


MAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE BETWEEN 1 OCTOBER AND 31 DECEMBER 2024

- In the fourth quarter (Q4), the Russian army launched four missile and drone attacks against Ukraine's energy infrastructure, primarily targeting electrical facilities, thermal power plants, boiler stations heating civilian homes, and gas infrastructure. The attacks led to intermittent power loss and rolling blackouts, disrupting residential homes' and businesses' access to power, heating, and water. The attacks affected almost all oblasts, but scheduled power cuts occurred less frequently than expected but still averaged eight hours daily (Hromadske 25/12/2024; TKI 13/12/2024; OHCHR 26/12/2024; BBC 17/11/2024; Slovo i Dilo 17/11/2024; Suspilne 22/11/2024 and 04/12/2024).
- Reports of civilian infrastructure damage increased substantially throughout the country, particularly in Kharkivska, Khersonska, and Sumska oblasts. Such damage increased nearly tenfold in Odeska oblast, threefold in Kyivska and Mykolaivska oblasts, and twofold in Zaporizka oblast (ACAPS accessed 15/01/2025)
- Increased targeting of civilian infrastructure led to electricity, water, and heating disruptions, particularly in Donetskka, Kharkivska, and Sumska oblasts (UNIAN 08/01/2025; Suspilne 18/12/2024 and 07/11/2024; UNN 11/11/2024; RBC Ukraine 07/11/2024).
- Given heightened security concerns, humanitarian organisations had limited or no humanitarian access in parts of Donetskka and Kharkivska oblasts. In the former, aid delivery constraints were reported in Bahmutskiyi and Pokrovskiyi raions. In Kharkivska oblast, aid delivery and road travel became more constrained in Bohodukhivskiyi, Chuhuivskiyi, Iziurnskiyi, and Kupianskyyi raions (KII 24/01/2024; Korrespondent 06/11/2024; Glavcom 27/11/2024; Slovo i Dilo 06/11/2024; Bahmut 04/12/2024; Ukrainska Pravda 30/10/2024; Suspilne 14/10/2024; Aqlity 04/12/2024).
- Compared to Q3 (19 events), Q4 saw slightly fewer (13) publicly reported attacks on humanitarian responders and facilities that injured humanitarian employees and civilians and precluded humanitarian operations in Donetskka, Kharkivska, Khersonska, and Mykolaivska oblasts (ACAPS accessed 15/01/2025)
- Between October–December, the quickly advancing front line in the Pokrovsk city and nearby led to the announcement of mandatory evacuations for 211 children with their parents or other legal representatives from 28 settlements in Volnovaskyyi and Pokrovskyyi raions (Slovo i Dilo 17/12/2024; Suspilne 04/12/2024).

- The new Mobilisation Law, enacted in May 2024, continued to affect humanitarian operations and the provision of public services (e.g. water, gas, and public transport) to the civilian population by mobilising specialists employed in logistics, healthcare, public transportation, construction, and utilities (KII 23/01/2025; KII 28/01/2025 a; KII 27/01/2025; Telegraf 27/12/2024; Forbes 21/11/2024; Focus 28/11/2024; Interfax 04/10/2024).

Map 1. Humanitarian access severity at the oblast level by 31 December 2024



*Maps showing access severity at the raion level are available further in this report.

Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 31/12/2024)

ABOUT THIS REPORT

Aim

This report compares access challenges across Ukrainian oblasts and raions to inform humanitarian responders and support decision-making. It is part of the ACAPS quarterly analysis of access constraints, with the latest report published on 28 October 2024.

Methodology

This analysis is based on changes in the access severity model between 1 October and 31 December 2024. ACAPS developed these updates using data collected from secondary sources and five key informant interviews conducted in January 2024 with international and regional humanitarian responders.

The last section of this report provides a short description of the methodology. The complete methodology, access events dataset, and access severity model API are available on the [ACAPS Ukraine hub website](#).

This report contains the scoring and mapping of access constraints at the raion level. Scores were based on the application of ACAPS' subnational access model on the raion-level data collection of access events, with minor modifications.

Limitations


This analysis relies primarily on publicly available data, which is unlikely to be comprehensive because of the dynamic situation. Access severity scores at the raion level may be lower than expected in Russian-occupied territories owing to extremely limited response, fewer reported incidents, and lower conflict intensity.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Access trends in oblasts and raions facing the highest constraints	3
Donetska oblast	4
Kharkivska oblast.....	6
Khersonska oblast	9
Luhanska oblast.....	10
Sumska oblast.....	11
Zaporizka oblast.....	13
Main access developments at the national level	14
Attacks affecting humanitarian responders and facilities.....	14
Attacks on civilian infrastructure	15
Constraints for civilians in Russian-occupied territories	16
Conscription and new Mobilisation Law	16
Methodology	17
Changes for raion-level access severity scoring	17
Limitations	17


ACCESS TRENDS IN OBLASTS AND RAIONS FACING THE HIGHEST CONSTRAINTS

Map 2. Severity of restrictions to people's access to services and assistance by 31 December 2024




Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 31/12/2024)

Map 3. Severity of access constraints for humanitarians by 31 December 2024



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 31/12/2024)


Map 4. Severity of physical and security constraints across Ukraine by 31 December 2024



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 31/12/2024)

