

GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS

October 2023

INTRODUCTION [1/2]


ACAPS monitors the daily evolution of the humanitarian situation in more than 150 crisis-affected areas and anticipates the potential risks that may trigger new crises or worsen situations. This **Global Risk Analysis** outlines a number of locations where new crises may emerge or where a particular situation may notably deteriorate within the next six months, causing a spike in humanitarian needs.

The risks included in this report were based on the identification of:

- **'Emerging crises' (emerging risks)** following new events or factors (triggers) that may emerge over the coming six months. Such triggers would point towards a hazard materialising, which would result in new or more severe humanitarian needs in a monitored context.
- Potential **'rapid and marked deterioration' in an existing crisis** that, because of a combination of deteriorating trends and new events, may significantly deteriorate in the next six months, leading to worse humanitarian outcomes. We run a trend analysis to identify such risks. It should be noted that a humanitarian situation that deteriorates at the same pace is considered a trend and not a risk. This report does not include trends.

ACAPS closely monitors previously identified risks to see if they materialise. **You can find the updates on the risks identified in the March 2023 ACAPS Global Risk Analysis at the end of this report.**

ACAPS has identified risks over the next six months **in the following 10 locations**. ACAPS has also identified **developments to watch** – changes or factors within a context that, depending on their evolution or trend, might become risks in the future or are likely to have a humanitarian impact/represent an aggravation of the humanitarian situation – **in seven locations: Ecuador, Iran, Libya, Myanmar, Niger, Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine.**



ACAPS METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS

The ACAPS risk methodology defines **risk as the probability of a hazard or multiple hazards materialising, combined with the estimated impact of such hazards**. Simplistically stated: risk = impact x probability. The associated risk level (low, medium, or high) is given by the combination of impact x probability, with the risk level increasing as either the expected severity of the impact of the event or its probability of happening increases.

Impact is the expected overall humanitarian consequences of a hazard. It can be an increase in the number of people needing assistance, the severity of their needs, or both. The impact is based on the assessment of the following components:

- exposure to the hazard: people, property, systems, or other elements present in hazard zones that a hazard could adversely affect
- intensity (of the hazard): the degree, level, strength, or magnitude of a hazard
- severity of impact: the degree or level of humanitarian consequences resulting from the materialisation of the hazard
- the population's vulnerability to shocks
- people's coping strategies and local, national, and international response capacities to deteriorating living and humanitarian conditions.



INTRODUCTION [2/2]

ACAPS classifies impact on a five-point scale: very low, low, moderate, significant, or major.

Probability is the chance of a hazard materialising. ACAPS assesses probability on a five-point scale: very low, low, medium, high, or very high.

Probability and impact levels are not mathematically calculated but assigned through expert judgement based on context knowledge. The overall risk level is the combination of the two, meaning it is also assigned through expert judgement.

KEY PRINCIPLES OF RISK ANALYSIS

Risk analysis requires a solid understanding of the context and an investigation of the interaction of variables that could cause or resist change.

Risk analysis has a certain degree of uncertainty. An event identified as a hazard might not evolve or materialise as anticipated, or it might not have the projected impact. Events or factors (triggers) expected to drive a shift or change in the situation may not occur, or new factors may arise that prevent the projected change or shift from happening.

Risk probability does not need to be high to warrant concern. A hazardous event with a low or medium probability of occurring should be a cause of concern for humanitarians if the expected impact is medium, high, or very high.

LIMITATIONS

- Considering the diversity and complexity of the crises presented in this report, we cannot cover each in detail. Instead, we highlight the broad evolution of each crisis to flag potential deteriorations and inform the framing of operations, strategies, and policies.
- Risk analysis focuses on negative outcomes and may not adequately consider the potential benefits or opportunities of different events.
- This report does not capture all the risks that we are monitoring. It is a selection of ten contexts that we deem relevant to the humanitarian sector for the next six months.
- Geophysical sudden-onset disasters (such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions) and other unforeseen circumstances that may change the course of events are difficult to account for in risk analysis.
- Information and data gaps for certain contexts limit the analysis.
- While we seek to ensure that all information is current at the time of publication, the fluidity of the situation in some countries means significant changes can occur quickly.

[Read more about our risk methodology](#)

OTHER ANTICIPATORY ANALYSES PUBLISHED BY ACAPS IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS

ACAPS often produces country-specific risk reports, scenarios, and anticipatory notes. Some recent publications include:

- **El Niño Overview:** anticipated humanitarian impact in 2023
- **Ukraine Scenarios:** possible developments in people's basic needs and coping capacity over the next 12 months in Ukraine
- **Somalia:** risk of worsening existing humanitarian needs in conflict-affected areas
- **Afghanistan:** scenarios - April 2023

To access the complete list of risks that ACAPS analysts have identified during their daily monitoring and analysis over time, you can consult the [ACAPS Risk List](#).



GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS

OCTOBER 2023

Risk level

- High
- Medium
- Low

**The risks identified on this map are expected to materialise within the next six months.*

UKRAINE

The upcoming Russian presidential elections increase administrative coercion and violence in occupied areas, heightening access constraints to critical services and protection concerns

LEBANON

An escalation of clashes between Hezbollah and Israel, coinciding with conflict escalation between Palestine and Israel, results in displacement, infrastructure damage, and humanitarian needs in southern

IRAQ

Failure to replenish water reserves in Iraq causes livelihood-induced displacement as well as a deterioration of health and WASH services

AFGHANISTAN

Increased conflict between resistance armed groups and the Interim Taliban Authority (ITA) leads to overall security deterioration and displacements, requiring emergency response

MALI

Conflict escalation from the complete withdrawal of MINUSMA leads to protection concerns and reduced humanitarian access in northern and central Mali

SUDAN

Increased political and ethnic tensions, as well as the geographic expansion of armed conflict, lead to mass displacements and unmet needs

PAKISTAN

The prolonged economic crisis coupled with austerity measures and political uncertainty contribute to worsening food insecurity and malnutrition countrywide

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

Increased intercommunal conflict and militia attacks in southwestern DRC trigger new displacements and decreased access to services and humanitarian assistance

YEMEN

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) push for the independence of the south results in local fighting, leading to displacements and increased needs for the affected

ETHIOPIA

The intensification of localised conflicts in Amhara between Fano militia and the Federal Government sparks new conflicts in disputed and rural areas, resulting in mass displacements and heightened protection concerns

The border lines and names of the countries or territories indicated on this map comply with official international practices (UN) and do not in any way reflect an ACAPS political stance.




SUDAN (1/2) MARKED DETERIORATION




 Risk level | High

Increased political and ethnic tensions, as well as the geographic expansion of armed conflict, lead to mass displacements and unmet needs

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

The conflict that erupted on 15 April 2023 between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) had already killed about 7,500 people as at 1 September and internally displaced 4.2 million people as at 13 September (ACLED 08/09/2023; IOM 20/09/2023). The violence has particularly affected Darfur region, which has been experiencing the largest numbers of fatalities and displacements. Since mid-April, there have been increasing reports of killings and ethnically motivated attacks by the RSF and their allies from Arab militias, especially against the Masalit community (VOA 16/07/2023; UN 13/06/2023; AP 28/07/2023). RSF fighters are targeting injured non-Arab civilians being treated at hospitals and attacking displaced people at checkpoints (OHCHR 24/06/2023; AI 19/06/2023; Reuters 18/07/2023). Such acts are leading to more calls among civilians in Darfur to arm and defend themselves, potentially driving an escalation of armed conflict (AI Jazeera 01/06/2023). Khartoum city and Kordofan region saw an intensification of fighting in September as well.

Both RSF and SAF have been committing acts of sexual assault, indiscriminate attacks against civilians, and targeted attacks against civilian infrastructure, including hospitals. Armed conflict will likely increase over key strategic positions and specific areas, such as Port Sudan city, which hosts seaports, the only operating airport, and humanitarian hubs (AI 03/08/2023; UN Women 21/04/2023; Sudan Tribune 13/09/2023; AI Jazeera 21/09/2023). Competition between Arabs and non-Arabs over limited food and water sources can contribute to increasing tensions, especially as West Darfur state has the highest food insecurity levels across Sudan. Between July–September 2023, about 62% of its population was projected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse food insecurity levels (IPC 02/08/2023).



SUDAN (2/2) ⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION




● Risk level | High

IMPACT

The entire population of Sudan will likely be exposed to the geographic expansion of clashes, resulting in more displacement; increased needs for shelter, water, food, and medical care; and further humanitarian access restrictions. The about ten million people living in Darfur region will likely receive the most impact. Between 15 April and 16 August, nearly 1.2 million people were already displaced from the region (IOM 23/08/2023). With more clashes, the numbers will likely increase. Most displacement will likely remain internal, except from West Darfur, where people will continue to go to Chad. Shelter, water, food, and medical care needs will increase. The IDP/refugee camps in Chad had already reached their capacity before the influx from West Darfur, and there will likely be a need to establish more camps (UNHCR 18/07/2023; DW 29/05/2023). Humanitarian organisations are already facing challenges in aid delivery to Darfur region. Between 3–5 August, WFP delivered its first food assistance convoy since 15 April to West Darfur (OCHA 17/08/2023). With high insecurity and very limited aid delivery, people’s needs will likely remain unmet, especially health needs given the targeting of hospitals.

Clashes in Darfur region between January 2021 and August 2023



Source: ACAPS using data from ACLED (accessed 14/09/2023)




UKRAINE (1/2) ⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION




● Risk level | High

The upcoming Russian presidential elections increase administrative coercion and violence in occupied areas, heightening access constraints to critical services and protection concerns

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

The Russian presidential elections are due in March 2024, and current President Vladimir Putin is likely to run for a fifth term. Putin is likely to use the elections to internationally legitimise the Russian presence in Ukraine, through pro-Russia media and organisations and by seeking recognition statements from ally countries, such as Syria and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (VOA 21/07/2023; RFE/RL 07/08/2023; Al Jazeera 11/08/2023; CSIS 01/06/2022).

