UKRAINE
February 2023 humanitarian access update

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

- **Newly accessible areas in Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts**: Mykolaiv oblast and parts of Kherson oblast on the right bank of the Dnipro River have become newly accessible. Constraints remained high as at February 2023, due to severe damage to civilian infrastructure, the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), and shelling, especially in Kherson oblast.

- **Russian forces have halted movements between non-government-controlled-areas (NGCAs) and government-controlled areas (GCAs)** via the only recognised checkpoint at Vasylivka in Zaporizhzhia oblast, and there have been no reported crossings into the Zaporizhzhia GCA since the start of February.

- **In Zaporizhzhia oblast, particularly in Vasylivka raion (GCA)**, damage to water, gas, and electricity infrastructure is constraining civilian access to those services. The damage is outpacing infrastructure repairs. Mobile units are also the only providers of healthcare (KII 20/02/2023 b).

- **Since 13 February, Ukrainian forces no longer allow humanitarian responders to enter or operate in Bakhmut because of the danger posed by approaching Russian troops** (NYT 13/02/2023).

- **Continued water shortages in the Donetsk NGCA cause residents to take water directly from the Don River or drain water from the heating system, causing certain boiler plants to shut down because of lower water pressure** (Radio Svoboda 08/12/2022; Donbas24 22/11/2022; FreeRadio 30/10/2022).

- **As Russia attempts to integrate NGCAs, there is increased pressure on the population to obtain Russian passports, partly because those without Russian passports cannot access essential services, such as pensions, loans, and healthcare. Russian forces are increasingly taking over civilian facilities for military use.**

- **Conscription exemptions for humanitarian staff**: a law allowing conscription exemptions for the staff of international humanitarian organisations and national organisations implementing internationally funded humanitarian programmes has been put in place, but uncertainty remains around its implementation.

Humanitarian access severity in Ukraine

See the full map on page 12.

Sources: ACAPS using data from ISW (16/02/2023); ACLED (accessed 09/03/2023).
This report aims to provide a comprehensive comparison of access challenges across different oblasts in Ukraine to inform humanitarian responders and support their decision-making. This analysis is based on changes in a severity model between 1 November 2022 and 28 February 2023, which ACAPS developed using data collected from publicly available secondary sources, complemented by ten interviews with key informants that include local volunteers, NGOs, and authorities. A joint analysis meeting was held during the drafting of the report involving several humanitarian responders involved in humanitarian access discussions.

The access constraints analysed in this report involve the access of people to humanitarian aid, the access of humanitarian responders to the affected population, and security and physical constraints.

**OBLASTS WITH THE HIGHEST ACCESS CONSTRAINTS**

Sources: ACAPS using data from ISW (16/02/2023) and ACLED (accessed 09/03/2023).
Humanitarian access severity scores for oblasts with the highest access constraints with the ‘Multiple authorities controlling the territory’ access event (all scores range from 0–5); please refer to the methodology for a scoring description.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBLAST</th>
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<th>SEVERITY SCORE</th>
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Russian efforts to integrate NGCAs into the Russian administrative system have led to several new access constraints, including checkpoints and movement restrictions, the conversion of civilian facilities for military use, and the requirement of a Russian passport for access to certain services, such as pensions, healthcare, and loans.

**Movement restrictions for civilians:** restrictions on the movement of civilians, including temporary bans on all civilian movement in some towns and raions, limit their access to basic goods and services, especially between late December 2022 and early January 2023.

- In Vasylivka (Zaporizhzhia oblast), a complete curfew between 28 December 2022 and 4 January 2023 prevented people from leaving their homes (Ukrainska Pravda 25/12/2022).
- Hornostaivka (Kherson oblast) implemented a similar measure between 25 December 2022 and 3 January 2023 (Ukrainska Pravda 24/12/2022).
- In December 2022, there was a temporary ban on the movement of civilians between certain localities of Melitopol raion (Resistance 28/12/2022).
- In early January 2023, Russian forces temporarily blocked movement in and out of Polovynkyne village (Luhansk NGCA) as they investigated alleged assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Russian forces took 30 residents to Luhansk city (Resistance 02/01/2023).

The number of checkpoints throughout the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia NGCAs has increased. People’s phones are being searched for evidence of Ukrainian applications (Resistance 26/01/2023). Men of conscription age are not allowed to leave NGCAs (LBA 03/11/2022).