Donetska oblast

Map 5. Access severity at the raion level in Donetska oblast by 31 December



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 31/12/2024)

Table 1. Access severity at the raion level in Donetska oblast by 31 December 2024

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Bakhmutskyi	5.0	3.3	1.8	3.4
Donetskyi	3.5	3.9	1.3	2.9
Horlivskyi	3.5	3.3	1.7	2.8
Kalmiushkyi	3.5	3.3	1.0	2.6
Kramatorskyi	5.0	5.0	4.0	4.7
Mariupolskyi	5.0	3.3	1.9	3.4
Pokrovskyi	5.0	5.0	3.2	4.4
Volnovaskyi	5.0	3.3	2.3	3.6

*A lack of physical response in Russian-occupied territories, where fewer incidents are reported, may have led to lower-than-expected scores.

- **Access severity score trend since Q3 of 2024:** deterioration across all raions, with the highest in Bakhmutskyi, Mariupolskyi, and Volnovaskyi
- **Raions with the highest numbers of events:** Bakhmutskyi, Kramatorskyi, and Pokrovskyi raions
- **Most recurrent access event:** physical prevention of the use of services or assistance

Advancing front lines led to the closure of essential services, increased attacks on humanitarian responders, and deteriorated humanitarian access, particularly in Bakhmutskyi, Kramatorskyi, and Pokrovskyi raions. These raions suffered high levels of armed clashes while also experiencing the highest levels of air, drone, and shelling attack incidents among all Donetska raions (ACLEDA accessed 15/01/2024).

From October–December 2024, the Russian military advanced much faster than in the whole of 2023, securing substantial territorial gains in Ukraine amounting to approximately 1,700km² by the end of December 2024, with most captured territories in Donetska oblast (France 24 31/12/2024; Reuters 26/11/2024). The gains accelerated in October (610km²), peaked in November (725km²), and slightly declined in December (465km²) (France 24 31/12/2024). During Q4, the Russian army captured Vuhledar and approached the suburbs of Chasiv Yar and Toretz (Bakhmutskyi raion), Kurakhove (Kramatorskyi raion), and Pokrovsk (Pokrovskyi raion) (Suspilne 31/12/2024 and 29/11/2024; 24 Kanal 04/12/2024; Ukrainska Pravda 12/11/2024).

Access constraints

In Q4, access to frontline territories was constrained and required prior authorisation from the oblast military administration. In particular, unlike in Q3, it was virtually impossible to deliver humanitarian aid to civilians in Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Toretsk given the quickly advancing front line and the constant presence of first-person view (FPV) drone, air, and rocket attacks in the area (KII 28/01/2025 a; Suspilne 18/12/2024; Korrespondent 06/11/2024; Glavcom 27/11/2024; Slovo i Dilo 06/11/2024; Bahmut 04/12/2024). Until the end of December, approximately 300 civilians remained in Kurakhove, about 200 in Toretsk, and around 180 in Chasiv Yar (UNIAN 08/01/2025; Suspilne 18/12/2024).

Closure of essential services

Russian air, rocket, and shelling attacks suspended several healthcare, postal, and financial services in several localities in Donetsk oblast. One key informant reported that closures affected healthcare facilities more owing to damage resulting from the worsened security situation. Some medical departments and their staff were relocated to other regions. For instance, several dialysis departments were relocated to Kirovohradska oblast. Community members also had to travel to Kharkivska or Dnipropetrovska oblast to receive prenatal or similar medical services (KII 28/01/2025 a).

Since 1 October, the maternity ward of the oblast's multidisciplinary intensive care hospital has stopped working in Kostiantynivka city, leaving the government-controlled areas of the oblast with only one remaining maternity ward (KII 28/01/2025 a; Suspilne 03/10/2024). On 25 October, several postal services had to be indefinitely suspended in Pokrovskyi raion (UNN 25/10/2024). In December, regional authorities decided to suspend gas distribution in some settlements close to the front line, such as Pokrovsk (Ukrinform 04/12/2024).

Access to water

Access to drinking water deteriorated with frequent Russian shelling damaging water supply systems across the oblast, particularly in localities such as Druzhkivka, Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, and neighbouring settlements, which have a total population of around 260,000 (UNN 11/11/2024; Fakty 12/11/2024; Suspilne 08/10/2024).

The Russian army's recent destruction of two Vody Donbasu utility company facilities led to water supply shortages for the north of Donetsk oblast. In October, subnational authorities announced plans regarding the drilling of wells in the above settlements, including Dobropillia, to help overcome the water shortage issues, although without providing details on the timeline (Suspilne 08/10/2024).


Extensive curfews

In October, the 20-hour curfew (15:00–11:00) was extended across settlements in Kostiantynivska and Illinivska hromadas in light of the quickly approaching front line. During this month, shops and other public services were non-operational, further limiting people's access to basic services (Suspilne 02/10/2024). The curfew had already been in effect in other settlements of these hromadas since Q3 (LB 10/08/2024).