Russian authorities and Russian forces had previously coerced and intimidated people in the occupied areas to vote in the yearly Russian regional elections held in September 2023 (CEIP 12/06/2023; Politico 16/08/2023; BBC 11/09/2023). The same happened during the so-called referenda organised to annex Luhansk and parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts on 30 September 2022, similar to Crimea in 2014 (The Guardian 30/09/2022; Brookings 17/03/2020; TWP 24/09/2022; Hromadske 08/04/2018). Russian authorities are likely to increase threats and violence to pressure participation in the elections, heightening the risks to personal safety and protection for people residing in the occupied areas, notably through civilian detention (AP 13/07/2023; RFE/RL 26/09/2022).

An April 2023 Russian decree stipulates that people without Russian passports in the occupied areas are retroactively considered foreigners or stateless from 30 September 2022. They must apply for a residence permit or risk forcible displacement by July 2024. Forcible displacement has been taking place since the 2022 full-scale invasion (OHCHR 16/06/2023; Svidomi 03/05/2023; The Guardian 03/08/2023). The Russian campaign to fast-track citizenship started in 2014 in Crimea. In 2019, it spread to Russian-controlled parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and it has been accelerating since 2022 (Zaborona 20/06/2022; Conflict Observatory 02/08/2023). The imposition of Russian passports and coercion of civilians into voting through threats and violence will likely increase significantly in the lead-up to the Russian presidential elections (CEIP 12/06/2023; OHCHR 16/06/2023). Widespread and systematic violence is already being used against civilians to consolidate control (OHCHR 25/09/2023; Insider 13/07/2023; Zmina 04/2023).

IMPACT

At least five million people live in areas occupied by Russia, with 1.5 million Russian passports issued since 2022 (UNFPA 14/11/2022; RFI 26/06/2023; The Guardian 03/08/2023). Those who refuse Russian passports are increasingly vulnerable to violence, forced displacement, detention, filtration on the Russian borders, and loss of documentation and property (UNSC 24/08/2023; OHCHR 16/06/2023; RFE/RL 28/04/2023; MEI 23/03/2023). Detained civilians are at high risk of torture, sexual abuse, and ill treatment, with at least 25,000 people considered missing in detention as of September 2023 (OHCHR 27/06/2023; AP 13/07/2023; Ukrainska Pravda 07/09/2023).

Men will be at heightened risk of forced conscription by the Russian military. They might cope by hiding, putting further financial burden on families, particularly on women, while more children will be sent to military youth camps (PILPG 09/06/2023; Politico 01/01/2023; TWP 14/02/2023).



UKRAINE [2/2]

⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION



● Risk level | High

Since 2022, Russian authorities have illegally transferred at least 19,500 children from Ukraine into Russia. Unaccompanied children are at risk of inadequate living conditions, family separation, psychological trauma, physical abuse (including sexual gender-based violence), hunger, and forced conscription after turning 18 (UNSC 24/08/2023; National Resistance Center 18/07/2023; TCH 01/08/2023; Euromaidan Press 07/08/2023).

People who do not accept Russian passports will have further reduced access to essential services and livelihoods, such as healthcare, education, employment, and social protection (Conflict Observatory 02/08/2023; Politico 01/01/2023; AI accessed 25/08/2023; OHCHR 24/05/2023). A protracted lack of access to healthcare, medicine, and specialised care puts older people at higher risk of otherwise preventable death (AI accessed 25/08/2023; AP 11/10/2022).

Social cohesion will decrease given tensions between those who accept Russian passports and those who do not, besides crime, looting, and violence resulting from the increased presence of Russian armed forces (MEI 23/03/2023; AI accessed 25/08/2023; NYT 26/10/2022; National Resistance Center 18/07/2023; Wilson Center 27/06/2023).

Russian-occupied areas in Ukraine



Source: ACAPS using data from ISWN (accessed 30/08/2023); ISW (accessed 30/08/2023)


AFGHANISTAN [1/2] ⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION




● Risk level | Medium

Increased conflict between resistance armed groups and the Interim Taliban Authority (ITA) leads to overall security deterioration and displacements, requiring emergency response

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

Since the regime change in August 2021, the ITA has progressively consolidated control over the security situation in Afghanistan through intelligence and security operations and the repression of opposition groups (UNSC 23/05/2023; UNICRI 02/05/2023).


Some armed opposition groups against the ITA have shown resistance (ISW 09/03/2022; RFE/RL 27/04/2022; FPRI 21/11/2022; SIGA 07/04/2022; ISW 29/11/2022; UNSC 23/05/2023). Among them, the National Resistance Front (NRF) with Ahmad Massoud at the helm; the Afghanistan Freedom Front, which has the objective of “fighting for the freedom of the country from occupation” and claims a presence in all 34 provinces; and the Afghanistan Liberation Movement, which fights for former security officers that the Taliban have killed. All these groups have been launching a higher number of attacks against the ITA, especially since July 2023, and are expected to further increase the frequency and geographical spread of their attacks in the next six months (VOA 27/04/2022; ACLED accessed 14/09/2023; UNAMA 20/06/2023; FPRI 21/11/2022; Critical Threats 29/11/2022). In the first three months of 2023, the aforementioned groups operated in Badakhshan, Balkh, Helmand, Jowzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Kapisa, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Parwan, Samangan, and Takhar provinces.

By September, they had conducted operations in an additional five provinces (Baghlan, Ghazni, Kunduz, Laghman, and Paktika). The number of attacks increased from 23 (January–March) to 57 (June–August). Although the overall military capability of these groups is unclear, the Taliban have consistently signalled taking the threat that they pose seriously by stationing large numbers of troops and military leaders in northern provinces (ORF 10/01/2023).

There has also been a sharp increase in ITA search operations, starting with the northern parts of Kabul (Afghanistan International 01/08/2023; KII 17/08/2023). The ITA found over 100 weapon caches, possibly belonging to the armed resistance groups, between 1 February and 20 May across 30 provinces, indicating that many weapons may remain undetected (UNAMA 20/06/2023). The ITA is also increasingly and rapidly reacting to pro-NRF posts on social media (KII 23/08/2023).

At the same time, the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-KP), often considered the main military threat to the ITA, continues its armed activities (ISW 29/11/2022). Suicide attacks by the IS-KP remain lethal but infrequent, with only 12 attacks recorded from January–September 2023 (UNAMA 27/06/2023; ACLED accessed 14/09/2023).

Conflict events by armed resistance groups in 2023



AFGHANISTAN [2/2]

⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION




● Risk level | Medium

IMPACT

A further increase in the number and geographic spread of armed attacks by resistance groups targeting the ITA would result in harsh military and security countermeasures by the Taliban, leading to an overall deterioration in the security situation. As the frequency and scale of armed attacks increase, so will civilian casualties and humanitarian access challenges. Increased arrests, detentions, and pre-emptive strikes by the ITA to counter expected opposition attacks will also put certain populations perceived as suspects by the authorities at risk. The Tajiks and the northern population will especially be held and interrogated to see whether they are connected to the resistance groups, particularly the NRF, which the ITA views as strongly linked to Afghanistan's northern region. Insecurity will lead to renewed conflict-induced displacement, increasing the numbers of IDPs (already 3.25 million) and people seeking asylum beyond international borders (already 5.2 million). This will force humanitarian responders to redirect programming towards emergency response (UNHCR 01/07/2023). The rate of refugee return, mainly from Pakistan, will also slow (Macrotrends accessed 10/09/2023; UNHCR 24/07/2023). Consequently, the need for life-saving shelter, essential relief items, community infrastructure, psychosocial support, and humanitarian financial assistance to displaced Afghan populations and host communities will be dominant (UNICEF 01/01/2023).

Increase in the number and geographic spread of attacks by armed resistance groups, January–August 2023




Source: ACAPS using data from ACLED (accessed 28/09/2023)

Note: violent incidents include attacks, armed clashes, abductions and forced disappearances, sexual violence, looting, and property destruction



DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) [1/2]

⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION



● Risk level | Medium

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



Increased intercommunal conflict and militia attacks in southwestern DRC trigger new displacements and decreased access to services and humanitarian assistance

RATIONALE

Since June 2022, a customary land tax dispute between two communities in Kwamouth territory, Mai-Ndombe province, has gradually escalated to intercommunal violence between the so-called native and non-native communities. The violence has killed at least 300 people and displaced more than 161,000 (OCHA 10/07/2023; HRW 30/03/2023). In early 2023, the emergence of a communal militia called Mobondo, mainly comprising people from the Yaka and allied communities, marked a change in the conflict dynamics, which until then was characterised by sporadic clashes between communities. The Mobondo militia has repeatedly attacked people from rival communities, mainly Teke. Regular clashes between the Mobondo militia and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) have also caused population displacements (HRW 29/06/2023; Caritas et al. 20/07/2023). Their number is unknown, but the Mobondo militia maintains an active presence in several areas in the west of the country, presumably to gain access to land and natural resources.

Violence by the Mobondo militia is likely to intensify in the coming months despite FARDC military operations launched in May 2023.

Increased attacks in Kongo-Central, Kwango, Kwilu, and Mai-Ndombe provinces and the Kinshasa periphery in recent months illustrate the propensity of the militia to strengthen its presence. The periphery of the DRC's capital city, Kinshasa, is particularly exposed to this surge in violence because of the Mobondo militia already being active in the surrounding provinces (Caritas et al. 20/07/2023; Actualité 24/08/2023; La Presse 17/09/2023).

Recurrent attacks by the Mobondo militia, which the Congolese army does not seem to be able to contain, will likely trigger the creation of community self-defence groups, as has been observed in the DRC (Caritas et al. 20/07/2023; Protection Cluster 22/06/2023). Many members of the youth in areas already affected but also in the outskirts of Kinshasa will likely join these self-defence groups to protect their own communities. This would lead to conflict escalation, growing insecurity in western DRC, and increased violence against civilians. Disputes over land access and use already trigger many conflicts, and the involvement of other communities could renew pre-existing tensions, further expanding the geographic scope of violence.