**Removal of the Ukrainian hryvnia from circulation:** as at 1 January 2023, NGCAs had withdrawn the Ukrainian hryvnia from circulation and replaced it with the Russian rouble (TWP 27/01/2023). The de facto local authorities have threatened businesses continuing to use the hryvnia with the confiscation of their property (Ukrainska Pravda 10/01/2023 a). This change in currency is likely to affect people’s access to social and financial assistance from family members and organisations in GCAs. More information on this topic can be found in ACAPS’ analysis of the economic impacts of the full-scale invasion.

**Access to pensions:** it is likely that online banking applications are no longer a viable method to receive state assistance, such as pensions, following the full switch to roubles in NGCAs as at 1 January and the intensified checkpoint searches of phones. Elderly people and people with disabilities were already less likely to have access to online or mobile banking systems prior to the full switch to roubles. As at late 2022, the Government of Ukraine (GOU) continued to pay out pensions to people in NGCAs who could set up an internet bank account (Eurozine 17/01/2023).

**Separate scores for GCAs and NGCAs**

For oblasts with the presence of Russian forces, the event ‘Multiple authorities controlling the territory’ is active, automatically giving the highest score to indicators I1, I3, and I4. To provide more nuance between GCAs and NGCAs, we recalculated the score for the former without including the effects of the ‘Multiple authorities controlling the territory’ access event.

This method is not a complete disaggregation of scores based on GCA/NGCA status, as access events are still collected at the oblast level. These changes only influence I1, I3, and I4.
**Conversion of civilian facilities for military use:** Russian forces are taking over civilian infrastructure for their military needs, depriving the population of access to certain basic services.

- In Zaporizhzhia oblast, the children’s hospital in Vasylivka has become a military hospital and no longer admits children (Ukrainska Pravda 06/02/2023).
- In Luhansk oblast, the Russian military has taken over three civilian hospitals, including maternity wards converted into field hospitals in Luhansk city and Novopskov village (Ukrainska Pravda 02/02/2023, 20/01/2023, and 31/01/2023).
- In Kherson, an anti-tuberculosis health facility in Kakhovka city has become a military hospital and stopped serving civilians (Resistance 16/01/2023). Russian forces have also turned non-medical facilities, such as kindergartens, into military hospitals (Ukrainska Pravda 21/01/2023).

**The looting of civilian infrastructure:** there were several reports of Russian forces looting civilian infrastructure in NGCAs between November 2022 and January 2023, depriving the population in certain localities of basic services. For example, in the Kherson NGCA, Russian forces looted the fire stations and hospitals in Nova Kakhovka and the general hospital in Skadovsk (Resistance 06/12/2022 and 22/01/2023).

**Passport requirements:** throughout NGCAs, the de facto authorities are increasingly requiring Russian passports in order for people to access basic services.

- Social assistance: Skadovsk raion (Kherson oblast) has halted the delivery of pensions via post. To receive their pensions, pensioners must fill out Russian passport and citizenship applications at the post office (Ukrainska Pravda 04/12/2022 a).
- Employment: public sector employees must renounce their Ukrainian citizenship and get a Russian passport to continue working (Resistance 30/12/2022 and 28/01/2023; Ukrainska Pravda 07/02/2023).
- Medical services: in Mariupol, possession of a Russian passport is necessary to access medical services and insurance (Ukrinform 30/01/2023).

**Access to education:** the de facto authorities enforce children’s participation in Russian education through various means, such as by investigating house computers and mobile phones for evidence of participation in Ukrainian online schooling, and interrogating children found outdoors during school hours and during medical check-ups. They also threaten and impose fines on the parents of unenrolled children or promise financial rewards if they send their children to Russian schools (Resistance 29/11/2022; Ukrinform 14/02/2023). On 2 February, it was reported that the de facto authorities took 50 high school students from Lysychansk city (Luhansk oblast) to Russia to take the end of high school exams, with the promise of free higher education at Russian universities (Resistance 02/02/2023).

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**Zaporizhzhia**

Humanitarian access constraints in the oblast remained very high during the November 2022 to February 2023 reporting period. The population’s access to utilities, food, and healthcare deteriorated in areas near the frontlines, and fighting restrained the movement of civilians in NGCAs and at the Vasylivka crossing point.

