

GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS

October 2021

INTRODUCTION

ACAPS' *Global Risk Analysis* outlines a number of key contexts where a notable deterioration in a particular crisis may occur within the next six months, leading to a spike in humanitarian needs

The risks included in this report were selected because certain events or factors (triggers) may emerge over the coming six months, pointing towards a hazard materialising. The materialisation of a hazard deteriorates the humanitarian situation of the monitored crises.

ACAPS analysts conduct daily monitoring and independent analysis of more than 150 countries, including risk analysis and risk analysis updates. ACAPS closely monitors previously identified risks to see if they materialise. **You can find updates on the risks identified in the [March 2021 Global Risk Analysis](#) at the end of this report.**

For the next six months, ACAPS has identified the following ten risks:

High

Afghanistan
Ethiopia (Tigray)

Medium

Afghanistan-regional
Costa Rica/Nicaragua
Ethiopia (Amhara and Afar)
Haiti/Central America
Niger

Low

Somalia
Sudan
Tunisia

WHAT IS A RISK?

The [ACAPS risk methodology](#) defines risk as the probability of a hazard or multiple hazards materialising, combined with the estimated impact of the hazard(s). The risk level (low, medium, or high) posed by a hazard rises as either or both the probability of it occurring and the severity of the expected impact increase.

Impact is the predicted overall humanitarian consequence of a hazard materialising. It can include an increase in the number of people needing assistance, an increase in the severity of needs, or both. The impact is estimated based on the exposure to the hazard, its intensity, and the population's vulnerability and coping capacity. ACAPS classifies impact on a five-point scale as very low, low, moderate, significant, or major.

Probability is the chance of a hazard materialising. ACAPS assesses probability on a five-point scale: very low, low, medium, high, and very high.

In this report, some of the risks represent 'newly emerging crises,' and others indicate a potential 'rapid and marked deterioration' in an existing crisis. A steadily deteriorating humanitarian situation that continues at the same rate is considered a trend rather than a risk; this report does not include trends.



INTRODUCTION

KEY PRINCIPLES OF RISK ANALYSIS

Risk analysis requires a solid understanding of the context and an investigation of the interaction of variables that could cause or resist change.

Risk analysis is not an exact science. An event identified as a hazard might not evolve or materialise as anticipated, or it might not have the projected impact. Events or factors (triggers) that had been expected to drive a shift or change in the situation may not occur, or new factors might arise that prevent the projected change or shift from happening.

The probability of a risk does not need to be high to warrant concern. A hazardous event with a low or medium probability of occurring should be a cause for concern for humanitarians if we expect its impact to be medium, high, or very high.

LIMITATIONS

- Considering the diversity and complexity of the crises in this report, we cannot cover each in detail. Instead, we have highlighted the broad evolution of each crisis to flag potential deteriorations and inform operational, strategic, and policy-makers.
- This report is about risk analysis, as such it does not present further potential combined factors that could lead to an improvement of a given situation.
- We do not publish our full risk monitoring; we publish an edited version that we deem relevant for the humanitarian sector.
- In this report, we have not considered unforeseen circumstances that may change the course of events (e.g. sudden-onset disasters, including natural hazards such as earthquakes or volcanic eruptions).
- Information gaps limit the analysis.
- While we sought to ensure that all information was current at the time of publication, the fluidity of situations in some countries means that significant changes can occur quickly.

OTHER FORWARD-LOOKING ANALYSIS FROM ACAPS

ACAPS often produces country-specific risk reports, scenarios, and anticipatory notes in our forward-looking analytical work. Some recent publications that complement this global analysis can be found [here](#).

[Read more about our risk methodology](#)



GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS

OCTOBER 2021

Risk level

- High
- Medium
- Low

**The risks identified on this map are expected to materialise within the next six months.*

HAITI/CENTRAL AMERICA

Worsening insecurity and deteriorating living conditions in Haiti increase displacement through Central America, resulting in high food, shelter, and protection needs for migrants and asylum seekers

COSTA RICA/NICARAGUA

Government crackdown on the opposition and economic uncertainty surrounding the upcoming elections result in a spike in the number of Nicaraguan migrants and asylum seekers with food, health, and protection needs

TUNISIA

Prolonged sociopolitical unrest leads to violent protests and localised violence resulting in protection and human rights concerns, humanitarian access impediments, and disruption of the COVID-19 response

NIGER

An increase in attacks targeting civilians leads to displacement and further deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the Tillabéri region

ETHIOPIA - AMHARA & AFAR

Increasingly intense and widespread conflict in Afar and Amhara causes mass displacement, access constraints, food insecurity, and protection concerns

ETHIOPIA - TIGRAY

Intensified conflict in the Tigray region, a sustained humanitarian blockade, and the main harvest being missed for the second time result in mass starvation and deaths

SUDAN

Escalation of conflict between Sudan's Rapid Support Forces and Ethiopian National Defense Force in Al Fashaga district, Gedaref state, results in violence against civilians, displacement, disruption of agricultural activities, and protection concerns

AFGHANISTAN

Financial crisis leads to reduced income and purchasing power, resulting in increased humanitarian needs in Afghanistan

AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, PAKISTAN - REGIONAL DISPLACEMENT

Increased displacement into surrounding countries, particularly Pakistan and Iran, results in increased needs and heightened protection concerns

SOMALIA

Conflict in Mogadishu between pro-government and pro-opposition military forces and increased Al-Shabaab attacks result in displacement and humanitarian access constraints



AFGHANISTAN [1/2]



Risk level | High

Financial crisis leads to reduced income and purchasing power, resulting in increased humanitarian needs in Afghanistan

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

In mid-August, the Taliban took control of Kabul and consolidated power over most of Afghanistan's 34 provincial capitals (AP News 17/08/2021). The new government was announced on 9 September. The cabinet consists mostly of Taliban representatives, some of whom are sanctioned by the US and UN (Gandhara 21/09/2021 and 08/09/2021; Bloomberg 09/09/2021; UNSC 10/09/2021). The political situation is likely to remain unstable because the new government lacks international recognition and the Taliban prioritise internal cohesion over international relations, making it difficult to obtain international support (Afghanistan Analysts Network 06/09/2021; USIP 28/09/2021).

The US froze the Afghan Central Bank assets after the Taliban seized control of the country. As a result, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the EU cut off development and government financial support for Afghanistan (Devex 18/08/2021; The New York Times 21/08/2021). Without international recognition, the Taliban's cabinet will be unable to access

the frozen assets, international aid, foreign currencies, and international transactions. This impairment is likely to cause a liquidity crisis and destabilise the economy, which since 2002 has been dependent on foreign aid (World Bank accessed 19/10/2021; Market Place 16/08/2021). A liquidity crisis would likely push the Taliban to resort to traditional illegal income sources, increasing the risk that Afghanistan will be blacklisted as a country with a high risk of money laundering and terror financing, subjecting it to further sanctions and regulations (UNSC 01/06/2021; Swiss Info 02/09/2021). Such a financial crisis would likely cause Afghanistan's GDP to contract by up to 13% in 2022 (ABC News 02/09/2021; UNDP 09/09/2021). The economy is expected to shrink further, triggered by high inflation, devaluation of the Afghani, a rise in unemployment, and disruption of industrial production, market, and domestic supply chains. With recent events compounding pre-existing drivers of an economic crisis and preventing many options for bilateral financial assistance, Afghanistan will become almost wholly dependent on humanitarian aid via a system unable to meet the widespread needs

IMPACT

About 97% of Afghans are projected to fall below the poverty line in 2022, and 10.8 million are expected to need food assistance between September–December 2021 (OCHA 05/09/2021; UNDP 09/09/2021). The financial crisis is likely to severely affect the already highly economically vulnerable Afghan population, causing a significant increase in the scale and severity of humanitarian needs, mainly because of food insecurity and limited access to essential goods and services. These needs are likely to be compounded by sporadic violence, drought, displacement, and COVID-19 impact.