High level of civilian infrastructure damage

The overall newly reported damage to civilian infrastructure slightly decreased in Q4 compared to Q3 (366 vs 424). Despite the general reduction, critical infrastructure such as gas supply, education, and health facilities experienced increased damage in Q4 compared to Q3. Kramatorskyi and Pokrovskyi raions had the highest numbers of incidents (246 and 80, respectively), mainly affecting government, commercial, and electrical facilities (ACAPS accessed 15/01/2024)

Figure 1. Main damage per type of infrastructure in Donetsk oblast, Q4 vs Q3 2024



Source: ACAPS (accessed 15/01/2025)

Mandatory evacuations

In response to the quickly advancing front line, evacuation trains carried residents of Donetsk oblast to Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovska oblast (Donetsk Regional State Administration 02/11/2024). In isolated cases, civilians were evacuated from frontline cities such as Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, Myrnohrad, and Toretsk (NV 27/11/2024). One key informant mentioned the particular issue of evacuating older people and people with low mobility from frontline areas given a lack of adequate infrastructure facilities to meet their needs (KII 28/01/2025 a).

In turn, between November–December, regional authorities decided to mandatorily evacuate minors with at least one guardian from 44 settlements in Volnovaskyi and Pokrovsk raions (Glavcom 14/11/2024; Slovo i Dilo 17/12/2024; Suspilne 04/12/2024). In some of these settlements (e.g. Kurakhove), many residents refused to evacuate despite lacking food, water, and medical care (NV 27/11/2024; Comments.ua 28/11/2024). One key informant refused to evacuate as they were unwilling to leave their livestock and pets, which they found problematic to transport (KII 28/01/2025 a).

Kharkivska oblast

Map 6. Access severity at the raion level in Kharkivska oblast by 31 December



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 31/12/2024)

- **Access severity score trend since Q3 of 2024:** deterioration in Bohodukhivskiy, Iziumskiy, and Kharkivskiy raions
- **Raions with the highest numbers of events:** Bohodukhivskiy, Kharkivskiy, and Kupianskiy raions
- **Most recurrent access event:** physical prevention of the use of services or assistance

The intensified Russian offensive, featuring combined air, drone, and shelling attacks in close proximity to Borova, Kupiansk, and Vovchansk settlements, aggravated the security situation. As a result, travel and aid delivery to some settlements worsened in Bohodukhivskiy, Chuhuivskiy, and Kupianskiy raions (KII 24/01/2025; Suspilne 14/11/2024).

Overall, five settlements in the north (Hlyboke, Kozacha Lopan, Lyptsi, Starytsia, and Vovchansk) and five in the east (Hlushkivka, Holubivka, Kupiansk, Lozova, and Zahryzove) accounted for almost one-third of the armed clashes reported in the oblast (ACLED accessed 15/01/2025).



Table 2. Access severity at the raion level in Kharkivska oblast by 31 December

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Bohodudivskyi	1.5	1.7	2.7	2.0
Chuhuivskyi	3.5	3.9	3.3	3.6
Iziumskyi	4.0	3.3	2.5	3.3
Kharkivskyi	2.0	3.0	3.8	2.9
Krasnohradskyi	0	0.5	0.9	0.5
Kupianskyi	3.5	4.4	2.9	3.6
Lozivskyi	0	0	1	0.3

*A lack of physical response in Russian-occupied territories, where fewer incidents are reported, may have led to lower-than-expected scores.

Between October–December, the Russian army continued its attempts to advance in the Vovchansk city and nearby in Chuhuivskyi raion from the north and towards Kupiansk city (Kupianskyi raion) and Borova settlement (Iziumskyi raion) from the east (Slovo i Dilo 19/12/2024; Rubryka 04/12/2024; 24 Kanal 09/12/2024). While the Russian army could not advance in the north, by stepping up attacks around Vovchansk, Starytsia (Chuhuivskyi raion), and Hlyboke (Kharkivskyi raion), they managed to capture more territories in the areas surrounding Kupiansk city in east Kharkivska oblast (Censor.net 15/12/2024; ISW 31/12/2024; Reuters 14/11/2024). From November–December, Russian troops continued active ground combat efforts by advancing near Holubivka and Hlushkivka from both sides of Kupiansk, which appeared to be aimed at encircling and capturing the city (RBC Ukraine 01/11/2024). On 14 November, a small Russian assault group managed to reach the outskirts of Kupiansk but was neutralised by the Ukrainian army (Reuters 14/11/2024).

Simultaneously, since the end of November 2024, Russians have stepped up their efforts in Iziumskyi raion to advance towards Borova from Zahryzove and Lozova (Lozova raion) to entirely cut Ukrainian military logistics between the cities of Kupiansk and Borova. This would also allow them to advance to Izium city, another strategic hub of the Ukrainian military. In December, the Russian army was located approximately 14km from Borova (Espresso 04/12/2024). On 15 December, Russian troops managed to capture part of Dvorichna, Dvorichanskyi raion, and advanced in the village of Lozova in the direction of Borova (ISW 15/12/2024).


Humanitarian access constraints

humanitarian access worsened in several hromadas in the oblast given the intensive artillery shelling and aerial bombs that came with the advancing front line. While in Vovchanska hromada, Chuhuivskyi raion, organisations could not reach settlements close to the front line and border, it was possible to access settlements within the 5–10km zone from the border across Zolochivska hromada in Bohodudivskyi raion, but only with special permission. In turn, since December, the worsened security situation has heavily constrained access to all humanitarian organisations in Kupianska and Kurylivska hromadas in Kupianskyi raion. In Dvorichanska and Kindrashivska hromadas in Kupianskyi raion, humanitarian organisations did not have access to some localities given constant shelling and the risk of being hit by FPV drones (KII 24/01/2025).

