

Social impact monitoring report: April-June 2022

CONTEXTUAL ISSUES CAUSING NEGATIVE SOCIAL IMPACTS

The Social Impact Monitoring Project (SIMP) report has been scheduled to be produced quarterly in 2022. The first two editions of the year are intended to mirror each other to consider the impact of the truce between the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG) and the de-facto authority (DFA) in the north of Yemen (also known as the Houthis). The truce commenced on 2 April 2022 initially for two months before being extended for another two months until 2 August. Both editions focus on the three themes that emerged from a review of available data across the first six months of 2022. This approach is to compare the impact of the themes on people before and during the truce.

The three highlighted themes are:




-  conflict and associated impacts (across the country)
-  cultural, social and religious control (in DFA-controlled areas)
-  decreasing purchasing power (across the country).

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About the report

The SIMP report identifies events and themes emerging from information on Yemen between April–June 2022 that have had or are likely to have a social impact. The product uses a general definition of social impact, which is the effect on people and communities of a specific action or event or the lack of action to intervene in a situation. Themes were chosen based on the considered significance of their impact (or potential impact) on people as already observed and through time. The report aims to support the understanding of the groups and categories of people in Yemen facing the greatest challenges in meeting needs and those most vulnerable to protection concerns.

Limitations


There is limited information available, specifically related to the impact of the conflict on groups and categories of people identified as vulnerable. The nature of available information, which is mainly qualitative, also makes it difficult to compare and aggregate data on a continuous and countrywide basis. ACAPS has confidence that the approach used to monitor and analyse events likely to have a social impact provides a structured way of improving the understanding of social impact within these constraints.

Methodology

The analysis presented in this report is based on:

- the daily monitoring of relevant indicators logged in the ACAPS qualitative database
- the analysis of data from ACAPS' core dataset
- the secondary data review of documents published in and on Yemen
- discussions with context experts
- key informant interviews and discussions
- a collection of small case studies through interviews to capture the impressions and experiences of people living in Yemen.


Yemen: Events with social implications between April-June



Source: (HNO 04/2022; ISW 18/06/2022)

Disclaimer: The boundaries, names, and designation provided on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by ACAPS

Description of trends:



Conflict and its associated impacts across the country


Reduced civilian casualties and impact on critical infrastructure

This improvement manifested through the following reported statistics:

- Civilian casualties decreased by 58% from 1,095 in the first quarter (Q1) of the year (January–March) to 457 in Q2 (April–June) – largely because of the decrease in shelling incidents and zero reported incidents of air strikes.
- Armed violence affecting critical infrastructure decreased by 54% in Q2 compared to Q1 and by 63% compared to the same period in 2021. Armed violence affecting education, fuel, and telecommunications facilities also decreased by 100%, with zero reported incidents compared to 45 in Q1 (nine on education, eight on fuel stations, and 28 on telecommunications). On the other hand, there were over 287 reported incidents of armed violence affecting civilian houses compared to 535 in Q1 (Protection Cluster 14/07/2022).

Despite the improvements outlined above, small arms fire incidents increased mainly in Aden, Amran, Shabwah, Sana'a city, and Ta'iz, with the number of casualties rising from 70 in Q1 to 127 in Q2.

Civilian casualties 2018-2021



Source: Protection Cluster accessed 20/07/2022

Decreased displacement from Q1

A decrease in fighting, shelling, and air strikes reduced displacement numbers by 60% in Q2. Regardless, the number of returnees to their districts or governorates of origin remained low (IOM accessed 27/07/2022). Anecdotal observations suggest that as the conflict decreased, people remained where they were likely because of limited financial resources for moving, establishing a life in their current area of residence, or a lack of trust in the truce and its ability to continue.

Displacement decreased but continued, with the main reasons being conflict and violence. Displacement for economic reasons also increased compared to Q1 and the same period in 2021. People moved mainly from Al Hodeidah, Ibb, and Ta'iz governorates towards Ma'rib governorate. There is a need for further monitoring to understand the reasons and to know if there are active tensions over limited resources.

A perception of security leading to more mobility

Anecdotal observations and reports cite that since the beginning of the truce, many have started moving between districts and governorates. Some parents have been allowing their children to go outside and play, and others have been feeling more comfortable going to work and visiting friends.

