy on how to communicate the impact of the funding freeze and cuts to affected communities appeared to be very limited. While some organisations, predominantly NNGOs, have been communicating through social media channels, the vast majority indicated no coordination and very limited communication with communities (KII 12/03/2025; KII 14/03/2025). One NNGO reported receiving feedback from communities affected by the US funding cuts, indicating general feelings of abandonment and increasing hopelessness over lack of support (KII 14/03/2025).

### Anticipated intersectoral effects on communities

The intersectoral impacts of the freeze and subsequent cuts of US humanitarian, development, and government funding are anticipated to affect different groups and areas to varying extents, depending on how the available funding is reprioritised. The Government of Ukraine has already discussed filling some critical gaps resulting from the end of USAID-funded programmes with a focus on recovery, energy resilience, and defence projects (Pravda 07/02/2025). Based on the prioritisation discussions taking place on both the global and national levels of humanitarian coordination, the areas most likely to be prioritised are those with the highest intersectoral severity levels. In Ukraine, this is likely to mean primarily the frontline areas, with second priority given to areas affected by air attacks, evacuations, and IDP hosting (KII 11/03/2025; OCHA 10/03/2025). That said, critical needs are likely to remain across the country and be further compounded by unstable political and conflict situation, which is also aggravated by recent US policy developments, particularly the level of military support that has already been temporarily suspended by the new US administration (NYT 05/03/2025).

The following communities are at particular risk of facing considerable unmet basic needs as a result of the US funding cuts. The below is based on information currently available (at end of March 2025) and may change once the full implications of the funding cuts become clearer.

**People living in frontline areas and areas most affected by the war** will be particularly affected by the decreased capacity to physically reach these areas and support safe evacuations, which all NGOs interviewed for this report underlined as the main anticipated gap. Evacuation programmes, which have been affected by the funding cuts, support people to travel safely, find alternative shelter, and provide legal advice and cash assistance to facilitate evacuation. Without this assistance, people are more likely to stay in insecure areas, facing high protection risks. Support is also necessary in places people evacuate to, where reception services are often overwhelmed (for example, in Khmelnytska oblast) and are now at risk of being deprioritised (Alliance UA CSO unpublished; KII 05/03/2025 a; KII 05/03/2025 c; KII 09/03/2025).

**People living in TOTs** are likely to be particularly affected by US funding cuts, as USAID's BHA was one of the main donors funding assistance programmes in these areas. Key informants expressed concern that TOTs are likely to be deprioritised, as other donors have been hesitant to fund humanitarian projects in these areas, despite continuing conflict and severe access restrictions on services and assistance. Interviewees also noted that cuts in MPCA funding are likely to affect people in TOTs, as MPCA was a powerful motivator for people to evacuate and a response tool to reach people remotely. Given the reduction in US funding for MPCA, TOT residents are more likely to remain in insecure areas, facing precarious living conditions (KII 05/03/2025 c; KII 25/02/2025).

**New and protracted IDPs** are likely to be greatly affected, as both state social protection systems and humanitarian response capacity to respond to IDP needs have been affected by US funding cuts. IDPs living in collective sites, particularly older people, people with disabilities, and people with limited mobility, are likely to be most affected by the decrease in state and humanitarian assistance. One organisation expressed concern that "there will be no mechanism to provide assistance, they'll [IDPs in collective sites] be excluded from the national system, their needs won't be considered lifesaving either." This may trigger unsafe returns and the use of coping mechanisms with potential harmful effects (KII 06/03/2025 a; KII 06/03/2025 c).

**People with limited livelihood opportunities**, including older people, people with disabilities or low mobility, and unemployed people dependent on state assistance, will likely struggle to meet their basic needs. Reduced state and humanitarian cash assistance and the termination of livelihood programmes will aggravate economic vulnerability among these populations. Many employees of international, national, and local NGOs and CSOs, who themselves often belong to affected communities, will lose their jobs. This will increase unemployment and aggravate any reduction in state-funded social protection schemes. These combined factors will significantly reduce communities' ability to meet their basic needs, likely resulting in larger humanitarian caseloads and higher severity of needs among affected populations. Decreased access to MPCA, MHPSS, livelihoods, and general protection support will have a direct impact on community resilience (KII 07/03/2025 b; KII 06/03/2025 c; KII 26/02/2025).

