acaps

# HUMANITARIAN ACCESS EVENTS MONITORING

**Codebook**

February 2024

## INTRODUCTION

This document outlines the structure of the ACAPS Humanitarian Access Events Monitoring Dataset. The dataset tracks humanitarian access events on a global level, using various publicly available sources, including – but not limited to – local, regional, and international operational and non-operational humanitarian organisations; UN agencies; media; and social media platforms. ACAPS collects and reviews data regularly and continuously updates the dataset.

## METHODOLOGY

Humanitarian access involves three essential components: (1) the access of humanitarian responders to people in need of assistance and protection, (2) the access of those in need to the goods and services essential for their survival and health, and (3) obtaining access in a manner consistent with core humanitarian principles.

In general, to assess the humanitarian access situation, data collectors need to identify the factors and stakeholders influencing humanitarian access and the relationships between them. A factor can be anything that directly or indirectly influences access. Factors may have a positive enabling or negative constraining influence. The Humanitarian Access Methodology uses a range of qualitative and quantitative information sources together with relevant datasets and collates these in a structured way.

The framework is as follows.

- Humanitarian access is divided into **three core pillars**.
- These pillars are broken down into **nine indicators**.
- These indicators are broken down into **34 subindicators**.

ACAPS has identified categories to track access events (one-time events, policies, or recurrent practices) that impede humanitarian access, as shown in the graph below.

### Figure 1. Humanitarian Access Framework

| Subindicator | Subindicator |
|:---:|:---:|
| Indicator | |
| Pillar | |

## Table 1. List of access events and their relative framework

| PILLAR | INDICATOR | SUBINDICATOR |
|---|---|---|
| **Pillar 1 - access of people in need to humanitarian aid** | Indicator 1 - denial of existence of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance | S1.1 - public statements denying the needs of people in need |
| | | S1.2 - discrepancies between humanitarian needs and public statements |
| | | S1.3 - the denial of the entitlement to assistance to certain groups or areas |
| | Indicator 2 - restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance | S2.1 - physical obstruction to service access (e.g. besieged areas, travel restrictions) |
| | | S2.2 - bureaucratic and administrative requirements to access assistance (e.g. requirement of specific documents for service access) |
| | | S2.3 - the forced displacement of people in need away from services |
| **Pillar 2 - access of humanitarian organisations to people in need** | Indicator 3 - impediments to enter the country (bureaucratic and administrative) | S3.1 - complex, costly, and time-consuming registration processes |
| | | S3.2 - the denial or random assignment of the registration of organisations |
| | | S3.3 - constraints on the import of relief items and equipment and staff visas and permits |
| | | S3.4 - aid organisations systematically not being allowed to operate |
| | Indicator 4 - Restriction of movement within the country (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions) | S4.1 - country not entirely controlled by the same authority |
| | | S4.2 - administrative impediments (e.g. taxes, fines, quotas) on the passage of goods or people to reach people in need |
| | | S4.3 - checkpoints towards or in the affected areas |
| | | S4.4 - the closure of crossings to the affected areas |
| | | S4.5 - organisations being put on hold despite being ready |
| | Indicator 5 - interference into implementation of humanitarian activities | S5.1 - authorities or other groups imposing conditions on aid delivery |
| | | S5.2 - politics and humanitarian issues overlapping in the country |
| | | S5.3 - aid diversion or confiscation |
| | Indicator 6 - Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets | S6.1 - aid workers killed |
| | | S6.2 - aid workers kidnapped |
| | | S6.3 - aid workers injured |
| | | S6.4 - aid workers assaulted |
| | | S6.5 - aid workers arrested |
| | | S6.6 - aid-related premises looted |
| **Pillar 3 - physical, environmental, and security constraints** | Indicator 7 - insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance | S7.1 - violence inhibiting the affected population from moving freely and safely to where humanitarian assistance is available |
| | | S7.2 - targeting or attack of public services, such as hospitals, schools, and other civilian facilities |
| | | S7.3 - violence leading to the relocation of humanitarian staff and/or the temporary or permanent suspension of humanitarian activities |
| | Indicator 8 - presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), explosive remnants of war (ERW), and unexploded ordnance (UXO) | S8.1 – confirmed contamination (km2) |
| | | S8.2 - suspected contamination (km2) |
| | | S8.3 - casualties |
| | Indicator 9 - Environmental constraints | S9.1 - rainy season (e.g. snow, monsoon, seasonal impediments) |
| | | S9.2 - severe infrastructure disruption |
| | | S9.3 - logistical constraints on consumable goods (e.g. fuel scarcity, internet cut-offs) |
| | | S9.4 - logistical constraints on infrastructure (e.g. remote locations of those in need, travel difficulties) |

# FRAMEWORK DESCRIPTION

## PILLAR 1. Access of people in need to humanitarian aid

This pillar includes all the information about the constraints (denial/obstruction) imposed to the people in need and the people affected and exposed in their access to the humanitarian responders, services, and assistance present in the affected country or area.

