


MAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE BETWEEN 1 JANUARY AND 31 MARCH 2024

- Increased targeting of critical infrastructure led to electricity disruptions in many of Ukraine's oblasts (OCHA 26/03/2024).
- On 22 March, an attack damaged the Dnipro hydroelectric power plant, the country's largest. The damage will take several years to repair (Kyiv Independent 25/03/2024). While there is no risk of flooding, the attack further affected Ukraine's electric grid (Ukrhydroenergo 22/03/2024; Zmina 23/03/2024).
- Shifting front lines in Donetsk are constraining humanitarian responders' ability to reach communities (OCHA 20/03/2024). The number of monthly air and drone strikes on Ocheretynska hromada more than doubled in February (97) and March (93) compared to January (42) (ACLEDA accessed 15/04/2024).
- In response to increased shelling in Sumska border areas, authorities have encouraged civilians to evacuate and are requiring the evacuation of minors in three settlements. As at 15 March, more than 4,500 people, including over 800 children, had evacuated from border areas (Ukrainska Pravda 15/03/2024). Humanitarian operations near the border face a comparable risk to those near the front lines (KII 15/04/2024).
- Authorities in Khersonska now require prior notification from international organisations planning to access 52 communities along the right bank of the Dnipro River. Oblast authorities remain in charge of granting or refusing access depending on the security situation (KII 01/04/2024; KII 05/04/2024).
- Landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) casualties increased in March, highlighting the continued threat to civilians and humanitarians (ACLEDA accessed 15/04/2024).
- Kharkivska saw a 131% increase in damage to civilian infrastructure between the fourth quarter (Q4) 2023 and Q1 2024 (ACAPS accessed 15/04/2024).
- According to Ukrainian authorities, access to medical care in Russian-occupied territories has been further restricted for those not holding Russian passports (Kyiv Independent 22/01/2024).
- First-person view (FPV) drone attacks on humanitarian vehicles, at least three between January–March 2024, renewed debates around policies of visibility for humanitarian operations near the front lines (Ukrainska Pravda 26/01/2024; RFI 20/02/2024; Radio Svoboda 26/03/2024; KII 05/04/2024).

Map 1. Battles, shelling, air strikes, and violence against civilians between January–March 2024



Source: ACLEDA (accessed 15/04/2024)

See full map on page 11.

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ABOUT THIS REPORT

Aim

This report compares access challenges across Ukrainian oblasts in order to provide information for humanitarian responders and support decision-making. This report is part of ACAPS's quarterly analysis of access constraints, with the last report published on 6 February 2023.

Methodology

This analysis is based on changes in the access severity model between **1 January and 31 March 2024**, which ACAPS developed using data collected from secondary sources and four interviews with international humanitarian responders conducted between 1–10 April 2024.

A short description of the methodology is available in the last section of this report. The complete methodology, access events dataset, and access severity model API are available on the [ACAPS Ukraine Hub website](#).

Limitations

This analysis relies primarily on publicly available data, which is unlikely to be comprehensive because of the dynamic conflict situation.

For this quarterly update, the thematic section will be published as its own separate report and cover duty of care and mitigation strategies in front line areas.

MAIN ACCESS DEVELOPMENTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Attacks on humanitarian responders

Attacks on humanitarian responders remained similar in number between January–March 2024 and October–December 2023. In January–March 2024, at least nine incidents were reported and a high-profile attack on INGO staff in Beryslav led to additional permit requirements in Khersonska. There were also at least three attacks on humanitarian vehicles by FPV drones, renewing debates around policies of visibility for humanitarian operations near the front lines (Ukrainska Pravda 26/01/2024; RFI 20/02/2024; Radio Svoboda 26/03/2024; KII 05/04/2024).

Khersonska: Following the 1 February incident in Beryslav in which two aid workers were killed and four injured, humanitarian responders' access to 53 settlements along the right bank of the Dnipro River now requires advance notice to oblast authorities (Office of the Prosecutor General Telegram 01/02/2024; Ukrinform 16/02/2024; OCHA 15/03/2024). On 26 March, a vehicle carrying humanitarian aid was attacked by two FPV drones in Odradokamianka, with no reported injuries (Radio Svoboda 26/03/2024). Attacks on humanitarian infrastructure – such as modular IDP shelters and local humanitarian aid storage and distribution points – were reported in Beryslav, Novooleksandrivka, and Tiahynska (Mind 06/01/2024; Suspilne 16/01/2024; Ukrinform 19/02/2024 and 23/03/2024).