**Veterans** have significant physical and mental health needs and require support for social and economic reintegration (FGD 10/03/2025). The Ukraine Veterans Fund, under the management of the Ministry of Veterans Affairs, runs a crisis and legal support hotline that was supported by IREX's Ukrainian Rapid Response Fund, which was suspended due to funding cuts. Although the Veterans Fund is continuing to operate its hotline while seeking alternative funding, another hotline supported by the Veteran Hub had to close because of the funding freeze (ZN 08/02/2025; IREX accessed 11/03/2025; The Guardian 29/01/2025). Other programmes supporting veterans, which were suspended and may have now been terminated, include support for people with disabilities, training, expert technical support, salary payments, mobile groups working in rural areas, and events facilitating dialogue between veterans, officials, and NGOs (ZN 08/02/2025; FGD 10/03/2025). This is likely to result in negative longer-term impacts, contributing to veterans' social and economic exclusion. Veteran communities are largest in the Dnipropetrovska oblast, but remote areas of Rivnenska and Volynska oblasts also risk being affected by responders' likely decreased capacity to deploy mobile teams to support veterans (KII 13/03/2025 b).

## Main anticipated gaps in humanitarian needs by sector

### Cash assistance

Multipurpose cash assistance (MPCA) has become widely used across Ukraine for meeting affected populations' basic needs and strengthening resilience to war-related and economic shocks. A REACH assessment found aid recipients to prefer this form of assistance over in-kind, service, and voucher assistance, especially households within 30km of the front lines and border regions (REACH 23/12/2024).

More than 715,000 people have been affected by cuts in US MPCA funding, jeopardising their ability to meet their basic needs (KII 11/03/2025). According to a survey by the CASH working group following the onset of the funding freeze, the oblasts most affected by the halt in MPCA operations are Donetsk, Kharkivska, Khersonska, and Mykolaiivska. The responding organisations also mentioned reduced capacity to implement the Emergency Rotation Mechanism, which is essential to speeding up coordination and response activities. This can be expected to rapidly and effectively reduce the aid sector's reactivity to target communities affected by sudden shocks in the coming months (CWG unpublished; OCHA 03/04/2024; KII 04/03/2025 a).

In 2025, USD 1.07 billion (or 39% of Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan requirements) was to be delivered through cash and voucher assistance (CVA) to 1.4 million people (OCHA 14/01/2025). The US accounted for more than 55% of incoming MPCA funds for 2025 reported through the FTS (FTS accessed 07/03/2025). The US funding freeze and cuts are likely to severely

affect the ability of those who would have otherwise received MPCA to meet their basic needs and access critical services. Decreased rapid MPCA will leave people less resilient to war and economic shocks, and those who are already more economically vulnerable – such as IDPs, returnees, people with disabilities, and older people – will struggle most if they lose access to MPCA, as will people living in areas difficult to access, close to the front lines, or in Russian-occupied territories (CWG unpublished). It remains uncertain whether the US administration will resume funding for cash programmes in the future or if other donors will increase MPCA funding (KII 04/03/2025 a; CALP Network 03/02/2025).

## WASH services

The suspension and termination of US funding is likely to disrupt the public service provision and humanitarian WASH activities planned for two million people in 2025, mostly in Ukraine's war-affected eastern and southern regions (WASH Cluster 14/02/2025; KII 03/03/2025). Most affected will be Dnipropetrovksa, Donetska, Kharkivska, Khersonska, Mykolaivska, and Zaporizka oblasts (KII 03/03/2025). These regions are highly reliant on external aid for reliable access to safe water, sanitation, heating, and hygiene essentials (WASH Cluster 14/02/2025). Preliminary data collected from 25% of WASH Cluster members found that at least 11 (45% of respondents) have been directly affected by the SWOs and funding cuts. 24% of respondents said that more than half of their WASH activities had been funded by USAID. By 3 March, the funding freeze and cuts were known to have disrupted WASH projects benefitting over 300,000 people, but this number is likely to be much higher (WASH Cluster 14/02/2025).