"When we heard about the truce and the halting of air strikes, I felt safe again. I felt like I could go to my job motivated, not scared of what could go wrong at any second, because [before the truce] a lot of things could happen – you might die or get injured or lose your job or even someone dear to you"

(Salma, Sana'a city)

Explosive remnants of war and mines remaining a threat

Despite the improvement mentioned above, explosive remnants of war and mines remain a threat. Explosive remnants of war (ERW), landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and unexploded ordnance (UXO) resulted in 195 civilian casualties in Q2 compared to 127 in Q1, reaching the highest number reported since the war started in 2015 (ACLEDD 14/06/2022; Protection Cluster 14/07/2022). Anecdotal observations suggest that people have felt safer to move around in their neighbourhoods, towns, and cities since the truce started in April, inadvertently leading them to contaminated areas (FGD 30/06/2022).

The presence of ERW, landmines, IEDs, and UXO has persisted since the war started. The information below represents its past and current impacts on people and their livelihoods.

Direct impact on people

Between January 2018 and June 2022, landmines, IEDs, and UXO resulted in 2,006 casualties, including 748 fatalities and 1,258 injuries. Children made up 28% of these numbers, likely because their heightened mobility and inquisitiveness, coupled with a lack of awareness of the threat these mines pose, made them particularly vulnerable to remnant explosives (Protection Cluster 14/07/2022).

The presence of mines affected people living in rural areas the most because limited or insufficient health services and long distances to adequate health facilities often led to the amputation of affected body parts, which then required months of rehabilitation. Victims likely became socially isolated and heavily dependent on family members (Protection Cluster accessed 20/07/2022; MSF 09/01/2019). In some areas, people also lacked access to information regarding the presence of landmines. According to anecdotal observations, people gained awareness of the presence of landmines, IEDs, and UXO by observing the pattern of injuries and deaths in the area.

The presence of mines prevented people from accessing water points and their land (HRW 22/04/2019).

Landmines also prevented humanitarian organisations from reaching communities on the frontlines, such as the west coast (including villages in At Tuhayta and Mawza' districts) and the major port city of Al Hodeidah (HRW 22/04/2019).

Market closures

Market closures affected areas and districts close to the frontlines the most. For example, being one of the main frontlines in 2019 led to the contamination of Ahim village in Kushar district in Hajjah governorate with landmines. Resulting injuries and deaths led to the closure

of the local market, which has not reopened since. The closure led to the loss of market access for the around 6,000 villagers it used to serve and the loss of livelihoods for the people working in the market. With the reasons people stopped using the market persisting despite the truce, there are no expectations for the market to reopen soon (FGD 30/06/2022).

"One of the most visited markets in Hajjah was Ahim market, but in 2019, it became inaccessible as landmines were planted across the market, and some people got injured or died. The community in the area decided to close the market, forcing many to close their shops"

(Saleh from Hajjah)

Unusable roads and routes

Trade movement within villages is often cited as one of the economic activities that the presence of landmines and ERW affected the most. Outside large urban areas, people typically conduct trade on unpaved, poorly maintained roads. Unlike main routes connecting cities, rural roads and nearby roadside paths are more likely to be mined or contaminated with ERW and are more challenging to clear. Vehicles are often in danger of triggering roadside explosive devices when avoiding potholes and other obstacles. The higher costs associated with longer routes forced many enterprises and small companies situated in heavily contaminated areas to suspend their activities (MC/ACAPS 20/07/2022; Al-Monitor 17/06/2022).

Agricultural land becoming unproductive over long periods

Contaminated areas are typically closed once discovered, and local communities and mine organisations place warning signs to mark dangerous areas. The presence or likelihood of mine and UXO contamination in productive areas prevents the land from being farmed until it is cleared. Mine clearance is typically a lengthy and costly process, meaning it will take long for the land to become suitable for farming again. Farmers affected by landmine contamination in Ma'rib, Abyan, and other governorates reported being unable to continue working on their lands since 2015. Chemical contamination could also affect underground water reserves, compounding the threat of land degradation. Herders might also risk losing their livestock when they step on hidden explosive devices (MC/ACAPS 20/07/2022).