### INDICATOR 1. Denial of existance of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance

This indicator includes statements that demonstrate a recognition or denial of the needs of a population or the rights of minorities and any discrepancy between the reported humanitarian needs and official statements.

### SUBINDICATOR 1.1. Public statements denying the needs of people in need

This subindicator focuses on tracking and analysing the public statements of government officials, community leaders, and other authoritative bodies that specifically deny the needs of populations in dire need of humanitarian assistance. The aim is to measure the extent to which authoritative discourse rejects reported and observed humanitarian needs.

#### Examples

- A government press release explicitly states that "there is no hunger crisis" in an area where multiple reports and data have already highlighted severe food insecurity.

- A community leader publicly announces that medical assistance is not required in a region recently affected by a natural hazard, contradicting NGO and healthcare assessments.

- An independent body reports on the subhuman conditions in refugee camps, but the Government insists that the refugees are being well taken care of.

### SUBINDICATOR 1.2. Discrepancies between humanitarian needs and public statements

This subindicator focuses on tracking and analysing the **public statements of government officials, community leaders, and other authoritative bodies** that specifically d**ownplay the needs** of populations in dire need of humanitarian assistance. The aim is to measure the extent to which authoritative discourse contradicts reported and observed humanitarian needs.

#### Examples

- International health organisations report a growing number of cholera cases in a refugee camp, indicating a health crisis, but the Government declares only a limited number of cases.

- Gender-based violence rates rise sharply in conflict areas, as indicated by data collected by women's rights NGOs. On the contrary, officials suggest that these reports are "culturally biased" and state that "what is considered violence in one culture might not be in another".

- Educational NGO surveys show that most schools are closed in a conflict zone and children are missing out on education, while a community leader claims in an interview that "children are better off learning traditional skills at home rather than wasting time in a formal school setting".

### SUBINDICATOR 1.3. The denial of entitlement to assistance to certain groups or areas

This subindicator pertains to **explicit or implicit public statements, policy decisions, and actions** by government or authoritative bodies that selectively **deny humanitarian assistance to specific groups or geographical areas.** These actions may be based on ethnic, religious, political, or other types of affiliation. The subindicator serves as a measure of discriminatory practices that can severely impede equitable aid distribution and the universal right to humanitarian assistance.

#### Examples

- An official policy or statement indicates that humanitarian aid will not be extended to members of a particular ethnic or religious group despite evidence of need.

- The party in control deliberately excludes certain areas from receiving humanitarian assistance given their strategic importance, political alliances, or as a form of collective punishment.

- The authorities decide to not distribute food aid to informal settlements based on stigmatising public statements that deem residents as undeserving of aid.

## INDICATOR 2. Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance

This indicator refers to the affected population's perspective. It assesses whether people are prevented from reaching aid or services through various restrictions, such as the blockage of border crossings for those seeking refuge, administrative barriers, and specific documentation requirements. Sieges, roadblocks, curfews, and harassment should be considered.

Note: subindicators belonging to indicator 2 may be related or unrelated to subindicator 1.3, as they pertain to obstacles in accessing humanitarian assistance. That said, while subindicator 1.3 examines the deliberate denial of aid based on group affiliation, indicator 2 evaluates physical restrictions to accessing aid from the perspective of the affected population (actual occurrence). They may be unrelated to the denial of assistance as indicator 2 is not directly associated with entitlement denial. For example are cases where obstructions occur independently of earlier policies or laws – or vice versa, when aid denial occurs independently of physical access barriers.

### SUBINDICATOR 2.1. Physical obstruction to service access (e.g. besieged areas, travel restrictions)

This subindicator examines the tangible barriers that prevent or limit the access of affected populations to humanitarian aid and services. These physical obstructions are man-made challenges to strategically imposed limitations, such as sieges, roadblocks, and travel restrictions. The focus is on understanding how these barriers affect the capacity of people in need to reach and benefit from humanitarian interventions.

#### Examples

- In conflict zones, a conflict party imposes a siege around a city or area that prevents the entry of humanitarian aid, such as food, medicine, and clean water.

- The authorities impose curfews or movement restrictions that prevent people from accessing humanitarian services, such as clinics, food distribution centres, or shelters.

- The Government closes borders to prevent refugees or migrants from crossing into a territory where they could access humanitarian aid.

- Armed groups, law enforcers, or community members harass or intimidate those trying to access humanitarian services, effectively serving as a physical deterrent.

- The State enacts a law or gives out orders restricting movement in a way that is targeted and deliberately done, affecting civilians.