The main gaps resulting from the funding disruption involve the delivery of lifesaving WASH assistance, including: water tanks, water bottles, and hygiene kits; critical infrastructure projects (such as borehole installations and water treatment system repairs); disruption in modernising district heating in urban centres; and generator and fuel provision for essential WASH operations (WASH Cluster 14/02/2025; KII 03/03/2025). This will be aggravated by gaps in public service provision through Vodokanals which, according to the president of the Ukrainian Association of Water Supply and Sewerage Enterprises ("Ukrvodokanalekologia"), may have its humanitarian assistance reduced by 20% (KII 03/03/2025; WASH Cluster 14/02/2025).

Immediate consequences of the funding cuts have been reported in eastern oblasts, such as Donetska and Kharkivska, with major setbacks in well restoration, borehole installation, and water system maintenance, leaving residents without reliable access to water. In Khersonska oblast, the indefinite postponement of bottled water deliveries and reverse-osmosis system installations affected at least 32 healthcare facilities (WASH Cluster 14/02/2025). Any disruption to lifesaving WASH activities might leave people to resort to using surface water, which is often unclean and can lead to waterborne disease. Older people in frontline areas are particularly

vulnerable to disruptions in water trucking and dependent on WASH assistance and hygiene kits (KII 03/03/2025).

## Health services

1.8 million people are likely to be directly affected by the disruption to humanitarian medical services, with a further four million at risk of being indirectly affected by the disruption to the public healthcare system in crescent oblasts (KII 05/03/2025 b). 2 76% of medical facilities funded by the National Health Service of Ukraine surveyed by Relief Coordination Centre in Kharkivska in March 2025 reported that reduced funding had led to reductions in staff (in 50% of facilities) and the closure of medical programmes or departments (in 24% of facilities), indicating that state health services are likely affected by US funding cuts (RCC 03/2025).

Preliminary data collected by the Health Cluster shows that at least 23 of 29 (79%) member organisations have been directly affected by programme suspensions and cuts (KII 05/03/2025 b). Combined with the impact on the health system and disruptions in the Ministry of Health, this is likely to lead to reduced access to primary and secondary health services, especially in war-affected and de-occupied areas, which continue to be exposed to attacks on health facilities (KII 05/03/2025 b; RCC 03/2025). Key informants noted that rural areas largely dependent on costly mobile health teams are most at risk. Older people and people with disabilities in these areas are, in particular, highly dependent on emergency and mobile health assistance. Interviewees noted that MHPSS services, mobile health teams, non-emergency medical supplies and medicines, and rehabilitation care are likely to experience some of the most substantive gaps (Action Against Hunger 19/02/2025; KII 05/03/2025 b; KII 07/02/2025). Up to 87,000 children are at risk of not receiving MHPSS services, as such programmes were to be funded by USAID, threatening the longer-term resilience and wellbeing of the next generation of Ukrainians.

In the longer term, interviewees flagged an increased risk of disease outbreaks and localised epidemics (such as tuberculosis) leading to increased morbidity if the current disruption to vaccine and health-prevention programmes is not addressed. People reliant on insulin are also likely to face greater difficulty accessing medication. Women's and girls' access to sexual and reproductive health programming is likely to be impeded in locations previously covered by US funding, as the new US administration outlined the specific exclusion of this thematic area from funding waivers, leading to outright programming cuts (KII 05/03/2025 b).

In areas significantly damaged by the war, such as Izium, USAID had also been directly funding some health facilities, helping to restore medical services and provide training and equipment. This support has been suspended, despite communities' continued need for these services (Suspilne 13/02/2025).

2 'Crescent oblasts' refers to the areas near the border with Russia that are most affected by the war: Chernihivska, Donetska, Luhanska, Dnipropetrovska, Kharkivska, Khersonska, Mykolaivska, Odeska, Sumska, and Zaporizka oblasts.