Reduced land value

Farmers reported mine blasts severely damaging banana and mango plantations in Abyan. Abandoned farmlands depreciate in value, increasing pressure on arable lands to compensate for losses from lands that have become inaccessible (MC/ACAPS 20/07/2022; FGD 30/06/2022).

Mine clearance in Yemen

There were some efforts to clear UXO across IRG-controlled areas. In DFA areas, bureaucratic and import restrictions, such as authorities controlling and restricting data collection, and a lack of equipment limited mine clearance activities. Importing mine action equipment in IRG and DFA areas entails obtaining approval from several line ministries, security organisations, and the Saudi-led coalition. Many of the needed tools, such as detectors, detonators, and personal protective equipment, count as dual-use items and are subject to import restrictions. The Saudi-led coalition, which controls access by air and sea, could veto the entry of these tools. Mine action specialists reported delays of up to 18 months, with some items held abroad for investigation or awaiting import permission from authorities. Counterterrorism legislation also restricts dual-use military equipment from entering DFA-controlled areas (MC/ACAPS 20/07/2022).

Map of land and sea mine, IED, and UXO events between January 2018 and June 2022




Source: Protection Cluster accessed 20/07/2022. See full map on page 13.

Increased cultural, religious, and social control in DFA-controlled areas

With authorities becoming less engaged in waging the military conflict and fighting on the frontlines during the period of decreased military activity, social, religious, cultural, and intellectual control increased throughout the DFA areas. There are concerns that the level of control could increase further (FGD 30/06/2022). The increase in social and religious control or influence was observed in three main themes in DFA areas during Q2:

- more recruitment into armed groups, including through summer camps for children
- continuous control over university students and faculty
- the enforcement of male guardianship over women.

Convergence between religious and social/cultural control - e.g. where religion is used as a justification or an excuse for a measure restricting cultural freedom or imposing social behaviour change.



Source: ACAPS

Summer camps leading to child recruitment and enforcing Houthi ideology

Religious summer schools were already present in Yemen before the war started in 2015, but they used to focus on teaching the Qur'an. When the DFA took control, they inserted ideological education material into the curriculum, with the argument that the purpose was to counter misconceptions about Islam and prepare the youth to fight their enemies (Arab News 12/05/2022). They also banned the establishment of unaffiliated camp centres (SCSS 05/11/2021).

Since 2015, the DFA has established almost 3,700 summer camp centres across 16 governorates under their control, including 57 camps in Sana'a (SCSS 05/11/2021; Arab News 12/05/2022). Authorities usually conducted these camps for children during the summer break. Anecdotal observation reports that there are two types: one has the children staying over, with parents occasionally visiting, while the other starts in the morning and ends in the afternoon (FGD 17/07/2022).

According to reports, children would be taken to the centres for a month or more of religious courses, where they learnt to use and clean weapons and dodge rockets. Between January 2020 and May 2021, over 2,000 children ages 10–17 were recruited and died fighting on the battlefield, mainly in Al Hodeidah, Amran, Dhamar, Hajjah, Ibb, Sa'dah, and Sana'a governorates (ABC News 30/01/2022; Al Jazeera 30/01/2022).

In April 2022, the DFA signed an action plan with the UN to end and prevent the recruitment, killing, and maiming of children in armed conflict (UN 18/04/2022). On 9 May, however, DFA leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi in a speech urged the enrollment of children in the annual summer courses, calling this year's programme 'Education and Jihad' (SCSS 09/06/2022). Anecdotal observation suggests that compared to previous years, there was an increase in the number of camps, level of children's involvement, and amount of encouragement and influence for them to join in 2022 (FGD 30/06/2022). Authorities influence children to join through the following methods:

- Preachers and other influential figures promote attendance in mosques.
- DFA leaders pressures children, who are not part of the camps into joining by portraying them as weak and not defending the country. Yemeni society, especially in rural and mountainous communities, traditionally views having or carrying a weapon as a source of pride and a marker of manhood.
- Some children feel peer pressure when their friends go to these camps.
- The camps promote engaging activities such as swimming, picnics, and horseback riding.
- Crucial food aid for households is conditioned on their child members attending the camps (SCSS 05/11/2021; FGD 30/06/2022; VOA 19/06/2022; The Arab Weekly 16/06/2022).