**Civilian movements:** shelling restrains movements in Zaporizhzhia city and in the frontline areas of the Vasylivka raion. In the frontline areas, checkpoints, roadblocks, and frequent changes in control over roads also restrain movements. Despite growing insecurity, local NGOs and volunteers are able to reach people with limited humanitarian aid, although assistance remains insufficient for people in frontline communities unable to travel to aid distribution points, especially elderly people and people with disabilities (KII 20/02/2023 b). Starting 1 March, those exiting Berdiansk and Melitopol cities (NGCA) were required to hold special passes (Resistance 19/02/2023; Ukrainska Pravda 20/01/2023). The de facto authorities also prevent civilians from exiting Enerhodar (Ukrainska Pravda 06/02/2023).

**Vasylivka crossing point:** the Vasylivka checkpoint is the only recognised crossing point between all NGCAs and GCAs. On 5 January, reports indicated that Russian forces had only allowed one person to cross into the GCA during the previous two weeks, compared to 100–200 people per day in late October 2022 (Ukrainska Pravda 05/01/2023 a; Suspilne News 22/10/2022). A few people still manage to cross from NGCAs, although it is unclear what permit they have to secure from the de facto authorities. Civilian men of conscription age avoid both sides of the checkpoint (KII 20/02/2023 b). Ten people were evacuated from NGCAs across the checkpoint on 1 February 2023, and there have been no further reported evacuations (Zaporizhzhia RMA Telegram accessed 02/03/2023). Even when there were crossings from NGCAs into GCAs across the checkpoint, reports indicated frequent abuse and movement impediments. These impediments include arbitrary detentions, the use of physical force, and delays of up to ten days (Ukrainska Pravda 04/12/2022 b and 25/12/2022). Compared to previous reports, there is no information on diversions or Russian forces confiscating aid from people entering NGCAs. This lack of information is likely because of the significant drop in people crossing into NGCAs.
Location of the Vasylivka checkpoint

Sources: ACAPS using data from ISW (16/02/2023) and ACLED (accessed 09/03/2023).

**Conflict:** from November 2022 to February 2023, ground conflict reports mainly came from Polohivsky and Vasylivskyi raions, albeit at a lower intensity in December and February (ACLED accessed 28/02/2023). Incidents of violence against civilians occurred, including shooting to disperse people trying to get their pensions paid in Berdiansk city (NGCA) and the kidnapping of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant employees who had refused to sign contracts with a Russian company (Ukrainska Pravda 12/02/2023; Resistance 06/02/2023).

**Shelling:** shelling creates safety risks that hamper the free movement of civilians and responders. Between November 2022 and February 2023, Russian forces particularly targeted Huliaipole, Malynivka, and Orikhiv cities and their surrounding areas. Shelling remains a concern throughout the oblast (ACLED accessed 28/02/2023).

**Access to information on available assistance:** as the systems for requesting assistance have switched to online methods, people with little or no access to technology, such as older people, are likely left out (LBA 19/01/2023).

**Service provision in GCAs:** as at February 2023, most of the water and gas distribution facilities in Vasylivka raion were damaged or destroyed, and only some had been repaired. Electricity is only available some of the time, and electricity and gas supplies have decreased since November. The authorities’ capacity to respond to countrywide attacks on the electric grid and a lack of spare parts are limiting electricity repairs. In some locations, fear of further damage has halted the repair of destroyed telecommunication infrastructure. There are frequent food and medicine shortages, and mobile units are the only providers of healthcare (KII 20/02/2023 b). In Zaporizhzhia city, there are reports of some power outages, but other goods and services, such as water, gas, food, medicine, and healthcare, are available (KII 22/02/2023 b). The city has reported shrinking aid supplies and increasing poverty (LBA 19/01/2023).

**Service provision in NGCAs:** in Berdiansk city, water is rarely available (Resistance 21/02/2023). Based on satellite data, Russian forces are draining the Kakhovka reservoir, likely causing water shortages across the oblast, including in Berdiansk, Enerhodar, and Melitopol cities. This may seriously affect farming capacity and pose a risk to the functioning of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. It is unclear why they are draining the reservoir, which currently sits at its lowest level in 30 years (NPR 10/02/2023).

**Donetsk**

The presence of ground conflict and NGCAs meant that humanitarian access constraints in Donetsk oblast remained high as at the end of February 2023. Russian forces have made small territorial gains, which, along with persistent conflict, has rendered certain localities, such as Bakhmut, inaccessible.