### SUBINDICATOR 2.2. Bureaucratic and administrative requirements to access assistance (e.g. requirement of specific documents for service access)

This subindicator examines the **bureaucratic and administrative hurdles** that limit or obstruct the ability of people in need to access humanitarian aid and services. It focuses on policy-level decisions that manifest as tangible barriers, often requiring the affected population to present specific documents or fulfil administrative criteria that may be impractical under crisis conditions. These requirements can serve as de facto mechanisms of exclusion, limiting equitable aid access.

#### Examples

- The authorities insist on formal identification, such as a national ID or passport, to access food aid or medical services, which can be a major barrier for displaced people, refugees, and other marginalised communities.

- The State requires extensive financial or asset documentation for aid qualification, delaying or preventing access to immediate needs, such as emergency healthcare or food distribution.

- Complex or cumbersome application procedures to receive assistance are not easily navigable for all, particularly those with limited literacy or language skills.

- Special permits are required for movement across certain areas to reach aid stations, which may be difficult to acquire given bureaucratic inefficiencies or intentional policy barriers.

### SUBINDICATOR 2.3. The forced displacement of people in need away from services

This subindicator evaluates instances when affected populations are **forcibly moved or relocated away from areas where humanitarian assistance and services are available**. Such forced displacement can result from a range of actions, including official policy decisions, military operations, or coercive tactics by non-state groups. The subindicator aims to describe the extent to which forced displacement intentionally serves as a mechanism for limiting access to humanitarian aid.

#### Examples

- The party in control deliberately removes specific ethnic or religious groups from areas where humanitarian aid is available, often as part of broader discriminatory policies.

- An armed group forcibly removes marginalised communities, such as informal settlements, away from areas with existing humanitarian services, such as healthcare and food distribution centres.

- Military activity forces populations to flee their homes, pushing them into regions where humanitarian aid is scarce or unavailable.

- Refugees or asylum seekers are forcibly repatriated away from border areas where they can access humanitarian assistance

.

## PILLAR 2. Access of humanitarian organisations to people in need

This pillar focuses on information about constraints imposed on **humanitarian responders** in their access to the people in need, affected, or exposed.

### INDICATOR 3. Impediments to enter the country (bureaucratic and administrative)

This indicator refers to registration, accreditation, and visa policies; the provision of taxes or fees on activities or goods; policies related to import and logistics; visa or accreditation delays or denial; discretional registration or visas by authorities; and the presence of humanitarian organisations and workers being allowed to operate in the country.

**SUBINDICATOR 3.1. Complex, costly, and time-consuming registration processes**

This subindicator assesses the **difficulty, financial burden, and temporal demands** associated with the **registration procedures** that humanitarian organisations and individuals must undergo to operate within a given jurisdiction. It captures how procedural complexities, financial costs, and delays in registration processes can impede the capacity of humanitarian entities to efficiently access a country and assist people in need.

#### Examples

- High registration costs deter smaller NGOs or humanitarian groups from even initiating the registration process.

- Requirements to obtain permissions from various governmental or administrative bodies each come with their own set of complex guidelines and timelines.

- Unspecified or overly lengthy processing times for registration delay the initiation of humanitarian projects.

**SUBINDICATOR 3.2. The denial or random assignment of the registration of organisations**

This subindicator examines **the arbitrariness and lack of transparency in the approval or denial of registration** for humanitarian organisations seeking to operate in a specific jurisdiction. It investigates instances when there appears to be no consistent or objectively justifiable rationale for decisions made by authorities concerning the registration of humanitarian entities. This randomness undermines predictability and reliability, ultimately serving as an impediment to humanitarian responders attempting to access a country and assist affected populations.

#### Examples

- Organisations are denied registration based on political affiliations or objectives not explicitly stated in registration criteria.

- Vague or discretionary criteria for approval allow authorities to selectively stall or deny registration based on non-transparent grounds.

- The registration of organisations from specific countries is denied without transparent guidelines.

- Organisations are met with prolonged silence or lack of feedback during the registration process, only to be followed by a sudden denial.

- The sudden and unexplained revocation of previously granted permissions to operate is often accompanied by a public discrediting of the organisation.

**SUBINDICATOR 3.3. Constraints on the import of relief items and equipment and staff visas and permits**

This subindicator examines the **regulatory and procedural impediments** imposed on the importation of essential **relief items and equipment,** as well as on visa and permit acquisition for humanitarian personnel. It identifies the administrative, logistic, and bureaucratic bottlenecks that hinder the smooth transit of both material aid and human resources into the affected jurisdiction. These constraints can manifest as tariffs, permit requirements, inspection delays, visa restrictions, or other administrative challenges that inhibit the efficacy and timeliness of humanitarian interventions.