In Borivska hromada, Iziumskyi raion, structural damage and muddy conditions made roads heading to villages such as Nyzhche Solone, Nyzhnia Zuravka, and Pidlyman passable only by van or entirely unpassable. Access to Pidlyman and Maliivka villages was also constrained by the approaching front line, which was only 25km to these localities by the end of December, 10km closer than in October (Aqlity 04/12/2024).

Damage to civilian infrastructure: newly reported damage to civilian infrastructure increased in Q4 compared to Q3 (236 vs 191), affecting Bohodudivskyi, Kharkivskyi, and Kupianskyi raions the most (52, 18, and 140 damage incidents, respectively) (ACAPS accessed 15/01/2025). The impact of several Russian air and rocket attacks on critical energy infrastructure led to several blackouts in Kharkiv city and neighbouring settlements in these raions and regular power outages in the oblast lasting for several hours daily, depending on the locality (Energy-UA accessed 29/01/2025; ACAPS accessed 15/01/2025; Ukrinform 13/12/2024; RBC Ukraine 14/11/2024; Suspilne 28/11/2024).

Figure 2. Main damage per type of infrastructure in Kharkivska oblast, Q4 vs Q3 2024



Source: ACAPS accessed 15/01/2025)

Access to healthcare

With the worsening security situation, healthcare facilities and pharmacies in Borova and Novoplatonivka settlements became less equipped (KII 24/01/2025; Aqlity 21/11/2024). In Pisky-Radkivski, there were no paramedics and medication prescriptions available, likely owing to the discontinuation of the mobile pharmacy service in the settlement (Aqlity 21/11/2024).

Heating season delays

As a result of active hostilities and infrastructure damage, settlements in eight hromadas – Dvorichanska, Kindrashivska, Kupianska, Kurylivska, Petropavlivska, Vilkhuvatska (Kupianskyi raion), Vovchanska (Chuhuivskyi raion), and Lypetska (Kharkivskyi raion) hromadas – were unable to start the heating season on time (Suspilne 07/11/2024). By the end of December, following large-scale attacks, the heat supply was still being restored in Kharkiv city and across Kharkivska oblast, with 85,000 customers in the city and 27,000 in the oblast remaining without heat (UNN 28/12/2024 and 25/12/2024; Glavcom 25/12/2024; RBC 29/12/2024).


Mandatory evacuations

Between October–December, the Defence Council of Kharkivska oblast ordered several waves of mandatory evacuations of adults and minors with at least one guardian from Borivska, Kupianska, and Vovchanska hromadas (Kharkivska ODA 20/11/2024; Reinform 02/12/2024; InfoCity 16/10/2024). Approximately 9,000 people were subject to evacuation from the settlements of Kupianska hromada given the decreased pace of evacuations caused by Russian attacks on the nearby crossing via the Oskil River (Espresso 23/10/2024).

On 11 November, subnational authorities announced the mandatory evacuation of adults from ten settlements in Borivska hromada. Until early December, 2,000 civilians were still awaiting evacuation (Dumka 03/12/2024; Espresso 11/11/2024).

Khersonska oblast

Map 7. Access severity at the raion level in Khersonska oblast by 31 December



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 31/12/2024)

- **Access severity score trend since Q3 of 2024:** deterioration in Henicheskyyi and Skadovskiyi raions
- **Raions with the highest numbers of events:** Beryslavskiyi and Khersonskiyi raions
- **Most recurrent access events:** unexploded ordnance; physical prevention of the use of services or assistance

Compared to Q3 (690 incidents), there was a 44% increase in Q4 (995) in the number of Russian shelling attack incidents in a 20km zone on the right bank of the Dnipro River and in Kherson city, leading to civilian infrastructure damage and four casualties among humanitarians (ACLEd accessed 16/01/2025; Radio Svoboda 30/11/2024; Ukrinform 02/12/2024; BBC 31/10/2024). In particular, Khersonska hromada experienced a substantial increase in air, drone, and shelling attack incidents in Q4 vs Q3 (365 vs 317) while accounting for nearly one-third of such incidents in Q4 in the oblast (ACLEd accessed 16/01/2025).

Table 3. Access severity at the raion level in Khersonska oblast by 31 December

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Beryslavskiyi	0	2.5	3.3	1.9
Henicheskyyi	3.5	3.3	1.4	2.8
Kakhovskiyi	3.5	3.3	2.6	3.2
Khersonskiyi	5	5	3.9	4.6
Skadovskiyi	5	3.3	1.8	3.2

*A lack of physical response in Russian-occupied territories, where fewer incidents are reported, may have led to lower-than-expected scores.


Access constraints

One interviewed INGO reported that in response to intensive shelling, rocket, and drone attacks, humanitarian responders were banned entry into Kherson city in December by local authorities. In light of the worsened security situation, the interviewed organisation also had to cancel 12 humanitarian missions across the oblast (KII 28/01/2025 b).