**Conflict:** the main driver of access constraints in Donetsk oblast continues to be active ground conflict, especially in localities near the frontlines. Donetsk oblast is where the conflict is most intense. Between November 2022 and January 2023, ground conflict continued, mainly in Bakhmut and Pokrovsk raions, with systematic shelling throughout the oblast (ACLED accessed 28/02/2023). Around 60% of Bakhmut city is destroyed, and no more than 5,900 civilians remain out of 71,000 before the invasion (Ukrainska Pravda 05/01/2023 b; SSU 01/01/2022; The Kyiv Independent 04/02/2023).

**Access of humanitarians:** since 13 February, Ukrainian forces no longer allow humanitarian responders to enter or operate in Bakhmut given the dangers posed by approaching Russian forces (NYT 13/02/2023). Access between Soledar city and the rest of the GCAs was impossible as at 7 February, halting aid delivery and civilian evacuation. 523 people, most of whom were over 50 years old, remained in Soledar city as at 11 January (Obozrevatel 11/01/2023).
Violence against humanitarian responders: on 24 January, two missing British volunteers assisting in evacuations were confirmed to have died while assisting in evacuations from Soledar (Ukrainska Pravda 24/01/2023). Shelling also damaged a national NGO’s warehouse in Chasiv Yar, 10km west of Bakhmut. It serves as a distribution hub for several organisations, including the UN, and is a location where civilians receive assistance (OCHA 16/02/2023).

Evacuations: safety and security concerns make evacuations from frontline areas extremely difficult, although reports indicate that they continued in January and February (RFE/RL 16/01/2023; OKO Press 06/01/2023; BBC 06/02/2023). Many of those who remain in Bakhmut city do not wish to leave or do not think they have the financial means to support themselves (The Kyiv Independent 04/02/2023). On 13 January, reports indicated that Russian forces evacuated 250 civilians from Soledar city to Shakhtarsk city (Donetsk NGCA) (IWS 13/01/2023). Russian-organised evacuations in NGCAs come with heightened risks of forced displacement.

Donetsk NGCA

Drinking water shortages: damage to the Donetsk-Donbas canal pipe system is perpetuating extreme water shortages in Donetsk and Mariupol. As at December 2022, Donetsk inhabitants are receiving water two to three times a week and are resorting to taking water directly from the Don River or draining central heating systems (Radio Svoboda 08/12/2022; Donbas24 22/11/2022; FreeRadio 30/10/2022). In late October 2022, insufficient water pressure resulted in the shut down 32 out of the 268 boiler plants in Donetsk NGCA after residents drained water from the heating systems (FreeRadio 30/10/2022).

Damage and destruction of infrastructure in Mariupol: the damage and destruction of infrastructure, as well as the slow pace of reconstruction, continue to heavily constrain access to basic needs and services in Mariupol. Water, electricity, and heating access barely improved between November 2022 and January 2023 (LBA 19/01/2023). Many of Mariupol’s estimated 150,000 remaining inhabitants live in destroyed buildings (El Pais 06/03/2023). Without access to gas, many use electric heaters when electricity is available. Such heating is insufficient and can cause a network overload or fires (Ukrainska Pravda 24/11/2022; LBA 02/12/2022). The destruction of wastewater treatment facilities means plants must discharge sewage to waterways, increasing health risks (PAX 21/12/2022).

Luhansk

Humanitarian access constraints remained very high between November 2022 and February 2023 in Luhansk, as most of the oblast was comprised of NGCAs. This has also made it difficult to get detailed information about the humanitarian situation. An escalation in conflict intensity since November has further increased the already high access constraints (ACLED accessed 28/02/2023). Constraints on humanitarians’ capacity to reach the population in need remain severe, as do civilians’ ability to access assistance.

Conflict: since November 2022, the intensity of active ground conflict has increased in Luhansk oblast compared to the August–October period. Between November 2022 and January 2023, the oblast recorded the second-highest number of battles of all the oblasts after Donetsk. The most affected areas were Kolomyichykha and Krasnorichenske villages (Svatove raion) and Kreminna and Lysychansk cities (Sievierodonetsk raion) (ACLED accessed 28/02/2023).

Kherson NGCA

Access constraints remained very high between November 2022 and February 2023 in the Kherson NGCA, as in all other NGCAs. Forced displacements and limits to the free movement of civilians were the main drivers of reported access incidents.