- Excessive taxes or customs duties are imposed on relief items, effectively increasing operational costs.
- Visas for humanitarian staff are denied or delayed without sufficient explanation, affecting the deployment of vital personnel.
- Difficulties in acquiring necessary permits for special equipment, such as radio communications gear or medical devices, lead to operational delays.

## SUBINDICATOR 3.4. Aid organisations systematically not being allowed to operate

This subindicator evaluates the complete systemic or institutionalised prohibitions that prevent humanitarian organisations from operating in a given jurisdiction. It reveals the extent to which the operating environment is systematically hostile to humanitarian responders.

**Examples**

- The State enacts laws that outright prohibit the operation of foreign humanitarian organisations.
- Note: the prohibition should be collective and involve all humanitarian organisations. If the prohibition is random, then previous subindicators should be selected.

# INDICATOR 4. Restriction of movement within the country (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions)

This indicator refers to the presence of **taxes and fines on the passage of goods and people**, quotas and limits on relief items in specific areas, the seizure of assistance, organisations being put on hold despite readiness to intervene, checkpoints, or the closure of border crossings.

## SUBINDICATOR 4.1. country not entirely controlled by the same authority

This subindicator refers to the **lack of unified governmental or authoritative control over a country's entire territorial jurisdiction,** focusing on how such fragmentation affects the freedom of movement and administrative functioning of humanitarian responders. It encompasses situations where various regions, provinces, or zones within a country are controlled by different political, ethnic, or armed groups, each with its own set of rules, policies, and administrative procedures.

**Examples**

- Varying rules for the import of relief items depend on which authority controls the entry point.
- Humanitarian organisations are required to obtain multiple permits or licences to operate in different regions controlled by different entities.
- Conflicting tax regimes in areas controlled by different groups add a financial burden and administrative complexity for aid organisations.
- Differing security guidelines and protocols across territories make it challenging to ensure the safety of humanitarian workers.

## SUBINDICATOR 4.2. Administrative impediments (e.g. taxes, fines, quotas) on the passage of goods or people to reach people in need

This subindicator assesses the **bureaucratic and financial barriers imposed by authorities that impede the movement of goods and people** involved in humanitarian assistance within the country itself. It encompasses all forms of financial requests, including taxes and fines, as well as quotas or limits set on the transportation of specific goods or individuals. Such administrative impediments can serve to either intentionally or unintentionally restrict effective aid delivery to people in need.

**Examples**

- Humanitarian organisations are required to pay import taxes on essential relief supplies, such as medicine, food, or tents, and to reach and deliver in certain areas.
- Multiple checkpoints charge fees from humanitarian responders and each require separate payments to different factions or administrative bodies.
- Unpredictable or inconsistent fines against humanitarian staff are without clear justification, often as a means of harassment or obstruction.
- Unfavourable or manipulated exchange rates increase the effective cost of humanitarian assistance delivery.

**SUBINDICATOR 4.3. checkpoints towards or in the affected areas**

This subindicator evaluates the **existence and impact of checkpoints set up by governmental, military, or non-state entities on routes leading to or within areas affected by humanitarian crises**. The presence of such checkpoints can obstruct or delay the free movement of humanitarian responders, goods, and services, complicating or impeding access to people in need. This should take into account the reported number, location, and nature of these checkpoints, as well as any fees, fines, or other requirements imposed for passage.

### Examples

- Armed forces set up checkpoints to control movement in conflict zones, often resulting in extended delays for security checks and sometimes demanding bribes or 'fees' for passage.

- Non-state armed groups control specific areas and set up their own checkpoints, potentially creating dangerous situations and leading to ad hoc 'taxes' or 'fees'.

- Local communities suspicious of outsiders set up informal barriers, which may require negotiation and local engagement for passage.

**SUBINDICATOR 4.4. The closure of crossings to affected areas**

This subindicator assesses the **frequency, duration, and impact of the closure of critical transit points,** such as roads, bridges, or border crossings, leading to areas affected by humanitarian crises. State or non-state entities often impose such closures for various reasons, including security concerns, political motives, or administrative restrictions. These closures severely impede the free movement of humanitarian responders, supplies, and services, limiting or completely obstructing access to affected populations.

### Examples

- The authorities close roads or entire regions in the wake of terror attacks, civil unrest, or military operations.

- In areas of active conflict, crossings are closed or become too dangerous to traverse, requiring humanitarian responders to seek alternative routes or means, such as airdrops.

- The authorities specifically close crossings to aid organisations or certain population groups, such as refugees or specific ethnic or religious communities.

**SUBINDICATOR 4.5. Organisations being on hold despite being ready**

This subindicator examines instances where **humanitarian organisations are fully prepared to deliver aid or services, but external constraints prevent them from doing so**. These constraints can be legal, administrative, or security-related and often delay or completely halt planned interventions.

### Examples

- Organisations are ready to intervene but have to wait for security clearance from local or international authorities.