Damage to civilian infrastructure

There was a substantial increase in recorded civilian infrastructure damage in Q4 compared to Q3, with the highest damage to industrial, energy, healthcare, and education facilities (ACAPS accessed 15/01/2024). Khersonskiyi raion accounted for most incidents (107), resulting in frequent blackouts in Kherson city and neighbouring settlements (RBC Ukraine 30/11/2024 and 28/11/2024; Slovo i Dilo 28/11/2024). In December, Russian drone attacks on public transport suspended trips from Kherson to Antonivka, Kindiyka, and Skhidne in Dniprovskiyi raion, with several other routes shortened (Suspilne 02/12/2024). In several instances, Russian shelling also suspended public electric transport in the oblast (Suspilne 15/10/2024).


Figure 3. Main damage per type of infrastructure in Khersonska oblast, Q4 vs Q3 2024



Source: ACAPS (accessed 15/01/2025)

Luhanska oblast

Map 8. Access severity at the raion level in Luhanska oblast by 31 December



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 31/12/2024)

- **Access severity score trend since Q3 of 2024:** slight decline across most raions
- **Raions with the highest number of events:** Rovenkivskiy raion
- **Most recurrent access event:** constrained access to humanitarian assistance and services

Most of Luhanska oblast remained occupied, with Russian-installed authorities preventing residents from using the internet across some settlements and limiting reporting on incidents affecting humanitarian access (Ukrainska Pravda 29/12/2024; Telegraf 30/11/2024). Since October, Russian forces have focused on conducting ground attacks with infantry units to capture Bilohorivka in Siverskodonetskiy raion, the only remaining Ukraine-controlled city in the oblast, as its capture could pave the way towards conducting a ground offensive in Siversk and then towards Sloviansk in Donetsk oblast and Izium in Kharkivska oblast (GlavRed 11/10/2024; Fakty 15/11/2024; ArmyInform 07/11/2024).

Table 4. Access severity at the raion level in Luhanska oblast by 31 December

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Alchevskiyi	5	3.3	1.1	3.2
Dovzhanskyi	5	3.3	1.1	3.2
Luhanskyi	5	3.3	1.1	3.2
Rovenkivskyi	5	3.3	1.1	3.2
Shchastynskyi	5	3.3	1.1	3.2
Sievierodonetskyi	5	3.3	1.6	3.3
Starobilskyi	5	3.3	1.1	3.2
Svativskyi	5	3.3	1.9	3.4

*A lack of physical response in Russian-occupied territories, where fewer incidents are reported, may lead to lower-than-expected scores.


In Q4, nearly half of all armed clashes in the oblast occurred around Hrekiivka and Makiivka villages in Krasnorichenska hromada (130 out of 285), located on the border with Kharkivska oblast where the Russian army is pushing towards Lozove (around 30km away) to cut Ukraine's logistics along the Oskil River (ACLEd accessed 16/01/2025).

Delayed heating season

According to Ukrainian authorities, from October–November, Russian-installed authorities delayed providing heating to residential buildings across the Russian-occupied territories of Luhanska oblast for an indefinite time (Ukrinform 28/11/2024; Hromadske 27/10/2024).

Sumska oblast

Map 9. Access severity at the raion level in Sumska oblast by 31 December



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 31/12/2024)

- **Access severity score trend since Q3 of 2024:** overall, slight improvement across all raions
- **Raions with the highest numbers of events:** Konotopskiyi, Shostkynskiyi, and Sumskiyi raions
- **Most recurrent access event:** physical prevention of the use of services or assistance

In Q4, after Ukraine's incursion into Russia's Kursk oblast in August, the number of Russian shelling attack incidents decreased by 31% in Sumaska oblast compared to Q3. At the same time, while there was a slight decrease (11%) in the overall number of air and drone attacks in the oblast, the Russian army targeted energy systems, water supplies, and mobile communication infrastructure in Okhtyrskiyi, Shostkynskiyi, and Sumskiyi raions, leading to additional mandatory evacuations (Glavcom 03/12/2024; Interfax 04/12/2024; Suspilne 05/12/2024). In particular, Bilopilska and Khotinska hromadas in Sumskiyi raion, Esmanska hromada in Shostkynskiyi raion, and Velykopisarivska hromada in Okhtyrskiyi raion accounted for over half of all shelling, air, and drone attack incidents in Q4 (ACLEd accessed 15/01/2025). One interviewed national NGO (NNGO) mentioned that there were continued FPV drone attacks against humanitarians in Q4, with cases of drones attacking cars travelling along rural roads, even those with visible humanitarian logos. Those on evacuation missions could only go up to 20km from the frontline area given such security risks (KII 27/01/2025).

Mandatory evacuations

in Q4, continued shelling and air attacks led the oblast military administration to announce the additional mandatory evacuation of approximately 500 minors with at least one guardian from 101 settlements across Sumskiyi and Konotopskiyi raions (Suspilne 09/10/2024 and 21/11/2024). Some residents did not want to leave their homes to harvest crops and food supplies. There were also cases of residents partially returning to Mezenivka, Slavhorod, and Velyka Pysarivka in the oblast (Suspilne 01/12/2024).


Increased civilian infrastructure damage

from October–December, Russian troops stepped up their shelling and air and missile attacks, increasing the amount of civilian infrastructure damage incidents compared to the previous quarter (148 vs 104). Shostkynskiyi and Sumskiyi raions were the most affected, with 54 and 60 instances, respectively (ACAPS accessed 15/01/2024).