The livelihoods of those working in the public sector are particularly at risk, as there are doubts about the Taliban's capacity to sustain salary payments (Guardian 22/08/2021). The unemployment rate will likely increase within the formal private sector, pushing more people into informal labour. Workers in the informal sector will face income decline and inadequate social protection.



AFGHANISTAN [2/2]



● Risk level | High

Food and basic commodity prices continue to increase, in line with currency depreciation, inflation, and lack of access to the foreign currencies needed to uphold the import-based economy (Reuters 01/09/2021). Lower income and increased prices will reduce households' purchasing power, rendering more people unable to afford basic goods.

The financial crisis is likely to trigger significant deterioration in living conditions, leading to increased internal displacement towards areas with better services and new sources of income. IDPs will likely rely on limited humanitarian assistance and face shortages of housing options.

High inflation compounded by funding shortfalls and compliance challenges will reduce humanitarian operations. In addition, organisations operating in Afghanistan will face increasing difficulties complying with changing regulations and banking and cash transfer challenges, delaying and restricting financial operations (Devex 30/08/2021; OCHA 05/09/2021).


Afghani exchange rate to US dollar between January 2021 - October 2021



Source: Business Insider (last accessed on 18/10/2021)



ETHIOPIA - TIGRAY



Risk level | High


Intensified conflict in the Tigray region, a sustained humanitarian blockade, and the main harvest being missed for the second time result in mass starvation and deaths

[1/2]

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

Conflict in the Tigray region has displaced over two million people and led to a humanitarian crisis since November 2020. From the start of the conflict until June 2021, heavy fighting in the region has disrupted the 2020/2021 meher harvest season and market functionality, resulting in increased food prices (OCHA 08/03/2021). The destruction and looting of food stocks, livestock, and farming equipment have diminished livelihood opportunities (WFP 06/04/2021). Insecurity, bureaucracy, and logistical issues have prevented aid from scaling up to meet the growing needs. As a result, there is widespread lack of food in Tigray, and malnutrition rates are high. At least four million people are food-insecure, and famine-like conditions and starvation are reported in some areas (WFP 01/10/2021; AP News 20/09/2021; IPC 10/06/2021).

The Government's declaration of a unilateral ceasefire on 28 June and withdrawal of the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) from most of Tigray have not ended the conflict (OCHA 02/07/2021). Instead, the fighting shifted from Tigray to bordering areas in Afar and Amhara regions. Various triggers could shift the conflict back to Tigray, including the end of the rainy season in September (facilitating military movements), the re-engagement of the Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF), who remain in border

areas and in western Tigray, or the advancement of regional forces (Independent 24/08/2021). Without a mutual ceasefire by the end of the 2021 farming season, an intensified conflict would prevent some farmers from harvesting the crops they sowed.

Since July, humanitarian access within Tigray has improved, but commercial and humanitarian movement into the region has effectively been blocked. The transportation of humanitarian supplies is only sporadically feasible via one road in the Afar region. With an intensification of conflict, the affected border areas likely will continue to be blocked, and the access along the Afar route will deteriorate. Fighting will continue to prevent commercial activity. Shortages and depletion of fuel and cash are already occurring and will continue to paralyse movements and the humanitarian response within Tigray, increasing the risk of famine (OCHA 02/09/2021).

IMPACT

Intensified conflict and a sustained blockade will prevent food assistance from reaching people in need and result in the 2021 meher harvest being missed in conflict-affected locations. Food stocks are largely depleted. People have been adopting emergency coping strategies since the start of the lean season in May 2021 (IPC 10/06/2021). Since the conflict began, humanitarian


assistance has been insufficient to meet the population's food needs, and the blockade that began in July has further increased this gap (OCHA 16/09/2021). If the harvest is obstructed, over five million people in Tigray will lose a vital food source. Compounded by insufficient food assistance, that would lead to an exhaustion of coping strategies. Active fighting, the blockade, and the missed harvest would continue to disrupt trade and the importation of food into Tigray, leading to rising food prices in a place where residents have limited cash. Conflict and lack of fuel will restrict people's movement, preventing them from obtaining food assistance.

The food shortage will result in an extreme increase in food insecurity, leading to more malnutrition and health-related complications, aggravated by the lack of WASH and health services. People across Tigray will die from starvation. Already by July, over 400,000 people were projected to be acutely food-insecure in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) (IPC 22/07/2021). Infants and children under five, pregnant and nursing women, older adults, and people with disabilities or chronic diseases face a heightened risk of starvation. People who have received no or minimal food assistance since the conflict began, including many IDPs, will also be of particular concern. Data collection challenges and political sensitivities will prevent experts from officially declaring a famine.




ETHIOPIA - TIGRAY

[2/2]



● Risk level | High

PROBABILITY




IMPACT



Access constraints in northern Ethiopia

Date created: 2021-10-18



Source: UNHCR 09/2021; OCHA 30/09/2021; Logistic cluster 10/10/2021



AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, PAKISTAN – REGIONAL DISPLACEMENT

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


● Risk level | Medium

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



Increased displacement into surrounding countries, particularly Pakistan and Iran, results in increased needs and heightened protection concerns

RATIONALE

The Taliban takeover is likely to increase humanitarian needs in Afghanistan, driving internal and external displacement. The economic and political instability, insecurity, and the limited availability of legal migration routes are likely to push people towards irregular routes to facilitate entry to Iran and Pakistan, whether for transit or long-term stay (MPI 02/09/2021). The number of people who left Afghanistan by official land crossings remained low during July–August, as the borders were mostly closed (UNHCR 01/09/2021). Pakistan and Iran will likely keep their official borders closed to avoid new displacement and to pressure the US and Europe to step in with a third-country resettlement plan (National Review 01/09/2021; The New Humanitarian 30/08/2021). Officials from both countries have stated that they could not accommodate more refugees (Nikkei Asia 07/09/2021; VOA News 30/08/2021).

Closed borders, lack of access to passports and visas, and lack of migration-friendly policies of destination countries are likely

to push people to use irregular migration channels and result in lack of access to international protection (CFR 08/09/2021). Any new arrivals in Pakistan and Iran will join more than 2.2 million registered refugees and three million Afghans of varying status who have been living in those countries for decades (UNHCR 28/08/2021; UNHCR accessed 31/07/2021). Afghan refugees and migrants already face a dire situation in those host countries. Many of them have returned to Afghanistan because of a lack of economic opportunities following the COVID-19 outbreaks or lack of legal status and use of arbitrary arrests and deportations (IOM 19/08/2021; Euronews 10/08/2021; Al Jazeera 26/04/2021). Without designated policies to support them, newly arrived Afghan migrants and asylum seekers are likely to face similar challenges.

Iran and Pakistan face their own economic and political struggles, with Pakistan heavily dependent on international assistance and Iran suffering from strict sanctions (The Wall Street Journal 02/09/2021; World Bank accessed 04/10/2021; The Economic Times 09/04/2021). Both countries are vulnerable to

environmental hazards and high COVID-19 spread. A new migration wave is likely to further stress economies and overwhelm civil services in host countries, leading to increased competition between displaced Afghans and host communities in Pakistan and Iran.

IMPACT

Although there had not been much movement across official crossings as at September, irregular migration has been reported (UNHCR 05/10/2021 and 20/09/2021). In a worst-case scenario, up to 500,000 Afghans could attempt to move to neighbouring countries between September–December 2021 (UNHCR 27/08/2021). Pakistan alone is predicted to receive as many as 700,000 new arrivals in the first year after the Taliban takeover (VOA News 13/07/2021). Both Pakistan and Iran have set up closed camps in preparation. Iran has flagged that they will repatriate Afghans when conditions improve in Afghanistan (Al Jazeera 18/08/2021; The New Humanitarian 11/08/2021; Mixed Migration 18/10/2021).



AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, PAKISTAN – REGIONAL DISPLACEMENT

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
● Risk level | Medium



Displaced Afghans, especially those who are undocumented and resorting to irregular migration channels, are likely to find themselves stranded at the border with increased protection, shelter, and NFI needs. In countries of arrival, displaced Afghans are likely to face unemployment, discrimination, and limited access to financial resources – conditions that will be aggravated by their lack of legal support in foreign countries (The World 12/02/2021; The New Humanitarian 26/01/2021; DW 22/06/2020). Afghans who are undocumented and lack international protection will not be entitled to access essential services. Humanitarian organisations will face challenges to reach people in need because of the difficulty of identifying their locations.

Increased migration to Pakistan and Iran is likely to strain the resources of host communities and fuel those communities' anti-Afghan xenophobia, triggering verbal and physical abuse and harassment (DW 22/06/2020; Dawn 29/09/2021).

Migration routes from Afghanistan into neighbouring countries



(1) UNHCR 08/10/2021 (3) UNHCR 14/09/2021
 (2) UNHCR 23/08/2021 (4) RI 08/09/2021



COSTA RICA/NICARAGUA

[1/2]




● Risk level | Medium

Government crackdown on the opposition and economic uncertainty surrounding the upcoming elections result in a spike in the number of Nicaraguan migrants and asylum seekers with food, health, and protection needs

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

On 7 November 2021, Nicaragua will elect the president and members of the National Assembly. President Daniel Ortega is running for a fourth term. Since the beginning of June, the Ortega administration has jailed or put under house arrest seven opposition presidential candidates and dozens of political activists and civil society leaders (The New York Times 05/09/2021; NPR 09/09/2021). Critics of the Government in all realms – businessmen, human rights defenders, students, doctors, journalists, clerics, and NGOs – have faced political persecution (DW 12/09/2021; El Nuevo Siglo 12/09/2021). Of the 55 NGOs that Nicaragua has prohibited over the past three years, 45 were outlawed between June–August 2021 (El Tiempo 26/08/2021).

The political situation also creates economic uncertainty. The possibility that sanctions will be imposed on the country raises concerns (Fitch Ratings 11/06/2021; The New York Times 05/09/2021; DW 08/07/2021). The US said it would not recognise the outcome

of the elections, and the EU expressed concerns over the process being undemocratic (DW 08/08/2021; AP News 09/08/2021). There are fears that some financial institutions will stop issuing funds to the Nicaraguan Government after the election, given that political instability could reduce the collateral available for loans. Political uncertainty already has increased food prices and is likely to affect critical economic sectors, such as mining and banking (BNAmericas 13/09/2021; Confidencial 01/08/2021). The third wave of COVID-19 appears to have already derailed employment recovery (Confidencial 10/09/2021; El País 21/06/2021). Information on COVID-19 is scarce; medical associations have said the Government is preventing the release of accurate information (IACHR 28/07/2021; The San Diego Union-Tribune 12/09/2021).

The Government's actions against opponents and the potential economic consequences of the elections would likely accelerate the deterioration of the population's living conditions and increase Nicaraguans' displacement to Costa Rica.

IMPACT

Cross-border displacement of Nicaraguans to Costa Rica peaked between 2018–2019 as a result of the crackdown on the Nicaraguan protests that erupted in April 2018. The largest wave of migrants and asylum seekers came in 2019, one year after the crackdown (The New Humanitarian 28/09/2020; Confidencial 12/09/2021). Although Nicaraguan cross-border displacement to Costa Rica has been increasing since 2017, the outcome of the elections and the potential deterioration of the economy could lead to a further rapid rise in the number of migrants and asylum seekers entering Costa Rica, which shares a border of more than 300km with southern Nicaragua and which many Nicaraguans see as a politically and economically stable country. However, Costa Rica's capacity to provide healthcare and education is limited and was further strained by the number of migrants and asylum seekers from Haiti, Cuba, and some African countries transiting to reach the US, which also has increased this year (El Nuevo Diario 17/09/2019; IFRC 23/08/2021; Reuters 02/09/2021).



COSTA RICA/NICARAGUA


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● Risk level | Medium

In 2020, measures taken to contain COVID-19 contracted the Costa Rican economy and caused many migrants to become food-insecure (UN News 28/08/2020; UNHCR 08/2020). New Nicaraguan migrants and asylum seekers in Costa Rica are likely to face similar concerns (The New Humanitarian 28/09/2020). Nicaraguans who face administrative barriers to legally crossing into Costa Rica and cannot obtain visas have been forced to use irregular cross-border movement routes controlled by smugglers and border trafficking networks (Confidencial 23/05/2021; InSight Crime 15/01/2021). Some of them risk falling into the hands of criminal organisations, likely facing high protection concerns (La Nación 21/10/2018; InSight Crime 15/01/2021). On 19 September, Costa Rica announced 15 confirmed malaria cases in La Trocha, a border area with Nicaragua; seven of them were Nicaraguans. An increase in the flow of migrants and asylum seekers also represents a risk of a malaria outbreak in border areas (Delfino 21/09/2021; VOA 23/09/2021; Chaves et al. 30/06/2020).

Nicaraguan asylum applications in Costa Rica in 2021




Source: El Confidencial 12/09/2021



ETHIOPIA - AMHARA & AFAR

[1/2]



Risk level | Medium

Increasingly intense and widespread conflict in Afar and Amhara causes mass displacement, access constraints, food insecurity, and protection concerns

RATIONALE


The conflict, which has been active in the Tigray region since November 2020, began spreading into northern Amhara and northwestern Afar regions in mid-July (Addis Standard 22/07/2021). As at 1 September, fighting in these two regions has displaced more than 370,000 people (OCHA 16/09/2021). More conflict likely will erupt in Afar and Amhara if the Tigrayan forces advance to more zones. Fear of Tigrayan forces attempting to reach Semera (Afar) again and controlling Ethiopia's main supply route from Djibouti port is likely to intensify any conflict in Afar and lead parties to the conflict to request support from allies (International Crisis Group 30/07/2021).

Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) is likely to continue seeking foreign support from Eritrean Defense Force (EDF). Large numbers of EDF members re-entered Ethiopia on 23 August and are present in boundary areas close to the Eritrean border and in western Tigray (Reuters 24/08/2021; OCHA 17/09/2021). If EDF re-engages in the fighting, the armed conflict likely will be further intensified.

During the 1980s insurgency against the military dictatorship in Ethiopia, the Sudanese border with Tigray was an essential supply route for Tigrayans (International Crisis Group 24/06/2021). Currently, EDF and Amhara forces continue to occupy positions in western Tigray to prevent the establishment of a Tigrayan supply route to import food and weapons from Sudan (CrisisWatch Digest 09/2021; Independent 24/08/2021; Reuters 26/07/2021).

Other alliances with non-state armed groups inside Ethiopia will probably be established, following the Oromo Liberation Army's alliance with Tigrayan forces in August (AP 11/08/2021). Attempts to control supply routes and new alliances with more military forces are likely to increase tensions between parties to the conflict, spreading armed conflict into more zones in Afar and Amhara.

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



IMPACT

The escalating tension among armed groups is likely to spread armed conflict to more areas in Afar and Amhara, affecting an estimated 745,000 people in Afar and about 3.3 million in Amhara¹.


Increased insecurity in Afar and Amhara likely will lead to further mass displacement and access constraints. Humanitarian aid is apt to be affected by increased checkpoints, insecurity, and looting of supplies, contributing to worsening food insecurity. Already, nearly 1.7 million people in Afar and Amhara are food-insecure (OCHA 02/09/2021). The number is likely to increase, and food insecurity levels will likely worsen.

¹ The conflict is already affecting north, central, and south Gondar, north Wello, and Awi zones in Amhara region and Kilbati and Fanti zones of Afar region. Further escalation would likely affect south Wello, east and west Gojam, and Oromia zones in Amhara as well as Awsi zone in Afar. The risk exposure is calculated based on the percentage of the total population of those zones experiencing humanitarian needs (50% of the population in Afar and 17% of the population in Amhara).