Donetska: On 26 January, an aid worker was injured in Chasiv Yar when their vehicle – with visible humanitarian markings – was targeted by an FPV drone, and an IDP shelter in Kostiantynivka was destroyed in a separate incident (Ukrainska Pravda 26/01/2024; Suspilne 24/03/2024).

Kharkivska: On 17 January, a school serving as a humanitarian aid distribution point was destroyed in Chuhuiv (Suspilne 18/01/2024).

Escalation of attacks in Sumaska

Between January–March 2024, the security situation along the Russian border deteriorated, causing increased damage to civilian infrastructure and disruption to utility provision (OCHA 19/03/2024). The number of shelling and airstrikes in the oblast increased from 296 in January to 414 in March, and humanitarian operations near the border faced risks comparable to those along the front lines (ACLEDA accessed 15/04/2024; KII 01/04/2024).

Such escalating attacks have led the authorities to organise evacuations. As at 15 March,

more than 4,500 people, including over 800 children, had evacuated from areas near the Russian border (Ukrainska Pravda 15/03/2024).

Mandatory evacuations

Between January–March 2024, Ukrainian authorities called for the mandatory evacuation of minors, accompanied by at least one parent or legal guardian, from areas severely affected by conflict and shelling.

Donetska: On 29 January, Ukrainian authorities announced the mandatory evacuation of 73 minors and 62 family members from Marinska and Ocheretynska hromadas (MRTOT 29/01/2024). On 7 March, 28 minors from four settlements in Kurakhivska hromada were called for mandatory evacuation (Suspilne 07/03/2024).

Kharkivska: On 16 January, oblast authorities announced the mandatory evacuation of minors from 21 settlements in Kindrativska hromada and five settlements in Kurylivska hromada, where over 3,000 civilians, including 279 children, remained (Kharkiv OMA 16/01/2024). On 7 March, the mandatory evacuation of minors came into force for 18 settlements in the Velykoburlutska and Vilkhuvatska hromadas (Suspilne 07/03/2024).

Khersonska: As at 14 January, no new mandatory evacuation of minors had been ordered in the oblast, but 114 children remained in settlements under prior mandatory evacuation orders (MOST 14/01/2024). Between 29 January and 21 March, 13 children were evacuated from those settlements (MOST 20/03/2024).

Sumaska: On 23 March, authorities announced the mandatory evacuation of 54 minors remaining in three settlements in Shostkynskyi raion, despite escalating attacks (Ukrinform 23/03/2024).

Targeting of civilian infrastructure

In January–March 2024, Ukraine came under increasing air and shelling attacks by Russian forces, damaging civilian infrastructure, causing civilian casualties, and disrupting utility provision (France 24 08/01/2024; OCHA 05/04/2024). Escalations in March were focused on critical energy infrastructure, disrupting people's access to electricity (KII 01/04/2024; OCHA 26/03/2024). By the end of March, scheduled or emergency power outages resulting from conflict damage had been reported in Dnipropetrovska, Donetska, Kharkivska, Khersonska, Kirovohradska, Odeska, Poltavska, Sumaska, and Zaporizka (Ukrinform 26/03/2024 and 29/03/2024; Zmina 31/03/2024).

In January–March 2024, Donetsk, Kharkivska, and Sumska saw a notable increase in new damage to civilian infrastructure as compared to the October–December 2023 period. Dnipropetrovska, although not directly on the front lines, remained the oblast with the second highest new civilian infrastructure damage, mostly (71%) in Nikopolskyi raion (ACAPS accessed 15/04/2024). Such attacks disrupted electricity and water provision in the oblast (OCHA 22/03/2024).

Figure 1. Change in newly reported damage to civilian infrastructure between October–December 2023 and January–March 2024 in oblasts most affected



Source: ACAPS accessed 15/04/2024

Landmines and UXO

Following decreases in November (24), December (19), and January (16), the number of landmine and UXO incidents involving civilians increased in February (18) and March (36) 2024. Donetsk, Kharkivska, Khersonska, Luhanska, and Mykolaivska were most affected (ACLEED accessed 15/04/2024). A similar seasonal trend was observed in February–March 2023, indicating that this increase could be linked to renewed agricultural, gardening, and other activities that put people at risk in contaminated areas (ACLEED accessed 15/04/2024). Despite this seasonal increase, the number of recorded landmine and UXO incidents affecting civilians in January–March 2024 (70) remained significantly lower than in the same period last year (140) (ACLEED accessed 15/04/2024). Landmines and UXO continued to impede movement and agricultural activities, particularly in rural areas (ACAPS 24/01/2024).