"In Sana'a, we see groups of children walking down the street saying the Houthi slogan, and you see their expressions are full of anger. Every year, there are summer schools, but this year, there are more, and authorities are making huge propaganda to influence children to join"

(Maram*, Sana'a city)

"I have been living in Hajjah governorate for almost 20 years. I have never seen this image before. Yes, in the past years, we heard about summer camps, we saw children with guns, but not this scenario of recruitment with these massive numbers and this kind of ideology"

(Saleem*, Hajjah city).

Parents reported their children's classmates influencing them during summer school or in the neighbourhood to join the frontlines. As a result, some children had run away from their homes to join the active frontline (FGD 30/06/2022; SCSS 05/11/2021).

"Some parents have stopped their children from going, but in some cases, children run away or beat their parents for not allowing them to go to the summer schools or join the frontlines"

(Safa*, Al Hodeidah city).

The exposure of children to ideological concepts and their use or recruitment into armed groups in exchange for aid, out of fear, or with the idea that they are protecting their communities are grave violations of child rights and international humanitarian law. Raising children in an environment implementing conservative or radical ideology, exposing them to and letting them experience severe violence, and subsequently making them commit cruelties themselves deprive them of normal and healthy development and impair their integration as a fully functioning member of society (Schauer and Elbert 03/2010; UN accessed 20/07/2022).

Continuous control over university students and faculty

The policies and restrictions observed in Q1 regarding gender segregation, such as the imposition of a dress code and strict monitoring of research subjects in universities, continued through Q2. Between April–June, the DFA established a committee to oversee graduation ceremonies and ensure that the dress code is aligned with their circular published in March. They prohibited tattoos, specific haircuts, accessories, tight clothes, open-toe sandals, nail polish, nose piercings, and make-up (FGD 30/06/2022; ACLED 24/03/2022; Al Ain News 11/07/2021).

Increased religious and cultural control could signal that the link between religion and society is changing. Some related policies are those that restrict people’s freedom of opinion and intellectual thinking, as well as those that limit diversity – marginalising more groups and creating a conservative community unable to accept other societies or changes.

Continual shrinking of women’s civic space

The DFA requiring female aid workers and women travelling between governorates to have a male guardian increasingly affected field missions and the implementation of activities (OCHA 13/06/2022). The impact on employed women and their households was severe. Requiring a male guardian to accompany an employed woman would disrupt household activities. It could also intimidate or force women to leave their jobs, leading to a loss of household income. A male-dominated workforce would have longer-term societal impacts as well. The situation would limit humanitarian response, particularly for women and girls, as there might not be enough female humanitarians to meet with or deliver to them. Such policies or impositions could also change the community’s perception of employed women. Overall, the imposition of policies such as Al Mahram would overturn the increase of female presence in the Yemeni labour force since the war started and narrow women’s freedom and their right to be independent. It would also heavily affect access to and the delivery of services (ACAPS 05/11/2022).

Weak purchasing power across the country

The truce helped prevent prices from increasing and the Yemeni rial from depreciating further. Fuel and cooking gas also became more available in the market. Despite these developments, the root causes of people’s low purchasing power persisted, such as high and unaffordable prices, the weak Yemeni rial, continuous inflation, a lack of adjustment in public institution salary payments, and inconsistent salaries (ACAPS 29/06/2022).

After the announcement of the truce and the new presidential leadership, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia pledged in total a USD 3 billion economic aid package to Yemen. The package included a USD 2 billion deposit into the Central Bank to help stabilise the economy and support the bouncing back of the rial to make food and other essential goods affordable for people. Fuel products were also allowed to pass through Al Hodeidah port (UNSC 14/04/2022).

The following reviews how the truce helped alleviate the situation for the Yemeni people during the three-month monitoring period (April–June):

- The Yemeni rial slightly improved after the announcement of the truce. In IRG areas, its Q2 value ranged between YER 1,000–1,100 per USD 1 compared to YER 1,200 per 1 USD in Q1. In DFA areas, its value appreciated to YER 550 per 1 USD in Q2 compared to YER 600 per 1 USD in Q1.
- The minimum cost of food baskets remained the same, ranging between YER 100,000–113,000 in IRG areas and YER 59,000–64,000 in DFA areas.
- Fuel products continued to flow through Al Hodeidah port, which, despite fuel prices remaining high, helped prevent disruptions to essential public services, such as clean water, healthcare, electricity, and transportation. Cooking gas was available in the formal market and through Al Aqil (community chairman).