- Organisations have the resources lined up but have to wait for governmental or administrative permissions to operate in a specific area.

- Interorganisational conflicts or lack of coordination result in delays even when different organisations are prepared to act.

- Concerns about public or international perception cause organisations to pause operations, especially given sensitive or potentially controversial situations.

- Organisations are operationally ready but await the release of funds from donors or governing bodies.

## INDICATOR 5 - Interference into implementation of humanitarian activities

This indicator refers to factors such as conditions imposed on the type of aid or the modality of aid delivery. It includes operational restrictions by the Government and aid confiscation or diversion.

### SUBINDICATOR 5.1. Authorities or other groups imposing conditions on aid delivery

This subindicator refers to the explicit or **implicit stipulations, guidelines, or requirements set forth** by governmental or non-governmental entities that **humanitarian organisations must adhere to for aid provision.** These conditions can affect recruitments, the type of aid that can be provided, the target population, the regions that can be accessed, or the manner of aid delivery.

#### Examples

- The Government imposes specific security measures or escorts that draw out the aid delivery process.
- Excessive bureaucratic documentation are required post-aid delivery, straining humanitarian organisations' resources.
- A militant group controlling a region requires all aid to be delivered through their own distribution system.
- Authorities dictate that aid workers can only be hired from specific nationalities or certain ethnic or religious groups.

### SUBINDICATOR 5.2. Politics and humanitarian issues overlapping in the country

This subindicator refers to the **intertwining of political agendas, decisions, or power dynamics with humanitarian efforts** in a given context. The overlapping often manifests as political considerations influencing or constraining humanitarian operations, which should ideally be neutral, impartial, and independent. This can manifest in a variety of ways, from overt aid politicisation to more subtle forms of influence that condition the operational environment for humanitarian activities.

#### Examples

- International sanctions against a particular country complicate the logistics and legality of humanitarian operations, forcing humanitarian organisations to navigate a complex web of regulations. The growing frequency of this issue is evident in the escalating complexity of navigating humanitarian operations amid international sanctions, requiring organisations to address regulatory hurdles and logistical challenges.
- Counterterrorism measures inadvertently hinder aid financing by imposing strict financial regulations that make it difficult for humanitarian organisations to operate in certain countries/regions, delaying or interrupting aid delivery. Banks also hesitate to process transactions involving areas deemed high-risk for terrorism, further complicating the flow of funds to humanitarian efforts.
- Governmental bodies allocate aid preferentially to areas politically aligned with them, mixing political objectives with humanitarian imperatives.
- Donor countries attach political conditions to their funding, influencing which crises get attention and which do not.
- Political entities exploit humanitarian crises for propaganda purposes, disseminating misleading information that affect aid delivery and reception.

### SUBINDICATOR 5.3. Aid diversion or confiscation

This subindicator refers to the **unauthorised redirection, seizure, or appropriation of humanitarian aid or supplies** intended for affected populations. This act may be perpetrated by governmental bodies, armed groups, or other non-state entities. Confiscation is the act of authorities or parties in control taking possession/confiscating/seizing humanitarian warehouses or assets, while diversion includes fraud, corruption, bribery, terrorist financing, money laundering, and other misuse of funds that prevents funds from being directed to the aid outcomes or recipients intended.

#### Examples

- Humanitarian supplies being transported to an affected area are confiscated at a government or armed group checkpoint and not returned.
- Authorities or other groups seize aid supplies and stockpile them, often for political leverage or to distribute under their own name to gain social or political capital.
- Financial aid meant for specific humanitarian activities is seized and reallocated for other, often politically motivated purposes.

## INDICATOR 6. Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets

This indicator refers to security incidents, including attacks, abductions, executions, kidnappings, and lootings of humanitarian warehouses or humanitarian assets.

### SUBINDICATOR 6.1. Aid worker killed

This subindicator refers to targeted the assassination or **killing** of humanitarian personnel during attacks by armed groups on humanitarian facilities.

### SUBINDICATOR 6.2. Aid worker kidnapped

This subindicator refers to the **abduction** of humanitarian personnel for ransom or political leverage, often carried out by non-state groups.

### SUBINDICATOR 6.3. Aid worker injured

This subindicator focuses on aid workers being **wounded** during crossfire, in armed attacks against their facilities, or through intentional assault.

### SUBINDICATOR 6.4. Aid worker assaulted

This subindicator deals with **physical attacks or abuse** targeting humanitarian staff or facilities, often to intimidate or deter them from performing their duties.

### SUBINDICATOR 6.5. Aid worker arrested

This subindicator looks at the unlawful **detention** of aid workers by authorities, usually under false or politically motivated charges.

### SUBINDICATOR 6.6. Aid-related premises looted

This subindicator refers to the theft of humanitarian assets, including supplies, vehicles, and data.