ETHIOPIA - AMHARA & AFAR

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


● Risk level | Medium


Protection needs for women in Afar and Amhara are likely to increase, as they are highly likely to be subjected to sexual and gender-based violence in conflict areas (Amnesty International 10/08/2021). If EDF enters Afar, some 38,000 Eritrean refugees are likely to have increased protection needs (HRW 16/09/2021; DRC 01/2021).

Health facilities are likely to be overwhelmed by an increase in injuries and malnutrition patients (UNICEF 09/08/2021). Attacks and lootings targeting health facilities in conflict-affected areas in Afar and Amhara are likely, based on similar tactics adopted by parties to the conflict in Tigray (MSF 15/03/2021; AP 03/09/2021). Shelter needs are likely to increase because of mass displacement. The continuing use of school buildings by IDPs will likely affect the start of the school year in October, disrupting access to education (OCHA 30/09/2021).

Demographic information of Afar



Demographic information of Amhara



● Total population ● People in need ● Refugees

Note: Those numbers are likely to be much higher due to the expanding conflict in Afar and Amhara since July 2021

¹ Humanitarian Data Exchange (last accessed 25/10/2021)


² Humanitarian Data Exchange (last accessed 25/10/2021)

³ OCHA 16/09/2021



HAITI/CENTRAL AMERICA


(1/2)



● Risk level | Medium

Worsening insecurity and deteriorating living conditions in Haiti increase cross-border movement in Central America, resulting in high food, shelter, and protection needs for displaced populations

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

Since the beginning of 2021, clashes between rival gangs in Haiti have increased insecurity and displaced more than 19,000 people in Port-au-Prince. Although clashes have decreased since August – when aid organisations negotiated a humanitarian corridor to send aid to southern Haiti after the 14 August earthquake – gangs continue to fight and patrol the streets of Port-au-Prince. This fighting poses a risk for IDPs wanting to return home (The New Humanitarian 07/09/2021 and 20/07/2021; NBC News 28/09/2021; ElPais.cr 27/09/2021). Haiti also faces high political instability stemming from the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and repeatedly postponed general elections (France 24 11/09/2021; Le Nouvelliste 10/09/2021). The destruction of crops and food production infrastructure during the 2021 earthquake in southern Haiti, coupled with high inflation rates and the consequences of Tropical Storm Grace, has resulted in a projection of 980,000 Haitians in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse levels of


food insecurity between September 2021 and February 2022 in the departments of Grand'Anse, Nippes, and Sud (IPC 07/09/2021). Gang violence and the 2021 earthquake have also had a significant impact on access to essential services, increasing the WASH, healthcare, and education needs (UNICEF 04/10/2021; RFI 04/10/2021; Direct Relief 04/10/2021; Notimérica 15/09/2021). The combination of these events is likely to result in an increased number of Haitians leaving the country. Many cross-border population movements from Haiti have been recorded since the 2010 earthquake, mainly to Brazil and Chile (BBC 27/05/2021; El País 09/08/2021). Since 2019 though, there has been a change in migration routes following the outbreak of violent protests against the Government and a new migration law introduced in 2020 in Chile, as well as the health crisis in Brazil initiated by COVID-19 (BBC 27/05/2021; El País 09/08/2021; France 24 17/10/2020; Departamento de Extranjería y Migración 09/2016; Cooperativa.cl 13/01/2018; El País 08/09/2021). Haitian migrants and asylum seekers have started travelling

towards North America more frequently, passing through the Colombia-Panama border and Central American countries (El País 12/09/2021). A further increase in migrants and asylum seekers from Haiti travelling through Central America is highly likely in the upcoming months, given the country's deteriorating living conditions and heightened insecurity.



HAITI/CENTRAL AMERICA

[2/2]



● Risk level | Medium

IMPACT

Haitian migrants and asylum seekers going from South America to North America necessarily pass through the Darien region, a jungle area connecting Colombia and Panama. Between January–August 2021, the Government of Panama registered 70,986 migrants travelling through the country, accounting for almost 40% of the migrants who have passed through Panama over the past 12 years (La Prensa 03/09/2021). Panama only allows 650 people to cross the border per day, resulting in many getting stuck on the Colombian side of the border (France 24 12/08/2021; Caracol Radio 14/09/2021). Organised crime groups in Colombia offer to transport migrants and reportedly use violence to coerce them to carry drugs (Colombian Ministry of Defence 18/08/2021; RCN Radio 28/08/2018).

Some Central American countries have expressed concern about the potential increase in arrivals, citing lack of capacity to speed up migration processes (even when migrants are not going to stay in the country), which could generate new migrants and asylum seekers stuck at the borders of transit countries through Central America (ANPanamá 26/08/2021; Proceso Digital 22/08/2021). The number of migrants in need of shelter and food will likely increase. When in transit at the Colombia-Panama border and through Central America, they will be vulnerable to the activities of organised crime groups, including kidnapping for ransom, gender-based violence, and robbery (El Colombiano 19/02/2019; AP 17/09/20121; The World 13/08/2021).

Migration routes from Haiti to Central America



NIGER [1/2]



Risk level | Medium

An increase in attacks targeting civilians leads to displacement and further deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the Tillabéri region

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

Between January–August 2021, at least 424 civilians were killed in the northern Tillabéri region of Niger, in the border area with Mali and Burkina Faso. Such toll is higher than the number of civilian casualties in all of 2020 (ACLED accessed 13/09/2021). With the loss of land and personnel in central Mali during 2020, following Barkhane forces' airstrikes and clashes with the Support Group for Islam and Muslims, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) group began taking control of territories in western Niger (ICG 28/05/2021). In this drive, the group started conducting attacks against national armed forces and civilians (PCNS 24/03/2021).

While the ISGS used to spare civilians, hoping to gain their sympathy, in 2021 the group started conducting more violent attacks on civilians, particularly community leaders, to force their communities to pay the *zakat*². These attacks became particularly frequent from January, when villagers in northern Tillabéri, mainly belonging to the Djerma ethnic group, began

organising themselves into self-defence groups in response to the *zakat* extortion (France 24 03/01/2021; ICG 28/05/2021; OCHA 12/01/2021).

Attacks targeting civilians in northern Tillabéri are likely to increase, also because of the ethnic dimension of this conflict. The ISGS often recruits fighters among impoverished pastoralists, mainly from the Fulani community, who see recruitment as their only source of income. Pre-existing tensions between Fulani and Djerma communities, instrumentalised by ISGS in its quest to expand its area of control, risk fuelling a cycle of retaliation on an ethnic basis. Reprisals from certain communities against civilians perceived as belonging to the rival ethnic group are already taking place and are likely to escalate.

The very irregular presence of national and international security forces in Tillabéri – especially following the recent partial withdrawal of Nigerien troops from insecure military posts in Tillabéri – creates an opportunity for increased violence against civilians (BBC 12/01/2020; The New Humanitarian 23/09/2021).

² The *zakat* is one of the five pillars of Islam (arkan al-khamsa) and considered to be a religious obligation, other than a form of taxation among Muslim communities. The *zakat* can be a sum of money or belongings that wealthier Muslim donate to the community in order to support the less fortunate, and thus support the wealth of the entire community. For the ISGS, the extortion of the *zakat* started representing an important economic resource, necessary to relaunch its activities after being weakened in central Mali.



NIGER [2/2]




● Risk level | Medium

IMPACT

The increase in violence against civilians will likely displace around 10,000 to 20,000³ people, adding to the 100,000 IDPs already registered in the Tillabéri region (OCHA 02/08/2021). Threats from armed groups will force inhabitants to leave their villages, increasing population movements to areas less affected by the attacks, such as Tillabéri town and other regions of Niger. People's access to health, WASH, education services, land, and humanitarian aid – which already presents high constraints – risks deteriorating further because of the expansion of armed groups into areas previously free from armed presence and military operations. People living near the border with Mali will likely have restricted access to their fields because of security threats on the road and fear of being attacked by ISGS members. Merchants and traders will likely face heightened difficulties in accessing markets given recurring attacks targeting people travelling to markets. Potentially, this will worsen food security and livelihoods. Banibangou department risks being particularly affected as levels of conflict are already high, and in at least 80% of all localities, people do not have access to sufficient food (REACH 07/05/2021). As most of the region's inhabitants do not have access to water, and some must travel long distances to reach a water point, insecurity and humanitarian access constraints will likely increase WASH needs (REACH 07/05/2021). ISGS members' cattle thefts and imposition of taxes likely will further reduce livelihoods.