During Q1, decreased purchasing power affected people’s quality of life in terms of essential needs, such as food, medicine, education, and electricity (ACAPS 08/02/2022). The trend continued to decline and, with continuously occurring shocks, further exhausted people’s coping strategies.

EID AL-ADHA 2022: THE IMPACT OF REDUCED PURCHASING POWER ON AN IMPORTANT RELIGIOUS CELEBRATION

As part of the religious celebrations during this holiday, people sacrifice a sheep or a goat and share it with neighbours, friends, family members, and the poor. With decreased purchasing power and increased prices, many people became unable to buy a sheep or a goat (the cost of which ranged from USD 60–300), preventing them from fulfilling or participating in social obligations (KII 12/07/2022; Al Jazeera 08/07/2022; FGD 17/07/2022).

Impact on social obligations

Supporting friends and family is part of the Yemeni tradition during Eid. People would support their families, friends, and neighbours by giving them food and money and visiting each other. Limited financial resources and the depreciation of the Yemeni rial made this kind of support hard to achieve, leaving many people dependent on it vulnerable to economic crisis.

- Financial support during Eid: aside from the Eid tradition of financially supporting friends and family, men would also give money to children and women (including sisters, wives, mothers, aunts, daughters, and cousins). Women would use the money to buy gold, repay debts, or on other obligations, such as lump sum payments like education fees (FGD 17/07/2022; KII 12/07/2022).

"I bought clothes for my children on debt to make them happy. I was hoping to get the money back during Eid, but only had very few visitors in the end"

(Salma, Sana'a city)

"My extended family have livestock and farms. During Eid, they would send us sheep or some kilos of red meat, fruits, and vegetables. This 2022, we didn't receive anything from them because they had fewer resources and needed to sell what they were going to give us to generate income and meet basic needs.

"Fuel is another issue. It has become expensive, making it hard to generate water. And because of limited resources, people end up wanting to sell what they were able to generate from the farm to earn income for their daily needs. I was hoping to receive this kind of support because it would help me for a couple of weeks without worrying about certain expenses"

(Akram, Hajjah city)

- Visiting family and friends within the same governorate or in the ancestral villages: anecdotal observation reports that in 2022, many commercial shops remained open during Eid when they usually closed as people travelled to their ancestral villages, as many stayed instead of visiting family and friends. The main reported reason for staying was to avoid the social obligations and expenses they would usually have had to spend on, such as transportation expenses, new clothes, and the money and support provided to close friends and extended family. People's loss of income led to fewer households purchasing clothes and other items compared to previous years (FGD 17/07/2022).

"The main reason for not visiting my family was the lack of financial resources. I didn't have the financial capability to bring gifts to my family. I would also have needed to give money to my parents and sisters. I would have needed to give money to the children. Some extended families wait for you to visit them on Eid and contribute to paying for the holiday expenses. As someone living in the city and owning a shop, I am expected to contribute because I am seen as someone who has everything. This year, instead of travelling and meeting my extended family, I only sent money to my parents."

(Saqr, Taiz city)

Within the same governorate, people avoided visiting relatives to avoid the pressure of providing for them. Instead, they spent some time with the household members staying at home or going to local parks (KII 16/07/2022).

- Private sector, businessmen, local and regional initiatives: part of the support people expect during occasions such as Eid are the local initiatives by the private sector or businessmen and local community initiatives. These initiatives would usually provide food and cash to people. Especially in DFA areas, however, this practice has changed. DFA authorities have started requiring these initiatives, to be channelled and coordinated through them, making people reluctant to provide such assistance. Most of the support has to be channelled through the Martyrs Foundation (مؤسسة الشهداء) established by the DFA. It supports the families of martyrs and people supporting their ideology and participating in their events (FGD 17/07/2022).

The 2022 Eid situation in IRG-controlled areas was different, with the presence of initiatives by government institutions and the private sector as well as Saudi, Kuwaiti, Emirati, and Turkish assistance providing food (mainly red meat) and cash to community members. These observations were reported in Abyan, Aden, Hadramawt, and Ma'rib. Anecdotal observation reports that local and regional humanitarian organisations were present in Ma'rib to provide IDPs with cash and food support (FGD 17/07/2022).