Forced displacement: during November–December 2022, the de facto authorities evacuated communities along the left bank of the Dnipro River. Attempts to evacuate from NGCAs carry the risk of forced displacement and arbitrary detentions. In Kakhovka city (Henichesk raion), evacuations focused on people with disabilities and bedridden people (Ukrainska Pravda 02/12/2022). In Oleskiv town, the de facto authorities transferred children from an orphanage to a psychiatric hospital in Crimea (Dmytro Lubinetz Telegram 05/11/2022). Updated information on the status of the evacuated or displaced population and any potential needs is unavailable.

Dnipro River: the Dnipro River is currently the frontline between GCAs and NGCAs, but it is not a possible crossing point. On 4 December, gunfire killed a woman attempting to cross after Ukrainian forces made an exception to allow people to cross into Kherson city. The exact circumstances of her death remain unclear (TWP 04/12/2022; Ukrainska Pravda 04/12/2022 c). Since then, there have been no reported civilian crossings in either direction. There is active conflict on the river (Ukrainska Pravda 10/01/2023 b; KII 07/02/2023).
RECENT ACCESS DEVELOPMENTS IN MYKOLAIV AND NEWLY ACCESSIBLE AREAS OF KHERSON

Current humanitarian access severity scores in newly accessible areas (all scores range from 0–5); please refer to the methodology for a scoring description.

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* Excluding NGCAs

On 11 November 2022, the NGCAs in Mykolaiv oblast and the right bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson oblast became accessible as the areas returned to GOU control. These areas include the southern areas of Bashtanka and Mykolaiv raions in Mykolaiv oblast, the southern part of Beryslav raion, and all of Kherson raion north of the Dnipro River in Kherson oblast (ISW 11/11/2022). Three settlements in the Kinburn Spit of Mykolaiv oblast, an area only accessible from the Kherson NGCA, remain inaccessible and under the control of Russian forces (CEPA 07/02/2023).

Location of the Kinburn Spit

Access constraints in newly accessible areas of Kherson oblast remain very high because of continued shelling and airstrikes, mine and UXO contamination, damage to critical infrastructure, and limited humanitarian presence in rural areas. Damage and destruction to road infrastructure limit humanitarian access to localities away from the large population centres (KII 07/02/2023).

As with previous experiences in newly accessible areas, information on the accessibility of certain areas may not always be readily available or may be contradictory (ACAPS 17/11/2022 and 06/10/2022). There have been cases of regional authorities informing responders that access to a certain area is possible even when access remained constrained. Local authorities remain the best placed to provide up-to-date information on the accessibility of given areas (KII 07/02/2023).

Newly accessible areas of Kherson oblast

Shelling: constant shelling of Kherson city, surrounding areas, and localities along the right bank of the Dnipro River is the main driver of access constraints in newly accessible areas (KII 07/02/2023; KII 21/02/2023; KII 23/02/2023 a; KII 24/02/2023 a; KII 24/02/2023 c). The shelling rate in Kherson oblast has remained high, with 301 reported incidents in November 2022, 290 in December, 333 in January 2023, and 316 from 1–24 February. The most affected localities have been Kherson city, its surroundings, and newly accessible areas along the right bank of the Dnipro River, including Beryslav, Bilozerka, Mylove, Novooleksandrivka, and Tiahynka hromadas (ACLED accessed 28/02/2023).

Number of shelling and airstrike incidents per week in Kherson oblast

| Source: ACLED (accessed 10/02/2023). |
Access of civilians to assistance: the fear of being targeted by heavy shelling is preventing people from going to aid distribution points (NP 25/11/2022).

Violence against humanitarian personnel: on 15 January, Russian shelling hit the premises of a Ukrainian Red Cross rehabilitation centre for children with disabilities. On 14 February, shelling hit the warehouse of a national NGO, injuring one aid worker (Kherson RMA Telegram 15/01/2023; OCHA 16/02/2023).

Mines and UXO: between November 2022 and January 2023, Kherson oblast reported more mine and other explosive incidents than any other oblast. The localities with the most incidents were Beryslav city, Borozenske village, Kherson city, and Velyka Oleksandrivka town (ACLED accessed 28/02/2023).

Disrupted road travel: shelling and the presence of mines and UXO constrain the passage of transport through certain roads, causing an increase in traffic and travel times. The presence of checkpoints further slows travel (KII 24/02/2023 a).

Escort requirements: access of humanitarians to certain villages and settlements along the right bank of the Dnipro River requires escorts. On most days, civilian personnel provide these escorts. When the risk is deemed high enough, the authorities require armed escorts. This requirement may prevent access to these communities for organisations refusing to operate with armed escorts, especially international ones (KII 07/02/2023).