Damage to critical energy infrastructure persisted in Q4, leading to regular power outages in the oblast. Following several Russian air and rocket attacks on critical energy infrastructure, Sumy and neighbouring settlements experienced several blackouts that often lasted up to 12 hours between October–December (Glavcom 02/11/2024; EPravda 04/11/2024; RBC Ukraine 07/11/2024; Suspilne 17/11/2024).

Drone, rocket, and shelling attacks on settlements (e.g. Shostka and Sumy) across the oblast also disrupted the heating supply for approximately 300,000 people (RBC Ukraine 12/11/2024; SumyToday 30/10/2024).


Figure 4. Main damage per type of infrastructure in Sumaska oblast, Q4 vs Q3 2024



Source: ACAPS (accessed 15/01/2025)

Zaporizka oblast

Map 10. Access severity at the raion level in Zaporizka oblast by 31 December



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 31/12/2024)

Table 6. Access severity at the raion level in Zaporizka oblast by 31 December

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Berdianskyi	5.0	3.3	0.9	3.1
Melitopolskyi	5.0	3.3	0.7	3.0
Polohivskyi	5.0	3.9	2.3	3.7
Vasylivskyi	5.0	3.3	2.2	3.5
Zaporizkyi	2.0	1.4	3.6	2.3


- **Access severity score trend since Q3 of 2024:** deterioration in Berdianskyi, Polohivskyi, and Zaporizkyi raions
- **Raions with the highest numbers of events:** Berdianskyi, Vasylivskyi, and Zaporizkyi
- **Most recurrent access events:** physical prevention of the use of services or assistance; general impediments to movement to and within the area

In Q4, while the front lines remained static, there was a substantial increase in Russian air and drone attack incidents targeting critical infrastructure. Zaporizka oblast experienced a 28% increase in Russian air and drone attack incidents in Q4 vs Q3, which primarily damaged industrial, energy, heating, and water facilities (ACLED accessed 15/01/2025; Suspilne 17/11/2024; RBC Ukraine 16/11/2024; LB 23/11/2024). Nearly two-thirds of these attacks took place in Orikhivska (134), Huliaipilska (97), Malynivska (96), and Stepnohirska (93) hromadas (ACLED accessed 15/01/2025).

Since November, Russian infantry units have carried out assaults and reconnaissance by combat, trying to identify weak spots in Ukraine's defence lines and pave the way to advancing towards Zaporizhzhia in Zaporizkyi raion, currently located 30km from the front lines (LB 25/11/2024; ZN.UA 23/10/2024). In particular, since October, the Russian army has focused its ground offensive efforts on capturing the town of Orikhiv and controlling the logistical routes from Zaporizhzhia city to eastern Ukraine (Suspilne 05/12/2024). Over two-thirds of armed clashes occurred in and around settlements in Malotokmachanska, Malynivska, Orikhivska, and Tokmatska hromadas (ACLED accessed 15/01/2025).

That said, by the end of December 2024, Russian ground troops had not moved forward, likely because they were focused on pushing into Donetsk oblast (FBC 08/01/2025; TSN 10/01/2025).

Figure 5. Main damage per type of infrastructure in Zaporizka oblast, Q4 vs Q3 2024



Source: ACAPS (accessed 15/01/2025)

Accommodation issues

One interviewed NNGO mentioned that, with the deteriorated security situation, one-third of dormitories serving as temporary accommodation points for approximately 4,000 displaced people required some form of repair (e.g. for roof damage). Accommodating and accessing people with low mobility remained challenging given insufficient resources and equipment to support them (KII 23/01/2025).

Access constraints

Constant air and rocket bombings by the Russian army caused several hromadas to become either partially or wholly inaccessible to humanitarian responders. In particular, bombings heavily constrained access to Stepanivska and Hylapilska hromadas and completely blocked off Malatokmachanska and Malynivska hromadas. The supply of chemical and hygiene products also remained problematic in these hromadas (KII 23/01/2025).

Access to education

In Komysheuvaska and Novooleksandrivska hromadas, children were unable to go to schools, which were not equipped with proper bomb shelters. As an alternative, they had to travel to either study online or attend properly equipped schools in nearby hromadas (KII 23/01/2025).

Access to healthcare

In some settlements, a lack of medicine and personnel, alongside health facility damage or destruction, hindered healthcare access (KII 23/01/2025).

MAIN ACCESS DEVELOPMENTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Attacks affecting humanitarian responders and facilities

The number of publicly reported attacks affecting humanitarian responders was slightly lower between October–December (13) than from July–September (19 incidents). Incidents primarily occurred near frontline or border areas in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts (ACAPS accessed 25/01/2025).

Donetska oblast

The number of publicly reported attacks that affected humanitarians was slightly higher in Q4 vs Q3 (4 vs 3). Between October–December, there were several cases of Russian armed forces targeting humanitarian facilities and humanitarians with FPV drones, leading to one death and three injuries among humanitarian staff. Most incidents were reported in Pokrovskiy raion (Zmina 23/10/2024 and 04/11/2024; Real Gazeta 07/10/2024; Suspilne 04/12/2024).