IMPACT

Increased militia activity would lead to more preventive and consequent displacement. Based on trends in western DRC since June 2022 and the deteriorating security situation, the conflict will likely displace thousands more in the short term, adding to those already displaced. Conflict intensification will worsen protection risks for civilians, including abductions, sexual violence, property destruction, and targeted killings by armed groups and militias (Caritas et al. 20/07/2023; OCHA 10/07/2023).


In the affected areas, the presence of militias on the main roads towards major towns will disrupt the supply of food and NFIs and market functionality. Food availability and livelihoods will also be hampered as militia activity considerably limits access to fields in a region where agriculture is one of the main economic activities. It will become increasingly difficult to access food, as prices will continue in an upward trend (Actualité 12/07/2023; Radio Okapi 06/07/2023). Insecurity is also likely to disrupt fishing and transport activities in the Congo River (RFI 21/03/2023).



DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) (2/2)

⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION


● Risk level | Medium



The conflict will also affect education access. Armed violence has already significantly disrupted the 2022–2023 school year. The 2023–2024 school year is expected to be particularly uncertain, as many of the teaching staff and students living in the conflict-affected areas have fled (Caritas et al. 20/07/2023; ANPT-PP 31/03/2023).

In conflict-affected areas, militia and armed group attacks and the emergence of community self-defence groups will deteriorate humanitarian access. Physical constraints, such as roadblocks and civilian harassment by the Mobondo militia, on the main supply routes will further reduce humanitarian access (Caritas et al. 20/07/2023; Radio Okapi 30/07/2023 and 05/07/2023).

Violent events involving the Mobondo militia, March–September 2023



Source: ACAPS using data from OCHA (accessed 21/02/2023)



ETHIOPIA [1/2] MARKED DETERIORATION



 Risk level | Medium

The intensification of localised conflicts in Amhara between Fano militia and the Federal Government sparks new conflicts in disputed and rural areas, resulting in mass displacements and heightened protection concerns

RATIONALE

In April 2023, the decision of the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) to integrate regional forces into the police and national army sparked regional protests in Amhara, subsequently escalating into clashes between the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and Fano militia across areas of Amhara. Months of protests intensified into clashes in July, resulting in nearly 183 fatalities, displacement, and damage to basic infrastructure (VOA 14/08/2023; TNH 15/08/2023; ABC 03/08/2023; Reuters 08/09/2023). Fano perceived the GoE move as a deliberate attempt to undermine their ability to provide security to Amhara people (The Guardian 12/04/2023; ACLED 06/05/2023).

These events are happening in parallel to competing claims of Tigrayan and Amhara authorities over Tigray's Western zone and some areas of Southern zone. On 22 August, Ethiopia's Ministry of Defence, through a Facebook post, indicated that a referendum would be held to discuss the fate of the disputed areas and the return of those displaced during the two-year northern Ethiopia conflict (Reuters 22/08/2023; Addis Standard 22/08/2023). In 2021, conflict involving the ENDF, Amhara forces, and Eritrean troops subjected thousands of Tigrayans to forced displacement

from Western zone. These displaced individuals were relocated to neighbouring areas within Tigray and refugee camps in Sudan (OCHA 31/03/2021; TNH 26/09/2023). With the growing alignment between the GoE and the interim Tigrayan government, a mass return of displaced people by the GoE in contested areas might incite the Fano militia to strengthen their presence and further assert their territorial claims, potentially leading to clashes in Western and Southern zones.

The Fano militia will also likely continue to receive foreign support from the Eritrean military, given the continued presence of the ENDF in Tigray, including in Western zone where the Fano militia is currently active (TNH 15/08/2023; RVI 18/07/2023). Fano militia are also likely to exploit the Sudanese border to transport military supplies. The current conflict in Sudan could facilitate Fano's access to small weapons (Chatham House 12/04/2023; OCHA 23/08/2023). Fano militia will likely employ guerrilla warfare tactics against the ENDF, substantially increasing the probability of escalating internal conflict within Amhara region and sparking new conflict in disputed and rural areas. As a response, the ENDF is expected to intensify targeted counterattacks, aiming to reassert control over the region.

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



IMPACT

An escalation of hostilities in Amhara region would not only endanger its over 22,740,000 residents but also imperil those in the contested regions of Western and Southern zones, including those initially displaced in the 2020–2021 conflict (OCHA 28/03/2023; TNH 26/09/2023).

Should conflict in Western and Southern zones unfold, security incidents and protection concerns for the affected population in the disputed areas would heighten. These include ethnically motivated violence, extrajudicial killings, and indiscriminate civilian casualties, akin to the events of 2021, ultimately leading to fatalities and mass displacement (OCHA 13/03/2021; TNH 26/09/2023). Heightened displacement is set to amplify shelter needs, while the use of schools as shelter by IDPs is likely to disrupt access to education. If the conflict in Amhara escalates, Amhara nationalists in various regions will also likely be targeted.

Humanitarian access is susceptible to disruptions given a deteriorating security environment. The security situation will likely interrupt movements along the Gondar-Shire and Kombolcha-Mekele corridors, interfering with the supply of aid to Tigray region (Logistics Cluster 24/08/2023).



ETHIOPIA [2/2]


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
● Risk level | Medium

If widespread conflict persists, Amhara will probably continue to experience a widespread internet cutoff in conflict-affected areas, consequently restricting the flow of information regarding the situation. A months-long suspension of food supplies by major humanitarian organisations and the conflict escalation occurring during the Kiremt season, disrupting planting and access to crucial agricultural inputs, will worsen food insecurity. Conflict escalation will pose a significant risk to the macroeconomic stability of the country, resulting in further inflation (The Guardian 09/06/2023; ICPAC accessed 20/09/2023; FAO 15/06/2023; FEWS NET 05/2023).

Contested areas of Tigray



Conflict events in Amhara between April–September 2023



Source: ACLED (accessed 02/10/2023)



IRAQ [1/2] ⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION



● Risk level | Medium

Failure to replenish water reserves in Iraq causes livelihood-induced displacement as well as a deterioration of health and WASH services

RATIONALE

In July 2023, water reserves in Iraq reached their lowest levels in history. Iraqi officials claim that the reserves in the country reached below seven billion cubic metres in summer, significantly lower than the 60 billion cubic metres in 2020 (MEMO 08/08/2023). The meteorological drought and extensive dam building upstream in Iran, Syria, and Türkiye have led water levels in the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers to drop significantly below retention levels.

The majority of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers' water originates from outside the country, mainly from Türkiye (WB 09/11/2022). Multiple talks between the Iraqi and Turkish Governments have been held in 2023 to increase the amount of water released from Türkiye downstream to Iraq. This may contribute to a slight increase in the water supply in Iraq, but besides a 2021 memorandum of understanding, no agreement on water shares has been reached between the two countries (Rudaw 07/08/2023; MEMO 08/08/2023; AGSIW 27/08/2021; Climate Diplomacy accessed 28/02/2023; Arab Center DC 30/05/2023).

Poor water governance, outdated and damaged infrastructure, the lack of an overarching national water law, and dysfunctional centralisation of water management increase the effects associated with low water reserves in Iraq (WPS 12/09/2022; Fanack Water

06/12/2022; The Guardian 07/09/2022). The agriculture sector, which consumes more than 60% of Iraq's water, is very inefficient; it heavily relies on flood irrigation, which results in around 60% water loss because of evaporation and run-off (E-IR 18/05/2023; Fanack Water 06/12/2022; Iraq Business News 12/09/2011). Even after years of water scarcity, Iraq has failed to modernise its irrigation system in the agriculture sector (The Guardian 07/09/2022). In 2022, the Government reduced irrigated farmland by 50%, as the available water was enough for only 250,000 hectares of land using current irrigation methods. In 2023, the Government is likely to resort to the same approach and further reduce irrigated farmland for the 2023–2024 harvest season (Reuters 17/10/2021; WB 09/11/2022; USDA/GAIN 15/04/2022; Iraq Business News 12/09/2011). Failure to replenish its water reserves will expose between two to seven million Iraqis, mainly in south Iraq, to a significant lack of water.

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



IMPACT

Extremely limited water availability will translate into livelihood loss in the agriculture sector and possible disease outbreaks resulting from poor water quality (WB 09/11/2022; NRC 23/08/2021; FES 05/2021; UNICEF 29/08/2021). Drought and water scarcity significantly affect the agriculture sector, affecting labour demand, income generation, and food production (WB accessed 26/02/2023; WB 29/10/2020; WFP 31/03/2021; UNDRR 2021; NRC 15/12/2021; IDMC accessed 16/08/2023).

The most affected crop would be wheat, which accounts for 70% of cereal production in the country. 70% of wheat cultivation is irrigated (WVI et al. 31/03/2022; VOA 29/05/2022; WFP 31/03/2021; FAO 11/06/2021). Wheat planting season in Iraq starts in November, and the areas that would face the most impacts are central and southern Iraq, where agriculture is heavily dependent on irrigation (ACAPS accessed 17/09/2023; USDA/GAIN 15/04/2022). Displacement, mainly from rural to urban areas, is one of the main consequences of livelihood losses. In 2022 alone, water scarcity and drought displaced 51,000 people. With the worsening water scarcity situation, the number of displacements is expected to increase in 2023 (NRC 23/10/2022; IDMC accessed 26/09/2023).



IRAQ [2/2]

⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION




● Risk level | Medium

In a country where water treatment and sanitation services are generally insufficient, particularly in rural areas, water scarcity increases WASH needs and decreases people's health condition (OCHA 27/03/2022; WHO 24/03/2022; IDMC accessed 16/08/2023). Deteriorating WASH services and worsened water quality increase the likelihood of waterborne disease outbreaks, such as cholera and infections from Giardia and E. coli (HRW 22/07/2019 b and 22/07/2019 a; NRC 15/12/2021; OCHA 27/03/2022). In the summer of 2018, decreased water levels and consequent worsening of water quality led to the hospitalisation of at least 118,000 people (HRW 22/07/2019 a; Al Arabiya News 24/10/2022; NRC 15/12/2021; IDMC accessed 16/08/2023).