Impact on consumption and income

Reports and anecdotal observations highlight how in 2022, people instead bought ingredients only for the first day of Eid, purchasing one kilo of red meat per household level. Others just bought chicken, as meat cost around YER 12,000 (USD 20) per kilo (The New Arab 09/07/2022; FGD 17/07/2022). These changes meant that people with livelihoods that typically generated more income during Eid season, such as butchers and shepherds, gained a lower profit compared to previous years and prior to the war (FGD 17/07/2022; KII 12/07/2022).

Livestock is part of the main food basket in most Yemeni regions, as the agricultural sector absorbs the largest proportion of the workforce in Yemen, and livestock constitutes about 25% of the income of rural workers (The New Arab 09/07/2022). The continuous decrease in people's purchasing power left people working in the sector with a lower income, resulting in their inability to meet needs and cope with economic stresses.


Other livelihoods, such as selling nuts (like raisins, almonds, pistachio, and walnuts), which people bought as part of the Eid traditions, produced a lower profit as consumers prioritised basic needs (FGD 17/07/2022; KII 12/07/2022).

FOODS CONSUMED IN YEMEN



HOW MANY PEOPLE EAT THE TYPE OF FOOD?

HARDLY ANYONE



ALMOST EVERYONE

HOW OFTEN IS IT CONSUMED?

RARELY



USUALLY DAILY

Source: ACAPS. Read more in the coping strategies report.

ON THE WATCH LIST

Increased civil unrest compared to the previous quarter: between April–June, civil unrest in the form of protests increased mainly in Aden and Hadramawt. The protests were mainly in response to deteriorating living conditions (ACLED accessed 20/07/2022).

The recurrence of flash floods: in June, torrential rains and flash floods affected over 41,000 people in Ad Dali', Al Hodeidah, Hadramawt, Hajjah, and Ta'iz governorates (OCHA 13/06/2022). Flash floods are not new in Yemen, but the recurrence of rain severely affects people. These events generate displacement and affect people living close to streams or in houses that lack repairs and maintenance. Read more in the social impact report covering July–September 2021.

Increased violence against humanitarians in IRG-controlled areas: humanitarian organisations faced increasing incidents of violence against personnel and assets, including 25 carjacking incidents, when there were only 14 incidents in 2021. Most of these incidents took place in Lahj and Ta'iz governorates. One incident of kidnapping and two incidents of intimidation were also reported in Abyan governorate. All three incidents involved unknown armed men expressing objections to the mixing of male and female aid workers and demanding aid organisations to leave the area. As a result, aid organisations halted their missions in Abyan and limited movements to Lahj and Ta'iz governorates as precautionary measures. Despite the increase in violence, incidents of restrictions on the movement of humanitarian personnel and supplies into Yemen have been steadily declining since the beginning of 2022, with only 28 incidents recorded in April compared with 61 in January (OCHA 13/06/2022).

VULNERABLE GROUPS OR CATEGORIES PARTICULARLY AFFECTED, APRIL-JUNE 2022

ISSUES AND THEMES EMERGING FROM QUALITATIVE DATA MONITORING	GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION	VULNERABLE GROUPS OR CATEGORIES PARTICULARLY AFFECTED													
		IDPs	Yemeni migrants and their families (supported by remittances)	Primary producers (agriculture and fishery)	Northerners living in the south	Migrants living in the south	Prisoners and detained people	Marginalised ethnic, tribal, and religious groups (Al Muhamasheen, Al Mazayna, Jews, Christians, and Bahais)	People with disabilities, the elderly, and the chronically ill	Men (unemployed, without access to livelihood)	Women (unemployed, without access to livelihood)	Widows and female-headed households	Pregnant and lactating women and girls	Children (girls and boys)	
Conflict and associated impact	Nationwide or across frontlines							Info gap							
Reduced purchasing power	Nationwide														
COVID-19 situation	Nationwide, but the DFA-controlled areas are potentially the most affected and where information is the most limited	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Vaccine rollout	Nationwide, but the DFA-controlled areas are potentially the most affected and where vaccine rollout is limited to health and aid workers	Info gap		Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Religious control (cultural control)	DFA-controlled areas														
Fuel crisis (current)	Nationwide														
Seasonal rain (between April-October)	Nationwide														
Shrinking civic space (cultural and religious control)	Nationwide but the DFA-controlled areas are potentially impacted the most					Info gap		Info gap							
Civil unrest	Aden and Hadramawt														