Kharkivska oblast

The number of publicly reported attacks affecting humanitarians was substantially lower in Q4 vs Q3 (1 vs 6). Overall, there was one publicly reported case of the Russian army using an FPV drone to attack humanitarian facilities and staff in Chuhuivskiy raion, resulting in one injury (Radio Svoboda 08/11/2024). One interviewed NNGO mentioned several attacks on evacuation crews in the frontline hromadas, necessitating humanitarian organisations to provide alternative safe routes when possible (KII 24/01/2024).

Khersonska oblast

The number of publicly reported attacks affecting humanitarian staff was lower in Q4 vs Q3 (4 vs 9). Between October–December, several cases of shelling incidents were reported in Kherson city and Khersonskiy raion, leading to one death and three injuries among humanitarian staff (Suspilne 05/12/2024 and 01/12/2024; Espresso 14/10/2024; ZN.UA 20/11/2024). On 14 October, Russian shelling damaged the Red Cross Ukraine office building's windows and three organisations' vehicles (Espresso 14/10/2024).

Zaporizka oblast

In Q4, one publicly reported attack affected humanitarian staff in Orikhiv. A Russian drone attacked a truck belonging to a charitable organisation in the city, disrupting aid distribution but leading to no casualties (Suspilne 09/12/2024).

Mykolaivska oblast

On 25 November, Russian forces attacked Solonchaky in Kutsurubka hromada with an FPV drone during an aid distribution, injuring five people, including both humanitarian responders and residents (Zmina 25/11/2024).

Attacks on civilian infrastructure

In Q4, Russian forces maintained high levels of air and shelling attacks, damaging civilian infrastructure, causing civilian casualties, and disrupting the provision of utilities across the country.


From November–December, the Russian army conducted several waves of large-scale attacks, combining various types of missiles and drones to target electricity generation and transmission facilities, particularly thermal power plants and boiler stations providing heating to civilian homes (TKI 13/12/2024; OHCHR 26/12/2024; Suspilne 17/11/2024). Following these attacks, a series of emergency power cuts were introduced throughout the country. These cuts interrupted the supply of heat and water, particularly in the most attacked cities, such as Kyiv and Odesa, and in Dnipropetrovska, Donetsk, and Kyivska oblasts (OHCHR 26/12/2024; BBC 17/11/2024; Slovo i Dilo 17/11/2024; Suspilne 22/11/2024 and 17/11/2024). Nearly all oblasts were affected, but scheduled power cuts were fewer than expected, lasting from mid-November to the end of December (DiXi Group 02/01/2025).

Following a large-scale attack on 25 December, rolling outages lasted four or more hours and continued in many parts of the country, including Kyiv (OHCHR 26/12/2024). There were also substantial heat supply interruptions across the country. Residents of Kharkivska oblast suffered the most, with approximately 500,000 subscribers left without heat (UNN 25/12/2024).

Dnipropetrovska oblast, although not directly on the front lines, maintained the highest amount of new civilian infrastructure damage, with Nikopolskyi (327), Kryvorizkyi (104), and Dniprovskiyi (33) raions suffering the most damage. Donetsk oblast also experienced a substantial amount of new civilian infrastructure damage, affecting Kramatorskyi (246), Pokrovskyi (80), and Bakhmutskyi (16) raions the most (ACAPS accessed 15/01/2025).

At the same time, Kharkivska, Kyivska, Mykolaivska, and Sumska oblasts and Kyiv City also experienced a substantial increase in new damage to civilian infrastructure compared to the July–September period. Odeska oblast experienced a nearly tenfold increase in such damage in Q4 vs Q3, with most damage incidents occurring in Odeskyi raion (ACAPS accessed 15/01/2025).

Figure 6. Change in newly reported damage to civilian infrastructure between July–September and October–December 2024 in the most affected oblasts



Source: ACAPS (accessed 15/01/2025)

Constraints for civilians in Russian-occupied territories

Russian authorities continued restricting civilian access to essential services between October–December.

Conscription:

According to Ukrainian authorities, Russian-installed authorities launched the first large-scale conscription of male residents (approximately 1,000) in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine in October 2024. They carried out the conscription in occupied territory, mainly those occupied since 2022 (Hromadske 19/11/2024). According to Ukrainian authorities, Ukrainians who had received Russian passports were obliged to register for military service. Failure to do so could result in different punitive measures, such as arrest, revocation of citizenship, and a ban on leaving occupied territory (Suspilne 02/10/2024).

Access to water

Constraints to accessing water continued to be reported in Russian-occupied territories, with many water sources such as reservoirs, rivers, and ponds particularly drying up in Zaporizka and Kherson oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as a consequence of prior military activities (Investigator 02/11/2024). In occupied Berdiansk and nearby settlements in Zaporizka oblast, the water supply problem worsened substantially. Residents only had access to technical water from the local reservoir, which had limited resources (Suspilne 02/10/2024).

Communications constraints

In December, Russia restricted access to Viber and announced plans to halt access to WhatsApp beginning January 2025 in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine (Hromadske 26/12/2024; Suspilne 16/12/2024). In December 2024, widespread issues with internet access were reported in Russian-occupied territories, such as Berdiansk in Zaporizka oblast (Suspilne 19/12/2024).