Decreasing water levels in the Haditha and Mosul dam on the Euphrates River, 2019-2023

September 2019

September 2023




Source: Sentinel Hub, Sinergise Ltd last accessed 27/09/2023; ACAPS reference map 27/09/2023



MALI [1/2]

⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION



● Risk level | Medium

Conflict escalation from the complete withdrawal of MINUSMA leads to protection concerns and reduced humanitarian access in northern and central Mali

RATIONALE


The UNSC decided on the withdrawal of MINUSMA on 30 June 2023 at the request of the Malian transitional Government (UNSC 30/06/2023; IPI 21/07/2023). The departure of the UN mission of around 13,000 fighters is expected to be completed by the end of 2023. The departure coincides with growing tensions between the Malian Government and an alliance of Tuareg armed groups, who were signatories to the 2015 Algiers peace agreement also known as Cadre stratégique permanent pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement. MINUSMA facilitated the interaction between the two parties during the peace talks. The withdrawal of the UN mission could accelerate the end of the ceasefire between the Malian army and the signatory armed groups, renewing the conflict in the north of the country (MINUSMA 05/04/2023; ICG 27/06/2023; JA 08/08/2023; RFI 06/07/2023; IPI 06/07/2023).

The takeover by the Malian army of military bases left by MINUSMA will likely intensify tensions with the signatory armed groups, which control large areas of northern Mali. Several security incidents have already been reported during the first phase of the handover. The second phase, which is underway and involves the transfer of the bases of Aguelhok, Kidal, and Tessalit to the Malian army, could trigger more clashes (RFI 29/08/2023; UNSC 28/08/2023; JA 08/08/2023). MINUSMA's presence had deterred the activity

of armed groups in certain areas and guaranteed protection to civilians fleeing attacks in their villages (IPI 21/07/2023).

The departure of the mission will also further expose urban areas, where most of the bases are located, to attacks by Islamist armed groups (ICG 27/06/2023; The Conversation 17/07/2023). Armed groups such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and the Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen are likely to exploit the security vacuum left by MINUSMA to expand their areas of influence. These groups already control large areas of central and northern Mali. The French Barkhane forces had already withdrawn from the area in 2022 (ACSS 10/07/2023). The security vacuum left by MINUSMA could also stimulate a multiplication of self-defence groups in communities. Such groups already exist in Mali and face accusations of multiple abuses against other communities involving accessing their natural resources and alleged support to armed groups (IPI 21/07/2023; MINUSMA 22/03/2023).

PROBABILITY



IMPACT




IMPACT


A resumption of the conflict between the Malian army and signatory armed groups would increase displacement in the regions of Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, and Tombouctou, where there were more than 134,000 IDPs as at 30 June 2023 (UNHCR 06/07/2023). Thousands of people living in these areas will be at risk of kidnappings, extortions, and targeted attacks by armed groups, pushing many to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, such as Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Niger. While violence against civilians will likely increase, the ability to document protection incidents will be significantly limited. MINUSMA was one of the main reporters of violence by international and national forces over the past decade (ICG 27/06/2023; Afrique XXI 26/06/2023).

Movement restrictions are likely to increase with the growing presence of armed groups around major cities after the departure of MINUSMA. There is a possibility of Islamist armed groups encircling some cities, restricting access to livelihoods and basic services. Humanitarian access constraints will also increase as MINUSMA assisted in aid delivery in a volatile security environment. The air transport of humanitarian personnel from Bamako to conflict-affected areas, which MINUSMA provided, will probably be disrupted in a context where the presence of explosive devices and frequent attacks by armed groups limit road transport (ICG 27/06/2023; IPI 21/07/2023; OCHA 13/07/2023 and 28/08/2023).





Tensions between the Malian authorities and signatory armed groups signatories of the Algiers agreement and the Malian authorities between 2012 and 2023



PAKISTAN [1/2] MARKED DETERIORATION



 Risk level | Medium

The prolonged economic crisis coupled with austerity measures and political uncertainty contribute to worsening food insecurity and malnutrition countrywide

RATIONALE

The prolonged economic crisis in Pakistan is worsening over time. The country was at the brink of economic collapse until the IMF bailout came out in July 2023 (CNN 12/07/2023, Bloomberg 20/07/2023). The IMF bailout is however conditioned to austerity measures and reforms. While these measures aim to achieve economic stability, they have led to price hikes for food and basic commodities, and reduced subsidies and increased taxation by the government. For the population it is becoming more challenging to afford food, increasing food insecurity conditions (Reuters 30/06/2023, Aljazeera 14/07/2023). In addition, the escalating political instability since April 2022, after the ousting of former prime Prime Minister, is also affecting the Government's authority to implement effective solutions to the economic crisis (CNN 12/05/2023). Delayed elections, protests and repression on dissidents are also creating uncertainty in the economy, limiting investments (Arab News 26/08/2023).

There are some unfolding developments which will significantly exacerbate food insecurity in Pakistan, possibly leading to widespread malnutrition across the country. The government introduced a new tax of 5% on fertilisers in the 2023-24 budget as conditioned by IMF (Pro Pakistani 27/06/2023). This has increased fertiliser prices and made it unaffordable for farmers, affecting their

livelihoods and food security nationwide (DAWN 13/08/2023). The depreciation of the Pakistani rupee is also hindering raw material imports, shutting down several industries and leading to job losses for thousands (The Daily Start 07/08/2023; Business Recorder 14/02/2023). Amid rising global oil prices and local inflation, fuel costs have surged, escalating transportation expenses and further increasing food prices (The News 02/08/2023; ET 17/08/2023; India Today 11/08/2023). In May, food inflation increased by 48.65% compared to May 2022. In June 2023, wheat flour prices had risen by nearly 150% since the July 2022 floods (WFP 24/07/2023). The collapse of the Russia-Ukraine Black Sea deal could lead to additional grain supply shortages and further price hikes in Pakistan (Daily Sabah 02/08/2023; The New Arab 25/07/2023; S&P Global 15/03/2023). The deteriorating economic trend coincides with Pakistan's struggle to recover from recurring natural hazards, including heavy rainfall and floods. Between June–November 2023, floods affected over 33 million people, causing agricultural loss and reducing overall food availability and accessibility (NDMA 26/09/2023; UNOSAT 07/08/2023). The country is expected to experience rainfall 40–50% above the average in the coming six months (WMO accessed 03/10/2023; IRI accessed 03/10/2023; C3S accessed 03/10/2023).

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



IMPACT

Between November 2023 and January 2024, 11.8 million people are projected to experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse food insecurity levels, including 2.2 million people projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels. This is an increase compared to the 10.5 million estimated to experience IPC 3 levels between April–October 2023 (IPC 05/06/2023). The population in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Sindh provinces will be in need of urgent food assistance. As at June 2023, over 3.5 million children living in the 2022 flood-affected districts suffered from severe acute malnutrition, and almost half of all fatalities among children under-five could be attributed to undernutrition. Acute malnutrition affects one of every five children under the age of five in Pakistan, with the severe acute malnutrition rate at 8% and moderate acute malnutrition rate at 9.7% (OCHA 13/06/2023). A further increase in food insecurity and a lack of a diverse diet will increase malnutrition and child mortality rates in the country.



PAKISTAN [2/2]


⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION



● Risk level | Medium

The persistent economic crisis and recurrent natural hazards are eroding people's resilience, particularly among poor households. In 2023, the poverty rate was expected to reach 37.2%, pushing an additional 3.9 million people into poverty in comparison to 2022 (WB 04/04/2023 and 04/2023). The combination of subsidy cuts, higher food prices, and a drop in remittances has led to a decline in household income (DAWN 10/06/2023; WB 04/2023; Al Jazeera 10/07/2023). With escalating food insecurity and lower purchasing power, people will prioritise other necessities, such as healthcare and education, over food. Desperation over a lack of food and basic goods can potentially drive negative strategies, such as child labour, early marriage, and organ trafficking (PI/Protection Cluster 10/10/2022; ILO 16/05/2022; DAWN 16/09/2016).

Projected acute food insecurity between November 2023 and January 2024 and cumulative satellite-detected water between 26–30 July 2023



Source: ACAPS using data from IPC (05/06/2023); UNOSAT (01/08/2023)



YEMEN [1/2] ⊕ NEW RISK



● Risk level | Medium

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) push for the independence of the south results in local fighting, leading to displacements and increased needs for the affected


RATIONALE

Since the beginning of 2023, political conflict in southern Yemen has deepened, with the risk of escalating into open fighting, especially in Aden, southern Yemen's interim capital and main port city. Possible armed conflict has the potential to spread to other governorates, such as Abyan, Ad Dali', Lahj, and Hadramawt. The STC has been openly advocating an independent southern state since its formation but without taking concrete actions towards its goals until spring 2023. The STC's position is opposed to that of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the executive body of the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG), which operates outside the areas under the control of the de-facto Authority (known also as Houthis or Ansar Allah movement), including southern Yemen. The PLC includes representatives of the STC.


At the same time, on 8 May 2023, the head the STC restructured the council leadership by appointing three of the PLC members as vice presidents. This move was seen by both Saudi Arabia and the IRG as a first STC attempt to concretise its secessionist aspirations, placing itself as a main political actor in southern Yemen (Middle East I 24/07/2023; Yemen Future 22/09/2023; South24.net 13/02/2023). In response to the STC's move, Saudi Arabia and

the IRG formed the Hadramawt National Council and established the National Shield Forces, who report directly to the Head of the PLC. These forces may eventually find themselves in conflict with the STC's forces (AGSIW 18/07/2023; Yemen Future 22/09/2023; South24.net 13/02/2023; SCSS 09/03/2023 and 10/03/2023). On 24 June 2023, the Head of the PLC visited Hadramawt for the first time, timing the visit to highlight the growing disagreement between the STC and the IRG (Al Bawaba 26/06/2023). In the same week, the STC Head stated that peace in Yemen could only be accomplished when southerners' calls for independence are addressed, and that the IRG corruption is driving the country to the brink of economic failure. (Middle East Eye 23/6/2023; AGSIW 18/7/2023). The demand for a southern secession escalated, however, when the head of the STC, threatened to use force to protect the STC's objectives for the secession of southern Yemen's provinces during meeting with STC's military and security forces in July (debrief 10/07/2023). Also, while attending the United Nations General Assembly's annual meeting in September, the head of STC stated that he will prioritise establishing a southern independence in negotiations with Houthi (yahoo.news 22/09/2023). This stronger positioning of the STC, pre-announcing the possible use of military force, coupled with the formation of Hadramawt forces by the

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



PLC, indicate the possibility of a shift from political to military conflict in the south.