Renewed Russian air attacks also led to the presence of UXO in areas far from current or former front lines (Ukrinform 05/03/2024; Suspilne 05/03/2023 and 11/03/2024; DSNS 16/03/2024).

Winter weather

Between January–March 2024, environmental constraints decreased with the end of the winter season; by March, no winter-related service disruptions were being reported. In January, however, and to a lesser extent in February, extreme winter weather caused a number of service disruptions. Chernihivska, Dnipropetrovska, Kirovohradska, and Mykolaivska were particularly affected (Ukrinform 08/01/2024, 12/01/2024 and 11/02/2024; MEU 09/01/2024). On 8–9 January, the biggest disruption occurred, as 1,025 settlements in Dnipropetrovska, Kirovohradska, Mykolaivska, and Odeska lost power as a result of high winds and ice on powerlines (MEU 09/01/2024). Longer disruptions were reported in Russian-occupied areas of Luhanska (Ukrinform 14/02/2024).

Russian passport requirements


Since 1 January, Russian passport requirements in Russian-occupied territories appear to have further constrained civilians' access to services, particularly medical care. According to Ukrainian authorities, only those with Russian insurance, which requires a Russian passport, have access to non-emergency medical services (National Resistance Center 21/01/2024; Zmina 28/01/2024). Access to other forms of assistance, such as gas cylinders, coal, social benefits, and humanitarian aid, was also constrained for those not holding Russian passports (National Resistance Center 17/01/2024; Radio Svoboda 12/01/2024).

Border protests

On 9 February, Polish farmers resumed their demonstrations – protesting the relaxation of tariffs and quotas on Ukrainian agricultural products transiting via EU countries – at Polish-Ukrainian border crossing points (Censor 27/03/2024; Kyiv Post 28/03/2024; NYT 20/02/2024). Protesters vowed to allow critical and humanitarian cargo through unimpeded and, as at 31 March, no impact on the transport of humanitarian goods had been reported (Ukrainska Pravda 20/02/2024; OCHA 15/03/2024; KII 01/04/2024; KII 05/04/2024). Prolonged blockage of commercial cargo at the border may, over time, lead to difficulties in local procurement of commercially imported goods.

ACCESS TRENDS IN OBLASTS FACING THE HIGHEST CONSTRAINTS

Map 2. Humanitarian access severity for oblasts with the highest access constraints as at 31 March



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (21/03/2024). See full map on page 12.

Table 1. Humanitarian access severity scores for oblasts with the highest access constraints

OBLAST	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Donetska	5.0	5.0	3.7	4.6
Kharkivska	4.9	5.0	4.1	4.7
Khersonska	5.0	5.0	4.2	4.7
Luhanska	5.0	3.8	2.9	3.9
Zaporizka	5.0	4.0	3.1	4.0

Source: ACAPS

Table 2. Humanitarian access severity scores for oblasts with the highest access constraints, without accounting for the territory's controlling authority

OBLAST	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Donetska	3.5	5.0	3.7	4.1
Kharkivska	3.9	4.1	4.1	4.0
Khersonska	3.5	5.0	4.2	4.2
Luhanska	5.0	3.8	2.9	3.4
Zaporizka	3.5	4.0	3.1	3.5

Source: ACAPS

Donetska

Access severity score: 4.6/5.0

Access severity score trend since Q4 2023: slight improvement

Raions with the highest number of events: Bakhmutskiyi, Mariupolskiyi, and Volnovaskiyi

Most recurrent access events: physical prevention of the use of services or assistance


Despite civilians' constrained access to services and humanitarian organisations' increasingly restricted operations, limited new reporting on logistical and environmental constraints between January–March showed a slight decrease (improvement) in the overall access severity score, from 4.8/5 on 31 December 2023 to 4.6/5 on 31 March 2024.

Between January–March 2024, shifts in the conflict's front lines restricted humanitarian responders' ability to reach people in need. Security concerns meant that access to areas within 10km of the front lines has become more challenging (OCHA 20/03/2024). On 17 February, Russian forces took control of Avdiivka, completely severing access to the city; access already extremely constrained since October–December 2023 (OCHA 15/03/2024; ACAPS 06/02/2024). Provision of assistance to Ocheretynska hromada, where some IDPs from Avdiivka reside, has become more difficult (OCHA 15/03/2024; NYT 15/02/2024). The number of monthly air and drone strikes on Ocheretynska hromada more than doubled in February (97) and March (93) compared to January (42); the hromada also endured the most intense shelling in Donetska in the January–March period (ACLEd accessed 15/04/2024).