## PILLAR 3. Physical, environmental, and security constraints

This pillar includes all the information about **external untargeted factors**, including security, violence, land contamination, weather, and physical environment, that constrains the delivery and access of humanitarian services and assistance, affecting humanitarian responders, people in need, and people affected and exposed.

## INDICATOR 7. Insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance

This indicator refers to the presence of hostilities or violence affecting humanitarian operations, leading to decisions to divert or suspend aid or evacuate or modify operations.

### SUBINDICATOR 7.1. Violence inhibiting the affected population from moving freely and safely to the where humanitarian assistance is available

This subindicator focuses on the impact of **continuing violence on the mobility of the affected population,** affecting their ability to access critical humanitarian aid, and/or on humanitarian responders and their access to the affected people. The continuous state of insecurity restricts the free and safe movement of individuals to areas where humanitarian assistance, such as food, medical supplies, or shelter, is available.

#### Examples

- Active military conflict confines people to their homes, preventing them from reaching distribution sites.

- In areas where criminal gangs/armed groups control specific neighbourhoods, residents are unable to cross territories to reach areas where humanitarian aid is distributed.

- Fear of harassment, assault, or abduction while travelling to aid distribution points deter people from making the journey.

Note: to effectively differentiate between Pillar 3, Subindicator 7.1, and Pillar 1, Subindicator 2.1, it is essential to understand their distinct focuses and contexts. Subindicator 7.1 under Pillar 3 centres on active violence and its impact on the affected population's mobility, particularly how insecurity hampers movement to areas where humanitarian aid is available (untargeted). This indicator is relevant when documenting situations where violence directly impedes aid access, such as conflicts where hostilities create physical barriers to aid delivery. Conversely, Subindicator 2.1 of Pillar 1 examines physical obstructions regardless of violence, encompassing scenarios such as besieged areas, travel restrictions, and curfews. It is crucial to log information for this indicator

when detailing instances of deliberate barriers imposed by authorities or armed groups that hinder access to humanitarian services. In some cases, both indicators may overlap, such as during conflict situations where violence contributes to physical obstructions to aid access. In such instances, documenting information for both Subindicators 7.1 and 2.1 provides a comprehensive understanding of the challenges faced by populations in accessing humanitarian assistance amid conflict and insecurity.

**SUBINDICATOR 7.2. Targeting or attack of public services, such as hospitals, schools, and other civilian facilities**

This subindicator evaluates the extent to which **public services and civilian infrastructure**, such as hospitals, schools, and other non-military facilities, are **deliberately targeted** or subjected to attacks in the context of insecurity and hostilities.

### Examples

- Deliberate or indiscriminate air strikes or artillery attacks on hospitals not only disrupt healthcare services but also violate international humanitarian law.

- Armed groups or military forces occupying schools for military purposes expose these civilian spaces to attacks, disrupting education and endangering children and staff.

- Sabotage or attacks on water treatment facilities deprive communities of clean water.

**SUBINDICATOR 7.3. Violence leading to the relocation of humanitarian staff and/or the temporary or permanent suspension of humanitarian activities**

This subindicator evaluates the level of **violence and insecurity and their impact on humanitarian operations.** Specifically, it measures whether violence is causing the repositioning of humanitarian staff or leading to a t**emporary or permanent interruption** of activities.

### Examples

- The increasing intensity of armed conflict in a specific area prompts humanitarian organisations to move their staff to a safer location.

- A spate of terror attacks targeting humanitarian facilities leads to the permanent cessation of operations in certain regions.

- Repeated kidnappings of humanitarian workers result in the withdrawal of an organisation from an area, leaving the affected population without vital aid.

- Extreme security risks in one area lead an organisation to redeploy its resources to a more secure region, affecting the original target group.

## INDICATOR 8. Presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), explosive remnants of war (ERW), and unexploded ordnance (UXO)

This indicator looks into how the presence of landmines, IEDs, UXO, or ERW might hinder humanitarian access.

**SUBINDICATOR 8.1. Contaminated area (CHA, SHA, cluster munitions – km2)**

This subindicator refers to confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) affected by l**andmines, cluster bombs or cluster munitions, and IEDs.** This aspect critically informs the assessment of physical and security barriers faced by humanitarian organisations in delivering aid and services, as well as the risks posed to affected populations.

**CHA:** an area where the presence of mines/ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

**Antipersonnel landmines:** explosive devices designed to injure or kill people.

**Antivehicle or antitank mines:** devices designed to explode when triggered by a vehicle.

**Cluster bombs or cluster munitions:** weapons containing from several to hundreds of explosive submunitions. They are dropped from the air or fired from the ground and are designed to break open in mid-air, releasing submunitions and saturating an area that can be as wide as several football fields.

**IED:** a device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An IED may be victim-activated or command-detonated. IEDs that can be activated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person are called victim-activated.