Damage to civilian infrastructure: damage to civilian infrastructure in Kherson oblast was so severe that the GOU called on civilians to evacuate when the areas first became accessible again, as they could not guarantee the provision of basic needs (OCHA 16/11/2022). Before their 11 November 2022 withdrawal, Russian forces looted and damaged houses, businesses, and critical infrastructure, including hospitals, fire stations, and gas, telecommunications, and water infrastructure (Radio Svoboda 03/11/2022; Ukrainska Pravda 18/11/2022).

Access to information: civilians’ access to information on available assistance is lacking, especially for those unable to access the internet or reach aid distribution points (KII 23/02/2023 a; NP 25/11/2022). This difficulty was especially a problem in November, when information on eligibility criteria and when or how to receive assistance was unavailable at aid distribution points. People used social media and messaging applications to share information, but inconsistent connectivity meant that they did not always have access to critical information, and a part of the population did not use digital devices. At the same time, responders lacked up-to-date information on the vulnerable population groups requiring the most assistance, such as elderly people and people with disabilities, as the authorities were unable to update information on vulnerable groups while the areas were still NGCAs (NP 25/11/2022).

Evacuation: in November, a lack of available vehicles and blackout-induced train travel interruptions hampered evacuations from newly accessible areas of Kherson oblast (NP 25/11/2022). In November, some civilians complained about the lack of information on evacuation options (LBA 02/12/2022).

Service provision: following initial repairs after the oblast became newly accessible, local humanitarian responders indicate that constant shelling has reduced the availability of water, gas, and electricity. Security concerns prevent the completion of meaningful repairs. The situation is more severe in rural areas (KII 24/02/2023 a; KII 24/02/2023 c). Russian forces destroyed telecommunication infrastructure before their withdrawal, and providers are restoring these. Repair works are only possible after mine and UXO decontamination (Reuters 16/11/2022). Kherson city has largely restored the supply of electricity and water since it became newly accessible, although some power and water outages remain (LBA 19/01/2023). As at 6 February 2023, around 71% of the population in Kherson GCA were receiving electricity (GOU 06/02/2023).

Response capacity: for some community responders, growing aid flows, improved coordination with other humanitarian responders, and better local knowledge have improved humanitarian access to people in need in newly accessible areas since the initial response began (KII 23/02/2023 a; KII 24/02/2023 a). For others, the regional military administration’s increased control over humanitarian operations, as well as the continued presence of areas with access constraints, has affected the ability of responders to reach people in need (KII 21/02/2023; KII 24/02/2023 c). Constant shelling creates an extremely dangerous security situation, and the regional military administration’s strong role in coordinating the response can be explained as an effort to manage those security risks (KII 21/02/2023; KII 24/02/2023 a). This involvement has led to more vertical coordination via the regional military administration instead of a horizontal coordination structure between organisations (KII 24/02/2023 a). Despite this, coordination between different organisations remains good, according to community responders (KII 21/02/2023; KII 23/02/2023 a; KII 24/02/2023 a; KII 24/02/2023 c).

Mykolaiv oblast

Conflict: since the oblast came under the control of the GOU on 11 November 2022, there is no longer any active ground conflict. The last recorded armed clash on the mainland occurred on 13 November, although some reported clashes occurred on islands near the Kinburn Spit and the Kherson NGCA (ACLED accessed 28/02/2023). As a result, access constraints because of conflict concerns have greatly diminished.

Shelling: shelling has significantly decreased in Mykolaiv oblast but continues to drive safety and security concerns. The number of shelling incidents per day has decreased from...
The shelling of Ochakiv city, located on the opposite side of the Kinburn Spit across the Dnipro-Bug Estuary, has increased since parts of Kherson oblast became newly accessible (KII 21/02/2023).

Access of the affected population to assistance: people living in areas experiencing heavier shelling are less likely to be able to leave their houses to access basic services or humanitarian aid (KII 22/02/2023 a).

Mines and UXO: the presence of mines and UXO continue to drive access constraints, making travelling along certain routes dangerous. Slower travel times also prevent access to certain localities of the oblast for non-government responders, as it is impossible to complete the round trip from Mykolaiv city to those remote areas before the start of the curfew (KII 20/02/2023 a). Newly accessible areas east of the oblast are particularly contaminated with mines and UXO (LBA 19/01/2023). There were four reported incidents involving mines and UXO between November 2022 and February 2023. One affected a member of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, while the other three affected civilians. (ACLED accessed 28/02/2023).