The suspension of US funding may also have a critical impact on lifesaving treatment for HIV/AIDS, as supplies of antiretroviral medications have been (at least temporarily) paused (Suspilne 20/02/2025 and 13/02/2025). Insufficient medicine not only directly affects people living with HIV/AIDS, as there can also be severe impacts on HIV-infected mothers' ability to give birth to healthy children (Suspilne 20/02/2025). People living in remote areas, who could previously access free HIV medication from US-funded programmes, will now face limited access as the antiretroviral drugs availability and delivery has been disrupted (KII 05/03/2025 b; Suspilne 13/02/2025). USAID funds had also been used to purchase test systems and run detection programmes for viral hepatitis B and C, syphilis, and HIV, threatening longer-term sexual health outcomes (Suspilne 13/02/2025 and 15/02/2025).

## Protection services

US-funded protection services reached 650,000 people in 2024; in 2025, at least as many people are likely at risk of not receiving these critical protection services and assistance. State-funded social protection services have also been affected by the cuts, although the scale of the longer-term impact is unknown. Although there is no comprehensive data on the effects of the funding cuts on Protection Cluster members, at least ten international and national organisations are known to have been significantly affected and seven had to completely cease critical protection activities. Over 80% of Gender-Based Violence Area of Responsibility members and 20% of Mine Action Area of Responsibility members have been affected by the freeze and subsequent cuts (KII 07/03/2025 c).

For general protection, southern oblasts such as Khersonska, Mykolaivska, and Odeska are more likely to be affected by the cessation of activities resulting from the funding freeze and cuts, as there had been a strong presence of US-funded organisations in these areas. Western and central oblasts (Lvivska, Kirovohradska, Rivnenska, and Volynska) will also likely be affected, as there will be a prioritisation of higher severity areas. Western and central oblasts are known to host many IDPs and frequently receive evacuations, but their reception capacities will be affected by the disruption to funding. One key informant named Dnipropetrovska, Kharkivska, Mykolaivska, and Zaporiska oblasts as locations that face substantive cuts to child protection and GBV activities (KII C 07/03/2025).

By mid-March 2025, the main anticipated gaps in protection programming included activities in support of evacuations (case management, social accompaniment, and support for people with disabilities), protection monitoring, case management, GBV awareness raising, and legal assistance. Women- and child-friendly spaces had also been affected, with some having to close, and up to 500,000 people were at risk of not receiving necessary GBV response services alone (KII 07/03/2025 c; KII 11/03/2025; KII 05/03/2025 c).

Any US-funded activities related to gender, inclusion, or LGBTQ+ rights are likely to have been cut, as 93% of surveyed women-led and women's rights organisations have been forced to close at least one diversity, equity, and inclusion programme. Some organisations have removed language related to such programmes from their project design. The effect is likely to be dramatic, especially on women and girls living in the most war-affected regions in the east and south of Ukraine and LGBTQ+ communities in general, as access to dedicated services will be much more limited (UN Women 12/03/2025; KII 03/03/2025).

## Food security and livelihoods assistance

Access to livelihoods and (to a lesser extent) food security are already significantly affected by cuts to both humanitarian and development funding. According to a Food Security Cluster survey, livelihood assistance has been the intervention area most severely affected. Such assistance includes agriculture, livestock, and poultry support, leaving over 20,000 people without assistance, as well as off-farm livelihood programmes such as vocational education and training and support for small and medium-sized enterprises, which left over 15,000 people without assistance. Only 17% of responding organisations reported a direct or indirect effect on food distribution programmes, affecting approximately 3,500 people. Almost half (44%) the organisations that reported disruptions resulting from the funding freeze operate in war-affected regions of the east – Dnipropetrovska, Donetsk, Luhanska, Kharkivska, and Zaporizka – where food security and livelihood needs are critical. Food Security Cluster members also reported disruptions to cash for food programme activities, with 30% of responding organisations reporting challenges continuing cash for food programmes because of the funding cuts (Food Security Cluster 03/03/2025). It must be noted that these figures reflect only the information provided by the 43 responding organisations before the funding cuts were initiated. The actual number of affected food security and livelihood programmes is likely significantly higher (Food Security Cluster accessed 10/03/2025).

As funding declines and donors appear to already be prioritising reaching larger numbers of people with limited resources, communities in frontline and remote areas may face even greater challenges accessing food and livelihood assistance, as delivering support to these areas is often more costly and risky. Strained resources could lead to a reduced presence in and less data collection from remote areas, increasing the risk that more people in need may fall off the radar (KII 07/03/2025 d).