**Improvised mine, also improvised landmine and improvised antipersonnel landmine**: an IED acting as a mine, landmine, or antipersonnel landmine.

**SUBINDICATOR 8.2. Other contaminated area (km2)|**

This subindicator refers to suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) affected by **unexploded cluster submunitions, UXO, abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), and ERW.** This aspect critically informs the assessment of physical and security barriers faced by humanitarian organisations in delivering aid and services, as well as the risks posed to affected populations.

**SHA:** an area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

**Unexploded cluster submunitions**: submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming UXO.

**UXO:** weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended, becoming UXO. These unstable explosive devices are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines.

**AXO:** explosive ordnance that has not been used during armed conflict, has been left behind, and is no longer under the control of the party that left it behind. It may or may not have been primed, fuzed, armed, or otherwise prepared for use.

**ERW:** explosive munitions left behind after a conflict has ended. They include unexploded artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munitions. Under the international legal definition, ERW comprise UXO and AXO but not mines.

**SUBINDICATOR 8.3. Casualties**

This subindicator captures the resulting **casualties caused by any type of land contaminatio**n (mentioned in Subindicators 8.1. and 8.2).

Casualty: the person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

Survivors: people who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.

Victim: an individual killed or injured by a mine/ERW explosion (casualty), their family, and community.

## INDICATOR 9. Enviromental constraints

This indicator looks into seasonal events or weather conditions as well as pre-existing infrastructure. The status of roads, bridges, and airfields are also considered, along with communication and logistical constraints, such as lack of fuel or assets hampering physical accessibility to people in need.

**SUBINDICATOR 9.1. Rainy season (e.g. snow, monsoon, seasonal impediments)**

This subindicator refers to the constraints and complications arising from s**easonal weather phenomena**, such as heavy rains, snowfall, and monsoons. It captures how these conditions can have a damaging effect on pre-existing infrastructure, notably roads, bridges, and airfields.

**Examples**

- Monsoon rains lead to flooding in a region, making roads impassable and disrupting aid deliveries.
- Heavy snowfall in mountainous regions blocks critical roads, delaying humanitarian convoys.
- The rainy season triggers landslides, isolating remote communities from essential services.
- Seasonal weather conditions result in the temporary closure of airports, disrupting the supply chain for aid materials.
- Weather conditions interrupt communication networks, hampering coordination among humanitarian responders.

**SUBINDICATOR 9.2. Severe infrastructure disruption**

This subindicator evaluates the extent to which critical **civilian infrastructures** (not intended for military use), such as roads, bridges, airfields, ports, electricity grids, health facilities, educational facilities, and communication networks, **are disrupted, damaged, or rendered unusable by natural disruptions** (e.g. natural hazards, severe weather events). It aims to capture how these disruptions impede humanitarian responders' ability to access people in need and how they affect the capacity of affected populations to reach points of aid and essential services.

**Examples**

- A key bridge providing the only access to a remote village collapses because of a natural hazard, cutting off aid supplies.
- A natural hazard leads to a prolonged electricity outage, affecting hospitals and other essential services.
- A cyclone damages a key seaport, delaying the arrival of essential aid and supplies.

**SUBINDICATOR 9.3. Logistical constraints consumable goods (e.g. fuel scarcity, internet cut-offs)**

This subindicator examines the extent to which the **availability/lack of essential consumable goods,** such as fuel, food, water, and medical supplies, affects the logistical efficiency of humanitarian operations. It focuses particularly on constraints that limit the operation of vehicles, generators, and other equipment crucial for aid delivery and other humanitarian activities.

**Examples**

- Limited fuel availability halts or severely restricts the movement of humanitarian convoys, aircrafts, and ships, delaying essential supply delivery to people in need.
- The scarcity of essential goods lead to the proliferation of black markets, making it difficult and more expensive for humanitarian organisations to acquire what they need.
- Scarcity inflates essential goods prices, increasing operational costs for humanitarian activities.
- In areas experiencing economic instability, rapid fluctuations in the value of the local currency add an additional layer of complexity to acquiring consumable goods.

**SUBINDICATOR 9.4. Logistical constraints on infrastructure (e.g. remote locations of those in need, travel difficulties)**

This subindicator focuses on the **physical and logistical barriers** that impede the access of humanitarian responders to affected populations – specifically, the challenges posed by the **remoteness of the locations** of communities in need. It also looks at the difficulties encountered because of poorly developed or damaged infrastructure.

**Examples**

- The isolation of villages or settlements delay the provision of necessary services and resources, requiring more robust logistical planning and resources.
- Geographical constraints, such as in high-altitude or mountainous regions, present unique logistical challenges for transportation.
- In some areas, the absence or unreliability of public transport systems pose a constraint for local staff and beneficiaries alike.