IMPACT

An outbreak of armed fighting in the south of Yemen, will likely result in many casualties, including civilians, rapidly overwhelming hospitals. Internal displacement from the southern governorate could exceed 400,000 people (based on data from January to December 2019 during the fighting between STC and IRG), with most IDPs attempting to reach other governorates. Those who get trapped in the frontlines may use the sea route to East Africa, particularly to Djibouti, to flee the conflict (dtm.iom 09/11/2019; UNHCR report 14/04/2015). Internal displacement will increase population density in more secure governorates such as Marib or Taiz, and in some DFA-controlled areas such as Al Hodeidah, putting pressure on the limited resources and services available. Displacement will also result in overcrowding shelters in host communities and IDPs sites, which already have poor WASH services, increasing the risk of waterborne disease.




YEMEN [2/2] ⊕ NEW RISK



● Risk level | Medium

Conflict along main transport routes and around the southern ports, mainly Aden and Al Mukalla ports, will disrupt the supply of fuel and food across the country. A reduction or depletion of basic goods will bring an exponential increase in prices, which are set by the informal economy, leaving people unable to afford them. The import of food and commodities might be halted, which will inevitably have an impact on Yemenis' living conditions. DFA attacks and threats on southern ports have stopped crude oil exports from the southern ports since November 2022. A resurgence of conflict will not allow for crude oil export to resume, further aggravating the financial crisis in IRG-controlled areas and preventing the payment of pensions and public servants' salaries. The currency will likely further depreciate. Depending on the intensity of the conflict, humanitarian organisations may have to exit affected areas, leaving thousands of IDPs and host communities without assistance.

Projected conflict hotspots and population displacement flows in Yemen



Source: ACAPS using ISWN (accessed 13/09/2023); Political Geography Now (31/10/2020)



LEBANON (1/2) ⊕ NEW RISK



Risk level | Low

An escalation of clashes between Hezbollah and Israel, coinciding with conflict escalation between Palestine and Israel, results in displacement, infrastructure damage, and humanitarian needs in southern Lebanon

Disclaimer: ACAPS identified this risk before the escalation of conflict between Palestine and Israel since 7 October and updated it based on the latest developments. Given the regional implications of the Palestine-Israel conflict, particularly on neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, it was very difficult at the time of writing to properly assess how this risk will unfold in the next six months

RATIONALE


The Blue Line, a disputed border area between Lebanon and Israel, has always been a source of tension between the two countries, who have been at war twice already, the latest being in 2006. Hezbollah – a political party and militant group mostly representative of the Shia population in southern Lebanon, with the backing Iran – has been the main entity fighting against Israel in Lebanon in the past (AI-Monitor 04/08/2023; i24 News 30/05/2023; INSS 07/03/2021).

Since the beginning of 2023, there has been a growing number of breaches of international commitments on the Blue Line, which has been patrolled by UNIFIL. There has also been an increase in provocative actions near the border area from both sides, besides increased confrontations and escalation of rhetoric. Hezbollah has been setting up tents near the border, and Israeli fighter jets have been flying over the area. Both sides have conducted military drills and made many attempts to cross the border (UNIFIL

16/08/2023; Al Arabiya 09/07/2023; BBC 28/07/2023; Independent 23/06/2023). Hezbollah and Israel are unlikely to enter into a full scale war in Lebanon. However, any provocative action from the two sides amid increased tensions in the Blue Line area, or the increased involvement of Hezbollah and Iran in the Palestine-Israel conflict, which would trigger Israel's reaction, could result in clashes or international armed conflict at the Lebanon-Israel border (Reuters 10/10/2023; AP 10/10/2023). As at 15 October, cross border attacks between Hezbollah and Lebanon are ongoing (Al Jazeera accessed 15/10/2023).

Regional tensions in the Middle East, mainly between Israel and Iran, play a role in increasing clashes between Israel and Hezbollah. Israeli air strikes on Syria continue to target armed groups or cells backed by Iran (including some Hezbollah members) almost weekly, leading to more tensions with Hezbollah in Lebanon (Crisis24 06/08/2023; Arab News 07/08/2023; Al Jazeera accessed 15/10/2023). The involvement of Palestinian armed groups based in refugee settlements in Lebanon (usually supported by Hezbollah) who sporadically clash with Israeli soldiers and attempt to cross the borders can also contribute to an escalation of fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. Together with the Palestinian Islamic

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



Jihad, Hamas is one of the groups present in Lebanon and has fired rockets from Lebanon to Israel in the past (Atlantic Council 13/04/2023; Reuters 10/10/2023).

IMPACT

The escalation of clashes at the Blue Line and air strikes by the Israeli Air Forces will likely expose up to 800,000 people in Lebanon to displacement and increased humanitarian needs. A 33-day war between Lebanon and Israel in 2006 displaced an estimated 800,000 to 1 million people, mostly from northern Lebanon to mountain areas inside the country, as well as to neighbouring countries such as Syria (ADL 09/01/2016; Britannica accessed 23/09/2023; MPI 01/09/2006). Fighting and air strikes are also likely to result in severe damage to critical infrastructure in targeted areas, such as Al Dahiya neighbourhood of Beirut city, which is predominantly inhabited by Shia Muslims (Ynetnews 30/08/2006). Many displaced people will stay in schools, mosques, and other public buildings, and shelter needs will be high. Priority needs will include food, medicine, safe drinking water, and NFIs (MPI 01/09/2006). In 2023, an estimated 80% of Lebanon's population live below the poverty line. Conflict will result in livelihood losses and further increase poverty (EC 30/03/2023; HRW accessed 06/09/2023).



LATEST DEVELOPMENTS TO WATCH (1/4)

ECUADOR

Increased violence and a renewed state of emergency lead to protection concerns and international displacement for the population

Since early 2023, Ecuador has been experiencing a surge in criminal and political violence, as well as political turmoil amid a deteriorating economic situation (CFR 14/06/2023). Between January–June 2023, over 3,560 violent deaths were recorded, higher than over 2,000 during the same period in 2022. Ecuador is a drug-trafficking route from South to North America, and organised crime groups have been proliferating and fighting for the control of the supply routes. Because of the economic effects of COVID-19, some people have joined criminal groups as a last resort in the absence of alternative livelihoods (AP 14/08/2023; The Guardian 15/08/2023). Violence is high in prisons, where criminal groups control drug trafficking. Violence has also been expanding to the public and political space. On 10 August, presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio was shot dead during the electoral campaign. As a result, the current Government of Guillermo Lasso declared a nationwide state of emergency of 60 days (BBC YouTube 27/07/2023; France 24 YouTube 27/07/2023; France 24 10/08/2023). Other candidates and politicians have also been killed in the wave of violence. The state of emergency announced with Decree No. 841 suspends some fundamental rights and allows for police search operations without a warrant, increasing the risk of arbitrary detention (France 24 10/08/2023; AI 10/08/2023). The downward economic situation, coupled with increased levels of violence, insecurity, and political control, might drive people to leave the country in search of protection, physical security, and livelihood opportunities.

IRAN (1/2)

The renewed Helmand River water dispute between Afghanistan and Iran affects the implementation of Iran's refugee policy towards Afghans in Iran

A decades-old dispute over the Helmand River's water allocation between Iran and Afghanistan has intensified since May 2023, with Iran accusing Afghanistan of not upholding their water-sharing agreement from 1973 (DW 01/06/2023; The Diplomat 08/06/2023). The Iranian regime is demanding its water rights at a time when Afghanistan is suffering from severe drought and an acute water shortage (TOLOnews 20/05/2023; RFE/RL 30/05/2023). The disagreement triggered border confrontations in May 2023, leading to casualties and injuries on both sides (Al Jazeera 30/05/2023; The Diplomat 08/06/2023). Iran currently hosts one of the largest and most protracted urban refugee populations, with 4.5 million Afghans residing in the country as at September 2023 (UNHCR accessed 14/09/2023 a; UNHCR accessed 14/09/2023 b). There is a low possibility that Iran may not uphold its refugee policy and the tripartite agreement, leveraging the water dispute as a pretext (EUAA 11/01/2023; Arab News 28/05/2023; Salaam Times 01/08/2023). Tensions at the border area are likely to result in a higher trend of forceful deportations and arbitrary detentions of (refugee or undocumented) Afghans in the country. Forced returns and the deportation of Afghans from Iran precede the renewed tensions around the Helmand River. 58.5% of those who have returned from Iran to Afghanistan since March 2022 reported being forced to do so. Between January–July 2023, more than 400,000 Afghans returned to Afghanistan, 53% of whom were deported (EUAA 01/2023; IOM 06/09/2023).



LATEST DEVELOPMENTS TO WATCH (2/4)

IRAN (2/2)

Reports of Afghans experiencing limited access to services and physical abuse by authorities in Iran, including beatings and mistreatment, along with instances of xenophobia, have been continuing since early 2023 (EUAA 11/01/2023; RFE/RL 30/08/2023; Khama Press 27/03/2023). Tensions could further result in a stronger crackdown on Afghans in Iran and reduce their access to crucial humanitarian and basic services (RFE/RL 30/08/2023).