Power outages

Damage to power lines caused blackouts that affected approximately 200,000 civilians in the Russian-occupied territories of Zaporizka and Khersonska oblasts (5 Kanal 27/11/2024; Suspilne 30/11/2024). In Berdiansk, this situation led to water and heat supply interruptions in some microdistricts (BRD 27/11/2024).

Access to healthcare

According to Ukrainian authorities, Russian-installed authorities decided to reduce the number of emergency medical service employees in Russian-occupied parts of Donetsk oblast, leading to deteriorated access to medical services in Q4 (24 Kanal 04/12/2024). In particular, access to laboratory and diagnostic services and facilities was reported to be even more limited in settlements within 30km of the front line, particularly in the Russian-occupied territories of Khersonska and Zaporizka oblasts (REACH 02/01/2025). This situation was complicated by the requirement to obtain Russian citizenship by 1 January 2025 to access medical care and other social benefits (NV 12/12/2024; REACH 02/01/2025).

Shortages of medical specialists and ambulances were reported, particularly in larger cities such as Siverskodonetskyi and Luhansk (Tribun 04/12/2024). According to Ukrainian authorities, in December, 51% of the positions in emergency medical aid and disaster medicine services were vacant (Artem Lysogor Luhansk Telegram 02/12/2024). The shortage of personnel in field hospitals, particularly highly specialised doctors, led to longer queues and the inability to help people in need (Ukrinform 28/11/2024).

Conscription and new Mobilisation Law

The new Mobilisation Law, enacted in May 2024, has continued to affect humanitarian operations and the provision of public services to the civilian population.

Two key informants pointed out that some men of conscription age and their families refused to evacuate for fear of mobilisation in Kharkivska oblast (KII 24/01/2025; KII 12/11/2024). One interviewed NGO mentioned that the mobilisation of men of conscription age affected their activities, which mainly involved clearing up rubble after Russian rocket and shelling attacks and renovating accommodation facilities (KII 23/01/2025). Two NGOs mentioned several cases where men of conscription age performing evacuation and other humanitarian activities were mobilised (KII 28/01/2025 a; KII 27/01/2025).

Mobilisation also affected the provision of public services to the civilian population. Between October–December, the law continued the trend of mobilisation for multiple specialists employed across critical economic segments (e.g. logistics, healthcare, public transportation, construction, and utilities), affecting the provision of essential services such as water, public transport, sewage, and gas (Forbes 21/11/2024; Focus 28/11/2024; Interfax 04/10/2024).

METHODOLOGY

The data used in this report came from publicly available and unpublished sources circulated within the response. The narrative presented was based on data analysis and a secondary data review. Access severity scores were calculated using the oblast- and raion-level data collection of events related to access constraints. The collected access events are available in the [Ukraine hub humanitarian access events dashboard and dataset](#). ACAPS has predefined 75 event types and grouped them into 35 subindicators, nine indicators (I1–9), and three pillars (P1–3). The indicators receive a score between 0–3, and the pillars receive a score between 0–5. The final access severity score is an average of the three pillar scores.

Pillar 1: access of people in need to humanitarian aid

- I1. Denial of existence of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance
- I2. Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance

Pillar 2: access of humanitarian organisations to people in need

- I3. Impediments to enter the country (bureaucratic and administrative)
- I4. Restriction of movement within the country (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions)
- I5. Interference into implementation of humanitarian activities
- I6. Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets

Pillar 3: physical, environmental, and security constraints

- I7. Insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance
- I8. Presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices, explosive remnants of war, and unexploded ordnance
- I9. Physical constraints in the environment (obstacles related to terrain, climate, lack of infrastructure, etc.)

More information on ACAPS' humanitarian events monitoring and access scoring system is available in [this methodology note](#). For Ukraine's oblast-level scoring, calculations were done on a continuous numerical scale instead of thresholds, allowing for decimals and a more nuanced result. The resulting scores were classified into the following groups:

- 0–1 low access constraints
- 1–2 moderate access constraints
- 2–3 high access constraints
- 3–4 very high access constraints
- 4–5 extreme access constraints.

Changes for raion-level access severity scoring

When applying the oblast-level model to raions, the following changes were made to the methodology.

- Only events logged at the raion level were taken into account, with the exception of subindicators S9.1, S9.3, and S9.4, as information for these is mostly reported at the oblast level. For these subindicators, scores were taken from computing all entries in the oblast.
- Thresholds for scoring subindicators S7.1, S7.2, and S9.2 and indicator I6 were recalibrated to reflect the number of events at the raion level.
- I3 (impediments to enter the country) was not included when computing scores, as it is not relevant to the raion level.

Limitations

The analysis relies on publicly available data, which is unlikely to be comprehensive in a dynamic war situation such as Ukraine. Reported data may come with a delay, meaning some published data may no longer be applicable at the time of analysis. This analysis collected data through a review process to ensure that selected subindicators for a given oblast were still relevant. The evolving situation and amount of data collected mean that some inaccuracies will likely remain.

Detailed information is lacking on the humanitarian response and access constraints that humanitarians face in Russian-occupied areas, including Crimea and Sevastopol.

As there is lower conflict intensity in Russian-occupied raions, raion-level access scores for such areas may be lower than expected. For these raions, P1 and P2 scores may be more accurate reflections of the actual access severity.