## SOURCES

ACAPS' data is derived from a range of credible publicly available sources, such as reports from international and local humanitarian organisations, UN agencies, human rights organisations, think tanks, international and local media, social media platforms, and governments (official sites, embassies, etc.). Analysts and data collectors use their expert judgement in deciding what data to include.

## LIMITATIONS

ACAPS aims to monitor and track humanitarian access events daily. This dataset presents a broad coverage of the reported information to flag events that may affect access to the aid and basic services that humanitarian responders provide. The goal is to inform operational, strategic, and policy decision makers, although there are some limitations.

- Considering the diversity and complexity of different crises, some types of events may appear to fall outside the given categorisation.
- Data might not be complete because of the high volatility of some crises, and some events might be recorded with some delay.
- ACAPS relies on open sources and the judgement of trained data collectors in selecting the most reliable sources. We do not have operational presence in every country, meaning some events might not be recorded.
- Linguistic and capacity barriers might prevent ACAPS from identifying all the available information.
- When ambiguous or conflicting data is found, we hold an analytical discussion to reach a common agreement on coding.
- Considering the diversity and complexity of different crises, some information is lacking and underreported.

If you think an access-related event is not currently in the dataset and should be added, please contact us at info@acaps.org.

## DATA COLLECTION AND REVIEW

A team of ACAPS data collectors collects the data. These data collectors are trained on data collection methods, the humanitarian access methodology, the inclusion criteria, and the dataset structure. The intended coverage of the dataset includes the countries where, according to ACAPS methodologies, there is an active humanitarian crisis.

ACAPS collects data daily from a wide range of reports. The data collectors then aggregate the information per event type and administrative level. If the source includes information relevant to multiple event categories, it will be repeated, and separate lines will be created in the dataset. Each line in the dataset should include information relevant to one event.

The collected data goes through a review process to check the completeness, validity, and reliability of the information included.

## DATASET STRUCTURE

Data is logged in the dataset following these rules.

- Data collection is done at administrative level 1.
- If the whole country (all of admin 1, maybe) is affected, the event is tagged as countrywide.
- If the same source covers one event in multiple administrative level 1 areas, it is logged in one row.
- One data point refers to one event.
- If the same source covers multiple types of events, the source is logged in separate rows.

## Data is uploaded to the dataset according to the following structure and coding system:

| VARIABLE NAME | FORMAT | DEFINITION | CODES |
|---|---|---|---|
| ID | Numeric | Unique code for every entry | None |
| Country name | Text | Dropdown list | None |
| ISO3 | Text | Country ISO3 code | None |
| Crisis ID | Text | Unique code for every crisis. Some countries have one crisis. When there are multiple crises within a country, the country-level crisis is an aggregation of the different crises at the country level. | None |

| VARIABLE NAME | FORMAT | DEFINITION | CODES |
|---|---|---|---|
| Countrywide | Checkbox | Checkbox marked if the event affects all the administration level 1s in the country | Administration 0 |
| ADM1 | Text | Administration 1 code | The largest subnational administrative region where the event took place |
| ADM1 name | Text | Administration 1 name (English standard) | The largest subnational administrative region where the event took place |
| Subindicator | Text | - | See Table 1 |
| Indicator | Text | - | See Table 1 |
| Pillar | Text | - | See Table 1 |
| Targeting specific population groups | Text | Dropdown list with the age, sex, gender, disability, language, religion, ethnic or tribal affiliation, political affiliation, displacement status, sexual orientation, and membership in other population groups relevant in this context | - |
| Event date | Date (DD/MM/YYYY) | Date of the event | None |
| Description | Text | Narrative description of the event | None |
| Source name | Text | Source name | None |
| Source date | Date (DD/MM/YYYY) | Publication source date | None |
| Source link | Text | Source link | None |
| Additional source | Text | Other publications and alternative sources that support the findings | None |

## USER CASE

ACAPS internally uses this dataset to estimate the scores in the Global Humanitarian Access Index. The data is fed into the model based on the relevant subindicators, and a final score is provided at both crisis and country levels. More information on the methodology behind this, as well as the most recent report, are available at https://humanitarianaccess.acaps.org/.

## REFERENCES

ACAPS, Humanitarian Access Methodology Note, 12/2021: https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Technical_notes/20211207_acaps_humanitarian_access_methodology_note_december_2021.pdf

Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Humanitarian Access in Situations of Armed Conflict: Practitioners' Manual, 12/2014: https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/Human-access-in-sit-of-armed-conflict-manual_EN.pdf

OCHA, Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework, 05/2012: https://www.unocha.org/humanitarian-access

OCHA, Minimum Package of Services on Access, 31/12/2019: https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/world/ocha-minimum-package-services-access

The Monitor, Glossary of Terms, accessed 09/2019: http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/the-issues/glossary.aspx