LIBYA

Water contamination following the passage of Storm Daniel and subsequent floods is increasing the risk of waterborne disease outbreaks

Between 9–11 September 2023, Storm Daniel caused flooding and destruction in the coastal areas of northeastern Libya. The impact was compounded by the collapse of two dams in Derna district that led to the deaths of thousands of people. As at 16 September, WHO had recorded almost 4,000 deaths, and more than 9,000 people were still missing (WHO 16/09/2023). OCHA estimates that 884,000 people have been exposed to the floods and affected to “varying degrees” (OCHA 14/09/2023). More than 40,000 people are displaced, including at least 16,000 in Derna city and surrounding areas (IOM 26/09/2023). People living in flood-affected areas are in urgent need of fresh water, as the floodwaters have washed away, buried in mud, or damaged entire residential zones, including water and sewage networks. Satellite imagery analysis indicates that the disaster destroyed over 2,200 buildings in Derna (OCHA 29/09/2023). Half of the 18 boreholes for drinking water are out of service in the city (ECHO 25/09/2023). The consequent contamination of soil and groundwater, as well as poor hygiene and a lack of sanitation facilities, is creating a risk of waterborne disease outbreaks, such as acute watery diarrhoea

and cholera, and vector-borne disease outbreaks, such as malaria and typhoid, dengue, and yellow fever (WHO 22/09/2023). Because of their more fragile immunity system, older people, children, and pregnant women are particularly at risk of waterborne diseases (IRC 18/09/2023; WHO 22/09/2023; UNICEF 14/09/2023). More than half of the 78 health facilities assessed by WHO in two districts and in Derna city are either closing or not functioning because of damaged infrastructure and shortages of staff, medicine, supplies, and equipment. Given the weaknesses of the health system and the magnitude of health needs, a public health crisis is looming (WHO 22/09/2023; ECHO 25/09/2023). Floodwater has also shifted explosive remnants of war left over from years of conflict, posing a risk to residents and displaced people (Reuters 17/09/2023).

MYANMAR (1/2)

Increased security incidents between the military junta and the Arakan Army (AA) lead to renewed conflict, further worsening the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state

A resurgence of tensions between the AA and the Myanmar military junta could potentially break the “informal and humanitarian ceasefire” between the two forces agreed in November 2022. In the second half of 2023, a number of security incidents have been reported in Rakhine state, similar to those that occurred in the months leading to the breakdown of the previous ceasefire in August 2022 (ACLED accessed 10/08/2023; Stimson 21/04/2023). These incidents include arrests of civilians with ties (or suspected ties) with the AA by the junta and increased military activities, including drone reconnaissance operations and the AA instructing the residents of a township to dig bomb shelters (DMG 11/07/2023, Narinjara 17/07/2023, 28/07/2023, 21/09/2023, 15/09/2023, and 24/09/2023). Intense fighting may resume if such security incidents continue to occur and would have significant humanitarian consequences, such as internal and cross-border displacements;



LATEST DEVELOPMENTS TO WATCH (3/4)

MYANMAR (2/2)

civilian casualties; increased travel restrictions limiting the movement of people, essential supplies, and aid; and rice harvest disruptions, affecting the livelihood of farmers and heightening food insecurity (OCHA 01/10/2022, 31/10/2022, 03/12/2022, and 30/12/2022; ECHO 19/09/2022; ACAPS accessed 24/09/2023; The Irrawaddy 29/09/2022 and 29/08/2022). The impact of Cyclone Mocha that made landfall on 14 May 2023 aggravates such consequences (ACAPS 23/05/2023).

NIGER

Diplomatic tensions, economic sanctions, and potential regional conflict further deteriorate the humanitarian crisis

Following the 26 July 2023 military coup in Niger, international condemnations have multiplied against the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Fatherland currently in power. ECOWAS has strongly expressed its disapproval of the coup and imposed economic sanctions on Niger (VOA 08/08/2023; Africanews 14/08/2023). ECOWAS has also indicated that it does not rule out resorting to a military solution to restore constitutional order. The standby force of the regional organisation has been mobilised for a potential military intervention. A diplomatic solution seems out of reach, as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have signed a military alliance that provides that any foreign military intervention would be considered an aggression against the other parties and that will engage a duty of assistance from all parties (Le Monde 16/09/2023; l'Opinion 25/08/2023). While armed group activities affect several regions of the country, forcing thousands of people to be internally displaced or seek refuge in neighbouring countries, a military intervention would escalate into a regional armed conflict. Although it is quite unlikely at this stage, a military intervention

would significantly increase the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance while heightening humanitarian access constraints across the country (OCHA 09/03/2023; TV5Monde 27/08/2023).

SYRIA (1/2)

Severe winter conditions in Northwest Syria (NWS) hit earthquake-affected displaced populations, worsening the humanitarian crisis

The earthquakes that hit both Syria and Türkiye in February 2023 damaged at least 10,600 buildings in Syria (OCHA 28/04/2023). In Syria alone, the disaster affected around 8.8 million people, displacing more than 120,000 in NWS (Global Shelter Cluster 03/2023; UNHCR 24/07/2023). In total, there are around 2.8 million IDPs in NWS, with around 1.8 million living in more than 1,400 last-resort sites (OCHA 28/04/2023 and 22/12/2022). Harsh winter conditions between mid-December to mid-February are expected to expose the people living in the 227 displacement sites across NWS to low temperatures, snow, frost, and floods (ACU et al. 07/11/2022; UN 24/01/2022; UNSC 21/10/2021; France 24 20/01/2022; OCHA 25/01/2022). Combined with the earthquakes' impact, winter conditions will heighten humanitarian needs in the region, especially for shelter, WASH, and healthcare (UN 24/01/2022; OCHA 25/09/2022; UNHCR 02/11/2022). Communities living at high altitudes will likely be the most vulnerable to harsh winter conditions (OCHA 25/09/2022). The governorates most likely to be affected are Idleb and Aleppo, particularly Afrin, Azaz, Dana, Harim, and Maaret Tamsrin districts (OCHA 25/01/2022; UNHCR 26/09/2022; CARE 17/01/2022). Since the start of the conflict, people in NWS have been experiencing a drastic rationing of the electricity supply (The Syrian Observer 12/01/2023; UN 02/10/2022). Wood and coal for heating during winter are already unaffordable for most of the displaced population.



LATEST DEVELOPMENTS TO WATCH (4/4)

SYRIA (2/2)

Many resort to burning plastic and manure for warmth, which is harmful and often results in children falling ill (MEMO 28/10/2022; TNH 13/12/2022). According to multiple forecast model projections, NWS will receive above-average rain this winter, increasing the probability of floods (IRI accessed 05/09/2023; C3S accessed 05/09/2023; WMO accessed 05/09/2023). Overcrowding in IDP camps and poor camp infrastructure and shelters are likely to increase cases of respiratory infection, health issues from smoke inhalation, pneumonia, and waterborne diseases (Tarnas et al. 07/06/2022; MSF 17/12/2020; Al Jazeera 01/02/2022).

UKRAINE

Increased Russian attacks on grain infrastructure and ports in Ukraine after withdrawing from the Grain Deal results in more casualties and economic deterioration

Russia's withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative, also known as the Grain Deal, preceded an intensification of attacks targeting Ukraine's grain storage infrastructure, seaports, and southern cities. The withdrawal in July 2023 came at the beginning of the harvest season in Ukraine. Within one month since Russia's withdrawal, attacks damaged at least 270,000 tonnes of Ukrainian grains. Russia carried out 14 attacks between 11 July and 23 August, hitting grain terminals, warehouses, port infrastructure, industrial equipment, and administrative buildings, as well as grain storage facilities in ports on the Black Sea and Danube River. The attacks also hit Zatoka Bridge, a key transport route for grain to Izmail (UN 23/08/2023; The Kyiv Independent 14/08/2023; Ukrinform 23/08/2023; Reuters 23/08/2023; BBC 08/08/2023). Targeted attacks on grain export routes will result in more casualties and potential displacement (UN 23/08/2023; NRC 14/08/2023). The conflict is already heavily affecting agriculture. A drop in grain export will lead to increased grain stockpiling and could force farmers to reduce sowing in the next harvesting season. Increasing transportation and grain storage costs, compounded by increasing insecurity at grain facilities, will affect the safety and socioeconomics of Ukrainian farmers, households, and businesses that depend on agricultural livelihoods and exports (KSE accessed 31/08/2023; UN 09/06/2023; The Guardian 20/07/2023; Reuters 19/07/2023; NYT 02/08/2023).



UPDATE FROM THE MARCH 2023 RISK ANALYSIS

This is an update of the risks identified in the March 2023 Global Risk Analysis report.

AFGHANISTAN — ● High risk level

A severe economic crisis, harsh winter, and disruption of aid and winterisation support increase food insecurity and malnutrition between July–August

This risk has only partially materialised and remains active. The first half of 2023 saw a worsening of the situation in Afghanistan, which continues to experience the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. The number of people in need of aid had risen by 500,000, from 28.3 million at the start of the year to 28.8 million by the end of May (OCHA 21/06/2023). The malnutrition rate has remained the same, with 2023 projections of around 875,000 under-five children having severe acute malnutrition and 2,847,000 having moderate acute malnutrition, as well as 804,000 pregnant and lactating women having acute malnutrition (Nutrition cluster's 2023 HRP Review). According to May 2023 estimates, two-thirds of the population faced an urgent threat to their wellbeing or means of sustenance (Islamic Relief 17/08/2023). As at July 2023, the migration rate has declined by 3.45% compared to 2022, and the number of returnees, especially from Pakistan, has increased (Macrotrends accessed 10/09/2023; UNHCR 24/07/2023). At the same time, the budget for Afghanistan's 2023 aid plan has been reduced from USD 4.6 billion earlier in 2023 to USD 3.2 billion. The updated strategy, according to OCHA, was influenced by a "changing operating context" following the Taliban regime's ban on female aid workers. The 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan Overview indicates that there have been fewer rounds of aid and less food distributed given a lack of resources. As a result, 3.4 million people, including those in IPC 4 districts, received half-rations, and 18 million people in IPC 3+ areas had not received food aid as at end of August 2023 (OCHA 27/08/2023). Mitigating factors include the relative decrease in food prices in most parts of the country compared to 2022 (FEWS NET 29/08/2023). Economic experts in Afghanistan view the recent increase in the value of the Afghan afghani as a positive sign, as it could reduce the prices of imported products in the country (Pajhwok 30/08/2023).

ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN [1/2] — ● Low risk level

Conflict escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh triggered by the Lachin corridor blockade results in population displacement and increased humanitarian needs

The risk has partially materialised and is still under development. On 19 September 2023, after nine months of blockading the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, Azerbaijan launched a flash military operation in the region. On 20 September, after one day of the offensive, the de facto government of Nagorno-Karabakh lost most of its military posts and surrendered (ACLED 21/09/2023; UN 16/08/2023; News18 19/09/2023; BBC 20/09/2023). As at 20 September, the violence had killed more than 200 people and injured 400. More than 100,000 of the 120,000 people living in Nagorno-Karabakh have crossed the border into Armenia as at 11 October (Al Jazeera 06/10/2023 and 26/09/2023; The Guardian 27/09/2023 and 20/09/2023; EC 12/10/2023; IOM 12/10/2023). Armenia decided not to go to war with Azerbaijan to defend ethnic Armenians in the region and the de facto government of Nagorno-Karabakh as it did in 2020 (IWPR 22/09/2023). Despite protests and opposition in Armenia, on 19 September 2023, Armenia's Prime Minister declared that he would not allow Armenia to be dragged into a military operation with Azerbaijan (Politico 20/09/2023; BBC 26/09/2023; AA 26/09/2023). One likely explanation is the military power imbalance between the two countries, with Azerbaijan having larger troops trained and equipped by Türkiye and Israel (Caspian News 01/09/2023; Al Jazeera 01/10/2020).



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN [2/2]

Relations between Armenia and Russia, its main ally, have also been fraught since the 44-day conflict in 2020. More recently, Russia did not intervene in the Azerbaijani blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, likely because of its war with Ukraine and desire for stronger relationships with Azerbaijan (Politico 20/09/2023; Atlantic Council 13/07/2023; JAM News 04/09/2023). The rift in their relationship recently reached new levels after Armenia declared not to be an ally of Russia in its war with Ukraine and conducted joint military drills with the US (Politico 20/09/2023; Al Jazeera 20/09/2023; Reuters 02/06/2023; ARKA accessed 22/09/2023). Armenia and Azerbaijan going into war will expose at least 1.5 million people to conflict, displacement, and humanitarian needs in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, in Gegharkunik, Syunik, and Vayots Dzor provinces (marzers) in Armenia, and in Karabakh and East Zangazur economic regions in Azerbaijan (ACLED 21/09/2023; ICG accessed 28/09/2023; The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan accessed 20/09/2023; Statistical Committee of Armenia accessed 20/09/2023; IFRC 07/10/2022). The last major conflict between the two countries in 2020 resulted in more than 5,000 deaths and displaced more than 90,000 (CRF accessed 20/09/2023; AI 14/01/2021; UNSDG 19/10/2021; DW 14/07/2020).

DRC — ● Medium risk level

The expansion of the areas under the control of the 23 March Movement (M23) in North Kivu causes increased violence targeting Rwandophone communities, resulting in displacement and protection needs

This risk did not materialise. Although tensions between the DRC and Rwanda persist and the M23 is still active in several territories of North Kivu, demonstrations against Rwandophone communities have not increased (Africanews 27/07/2023; MONUSCO/OHCHR 16/08/2023). This is partly attributable to the fact that fewer riots linked to Rwanda's role in supporting the M23 have taken place since March 2023 (ACLED accessed 24/08/2023).

That said, hostility towards Rwandophone populations perceived as supporting the M23 persists, especially in South Kivu (Radio Canada 28/04/2023). Violence against Rwandophone communities is taking place but in proportions similar to those observed in 2022. Between March–July 2023, five incidents targeting Rwandophone communities were reported, the same number as during the same period in 2022 (ACLED accessed 24/08/2023). The withdrawal of MONUSCO could be anticipated by December 2023. While presidential elections are not supposed to take place until 20 December, many people from Rwandophone communities are already reporting pre-electoral violence. Armed groups prevent them from registering in electoral lists, considering that they are not Congolese. This trend indicates a potential escalation of violence against this community as the elections approach (HRW 09/05/2023; Le Monde 21/09/2023).

INDONESIA [1/2] — ● High risk level

Violent crackdown on protests and insurgency and rising ethnic tensions after the announced division of Papua province result in increased displacement and protection needs in West Papua territory

This risk was originally raised in the ACAPS October 2022 Global Risk report. The risk has partially materialised and is still active. Low-intensity armed conflict between the Indonesian security forces and the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) continued from February–August 2023 (ACLED accessed 27/08/2023). The kidnapping of a New Zealand pilot by the TPNPB in February 2023 preceded the Indonesian military operations in West Papua territory resulting in confrontations between the two forces and deaths of Indonesian soldiers (The Guardian 14/02/2023; The Diplomat 20/04/2023 and 21/08/2023). The Indonesian security forces have also intensified operations in conflict hotspots in West Papua territory, including the raid of villages from April–June 2023 that resulted in civilian deaths and internal displacement, with some people fleeing into the forest (Human Rights Monitor 30/03/2023, 18/04/2023, and 23/06/2023; Asia Pacific Report 21/04/2023). The presence of the Indonesian military in public facilities in West Papua territory, such as schools, health facilities, and churches, has limited the access of indigenous Papuans to services (Human Rights Monitor 18/04/2023).



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

INDONESIA [2/2]

On 15 August, 20 people were injured when police dispersed hundreds of people who joined rallies in Jayapura, the capital of Papua province, on the 61st anniversary of an agreement that made West Papua territory part of Indonesia (UCA 15/08/2023; Asia Pacific Report 16/08/2023). Authorities are set to bolster security across some of the newly formed provinces in the prevision of the general elections on 14 February 2024 (Antara 03/07/2023; The Interpreter 01/03/2023; Kompas.com 28/08/2023). This will likely heighten tensions in West Papua territory in the weeks leading up to and during the elections.

30/06/2023; BNI 05/08/2023; The Irrawaddy 02/08/2023). As at 28 August, the number of post-coup IDPs was around 1.65 million, taking the total IDPs in the country to around 1.96 million (UNHCR 19/09/2023). A lot of the displaced live in makeshift shelters or in remote places, such as forests and jungles, which are cut off from any services and difficult to reach by humanitarian responders (OCHA 06/05/2023; UNHCR 24/04/2023). Reduced agricultural production in 2022 resulted in income losses and increased food prices. The devastating impact of Cyclone Mocha also worsened the food insecurity and malnutrition situations in the country (FAO 04/08/2023; OCHA 13/06/2023 and 15/07/2023). ACAPS projections regarding the number of battles, explosion/remote violence, and fatalities from March–July 2023 were reasonably close to the reported figures by ACLED (ACLED accessed 27/08/2023)¹.

The removal of the fuel subsidy in June 2023 caused a 200% hike in fuel prices and increased the cost of transportation costs and food prices (UNICEF 19/08/2023; FEWS NET 11/07/2023; FP 24/07/2023). As at July 2023, food inflation had risen to 26.98%, from 24.82% in May (CBN accessed 24/08/2023). The Government declared a state of emergency on food security in mid-July to help address the high food prices after the removal of the fuel subsidy (FEWS NET 01/08/2023; VOA 14/07/2023; IRC 17/07/2023). Acute food insecurity, particularly in the northern states, has worsened as a result, with 51% of households in the northeast going without adequate food consumption in July (WFP 21/08/2023). Approximately 24.8 million people countrywide were projected to face Crisis (CH Phase 3) or worse nutrition levels during the lean season (June–September), including 4.3 million people in northeastern Nigeria. They require urgent food assistance (WFP et al. 04/04/2023; WFP 24/08/2023; FEWS NET 11/07/2023).

MYANMAR — ● High risk level

A heightened military response following increased territorial control of and collaboration among anti-military resistance forces results in intensified conflict across most of the country, leading to a deterioration of the humanitarian situation

This risk has materialised. Armed conflict has intensified in most parts of the country, especially in the months of June, July, and August 2023 (RFA 07/08/2023; IISS accessed 27/08/2023; ACLED accessed 24/09/2023). The military junta extended the state of emergency in July 2023 for an additional six months and ramped up efforts to gain lost territories in many parts of the country (The Irrawaddy 17/07/2023 and 01/08/2023). Conflict has continued to damage and destroy vital civilian infrastructure, such as healthcare facilities and schools, and resulted in civilian casualties (OHCHR

NIGERIA — ● Medium risk level

High inflation and economic disruptions contribute to worsening food insecurity countrywide

This risk has materialised, but new developments in the country point towards a new and graver deterioration of the economic situation. Inflation rates have reached a new high, up from 21.82% in January 2023 to over 24% in July, and are projected to keep rising (TE accessed 24/08/2023; NBS 01/2023).

PALESTINE [1/2] — ● High risk level

Israel's new proposed legislation and planned evictions cause an uprising and violence in the West Bank, with the potential of spillover in Gaza, affecting Palestinians' security, livelihoods, and humanitarian conditions

The risk has materialised and is still under development. Violence between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank has increased in 2023, leading to a spillover in Gaza. The Israeli governing coalition, comprising the Likud and ultranationalist parties, succeeded in July in passing the judicial system reform, allowing the Israeli parliament to overrule by simple majority the Supreme Court decisions

¹ The total number of reported battles is 1,376, and ACAPS' upper-bound projection was 1,398. The total number of reported explosions/remote violence is 1,290, and ACAPS' upper-bound projection was 1,282. The total number of reported fatalities is 6,281, and ACAPS' upper-bound and lower-bound projections were 7,426 and 5,694.