Civilians' access to services remains a key challenge. Communities on both sides of the front lines, in localities such as Ocheretyne, Donetsk city, and Mariupol, reported a lack of access

to water, gas, and electricity (Suspiłne 05/01/2024; Ukrinform 14/01/2024; TSN 14/02/2024). Shelling by Russian forces continued causing new damage and interruptions to utilities provision (EPravda 26/02/2024; Ukrinform 25/03/2024).

Figure 2. Newly reported infrastructure damage in Donetska between January–March 2024



Source: ACAPS accessed 15/04/2024

Kharkivska

Access severity score: 4.7/5.0

Access severity score trend since Q4 2023: no significant change

Raions with the highest number of events: Kupianskyi, Kharkivskyi


Most recurrent access events: physical prevention of the use of services or assistance, victims of landmines and UXO

The January–March 2024 period in Kharkivska was characterised by an increase in airstrikes and shelling (ACLEd accessed 15/04/2024). The use of short-range munitions and new types of weaponry, such as guided bombs, reduced Ukrainian forces' ability to detect or intercept air attacks, leaving Kharkivska particularly exposed (Suspiłne 25/02/2024; TSN 05/03/2024; KII 01/04/2024). The deteriorating security situation does not translate into an increased access severity score, however, as conflict-related indicators were already at the maximum possible score.

Increasing attacks have led to further access constraints for front line settlements, although Kharkiv city retains a humanitarian presence and operations in the oblast's non-front line areas continue (Health Cluster 25/03/2024; KII 01/04/2024; KII 05/04/2024; KII 10/04/2024). As at the end of March, organisations were evaluating the situation, implementing contingency measures for utility disruptions, and re-evaluating emergency relocation measures while maintaining programmes. Some responses have been postponed by a day in the immediate aftermath of an attack or on advice of authorities (KII 01/04/2024; KII 05/04/2024; KII 10/04/2024). Continued humanitarian operations despite increased attacks means that the toll on staff's mental health in the longer term remains a concern (KII 05/04/2024).

Increased attacks led to a significant increase in newly reported damages to civilian infrastructure in the oblast, 217 in January–March 2024 compared to 94 in October–December 2023. Chuhivskyi, Kharkivskyi, and Kupianskyi hromadas were most affected (ACAPS accessed 15/04/2024). These attacks have constrained utility provision in the oblast, as 18,000 consumers were without power across the oblast as at 13 March and scheduled black outs were in effect in Kharkiv city as at the end of March (MEU 13/03/2024; Zmina 31/03/2024).

Figure 3. Newly reported infrastructure damage in Kharkivska between January–March 2024



Source: ACAPS accessed 15/04/2024

Khersonska

Access severity score: 4.7/5.0

Access severity score trend since Q4 2023: no significant change


Raions with the highest number of events: Beryslavskiyi, Khersonskiyi

Most recurrent access events: physical prevention of the use of services or assistance, Russian passport requirements in Russian-occupied territories

Khersonska remains the most dangerous oblast for humanitarian responders, as Kherson city and other communities along the right bank of the Dnipro River have come under frequent attack (ACLEDA accessed 15/04/2024; OCHA 15/03/2024). In reaction to the 16 February attack on humanitarian responders in Beryslav, oblast authorities began requiring staff of international organisations to provide notification three days in advance of operations in 39 settlements; a requirement extended to 52 settlements along the right bank of the Dnipro River as of 16 February (Ukrinform 16/02/2024; OCHA 15/03/2024; Kherson OMA Telegram 08/03/2024). Such notification requirements do not necessarily indicate increased access constraints, however, as oblast authorities remain in charge of granting or restricting access to communities based on security developments (KII 01/04/2024; KII 05/04/2024).

Civilians face restricted access to basic utilities as a result of damage caused by constant shelling. In government-controlled areas, 25,800 consumers in 45 settlements were without power as at 13 March, including 3,160 in Kherson city (MEU 13/03/2024). In Russian-occupied territories, electricity, water, and telecommunications disruptions were reported in Kakhovka and Nova Kakhovka cities (Novyny Live 13/03/2024; Investigator 25/03/2024).