Number of casualties due to violence against civilians in 2020-2021 in Tillaberi, Niger



Source: ACLED (last accessed 22/10/2021)

3. This estimate was made taking into account the annual average evolution of displaced populations in the Tillaberi region since 2019, while taking into consideration an escalation of conflict in the region (IOM 11/08/2021).



SOMALIA (1/2)



Risk level | Low

Conflict in Mogadishu between pro-government and pro-opposition military forces and increased Al-Shabaab attacks result in displacement and humanitarian access constraints

RATIONALE

In Somalia, failure to hold general elections by February 2021 resulted in disagreements between the Government and the opposition. In April 2021, the Somali Federal Parliament extended President Farmaajo's term by two years, which led to armed conflict in the capital, Mogadishu, between pro-government and pro-opposition military forces. Inter-clan tensions have historically been a significant issue in Somalia, affecting the cohesion of the Somali army, particularly in periods of political instability (ICG 05/05/2021, 27/04/2021, and 16/04/2021; Garowe Online 08/05/2021; AA 06/05/2021; UNSC 23/11/2020).

After repeated failed attempts, negotiations around the electoral process led by Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble resulted in the scheduling of parliamentary elections for October–November 2021. It is unclear when the presidential elections will be conducted. Meanwhile, the opposition leaders' distrust of the President has increased (Garowe Online 19/06/2021 and 20/06/2021). Since 5 September, a serious rift developed between the President and Prime Minister over the replacement of the head of the National Intelligence Security Agency. This incident has further polarised the country and raised political tensions to a level last

witnessed in April 2021. Since the Prime Minister has been spearheading the electoral process, this new political crisis could be a severe setback to the parliamentary elections. There is also a risk of the President staying in office long past his mandated term, leading to further resentment among the opposition.

A possible political stalemate also risks affecting the functioning of security institutions. Coupled with a lack of cohesion within the army, this will likely result in increased insecurity across the country, with armed groups potentially intensifying fighting and gaining more territorial control. Al-Shabaab has already increased its attacks countrywide as part of an attempt to derail the electoral process. From January–September 2021, the group carried out at least 287 attacks in Mogadishu – a 32% increase compared to the same period in 2020. These attacks may continue to escalate as elections are repeatedly delayed, and factions of the army could clash again in Mogadishu (BBC 10/09/2021; Garowe Online 10/09/2021; UNSOM 08/09/2021; ICG 14/09/2021; Security Council Report 30/07/2021; VOA News 21/07/2021 and 12/08/2021; ACLED accessed 06/10/2021).

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



IMPACT

Potential renewed armed conflict in Mogadishu is likely to have a similar impact to the April 2021 conflict. The impact could be much higher if the conflict continues for longer than in April 2021, which lasted ten days. The entire population of Mogadishu likely will be affected in varying degrees. Armed conflict is also likely to lead to the displacement of at least 200,000⁴ people, either internally or across borders to Kenya or Ethiopia. Overcrowding and poor sanitation are significant challenges in Mogadishu IDP camps because of the many IDPs and the lack of WASH infrastructure. Any newly displaced person would experience similar conditions and potentially be exposed to COVID-19 and waterborne diseases. Conflict in Mogadishu would disrupt economic activities and livelihoods. This would add to the impacts of multiple natural hazards (such as drought and floods) on Mogadishu and the rest of the country,

4. The baseline for this estimate is the number of people displaced in the April 2021 armed conflict resulting from disagreements over elections (OCHA 06/05/2021; Global Protection Cluster 09/02/2021).



SOMALIA [2/2]




Risk level | Low

resulting in the deterioration of the affected population’s coping capacity. Increased Al-Shabaab attacks and counterattacks by security forces are likely to increase human rights violations and abuses against civilians, including kidnapping and conflict-related sexual violence. In the event of increased attacks, or if soldiers allied to different political actors take over areas of Mogadishu, insecurity and bureaucratic impediments likely would significantly restrict humanitarian access. Many vital roads within and to/from the city could be sealed off, further hampering access. This would potentially leave the IDP population in Mogadishu, which is close to 848,000⁵, without humanitarian assistance (OCHA 06/05/2021; Amnesty International 21/07/2020; CCCM accessed 10/09/2021; HRW accessed 16/09/2021; CCCM 23/07/2021).


Note: This risk was initially identified by ACAPS in September 2021. At time of publication new significant political developments occurred in the country, which are not captured in the original narrative. On 21/22 October, President Farmaajo and Prime Minister Roble held meetings and reached a truce. They settled their differences after mediation by other Somali leaders and the international community. This makes the probability of the hazard materialising Low (initially set at Medium) and potentially change the expected humanitarian impact (BBC Somali 21/10/2021; BBC Somali 22/10/2021; VOA Somali 21/10/2021).

5. This is the number of IDPs identified in a joint IDP site verification exercise conducted in Mogadishu Dayniile and Mogadishu Khada in July 2021. The operation was carried out by Banadir Regional Authority in conjunction with UNHCR and other agencies (CCCM Cluster 23/07/2021).

Fatalities due to Al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu



Number of Al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu



Source: ACLED (last accessed 06/10/2021)



SUDAN [1/2]




Risk level | Low

Escalation of conflict between Sudan's Rapid Support Forces and ENDF in Al Fashaga district, Gedaref state, results in violence against civilians, displacement, disruption of agricultural activities, and protection concerns

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

The Al Fashaga district is an agricultural area disputed between Sudan and Ethiopia since 1902. Sudanese troops moved into the district in December 2020 and took control of over 90% of the land, evicting Ethiopian farmers and disrupting a land-use agreement that had been in place for over a decade (Crisis Group 24/06/2021).

Resident Sudanese and Ethiopian farmers depend on the Al Fashaga district for agricultural livelihoods and goods (IPC 24/05/2021). In Ethiopia, half of Amhara's population and close to 80% of Tigray's population are projected to be in crisis or above food insecurity levels (IPC Phase 3 or worse) between July–September 2021 (IPC 10/06/2021). With the harvest season approaching in October, clashes are likely to re-escalate between Sudanese and Ethiopian farmers. In October 2020, armed groups from Amhara launched attacks in Al Fashaga to prevent Sudanese farmers from harvesting (ACLED accessed 22/09/2021).

Rivalry over agricultural resources is likely to increase tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia, already running high in 2021 with mutual accusations of destabilising the security situation, which has deteriorated sharply as a result of the expanding conflict in the Ethiopian regions bordering Sudan (MEE 09/09/2021). Tensions are likely to be further aggravated in 2022 in the lead-up to the third filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The Ethiopian army reported killing 50 people attempting to cross from Sudan to attack the dam in early September. This clash has further escalated tensions between the two countries even though Sudan rejected any accusations that it supports groups fighting the Ethiopian Government (Addis Standard 04/09/2021; Sudan Tribune 03/09/2021). Lack of agreement over the functioning of the dam is likely to trigger more insecurity and potential violence (Crisis Group 24/06/2021).


The Al Fashaga district is a strategic area for both Sudan's and Ethiopia's recovery and economic development. Sudan encourages more farmers to settle in the district by investing in road and

agricultural infrastructure linking Al Fashaga with greater Sudan (Crisis Group 24/06/2021). Renewed escalation of tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia will likely result in a flare-up of violence in the district and clashes on the border between Sudan's Rapid Support Forces and ENDF.

6. The entire population of Al Fashaga district, including refugees, is considered to be affected by this risk, as more than 90% of the current population were already in need in July 2021.