Damage to civilian infrastructure: damage sustained since the start of the February 2022 invasion continues to affect service provision. As at 6 January 2023, the fighting had damaged or destroyed over 14,700 civilian objects in the oblast, including over 9,500 residential buildings, 92 medical institutions, and 397 educational institutions (Ukrinform 06/01/2023).

Service delivery: the provision of water supply to Mykolaiv city has been a concern ever since Russian forces damaged the water supply infrastructure on 12 April 2022. Potable water is only accessible via wells installed throughout the city, raising concerns for people who cannot carry water bottles back to their homes. The tap water available in homes remains non-potable (The Kyiv Independent 17/02/2023). On the other hand, while gas and water are still not available everywhere, there has been an improvement in their availability since November, as authorities transitioned from emergency repairs to more comprehensive reconstruction efforts (Suspilne News 09/01/2023; The Kyiv Independent 17/02/2023; KII 20/02/2023 a; KII 23/02/2023 b). Russian shelling has delayed repairs in Snihurivka hromada and surrounding areas (KII 22/02/2023 a).

Response capacity: some residents of Mykolaiv city feel that newly accessible areas, including Kherson city, are prioritised for humanitarian resources despite Mykolaiv’s continuing humanitarian needs (LBA 02/12/2022). Mykolaiv city is a hub for the humanitarian response in Kherson and parts of Zaporizhzhia, meaning that many large organisations are present, including government organisations, international organisations, INGOs, and large national NGOs. The presence of international responders comes with more complex coordination mechanisms and response regulations. Some smaller local NGOs feel that the space for their activities has shrunk, as complex procedures and regulations limit their scope of work and activities (KII 20/02/2023 a; KII 23/02/2023 b). INGOs have also hired experienced staff from local organisations (KII 23/02/2023 b). At the same time, the presence of many large organisations and the establishment of procedures create aid delivery channels that allow for routine deliveries and faster resolution of response gaps (KII 23/02/2023 b). In Snihurivka hromada and surrounding localities, there were fewer community volunteers in February 2023 compared to November 2022, leading to a decrease in their response capacity. These community volunteers are crucial for aid delivery to settlements that large convoys do not reach, such as small rural hromadas (KII 22/02/2023 a).

NATIONWIDE ACCESS TRENDS

Risk of loss of state assistance for some IDPs: since 14 October 2022, the GOU has amended its rules on IDP assistance to include a provision that allows social security services to conduct random checks on IDPs’ actual places of residence. This change was likely done as a cost-saving measure to limit social assistance spending (KII 20/02/2023 a; KII 23/02/2023 a). If an IDP is not found at the place they indicated in their registration for assistance, social security services will notify them, and they will have ten days to identify themselves at the local National Security Service office. Before the February 2022 invasion, similar verification procedures led to arbitrary assistance suspensions for some IDPs (ORC 30/11/2022). IDPs who have relocated from collective centres but are still registered there are the most at risk from these amendments (OCHA 16/11/2022). Those who cannot provide sufficient documentation and those who do not have a postal address to receive the request to update their information are also at risk of having their assistance cut (KII 20/02/2023 b; KII 21/02/2023; KII 22/02/2023 a). The potential impact will depend on how local authorities handle the paperwork and information flow with IDPs (KII 23/02/2023 a; KII 23/02/2023 b; KII 24/02/2023 a).

Visas: Schengen visa requirements continue to hamper the travel of international humanitarian staff towards Ukraine. Entry into Ukraine is only possible via neighbouring countries, so international staff travelling to Ukraine may need a Schengen visa. Evidence shows that some staff are not able to access Ukraine because of denied and/or delayed Schengen visas. At least one INGO has halted hiring of staff requiring a Schengen visa as a result of these issues (KII 15/02/2023).

Conscription exemptions: as at 27 January 2023, INGOs and NGOs implementing internationally funded programmes could apply for waivers for male Ukrainian staff following a new conscription decree. After approval, the exceptions last for six months (Cabinet of Ministers 27/01/2023). As at mid-February, the exact procedures through which organisations were to submit such requests, including the timeline and additional paperwork required, remained unclear (KII 15/02/2023). Through this decree, the GOU requires organisations to keep
a record of the military status of each male Ukrainian staff member, and it is unclear if those records will have to be submitted in the future (Cabinet of Ministers 27/01/2023; KII 15/02/2023). This necessity could hamper the recruitment of male staff not wishing to have their names on such lists. Exemptions will not be available for smaller local NGOs not involved in the implementation of internationally funded programmes but that remain a critical part of the humanitarian response. The impact of conscription on staff from smaller local NGOs with limited funds to hire competitively is almost on par with staff drain for INGOs (KII 23/02/2023 b).