Figure 4. Newly reported infrastructure damage in Khersonska between January–March 2024



Source: ACAPS accessed 15/04/2024

Luhanska

Access severity score: 3.9/5.0

Access severity score trend since Q4 2023: no significant change

Raions with the highest number of events: Alchevskiyi, Sievierodonetskiy

Most recurrent access events: Russian passport requirements in Russian-occupied territories

Luhanska continues to have the lowest access severity score of all oblasts. As most of the oblast is occupied, however, information on incidents affecting humanitarian access is more limited. People still continue to face constraints accessing services as a result of restrictions imposed by Russian-installed authorities and service disruptions.

Utility provision remains heavily constrained in Russian-occupied areas of Luhanska, as residents of Lysychansk, Rubizhne, and Sievierodonetsk completed their second full winter without access to central heating (Ukrinform 09/01/2024; Espresso 20/01/2024). Severe winter weather also caused further cuts to electricity (Ukrainska Pravda 02/01/2024; Ukrinform 14/02/2024).

Medical services, already only available to Russian passport holders, have also been further constrained by staff shortages (Censor 17/01/2024; Zmina 28/01/2024).

On 6 March, a bus travelling to a funeral in Kirovsk (Russian-occupied Luhanska) hit a landmine, killing five people. Incidents involving landmines and UXO are less frequent in Luhanska, as most of the oblast is not affected by active ground conflict (TSN 06/03/2024). This incident highlights the continued risk of landmines and UXO on people's safety, security, and free movement, including that of humanitarian responders, even when the number of reported incidents is low.

Zaporizka

Access severity score: 4.0/5.0

Access severity score trend since Q4 2023: slight improvement


Raions with the highest number of events: Vasylivskiyi, Berdianskiy

Most recurrent access events: physical prevention of the use of services or assistance, Russian passport requirements in Russian-occupied territories

Between January–March 2024, Zaporizka main access developments related to the impacts of Russia's countrywide attacks on critical infrastructure. Such attacks have led to sporadic

water, electricity, and internet disruptions in the oblast (Ukrinform 11/02/2024, 17/02/2024 and 14/02/2024; MEU 11/03/2024). An attack on 22 March heavily damaged the Dnipro hydroelectric power plant, the country's largest. While there is no risk of the dam failing and causing floods, Ukraine lost 20% of its electricity regulation capacity (i.e. the ability to maintain overall electricity generation matched to the grid's demand) (Ukrhydroenergo 22/03/2024; Zmina 23/03/2024). An initial evaluation has found that the damage will take several years to repair (Kyiv Independent 25/03/2024).

Figure 5. Newly reported infrastructure damage in Zaporizka between January–March 2024



Source: ACAPS accessed 15/04/2024

There is anecdotal evidence of oblast authorities telling humanitarian responders that continued assistance in areas under orders to evacuate hampers evacuation efforts and causes people to remain. Such discussions have not had a tangible impact on the ability to deliver aid, however (KII 01/04/2024; KII 10/04/2024). While humanitarian responders are aware of this dilemma, withholding assistance violates humanitarian principles, and other factors – such as personal property and limited mobility – are likely playing a larger role in people's decisions to remain in areas under evacuation orders (KII 10/04/2024).

METHODOLOGY

The data used in this report came from publicly available and unpublished sources circulated within the response. The narrative presented is based on data analysis and a secondary data review. Access severity scores were calculated using the oblast-level data collection of events related to access constraints. The collected access events are available in the [humanitarian access events dashboard and dataset](#). ACAPS has predefined 75 event types and grouped them into 35 subindicators, nine indicators (I1–9), and three pillars (P1–3). The indicators receive a score between 0–3, and the pillars receive a score between 0–5. The final access severity score is an average of the three pillar scores.

Pillar 1: access of people in need to humanitarian aid

- I1. Denial of the existence of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance
- I2. Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance

Pillar 2: access of humanitarian organisations to people in need

- I3. Impediments to enter the country (bureaucratic and administrative)
- I4. Restriction of movement within the country (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions)
- I5. Interference in implementation of humanitarian activities
- I6. Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets

Pillar 3: physical, environmental, and security constraints

- I7. Insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance
- I8. Presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices, explosive remnants of war, and UXO
- I9. Physical constraints in the environment (obstacles related to terrain, climate, lack of infrastructure, etc.)