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

PALESTINE [2/2]

(BBC 11/09/2023; The Guardian 04/01/2023; Al Jazeera 03/02/2023; Reuters 25/03/2023). In June, the coalition approved more than 13,000 new settlement housing units in the West Bank (Xinhua 27/06/2023). Besides new evictions, violence towards Palestinians has increased since the beginning of 2023. Israeli forces raided religious sites in East Jerusalem in April, conducted four-day air strikes on Gaza in May, and held a two-day large-scale military operation in Jenin refugee camp and its surroundings in July (UNHRC 06/04/2023; Al Jazeera 02/04/2023; UNGA 05/04/2023; OCHA 19/05/2023, 04/07/2023, and 03/07/2023; The Guardian 04/07/2023). On 7 October, the Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of the Palestinian organisation Hamas that governs the Gaza Strip, launched an unprecedented air, land, and sea attack on several military and civilian targets in southern Israel. Israel retaliated by striking military and civilian targets in the Gaza Strip and declaring war on 8 October (OCHA 07/10/2023; AP 09/10/2023). As at 13 October, Hamas attacks had killed more than 1,300 people and injured over 3,300 in Israel (POLITICO 13/10/2023; CNN 13/10/2023). As at 12 October, the conflict escalation had displaced more than 330,000 Palestinians and led to the targeting of several health assets in the Gaza Strip. On 13 October, the Israel Defense Forces called for civilians to evacuate Gaza, amid news outlets reporting a possible ground assault from the Israeli military (POLITICO 13/10/2023). The situation is under development, and the number of displaced people and extent of humanitarian needs are expected to rise. 80% of the people in Gaza already depend on humanitarian assistance (OCHA 08/10/2023; ECHO accessed 09/10/2023; OCHA accessed 09/10/2023; CNN accessed 10/10/2023).

ACAPS is producing more analysis on the Israel-Palestine conflict. For more information, you can access our latest report here. For future analyses, you can consult the ACAPS Palestine country page.

PAKISTAN — ● Medium risk level

The prolonged economic crisis and stalling of the bailout programme result in increased poverty and social unrest, leading to heightened food insecurity and protection concerns

This risk raised in March has materialised despite the USD 3 billion bailout programme approved by the IMF in July. Pakistan's foreign reserves, after declining to USD 4.9 billion in May (less than a month's worth of imports), rebounded in July to around USD 9.5 billion following the bailout (Reuters 25/05/2023; Bloomberg 21/07/2023). The country's inflation reached an all-time high in May (37.97%) and eventually slightly decreased in July to 28.31% (PBS 07/2023; Al Jazeera 02/06/2023). Since April, Pakistan has experienced social unrest, with people protesting the fuel price hikes and fighting at food distribution points, leading to death at stampedes (CNBC 06/04/2023; VOA 27/08/2023). Street crime has also been rising because of unemployment (The Print 25/04/2023). 3.7 million Afghan refugees living in the country are also facing the turmoil of the economic crisis, with a lack of access to necessities (RI 06/07/2023). The economic crisis is showing a downward trend, but more people are unable to afford basic goods, including food. ACAPS has raised a new risk for Pakistan in this report, looking at increased food insecurity resulting in widespread malnutrition.

PERU — ● Medium risk level

Continued protests and mobility restrictions affect the living conditions of economically vulnerable population groups, worsening their overall living conditions

This risk did not materialise, although the state of emergency is still in force in certain cities and continues to authorise warrantless searches and limit free transit and free association (Crisis24 14/08/2023). The demonstrations that took place at the start of 2023 did not continue with the same intensity, although they resumed in July when the President sought to extend her legislative powers on security grounds. Tensions between demonstrators and the President remain alive. They are calling for a new constitution, the dissolution of the parliament, and early elections (CNN 18/07/2023; France 24 29/07/2023). The year-on-year inflation rate decreased to 6.46% in June compared to 7.89% in May. The decrease is mainly attributed to the drop in certain food and fuel prices and the cut in residential electricity rates. This downward trend is expected to continue through the end of 2023 (BBVA 03/07/2023). Refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants, mainly from Venezuela, continue to be exposed to the risks of exploitation, abuse, and violence. A regularisation programme launched in June 2023 is expected to contribute to their socioeconomic inclusion (UNHCR accessed 18/09/2023).



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

TUNISIA — ● Low risk level

Increased protests, clashes between protesters and security forces, and major civil strikes lead to a social uprising and more needs for food and livelihood assistance

Even though there have been no major protests and strikes in Tunisia since March 2023, the risk has partially materialised. The economic situation continues to deteriorate as deficit and debt increase, worsening living conditions. The IMF loan is still not secured, but the Tunisian Government was able to reach a deal with the EU in July to secure some funds to support the country's economy and stem migration to Europe (USIP 24/08/2023; Reuters 13/06/2023; InfoMigrants 17/07/2023). The country remains without a parliament as at September 2023, complicating the social and political situation. In July, teachers led protests to demand an increase in pay. This has resulted in the suspension of 17,000 teachers and sacking of 350 school principals. That said, there were no clashes reported between the protesters and security forces (Reuters 10/07/2023). More than 1,500 modern bakeries were forced to close after the Government's decision to cut flour subsidies on the grounds of shortages. This triggered protests in August (Africanews 07/08/2023; The New Arab 21/08/2023).

TÜRKIYE — ● Medium risk level

The involuntary mass return of Syrian refugees from Türkiye results in displacement, increased protection needs, and a deterioration in the humanitarian situation in NWS

This risk raised by ACAPS in March remains active. The coalition of opposition parties that ran for the presidential and general elections on anti-refugee sentiment and vowed to return all Syrian refugees within two years failed to win the presidential elections. That said, the anti-refugee public sentiment in Türkiye remains high and has been increasing in the past years according to opinion polls, especially after the February 2023 earthquakes and the May presidential and general elections (Arab News 06/02/2022; Al Jazeera 30/01/2023; The New Arab 24/06/2022). In July 2023, the Turkish Government claimed that more than half a million Syrian refugees had voluntarily returned to Syria since the beginning of the conflict (Multeciler 14/09/2023; Al-Monitor 06/12/2022; AP News 24/10/2022). Some left because of economic hardship, discrimination, and a general feeling of being unsafe in Türkiye (MEMO 03/10/2022; SCF 27/09/2022). The high anti-refugee public sentiment puts pressure on the Government to act. This is highlighted by its plans to build infrastructure in NWS to house one million refugees (Al Jazeera 09/05/2022). In April 2023, the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Authority and Qatar Fund for Development inked a protocol to construct a total of 240,000 homes in the region over the next three years to house Syrian returnees (Daily Sabah 25/05/2023). According to the Turkish Government, the housing project aims to encourage Syrians to voluntarily return to NWS (AAwsat 15/08/2023). That said, UN agencies and INGOs have long stated that Syria is not safe for

return (RPW 16/11/2021; MEI 22/02/2022; HRW 06/07/2022). The humanitarian and security situation in NWS has actually worsened, mainly given the increase in conflict violence and the impact of the February earthquakes, which increased displacement and worsened people's living conditions (UNSC 29/06/2023; Hurriyet 01/05/2023).

UKRAINE [1/2] — ● High risk level

Increased fighting and power and gas supply disruptions severely limit people's ability to access heating, resulting in the loss of life and increased acute humanitarian needs in Russian-controlled areas and areas of active ground conflict in the southeast

This risk was first raised in ACAPS' October 2022 Global Risk report and materialised during the 2022–2023 winter season. It will likely materialise again during the 2023–2024 winter season. Attacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine continue, but with the start of the cold season in October, the Russian armed forces will likely ramp up attacks against heating and electric energy production infrastructure to disrupt the provision of power (Shelter Cluster 15/08/2023; Atlantic Council 22/09/2023). The Government of Ukraine has been preparing the energy sector for the winter, conducting repairs, strengthening the air defence of key infrastructure, and accumulating gas and coal reserves. The high-voltage power grid can only be repaired to an estimated 30–40% of its pre-full-scale invasion capacity.



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

UKRAINE ^[1/2]

Officials have warned that the 2023–2024 winter will be more difficult than the last, as the country has a significantly affected energy sector that will have limited margins to cope with additional shocks (Ukrenergo Telegram 31/07/2023; EPravda 13/07/2023; Business Censor 29/07/2023; REACH 04/09/2023). These challenges will happen as many households in Ukraine struggle with limited income opportunities given job losses and displacement. This means many may not have the means to purchase winter items, such as generators, batteries, heating fuel, clothes, and blankets, or repair damaged houses ahead of winter. The impact will be especially high in frontline and occupied areas, where humanitarian needs are significant and humanitarian access is highly constrained. By August 2023, only 4% of the people who received aid lived in occupied areas. Older people are particularly vulnerable to harsh winter conditions. The lack of food, medicine, and adequate housing can result in preventable deaths (OCHA 14/08/2023, 28/12/2023, and OCHA 03/08/2023; Shelter Cluster 15/08/2023).

ZIMBABWE — ● Medium risk level

Electoral violence, compounded by the deepening economic crisis, leads to protection incidents and increased food insecurity across the country

The risk has materialised; the country's pre-electoral period was characterised by arbitrary arrests and the detention without trial of members and supporters of the main opposition party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC). During this time, the police selectively enforced the Maintenance of Peace and Order Act of 2019, denying the opposition permission to hold public gatherings and rallies while allowing the ruling party, the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU-PF), to hold them without interference. There were also numerous instances of harassment, threats, and violence preventing opposition parties from organising rallies and campaigns (HRW 03/08/2023; AA 13/07/2023; PBS 09/07/2023). The general elections took place on 23 August 2023 but were extended to 24 August in some parts of the country, including Harare, given delays in the delivery of ballot papers, mostly in opposition strongholds. This led to chaos at polling stations, with voters pushing and shouting at election officials and police officers (Africanews 24/08/2023; UN 27/08/2023). The Zimbabwe Election Commission announced on 27 August that Emmerson Mnangagwa, the ZANU-PF candidate, as re-elected President. He has been elected for a second five-year term, and his party has been in power since 1980. The CCC has disputed the results, claiming that the elections were not free and fair (NYT 26/08/2023; The Guardian 27/08/2023).

Local, regional, and international observers have all noted that the electoral process failed to meet credibility standards. There were instances of electoral observers being arrested and their property being destroyed, as well as reports of voter intimidation, threats of violence, harassment, and coercion (EU 25/08/2023; US DOS 28/08/2023; UN 27/08/2023). As at early September, the political situation remained tense, with reports of multiple human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests, abductions, and the torture of opposition party activists (AI 04/09/2023).

According to the assessments of the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee's Urban and Rural Livelihood, in 2023, 29% of the urban population (1.5 million people) are food-insecure. 19% of those living in rural areas (1.9 million people) are projected to be food-insecure from October–December 2023 (WFP 22/09/2023).



SEE THE CRISIS CHANGE THE OUTCOME

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