SUDAN [2/2]



Risk level | Low

IMPACT

Flare-up of violence in the Al Fashaga district of Gedaref state is likely to result in increased humanitarian needs and civilian casualties and the displacement of at least 36,000 people in Sudan (OCHA 12/07/2021)⁶.

The harvest season is likely to be disrupted and crops damaged, increasing the scale and severity of food insecurity. Over 6,000 people (25% of the population) are likely to become food-insecure if violence erupts in the district (IPC 24/05/2021).


Protection concerns for displaced women and girls staying in overcrowded shelters are serious, as they might face sexual violence and harassment. More than 13,000 Ethiopian and South Sudanese refugees in Al Fashaga would be caught in the clashes and need more protection services (OCHA 12/07/2021). In Ethiopia, clashes on the border are likely to affect movement from western Tigray and Amhara to Sudan, leaving asylum seekers stranded in conflict areas. The increase in fatalities and injuries is likely to overwhelm health facilities in the affected areas. Disease outbreaks related to water and vector-borne disease and COVID-19 are likely and will further exhaust health centres' capacities (OCHA 09/08/2021).

An estimated 3,000–5,000 people are likely to be displaced if violence breaks out (The Washington Post 19/03/2021). Displaced

people are likely to have increased shelter needs, as IDPs will stay in open areas, with relatives, or in school buildings (USAID 15/04/2021).

Note: This risk was initially identified by ACAPS in September 2021. On 25 October, Sudan's military dissolved the transitional government. Although it is still unclear how, this new significant development could affect the probability of the hazard materialising and/or the expected humanitarian impact (AP News 25/10/2021; BBC 25/10/2021).

Affected population in Al Fashaga district



● Total population ● People in need ● Refugees

(1) According to OCHA HDX data for Sudan HNO (last updated on 12/07/2021)

(2) According to OCHA HDX data for Sudan HNO (last updated on 12/07/2021)



TUNISIA [1/2]



Risk level | Low

Prolonged sociopolitical unrest leads to violent protests and localised violence resulting in protection and human rights concerns, humanitarian access impediments, and disruption of the COVID-19 response

RATIONALE


Tunisian President Kais Saied suspended parliament, revoked legislators' parliamentary immunity, and dismissed Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi on 25 July in response to increasing protests against the failure of the COVID-19 response and the economic crisis. This move, labelled by the opponents of the President as a coup, received some public support from the part of the society calling for political reforms in Tunisia, which was heavily affected by the COVID-19 crisis. In 2020, the GDP contracted by almost 9%, and unemployment among young people increased to over 40% (GIEWS 27/07/2021).

The President's decision led to a deepening constitutional crisis. Kais Saied extended the parliament's suspension indefinitely on 23 August and refused to hold dialogue with the Ennahda party, which holds the majority of seats in the suspended government (Reuters 15/09/2021; Washington Institute 31/08/2021; Al Jazeera 24/08/2021). On 22 September, the President's public statements suggested he is likely to seek further constitutional

reform, which could entail complete dissolution of the parliament and drafting of a new constitution, possibly with a more presidential system. On 29 September, the President named a new prime minister, Najla Boden (Al Jazeera 22/09/2021; France 24 12/09/2021; African Arguments 30/08/2021). At the same time, the opposition is consolidating against the presidential moves and calling on the President, the army, and the judiciary to respect the current constitution (MEMO 19/09/2021).

Increasing protests took place in September, both in support of and in opposition to presidential decisions (Al Jazeera 19/09/2021). Growing sociopolitical unrest is likely to trigger violent police and army response, with the president warning that any violent protests will be met with a military response. The army's support of the presidential power grab is concerning, as the Tunisian army rarely gets involved in political matters (Foreign Policy 2/09/2021; Al Jazeera 25/07/2021). The protests are likely to be aggravated by the prevailing political and prolonged economic crisis. Higher mobilisation is anticipated if the economic crisis pushes the President to introduce new aus-

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



terity measures or changes in subsidy policies (ICG 28/07/2021; Reuters 05/05/2021).

IMPACT

Increased protests are likely to trigger disproportionate police response, as the police already were reported using pepper spray against protesters and storming news agencies associated with the government (Al Jazeera 25/07/2021; International Crisis Group 28/07/2021). More violent protests are likely to increase during December–January because of the anniversary of the Jasmine Revolution. If violence erupts, it is expected to happen in Tunisia's three most populated cities: Sfax, Sousse, and Tunis. Up to 100,000 people across Tunisia, including migrants, would likely be most affected by the economic downturn and face humanitarian needs (UNDP 15/12/2020; UNHCR accessed 06/10/2021)⁷.

⁷ The exposure was calculated based on the number of people exposed to multidimensional poverty in Tunisia and the number of registered migrants.



TUNISIA [2/2]




Risk level | Low

Political instability is highly likely to increase protection concerns and human rights violations. People associated with the opposition movements are likely to experience close surveillance and harassment and be subjected to interrogation, arrest, and imprisonment (Al Jazeera 31/08/2021 and 22/09/2021). Movement restrictions, administrative impediments, and information disruption stemming from protests will likely hamper any human-

itarian response (either for migrants or emerging needs). The response to the COVID-19 outbreak is apt to face disruptions as the President announced that the army would take over management of the COVID-19 crisis (Al-Monitor 24/08/2021). Migrants and refugees are among the most affected groups because of the expected movement restrictions, humanitarian access constraints, and lack of livelihood opportunities. Migrant children's

needs for education are likely to increase because they are dropping out of school and engaging in child labour. Insecurity in Tunisia and rising unemployment can encourage smugglers to organise sea crossings to Europe for people looking for better economic opportunities, leading to more deaths or detentions (IOM 28/02/2021 MMC, Save the Children 15/05/2021; Ansamed 31/08/2021).



UPDATE FROM THE MARCH 2021 RISK ANALYSIS

These risks were identified in the March 2021 report; below each risk, we have provided an update on the situation.

In this report, ACAPS gave particular attention to the risk updates on Lebanon and Myanmar because not only have the risks materialised, but significant developments have occurred since the publication of the *March 2021 analysis*. The Yemen risk update refers to the risk initially raised in the *Global Risk Analysis* published in *October 2020* and then updated in the *Global Risk Analysis of March 2021*. As the risk remains relevant for preparedness purposes, a new update is included in this report.

COLOMBIA — ● High risk level

Significant escalation of conflict leads to increased displacement, attacks in urban areas, and reduced humanitarian access, as well as a spike in the number of confinement events and attacks on social leaders

Following the demobilisation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP), many non-state armed groups in the country have fragmented, and new groups have emerged. Armed groups are particularly present along the border with Venezuela in areas such as Catatumbo and along main narco-trafficking routes, including northern Antioquia, Chocó, and the wider Pacific Coast region. Fighting for control over territory and illicit economies (such as drug production and trafficking) has intensified, leading to an overall conflict escalation, especially in Antioquia, Arauca, Cauca, Chocó, and Nariño departments, as identified in the previous risk report (Pares 11/06/2021; Pares 20/10/2021; ACAPS 29/04/2021). State presence and response capacity are limited, especially in rural areas, leaving many affected populations with little assistance (OCHA 28/08/2021). Clashes between armed groups for the consolidation of control over disputed areas, including areas previously controlled by the FARC-EP, have led to increased displacement and confinement, as was raised in the ACAPS March 2021 risk analysis (MSF 24/08/2021). Conflict escalation also led to spillover into Venezuela, as various armed groups already control areas at the Colombia-Venezuela border. On 23 March, clashes broke out between some FARC-EP dissident groups and the Venezuelan

army on the border. The fighting displaced 5,000 Venezuelans to the department of Arauca, on the Colombian side of the border (El Tiempo 29/03/2021).

The economic and political situation in the country has not yet allowed for a reduction of violence and inequality as per the 2016 Peace Agreement, and the state still lacks presence in some regions of the country. Armed groups have taken advantage of the situation, organising attacks and expanding territorial control (Europa Press 24/08/2021; Justice for Colombia 25/02/2021; The Washington Post 14/06/2021).