More information on ACAPS's humanitarian events monitoring and access scoring system is available in the [methodology note](#). For Ukraine's oblast-level scoring, calculations were done on a continuous numerical scale instead of thresholds, allowing for decimals and a more nuanced result. The resulting scores were classified into the following groups:

- 0–1 low access constraints
- 1–2 moderate access constraints
- 2–3 high access constraints
- 3–4 very high access constraints
- 4–5 extreme access constraints

LIMITATIONS

The analysis relies on publicly available data, which is unlikely to be comprehensive in a dynamic conflict situation such as Ukraine. Reported data may come with a delay, meaning some published data may no longer be applicable at the time of analysis. This analysis collected data through a review process to ensure that selected sub-indicators for a given oblast are still relevant. The evolving situation and the amount of data collected mean that some inaccuracies will likely remain.

Detailed information is lacking on the humanitarian response and access constraints faced by humanitarians in Russian-occupied areas, including Crimea and Sevastopol.

Map 3. Ukraine's access severity as at 31 March 2024




Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (21/03/2024). See full map on page 13.

TABLE 3. ACCESS SEVERITY SCORES AS AT 31 MARCH 2024

OBLAST	I1	I2	I3	I4	I5	I6	I7	I8	I9	P1	P2	P3	ACCESS
Autonomous Republic of Crimea	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1
Cherkaska	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.2	1.2	0.0	1.5	0.4	0.8	0.9
Chernihivska	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.8	0.9	0.7	1.6	3.0	0.8	2.0	1.0	3.0	2.0
Chernivetska	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.1	1.2	0.8	1.5	0.4	1.1	1.0
Dnipropetrovska	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.5	0.9	1.1	2.8	1.2	1.3	2.0	1.0	2.9	2.0
Donetska	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.8	3.0	0.8	5.0	5.0	3.7	4.6
Donetska*	1.2	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.8	3.0	0.8	3.5	5.0	3.7	4.1
Ivano-Frankivska	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.1	1.2	1.5	2.0	0.4	1.6	1.3
Kharkivska	3.0	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.8	3.0	1.6	4.9	5.0	4.1	4.7
Kharkivska*	0.8	2.8	3.0	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.8	3.0	1.6	3.1	4.9	4.1	4.0
Khersonska	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.0	1.6	5.0	5.0	4.2	4.7
Khersonska*	1.2	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.0	1.6	3.5	5.0	4.2	4.2
Khmelnyska	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.4	1.2	1.5	1.5	0.4	1.7	1.2
Kirovohradska	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.3	2.3	0.0	1.5	0.4	1.4	1.1
Kyiv	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.9	1.5	0.6	1.2	0.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.2
Kyivska	0.0	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	1.9	0.4	1.7	1.3
Luhanska	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	0.0	1.5	3.0	0.8	5.0	3.8	2.9	3.9
Luhanska*	1.2	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	0.0	1.5	3.0	0.8	3.5	3.8	2.9	3.4
Lvivska	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.8	0.9	0.0	0.3	1.2	1.5	2.0	0.7	1.7	1.5
Mykolaivska	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.5	0.9	0.0	1.6	3.0	1.3	2.0	0.6	3.3	2.0
Odeska	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.8	0.9	0.0	1.0	3.0	0.8	2.0	0.7	2.6	1.8
Poltavska	1.2	2.4	0.0	0.5	0.9	0.0	0.4	1.2	0.0	3.0	0.6	0.9	1.5
Rivnenska	0.0	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.4	0.0	0.8
Sevastopol	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sumska	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.5	0.9	0.0	1.8	2.6	1.6	2.0	0.6	3.3	2.0
Ternopil'ska	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.1	1.2	0.0	1.5	0.4	0.7	0.9
Vinnyska	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.3	1.2	0.8	1.5	0.4	1.2	1.0
Volyn'ska	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.8	0.9	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.7	0.1	0.9
Zakarpatska	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.8	1.5	2.0	0.4	1.3	1.2
Zaporizka	3.0	2.4	3.0	3.0	3.0	0.7	1.6	2.5	1.5	5.0	4.0	3.1	4.0
Zaporizka*	1.2	2.4	3.0	3.0	3.0	0.7	1.6	2.5	1.5	3.5	4.0	3.1	3.5
Zhytomyrska	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.2	1.2	0.0	1.5	0.4	0.8	0.9


*Scores not considering the territory's controlling authority

MAP 1. BATTLES, SHELLING, AIR STRIKES, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS BETWEEN JANUARY–MARCH 2024



Source: ACLED (accessed 15/04/2024)

MAP 2. HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SEVERITY FOR OBLASTS WITH THE HIGHEST ACCESS CONSTRAINTS AS AT 31 MARCH



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (21/03/2024).

MAP 3. UKRAINE'S ACCESS SEVERITY AS AT 31 MARCH 2024



Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (21/03/2024).