This table is based on qualitative monitoring. Key information:

Very negative	Negative	Somewhat negative	No impact	Somewhat positive	Positive	Very positive	Information gap	Not applicable or no specific impact

VULNERABLE GROUPS OR CATEGORIES PARTICULARLY AFFECTED, COMPARISON BETWEEN QUARTER 1 (JAN-MAR) 2022 AND QUARTER 2 (APR-JUN) 2022

ISSUES AND THEMES EMERGING FROM QUALITATIVE DATA MONITORING	GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION	VULNERABLE GROUPS OR CATEGORIES PARTICULARLY AFFECTED													
		IDPs	Yemen migrants and their families (supported by remittances)	Primary producers (agriculture and fishing)	Northerners living in the south	Migrants living in Yemen	Prisoners and detained people	Marginalised ethnic tribes, and religious groups (Al-Hawsh, Al-Balawad, Al-Balawad, Al-Balawad, Al-Balawad)	People with disabilities (the elderly, and the young)	Men (unemployed, without access to livelihood)	Women (unemployed, without access to livelihood)	Widowed female-headed households	Program and leading women and girls	Children (girls and boys)	
Increased conflict	Nationwide or across frontlines	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Reduced purchasing power	Nationwide	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
COVID-19 situation	Nationwide, but the DFA-controlled areas are potentially the most affected and where information is the most limited	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Vaccine rollout	Nationwide but the DFA-controlled areas are potentially the most affected and where vaccine rollout is limited to health and aid workers	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Religious control (cultural control)	DFA-controlled areas	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Fuel crisis (current)	Nationwide	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Seasonal rain (between April-October)	Nationwide	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Shrinking civic space (cultural and religious control)	Nationwide but the DFA-controlled areas are potentially impacted the most	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Civil unrest	IRG-controlled areas	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap

See full table on ACAPS Social impact monitoring report: January - March 2022

Conflict and its associated impact

Improvement was observed in terms of civilian casualties as a direct impact of air strikes and shelling. People's perception of moving around districts and governorates also slightly improved. This perception should be considered with caution as mine-related incidents increased. Further monitoring is required to understand the situation and the trend.

Reduced purchasing power


The trend remained the same for vulnerable groups and categories, with the roots of the problems persisting.

ISSUES AND THEMES EMERGING FROM QUALITATIVE DATA MONITORING	GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION	VULNERABLE GROUPS OR CATEGORIES PARTICULARLY AFFECTED													
		IDPs	Yemen migrants and their families (supported by remittances)	Primary producers (agriculture and fishing)	Northerners living in the south	Migrants living in Yemen	Prisoners and detained people	Marginalised ethnic tribes, and religious groups (Al-Hawsh, Al-Balawad, Al-Balawad, Al-Balawad)	People with disabilities (the elderly, and the young)	Men (unemployed, without access to livelihood)	Women (unemployed, without access to livelihood)	Widowed female-headed households	Program and leading women and girls	Children (girls and boys)	
Conflict and associated impact	Nationwide or across frontlines	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Reduced purchasing power	Nationwide	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
COVID-19 situation	Nationwide, but the DFA-controlled areas are potentially the most affected and where information is the most limited	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Vaccine rollout	Nationwide, but the DFA-controlled areas are potentially the most affected and where vaccine rollout is limited to health and aid workers	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Religious control (cultural control)	DFA-controlled areas	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Fuel crisis (current)	Nationwide	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Seasonal rain (between April-October)	Nationwide	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Shrinking civic space (cultural and religious control)	Nationwide but the DFA-controlled areas are potentially impacted the most	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap
Civil unrest	Aden and Hadramawt	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap	Info gap

Seasonal rain

IDPs and people with disabilities felt the most impact. As the seasonal rains (April–October) continue, more groups will likely be affected.

MAP OF LAND AND SEA MINE, IED, AND UXO EVENTS BETWEEN JANUARY 2018 AND JUNE 2022



Source: Protection Cluster accessed 20/07/2022.