LIBYA — ● Low risk level

Disruption of the political process leads to conflict escalation and an increase in humanitarian needs

The Government of National Unity (GNU) has been acting as interim government since February 2021, but the political situation in Libya remains fragile. Although the political process has not been disrupted, the continued disputes and divisions between the Presidential Council, the House of Representatives, the High Council of State, and the Libyan National Army remain a serious concern for the political process. The House of Representatives passed a no-confidence motion against the GNU on 21 September. The motion was rejected by international stakeholders and the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), which reiterated that the GNU remained the legitimate government of Libya until a new government is formed through legitimate elec-



tions (UNSMIL 21/09/2021). The legal framework for legislative elections, now scheduled for 24 December, was only announced by the parliament on 4 October (Al Jazeera 04/10/2021; RFI 04/10/2021). Ministers have criticised the parliament for not approving the budget submitted by the Presidential Council, restricting their ability to provide services. The opening of the coastal road connecting the west of the country to the east, which was a part of the ceasefire agreement, was delayed until the end of July (Reuters 30/07/2021; UNSMIL 30/07/2021). In the meantime, mercenaries, foreign fighters, and private military contractors did not leave the country despite national and international demands (Al Jazeera 22/05/2021; AP News 03/09/2021). Armed clashes were reported in early September in Tripoli, threatening the stability of the ceasefire (UNSMIL 03/09/2021; Al-Monitor 03/09/2021; Al-Arabiya 31/08/2021 and 31/08/2021). Attacks on water infrastructure and oil resources are used to pressure authorities. These attacks increase the risk of hindered access to essential services and could lead to social unrest (UNSMIL 21/08/2021; UNICEF 01/08/2021; Al-Arabiya 14/08/2021 and 27/06/2021).

Humanitarian needs remained stable in the past six months, and IDP numbers decreased from over 245,400 at the end of February 2021 to over 212,500 at the end of June 2021 (IOM 25/04/2021 and 26/08/2021).

NICARAGUA — ● Medium risk level

New legislation that highly limits humanitarian operations adds to unmet needs and worsens humanitarian conditions

Since the end of 2018, following the protests that took place across the country, the Nicaraguan Government has issued several laws that restrict the exercise of human rights and any form of opposition (Amnesty International 15/02/2021). In October 2020, the nation enacted the Foreign Agents Act, which requires all people and entities (including humanitarian organisations and agencies) that receive foreign funds or goods to register with the Government and report on activities monthly to continue operating in the country (Government of Nicaragua 15/10/2020). As highlighted by ACAPS in March 2021, there were signs that this new legislation would be used to close down or limit the presence of humanitarian organisations that were not aligned with the Government.

From the beginning of the protests until September 2021, 55 NGOs have been outlawed in Nicaragua (the vast majority under this new regulation), 49 of them in August 2021 (El Tiempo 26/08/2021; CNN 26/08/2021). Several of these organisations provided health assistance, economic aid, and emergency response to natural disasters (DW 27/08/2021; CNN 26/08/2021). Amid the third wave of COVID-19 and an unstable economic and political situation, access restrictions for humanitarian agencies and organisations have been increasing during the campaign for Daniel Ortega's re-election (DW 21/05/2021; Confidential 10/09/2021). Since July, the wave of political persecution and



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

access restrictions on humanitarian organisations has resulted in increased migration of Nicaraguans to Costa Rica and the United States (*The New York Times* 05/09/2021). The closure of these aid organisations is also likely to increase the health and food needs of the Nicaraguan population, the principal recipient of humanitarian aid.

UKRAINE — ● Medium risk level

Moderate conflict escalation in Donbas leads to casualties and an increase in humanitarian needs

Conflict escalation between Ukraine and Russia did not occur as projected in the risk raised in ACAPS' March 2021 Global Risk Analysis. However, the low-level conflict in east Ukraine continues. Political tensions and military movements between Russia and Ukraine increased at the end of March 2021, when an estimated 100,000–150,000 Russian troops moved to the western border of Ukraine. Although Russia removed the troops by mid-May, the countries raised mutual accusations of military preparedness activities. Military preparations continued when Ukraine received USD 275 million from the US Defense Department assistance initiative between March–June 2021 (*Al Jazeera* 19/04/2021, 21/04/2021, 22/04/2021, and 11/05/2021; *EU* 12/04/2021; *UNIAN* 02/03/2021; *Kyivpost* 12/06/2021).

Ceasefire violations tripled in the second quarter of 2021. Over 26,700 violations were reported compared with the first quarter of 2021, with over 8,600 violations including the use of heavy weapons. Thirty civilian casualties were reported along the

contact line in April–June 2021, compared with six reported in January–March 2021. Civilian casualties in April–June 2021 were even higher than April–June 2020, despite a significant decrease in ceasefire violations compared with 2020. Most of the civilian casualties in April–June 2021 were caused by mines or unexploded ordnance. This hazard restricts people's movements and prevents IDPs from returning to their homes (*OSCE* 05/05/2021 and 19/08/2021).

Shelling on clean water pumping stations in eastern Ukraine puts water supply at risk. The Northern Pumping Station of Donetsk City stopped water distribution for several hours in May 2021. A similar incident damaged electricity lines and stopped water pumping in April 2021 at the First Lift Pumping Station, which provides clean water to Mariupol, Volnovakha, Pokrovsk, and Dobropilia in government-controlled areas and to Donetsk, Yasynuvata, Dokuchaievsk, Yasne, and Olenivka in nongovernment-controlled areas (*NGCA*) (*WASH Cluster* 07/04/2021, 07/05/2021, and 02/07/2021).

VENEZUELA — ● High risk level

Worsening living conditions and reduced access to humanitarian assistance and basic services lead to a spike in displacement to Colombia

As raised by ACAPS in the March 2021 Global Risk Analysis, national NGOs in Venezuela continue to face difficulties as the Government's registration process remains challenging, resulting in delays in the implementation of activities (*Caraota*

18/08/2021). Government harassment pushes national civil society organisations, NGOs, and INGOs to suspend or limit their operations. This decreases the organisations' ability to implement programmes to respond to people's needs, increasing the number of people in need in Venezuela (*Cronica Uno* 26/08/2021). Nationwide fuel shortages have hampered the movement of people and goods, including humanitarian aid, and limited people's access to food and essential services such as healthcare (*Bloomberg* 23/07/2021; *AA* 29/05/2021).

The economic crisis also drives humanitarian needs in the country. Continued hyperinflation is causing a further increase in prices of essential commodities, while household purchasing power remains low – as illustrated by the monthly minimum wage, which could buy 1% of the monthly basic food basket in June 2021 (*CENDA* 06/2021). The prices of food and services remained the same, while the minimum wage decreased and hyperinflation continued between February–June 2021 (*CENDA* 06/2021). As a result, access to basic services and goods, including food, continues to be increasingly challenging (*Perfil* 19/07/2021). The deteriorating living conditions in Venezuela have resulted in continued migration flows to Colombia. Contrary to expectations, no spike in displacement to Colombia was recorded in the past months. Between February 2021–September 2021, the number of Venezuelans residing in Colombia remained at around 1.7 million (*GIFMM* 05/09/2021).



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

WESTERN SAHARA — ● Low risk level

Localised fighting and coercive protection environment results in increased protection needs and limited access to services

Tensions continue between the Polisario Front and Morocco over Western Sahara after the announcement of the end of the 29-year-long ceasefire on 13 November 2020. No significant developments have been reported since a temporary escalation of fighting in November 2020. That escalation led to a slight increase in humanitarian needs because of the displacement of over 4,700 Saharawi people to Tindouf camps in Algeria. Newly displaced people were reported in need of food and shelter. More people fled to Mauritania, but there is no information on their number or needs. Humanitarian needs also increased because of the disruptions in commercial activities through trading crossing points near the conflict-affected area. Saharawi activists continue to encounter discrimination, harassment, arrest, and assault (Amnesty 26/05/2021; Front Line Defenders 14/05/2021; Al Jazeera 13/11/2020; key informant interview 02/09/2021).