The funding freeze and cuts also threaten agricultural infrastructure support, such as the rehabilitation of irrigation systems, which were expected to be restored with US funding, further aggravating agricultural challenges (KII 07/03/2025 d). Reduced agricultural productivity in 2025 may induce some farmers to cultivate land contaminated by unexploded ordnance and mines to compensate for lost yields. This raises serious safety concerns, especially considering that some demining operations, which also rely on US funding, are on hold (KII 07/03/2025 d).



## Assistance to IDPs in collective sites

38,000 people living in 359 collective sites supported by CCCM Cluster members directly funded by USAID's BHA are very likely to be affected by the lack of services resulting from the US funding cuts. This effect could even extend to the up to 66,600 people living in the 939 sites across Ukraine, which are supported by either BHA-funded CCCM members or other organisations currently reprioritising their programmes in response to the changing funding environment. At least ten CCCM Cluster members out of 18 have been affected by the funding cuts (KII 04/03/2025 b). As the frontline areas are prioritised, collective sites in Ukraine's western oblasts are more likely to be deprioritised, despite receiving a lot of newly displaced people. Collective sites in crescent oblasts are also overwhelmed, but are more likely to receive additional funding or be supported by the Ukraine Humanitarian Fund as a result of their location, near the front lines.

Decreasing reception capacities and lack of support for services for people experiencing protracted displacement, such as NFI distribution and infrastructure repairs (e.g. replacing toilets and installation of ramps for people with disabilities), are expected to be the main gaps in CCCM Cluster programming. In Ukraine's centre and east, USAID has allowed some CCCM members to continue responding, but only to new displacements. As a result, protracted IDPs have been left with higher needs and mobility constraints, particularly older people and people with disabilities or limited mobility, but no access to necessary assistance. In the longer term, this could lead to increased returns to unsafe areas, including to TOTs and frontline areas (KII 04/03/2025 b).

## Shelter and NFIs

The suspension and termination of US funding is likely to disrupt shelter and NFI activities planned for at least one million people in 2025 (KII 13/03/2025 a; KII 11/03/2025). With the prioritisation of frontline areas and highest severity raions, the areas likely to see the highest service gaps include those between 100–200km from the front lines and the central, western, and northern oblasts likely to be deprioritised despite still requiring shelter and NFI support for IDPs living in collective sites or households affected by aerial attacks (KII 13/03/2025 a). Older people with limited mobility are likely to be the most affected by these gaps. One key informant noted, however, that there is increasing concern for families with no particular vulnerability factors but whose resilience has been gradually eroded by insufficient income and the protracted socioeconomic impact of the war. These families are not likely to qualify for shelter or NFI assistance in a climate of reduced funding, and may be left in precarious or unsafe living conditions (KII 13/03/2025 a).

Decreasing capacity for emergency response after aerial attacks is the most likely shelter and NFI gap to result from the funding freeze and cuts. Multiple Shelter Cluster members have been forced to suspend their emergency response activities as a result of the funding uncertainty, even after receiving waivers. One interviewee gave Sumska and Chernihivska oblasts as example of areas where existing capacity is unable to meet the scale of shelter and NFI needs. This key informant noted that the cluster's capacity to engage multiple organisations directly after a shelling or other aerial attack has been significantly affected, particularly if attacks happen on the weekend, as national and local NGOs forced to suspend operations as a result of the funding cuts were more able to quickly mobilise outside standard working hours (KII 13/03/2025 a). Reflecting the possible implications of the funding reductions, one interviewee observed that the recent attack on Dobropillia town in Donetsk oblast destroyed or heavily damaged at least eight five-story residential buildings, but the Shelter Cluster could not mobilise the capacity to respond to the needs (OHCHR 08/03/2025; KII 13/03/2025 a).

In the longer term, the same key informant noted that the US had previously provided significant support for the winterisation response, such as providing insulation for houses. The 2025–2026 winter response is now at risk of being underfunded, unless other donors fill the gap (KII 13/03/2025 a). Humanitarian shelter repairs, beyond the initial emergency response, are also likely to be one of the biggest gaps, particularly in deprioritised areas (KII 13/03/2025 a).