**Conscription notices:** there is anecdotal evidence of local humanitarian responders receiving conscription notices at checkpoints. As a result, some staff are wary of travelling in southern and eastern areas where more checkpoints are present because of the higher chance of receiving conscription notices (KII 15/02/2023). There is evidence of volunteer groups ceasing or limiting their operations because of the mobilisation of their staff (KII 22/02/2023 a).

**Renewal of martial law:** on 7 February, the Verkhovna Rada approved the presidential decrees prolonging martial law and mobilisation for another 90 days, until 20 May. This extension includes border-crossing restrictions for men ages 18–60, limiting their ability to leave the country and seek safety outside Ukraine (Ukrinform 07/02/2023).

**METHODOLOGY**

The data behind this report was extracted from publicly available and unpublished sources circulated within the response. The narrative presented was based on data analysis, secondary data review, a joint analysis meeting with humanitarian access stakeholders, and key informant interviews. The access severity scores were calculated using the oblast-level data collection of events related to access constraints. The collected access events are available in the humanitarian access events dashboard and dataset. ACAPS pre-defined 75 event types and grouped them into 35 sub-indicators, nine indicators (I), and three pillars. The indicators received a score between 0–3, and the pillars received a score between 0–5. The final access severity score is an average of the three pillar scores.

**Pillar 1:** access of people in need to humanitarian aid

I1. Denial of existence of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance

I2. Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance

**Pillar 2:** Access of humanitarian responders to the affected population

I3. Impediments to entering the country (bureaucratic and administrative)

I4. Restriction of movement within the country (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions)

I5. Interference in the implementation of humanitarian activities

I6. Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets

**Pillar 3: Security and physical constraints**

I7. Continuing insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance

I8. Presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices, explosive remnants of war, and UXO

I9. Physical constraints in the environment (obstacles related to terrain, climate, lack of infrastructure, etc.)

More information on ACAPS’ humanitarian events monitoring and access scoring system is available in the Humanitarian Access Events Monitoring Codebook. For oblast-level scoring in Ukraine, the calculations were done on a continuous numerical scale instead of thresholds, allowing for decimals and a more nuanced result. The resulting scores were classified into the following groups:

0–1 low access constraints

1–2 moderate access constraints

2–3 high access constraints

3–4 very high access constraints

4–5 extreme access constraints.

The score considers temporary sub-indicators, such as active hostilities, statements denying humanitarian needs, and time-sensitive events (checkpoints, aid diversion, weather, fuel scarcity) for 45 days from the day of the first report. A final data validation process for the other sub-indicators ensures their relevance.
LIMITATIONS

The analysis relies on publicly available data, which is unlikely to be comprehensive in a dynamic conflict situation like Ukraine. Reported data may come with some delay, so some published data may no longer be applicable at the time of analysis. This analysis collected data through a review process to check that selected sub-indicators for a given oblast are still relevant. The evolving situation and the amount of data collected mean that some inaccuracies likely remain.

Key informant interviews are a valuable source of additional information, but they only offer a snapshot of the situation based on the respondents’ experiences.

Detailed information on the humanitarian response and the access constraints that NGCAs face is lacking.

There are no access scores for Crimea and Sevastopol, as there is insufficient information to produce a reliable score. Russia has controlled these areas since 2014, and entering from Ukraine has been impossible since then.
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SEVERITY IN UKRAINE

Access severity score as at 28 February 2023
- Low access constraints
- Moderate access constraints
- High access constraints
- Very high access constraints
- Extreme access constraints

Conflict events between 1 November 2022 and 28 February 2023
- Battles
- Explosions and remote violence
- Violence against civilians
- Neighbouring countries
- Autonomous Republic of Crimea
- Territory not controlled by the Government of Ukraine as at 15 February 2023

Sources: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 16/02/2023) and ACLED (accessed 09/03/2023).
### Access severity table as at 28 February 2023 (indicator (I) scores out of 3, pillar (P) and overall scores out of 5)

Scores not taking into account the 'Multiple authorities controlling the territory' access event.