There were several political developments around Western Sahara in the past six months, including diplomatic tensions between Morocco and Spain and between Morocco and Algeria. Diplomatic tensions between Morocco and Spain increased in May 2021 after Spain hosted Saharawi and Polisario politicians in need of medical treatment. In mid-May, Morocco responded to that act of hospitality by allowing about 10,000 migrants, mainly Moroccans, to cross from Morocco to the Spanish Ceuta, con-

trary to agreements. Most of those migrants have been returned to Morocco (InfoMigrants 16/08/2021; Al Jazeera 14/08/2021; France 24 18/05/2021; Middle East Eye 02/06/2021).

Tensions between Algeria and Morocco escalated in late August, with Algeria announcing the end of diplomatic relations with Morocco, citing the Western Sahara issue. Morocco considered this decision one-sided. The Algerian airspace closed for all Moroccan planes on 22 September (Al Jazeera 24/08/2021 and 22/09/2021).

YEMEN — ● High risk level

Continued depreciation of the Yemeni rial drives inflation up, reducing households' purchasing power and access to basic needs

The value of the Yemeni rial (YER) in Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) areas continued to deteriorate. The risk identified in October 2020 materialised and the currency might continue to depreciate at a faster and higher monthly rate. At the end of July 2021, the rial in IRG areas surpassed the exchange rate of YER 1,000 to USD 1 and continues to go up (YETI accessed 16/09/2021). Before the war, the exchange rate was YER 250 to USD 1. Lack of bilateral funding to the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) in Aden and limited crude oil exports have reduced foreign currency reserves. This, along with competing monetary policies, is driving the depreciation.

The depreciation of the rial is a significant driver of food insecurity because Yemen relies on imported food for 90% of its needs. In August, the monthly food basket price in IRG areas was 16.7% higher than in May and 60% higher than in August 2020 (FAO accessed 16/09/2021). Rising costs, coupled with minimal income opportunities, are increasingly affecting Yemeni households' purchasing power, resulting in a larger number of families depleting their savings and assets and adopting further negative coping strategies. Yemen's economy and the currency value in IRG might improve thanks to the International Monetary Fund's allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) equivalent to USD 665 million to Yemen. The SDR units will be allocated to the IRG and CBY-Aden, which will then look to exchange the SDR units with another country for hard currency or foreign currency reserves, helping to stabilise the Yemeni rial exchange rate. CBY-Aden has not yet made public how it intends to use the funding (Reuters 23/08/2021).

Yemeni rial exchange rate can be found at yemen.yeti.acaps.org



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS | LEBANON

LEBANON — ● Medium risk level

Subsidies for basic goods are removed, leading to a marked deterioration of economic conditions and food insecurity and an increase in political violence

The risk of deterioration of economic conditions resulting from subsidies removal has been gradually materialising over the past six months. In July, the Government stopped subsidising medications that cost less than 10,000 Lebanese pounds (LBP) (The New Humanitarian 04/08/2021). Fuel subsidies were significantly reduced following the removal of the preferential official government exchange rate price in June. The exchange rate rose from LBP 1,500 to USD 1 to LBP 3,900 to USD 1 (Al Jazeera 25/06/2021). The exchange rate for fuel prices increased again in August and reached LBP 14,000 to USD 1 in September (Reuters 22/09/2021; National News 12/08/2021). The significant fuel price increase resulted in fuel shortages and hoarding and affected essential services in Lebanon, including healthcare, power supply, and water treatment (Euro-Med Monitor 15/08/2021; UNICEF 23/07/2021).

The currency devaluation led to a significant increase in basic commodities prices. The LBP hit a record low in July–August when it traded between LBP 18,000–22,000 to USD 1 on the parallel market, while the official rate remained at LBP 1,507 to USD 1 (BDL accessed 08/09/2021; Lira Rate accessed 08/09/2021). Based on the multidimensional poverty index, 82% of Lebanese people live in poverty in 2021, up from 42% in 2019 (ESCWA 03/09/2021). People from Akkar, Baalbek-Hermel, Nabatieh, and South Lebanon governorates reported the highest levels of extreme poverty. In 2021, 1.47 million people (Lebanese and


migrants) need food assistance – a 47% increase from 2020 (OCHA 05/08/2021 and 14/08/2020; WFP 16/08/2021).

Deteriorating living conditions led to increased protests and riots. Between March–August 2021, these increased by more than 75% over the previous six months (National News 03/09/2021; Al Jazeera 09/08/2021; ACLED accessed 15/09/2021).

The formation of a new government on 10 September could potentially stabilise the economy by restarting negotiations with the International Monetary Fund to mobilise aid and boost the reserve liquidity, as Lebanon’s central bank reserves were rapidly

depleting (Al-Monitor 10/09/2021; Al Jazeera 16/09/2021). The previous caretaker government announced that the subsidies programme would be phased out after September 2021 and replaced with direct cash support (Reuters 09/09/2021). The removal of petrol subsidies will likely result in price increase and shortages, resulting in deteriorating living conditions and limited ability to meet basic needs, particularly for people experiencing multidimensional poverty. Although the Government still subsidises chronic illness medications and wheat, rising prices and shortages of bread and medicines are being reported. Further scarcity of bread and medicines will continue to aggravate food insecurity and the health sector crisis.

Protests and riots, and currency exchange rate in Lebanon



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS | MYANMAR

MYANMAR — ● Medium risk level

The militarisation of political space and public sphere and escalation of violence by military junta results in greater access constraints, worsening of needs, and heightened protection concerns, particularly for ethnic minority groups

The risk of militarisation of the political space and the escalation of violence in Myanmar largely materialised in the past six months. Following the military coup on 1 February 2021, the military junta established the State Administrative Council and imposed a year-long state of emergency, later extended until August 2023. The declaration allowed the junta to consolidate power without holding elections (Myanmar Times 02/02/2021; Reuters 15/02/2021; Al Jazeera 01/08/2021).

Two competing governments contest governance: the military junta and the opposition shadow National Unity Government formed after the coup (The Diplomat 19/04/2021). The National Unity Government holds no real control over Myanmar but retains the support of the Civil Disobedience Movement, the anti-coup armed resistance People's Defence Force (PDF), and several ethnic armed groups. The anti-coup resistance (including the People's Defence Force, the Civil Disobedience Movement, and other protesters) was met with military arrests, detentions, and the disproportionate use of violence – particularly in areas where both the People's Defence Force and ethnic armed groups are active (CASS 08/09/2021).

Over 1,000 civilian casualties were reported during protests in the seven months after the coup (Reuters 27/08/2021). Military clashes with anti-coup armed resistance forces resulted in large-scale displacement in new regions, mainly in the south-


east, where over 140,000 people have remained displaced since May (UNHCR 27/08/2021).

Basic service providers such as the health and education sectors have been severely disrupted by the insecurity and the suspensions of essential staff who oppose the coup (OHCHR 06/07/2021). Disruption of basic services and the banking sector, political instability, and COVID-19 resulted in economic decline and increasing poverty (World Bank 23/07/2021). By early 2022, 12 million additional people are at risk of living below the poverty line, which would add up to almost half of Myanmar's population (UNDP 30/04/2022).

Two million people became in need of humanitarian assistance since the military coup (HCT in Myanmar and OCHA 12/07/2021).

Humanitarian access is more constrained because of clashes across the country. The political crisis has added operational and logistical challenges, including limited cash availability related to the banking disruptions (OCHA 27/08/2021).

Low-scale anti-coup armed resistance, which has been most active in rural areas with ethnic minorities, has been spreading into urban areas since May 2021 (ACLEDD 04/06/2021). Geographic expansion of insecurity, coupled with the political unrest, is expected to reshape the impact and scope of the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, and the situation is likely to continue to deteriorate in the next six months (CASS 01/09/2021). Ethnic minorities are particularly at risk of facing heightened protection concerns, including forced recruitment and the recruitment of youth into ethnic armed groups (CASS 25/08/2021).



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